Probate of Will; Allowance and Disallowance of Will

1. Guevara vs. Guevara 74 Phil 479 (1943)

2. Segura vs. Segura, G.R. No. L-29320, 19 September 1988
3. Roman Catholic Bishop of Tueguegurao vs. Prudencio, G.R. No. 187942, 7 September 2016
4. Morales vs. Olondriz et al
5. Salgado vs Salgado GR No. 167975
6. Manahan v. Manahan, 58 Phil, 448 (1933)
7. Maloles II vs. Pacita De Los Reyes Philips, G.R. Nos. 129505 & 13359, 31 January 2000
8. Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, G.R. No. L-23135, 26 December 1967
9. Pacioles, Jr. vs. Chuatoco-Ching, G.R. No. 127920, 9 August 2005
10. Heirs of Reyes vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 139587, 22 November 2000
11. Uy Kiao Eng v. Lee, G.R. No. 176831, 15 January 2010
12. Heirs of Fran vs. Salas, G.R. No. 53546, June 25, 1992
13. Alaban vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 15602
14. Peres vs. Perez, G.R. No. L-12359 July 15, 1959

Letters Testamentary and of Administration

15. Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, G.R. No. L-17759

16. Garcia-Quizon vs. Belen, G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013
17. Teotico vs. Del Val Chan, G.R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965
18. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. vs. Dumlao, G.R. No. L-44888, February 7, 1992
19. San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. Nos. 133743 & 134029, February 6, 2007

Special Administrator

20. De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-6476, November 18, 1955
21. Heirs Castill vs. Lacuata-Gabriel, G.R. No. 162934, November 11, 2005

Claims against the estate See: Rule 39, Sec. 7.

22. Afan vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-14713, April 28, 1960
23. Ignacio vs. Pampanga Bus CO., G.R. No. L-18936, May 23, 1967
24. Vera vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-31364, March 30, 1979
25. Stronghold Insurance CO., Inc. vs. Republic-Asahi Glass Corp.,
26. G.R. No. 157561,June 22, 2006
27. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 133347, April 23,
2010
28. People vs. Lipata y Ortiza, G.R. No. 200302, April 23, 2010
29. Paredes vs. Moya, G.R. No. L-38051, December 26, 1974
 Guevara vs. Guevara, GR No. 48840

FACTS:

Ernesto M. Guevara and Rosario Guevara, legitimate son and natural daughter, respectively, of
the deceased Victorino L. Guevara. Rosario Guevara filed a complaint against Ernesto to claim her strict
legitime as an acknowledged natural daughter of the decedent, to wit, a portion 423, 492 square meters
issued in the name of the latter, and a certain amount for damages for withholding her legitime. It was
only Ernesto Guevara who appeared to have possessed the land adjudicated to him in the registration
proceeding and have disposed various portion thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his
father

Ernesto answered that whatever rights Rosario might have had been barred by the operation of
the law. It is due to the fact, according to him, that the large portion of the land in questioned was
entitled to his name by virtue of Deed of Sale executed by the testator ( Victorino ), subject the southern
portion of the said land, while the northern portion was sold to Rafael B Tuzon for personal expenses of
the decedents.

When Victorino died, his last will and testament, which was in the custody of Rosario, was
never presented to the court for probate. It was only presented by Rosario to proved that she was
acknowledged as natural child of the decedent but not the content of the will.

.
The RTC and CA rendered decision in favor of Rosario Guevara. The CA ruled that if the said case
filed by the respondent be dismissed, and ordered the filing of testate proceeding, it would cause
injustice, inconvenience, delay, and much expenses to the party.

Unsatisfied to the decision of the CA, Ernesto filed a petition to the Supreme Court .

ISSUE:

Whether or not the procedure adopted by Rosario, not probing the will of his father, is valid?

