MANNER OF INTERPRETATION

Belgica v. Ochoa
Keyword: Pork Barrel - Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the
"collusion between the Legislative and Executive branches of government to
accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary
powers to determine its distribution as political largesse
FACTS
Before the Court are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the government
has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using
funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores
of ghost projects. The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6)
whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim
Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost
projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade.
Petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), Pedrito M. Nepomuceno
(Nepomuceno) filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional,
ISSUE
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the
principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-
delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e)
political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
HELD
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork
Barrel provision, petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power given to the Members of
Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to be funded by the CDF is an
encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an
appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and
identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution the
power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress
the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-
enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to
congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.
the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view
of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates
the system has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has
conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal,
discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they
themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are
not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of
presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar
as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a
stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be
called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public
accountability
Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions
Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez v. House of Representatives
FACTS
For resolution is petitioner’s "Motion for Reconsideration dated February 25,
2011 Upon examination of the averments in the Motion, the Court finds neither
substantial nor cogent reason to reconsider its Decision. Petitioner’s Motion concedes
that the Francisco doctrine on the initiation of an impeachment proceeding includes
the House’s initial action on the complaint. petitioner abandons her earlier claim that
per Francisco an impeachment proceeding is initiated by the mere filing of an
impeachment complaint. Having uprooted her reliance on the Francisco case in
propping her position that the initiation of an impeachment proceeding must be
reckoned from the filing of the complaint, petitioner insists on actual initiation and not
"constructive initiation by legal fiction
ISSUE
Did the Court deviate from Francisco v. House of Representatives regarding
the proper initiation of an impeachment complaint?
HELD
The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions are
not self-executing. Section 3(8) does not, in any circumstance, operate to suspend the
entire impeachment mechanism which the Constitutional Commission took pains in
designing even its details. Notably, the provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the
12th Congress that were successfully challenged in Francisco provided that an
impeachment proceeding was to be "deemed initiated" upon the Committee’s finding
of sufficiency of substance or upon the House’s affirmance or overturning of the
Committee’s finding the filing of the complaint and the taking of initial action are
merged into a single act. Moreover, it is highly impossible in such situation to
coincidentally initiate a second impeachment proceeding in the interregnum. Contrary
to petitioner’s position that the Court left in the hands of the House the question as to
when an impeachment proceeding is initiated, the Court merely underscored the
House’s conscious role in the initiation of an impeachment proceeding. Francisco
doctrine. Moreover, referral of an impeachment complaint to the appropriate
committee is already a power or function granted by the Constitution to the House.
To refer an impeachment complaint within an existing one-year bar, however, is to
commit the apparently unconstitutional act of initiating a second impeachment
proceeding, which may be struck down under Rule 65 for grave abuse of discretion.
The House needs only to ascertain the existence or expiry of the constitutional ban of
one year, without any regard to the claims set forth in the complaint. IN SUM, the
Court did not deviate from, as it did apply the twin rule of filing and referral in the
present case.

Self-executing and non-self-executing

provisions
CotesCUP v. DepEd Secretary
FACTS
Before the Court are consolidated petitions under Rule 65, assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10533 (K to 12 Law), RA No. 10157
(Kindergarten Education Act), and related issuances of the Department of Education
(DepEd), Commission on Higher Education (CHED), Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) and Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA) implementing the K to 12 Basic Education Program. Petitioners question
the validity of the enactment of the K to 12 Law claiming that: (1) sectors which
would be directly affected by the K to 12 Basic Education Program were deprived of
their right, under Section 16, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution the K to 12 Law
was incomplete because it failed to provide sufficient standards by which the DepEd,
CHED and TESDA, might be guided in addressing the possible impact of the
implementation of the K to 12 Law on labor; thus, Section 31 of the K to 12 IRR and
the Joint Guidelines are invalid and unconstitutional.
ISSUE
Whether the constitutional provisions invoked by petitioners are self-executing
HELD
A self-executing provision of the Constitution is one "complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation." It
"supplies [a] sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected." "[I]f the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed
are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action," the provision is self-executing.
In this regard, and to digress, only self-executing provisions of the
Constitution embody judicially enforceable rights and therefore give rise to causes of
action in court.
The Court in Basco also ruled that Section 17, Article II on giving priority to
education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports, and Section 2, Article
XIV on educational values, are non-self-executing Further, Section 6, Article XIV on
the use of the Filipino language as a medium of instruction is also not self-executory.
