Developmental Psychology Copyright 1991 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

1991, Vol. 27, No. 2,321-329 0012-1649/9i/$3.00

Children's Reasoning About Three Authority Attributes:

Adult Status, Knowledge, and Social Position
Marta Laupa
University of California, Berkeley

The study examined the development of authority concepts with regard to three attributes of
authority figures: adult status, knowledge, and social position. Subjects (40 male, 40 female) in
Grades 1-7, from schools with programs that place children in positions of authority, were inter-
viewed to assess their evaluations ofcommands from single individuals possessing different author-
ity attributes and their choices between different individuals who gave opposing commands. Sub-
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jects weighted both social position and knowledge more heavily than adult status in judging legiti-
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macy and obedience and in choosing between individuals giving opposing commands. Children
are not primarily oriented toward obedience to adults but are able to conceptualize the social-or-
ganizational role of authority, as well as authorities' relevant knowledge. Their understanding
of authority is linked to the development of underlying concepts of social organization and in-
stitutions.

Psychologists have long been interested in the influence of
authorityfigures,especially parents and teachers, on children's
social development and behavior (Baumrind, 1968,1975). Re-
cently, researchers have recognized the importance of under-
standing how children themselves think about authority rela-
tions. Children's concepts of authorities and their commands
werefirstdirectly studied by Damon (1977) and then by others
(Laupa & Turiel, 1986; Smetana, 1988; Tisak, 1986; Weston &
Turiel, 1980). This body of research has demonstrated that chil-
dren's authority concepts are complex and differentiated. Chil-
dren take into account the type of command issued, the attri-
butes of the authority figure, and the social setting when mak-
ing authority judgments. There are three attributes of authority
figures that have been shown to be central to children's author-
ity judgments and that have not been given much attention in
previous research: adult status, knowledge, and social position.
The present study investigates the degree to which children are
capable of distinguishing these attributes and how these attri-
butes are coordinated in their authority judgments.
Recent findings are in contrast to the traditional view that
young children have a one-sided orientation toward adults as
authorities that is based on a reverence for age, size, and power
(Piaget, 1932/1965). Studies have shown, first, that children do
This article was based on Marta Laupa's doctoral dissertation at the
University of California, Berkeley. Portions of this article were pre-
sented at the meetings of the Society for Research in Child Develop-
ment in Baltimore, (April 1987) and the Jean Piaget Society meeting in
Philadelphia (June 1988). This research was supported by National
Institute of Mental Health Grant 5T32HDO7181.
I would like to thank the principals, John Healy and James Turner,
and the teachers, staff, and students of Washington Elementary School
and Lincoln Middle School, Alameda, California, for their coopera-
tion in this research.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Marta Laupa, who is now at the Graduate School of Education,
UCLA, Los Angeles, California 90024.
321
not judge authorities to have absolute power but make judg-
ments about their legitimacy on the basis of the nature of the
commands they give. For example, Damon (1977) found that
children accepted parental commands regarding acts like
cleaning one's room but did not accept commands to steal or
cause harm. Tisak (1986) found that children judged parents as
more legitimate in making rules prohibiting stealing than ones
regulating family chores or children's friendships. The fact that
children reject authorities when they issue commands that
would cause harm is an indication that in their reasoning chil-
dren are not solely oriented toward obedience to authority but
draw boundaries regarding what they consider to be acceptable
acts.
A second finding of recent studies is that in making legiti-
macy judgments children take into account psychological and
social attributes of authorities. Damon (1977) found that chil-
dren accept peers in positions of authority because they have
special knowledge or skills. In addition, Laupa and Turiel
(1986) found that children take into account social-organiza-
tional position (e.g., whether the individual was hired for or
chosen to do the job) in making judgments of legitimacy. These
findings suggest that children are not oriented toward one par-
ticular attribute of an individual in making judgments of legiti-
macy but focus on different attributes in different contexts.
The finding that children reason about the social position of
authorities shows that authority is conceptualized by children
within the context of a social system. This aspect of children's
reasoning has not been investigated thus far, probably because
studies have looked at children's reasoning about authority
within the context of family and interpersonal relationships
(Damon, 1977; Selman, 1980; Smetana, 1988; Youniss & Smol-
lar, 1985). Although an understanding of authority does involve
knowledge of authority interactions within interpersonal rela-
tionships, it also involves knowledge of social systems and insti-
tutions and the hierarchical relations of individuals within
them. Our characterization of children's authority concepts
 322 MARTA LAUPA
needs to be broadened to include their understandings of social
organization.
Although children's reasoning about authority with respect to
command type has been explored extensively in recent years,
their reasoning about the three factors of adult status, knowl-
edge, and social position needs further exploration. We know
that children rely on these attributes in making authority judg-
ments. For example, children take into account the social posi-
tion of a teacher at school when judging his or her legitimacy.
We do not know the extent to which young children are capable
of distinguishing these attributes; do children know that there
are adults who do not have a social position at school? We also
do not know how children of different ages coordinate different
attributes in their reasoning about authority. For example, is
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social position or knowledge alone enough to confer legitimacy
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on an authority, or must she or he have both knowledge and
social position?
Children's reasoning cannot be globally characterized as fo-
cused solely on a single attribute at any given age level. However,
children of different ages may differ in the importance they give
to different attributes, alone or in combination. Evidence of this
is found in the Laupa and Turiel study (1986), which was done
at a primary school in which children were given positions of
authority over their peers during recess. This school provided a
setting in which to investigate children's reasoning about peer
and adult status of authorities where children held positions of
authority very much like that of adults. Subjects in this study
were asked to choose between individuals with different combi-
nations of attributes who gave opposing commands. All sub-
jects gave preference to a child with a social position over an
adult without social position (a peer authority over an adult who
does not work for the school). However, there was an age differ-
ence in responses to a comparison of an adult without a social
position to a child without a social position. In this case, first
grade children chose the adult, while fifth grade children were
equally divided between the two. Although all these subjects
recognized adult status as a legitimizing attribute, younger chil-
dren gave it more weight in the absence of social position. This
indicates that although subjects at all ages may recognize these
legitimizing attributes, their relative importance may change
with age.
A related issue is the degree to which children are able to
differentiate these three attributes in their reasoning about au-
thority. With respect to the age difference mentioned above
(that young children give priority to individuals on the basis of
adult status), the younger children may have been making an
inference that the adult has superior knowledge and not focus-
ing on her adult status, per se. It is possible that young children
do not differentiate these attributes in'their reasoning and are
thus unable to conceive of an adult or an individual with social
position as lacking knowledge.
The aim of the present research was to examine the develop-
ment of children's concepts of authority in relation to their un-
derstanding of social organizations and social systems. This
was done by focusing on the three attributes that are ones chil-
dren spontaneously generate when questioned about adult and
peer authorities at home and in the institution of the school:
adult/peer status, knowledge, and social-organizational posi-
tion (Damon, 1977; Laupa & Turiel, 1986). There were three
interrelated issues of interest. First, to what extent do children
understand and differentiate the three attributes? Second, what
attributes are important to children in making judgments
about individuals' legitimacy as authorities? Third, how are
these attributes weighed by children when put in opposition?
The research was conducted in an elementary school and a
middle school that had peers in positions of authority. This
made it possible to interview children who had experience with
a system that placed children in positions of authority. In addi-
tion, it provided a context in which authorities have well de-
fined social positions, so that children's reasoning about this
attribute could be assessed.
The interview included questions about a situation in which
children argue about turn-taking on the school playground.
The turn-taking situation was used for three reasons. First, it
has been used in a previous study (Laupa & Turiel, 1986) in
which it was shown that subjects would accept this as a situation
in which intervention by an outside party is necessary and de-
sirable in order to resolve the dispute. Second, it provided a
context in which different commands could be presented which