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that a voluntary partition of the estate among the heirs and legatees
should be supported by the evidence not by unprecedented and unheard procedure adopted by the
respondent ( Rosario ) who seek to prove her status as acknowledged natural daughter of the decedent
by his will and attempts to nullify and circumvent the testamentary disposition by not presenting the will
to the court for probate by claiming her legitime as an acknowledged natural child on the basis of
intestacy.

The Supreme Court reiterated that the respondent should present the will to court for probate
because the rights of the legatees and devisees under the will cannot be disregard nor be obliterated
on the ground of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the court.
 Segura vs. Segura et al, G.R. No. L-29320

FACTS:

On May 31, 1956, Plaintiffs in this case filed an action for recovery of possession and ownership
of the land which is supposed to be their inheritance, but was not received by them due to the executed
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition made by their co-heirs, the respondents in this case. The said Deed of
extra Partition made by respondents , has arrogated the entire property in questioned to themselves
alone as equal pro indiviso owner, excluded the plaintiffs.

The defendant in this case has executed several transaction of the subject land included the sale
of the same to Amojido, then, to Elison, then to De Javelosa, and lastly was mortgaged to Rural Bank of
Sta. Barbara.

On January 16, 1958 the action filed by the plaintiff was dismissed on the motion of the
plaintiff’s counsel.

The case was refilled on January 11, 1968 with the allegation that the partition and the
subsequent transfer of the subject land were null and void, insofar as those transaction deprived the
plaintiffs shares as co-owners of the said properties.

The defendant move to dismiss the case, contending that the action was barred by prior
judgment and by prescription under the Rules of Court and Civil Code.

The trial court and CA dismissed the case on the ground of prescription and res judicata.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the cause of action of the plaintiff has already prescribed and barred by res
judicata

HELD:

The ruling of the Supreme Court as to the barred by res judicata is on negative while on the
prescription of the cause of action is on affirmative.

According to the Supreme Court, the case was not barred by prior judgment as the dismissal of
the earlier complaint was without prejudice to the refilling at future date. The Supreme Court found that
the plaintiff’s counsel had an intention of reviving the case, and that must have impression too of the
trial judge because his dismissal did not state that it was with prejudice to the refilling of the case.

On the issue of prescription based on the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court ruled that Section
1, of Rule 74 of Rules of Court is not applicable on the ground that said deed of extrajudicial partition
null and void. However, on the issue of prescription based on the civil code, the SC ruled that the rights
of the plaintiffs has already prescribed based on article 1134 and 1144, which reiterating the ten years
prescriptive period of the rights acquired by operation of law. The said prescriptive period has started
last 1953, during the sale of the subject land to amojido who did not retained the annotation to
Transfer of Certificate of Title, and was suspended on May 1956 but continue running again on 1958,
and completed the ten ( 10 ) years prescriptive period on 1965. Hence, the complaint was barred by
prescription.

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao v. Prudencio, G.R. No. 187942

FACTS:
Petiitoner Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao is the one who bought the subject land to this
case from spouses Cepeda, who also bought the same from Teodora Abad. Teodora Abad is the second
wife of Felipe Prudencio, who had two children. The first wife of Felipe is Elena Antonio who begot 5
children, who are respondents to this case.

Upon the death of Felipe, Teodora, Fraudencio jr, and Leonora executed a deed of extra
Judicial partition of the estate of the former , which stated thereon that Teodora and her children is the
only heirs of the decedent. The two children of the Teodora has waived their rights to the subject
property which resulted to the transfer of the title of the subject land to Teodora.

On September 15, 1972, Respondent- appellees filed a complaint for partition with re-
conveyance of the subject land against petitioner. They alleged that they are the children and grand
children of Felipe by his first marriage. They also posited that they were fraudulently deprived of their
rightful shares in the estate of Felipe and Elena when Extra Judicial Partition declared Teodora as the
sole owner of the Cagayan Lot ( the subject land of this case ). They prayed that they be declared the
owners pro indiviso of the subject land , and that portion be re-conveyed to them.

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao contended that they do not have any knowledge of
any defect over the spouses Cepeda’s land title during the execution of the sale of the subject land.
They averred that they are innocent purchaser for value.

