2022 Forecast Civil Law

CIVIL LAW
from the doctrines and cases cited

during the lecture of Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya
Oct. 20, 2022
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab
initio. Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the
Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the
nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding
should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. Republic vs. Albios, 707
SCRA 584, G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for
a complete absence of consent.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to
a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered
into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. It is a pretended marriage not intended to be
real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent,
but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have
absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose. Republic vs. Albios, 707
A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law.
There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what
the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so
long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void
or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish
a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real
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intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered
into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and
incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus,
only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and
formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid. Republic vs. Albios, 707 SCRA 584, G.R. No. 198780
October 16, 2013
Marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,
are equally valid.
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.
The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way
they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or
not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the
legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is
not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly
support a marriage. Republic vs. Albios, 707 SCRA 584, G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul
a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does
not qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of
the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute
fraud, namely, (1) nondisclosure of a previous conviction involving moral turpitude; (2)
concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No
other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of

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fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no
injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Republic vs. Albios, 707 SCRA 584, G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. The Supreme Court cannot leave
the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties,
and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression
that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed. Republic vs. Albios, 707 SCRA 584, G.R. No. 198780 October
16, 2013
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In Orbecido, the Supreme Court (SC) laid down the elements for the application of Article 26(2),
bearing in mind the spirit and intent behind the provision as reflected in the Committee
deliberations. The SC held: x x x The SC states the twin elements for the application of
paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when [the Filipino spouse’s] wife was naturalized
as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between [them].
As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of paragraph 2 of
Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus x x x the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry. Galapon vs. Republic, 930 SCRA 51, G.R. No. 243722 January 22, 2020

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In the recent case of Manalo, the Supreme Court (SC) En Banc extended the scope of Article
26(2) to even cover instances where the divorce decree is obtained solely by the Filipino spouse.
In the recent case of Manalo, the Court En Banc extended the scope of Article 26(2) to even cover
instances where the divorce decree is obtained solely by the Filipino spouse. The Court’s ruling
states, in part: paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law
does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein
the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words
of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. “The legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have
expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.” Galapon vs.
Republic, 930 SCRA 51, G.R. No. 243722 January 22, 2020
Pursuant to the majority ruling in Manalo, Article 26(2) applies to mixed marriages where the
divorce decree is: (i) obtained by the foreign spouse; (ii) obtained jointly by the Filipino and
foreign spouse; and (iii) obtained solely by the Filipino spouse.
Based on the records, Cynthia and Park obtained a divorce decree by mutual agreement under
the laws of South Korea. The sufficiency of the evidence presented by Cynthia to prove the
issuance of said divorce decree and the governing national law of her husband Park was not put
in issue. Galapon vs. Republic, 930 SCRA 51, G.R. No. 243722 January 22, 2020
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It is recognized in jurisprudence that, as a general rule, Article 448 on builders in good faith
does not apply where there is a contractual relation between the parties.
Morever, in several cases, this Court has explained that the raison d’être for Article 448 of the
Civil Code is to prevent the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership: The rule
that the choice under Article 448 of the Civil Code belongs to the owner of the land is in accord
with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other

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way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is
preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner
of the building to remove it from the land. The raison d’être for this provision has been
enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights
arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements
without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a
state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land
the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the
builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise
either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his
right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the
accessory thing. Leviste Management System, Inc. vs. Legaspi Towers 200, Inc., 860 SCRA 355,
G.R. No. 199353 April 4, 2018
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are therefore inapplicable in
cases covered by the Condominium Act where the owner of the land and the builder are already
bound by specific legislation on the subject property (the Condominium Act), and by contract
(the Master Deed and the Bylaws of the condominium corporation).
In the case at bar, however, the land belongs to a condominium corporation, wherein the builder,
as a unit owner, is considered a stockholder or member in accordance with Section 10 of the
Condominium Act, which provides: SECTION 10. Whenever the common areas in a condominium
project are held by a condominium corporation, such corporation shall constitute the
management body of the project. The corporate purposes of such a corporation shall be limited
to the holding of the common areas, either in ownership or any other interest in real property
recognized by law, to the management of the project, and to such other purposes as may be
necessary, incidental or convenient to the accomplishment of said purposes. The articles of
incorporation or bylaws of the corporation shall not contain any provision contrary to or
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, the enabling or master deed, or the declaration of
restrictions of the project. Membership in a condominium corporation, regardless of whether it
is a stock or non-stock corporation, shall not be transferable separately from the condominium
unit of which it is an appurtenance. When a member or stockholder ceases to own a unit in the
project in which the condominium corporation owns or holds the common areas, he shall
automatically cease to be a member or stockholder of the condominium corporation. The builder
is therefore already in a co-ownership with other unit owners as members or stockholders of the
condominium corporation, whose legal relationship is governed by a special law, the
Condominium Act. It is a basic tenet in statutory construction that between a general law and a
special law, the special law prevails. Generalia specialibus non derogant. The provisions of the
Civil Code, a general law, should therefore give way to the Condominium Act, a special law, with

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regard to properties recorded in accordance with Section 4 of said Act. Special laws cover distinct
situations, such as the necessary co-ownership between unit owners in condominiums and the
need to preserve the structural integrity of condominium buildings; and these special situations
deserve, for practicality, a separate set of rules. Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders
in good faith are therefore inapplicable in cases covered by the Condominium Act where the
owner of the land and the builder are already bound by specific legislation on the subject
property (the Condominium Act), and by contract (the Master Deed and the Bylaws of the
condominium corporation). This Court has ruled that upon acquisition of a condominium unit,
the purchaser not only affixes his conformity to the sale; he also binds himself to a contract with
other unit owners. Leviste Management System, Inc. vs. Legaspi Towers 200, Inc., 860 SCRA
355, G.R. No. 199353 April 4, 2018
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In exceptional cases, the Supreme Court (SC) has applied Article 448 to instances where a
builder, planter, or sower introduces improvements on titled land if with the knowledge and
consent of the owner.
While petitioners cannot be deemed to be builders in good faith, it being undisputed that the
land in question is titled land in the name of respondents, the CA and the lower courts overlooked
the fact that petitioners constructed improvements on the subject lot with the knowledge and
consent of respondents. In exceptional cases, the Court has applied Article 448 to instances
where a builder, planter, or sower introduces improvements on titled land if with the knowledge
and consent of the owner. In Department of Education v. Casibang, 782 SCRA 326 (2016), the
Court held: x x x However, there are cases where Article 448 of the Civil Code was applied beyond
the recognized and limited definition of good faith, e.g., cases wherein the builder has
constructed improvements on the land of another with the consent of the owner. The Court ruled
therein that the structures were built in good faith in those cases that the owners knew and
approved of the construction of improvements on the property. Despite being a possessor by
mere tolerance, the DepEd is considered a builder in good faith, since Cepeda permitted the
construction of building and improvements to conduct classes on his property. Hence, Article 448
may be applied in the case at bar. Belvis, Sr. vs. Erola, 910 SCRA 476, G.R. No. 239727 July 24,
2019