lead to the same end point. That is, the dispute could be re-
solved by telling one child to go first and the other next, with
both children taking a turn at the activity. Thus subjects could
be asked to compare two individuals issuing opposing, but
equivalent, commands (one chooses one child to go first, the
other the other child). In this way we could assess how children
compare individuals with different authority attributes, allow-
ing subjects to focus on the attributes themselves and not on
features of the command. Third, the event is one which occurs
often on the playground at school and is often resolved by an
authority issuing an arbitrary command.
Method
Subjects and Setting
The subjects were 80 children, 60 from a public elementary school
and 20 from a public middle school, each of which had a peer authority
program. The subjects were not in peer authority positions and con-
sisted of 10 boys and 10 girls from each of four grades:firstgrade (M= 7
years), third grade (M = 8 years, 8 months),fifthgrade (M= 10 years, 10
months), and seventh grade (M = 13 years, 1 month). The subjects were
of mixed ethnic backgrounds (Black, Hispanic, and White). The sub-
jects from the elementary school were primarily from working-class
economic backgrounds, and the subjects from the middle school were
primarily from middle-class economic backgrounds.
In the elementary school the peer authorities, referred to as conflict
managers, were fourth and fifth graders who were taught a problem-
solving method for resolving arguments that might occur among chil-
dren on the playground during lunch and recess periods. In the middle
school the peer authorities, referred to as the honor patrol, were seventh
and eighth graders who were taught to approach students in any grade
who were violating the rules during lunch and recess and give them
written citations.
Design and Procedures
Children were administered an interview in which they were asked
to judge individuals with different attributes who intervene in an argu-
ment about turn-taking between children on the school playground. In
each case the individual chooses one child to take the first turn, the
 AUTHORITY CONCEPTS
other the second turn. For elementary school subjects the situation
described two children who simultaneously arrive at a slide and argue
as to who will use it first. For middle school subjects the situation
described two children who simultaneously arrive at the line for ice
cream in the cafeteria and argue as to who will go first.
The aim of the study was to investigate children's capacity to weigh
and coordinate authority attributes in making judgments of legitimacy
and obedience. Because children's authority judgments already have
been shown to vary in accord with the type of command issued (Laupa
& Turiel, 1986), the present study was designed to examine not how
authority attributes interact with the type of command in children's
judgments but how children differentiate and coordinate important
authority attributes apart from the type of command issued.
We presented to subjects individuals who issue commands in con-
crete situations. We asked about specific situations, rather than ques-
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tioning children abstractly (e.g., "This is a teacher. Can a teacher tell
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you what to do?"), because it has been shown by previous research
(Laupa & Turiel, 1986; Smetana, 1988; Tisak, 1988; Weston & Turiel,
1980) that children's judgments vary to a great extent dependent on the
specific type of command issued by authorityfigures.In order to study
children's capacities to distinguish authority attributes, we designed
the interview in such a way as to maximize subjects' reliance on author-
ity attributes and minimize their reliance on aspects of the command
in making their authority judgments. We used a "neutral" event, turn-
taking, which enabled subjects to focus solely on the attributes of the
individual and not on the type of command issued, (e.g., whether or not
the command conflicts with moral demands), when making their au-
thority judgments.
By using one event we were able to present many combinations of
authority attributes for subjects to compare. Furthermore, this type of
event allowed us to present different individuals giving opposing but
equivalent commands, for purposes of comparison of individuals with
different attributes. Given this study's purpose of assessing children's
competence, the conclusions that could be drawn from the use of one
event would depend on the findings. Whereas findings of lack of dif-
ferentiation would be difficult to interpret in the absence of a range of
events, positive findings would yield information regarding children's
ability to differentiate and coordinate authority attributes.
Children were interviewed individually for approximately 50 min.
Interviews were administered to some first and third graders in two
sessions. Assessments were divided into three components. First, the
children's evaluations of turn-taking were assessed in order to deter-
mine whether subjects judged it important that both children get a
turn. Second, a set of questions dealt with the legitimacy of and obe-
dience to commands by eight individuals who varied with respect to
the presence or absence of the three attributes of adult status, knowl-
edge, and social position. These questions were used in order to deter-
mine which attributes, alone or in combination, are considered neces-
sary by subjects to confer legitimacy on an individual issuing a com-
mand. Third, children's choices in six paired comparisons between
different persons giving commands were assessed. These included
persons who varied with respect to the three attributes of interest.
These questions were used in order to determine which attributes are
most important to subjects in making judgments of legitimacy and
obedience.
Assessments and Coding
Evaluation of turn-taking. Assessments were first made of subjects'
evaluations of turn-taking. They were asked whether there is a school
rule regarding the act, and, if so, whether a transgression (failure to
take turns) would be all right in the absence of a rule, and why. An
alternative assessment was used with those children who stated, in
response to the first question, that there was no school rule. They were
323
directly asked whether failure to take turns is or is not all right and why.
For all children, responses were coded as to positive or negative evalua-
tion of the transgression (i.e., the act would or would not be all right to
do in the absence of a school rule). Justifications for the evaluations
were scored by using a system formulated previously by Davidson,
Turiel, and Black (1983; see Results for categories used in this study).
Commands of single individuals. To ascertain children's judgments
about the legitimacy of authority commands and rationales for obe-
dience, they were then presented with separate stories and questions
about eight individuals with varying attributes. In the successive story
variations the names of the children and the day of occurrence were
changed so that subjects would not interpret it as one continuing event
with a succession of persons attempting to intervene. The individuals
were a teacher, a peer authority, an incompetent teacher, an incompe-
tent peer authority, a former teacher, a former peer authority, a lady,
and a child. These eight individuals include every possible combina-
tion of the three attributes of adult status, knowledge, and social posi-
tion. For example, the teacher has all three attributes: adult status,
knowledge, and social position. The peer authority has knowledge and
social position but lacks adult status, and so forth.
Each individual was described in detail to the subject. The individ-
uals presented as incompetent (incompetent teacher and incompetent
peer authority) were described as new on the job and lacking the knowl-
edge to handle arguments among children. The individuals lacking
social position (former teacher and former peer authority) were de-
scribed as "last year's teacher" and "last year's peer authority" who no
longer hold an authority position. The lady was described as a lady who
lives across the street from the school, who is not a teacher, and who has
no children. The child was described as a child who attends the school.
Pictures were used with subjects in Grades 1-5 in order to facilitate
understanding. The subjects were questioned as necessary in order to
ascertain their understanding of the individual's attributes or lack of
attributes (e.g., "This is Mrs. Roberts. She is a new teacher. This is her
first day. Did you know that sometimes teachers are brand new and it is
their first day? She is so new that she does not know what to do when
children have arguments on the playground. Are there ever teachers
who don't know what to do when children argue? Is she a teacher? Does
she know what to do when children argue?"). The interview continued
when the subject indicated that he or she knew the attributes of the
person presented.
In each story the individual intervening told one of the children to go
first in line.' Following each story variation, children were asked (a) to
evaluate the command ("Do you think it is all right that X told them
that?"), (b) to explain what gives the command legitimacy ("How come
X can tell them that?"), (c) whether the command should be obeyed
("Should they do what X tells them?"), and (d) the reasons for obedience
("Why should they do what X tells them?"). Thus, the legitimacy and
obedience questions each had two components: (1) judgments (yes/no)
and (2) justifications (why?). Each subject was presented with the indi-
viduals in a randomly determined order.
Evaluations of the legitimacy of the command and responses to
whether the command should be obeyed (Component 1) were coded as
positive, negative, or inconsistent (subject changes mind repeatedly or
cannot come to a decision). The reasons provided for the evaluations of
legitimacy and obedience (Component 2) were scored with the coding
' Some subjects rejected the type of command given by the individ-
ual on the grounds that it was not a fair resolution to the problem.
When this occurred, it was always stated by the subject when presented
with the first question about the first individual presented. In these
cases a different resolution to the problem was posed on the basis of
what the subject stated would be a fair resolution. The rest of the inter-
view was conducted with this resolution in place of the origi-
nal one.
 324 MARTA LAUPA