Spouses Cepeda also maintained that they had no knowledge to any other person had interest
on the subject land during the sale of the same by Teodora. They asserted that they were purchaser for
value and in good faith.
The RTC rendered decision in favor of the respondents-appellees. The RTC held that it was
impossible for Teodora and her children to not know that Felipe had children by his first marriage.

The CA found that the petitioner and spouses Cepeda failed to prove that they are purchaser in
good faith. Hence, it affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action for partition with re-conveyance will prosper
HELD:

The answer of the Supreme Court is on affirmative. It reiterated that the excluded hiers in the
deed of extra judicial partition could recover what is rightfully thiers from person who are innocent
purchaser for value. It stressed out that the answer would not depend on the good faith or bad faith on
the part of the purchaser, but rather on the fact of ownership, for no one give what he does not have.

The title of the subject land in favor of Teodora is void since the extra judicial partition they
executed was totally null and void due to the exclusion of the respondents to the said partition,
pursuant to section 1, rule 74 of the Rules of court.

The petition was denied.

Morales vs. Olondriz et al, G.R. No. 198994

FACTS:
The heirs of Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz Sr. believed that he died intestate which caused them to
filed an action for the partition of the estate of the former. However, on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed
a separate petition with the RTC alleging that the decedent left a will, and she prayed for the probate of
the said will. On the will, Francsisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, the illegitimate son of the decedent
was omitted. Because of the said omission, the respondents moved to dismiss the probate proceeding
on the ground of preterition. Morales contended that the probate court should not touch on the
intrinsic validity of the will.

The RTC found that Francisco, as admitted by Morals as one of the heirs, was clearly preterited.
Hence, ordered for case to proceed to intestacy.

The CA dismissed Morales petition for certiorari.. It held that the continuation of probate
proceeding with a will which is void due to preterition would be superfluous and impractical because the
inheritance should be adjudicated intestate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court should not touch the intrinsic validity of the will?

HELD:

The general rule is that in the probate proceeding, the scope of the court’s inquiry is limited only
to the questions on the extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court will only determine the will’s
formal validity and due execution. However, this rule is not inflexible and absolute. It is not beyond the
probate court’s jurisdiction to press upon the intrinsic validity of the will when so warranted by
exceptional circumstances. When practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will
be passed upon even before it is probated, the probate court should meet the issue.

The decedent’s will does not contain specific legacies or devisees, and Francisco’s preterition
has annulled the institution of the heirs. The said annulment effectively caused the total abrogation of
the will, resulting in the total intestacy of the inheritance. The said will, no matter how valid it may
appear extrinsically, is null and void due to preterition.

The petition was dismissed.

Manahan v. Manahan, 58 Phil, 448 (1933)

Facts:

On August 29, 1930, Tiburcia Manahan instituted special proceedings No. 4162, for the probate
of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan, who died in Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, on August 3,
1930.

The petitioner herein, niece of the testatrix, was named the executrix in said will. The court set
the date for the hearing and the necessary notice required by law was accordingly published. On the day
of the hearing of the petition, no opposition thereto was filed and, after the evidence was presented,
the court entered the decree admitting the will to probate as prayed for.

The will was probated on September 22, 1930. The trial court appointed the herein petitioner
executrix with a bond of P1,000, and likewise appointed the committed on claims and appraisal,
whereupon the testamentary proceedings followed the usual course.

One year and seven months later, that is, on May 11, 1932, to be exact, the appellant herein
filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the order admitting the will to probate be
vacated and the authenticated will declared null and void ab initio.

The appellee herein, naturally filed her opposition to the petition and, after the corresponding
hearing thereof, the trial court erred its over of denial on July 1, 1932. Engracia Manahan, under the
pretext of appealing from this last order, likewise appealed from the judgment admitting the will to
probate.