Absent any showing of a violation of any Constitutional self-executing right or any
international law, the Court cannot question the desirability, wisdom, or utility of the
K to 12 Law as this is best addressed by the wisdom of Congress. First, the
constitutional provisions alleged by petitioners to be violated are non-self-executing
provisions. As discussed above, the framers of the Constitution, in discussing Section
6 of Article XIV, explained that the use of Filipino as a medium of official
communication is still subject to provisions of law. The Court was of the view that all
sections in Article XIV pertaining to arts and culture are all non-self-executing, which
includes Section 14 on Filipino national culture and Section 18 on access to cultural
opportunities
I further note that the ponencia identifies several provisions of the Constitution
as non-self-executing, namely: (i) Article XIV, Sections 1110 and 2111 on the right of
all citizens to quality education, relevant to the needs of the people; (ii) Article XIV,
Section 6112 on the use of the Filipino language as a medium of instruction; and (iii)
Article XIII, Section 3113 on the protection of labor and security of tenure
It maintains that these provisions are not a source of rights or obligations, and
are mere policies which may be used as aids in the exercise of judicial review or in
the enactment of laws
Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
FACTS
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government
under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC, The
winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management
expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support
to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel only two (2)
bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58
per share, Renong Berhad which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic
partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to
respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share
tendered by Renong Berhad petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust
Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the
bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad which respondent GSIS refused
to accept. petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus the Court issued
a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10,
second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has
been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture
ISSUE
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10,
are self-executing.
HELD
While the Article 12, Sec. 10 (2) may be couched in such a way as not to make
it appear that it is non-self-executing,
 In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within
its national goals and priorities.
the legislature is not precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as it is consistent with the Constitution. The SC
remarked that Article 12, Sec. 10 (2) is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. The SC added further that there is a presumption that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing and minor details may be left to the
legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions. A
provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. However, a provision which is
complete and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. A constitutional provision is self-
executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are
fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action.
Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions
Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC
FACTS
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with
public respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to
Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's
Initiative. Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power
shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations
shall be established all over the country. The Delfin Petition further alleged that the
provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of
Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is
a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" embodying the proposed
amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the
provisions concerning term limits. According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative
will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of
the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the
COMELEC
ISSUE
Whether Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
HELD
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power
shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations
shall be established all over the country. The constitutional provision on people's
initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The conclusion then is
inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. NO. Although the mode of
amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis, it is still
dependent on congressional action. While the Constitution has recognized or granted
that right, the people cannot exercise it if the Congress for whatever reason, does not
provide for its implementation.
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter
are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. It
logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations
to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under
R.A. No. 6735.
Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions
Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC
FACTS
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to
themselves as "duals" or dual citizens, pray that they and others who retained or
reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed to avail themselves of the
mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. that the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be ordered to allow them to vote
and register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189. Petitioners are successful
applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to
such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. petitioners sought registration
and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine
Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of
Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003 2, they have yet no right to vote in such
elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the
Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained
and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee
voter under R.A. 9189
HELD
As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law – R.A. 9225
– requiring “duals” to actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. The irresistible
conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee
voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. While perhaps not determinative of
the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also
to what might be tag as the next generation of "duals". This may be deduced from the
inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225.
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall
have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. xxx.
SEC 2. The Congress shall provide … a system for absentee voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad.
In effect, qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to
vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or
re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the
system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003.
 How revision is instituted
Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC
FACTS
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with
public respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to
Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's
Initiative. Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power
shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations
shall be established all over the country. The Delfin Petition further alleged that the
provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of
Article VII,8 and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is
a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" embodying the proposed
amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the
provisions concerning term limits. According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative
will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of
the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the
COMELEC
ISSUE
Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as
proposed in the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would
constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
HELD
Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods
of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were recognized, viz.,
(1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a
constitutional convention. For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we
resolved to give due course to this petition. The people's initiative is limited to
amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term
limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's
initiative. The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment
to, the Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the
Constitution, or more specifically, only those which lay term limits. Extension of term
limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not a
revision thereof. The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a
revision of, the Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it
would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to
one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an
isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections
and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public
service and prohibiting political dynasties. The foregoing considered, further
discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective
national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution
is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
 Kinds of Referendum
Lambino v. COMELEC
FACTS
Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other
groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 Constitution. the Lambino Group filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section
5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum Act. The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of
6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered
voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
its registered voters. The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI. and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
(Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory
Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. On 30 August 2006, the
Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative
ISSUE
Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a
people's initiative
HELD
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of
the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. The Initiative Petition Does Not
Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the
People. Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional
provision that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition. the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see
the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must
sign on a petition containing such full text. The signature sheet does not show to the
people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature
sheet. This admission binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt
that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the
great majority of the people who signed the signature sheets. The inescapable
conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the
full text of the proposed changes. For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people
who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes
before signing
The 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets could not have known
that their signatures would be used to discriminate against the Senators. The full text
of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition,
not after they have signed the petition. In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void
and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition. Lambino Group's initiative
constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside
the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
Kinds of Referendum
1. ) Initiative on the Constitution - Refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution
2. Initiative on statutes - Refers to a petition to enact a national legislation
3. Initiative on local legislation - Refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, municipal, city, or barangay law.