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While respondents may have merely tolerated petitioners’ possession, respondents never
denied having knowledge of the fact that petitioners possessed, cultivated and constructed
various permanent improvements on the subject lot for over thirty-four (34) years.
In the instant case, respondents judicially admitted in their Complaint that “being close relatives
of the plaintiffs, [the defendants] sought the permission and consent of the plaintiffs to possess
lot 597 as they do not have any property or house to stay’’ and that “[the] plaintiffs agreed that
[the] defendants possess lot 597 but with a condition that in case [the] plaintiffs will be needing
the property, [the] defendants will vacate the lot in question upon notice to vacate coming from
the plaintiffs.” While respondents may have merely tolerated petitioners’ possession,
respondents never denied having knowledge of the fact that petitioners possessed, cultivated
and constructed various permanent improvements on the subject lot for over 34 years. In fact,
the records are bereft of any evidence to show that respondents ever opposed or objected, for
over 34 years, to the improvements introduced by petitioners, despite the fact that petitioner
Cecilia and respondent Conrado are siblings and that both parties reside in Pontevedra, Capiz. As
such, the Court finds that respondents likewise acted in bad faith under Article 453 of the Civil
Code. Belvis, Sr. vs. Erola, 910 SCRA 476, G.R. No. 239727 July 24, 2019
Under Article 448 in relation to Articles 546 and 548, respondents as landowners have the
following options: 1) they may appropriate the improvements, after payment of indemnity
representing the value of the improvements introduced and the necessary, useful and luxurious
expenses defrayed on the subject lots; or 2) they may oblige petitioners to pay the price of the
land, if the value is not considerably more than that of the improvements and buildings.
Should respondents opt to appropriate the improvements made, however, petitioners may
retain the subject lot until reimbursement for the necessary and useful expenses have been
made. Belvis, Sr. vs. Erola, 910 SCRA 476, G.R. No. 239727 July 24, 2019
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In the consolidated cases of Rivera v. Sps. Chua, 746 SCRA 1 (2015) and Sps. Chua v. Rivera, 746
SCRA 1 (2015), the Supreme Court (SC) affirmed the finding of the Court of Appeals (CA) that
five percent (5%) per month or sixty percent (60%) per annum interest rate is highly iniquitous
and unreasonable; and since the interest rate agreed upon is void, the rate of interest should
be twelve percent (12%) per annum (the then prevailing interest rate prescribed by the Central

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Bank of the Philippines for loans or forbearances of money) from the date of judicial or
extrajudicial demand.
Given that the agreement on the 5% monthly interest is void for being unconscionable, the
interest rate prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) for loans or forbearances of
money, credits or goods will be the surrogate or substitute rate not only for the one-year interest
period agreed upon but for the entire period that the loan of Zenaida remains unpaid.
Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the
obligation may be silent upon this point, the interest due on the principal amount accruing as
of judicial demand (the filing of the counterclaim, in this case) shall separately earn interest at
the rate prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) from time of judicial demand up to
full payment.
The invalidity of the 5% per month interest rate does not affect the obligation of Zenaida to repay
her loan of P200,000.00 from Atty. Bulatao. Based on the recent En Banc case of Lara’s Gifts &
Decors, Inc. v. Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc., 916 SCRA 1 (2019), the applicable interest is the
BSP-prescribed rate of 12% per annum from the execution of the DMRP on June 3, 2008, wherein
the parties agreed to the payment of interest, to June 30, 2013 and at the rate of 6% per annum
from July 1, 2013 until full payment. Also, taking into account Article 2212 of the Civil Code, which
provides that “[i]nterest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded,
although the obligation may be silent upon this point,” the interest due on the principal amount
(computed as mentioned above) accruing as of judicial demand (the filing of the counterclaim, in
this case) shall separately earn interest at the rate prescribed by the BSP from time of judicial
demand up to full payment. Bulatao vs. Estonactoc, 927 SCRA 535, G.R. No. 235020 December
10, 2019
The debtor of a thing cannot compel the creditor to receive different one, although the latter
may be of the same value as, or more valuable than that which is due.
For there to be a valid payment, the three characteristics of payment must be present. These are:
(1) integrity of payment, which is provided for in Article 1233 of the Civil Code: “A debt shall not
be understood to have been paid unless the thing or service in which the obligation consists has
been completely delivered or rendered, as the case maybe”; (2) identity of payment, which is
provided for in Article 1244: “The debtor of a thing cannot compel the creditor to receive
different one, although the latter may be of the same value as, or more valuable than that which
is due. In obligations to do or not to do, an act or forbearance cannot be substituted by another

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act or forbearance against the obligee’s will”; and (3) indivisibility of payment, which is provided
for in Article 1248: “Unless there is an express stipulation to that effect, the creditor cannot be
compelled partially to receive the prestations in which the obligation consists. Neither may the
debtor be required to make partial payments. However, when the debt is in part liquidated and
in part unliquidated, the creditor may demand and the debtor may effect the payment of the
former without waiting for the liquidation of the latter.” Since integrity of payment requires that
the thing or service in which the obligation consists has been completely delivered or rendered
as the case may be, the debtor must comply in its entirety with the prestation and that the
creditor is satisfied with the same. Bulatao vs. Estonactoc, 927 SCRA 535, G.R. No. 235020
December 10, 2019
Article 1396 of the Civil Code provides that ratification cleanses the contract from all its defects
from the moment it was constituted.
Estoque characterizes the contract entered into by the disposing co--owner as “ineffective, for
lack of power in the vendor to sell the specific portion described in the deed” and makes room
for a subsequent ratification of the contract by the other co-owners or validation in case the
disposing co--owner subsequently acquires the undivided or pro indiviso interests of the other
co-owners. Thus, the subsequent ratification or acquisition will validate and make the contract
fully effective as of the date the contract was entered into pursuant to Article 1396 of the Civil
Code, which provides that “[r]atification cleanses the contract from all its defects from the
moment it was constituted” and Article 1434 of the Civil Code, which provides: “[w]hen a person
who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor
acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee.” Bulatao vs.
Estonactoc, 927 SCRA 535, G.R. No. 235020 December 10, 2019
Under Article 1431 of the Civil Code, “through estoppel an admission or representation is
rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against
the person relying thereon.”
While Article 493 of the Civil Code may not squarely cover the situations wherein a co-owner,
without the consent of the other co-owners, alienate, assign or mortgage: (1) the entire co-
owned property; (2) a specific portion of the co-owned property; (3) an undivided portion less
than the part pertaining to the disposing co-owner; and (4) an undivided portion more than the
part pertaining to the disposing co-owner, the principle of estoppel bars the disposing co-owner
from disavowing the sale to the full extent of his undivided or pro indiviso share or part in the co-
ownership, subject to the outcome of the partition, which, using the terminology of Article 493,