Issue:

a. Whether or not the appellant, as an interested party in the testamentary proceedings, was
entitled to and should have been notified of the probate of the will
b. Whether or not the court, in its order of September 22, 1930, did not really probate the will but
limited itself to decreeing its authentication
c. Whether or not the will is null and void ab initio on the ground that the external formalities
prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in the execution thereof.

Held:

a. No; She was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will and neither had she the
right to expect it, inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not having filed an opposition to the
petition for the probate thereof. Her allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the deceased's
sister, did not confer on her the right to be notified on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in
which the appellant has not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not
acquire any successional right.
 b. No; In the phraseology of the procedural law, there is no essential difference between the
authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The words authentication and probate are synonymous
in this case. All the law requires is that the competent court declared that in the execution of the will the
essential external formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof, the document, as a
will, is valid and effective in the eyes of the law.

c. No; Once a will has been authenticated and admitted to probate, questions relative to the
validity thereof can no more be raised on appeal. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the
due execution thereof and it cannot impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of
fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceedings (sec. 625, Code of Civil Procedure;
Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil., 436; Sahagun vs. De Gorostiza, 7 Phil.,
347; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil., 393; Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil., 676; In re Estate of Johnson, 39
Phil., 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil., 105; Austria vs. Ventenilla, 21 Phil., 180; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42
Phil., 855; and Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil., 119).

Maloles II vs. Pacita De Los Reyes Philips, G.R. Nos. 129505 & 13359, 31 January 2000

Facts:

Dr. Arturo de Santos filed a petition for probate of his will in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. Where he alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he
had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he
disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that
copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes
Phillips. A copy of the will was annexed to the petition for probate.

The RTC of Makati issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will

Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.

Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only child of
Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and
nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus
prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of
administration in his name.

On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the designated executrix of
the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61. Later, however, private
respondent moved to withdraw her motion. This was granted, while petitioner was required to file a
memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said court (Branch 61) still had jurisdiction to
allow his intervention.

Petitioner's motion for intervention was granted. Private respondent moved for a
reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court. She then filed a petition for  certiorari in
the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision setting aside the trial court's order on the ground that
petitioner had not shown any right or interest to intervene

Issue:

Whether or not the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did not terminate upon the
issuance of the order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos

Held:

The contention has no merit.

In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to
ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.

Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator, so much so
that, after approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle
the estate of the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions,
courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living testator under the principle of
ambulatory nature of wills.

However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the will filed
by the testator himself. It provides:

CIVIL CODE, ART. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the
allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the
allowance of wills after the testator's death shall govern.

The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the
allowance of wills on petition of the testator.

Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator
or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

Rule 76, §1 likewise provides:

Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any executor, devisee, or legatee named
in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the
testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in
his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the allowance of his will.

Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was nothing
else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, Section
12 of the Rules of Court.
 Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, G.R. No. L-23135, 26 December 1967

Facts:

On July 5, 1960, Mariano Sumilang filed for the probate of the alleged will of Hilarion Ramagosa,
who died on December 26, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Quezon. The said will was written in
Tagalog, dated February 26, 1949 and institutes Sumilang as his sole heir.

The petition was then opposed by 2 sets of opposItors, first were Saturnina and Santigo
Ramagosa who questioned the due execution of the will contending that it was procured with under
duress and was not intended to be the Last Will and Testament of the testator and likewise claimed that
they were entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased instead of Similang. The other set of oppositors
prayed for the disallowance of the will.

During the hearings, oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will on
the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter alleging that the will was impliedly
revoked by the testator himself when he sold the parcel subject in the will to the petitioner Mariano
Sumilang and his brother Mario six years before his death.

Petitioner then filed opposition to the motion for dismissal stating that: a.) that oppositors have
no legal standing in court and they are bereft of personality to oppose the probate of the last will and
testament of the testators; and b.) that oppositors have no valid claim and interest in the distribution of
(the) estate of the aforesaid testator and no existing valid right whatsoever.

Issue:

Whether or not the probate of the will Hilarion Ramagosa should be denied.