Requisites for a valid ratification
Tolentino v. COMELEC
FACTS
Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on
Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite at which the proposed constitutional
amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of
the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people
pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971. by
declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so far as they
direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the respondent
Commission (COMELEC) performed and to be done by it in obedience to the
aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for being violative of the
Constitution of the Philippines.
ISSUE
Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on
its own fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment.
HELD
The Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the
amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people
in a single "election" or plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment now
proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention
propose We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the
same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section
1 of Article XV of the Constitution.
Constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose
amendments to this Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of
amendments that Congress or the Convention may propose. The same provision also
as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution
when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification. And so also, when an amendment is
submitted to them that is to form part of the existing constitution.
Requisites for a valid ratification
De Leon v. Esguerra
FACTS
Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8,
1987 be declared null and void that respondents be prohibited from taking over their
positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively. Petitioners
maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg.
222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7,
1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have
qualified It is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate
their successors. respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue
of the aforequoted provision and not because their term of six years had not yet
expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office
of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being
inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Memorandum issued by the OIC Governor designating the
respondents to replace the petitioners from their respective positions was valid.
HELD
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that
date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded
respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the
1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their
successors
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law,
therefore, the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act
of 1982 should still govern. Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing
inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the
1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative,
pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of
instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.
Distinction between Internal and External Self-Determination
Macariola v. Asuncion
FACTS
In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged
respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte with "acts
unbecoming a judge." Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968
the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging four causes of action, to wit: [1]
that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil
Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those
properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him [2] that he likewise
violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3,
paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an
impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a
certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a
practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of
Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar d [4] that there was a culpable
defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by respondent Judge

ISSUE
Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.
HELD
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a
portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June
8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the
reglementary period, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. The
fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot
1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which he
rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated
October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer
subject of litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New
Civil Code.
People vs. Perfecto this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the
public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that
continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after
the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of
the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and
binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First
Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph
because there is no showing that respondent participated or intervened in his official
capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers Directly or indirectly having
financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection
with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is
prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest. Respondent
Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no
showing that respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the
business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. It
does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue
advantage in its business operations by reason of respondent's financial involvement
in it, or that the corporation benefited in one way or another in any case filed by or
against it in court.
On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959
(R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly
Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under
Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the
President of the Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service.
 Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as
much as possible from maintaining close friendly relations with practising attorneys
and litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that his social or business relations
or friendship constitute an element in determining his judicial course. but if a Judge
does have social relations, that in itself would not constitute a ground for disciplinary
action unless it be clearly shown that his social relations be clouded his official
actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his friends.
Mark Anthony v. Zabal et al., vs. Rodrigo R. Duterte
FACTS
Claiming that Boracay has become a cesspool, President Duterte first made
public his plan to shut it down during a business forum held in Davao sometime
February 2018. 5 This was followed by several speeches and news releases stating
that he would place Boracay under a state of calamity. This was followed by several
speeches and news releases stating that he would place Boracay under a state of
calamity. This was confirmed by then Presidential Spokesperson Harry L. Roque, Jr.
in a press briefing the following day wherein he formally announced that the total
closure of Boracay would be for a maximum period of six months starting April 26,
2018. Following this pronouncement, petitioners contend that around 630 police and
military personnel were readily deployed to Boracay including personnel for crowd
dispersal management. They also allege that the DILG had already released
guidelines for the closure. Petitioners claim that ever since the news of Boracay's
closure came about, fewer tourists had been engaging the services of Zabal and
Jacosalem such that their earnings were barely enough to feed their families.
ISSUE
Whether or not the present business or of a particular mode of living can
prevent the exercise of police power of the State
RULING
No, the assailed governmental measure in this case is within the scope of
police power cannot be disputed. Verily, the statutes from which the said measure
draws authority and the constitutional provisions which serve as its framework are
primarily concerned with the environment and health, safety, and well-being of the
people, the promotion and securing of which are clearly legitimate objectives of
governmental efforts and regulations. The motivating factor in the issuance of
Proclamation No. 475 is without a doubt the interest of the public in general.
Undoubtedly, Proclamation No. 475 is a valid police power measure. To repeat,
police power constitutes an implied limitation to the Bill of Rights, and that even
liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is subject to the far more overriding demands
and requirements of the greater number
Besides, Proclamation No. 475 does not strip Zabal and Jacosalem of their
right to work and earn a living. They are free to work and practice their trade
elsewhere. That they were not able to do so in Boracay, at least for the duration of its
closure, is a necessary consequence of the police power measure to close and
rehabilitate the island
Sama y Hinupas v. People
FACTS
Accuses DIOSDADO SAMA y HINUPAS, DEMETRIO MASANGLAY y
ACEVEDA, BANDY MASANGLAY y ACEVEDA, residents of Barangay Baras,
Baco, Oriental Mindoro with the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 705.
PO3 Villamor D. Ranee (PO3 Ranee) testified that on March 15, 2005, his
team comprised of police officers and representatives of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) surveilled Barangay Calangatan, San
Teodoro, Oriental Mindoro to address illegal logging operations in the area.