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limits the effect of the alienation or mortgage to the portion that may be allotted to him in the
division upon termination of the co-ownership. Under Article 1431 of the Civil Code, “[t]hrough
estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and
cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.” Bulatao vs. Estonactoc,
927 SCRA 535, G.R. No. 235020 December 10, 2019
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It is settled that “the law favors testacy over intestacy” and hence, the probate of the will
cannot be dispensed with.
Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless
it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated,
the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.” In a similar way,
“testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose.” In the Matter of the Petition for the Probate of
the Will of Consuelo Santiago Garcia, 936 SCRA 414, G.R. No. 204793 June 8, 2020
The main issue which the court must determine in a probate proceeding is the due execution or
the extrinsic validity of the will as provided by Section 1, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court. The
probate court cannot inquire into the intrinsic validity of the will or the disposition of the estate
by the testator.
Thus, due execution is “whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law” as mandated by Articles 805 and 806 of the
Civil Code. In the Matter of the Petition for the Probate of the Will of Consuelo Santiago Garcia,
936 SCRA 414, G.R. No. 204793 June 8, 2020

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Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in
order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside
when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the
testator’s will.
When the number of pages was provided in the acknowledgment portion instead of the
attestation clause, “[t]he spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although
there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure
the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not
affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator’s will.” In
the Matter of the Petition for the Probate of the Will of Consuelo Santiago Garcia, 936 SCRA
414, G.R. No. 204793 June 8, 2020
Article 820 of the Civil Code provides that, “[a]ny person of sound mind and of the age of
eighteen (18) years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be
a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code.”
Here, the attesting witnesses to the will in question are all lawyers equipped with the
aforementioned qualifications. In addition, they are not disqualified from being witnesses under
Article 821 of the Civil Code, even if they all worked at the same law firm at the time. As pointed
out by Natividad, these lawyers would not risk their professional licenses by knowingly signing a
document which they knew was forged or executed under duress; moreover, they did not have
anything to gain from the estate when they signed as witnesses. All the same, petitioners did not
present controverting proof to discredit them or to show that they were disqualified from being
witnesses to Consuelo’s will at the time of its execution. In the Matter of the Petition for the
Probate of the Will of Consuelo Santiago Garcia, 936 SCRA 414, G.R. No. 204793 June 8, 2020
Inquiring into the intrinsic validity of the will or the manner in which the properties were
apportioned is not within the purview of the probate court.
In any case, as earlier stated, inquiring into the intrinsic validity of the will or the manner in which
the properties were apportioned is not within the purview of the probate court. “The court’s area
of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The
due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be
acted upon, by the court. Said court — at this stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to
rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or

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legacy therein.” In the Matter of the Petition for the Probate of the Will of Consuelo Santiago
Garcia, 936 SCRA 414, G.R. No. 204793 June 8, 2020
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An action for reconveyance and an action for declaration of nullity of the free patent cannot be
pursued simultaneously.
An action for reconveyance and an action for declaration of nullity of the free patent cannot be
pursued simultaneously. The former recognizes the certificate of title issued pursuant to the free
patent as indefeasible while the latter does not. They may, however, be pursued alternatively
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court on alternative causes of action or defenses.
Mayuga vs. Atienza, 850 SCRA 403, G.R. No. 208197 January 10, 2018
In Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 398 SCRA 550 (2013), the homestead application of one Fermin
Lopez had unfortunately remained unacted upon up to the time of his death, being neither
approved nor denied by the Director of the (then) Bureau of Lands as the Bureau failed to
process it; the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that he could not have acquired any vested rights as a
homestead applicant over the property, and his heirs did not inherit any property right from
him.
The other heirs of Fermin had no right to be declared co-owners with Hermogenes Lopez, the
eldest child of Fermin, who filed a new application after Fermin’s death and was granted a
homestead patent over the land which was subject of Fermin’s application because the land
exclusively pertained to Hermogenes. The Court reasoned out: The failure of the Bureau of Lands
to act on the application of Fermin up to the time of his death, however, prevented his heirs to
be subrogated in all his rights and obligations with respect to the land applied for. Perforce, at
the time Hermogenes applied for a homestead grant over the disputed property, it was still part
of alienable public land. As he applied for it in his own name, his application inures to his sole
benefit. After complying with the cultivation and residency requirements, he became a grantee
of a homestead patent over it, thereby making him its absolute and exclusive owner. Mayuga vs.
Atienza, 850 SCRA 403, G.R. No. 208197 January 10, 2018

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Since the Civil Code allows partition inter vivos, it is incumbent upon the compulsory heir
questioning its validity to show that his legitime is impaired.
Unfortunately, Araceli has not shown to what extent the Confirmation Affidavit prejudiced her
legitime. Araceli could not also claim preterition by virtue of the Confirmation Affidavit on the
assumption that the disputed two lots pertained to Perfecto’s inheritance, he had only three legal
heirs and he left Araceli with no share in the two lots. Article 854 of the Civil Code partly provides:
“[t]he preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious.” Mayuga vs. Atienza, 850 SCRA 403, G.R. No. 208197 January 10, 2018
Section 32 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 (the Property Registration Decree), pertinently
provides: “Upon the expiration of said period of one (1) year [from and after the date of entry
of the decree of registration], the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall
become incontrovertible.”
As the persons who applied for and were awarded free patents, the respondents are the rightful,
legal owners of the disputed lots. The free patents having been issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources on February 28, 1992 and recorded in the Book of Entries at
the Office of the Registry of Deeds in June 1992, the respondents’ certificates of title have already
become indefeasible pursuant to Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (the Property
Registration Decree), which pertinently provides: “Upon the expiration of said period of one year
[from and after the date of entry of the decree of registration], the decree of registration and the
certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible.” Mayuga vs. Atienza, 850 SCRA 403, G.R.
No. 208197 January 10, 2018
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Article 777 operates at the very moment of the decedent’s death meaning that the transmission
by succession occurs at the precise moment of death and, therefore, at that precise time, the
heir is already legally deemed to have acquired ownership of his/her share in the inheritance,
“and not at the time of declaration of heirs, or partition, or distribution.”
Article 777 of the Civil Code, which is substantive law, states that the rights of the inheritance are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Article 777 operates at the very
moment of the decedent’s death meaning that the transmission by succession occurs at the
precise moment of death and, therefore, at that precise time, the heir is already legally deemed
to have acquired ownership of his/her share in the inheritance, “and not at the time of
declaration of heirs, or partition, or distribution.” Thus, there is no legal bar to an heir disposing
of his/her hereditary share immediately after such death. The Court, early on in Teves de
Jakosalem v. Rafols, et al., explained that a sale made by a legal or intestate heir of his share in
an inheritance does not interfere with the administration of the estate. As applied to the instant
case, upon the death of Amanda, Resurreccion became the absolute owner of the devised subject
property, subject to a resolutory condition that upon settlement of Amanda’s Estate, the devise
is not declared inofficious or excessive. Hence, there was no legal bar preventing Resurreccion
from entering into a contract of sale with the petitioners Sps. Salitico with respect to the former’s
share or interest over the subject property. Salitico vs. Heirs of Resurreccion Martinez Felix, 901
SCRA 585, G.R. No. 240199 April 10, 2019
In a contract of sale, the parties’ obligations are plain and simple. The law obliges the vendor
to transfer the ownership of and to deliver the thing that is the object of sale to the vendee.
Therefore, as a consequence of the valid contract of sale entered into by the parties, Resurreccion
had the obligation to deliver the subject property to the petitioners Sps. Salitico. In fact, it is not
disputed that the physical delivery of the subject property to the petitioners Sps. Salitico had
been done, with the latter immediately entering into possession of the subject property after the
execution of the Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa. Therefore, considering that a valid sale has been
entered into in the instant case, there is no reason for the respondents heirs to withhold from
the petitioners Sps. Salitico the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT P-1908. To reiterate, Resurreccion
already sold all of her interest over the subject property to the petitioners Sps. Salitico. Therefore,
the respondents heirs have absolutely no rhyme nor reason to continue possessing the owner’s
duplicate copy of OCT P-1908. Salitico vs. Heirs of Resurreccion Martinez Felix, 901 SCRA 585,
G.R. No. 240199 April 10, 2019