system summarized in Table 1. Justifications were of three types: au-
thority orientation (those pertaining to the person giving the com-
mand, such as the person's position in a social organization); act orien-
tation (pertaining to the nature of the act commanded or its conse-
quences); and punishment avoidance. When a child used more than
one justification, the justification of the authority orientation type
was coded, if one was given. This was done because the primary focus
of the study was children's use of and reasoning about the three author-
ity attributes. Otherwise, the predominant justification (i.e., the most
extensive and elaborated) was coded.
Paired comparisons. Assessments of the eight individuals were fol-
lowed by story variations that described two persons intervening and
giving opposing commands (two persons come up to the children at the
same time). The opposing commands constituted choosing different
children to go first. The paired comparisons provided a means for
assessing the role of age, knowledge, and social position of persons
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one attribute and differ with respect to the other two (e.g., in #1 the lady
and the former peer authority both lack social position—the lady has
adult status but not knowledge, and the former peer authority has
knowledge but not adult status). These comparisons were made in
order to determine the priority that subjects give to each attribute when
it is put in opposition to each of the others.
Responses to the paired comparison questions were coded as to
choice of one person or inconsistent (inability to choose, vacillation, or
statement that the two are equivalent). Justifications for the choices
were coded with the scoring system used for the single individual as-
sessment.
Coding reliability. Coding reliability was assessed by randomly se-
lecting 20% of the protocols for coding by a second judge. The statisti-
cal significance of the percentage agreement for each question was
tested with Cohen's coefficient for agreement of nominal scales (Co-
hen, 1960). Interjudge agreement for act evaluation was 94%. For justi-

