SPL WAVE 4

CASE 1: PEOPLE VS. DELA CRUZ

FACTS:
Early evening of June 23, 1992, the lifeless bodies of Teodorico
Laroya Jr. and his children – Karen Verona (12), Lester (10), were
discovered in their residence in Cainta, Rizal. They were all bloodied
consequent to numerous stab wounds. Karen Verona also bore external
signs of sexual assault.
Balocating and Pangan (neighbors) testified in relation to Dela
Cruz’s actions before the crime. Dela Cruz was a brother-in-law of
Laroya. Police then apprehended Dela Cruz.
Appellant was observed by the trial court to be afflicted with a
problem in expressing himself and an impediment in his speech (ngo-
ngo; unable to read and write. He bluntly repudiated the version of
SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. and insisted that he was never assisted by any
counsel of his choice, much less met said Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-
Villanueva, when he was interrogated at the police headquarters in
Cainta, Rizal and signed his supposed extrajudicial confession.
He further contends that he was tortured by the police into
signing the same. While he admits having been at the residence of the
victims on the night that they were murdered, he flatly denied having
killed them as he left the trio well and alive that same night when he
proceeded to his brother's place in Fort Bonifacio.
RTC convicted Dela Cruz for multiple murder. On appeal, he
impugns his conviction as he anchors his entreaty for the reversal on
the ground that he was not fully and appropriately apprised of or
allowed to exercise his constitutional rights prior to and while
undergoing custodial investigation.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant Dela Cruz was appropriately apprised or
allowed to exercise his constitutional rights prior to and while
undergoing custodial investigation?
RULING:
NO. Accused-eppellant Dela Cruz was not allowed to exercise his
rights under custodial investigation.
1. Sec 12 (Par1 1) Art. III provides that "[a]ny person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." Any
confession or admission obtained in violation of the same shall be
inadmissible in evidence against the confessant.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law
enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.
And, the rule begins to operate at once as soon as the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and direction is
then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody
and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory question which
tend to elicit incriminating statements.
2. While SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. informed appellant in Tagalog of his
right to remain silent, that any statement he made could be used for
or against him in any court, and that he could have counsel preferably
of his own choice, he nonetheless failed to tell appellant that if the
latter could not afford the services of counsel, he could be provided
with one. The extrajudicial confession was taken at around 11:00 AM,
while the testimony of SPO1 Atanacio was at around 9:00.
The foregoing lapses on the part of the police authorities are
all fatal to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession
supposedly executed by appellant before SPO1 Atanacio, Jr.
Jurisprudence along these lines have all been too consistent — an
accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel
assisting him from the very start thereof.
3. Necessarily, even while there is evidence of the corpus
delicti in this case, appellant's conviction must be set aside for his
extrajudicial confession is obviously inadmissible in evidence against
him. The rule is that an extrajudicial confession, where admissible
must be corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti in order to
sustain a finding of guilt. Both must co-exist.
Appellant cannot be made to suffer the extreme penal consequences
of the crimes on account of the shaky and decrepit circumstantial
evidence proffered by the prosecution. In sum, the presumption of
innocence enjoyed by appellant has remained intact and impervious to
the prosecution's assault thereon.
RTC decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. DELA CRUZ is ACQUITTED.
SPL WAVE 4

CASE 2 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RAFAEL PRINCIPE

Facts: The case is a petition for review over the decision of the RTC Cabanatuan imposing on the
accused-appellant Rafael Principe the penalty of death for the rape-slaying of a 6-year old child.