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According to Section 92 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, with respect to the transfer of properties subject of testate or intestate
proceedings, a new certificate of title in the name of the transferee shall be issued by the
Register of Deeds only upon the submission of a certified copy of the partition and distribution,
together with the final judgment or order of the court approving the same or otherwise making
final distribution, supported by evidence of payment of estate tax or exemption therefrom, as
the case may be.
The said provision provides: Section 92. Registration of final distribution of estate.—A certified
copy of the partition and distribution, together with the final judgment or order of the court
approving the same or otherwise making final distribution, supported by evidence of payment of
estate tax or exemption therefrom, as the case may be, shall be tiled with the Register of Deeds,
and upon the presentation of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, new certificates of title
shall be issued to the parties severally entitled thereto in accordance with the approved partition
and distribution. Further, under Section 91 of PD 1529, even without an order of final distribution
from the testate/intestate court and in anticipation of a final distribution of a portion or the
whole of the property, the Register of Deeds may be compelled to issue the corresponding
certificate of title to the transferee only when the executor/administrator of the estate submits
a certified copy of an order from the court having jurisdiction of the testate or intestate
proceedings directing the executor/administrator to transfer the property to the transferees. The
said provision provides: Section 91. Transfer in anticipation of final distribution.—Whenever the
court having jurisdiction of the testate or intestate proceedings directs the executor or
administrator to take over and transfer to the devisees or heirs, or any of them, in anticipation
of final distribution a portion or the whole of the registered land to which they might be entitled
on final distribution, upon the filing of a certified copy of such order in the office of the Register
of Deeds, the executor or administrator may cause such transfer to be made upon the register in
like manner as in case of a sale, and upon the presentation of the owner’s duplicate certificate
to the Register of Deeds, the devisees or heirs concerned shall be entitled to the issuance of the
corresponding certificates of title. Salitico vs. Heirs of Resurreccion Martinez Felix, 901 SCRA
585, G.R. No. 240199 April 10, 2019
Under the applicable provisions of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 and the Rules of Court, it
is only upon the issuance by the testate or intestate court of the final order of distribution of
the estate or the order in anticipation of the final distribution that the certificate of title
covering the subject property may be issued in the name of the distributees.
The actual distribution of property subject to testate or intestate proceedings, i.e., the issuance
of a new title in the name of the distributee, shall occur only when the debts, funeral charges,
and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any,

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chargeable to the estate, have been paid. Only then can the testate or intestate court assign the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same. Under Rule 90, Section 1, the testate
or intestate court may also order the distribution of the property pending the final order of
distribution if the distributees give a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the
payment of the aforesaid said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision
is made to meet those obligations. Hence, under the applicable provisions of PD 1529 and the
Rules of Court, it is only upon the issuance by the testate or intestate court of the final order of
distribution of the estate or the order in anticipation of the final distribution that the certificate
of title covering the subject property may be issued in the name of the distributees. Salitico vs.
Heirs of Resurreccion Martinez Felix, 901 SCRA 585, G.R. No. 240199 April 10, 2019
Reading Article 777 of the Civil Code together with the pertinent provisions of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529 and the Rules of Court, while an heir may dispose and transfer his/her
hereditary share to another person, before the transferee may compel the issuance of a new
certificate of title covering specific property in his/her name, a final order of distribution of the
estate or the order in anticipation of the final distribution issued by the testate or intestate
court must first be had.
Therefore, despite the existence of a valid contract of sale between Resurreccion and the
petitioners Sps. Salitico, which ordinarily would warrant the delivery of the owner’s duplicate
copy of OCT P-1908 in favor of the latter, pending the final settlement of the Estate of Amanda,
and absent any order of final distribution or an order in anticipation of a final distribution from
the Probate Court, the RD cannot be compelled at this time to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a
new certificate of title in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico. Salitico vs. Heirs of Resurreccion
Martinez Felix, 901 SCRA 585, G.R. No. 240199 April 10, 2019
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------x
Juan and Mercedes appear to have been married before the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. There being no indication that they have adopted a different property regime,
the presumption is that their property relations is governed by the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains.
Article 119 of the Civil Code thus provides: Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete

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separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or
when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife. Carlos
vs. Tolentino, 869 SCRA 167, G.R. No. 234533 June 27, 2018
The Family Code contains terms governing conjugal partnership of gains that supersede the
terms of the conjugal partnership of gains under the Civil Code.
Article 105 of the Family Code states: Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage
settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property relations
during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application. The
provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established
between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. Carlos vs.
Tolentino, 869 SCRA 167, G.R. No. 234533 June 27, 2018
As in any other property relations between husband and wife, the conjugal partnership is
terminated upon the death of either of the spouses.
In respondent Juan’s Comment filed before the Court, the Verification which he executed on
February 9, 2018 states that he is already a widower. Hence, the Court takes due notice of the
fact of Mercedes’ death which inevitably results in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. In
retrospect, as absolute owners of the subject property then covered by TCT No. RT-90746
(116229), Juan and Mercedes may validly exercise rights of ownership by executing deeds which
transfer title thereto such as, in this case, the Deed of Donation dated February 15, 2011 in favor
of their grandson, Kristoff. Carlos vs. Tolentino, 869 SCRA 167, G.R. No. 234533 June 27, 2018
In the present case, while it has been settled that the congruence of the wills of the spouses is
essential for the valid disposition of conjugal property, it cannot be ignored that Mercedes’
consent to the disposition of her one-half (1/2) interest in the subject property remained
undisputed.
It is apparent that Mercedes, during her lifetime, relinquished all her rights thereon in favor of
her grandson, Kristoff. Carlos vs. Tolentino, 869 SCRA 167, G.R. No. 234533 June 27, 2018