giving commands in children's authority judgments in a situation in
which the opposing commands are equivalent (each resolves the dis-
pute with each child's getting a turn). Six paired comparisons were
presented to all subjects:
1. Lady versus former peer authority
2. Incompetent teacher versus peer authority
3. Lady versus incompetent peer authority
4. Former teacher versus peer authority
5. Incompetent peer authority versus former peer authority
6. Incompetent teacher versus former teacher.
In each comparison the two individuals are equivalent with respect to
fications for act evaluation it was 75% (Cohen's K was significant at p<
.05). For judgments of single individual questions, interjudge agree-
ment was 91% (12 of 16 questions were significant at p < .05). For
justifications to single individual questions, it was 75% (all questions
were significant at p < .05). For judgments of comparison questions,
interjudge agreement was 86% (8 of 9 questions were significant at p <
.05). For justifications to comparison questions, it was 79% (8 of 9
questions were significant at p < .05).
Results
Children's responses to each question were tested, with non-
parametric techniques, for both age and sex differences. Chi-

Table 1
Justification Categories
Category Definition and example
Authority orientation
Acceptance of authority Simple assertion that a person in the role has authority. ("A conflict
manager can do that because that is his duty.")
Adult status Authority derived from adult status. ("A teacher can tell them what to do
because she is a grown-up.")
Knowledge attributes Authority derived from knowledge that comes with an authority role.
("The teacher is smart and teaches you in class." "The honor patrol has
training.")
Social position Authority derived from a position within the social system. ("The principal
is in charge of the playground." "The conflict manager works at the
school.")
Nondifferentiation Inability to conceive of, or rejection of, the possibility of the individual
presented as being without the particular nondifferentiated attribute.
("Yes, the brand new teacher is so new that she doesn't know how to
solve problems . . . it is OK for her to tell them what to do because she
knows how to solve it." "She can do it because she was hired, and so
she must have the training.")

Act orientation
Other's welfare
Appeal to fairness
Pragmatics
Reference to the interests of others and prevention of harm. ("They should
stopfightingso no one gets hurt.")
Maintenance of a balance of rights between persons. ("He can't use the
slide all by himself because other kids might want to go on it too.")
Focus on the solution of a particular problem. ("They should do what the
teacher says because she is only trying to solve the problem.")

Punishment avoidance Reference to the person's ability to punish. ("You have to do what the
teacher says, or she will get you in trouble.")
 AUTHORITY CONCEPTS 325

Table 2 made comparisons among the eight questions about single indi-
Positive Responses (in Percentages) by Grade for Single- viduals in order to test for the effect of individual attributes (a
Individual Legitimacy Questions binomial test was used in cases where fewer than 10 subjects
changed responses from one question to the other). Compari-
Grade sons were made of individuals matched on adult status and
Individual 1 Total knowledge and differing only in social position. All tests were
significant: teacher to former teacher, x 2 0, N= 33) = 31.03, p <
Teacher 100 100 100 100 100 .005; peer authority to former peer authority, x2(l, N = 39) =
Peer authority 100 100 100 100 100 37.03, p < .005; incompetent teacher to lady, x2(l, N = 41) =
Incompetent teacher" 100 75 85 100 89
Incompetent peer authority 95 80 75 95 86 28.20, p < .005; and incompetent peer authority to child, x2(l>
Former teacher" 85 30 60 60 59 N = 46) = 30.63, p < .005. This shows an increase in positive
Former peer authority 70 45 50 40 51 evaluations for an individual with the addition of social posi-
Lady" 75 25 30 50 45 tion.
Child 60 25 30 50 41
Similarly, individuals differing only in knowledge were com-
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" Significant age differences (U < 12.72, p < .01). pared. Two comparisons were significant, teacher to incompe-
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tent teacher (binomial, p = .004) and peer authority to incom-