While patrolling the mountainous area of Barangay Calangatan, they heard the
sound of a chainsaw and saw a tree slowly falling down. They immediately crossed
the river and traced the source of the sound. In the area where the sound was coming
from, they caught the accused in the act of cutting a dita tree. They also saw a bolo
stuck to the tree that had been cut
The team inquired from the accused if they had a license to cut down the tree.
The latter replied they had none. After informing the accused of their violation, the
team invited them to the police station for further investigation. The team left the
illegally cut tree in the area because it was too heavy. Pictures of the accused and the
cut down tree were also taken.
ISSUE
Whether or not the IP rights to preserve cultural integrity and claim or title to
ancestral domains and land are subject to the State’s police power
RULING
Section 77 of PD 705, as amended is an exercise of police power, the validity
of which is not negated by the fact that the objects thereof are owned by those charged
with the offense, a police power measure is judged by the traditional test, the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
exercise of the police power. Police power trumps objections on the basis of
ownership
As police power invariably trumps ownership, the subject IP rights are not
themselves the same as the ownership proscribed as a defense in this type of offense.
Section 77 as a police power measure was legislated - the protection and promotion of
a healthy and clean ecology and environment through sustainable use of timber and
other forest products.
GENUINO, et al. vs. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA
FACTS
On March 19, 1998, then DOJ Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III issued DOJ
Circular No. 17, prescribing rules and regulations governing the issuance of HDOs.
The said issuance was intended to restrain the indiscriminate issuance of HDOs which
impinge on the people's right to travel.
On April 23, 2007, former DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez issued DOJ
Circular No. 18, prescribing rules and regulations governing the issuance and
implementation of watchlist orders. In particular, it provides for the power of the DOJ
Secretary to issue a Watchlist Order (WLO) against persons with criminal cases
pending preliminary investigation or petition for review before the DOJ. Further, it
states that the DOJ Secretary may issue an ADO to a person subject of a WLO who
intends to leave the country for some exceptional reasons.6 Even with the
promulgation of DOJ Circular No. 18, however, DOJ Circular No. 17 remained the
governing rule on the issuance of HDOs by the DOJ.
On May 25, 2010, then Acting DOJ Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued the
assailed DOJ Circular No. 41, consolidating DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18, which will
govern the issuance and implementation of HDOs, WLOS, and ADOs. Section 10 of
DOJ Circular No. 41 expressly repealed all rules and regulations contained in DOJ
Circular Nos. 17 and 18, as well as all instructions, issuances or orders or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with its provisions.
After the expiration of GMA's term as President of the Republic of the
Philippines and her subsequent election as Pampanga representative, criminal
complaints were filed against her before the DOJ.
GMA requested for the issuance of an ADO, pursuant to Section 7 of DOJ
Circular No. 41, so that she may be able to seek medical attention from medical
specialists abroad for her hypoparathyroidism and metabolic bone mineral disorder.
ISSUE
Whether or not the DOJ can issue DOJ circular under the guise of police
power
RULING
No, Police power may only be validly exercised if (a) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. On its own, the DOJ cannot wield police power since the authority
pertains to Congress. Even if it claims to be exercising the same as the alter ego of the
President, it must first establish the presence of a definite legislative enactment
evidencing the delegation of power from its principal. This, the DOJ failed to do.
There is likewise no showing that the curtailment of the right to travel imposed by
DOJ Circular No. 41 was reasonably necessary in order for it to perform its
investigatory duties.
In any case, the exercise of police power, to be valid, must be reasonable and
not repugnant to the Constitution.116 It must never be utilized to espouse actions that
violate the Constitution. Any act, however noble its intentions, is void if it violates the
Constitution.117 In the clear language of the Constitution, it is only in the interest of
national security, public safety and public health that the right to travel may be
impaired. None one of the mentioned circumstances was invoked by the DOJ as its
premise for the promulgation of DOJ Circular No. 41.
City of Manila v. Judge Laguio
FACTS
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a
corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging
houses.5 It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.6 On 28 June
1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 (RTC Petition) with the
lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo
S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of
Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.
MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its
enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria
Court considering that these were not establishments for "amusement" or
"entertainment" and they were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did
they use women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the
community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and moral welfare
of the community.
MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional
for the following reasons
1.) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels
2.) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
49913 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial
zone with certain restrictions
3.) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the
compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate
municipal interests sought to be protected
4.) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation
of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its enactment
5.) The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights
ISSUE
Whether or not the Ordinance has the power to exercise police power
RULING

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional
infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure
and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means employed for the
accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even under
the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is
against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in
derogation of a common right.
Acosta v. Ochoa
FACTS
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and
two of its members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural
and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to
challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance, and to seek the issuance of
provisional reliefs through a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable
exercise of police power.