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x-----------------------------------------------------------------------x
Conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of the Family Code
are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of Title IV
(Property Relations Between Husband and Wife) of the Family Code.
There is no dispute that Anastacio and Flora Domingo married before the Family Code’s
effectivity on August 3, 1988 and their property relation is a conjugal partnership. Conjugal
partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed
by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations
Between Husband and Wife) of the Family Code. This is clear from Article 105 of the Family Code
which states: x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains
already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in
Article 256. Domingo vs. Molina, 791 SCRA 47, G.R. No. 200274 April 20, 2016
Article 130 of the Family Code requires the liquidation of the conjugal partnership upon death
of a spouse and prohibits any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property prior to the
conjugal partnership liquidation.
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property
shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no
judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal
partnership property either judicially or extrajudicially within one year from the death of the
deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is made, any
disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated
marriage shall be void. Domingo vs. Molina, 791 SCRA 47, G.R. No. 200274 April 20, 2016

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In the case of Taningco v. Register of Deeds of Laguna, 5 SCRA 381 (1962), the Supreme Court
(SC) held that the properties of a dissolved conjugal partnership fall under the regime of co-
ownership among the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse until final
liquidation and partition.
In the case of Taningco v. Register of Deeds of Laguna, 5 SCRA 381 (1962), we held that the
properties of a dissolved conjugal partnership fall under the regime of co-ownership among the
surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse until final liquidation and partition. The
surviving spouse, however, has an actual and vested one-half undivided share of the properties,
which does not consist of determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and partition
of the conjugal partnership. Domingo vs. Molina, 791 SCRA 47, G.R. No. 200274 April 20, 2016
The binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so.
Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but
not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, Anastactio’s sale to the spouses Molina without
the consent of the other co-owners was not totally void, for Anastacio’s rights or a portion
thereof were thereby effectively transferred, making the spouses Molina a co-owner of the
subject property to the extent of Anastacio’s interest. This result conforms with the well-
established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally
possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest). Domingo vs.
Molina, 791 SCRA 47, G.R. No. 200274 April 20, 2016
As held in the case of Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr. and Marta Barola v. Servacio, 657 SCRA 10 (2011),
“it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were
not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares
of some of the co-owners is an action for Partition under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.”
The spouses Molina would be a trustee for the benefit of the coheirs of Anastacio in respect of
any portion that might belong to the coheirs after liquidation and partition. The observations of
Justice Paras cited in the case of Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr. and Marta Barola v. Servacio, 657 SCRA
10 (2011), are instructive: x x x [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really
would pertain to the share of the surviving spouse, then said transaction is valid. If it turns out
that there really would be, after liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the whole transaction
is null and void. But if it turns out that half of the property thus alienated or mortgaged belongs
to the husband as his share in the conjugal partnership, and half should go to the estate of the
wife, then that corresponding to the husband is valid, and that corresponding to the other is not.

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Since all these can be determined only at the time the liquidation is over, it follows logically that
a disposal made by the surviving spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held that the sale
of conjugal properties cannot be made by the surviving spouse without the legal requirements.
The sale is void as to the share of the deceased spouse (except of course as to that portion of the
husband’s share inherited by her as the surviving spouse). The buyers of the property that could
not be validly sold become trustees of said portion for the benefit of the husband’s other heirs,
the cestui que trust ent. Said heirs shall not be barred by prescription or by laches. Melecio’s
recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties, including the subject property, is an action for
partition under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. As held in the case of Heirs of Protacio Go,
Sr., “it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent
were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided
shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules
of Court.” Domingo vs. Molina, 791 SCRA 47, G.R. No. 200274 April 20, 2016
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------x
Any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must
be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of the
Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of Title
IV (Property Relations Between Husband And Wife) of the Family Code. Hence, any disposition
of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after
the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void. Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr. and Marta Barola vs.
Servacio, 657 SCRA 10, G.R. No. 157537 September 7, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------x

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Under Article 130 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership property, upon its dissolution
due to the death of either spouse, should be liquidated either in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased or, in the absence thereof, by the surviving spouse
within one (1) year from the death of the deceased spouse.
When Vipa died on March 5, 1994, the conjugal partnership was automatically terminated. Under
Article 130 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership property, upon its dissolution due to the
death of either spouse, should be liquidated either in the same proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased or, in the absence thereof, by the surviving spouse within one year
from the death of the deceased spouse. That absent any liquidation, any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property is void. Uy vs. Estate of Vipa Fernandez, 822
SCRA 382, G.R. No. 200612 April 5, 2017
Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife are co-owners of all
the property of the conjugal partnership.
It bears stressing that under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife
are co-owners of all the property of the conjugal partnership. Thus, upon the termination of the
conjugal partnership of gains due to the death of either spouse, the surviving spouse has an
actual and vested one-half undivided share of the properties, which does not consist of
determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and partition of the conjugal
partnership. With respect, however, to the deceased spouse’s share in the conjugal partnership
properties, an implied ordinary co-ownership ensues among the surviving spouse and the other
heirs of the deceased. Uy vs. Estate of Vipa Fernandez, 822 SCRA 382, G.R. No. 200612 April 5,
2017
Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title
to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
Upon Vipa’s death, one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved in favor of the
surviving spouse, Levi, as his share in the conjugal partnership. The other half, which is Vipa’s
share, was transmitted to Vipa’s heirs — Grace Joy, Jill Frances, and her husband Levi, who is
entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child. The ensuing implied co-ownership is
governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code, which provides: Article 493. Each co-owner shall have
the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,