square tests of all questions showed no sex differences within
grade or with grades combined; thus, sexes were combined in
further analyses. Planned comparisons among questions were
performed with nonparametric techniques for repeated mea-
sures. Because of the large number of tests performed, alpha
was set at .01 in order to control for Type I error.
Evaluation of Turn-Taking
Children negatively evaluated the transgression used in the
stories. Eighty-nine percent of subjects considered the failure to
take turns to be wrong even in the absence of a rule regulating
it. Almost all (97%) of the reasons given for the evaluations were
act-orientation justification categories, primarily (74%) reasons
of fairness.
Commands of Single Individuals: Legitimacy Judgments
Assessments were made of evaluations of the legitimacy of
commands of single individuals. Table 2 shows the percentage
of positive evaluations given by subjects for each of the eight
individuals. A significant majority of subjects (86%-100%) ac-
cepted the legitimacy of commands from the four individuals
holding a social position: the teacher, x 2 0, N= 79) = 79.00, p >
.005; the peer authority, x2U, N = 79) = 79.00, p > .005; the
incompetent teacher, x2U, N = 80) = 48.05, p > .005; and the
incompetent peer authority, x2(l, N = 80) = 42.05, p < .005.
Subjects' acceptance of the legitimacy of commands from indi-
viduals without social position ranged from 41%-59%. In each
case, this does not differ significantly from a chance distribu-
tion: former teacher, x2(l, N= 80) = 2.45, ns; former peer au-
thority, x 2 (l, N = 80) = 0.05, ns; lady, x 2 0, N= 80) = 0.80, ns;
and child, x 2 (l, N = 80) = 2.45, ns.
A test of multiple comparison of proportions based on an
arcsine transformation (Marascuilo & McSweeney, 1977)
showed significant age differences in positive responses to the
legitimacy question for the incompetent teacher, former
teacher, and lady (U > 12.72, p < .01). Post hoc comparisons
showed third graders more likely thanfirstgraders to give nega-
tive responses for both the former teacher (Z = 3.76, p < .01)
and the lady (Z = 3.31, p < .01).
Using a McNemar test (Marascuilo & McSweeney, 1977), we
petent peer authority, x 2 0, iV = 11) = 9.09, p < .005, showing
more positive evaluations with the addition of knowledge for
individuals holding a social position.
Comparisons were also made of individuals differing only in
adult status. None were significant: teacher to peer authority
(no change), incompetent teacher to incompetent peer author-
ity, x20> N = 12) = 0.08, ns; former teacher to former peer
authority, x2(l, JV = 22) = 1.14, ns; and lady to child, x2(U N =
28) = 1.14, ns. This indicates that the addition of adult status to
any individual does not result in an increase in positive evalua-
tion.
Commands of Single Individuals:
Legitimacy Justifications
Subjects' justifications are consistent with their judgments
overall; responses differed according to individuals' attributes.2
(Only justifications with percentages of at least 10% are re-
ported here.) For those individuals with social position and
knowledge (teacher and peer authority), justifications were 31%
acceptance of authority, 34% social position, and 25% knowl-
edge attributes. For those individuals with social position and
without knowledge (incompetent teacher and incompetent peer
authority), justifications were 31% acceptance of authority, 37%
social position, 11% non-differentiation, and 10% act orienta-
tion. For those individuals with knowledge and without social
position (former teacher and former peer authority), justifica-
tions were 45% knowledge attributes and 32% act orientation.
For those individuals without social position or knowledge
(lady and child), justifications were 67% act orientation and
14% adult status.
Justifications of the nondifferentiation type indicate sub-
jects' lack of understanding, or rejection, of the individuals
presented. They are given principally by the youngest (1st
grade) and oldest (7th grade) subjects (90%). (See Table 1.) These
2
Two percent of justifications were uncodable, and 77% (10/13) of
these were in response to questions about individuals without social
position. Two percent of subjects did not give a clearly positive or nega-
tive response and are not included in these results. Fifty-eight tests
were done on age differences in use of justifications categories over
each question. Seven percent were significant at the .01 level and
showed no systematic pattern.
 326 MARTA LAUPA
responses are given principally to questions about individuals
with social position and without knowledge, the incompetent
teacher and incompetent peer authority (75%). Ninety-three
percent of these responses are nondifferentiation of knowledge
from social position. These subjects stated that if the individual
has a social position, she or he must possess knowledge.
With respect to negative responses, the majority are given to
those individuals without social position. Rejection of the
former teacher and former peer authority is justified by lack of
acceptance of authority (37%) and lack of social position (58%).
Rejection of lady and child is justified by lack of acceptance of
authority (32%), lack of social position (27%), and lack of knowl-
edge (33%). When the incompetent teacher and incompetent
peer authority are rejected, it is for lack of knowledge (94%).
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Commands of Single Individuals: Obedience Judgments
Assessments were made of evaluations of obedience to com-
mands of single individuals. A significant majority of subjects
(92%-100%) stated that the commands should be obeyed when
given by an individual with a social position: the teacher, x2(l,
N=19) = 79.00, p < .005; the peer authority, x2(l, N=79) =
79.00, p < .005; the incompetent teacher, x2(h N=19) = 67 .46,
p < .005; and the incompetent peer authority, x 2 0, N = 79) =
60.27, p < .005. A significant majority of subjects also judged
that the former teacher should be obeyed, x2(l, N=19) = 9.22,
p < .005. Subjects' positive evaluations of the other three individ-
uals ranged from 53% to 58%, each of which does not differ
from a chance distribution: former peer authority, x20> N =
75) = 0.33, ns; lady, x 2 (l, N= 75) = 1.61, ns; and child, x 2 (t, N=
77) = 0.64, ns.
A test of multiple comparison of proportions showed age
differences in negative responses for the former teacher and
positive responses for the child (U 2:10.85, p < .01). Post hoc
comparisons showed third graders more likely than first or fifth
graders to give negative responses to obedience to the former
teacher (Z > 3.23, p< .01).
By use of a McNemar test, the same comparisons were made
among these eight obedience questions as were made of legiti-
macy questions. For individuals differing in social position, all
comparisons were significant: teacher to former teacher, x2(l,
N= 26) = 24.04, = p < .005; peer authority to former peer
authority, x 2 0, N = 36) = 30.25, p < .005; incompetent teacher
to lady, x2(l, 7V= 28) = 22.32, p < .005; and incompetent peer
authority to child, x2(l ,N=30)= 28.03, p < .005. This shows an
increase in positive evaluation with the addition of social posi-
tion.
Of comparisons made of individuals differing only in knowl-
edge, none were significant: teacher to incompetent teacher
(binomial, p = .03); peer authority to incompetent peer author-
ity (binomial, p = .38); former teacher to lady, x 2 0, N= 23) =
1.56, ns; and former peer authority to child, x2(l ,N=15)= 0.27,
ns. In addition, no comparisons of individuals differing only in
adult status were significant: teacher to peer authority (bino-
mial, p =. 50); incompetent teacher to incompetent peer author-
ity (binomial, p = 1.0); former teacher to former peer authority,
X2(l, AT = 18) = 4.50, ns; and lady to child, x 2 0, N = 22) =
0.05, ns.
Commands of Single Individuals:
Obedience Justifications
Justifications to obedience questions are similar to those for
legitimacy in the use subjects make of different attributes.3
(Only justifications with percentages of at least 10% are re-
ported here.) For those individuals with social position and
knowledge (teacher and peer authority), justifications were 26%
acceptance of authority, 13% social position, 16% knowledge,
15% act orientation, and 22% punishment orientation. For
those with social position and without knowledge (incompetent
teacher and incompetent peer authority), justifications were
32% acceptance of authority, 19% social position, 19% act orien-
tation, and 18% punishment orientation. For those with knowl-
edge and without social position (former teacher and former
peer authority), justifications were 11 % acceptance of authority,
25% knowledge, and 42% act orientation. For those without
knowledge or social position (lady and child), justifications
were 73% act orientation.
With respect to negative responses, the majority are given to
those individuals without social position. They are justified by
lack of acceptance of authority (49%) and lack of social position
(36%). In the few cases when the incompetent teacher and in-
competent peer authority were rejected, it was for lack of knowl-
edge (86%).
Comparison of Legitimacy and Obedience Justifications
There are differences between justifications for legitimacy
and obedience. Authority-orientation justifications are used
more overall for legitimacy questions (10%-99%) than they are
for obedience questions (0%-65%). Conversely, act-orientation
justifications are used more overall for obedience questions
than legitimacy questions. This difference shows up mostly in
responses to questions about individuals with social position.
Only 1%-14% of justifications for positive responses to legiti-
macy questions about individuals with a social position
(teacher, peer authority, incompetent teacher, incompetent peer
authority) were of the act-orientation type. For the same individ-
uals for obedience questions, 14%-22% were of the act-orienta-
tion type. This shows greater orientation toward the problem
and less focus on the attributes of the individual with respect to
obedience than legitimacy.
Another difference between responses to legitimacy and obe-
dience is the use of the punishment category. There was vir-
tually no use of this category in reasoning about legitimacy.
With respect to obedience its occurrence ranged from 2%-20%
over the eight questions. It is used more in response to questions
about individuals with social position than not (20% overall vs.
6% overall).
3
Four percent of justifications were uncodable, and 82% (18/22) of
these were in response to questions about individuals without a social
position. Eleven percent of subjects did not give a clearly positive or
negative response and are not included in these results. Fifty-six tests
were performed on age differences in the use of justification categories
over each question. Five percent were significant at the .01 level and
showed no systematic pattern.
 AUTHORITY CONCEPTS 327