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power
under the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code; that the ordinance,
being based on a valid classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause;
that aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of pesticides application because
it exposed the residents to a higher degree of health risk caused by aerial drift.
It ruled that the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone within and around
the agricultural plantations under Section 6 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 constituted
taking of property without due process because the landowners were thereby
compelled to cede portions of their property without just compensation; that the
exercise of police power to require the buffer zone was invalid because there was no
finding that the 30-meter surrounding belt was obnoxious to the public welfare; and
that, accordingly, Ordinance No. 0309-07 was unconstitutional because of the absence
of a separability clause.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07, SERIES OF 2007 IS
OPPRESSIVE AND AN UNREASONABLE EXERCISE OF DELEGATED
POLICE POWER
RULING
The City of Davao explains that it had the authority to enact the assailed
ordinance because it would thereby protect the environment and regulate property and
business in the interest of the general welfare pursuant to Section 458 of the Local
Government Code;35 that the ordinance was enacted to carry out its mandate of
promoting the public welfare under the General Welfare Clause.
The City of Davao insists that it validly exercised police power because it does
not thereby oblige the shift from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying; that the
respondents only choose boom spraying to justify the alleged impracticability of the
transition period by erroneously adding the months required for each of the stages
without considering other steps that may be simultaneously undertaken
The City of Davao contends that the imposition of the 30-meter buffer zone is
a valid exercise of police power, rendering the claim for just compensation untenable;
that the maintenance of the buffer zone does not require the respondents to cede a
portion of their landholdings; that the planting of diversified trees within the buffer
zone will serve to insulate the residents from spray drift; that such buffer zone does
not deprive the landowners of the lawful and beneficial use of their property; and that
the buffer zone is consistent with the Constitution, which reminds property owners
that the use of property bears a social function
The respondents submit that the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone
under Section 5 of the ordinance constitutes an improper exercise of police power;
that the ordinance will require all landholdings to maintain the buffer zone, thereby
diminishing to a mere 1,600 square meters of usable and productive land for every
hectare of the plantation bounding residential areas, with the zone being reserved for
planting "diversified trees;" that this requirement amounts to taking without just
compensation or due process; and that the imposition of the buffer zone unduly
deprives all landowners within the City of Davao the beneficial use of their property
To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a
two-pronged test: the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance is enacted within the
corporate powers of the local government unit, and whether it is passed in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by law); and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent
merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution
and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its
consistency with public policy)
In the State's exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may
be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
Government.110 A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its
police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
EMINENT DOMAIN
Rep. of the Philippines vs. Jose Gamir-Consuelo Diaz
FACTS
Jose Gamir-Consuelo Diaz Heirs Association, Inc. (respondent) is a duly
incorporated corporation composed of the heirs of Jose Gamir and Consuelo Diaz. It
was the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 1,836 square meters
covered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-7550.
On August 9, 2005, after a series of negotiations, respondent and the Republic
of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH), executed a Deed of Absolute Sale where it was agreed that
respondent would sell the above-mentioned property to petitioner in consideration of
P275,099.24. The property was eventually registered in petitioner's name under TCT
No. T-3906396 after respondent's receipt of the full consideration. The said parcel of
land forms part of Sta. Ana Avenue, a national road
On November 15, 2006, respondent filed a Complaint before the RTC. It
alleged that the subject parcel of land was taken by the DPWH sometime in 1957; the
value of P275,099.24 as just compensation stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale, was
based on the value of the property in 1957; it made verbal and written demands to
petitioner for the payment of interest from 1957; and it had a right to receive interest
because the DPWH had not paid just compensation when it occupied the property in
1957
ISSUE
WHETHER RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE PAYMENT OF
INTEREST NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABSENCE OF ANY STIPULATION IN
THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE WITH PETITIONER.
RULING
It is worth highlighting that the Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner and
respondent does not contain any provision or stipulation for the payment of interest.
Neither did respondent make any reservation for it to claim interest
In other words, reliance on the terms of written contract is practicable because
it is understood that whatever stipulations appearing therein was a result of
negotiation, posturing and bargaining between the parties. Whatever is not included in
the document is deemed waived or abandoned
 Without prompt payment, the compensation cannot be considered just. In
other words, just compensation in the context of eminent domain or expropriation
proceedings pertains to the timely or prompt payment of an adequate value sufficient
to recoup the loss suffered by the property owner.
Provided all the requisites for its exercise are present, a private individual
cannot resist the state's exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain.
Nevertheless, there is nothing that precludes the government from entering into a
negotiated sale with a private landowner to acquire a property to be devoted for a
public purpose
As above-mentioned, expropriation and voluntary sale have different legal
effects, especially considering that in the latter, the parties could freely negotiate the
terms and conditions of the contract, i.e., they could include a stipulation concerning
the payment of interest. In addition, in entering into a voluntary purchase or sale, the
state does not exercise its power of eminent domain
In sum, the award of legal interest in cases where the government acquires
private property through voluntary sale is not a matter of law. Unlike in cases where
the state exercises its power of eminent domain or a party initiates expropriation
proceedings and other similar actions, in negotiated sale, there is an existing contract
that governs the relations of the parties and determines their respective rights and
obligations
Lloyds Richfield Industrial Corp. v. National Power Corp
FACTS
Lloyds Richfield is a cement manufacturing corporation. With a plant site in
Danao City, it purchased parcels of land within its vicinity and quarried limestones
from these areas, which would then be used to manufacture cement.