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except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis ours) Although Levi became a co-
owner of the conjugal partnership properties with Grace Joy and Jill Frances, he could not yet
assert or claim title to any specific portion thereof without an actual partition of the property
being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Before the partition of a land or thing
held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that
the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
Uy vs. Estate of Vipa Fernandez, 822 SCRA 382, G.R. No. 200612 April 5, 2017
A co-owner could sell his undivided share.
A co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Levi had the right to freely sell and dispose of
his undivided interest. Thus, the sale by Levi of his one-half undivided share in the subject
property was not necessarily void, for his right as a co-owner thereof was effectively transferred,
making the buyer, Rafael, a co-owner of the subject property. It must be stressed that the binding
force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non
valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest). Uy vs. Estate of Vipa Fernandez, 822 SCRA 382, G.R.
No. 200612 April 5, 2017
In Nacar v. Gallery Frames, et al., 703 SCRA 439 (2013), the Supreme Court (SC) pointed out
that pursuant to Resolution No. 796 of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board (BSP-
MB), the interest rate of loans or forbearance of money, in the absence of stipulation shall be
six percent (6%) effective only from July 1, 2013. Thus, prior to July 1, 2013, the rate of interest
on loans or forbearance of money, in the absence of stipulation, is still twelve percent (12%).
Accordingly, the amount of P271,150.00, representing the unpaid rentals shall earn interest at
the rates of 12% per annum from the date of the last demand on May 3, 2003 until June 30, 2013
and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. Uy vs. Estate of Vipa Fernandez, 822 SCRA
382, G.R. No. 200612 April 5, 2017
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The property relations of parties to a void marriage is governed either by Article 147 or 148 of
the Family Code.
There is no quarrel that the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent had long been
declared an absolute nullity by reason of their psychological incapacity to perform their marital
obligations to each other. The property relations of parties to a void marriage is governed either
by Article 147 or 148 of the Family Code. Since the petitioner and the respondent suffer no legal
impediment and exclusively lived with each other under a void marriage, their property relation
is one of co-ownership under Article 147 of the Family Code. The said provision finds application
in this case even if the parties were married before the Family Code took effect by express
provision of the Family Code on its retroactive effect for as long as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Here, no vested rights
will be impaired in the application of the said provision given that Article 147 of the Family Code
is actually just a remake of Article 144 of the 1950 Civil Code. Paterno vs. Paterno, 928 SCRA 236,
G.R. No. 213687 January 8, 2020
For as long as the property had been purchased, whether on installment, financing or other
mode of payment, during the period of cohabitation, the disputable presumption that they
have been obtained by the parties’ joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
in equal shares, shall arise.
It is not disputed that the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell properties that were acquired during the
period of the parties’ cohabitation had not yet been fully paid at the time they separated. From
the arguments advanced by the petitioner, it can be inferred that he made much of the term
“acquired” in that he distinguished portions of the disputed property to that which had been paid
for during the period of cohabitation, and to the portion which was yet unpaid when the parties
separated. For him, only the paid portion should be encompassed in the term “acquired” and
thus, be presumed to belong to the parties in equal shares. The Court does not agree. In the
construction of the term “acquired,” this Court must be guided by the basic rule in statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the court. A reading of Article
147 of the Family Code would show that the provision did not make any distinction or make any
qualification in terms of the manner the property must be acquired before the presumption of
co-ownership shall apply. As such, the term “acquired” must be taken in its ordinary acceptation.
For as long as the property had been purchased, whether on installment, financing or other mode
of payment, during the period of cohabitation, the disputable presumption that they have been
obtained by the parties’ joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares, shall arise. Applied in this case, since the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell properties were
purchased while the petitioner and the respondent were living together, it is presumed that both
parties contributed in their acquisition through their joint efforts (which includes one’s efforts in

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the care and maintenance of the family and of the household), work or industry. Thus, the
properties must be divided between them equally. Paterno vs. Paterno, 928 SCRA 236, G.R. No.
213687 January 8, 2020
In the event that the respondent had not been able to contribute through her salary, income,
work or industry, but was able to show that she cared for and maintained the family and the
household, her efforts shall be deemed the equivalent of the contributions made by the
petitioner.
It must be borne in mind that the presumption that the properties are co-owned and thus must
be shared equally is not conclusive but merely disputable. The petitioner may rebut the
presumption by presenting proof that the properties, although acquired during the period of
their cohabitation, were not obtained through their joint efforts, work and industry. In such a
case, the properties shall belong solely to the petitioner. If the respondent is able to present
proof that she contributed through her salary, income, work or industry in the acquisition of the
properties, the parties’ share shall be in proportion to their contributions. In the event that the
respondent had not been able to contribute through her salary, income, work or industry, but
was able to show that she cared for and maintained the family and the household, her efforts
shall be deemed the equivalent of the contributions made by the petitioner. However, equal
sharing of the entire properties is not possible in this scenario since the Ayala Alabang and
Rockwell properties were still being amortized when the parties’ separated. As such,
respondent’s equal share shall only pertain to the paid portion before their separation, for in this
peculiar kind of co-ownership, and in keeping with the pronouncement in G.R. No. 180226, the
partnership is considered terminated upon the parties’ separation or desistance to continue said
relations. Hence, from the moment of separation, there is no more family or household to speak
of that the respondent could have cared for or maintained. If the allegation of the respondent
that the payments for the amortizations of these properties were taken from their common
funds, then the respondent would have an equal share in such portions because the payments
made therefor were actually taken from the co-ownership. Paterno vs. Paterno, 928 SCRA 236,
G.R. No. 213687 January 8, 2020
Article 198 of the Family Code provides that the obligation of mutual support between the
spouses ceases when a judgment declaring a marriage void becomes final and executory.
Anent the issue on the propriety of the increase in the amount of support, Article 198 of the
Family Code provides that the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases when a
judgment declaring a marriage void becomes final and executory. As the parties’ marriage was

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declared void on March 11, 2005, petitioner was only obliged to support, after such date, their
three children, Beatriz, Juliana and Margarita. According to the petition, at the time the assailed
Order of the RTC dated November 29, 2011 was issued, two of their three daughters already
attained the age of majority. If such is the case, respondent ceased to have the authority to claim
support in their behalf. In increasing the amount of support due from petitioner based on the
needs of all three children, the RTC gravely abused its discretion. Paterno vs. Paterno, 928 SCRA
236, G.R. No. 213687 January 8, 2020
After all, judgment of support does not become final, and may be reduced or increased
proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and
the resources or means of the person obliged to support.
Indeed, petitioner is not precluded from seeking the reduction of the amount of support he was
obliged to provide in the event that he can sufficiently prove that its reduction is warranted. After
all, judgment of support does not become final, and may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to support. This Court, not being a trier of facts, must necessarily
remand the case to the trial court for the accounting, reception of evidence and evaluation
thereof for the proper determination of the ownership and share of the parties in the nine
properties mentioned above, which include the Ayala Alabang house and Rockwell
condominium, based on the guidelines set forth in this case, as well as the determination of
arrears in support of the parties’ daughters, if any. Paterno vs. Paterno, 928 SCRA 236, G.R. No.
213687 January 8, 2020
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------x
Upon the effectivity of Republic Act (RA) No. 9255, the provision that illegitimate children shall
use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother was retained, with
an added provision that they may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by their father.
Thus, Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, provides: Illegitimate children shall
use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled
to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of
their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of