Held:

No; The petition below being for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to
the extrinsic validity thereof. The testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the
court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any
devise or legacy is premature. (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966).

Oppositors would want the court a quo to dismiss petition for probate on the ground that the
testator had impliedly revoked his will by selling, prior to his death, the lands disposed of therein.

True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is
one thing the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the
document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution.

In their brief, oppositors do not take issue with the court a quo's finding that they "have no
relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided by law and therefore . . . are totally (sic)
strangers to the deceased whose will is under probate." They do not attempt to show that they have
some interest in the estate which must be protected. The uncontradicted evidence, consisting of
certified true copies of the parties' baptism and marriage certificates, support the said court's finding in
this respect.
 It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it
either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091,
September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. (Teotico vs. Del Val, etc.,
G.R. No. L- 18753, March 26, 1965.)

The reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby the
court may be prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but
rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of
persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation thereto. (Paras
vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244.)

Pacioles, Jr. vs. Chuatoco-Ching, G.R. No. 127920, 9 August 2005

Facts:

Miguelita died intestate. She was survived by her husband, petitioner Pacioles, Jr. and two
minor children. He filed a verified petition for the settlement of her estate before RTC. He prayed that
(a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be divided
among the compulsory heirs.

Respondent, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, who is the mother of Miguelita, filed an opposition on

the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator; and
(b) the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of “paraphernal properties.” Respondent prayed that the
letters of administration be issued to her instead. Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her
appointment as special administratrix.

Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and
material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse,
has the preferential right to be appointed as administrator under the law.

Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave
half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them “would undertake whatever
business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners.” In her omnibus motion, she
nominated her son, Emmanuel Ching, to act as special administrator.

Intestate court ruled for joint administration between petitioner and Emmanuel. Both were
issued letters of administration after taking their oath and paying the docket fees. Notice to creditors
was published.

Petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s estate. Emanuel did not
submit an inventory.

Intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory heirs of
Miguelita.
 Petitioner filed before intestate court an omnibus motion including, among others, a partition
and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs. Respondent opposed on the ground that
partition and distribution is premature considering that there is yet no determination “whether the
properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture.” Respondent
contends that she owns bulk of Miguelita’s estate as an heir and co-owner.

The intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorney’s fees but denied
petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed "premature."

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the challenged
Order and Resolution, the intestate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied.

Issue:

Whether or not a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of
ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate

Held:

No; The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate
court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of
deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during
the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited
jurisdiction.

A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may
hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property
should be included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and
provisional.

The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the
intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondent’s claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said
principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and
passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be
included in the inventory. The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate
court.

Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course
should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction,
sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of
property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to
be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that
of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or
probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions,
which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.
 Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The
intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over
properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.

Heirs of Reyes vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 139587, 22 November 2000

Facts:

Spouses Ismael Reyes and Felisa Revita Reyes are the registered owners of parcels of land
situated in Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 4983 and
3598 (39303).

In 1973, Ismael died intestate. He was survived by his wife Felisa, his children Oscar Reyes, Cesar
Reyes, and five other children. Before his death however, the property covered by TCT No. 4983 was
levied sold and eventually forfeited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in favor of the government.

Sometime in 1976, Oscar Reyes availed of the BIR’s tax amnesty and he was able to redeem the
property covered by TCT No. 49836 upon payment of the reduced tax liability.

In 1982, the Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City sent a notice to Felisa Revita Reyes
informing her that the Arayat properties will be sold at public auction on August 25, 1982 for her failure
to settle the real estate tax delinquency from 1974-1981.

In 1986, Oscar Reyes entered into an amnesty compromise agreement with the City Treasurer
and settled the accounts of Felisa R. Reyes

In 1989, private respondent Cesar Reyes, brother of Oscar Reyes, filed a petition for issuance of
letters of administration with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City praying for his appointment as
administrator of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes which estate included 50% of the Arayat
properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598. Oscar Reyes filed his conditional opposition thereto on
the ground that the Arayat properties do not form part of the estate of the deceased as he (Oscar) had
acquired the properties by redemption and or purchase.