Sometime before June 25, 1996, the National Power Corporation entered into
negotiations with Lloyds Richfield to create an easement of right of way over the
parcels of land. Transmission lines would be constructed over the parcels of land for
the 230 KV Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project. A location map drawn by the
National Power Corporation depicted the lots that would be affected by the project,
with the lots owned by Lloyds Richfield denominated as Lot Nos. 1859, 1861, 1860,
1833, 1832, 1830, and 1829
 When negotiations failed, the National Power Corporation filed a Complaint
for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Danao City. It also filed an ex
parte motion, upon which the trial court issued a Writ of Possession allowing it to take
immediate possession of Lloyds Richfield's properties
Lloyds Richfield initially moved to dismiss the case, but the trial court denied
it.13 It then filed its Answer, demanding by way of compulsory claim that the
National Power Corporation pay the fair market value of the parcels of land, since the
construction of transmission lines over its properties would render the properties
useless to it. It also demanded to be paid the fair market value ofthe limestone
deposits in the parcels of land.
ISSUE
Whether or not Lloyds Richfield Industrial Corporation is entitled to just
compensation for the value of the limestone deposits found in its lots.
RULING
No, Lloyds Richfield, however, is not entitled to just compensation for the
limestone deposits in its properties. Under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution,
the State owns all minerals found in Philippine soil. While Lloyds Richfield has title
to the properties, it does not own the minerals underneath them, as shown by the
permits and the Mineral Production Sharing Agreement it had to secure from the
government to conduct quarrying activities in its properties.
Court cited Republic V. Court of Appeals wherein, Thus, if a person is the
owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such
land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the
permission of the State to which such minerals belong
For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just
compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make
the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has
always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the
owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the
230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the
use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use
 Private respondents recognize the inherent power of eminent domain being
exercised by NPC when it finally consented to the expropriation of the said portion of
their land, subject however to payment of just compensation. No matter how laudable
NPC's purpose is, for which expropriation was sought, it is just and equitable that they
be compensated the fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the
measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity

Republic of the Philippines v. Jorge Castillo

FACTS
The Solicitor General, filed a Complaint for Expropriation, before the CFI of
Dagupan City against respondents, who are coowners of the subject property with an
area of 11,585 sqm.
Respondents Sofia and Alipio filed an Appearance and Manifestation and
opposed the valuation made by petitioner RP because it was based on the 1974 tax
declaration and not on the current fair market value for the year 1980.
Respondents Benjamin and Estela filed their Answer and further averred that
the basis for computing just compensation of private property shall be the current and
fair market value declared by the owner. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case
before the trial court, respondent Alipio died and was substituted by his heirs. They
further averred that under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 76, the basis for computing
just compensation of private property shall be the current and fair market value
declared by the owner.
On April 9, 1986, respondent Benjamin filed an Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss
claiming that for almost six years, petitioner RP had not taken any step to further
prosecute the case. Thereafter, on August 27, 1987, petitioner RP filed a Motion to
Revive and Set Case for Hearing since it had already identified the heirs of deceased
respondents.
The RTC denied Benjamin and Estela's Motion to Set Aside Order dated
September 11, 1987 for lack of merit. On May 26, 1992, the RTC rendered its
Decision dismissing the Amended Complaint and ordering petitioner RP to restore the
possession of the subject property with a total area of 2,000 sqm to the respondents.
The CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision dated May 26, 1992. 21 The case
was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings and to compute just compensation.
ISSUE
Whether or not the computation of just compensation is in 1980
RULING
As correctly observed by the CA, other than the testimonial evidence of Perla,
no other evidence was presented by the petitioner RP to establish that the taking of the
subject property was in 1947. On the other hand, the evidence of the respondents, that
is, the tax declaration, clearly shows that until the year 1990, they religiously paid the
real property tax of the subject property which means that they were not dispossessed
of the use thereof. As between the filing of the original Complaint and Amended
Complaint, we rule that the computation of just compensation should be reckoned
from the time of the filing of the original Complaint, that is, on September 5, 1980.
Evidently, there was no actual taking in this case prior to the filing of the Complaint,
thus, the time of taking should be reckoned from the filing of the Complaint. Hence,
the value of the property at the time of filing of the original Complaint on September
5, 1980, and not the filing of the Amended Complaint in 1989, should be considered
in determining the just compensation due to the respondents.