Paired Comparisons with social position) were 47% and 62% social position and 41 %
and 27% acceptance of authority. Justifications for the choice of
Paired comparisons presented individuals matched on one former peer authority and former teacher (those with knowl-
attribute and differing with respect to the other two. Results for edge) were 97% and 96% knowledge.
the six comparison questions are presented in Figure 1. The
A test of multiple comparison of proportions based on an
first two comparisons shown in Figure 1 oppose individuals
arcsine transformation showed significant age differences for
varying in knowledge and adult status. Significantly more chil-
the question of incompetent peer authority versus former peer
dren of all ages chose a person with knowledge over one with
authority. Subjects' choice of incompetent peer authority in-
adult status: the former peer authority over the lady, x2(2, iV =
creased with age (U = 14.2, p < .01) from 15% among first
79) = 46.80, p < .005, and the peer authority over the incompe-
graders to 70% among seventh graders. Post hoc comparisons
tent teacher, x 2 (2, N= 79) = 12.94, p < .005. Justifications for
showed that first graders were less likely to choose the incom-
the choice of the peer authority and former peer authority
petent peer authority than were seventh graders (Z = 3.76,
(those with knowledge) are primarily (95% and 93%) knowledge
attribute justifications.
The next two comparisons shown in Figure 1 oppose individ-
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This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