The probate court subsequently issued letters of administration in favor of Cesar Reyes where
the latter was ordered to submit a true and complete inventory of properties pertaining to the estate of
the deceased and the special powers of attorney executed by the other heirs who reside in the USA and
that of Aurora Reyes-Dayot conforming to his appointment as administrator Cesar Reyes filed an
inventory of real and personal properties of the deceased which included the Arayat properties with a
total area of 1,009 sq. meters. On the other hand, Oscar Reyes filed his objection to the inventory
reiterating that the Arayat properties had been forfeited in favor of the government and he was the one
who subsequently redeemed the same from the BIR using his own funds.

The probate court allowed the petition of Cesar and approved the inclusion of the Arayat
properties into the estate of Ismael.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Oscar Reyes which was denied in an Order issued in
1994. He then filed his appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending,
Oscar died and he was substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners.
 The respondent Court issued its assailed decision which affirmed the probate court’s order. It
ruled that the probate court’s order categorically stated that the inclusion of the subject properties in
the inventory of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes "is provisional in character and shall be
without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought hereafter in the proper court on the issue
of ownership of the properties"; that the provisional character of the inclusion of the contested
properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of intestate court. It further
stated that although the general rule that question of title to property cannot be passed upon in the
probate court admits of exceptions, i.e. if the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the
property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for
adjudication, such has no application in the instant case since petitioner-appellee and oppositor-
appellant are not the only parties with legal interest in the subject property as they are not the only
heirs of the decedent; that it was never shown that all parties interested in the subject property or all
the heirs of the decedent consented to the submission of the question of ownership to the intestate
court.

Issue:

Whether or not a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass questions of ownership
involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate

Held:

No; The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and
removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees. The question of ownership is as a rule, an
extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional,
not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.

We find that the respondent Court did not err in affirming the provisional inclusion of the
subject properties to the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes without prejudice to the outcome of any
action to be brought thereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership considering that the
subject properties are still titled under the torrens system in the names of spouses Ismael and Felisa
Revita Reyes which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the
manner indicated in the law. The declaration of the provisional character of the inclusion of the subject
properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the Probate Court.

Uy Kiao Eng v. Lee, G.R. No. 176831, 15 January 2010

FACTS: 

Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus against his mother, petitioner Uy Kiao Eng,
before the RTC to compel petitioner to produce the holographic will of his father so that probate
proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already requested his
mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective
inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason. In her answer, petitioner
denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts.
She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were given to respondent and to his siblings.

After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that
her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied
the demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence, the petition was
dismissed.

Respondent appealed to CA who initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved for
reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, issued the writ of mandamus, and ordered the
production of the will. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.

Petitioner then filed this instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to
SC contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that
the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.

HELD: 

NO.  Writ of Mandamus can only be issued if there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked.

In the instant case, mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies

another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the
subject will. Rule 76, Section 1 and Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5 provides the adequate remedy that
respondent Lee can avail. Rule 76, Section 1 provides that petition for allowance of will can still proceed
regardless of whether or not petitioner has the will in his possession. Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5 provides
the remedy for the production of the original holographic.

Heirs of Fran vs. Salas, G.R. No. 53546, June 25, 1992

FACTS:

Remedios Tiosejo died with neither descendants nor ascendants. She left real and  personal
properties. In her last will and testament, she bequeathed to her collateral relatives all her properties.
When the will was presented before the probate court, private respondents who are sisters of the
deceased filed a manifestation, alleging that they needed time to study the petition because some heirs
have been intentionally omitted. However, none file any opposition. The petition thus became
uncontested. The probate court rendered a decision admitting the will to probate. Then, a Project of
Partition was submitted by the executor to the court. The private respondents still did not make any
objections. Thereafter, the probate court issued its Order approving the partition. Later, the aforesaid
branch which issued the order was converted to a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. The private
respondents filed with the new branch a Motion for Reconsideration of the probate judgment and the
order of partition. The Petitions challenged the jurisdiction of the court because only the English
translation of the will was attached to the petition and the will was not even submitted to the court for
their examination. Respondent Judge issued an order declaring the testamentary disposition as void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is necessary that the original of the will be presented in order for the court to
acquire jurisdiction