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birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an
action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Barcelote vs.
Republic, 834 SCRA 564, G.R. No. 222095 August 7, 2017
The law is clear that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother.
The use of the word “shall” underscores its mandatory character. The discretion on the part of
the illegitimate child to use the surname of the father is conditional upon proof of compliance
with RA 9255 and its IRR. Since the undisputed facts show that the children were born outside a
valid marriage after 3 August 1988, specifically in June 2008 and August 2011, respectively, then
they are the illegitimate children of Tinitigan and Barcelote. The children shall use the surname
of their mother, Barcelote. The entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname of the
children is therefore incorrect; their surname should have been “Barcelote” and not “Tinitigan.”
Barcelote vs. Republic, 834 SCRA 564, G.R. No. 222095 August 7, 2017
It is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth certificate of her child in
all cases, irrespective of whether the father recognizes the child as his or not.
The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of
the child who conclusively carries the blood of the mother. Thus, this provision ensures that
individuals are not falsely named as parents. The mother must sign and agree to the information
entered in the birth certificate because she has the parental authority and custody of the
illegitimate child. In Briones v. Miguel, 440 SCRA 455 (2004), we held that an illegitimate child is
under the sole parental authority of the mother, and the mother is entitled to have custody of
the child. The right of custody springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority
is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the
children’s physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and
the education of their heart and senses. Barcelote vs. Republic, 834 SCRA 564, G.R. No. 222095
August 7, 2017

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Since it appears on the face of the subject birth certificates that the mother did not sign the
documents, the local civil registrar had no authority to register the subject birth certificates.
Under the IRR of Act No. 3753, the civil registrar shall see to it that the Certificate of Live Birth
presented for registration is properly and completely filled up, and the entries are correct. In case
the entries are found incomplete or incorrect, the civil registrar shall require the person
concerned to fill up the document completely or to correct the entries, as the case may be.
Clearly, the subject birth certificates were not executed consistent with the provisions of the law
respecting the registration of birth of illegitimate children. Aside from the fact that the entry in
the subject birth certificates as to the surname of the children is incorrect since it should have
been that of the mother, the subject birth certificates are also incomplete as they lacked the
signature of the mother. Barcelote vs. Republic, 834 SCRA 564, G.R. No. 222095 August 7, 2017
The Supreme Court (SC) declares the subject birth certificates void and order their cancellation
for being registered against the mandatory provisions of the Family Code requiring the use of
the mother’s surname for her illegitimate children and Act No. 3753 requiring the signature of
the mother in her children’s birth certificates.
Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void. In Babiera v.
Catotal, 333 SCRA 487 (2000), we declared as void and cancelled a birth certificate, which showed
that the mother was already 54 years old at the time of the child’s birth and which was not signed
either by the civil registrar or by the supposed mother. Accordingly, we declare the subject birth
certificates void and order their cancellation for being registered against the mandatory
provisions of the Family Code requiring the use of the mother’s surname for her illegitimate
children and Act No. 3753 requiring the signature of the mother in her children’s birth
certificates. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be the primary consideration. Barcelote vs. Republic, 834 SCRA 564,
G.R. No. 222095 August 7, 2017
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The Three (3) Usual Actions to Recover Possession of Real Property.
The three usual actions to recover possession of real property are: 1. Accion interdictal or a
summary ejectment proceeding, which may be either for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful
detainer (desahucio), for the recovery of physical or material possession (possession de facto)
where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the
proper inferior court; 2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the better right of
possession (possession de jure), which should be brought in the proper inferior court or Regional
Trial Court (depending upon the value of the property) when the dispossession has lasted for
more than one year (or for less than a year in cases other than those mentioned in Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court); and 3. Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion or reivindicatory action,
which is an action for recovery of ownership which must be brought in the proper inferior court
or Regional Trial Court (depending upon the value of the property). Heirs of Alfredo Cullado vs.
Gutierrez, 911 SCRA 557, G.R. No. 212938 July 30, 2019
The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is conclusive with
respect to the possession only, will not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building, and will not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or
building.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are governed by the rules on summary procedure. The
judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is conclusive with respect
to the possession only, will not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building, and
will not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building. When the
issue of ownership is raised by the defendant in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession. Heirs of Alfredo Cullado vs. Gutierrez, 911
SCRA 557, G.R. No. 212938 July 30, 2019
When the issue of ownership is raised by the defendant in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership
shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
When the ejectment court thus resolves the issue of ownership based on a certificate of title to
determine the issue of possession, the question is posed: is this a situation where the Torrens
title is being subjected to a collateral attack proscribed by Section 48 of Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1529 or the Property Registration Decree, viz.: “A certificate of title shall not be subject to

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collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in

accordance with law.” The answer to this is “No” because there is no real attack, whether direct
or collateral, on the certificate of title in question for the simple reason that the resolution by the
ejectment court cannot alter, modify, or cancel the certificate of title. Thus, the issue of whether
the attack on a Torrens title is collateral or direct is immaterial in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases because the resolution of the issue of ownership is allowed by the Rules of Court
on a provisional basis only. To repeat: when the issue of ownership is raised by the defendant in
his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
Heirs of Alfredo Cullado vs. Gutierrez, 911 SCRA 557, G.R. No. 212938 July 30, 2019
If the plaintiff’s claim of ownership (and necessarily, possession or jus possidendi) is based on
his Torrens title and the defendant disputes the validity of this Torrens title, then the issue of
whether there is a direct or collateral attack on the plaintiff’s title is also irrelevant.
This is because the court where the reivindicatory or reconveyance suit is filed has the requisite
jurisdiction to rule definitively or with finality on the issue of ownership — it can pass upon the
validity of the plaintiff’s certificate of title. Heirs of Alfredo Cullado vs. Gutierrez, 911 SCRA 557,
G.R. No. 212938 July 30, 2019
In an ordinary ejectment suit, the certificate of title in never imperiled because the decision of
the ejectment court on the issue of ownership is merely provisional.
On the other hand, in a reivindicatory suit, where the Torrens title or certificate of title is the
basis of the complaint’s cause of action, there is always a direct attack on the certificate of title
the moment the defendant disputes its validity in a counterclaim or a negative defense. Heirs of
Alfredo Cullado vs. Gutierrez, 911 SCRA 557, G.R. No. 212938 July 30, 2019
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The expropriation of property consists of two (2) stages.
The first stage is concerned with “the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise
the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved
in the suit.” The second stage is concerned with “the determination by the court of ‘the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken.’ This is done by the court with the assistance
of not more than three (3) commissioners.” PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation vs. National
Grid Corporation of the Philippines, 918 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 224936 September 4, 2019
Based on Article 420 of the Civil Code, there are three (3) kinds of property of public dominion:
(1) those for public use, which may be used by anybody, such as roads and canals; (2) those for
public service, which may be used only by certain duly authorized persons, although used for
the benefit of the public; and (3) those used for the development of national wealth, such as
our natural resources.
Article 419 of the Civil Code classifies property as either of (1) public dominion (dominio publico)
or (2) of private ownership (propiedad privado). Article 420, in turn, identifies lands of public
dominion as either (1) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
or (2) those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth. Hence, based on Article 420 of the
Civil Code, there are three kinds of property of public dominion: (1) those for public use, which
may be used by anybody, such as roads and canals; (2) those for public service, which may be
used only by certain duly authorized persons, although used for the benefit of the public; and (3)
those used for the development of national wealth, such as our natural resources. PNOC
Alternative Fuels Corporation vs. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, 918 SCRA 27,
G.R. No. 224936 September 4, 2019
Patrimonial properties are properties owned by the State in its private or proprietary capacity.
Land of the public domain is outside the commerce of man and, thus, cannot be leased, donated,
sold, or be the object of any contract, except insofar as they may be the object of repairs or
improvements and other incidental things of similar character. Hence, they cannot be
appropriated or alienated. Inalienability is an inherent characteristic of property of the public
dominion. This characteristic necessarily clashes with an express declaration of alienability and
disposability, in that when public land is explicitly declared by the State to be subject to
disposition, it ceases to be land of the public dominion. Necessarily, as lands of public dominion