uals varying in social position and adult status. Significantly Discussion

more children of all ages also chose a person in an authority
position over one with adult status: the incompetent peer au-
thority over the lady, x2(2, N=19)= 27.44, p < .005, and the
peer authority over the former teacher, x2(2, N = 80) = 24.40,
p < .005. Justifications for the choice of peer authority and
incompetent peer authority (those with social position) were
68% and 60% social position and 23% and 29% acceptance of
authority.
Thefinaltwo comparisons shown in Figure 1 oppose individ-
uals with varying knowledge and social position. These compar-
isons did not yield results differing significantly from chance:
incompetent peer authority versus former peer authority, x2(2,
N = 80) = 3.70, ns, and incompetent teacher versus former
teacher, x2(2, N = 80) = 6.69, ns. Justifications for the choice of
incompetent peer authority and incompetent teacher (those
The results of this study bear on three interrelated issues: (a)
the extent to which children understand the attributes of adult
status, knowledge, and social position and are able to differen-
tiate them in their reasoning about authority; (b) how these
attributes are implicated in children's reasoning about the legiti-
macy of, and obedience to authority; and (c) the priority chil-
dren give these different attributes when they are put in opposi-
tion.
With respect to the first issue, there is one type of nondiffer-
entiation found in children's reasoning, that of knowledge un-
differentiated from social position: inability to conceive of an
individual with social position lacking knowledge. The subject
is asked to conceive of an individual with social position as
incompetent in an absolute sense, that is, as unable to solve this