The accused-appellant was having drinks with his friends and when he went to buy pulutan, he chanced
upon Arlene Capulong, his 6-year old niece. Instead of going back to their inuman session, he then led
Arlene to an abandoned house, ordered Arlene to undress who told him that she will tell somebody
about it. This angered the accused-appellant, who picked a large rock, hit Arlene in the head,
subsequently raped her and dumped her body in a toilet bowl to hide it. When the accused-appellant
was taken into custody, interrogated by the police, and having read to him his rights in Tagalog in the
presence of his father and his counsel, admitted to hitting Arlene with a large rock and raping her,
qualifying that he was drunk when it happened. With this confession, the accused-appellant was
charged with the crime of rape with homicide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. Now,
he questions said decision on the basis of his confession alone, alleging that it was an improvident guilty
plea of the crime charged. (improvident means thoughtless)

ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial confession of the accused is admissible in convicting him of the crime
charged

RULING: Yes. With respect to accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession, the Constitution, R.A. No.
7438, and case law lay down four fundamental requirements for the admissibility of extrajudicial
confessions in general, to wit: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) it must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express; and (d) it must
be in writing.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was read of his rights in tagalog and then signified his intention
to confess his participation in the rape and killing of Arlene. He did this in the presence of his father and
assistance of his counsel. In his confession, he categorically narrated what he did to Arlene and this was
in writing, signed by him, his counsel and the administering officer.

He further acknowledged this extra-judicial confession in open court. He was asked if the same was
entered voluntarily and in the presence of his counsel, both questions were answered in the affirmative.
Finally, the testimonies of witnesses for the prosecution confirm accused’s testimony that he committed
the crime.

JUDGMENT OF THE RTC WAS AFFIRMED, AWARD OF DAMAGES WAS MODIFIED.

SPL

CASE # 3

G.R. No. 200537

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee,

vs.

RODRIGO QUITOLA y BALMONTE, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

On March 15, 2008, the lifeless body of Maria Fe Valencia y Supan was found inside her rented room at
Nice Place Compound, Bgy. Nancayasan, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. Based on the joint investigation, it
was determined that the victim suffered several stab wounds on her chest, right hand, left elbow, neck
and back.

The initial investigation conducted disclosed that the victim entered the room at about 10:00 in the
evening of March 14, 2008, as recorded in the logbook of on duty security guard, Rodrigo Quitola. The
investigation also revealed that some of her personal belongings were missing. The investigating team
also found a broken knife with blood stains, uprooted hair strands of the victim, other hair strands of
unknown origin, and blood stains on the walls and floor.

In the course of the follow-up investigation, Police Officer 2 Herminigildo Ramos (PO2 Ramos)
discovered that accused-appellant, who happened to be the outgoing security guard of the Nice Place
Compound on March 15, 2008, was seen by one Chat Siquig Baculad (Baculad), a coffee vendor,
narrated that at around 5:30 in the morning, the accused-appellant bought a cup of coffee from her. She
noticed that the latter’s right arm was covered and when she asked him about it, he merely said he had
an accident. According to the witness, accused-appellant asked for her help in packing his and his
pregnant wife’s clothes as they were leaving the city, but she declined. The witness left the compound
and returned after a couple of hours. Upon her return, she chanced upon accused-appellant and his wife
boarding a black car, allegedly owned by Maria Fe Valencia (Valencia), with all their belongings already
loaded.

Upon finding out that accused-appellant, the security guard on duty, was nowhere to be found during
the initial investigations, the police investigators proceeded to his rented room in Camanang, Urdaneta
City. When they got there, the room was already abandoned. Convinced that accused-appellant was a
possible suspect, the policemen conducted further investigations. Accused-appellant’s relatives from
Natividad, Pangasinan averred no knowledge regarding the whereabouts of accused-appellant. On
September 8, 2008, accused-appellant was eventually arrested in Aklan.

On September 10, 2008, accused-appellant was interviewed by Joana Fe Tacason (Tacason), ABS-CBN
field reporter. The interview was conducted inside the detention cell. During said interview, accused-
appellant voluntarily relayed to Tacason that at early dawn of March 15, 2008, he was in the apartment
of the deceased because he tried to borrow money from her. He narrated that deceased refused to lend
him money. In frustration, he got money from deceased’s bag he saw lying on top of the table. When
asked what happened next, accused-appellant responded with “Hindi ko na alam ang sumunod na
nangyari.” The interview was taped and was aired the next day. The recorded interview forms part of
the records of the case as Exhibit “U.”

The deceased’s car, a black Mitsubishi Lancer with Plate No. AEM 184, was later surrendered to PNP
Calamba, by Raffy Quitola (Raffy) accused-appellant’s brother whoe claimed that the said car was left by
Rodrigo when he stayed in the former’s house for about a month..