Republic v. Jose Gamir-Consuelo Diaz Heirs Association, Inc

FACTS
Jose Gamir-Consuelo Diaz Heirs Association, Inc. (respondent) is a duly
incorporated corporation composed of the heirs of Jose Gamir and Consuelo Diaz. It
was the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 1,836 square meters
covered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-7550.
On August 9, 2005, after a series of negotiations, respondent and the Republic
of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH), executed a Deed of Absolute Sale where it was agreed that
respondent would sell the above-mentioned property to petitioner in consideration of
P275,099.24. The property was eventually registered in petitioner's name under TCT
No. T-3906396 after respondent's receipt of the full consideration. The said parcel of
land forms part of Sta. Ana Avenue, a national road.
On November 15, 2006, respondent filed a Complaint8 before the RTC. It
alleged that the subject parcel of land was taken by the DPWH sometime in 1957; the
value of P275,099.24 as just compensation stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale, was
based on the value of the property in 1957; it made verbal and written demands to
petitioner for the payment of interest from 1957; and it had a right to receive interest
because the DPWH had not paid just compensation when it occupied the property in
1957.
CA DECISION
The appellate court noted that petitioner had been occupying respondent's
property since 1957 and it was only in 2005 when the parties entered into a contract of
sale for the said lot. It explained that the Deed of Absolute Sale was not equivalent to
the constitutionally mandated just compensation because it refers not only to the
correct amount to be paid but also the payment within a reasonable time from the
taking. The CA expounded that without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered just if the property is taken immediately because the property owner
suffers the immediate deprivation of both the land and the fruits and income thereto
The CA elucidated that the Deed of Absolute Sale cannot be taken as a waiver
of the payment of interest because the determination of just compensation in eminent
domain cases is a judicial function and the taking of the property was done in the
exercise of the state's inherent power of eminent domain
ISSUE
WHETHER RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE PAYMENT OF
INTEREST NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABSENCE OF ANY STIPULATION IN
THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE WITH PETITIONER.
RULING
It is worth highlighting that the Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner and
respondent does not contain any provision or stipulation for the payment of interest.
Neither did respondent make any reservation for it to claim interest. Under Section 9,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon.
In other words, reliance on the terms of written contract is practicable because
it is understood that whatever stipulations appearing therein was a result of
negotiation, posturing and bargaining between the parties. Whatever is not included in
the document is deemed waived or abandoned.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the Deed of Absolute Sale between
petitioner and respondent does not contain any provision regarding the payment of
interest. Petitioner agreed to convey its property upon full payment of the purchase
price without reservation for any claim of interest
City of Davao v. AP Holdings, Inc
FACTS
AP Holdings, Inc. (APHI) entitled to a refund or credit of the 0.55% local
business taxes it paid to petitioner City of Davao for the dividends it earned from its
San Miguel Corporation (SMC) preferred shares and interests from its money market
placements for the taxable year 2010
The Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) under Presidential Decree 582
(PD 582) is a fund from part of the levy imposed on the initial sale by coconut
farmers of copra and other coconut products. Pursuant to PD 582's mandate, the CIIF
was invested in six (6) oil mills, the CIIF Oil Mills Group (CIIF OMG).
Over time, APHI received cash and stock dividends from its SMC preferred
shares. These dividends were deposited in a trust account which earned interest from
money market placements.5 In 1986, APHI's SMC shares were sequestered by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government. Subsequently, cases were filed before
this Court questioning the ownership of the CIIF, CIIF OMG, the fourteen (14)
holding companies and the SMC shares held by them. One of these cases was G.R.
Nos. 177857-58, entitled "Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. Republic
of the Philippines."6 In 2011, petitioner City of Davao, through its City Treasurer,
issued a Business Tax Order of Payment directing APID to pay 0.55% local business
tax in the amount of P723,531.50. Pursuant to Section 69(f) of the 2005 Revenue
Code of the City of Davao, the tax was assessed on the dividends and interests APID
earned from its SMC preferred shares and money market placements, respectively.
APHI paid the assessment under protest. Subsequently, it filed an administrative
claim for refund or tax credit with the City Treasurer. Claiming that the City
Treasurer failed to act on the protest, APHI filed a petition for review with the
Regional Trial Court
The Regional Trial Court's Decision
The trial court ruled that APHI's primary purpose in its Amended Articles of
Incorporation resembles the definition of a financial intermediary under Section
4101Q.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions, and,
hence, taxable under Section 69(f) of the 2005 Revenue Code of the City of Davao
The Court of Tax Appeals En Banc's Decision
The CTA En Banc reversed and declared APHI entitled to a tax refund or
credit. It found that APHI was not a non-bank financial intermediary. APHI belonged
to the CIIF block of SMC shares, which were declared to be owned by the
government, thus, any tax imposed upon it is a tax on the government.21 Under
Section 133 (o) of the LGC, local government units cannot tax the National
Government.
ISSUE
As a CIIF holding company, is APHI liable to pay local business taxes on its
dividend earnings from its SMC preferred shares?