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are inalienable, they cannot be acquired through prescription and cannot be registered under
the Land Registration Law and be the subject of a Torrens Title. Properties owned by the State
which do not have the aforementioned characteristics of a land of public dominion are
patrimonial properties of the State. Patrimonial properties are properties owned by the State in
its private or proprietary capacity. PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation vs. National Grid
Corporation of the Philippines, 918 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 224936 September 4, 2019
In our jurisprudence, despite dealing with the management of water, which is a natural
resource and an essential public utility, waterworks have been categorized as property owned
by municipal corporations in their proprietary character.
As explained by recognized Civil Law Commentator, former CA Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa, “[o]ver
this kind of property[,] the State has the same rights and has the same power of disposition as
private individuals in relation to their own property, but of course, subject to rules and
regulations. The purpose of this property is in order that the State may attain its economic ends,
to serve as a means for its subsistence and preservation and, in that way, to be able to better
fulfill its primary mission.” Examples of patrimonial property of the State are those properties
acquired by the government in execution or tax sales and mangrove lands and mangrove
swamps. Even public agricultural lands that are made alienable and disposable by the State, are
considered patrimonial properties. In fact, in our jurisprudence, despite dealing with the
management of water, which is a natural resource and an essential public utility, waterworks
have been categorized as property owned by municipal corporations in their proprietary
character. PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation vs. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines,
918 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 224936 September 4, 2019
Land of the public dominion expressly deemed by the State to be alienable and disposable,
susceptible to the commerce of man through sale, lease, or any other mode of disposition,
assumes the nature of patrimonial property.
The mere fact that a parcel of land is owned by the State or any of its instrumentalities does not
necessarily mean that such land is of public dominion and not private property. If land owned by
the State is considered patrimonial property, then such land assumes the nature of private
property. As further held in Republic v. Spouses Alejandre, 883 SCRA 510 (2018), patrimonial
property are either: (1) “by nature or use” or those covered by Article 421, which are not property
of public dominion or imbued with public purpose based on the State’s current or intended use;
or (2) “by conversion” or those covered by Article 422, which previously assumed the nature of
property of public dominion by virtue of the State’s use, but which are no longer being used or

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intended for said purpose. Furthermore, the aforesaid case holds that “upon the declaration of
alienability and disposability x x x the land ceases to possess the characteristics inherent in
properties of public dominion that they are outside the commerce of man, cannot be acquired
by prescription, and cannot be registered under the land registration law, and accordingly
assume the nature of patrimonial property of the State that is property owned by the State in its
private capacity.” Simply stated, land of the public dominion expressly deemed by the State to
be alienable and disposable, susceptible to the commerce of man through sale, lease, or any
other mode of disposition, assumes the nature of patrimonial property. PNOC Alternative Fuels
Corporation vs. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, 918 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 224936
September 4, 2019
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------x
Reproducing almost verbatim from the 1973 Constitution, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution provides that [a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.
The State’s ownership of and control over all lands and resources of the public domain are
beyond dispute. Reproducing almost verbatim from the 1973 Constitution, Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution provides that “[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State, x x x.” In Section 1,
Article XIII of the Amended 1935 Constitution, it was also provided that “[a]ll agricultural timber,
and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State
x x x.” Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bataan vs. Garcia, Jr., 804 SCRA 629, G.R. No. 174964
October 5, 2016

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If the property is owned by the municipal corporation in its public and governmental capacity,
it is public and Congress has absolute control over it; but if the property is owned in its private
or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control, in which
case, the municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just
compensation.
In The Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, et al., 22 SCRA 1334 (1968), cited
by the CA, the Province of Zamboanga del Norte sought to declare unconstitutional R.A. No. 3039,
which ordered the transfer of properties belonging to the Province of Zamboanga located within
the territory of the City of Zamboanga to the said City, for depriving the province of property
without due process and just compensation. In said case, the Court classified properties of local
governments as either (a) properties for public use, or (b) patrimonial properties, and held that
the capacity in which the property is held by a local government is dependent on the use to which
it is intended and for which it is devoted. If the property is owned by the municipal corporation
in its public and governmental capacity, it is public and Congress has absolute control over it; but
if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress
has no absolute control, in which case, the municipality cannot be deprived of it without due
process and payment of just compensation. In upholding the validity of R.A. No. 3 039, the Court
noted that it affected “lots used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and
leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites — a total of 24 lots — since these were
held by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject
to the absolute control of Congress.” Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bataan vs. Garcia, Jr., 804
It is established doctrine that the act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide
discretionary legislative power which will not be interfered with by the courts.
The Court ruled that, like R.A. No. 4118 in Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734 (1972), R.A. No. 3120
was intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the government’s
program of land for the landless. Thus, the sale of the subdivided lots to the bona fide occupants
by authority of Congress was not an exercise of eminent domain or expropriation without just
compensation, which would have been in violation of Section 1(2), Article III of the 1935
Constitution, but simply a manifestation of its right and power to deal with State property. “It is
established doctrine that the act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide
discretionary legislative power which will not be interfered with by the courts.” In Rabuco v.
Villegas, 55 SCRA 656 (1974), the rule in Salas was reiterated that property of the public domain,
although titled to the local government, is held by it in trust for the State. Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Bataan vs. Garcia, Jr., 804 SCRA 629, G.R. No. 174964 October 5, 2016

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CIVIL LAW

from the doctrines and cases cited

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

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Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

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A co-owner could sell his undivided share.

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Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

The Three (3) Usual Actions to Recover Possession of Real Property.

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

The expropriation of property consists of two (2) stages.

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

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