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation of the coffee vendor witness and his brother’s
statement when the Lancer was surrendered. Accused-appellant claimed that he and his wife were
bound for Aklan for the reason that his wife wanted to give birth there. He also denied visiting his
brother in Laguna. More notable is his claim that his confession before Tacason was merely prompted
by fear.

RTC Ruling: The court found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

Accused-appellant contends that the interview was impelled by extreme fear because the same was
conducted while accused-appellant was inside the detention cell and while police officers were around.
In addition, the defense argues that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the RTC were insufficient
to establish accused-appellant’s guilt.

CA Ruling: Dismissed accused-appellant’s contention.

“WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated October 21, 2009 of
the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 47, that convicted accused-
appellant Rodrigo B. Quitola for the special complex crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE as
defined and penalized under Article 294, subparagraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby
AFFIRMED.

ISSUES:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT’S EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION; (ito yung related sa topic natin RA7438-defining
certain rights of persons arrested, detained or under custodial investigation)
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION
ESTABLISHED THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S GUILT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

HELD:

1. No, the Court finds no merit in the appeal. The court, moreover, finds no reason to deviate
from the findings and conclusions of the courts below as the degree of proof required in
criminal cases has been met in the case at bar.

We have consistently held that the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with relations
between private individuals. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and
its agents; thus, accused-appellant’s confession to field reporter Tacason is not covered by
Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. Furthermore, accused-appellant would
 have this Court believe that the confession was given under a tense and fearful atmosphere,
similar to that of a custodial investigation. In a previous case with similar circumstances, the
Court observed that the presence of the police officers did not exert any undue pressure or
influence on the accused, coercing him into giving his confession.

The interview was not in the nature of a custodial investigation as the response of the
accused-appellant was made in answer to questions asked by the reporter and not by the police.
There is no showing that the field reporter colluded with the police authorities to elicit
inculpatory evidence against accused-appellant. Neither is there anything on record which
suggests that the reporter was instructed by the police to extract information from him.
Moreover, accused-appellant could have refused to be interviewed, but instead, he agreed. A
review of the taped interview would show that he answered the questions freely and
spontaneously.

2. Rule 133, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that an extrajudicial confession shall not
be a sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. In
the case at bar, the confession made by accused-appellant was corroborated by other
evidence. While there was no prosecution witness who positively identified accused-
appellant as the assailant, his culpability was nonetheless proven through circumstantial
evidence. Time and again, this Court has held that direct evidence is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.The rules of evidence
allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. At
times, resort to circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist on direct testimony
would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the
community.

Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

Accused-appellant Rodrigo Quitola y Balmonte is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the penalty of which is reclusion perpetua in view of the
absence of any modifying circumstance. COSTS AGAINST QUITOLA.

Notes.—What is sought to be protected by the Constitution is the compulsory disclosure of

incriminating facts. (People vs. Peñaflor, 766 SCRA 427 [2015])

As the Court of Appeals (CA) correctly pointed out, when accused-appellant Jocelyn signed the
Certificate of Orderly Search, she did not confess her guilt to the crime charged. She merely admitted to
the fact that a lawful search was conducted while she was in the same premises. (People vs. Posada, 769
SCRA 1 [2015])
Case 4 G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995 SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA

Facts:

Petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez filed a civil case for damages alleging that the private
respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted
and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to the petitioner's
dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event from a tape
recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. 

As a result of petitioner's recording and alleging that the act of secretly taping the confrontation
was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled
"An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes." 

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200, which the trial court granted.

Private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, but wasreferred the
case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent Court of Appeals declared the trial court's order as
null and void, holding that the allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under
Section 1 of R.A. 4200. Thus, quashing the information, the respondent judge acted in grave
abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the respondent Court of Appeals denied.

Issue: 

1. Whether or not Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by
one of the parties to the conversation. 

2. Whether or not R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private
conversation" and her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not
illegal under the said act.

Ruling:

1. Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible or absurb or would lead to an injustice.