HELD:

No. In several rulings of the Supreme Court, it ruled that it is not necessary that the original of
the will be attached to the petition. That the annexing of the original will to the petition is not a
jurisdictional requirement is clearly evident in Section 1, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which allows the
filing of a petition for probate by the person named therein regardless of whether or not he is in
possession of the will, or the same is lost or destroyed. In the instant case, a copy of the original will and
its English translation were attached to the petition and made integral parts of the same. It is to be
presumed that upon the filing of the petition the Clerk of Court, or his duly authorized subordinate,
examined the petition and found that the annexes mentioned were in fact attached thereto. Hence, the
order of partition issued by the old probate court is final and executory.

Alaban vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156021, September 23, 2005

 FACTS:

Respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of

the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado. Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and
the executor of her will. The RTC allowed the probate of the will and directed the issuance of letters
testamentary to the respondent.

Four months after the petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings.
They also filed an opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent, and the issuance of letters
testamentary to respondent, claiming that they are the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners
claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the correct
docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. Moreover, they alleged  that the
will could not have been probated because: (1) the signature of the decedent was forged; (2) the will
was not executed in accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation
clause; (3) the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the  will was
executed by force and under duress and improper pressure; (5) the decedent had no intention to make
a will at the time of affixing of her signature; and (6) she did not know the properties to be disposed of,
having included in the will properties which no longer belonged to her. Petitioners prayed that
the letters testamentary issued to respondent be withdrawn and the estate of the decedent disposed of
under intestate succession.

RTC and CA both dismissed the petition.

 Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision sought to
be annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the
CA. And that the proceedings in the RTC was attended by extrinsic fraud.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners were made parties in the proceedings

2. Whether or not the proceedings in the RTC was tainted by extrinsic fraud

HELD:

1. Yes the petitioners were made parties to the proceedings. Petitioners in this case are

mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the probate proceedings. Under
the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in
the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have
the will allowed.

Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive
weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the designated or
other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for
the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the
court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the
decedent.

As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of

motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a
motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening
of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been
filed out of time, long after the Decision became final and executory. 

According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator. A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir
of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor
testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent
had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of
the same.

2. No. The procedure in the RTC was not tainted with extrinsic fraud. The non-inclusion of

petitioners’ names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do
not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented
from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court.

Peres vs. Perez, G.R. No. L-12359 July 15, 1959

Letters Testamentary and of Administration

 d. Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, G.R. No. L-17759
e. Garcia-Quizon vs. Belen, G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013
f. Teotico vs. Del Val Chan, G.R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965
g. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. vs. Dumlao, G.R. No. L-44888, February 7, 1992
h. San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. Nos. 133743 & 134029, February 6, 2007

Special Administrator

i. De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-6476, November 18, 1955

j. Heirs Castill vs. Lacuata-Gabriel, G.R. No. 162934, November 11, 2005

Claims against the estate See: Rule 39, Sec. 7.

k. Afan vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-14713, April 28, 1960

l. Ignacio vs. Pampanga Bus CO., G.R. No. L-18936, May 23, 1967
m. Vera vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-31364, March 30, 1979
n. Stronghold Insurance CO., Inc. vs. Republic-Asahi Glass Corp.,
o. G.R. No. 157561,June 22, 2006
p. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 133347, April 23, 2010
q. People vs. Lipata y Ortiza, G.R. No. 200302, April 23, 2010
r. Paredes vs. Moya, G.R. No. L-38051, December 26, 1974