75%-

1i
50%-

25%-

IT PA NC L IPA NC FT PA NC IT FT NC IPA FPA NC

Figure 1. Comparisons of persons giving commands: proportions of subjects' choices on paired compari-
sons. (T = teacher; PA = peer authority; IT = incompetent teacher; IPA = incompetent peer authority;
FT = former teacher; FPA = former peer authority; L = lady; C = child; NC = no clear choice.)
 328 MARTA LAUPA
type of problem at all. Apparently, young children do not grasp
that an adult or a peer in an assigned position of authority can
be incompetent enough to be completely unable to solve this
type of problem among children.
Nondifferentiation of attributes does not appear in third and
fifth graders, but it reappears in a different form in the seventh
grade—with respect to the incompetent teacher. These young
adolescents do appear able to conceive of a teacher as being
incompetent, but instead make an inference that an adult in a
social position is very unlikely to lack knowledge relevant to
giving commands. These oldest subjects may perceive the prob-
lem facing the person in authority as not extremely complex
and therefore judge that a teacher is unlikely to be incapable of
solving it.
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Nondifferentiation in young children, the inability to con-
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
ceive of socially powerful adults as incompetent, is reminiscent
of traditional notions of heteronomy (Piaget, 1932/1965). Pia-
get described the young child as having a unilateral orientation
toward adults as socially powerful, infallible authorities. In this
view, the adult is not only all knowing and all powerful but is
also therefore the source of the child's moral knowledge. More
recent research has demonstrated that children's knowledge of
morality is not dependent on authority commands (Nucci &
Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1981) and that even preschool-aged chil-
dren make judgments about morality apart from the dictates of
authority. Thus, the nondifferentiation we see in this study is
not indicative of moral heteronomy. It is related to the develop-
ment of children's psychological knowledge: concepts of per-
sons and their psychological characteristics (Miller & Aloise,
1989). There are changes in subjects' understanding of and in-
ferences about what is in another's mind, that is, whether a
person with a social position in school is necessarily knowledge-
able. More research is needed to explore the way in which chil-
dren's psychological concepts are implicated in their reasoning
about other social concepts, such as authority.
The second issue addressed by the results of this study is the
way in which children reason about the three attributes in their
judgments of legitimacy and obedience. The findings indicate
that social position is of great importance in children's author-
ity judgments. Positive evaluations of individuals are increased
more often by the addition of social position than by the addi-
tion of knowledge or adult status. However, knowledge is also
relevant to judgments of legitimacy; knowledge and social posi-
tion together are given more weight than is social position alone
(more subjects judge a teacher or peer authority as legitimate
than they do an incompetent teacher or peer authority). The
importance of both knowledge and social position changes with
age. More third graders than first and seventh graders reject an
authority if she or he lacks social position or knowledge. Third
graders are more strict in their demands that an authority must
possess all the necessary attributes for legitimacy.
Adult status is of little importance to children across a wide
age range, when put in opposition to knowledge or social posi-
tion. Furthermore, the addition of adult status to an individual
with any combination of other attributes does not cause more
subjects to view his or her command as legitimate. Apparently
adult status is less important overall than has been found by
previous research (Piaget, 1932/1965). Young children do not
focus on adult status per se when assessing legitimacy; rather,
they infer that those with adult status and social position must
be in possession of problem-solving knowledge.
It is possible that the weight given by children to different
attributes would vary with type of command and/or problem
presented. In fact, there is much evidence that children do con-
sider the type of command given in accepting or rejecting indi-
viduals as authorities (Damon, 1977; Laupa & Turiel, 1986;
Smetana, 1988; Tisak, 1986). In this study the use of the turn-
taking event may have lessened the importance of knowledge in
subjects' judgments of legitimacy; subjects could judge that
even individuals presented as incompetent were not completely
unable to solve the problem. However, this strengthens the find-
ing that knowledge was given higher priority than was adult
status by subjects, even though the event was one which may
have not emphasized the importance of knowledge. (The prior-
ity given to social position over adult status still holds because
this finding does not rest on considerations of competence and
incompetence.) However, presentation of other events might re-
sult in different coordinations of knowledge as opposed to so-
cial position. Our results do not clarify all the possible relations
between authority attribute and command type. However, they
do demonstrate the considerable understanding that children
have of these three authority attributes and the extent to which
they are able to differentiate and coordinate them. There is
more to be learned about all the possible relations that exist
between authority attributes and type of command, and fur-
ther research is necessary to answer these questions.
The findings suggest that children's reasoning about obe-
dience is different from reasoning about legitimacy; obedience
judgments are strongly linked to presence or absence of social
position. The addition of social position to an individual with
any combination of other attributes causes more subjects to
view him or her as legitimate; this is not true for knowledge or
adult status. Justification responses show that children view
obedience in light of punishment and problem-solving con-
cerns more than they view legitimacy that way. These results
suggest that children are aware of techniques used to manage
their behavior; they recommend obedience to those individuals
who hold social position because they know that those individ-
uals can punish them.
Our results suggest that children's authority judgments are
related to the development of concepts of social organizations
which occurs during this age period (Turiel, 1983). This can be
seen in the way children give priority to the attributes when put
in opposition, which is the third issue of interest. Children's
responses show clearly the lack of importance placed on adult
status in legitimizing authority when contrasted with social po-
sition. Responses to the question of knowledge versus social
position are more difficult to interpret because subjects did not
show a clear preference when responding to these questions.
There is some evidence to suggest that social position increases
in importance over the ages studied. For a significant number
of young children, the solution is to choose the individual with
superior knowledge. Adolescents choose an incompetent indi-
vidual with a social position rather than a competent person
without a social position. These findings reflect the growth of
understanding in these subjects of the social institution of the
school and the teacher's place in the institution.
Taken as a whole, our findings of children's understanding of
 AUTHORITY CONCEPTS
the social-organizational position of authorities, their infer-
ences about authorities' knowledge, and the distinctions they
make between legitimacy and obedience can all inform re-
search into the management and control of children's social
behavior. Research has shown that parents' inferences about
their children's competencies and responsibility for their own
misconduct enter into their decisions about appropriate social-
ization techniques (Dix, Ruble, & Zambarano, 1989). In con-
junction with these findings, children's own judgments about
socializing agents and their actions constitute an important
aspect of their social development and behavior and should be
taken into account in socialization research.
It is likely that there are differences, as well as similarities, in
the ways in which children conceptualize parental authority, as
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opposed to the institutional authority investigated in this study.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Studies of children's relationships with parents (Youniss &
Smollar, 1985) have shown that in the transition to adolescence
the parent-child relation becomes less unilateral and takes on
the character of a friendship in which the parent and child
cooperate and negotiate parental expectations. This is in con-
trast to ourfindingthat in early adolescence (13 years), children
are beginning to view the teacher-child authority relation as
fixed within a hierarchically organized social system. Although
children do refer to the attributes of knowledge and adult status
when reasoning about parental authority (Damon, 1977), fur-
ther research is necessary to determine whether children con-
ceptualize parental authority as related in any way to social
position, how they conceptualize that social position, and how
they coordinate it with other parental attributes.
Overall, the results of this research demonstrate that chil-
dren's concepts of authority are related to underlying concepts
of social organization, so that the attribute of social position is
central to children's authority judgments. Children are not
principally oriented toward adult status in legitimizing an indi-
vidual's authority or in providing a rationale for obedience, but
they hold both knowledge and social position to be of greater
importance. In the age period studied, children first have a
limited understanding of social position in early childhood,
particularly compared with the importance of knowledge.
Then, in middle childhood, there is a strict rejection of individ-
uals lacking either knowledge or social position, with an inabil-
ity to coordinate the two. Finally, there is a greater understand-
ing in early adolescence of the place of those with social posi-
tion within the institution, an awareness that results in a rigid
hierarchicalization of attributes, with social position placed
above knowledge.
329
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Received April 3,1989
Revision received April 3,1990
Accepted June 1,1990 •