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," clearly and unequivocally
makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction
as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the
latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200.

What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. 

2. Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
“communication” to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word
communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, as in a conversation, or signifies the
"process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common
system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)".

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of
the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private
communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and
"communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the
bill.

Petition is denied.
Case 5- Ganaan vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts:

A direct assault case against Leonardo Laconico was filed by complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and
his client Manuel Montebon. One morning, complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon were in the living
room of PIntor’s residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint. After they had
decided on the proposed conditions, the complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. (kumbaga
nagplano sila na iwithdraw yung case laban kay Laconico pero maraming conditions)

On that same morning, Laconico called appellant Atty. Gaanan, to come to his office to advise
him about the proposed settlement. When the complainant called up, Laconico requested the appellant
to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally
the proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard the complainant enumerate the conditions
for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault, one of which is the giving of money worth P8,000.

Twenty minutes later, the complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the
conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where
to deliver the money. Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his
wife. Laconico, who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the
Philippine Constabulary (PC is like PNP before), insisted that the complainant himself should receive the
money.

When the complainant received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, he was arrested by agents
of the Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant
to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against the complainant. Since appellant
listened to the telephone conversation without the complainant's consent, complainant charged Gaanan
and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

The Trial court found both Laconico and Gaana guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No.
4200.

The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the
communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore,
covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication without the
knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by the
petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the
term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.

Hence, this petition on the ground that elephones or extension telephones are not included in
the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same
class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law.

Issue: W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement” under Rep. Act No.
4200.

Held: No.

No. Section 1 of RA 4200 provides that it shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized
by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape recorder, or however otherwise described xxx

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a
physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in
order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be placed
in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA
No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line.

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement", although not exclusive to that enumerated therein,
should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the
use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments
whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by
their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting
or recording a telephone conversation.

In the instant case, the telephone extension was not installed for that purpose. It just happened
to be there for ordinary office use.

The petition is granted and the petitioner is acquitted of the crime of violation of Republic Act
No. 4200.
CASE 6

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners, v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. AND

ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.

Facts:

Alexander and Allan Choachuy, herein respondents, are the owners of Aldo Development
& Resources, Inc. with lots adjacent to the property of Bill and Victoria Hing, herein petitioners.
Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction/TRO, claiming that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and
that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners’
property.  The court, in that case, denied Aldo’s application for preliminary injunction for failure
to substantiate its allegations. Now, in order to get evidence to support the said case,
respondents illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo two video surveillance cameras
facing petitioners’ property and that respondents, through their employees and without the
consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners’ on-going construction violating
petitioners’ right to privacy. Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove
the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.

Respondents claimed that they did not install the video surveillance cameras, nor did
they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners’ construction. They also clarified that
they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners Choachuy and issued the TRO. Respondents
filed MORECON, but were denied. Aggrieved, the respondents filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.

The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of
discretion because petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive
writ. The CA explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil
Code was not violated since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a residence.

Issue:

Whether or not there is violation of the right to privacy

Ruling:
 Yes. The right to privacy is the right to be let alone. It is enshrined in our Constitution
and other laws.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides a
legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals.  It
states:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Art. 26.  Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind
of his neighbors and other persons.  The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other
relief:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
(1)  Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

xxxx

Our Code specifically mentions “prying into the privacy of another’s residence.”  This
does not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers
also “similar acts.”  A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is
excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. 

Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude
the public or deny them access.  The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,”
therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as
private.  And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on
his right to privacy.  The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the
Civil Code only to residences.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test.  This test determines whether a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. In Ople v.
Torres, we enunciated that “the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends
on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as
reasonable.” 

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for
the protection and safety of everyone.  The installation of these cameras, however, should not
cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the
individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained.  Nor should these cameras
be used to pry into the privacy of another’s residence or business office as it would be no
different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the
Anti-Wiretapping Law.

The petitioners have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in their property, whether

they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance
cameras directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion thereof, without
their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED.  The Decision dated July 10, 2007 and the
Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6,
200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are
hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.