RULING
The Court ordained that RAVI, a CIIF holding company like APHI, was
exclusively established to own and hold SMC shares of stock. As such, it is not liable
to pay local business taxes on the dividends earned from its SMC preferred shares as
the same shares are government assets owned by the national government for the
benefit of the coconut industry.
As observed in the COCOFED case, RAVI is a CIIF holding company. The
SMC preferred shares held by it are considered government assets owned by the
National Government for the coconut industry. As held in the same case, these SMC
shares as well as any resulting dividends or increments from said shares are owned by
the National Government and shall be used only for the benefit of the coconut farmers
and for the development of the coconut industry. Thus, RAVI's management of the
dividends from the SMC preferred shares, including placing the same in a trust
account yielding interest, is not tantamount to doing business whether as a bank or
other financial institution, i.e., an NBFI, but rather an activity that is essential to its
nature as a CIIF holding company.
Verily, therefore, CIIF holding companies, including APHI itself and the
entire CIIF block of SMC shares, are public assets owned by the Republic of the
Philippines. Consequently, dividends and any income from these shares are also
owned by the Republic.26 On this score, APHI cannot be considered as a non-bank
financial intermediary since its investment and placement of funds are not done in a
regular or recurring manner for the purpose of earning profit. Rather, its management
of dividends from the SMC shares is only in furtherance of its purpose as a CIIF
holding company for the benefit of the Republic.
All told, the City of Davao acted beyond its taxing authority when it imposed the
questioned business tax on APHI.

La Sallian Educational Innovators Foundation (De La Salle University-College

Of St. Benilde) Inc., v. Commissioner Of Internal Revenue
FACTS
Petitioner La Sallian Educational Innovators Foundation, Inc. (De La Salle
University-College of St. Benilde Foundation)/for brevity) is a non-stock, non-profit
domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.4
Respondent is the Commissioner of Internal Revenue who has the power to decide,
cancel, and abate tax liabilities pursuant to Section 204(B) of the Tax Code, as
amended.5
On June 17, 2005, respondent issued two (2) Assessment Notices, both
numbered 33-FY 05-31-02, for fiscal year ending May 31, 2002.1âшphi1 The notices
have demand letters against petitioner for deficiency income tax. The alleged
deficiency income tax is in the amount of P122,414,521.70, inclusive of interest.
Respondent alleged that the petitioner Foundation has already lost its tax-
exempt status, malting it liable to deficiency income tax
Pursuant to section 30 of the NIRC, "Notwithstanding the provisions in the
preceding Paragraphs, the income of whatever kind and character of the foregoing
organizations from any of their properties, real or personal, or from any of their
activities conducted for profit [r]egardless of the disposition made by such income,
shall be subject to tax imposed under this Code
On the other hand, petitioner Foundation consistently argued that it enjoys a
tax-exempt status from all taxes as a non-stock, non-profit educational institution as
expressly provided under Paragraph 4, Section 4, Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution (All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institution
used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxes and duties)
Furthermore, petitioner Foundation's claim that all the said income is actually,
directly and exclusively used or earmarked for promoting its educational purpose and
not a single centavo inure to the benefit of any of the Foundation's members, trustees
and officers
Ruling of the CTA Division
The CTA Division also ruled that there's nothing in the Foundation's books
that will show that it operated for profit or that any of its income inured to the benefit
of its members or trustees.23 The CTA Division found that (1) petitioner Foundation
maintained its tax-exempt status under Section 4, Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution, and (2) the Final Assessment Notices issued by respondent against
petitioner Foundation are not valid for failing to state their legal and factual basis
hence, all other issues raised are moot and academic
Ruling of the CTA En Banc
The CTA En Banc ruled that the CTA Division should not have given due
course to petitioner Foundation's petition for review.33 Payment of docket fees and
other legal fees within the thirty (30)-day reglementary period to appeal is mandatory
and jurisdictional. The CTA En Banc emphasized that petitioner Foundation's tax
exempt status has been impliedly revoked due to its excessive profit-earning activities
ISSUE
WHETHER THE PETITIONER FOUNDATION HAS LOST ITS TAX-
EXEMPT STATUS UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
WHETHER THE CTA EN BANC COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE CTA
DIVISION DATED JULY 16, 2010 AND RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 18,
2010
RULING
1. ) Furthermore, a simple reading of the Constitution would show that Article XIV,
Section 4 (3) does not require that the revenues and income must have also been
earned from educational activities or activities related to the purposes of an
educational institution. In the instant case, petitioner Foundation firmly and
adequately argued that none of its income inured to the benefit of any officer or entity.
Instead, its income has been actually, exclusively and directly used for performing its
purpose as an educational institution. Thus, the tax exempt status of petitioner
Foundation under the 1987 Constitution is clear.
2.) Evidently, petitioner Foundation, being a non-stock, non-profit educational
institution, is not liable to the payment of VAT deficiency assessment, and the CTA
En Banc erred in finding otherwise and in reversing the CTA Division