Concrete Repair, Rehabilitation and Retrofitting II – Alexander et al (eds)

© 2009 Taylor & Francis Group, London, ISBN 978-0-415-46850-3

Diagnostic analysis and therapy of severely cracked bridges

Hans-Peter Andrä & Markus Maier

Leonhardt, Andrä und Partner, Stuttgart, Germany

ABSTRACT: Severe cracking in reinforced and/or prestressed concrete structures usually results from the
accumulation of a number of causes, such as errors in structural design, detailing of reinforcement, concrete
composition, concrete curing, overloading under construction, early lowering of falsework, underestimated
thermal loadings, fatigue, and lack of maintenance etc. The paper presents examples of a consistent strategy of
diagnosis and therapy.

1 INTRODUCTION The spans were erected with an overhead erection

Severe structural defects in buildings are generally
due to the accumulation of poor design, poor con-
struction and construction material and poor mainte-
nance. The predominant cause is human error, which
can only be reduced by means of thorough failure
mode and effect analyses (FMEA).
Human error often results from carelessness,
disregard, insufficient knowledge, underestimat-
ing of decisive influences, blind faith in computer
analysis, lack of plausibility checks and inad-
equate time and cost pressures. Preemptive risk
analyses by independent reviewers and checkers
as well as site supervision and continuous moni-
toring can significantly reduce the risk of error
accumulation.
Severe cracks in the cross heads of the T-shaped
piers of the Kepong Flyover in Kuala Lumpur are a
typical result of the accumulation of such errors. Les-
sons learned from these errors are described in detail
as follows.
gantry where the segments are dry jointed and the
spans post tensioned with external prestressing cables
within the void of the box.
The 33 piers consist of two types of reinforced
concrete substructures. Pier #19 and Pier #23 are twin
column portal frames supported on pile caps founded
on bored cast in place piles.
All other piers are T-shaped piers (see figure 1).
The column cross section is orthogonal, the width
across the flats amounts to 3.62 m. The columns range
from 1,5 m to 16 m in height and are supported on
8 m × 8 m square and 3 m deep pile caps which are
founded on 4 bored cast in place piles with 1,8 m diam-
eter. Each column supports a 18.65 m long cross head
which is cantilevering out on both sides about 7.50 m.
The cross heads depth varies from 2 m at the tip to 3,5 m
at the column face, with an overall width of 4 m.
These cantilever crossheads are the focus of the
case study, which is presented within this paper.

2 DESCRIPTION OF THE STRUCTURE

The Kepong Flyover is a dual three-lane elevated car-

riageway as a part of the exterior highway system of
Middle Ring Road II (MRRII) in Kuala Lumpur. The
overall length of the superstructure is 1537 m between
abutments.
The cross section consists of twin precast match
cast single cell box girders which are 11,5 m wide
between barriers with an overall depth of 2,50 m.
The bridge has 34 spans constructed by a span by
span construction method. The 45,2 m long spans are
simply supported with a continuous link slab at the
piers to provide continuity of the running surface.
Movement joints are provided at every fifth pier. At
each pier each box is supported on two bearings, one Figure 1. Kepong Flyover Viaduct at Middle Ring Road 2
underneath each web. in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

49
3 TRACK RECORD OF THE STRUCTURE
The contract for the flyover structure was awarded in
May 1999 on a design & built basis. Design was done
between July 1999 and August 2001. The construction
started in February 2000 and was completed in April
2002. The flyover was opened to traffic in May 2002.
First cracks on the crossheads were observed
already during construction. Shortly after opening of
the bridge for traffic further cracks were developing
and excessively widening. First reports about these
cracks are dated back to January 2003 respectively
November 2003. Detail crack mapping of all 33 piers
including abutments was subsequently appointed to
a specialist contractor in May 2004, in order to sys-
tematically have documentation of crack patterns
including crack sizes (see figure 2). Various field
investigations including cover meter tests, verification
of rebar sizes and spacing, core sampling for strength
tests and monitoring installations were initiated.
Typical crack patterns consist of
• two longitudinal (along the direction of the cross
head) cracks in between the two adjacent bear-
ings, more or less partitioning the cross head into
3 segments,
• a onionskin shaped crack mesh on the upper flanks
at the cross head centre, partly interconnected in
transverse direction by cracks on the top surface,
• horizontal cracks over the piers underneath the
onionskin mesh,
• inclined cracks running down the face of the cross
beams, and
• inclined cracks underneath and in the vicinity of
the bearings.
side face pier #9, max. crack width 3.2 mm
top and bottom faces pier #32, max crack width 3.0 mm
Figure 2. detailed scaled crack mapping of all crosshead
surfaces.
50
Expert reports from various parties with various
interpretations finally resulted in inconsistent conclu-
sions about the causes of the cracks and the cracks
influence on the structure load bearing capacity.
A major concern of the reports was the sensibility for
delayed ettringite formation (DEF) in the concrete,
where crack growth results from ettringite expansion.
The observed typical crack patterns, however, could
not be explained by DEF. Different expert opinions
about the causes of measured test results are a well
known phenomenon both in research and in surveys
on defects of existing structures. This results from the
fact that everybody draws conclusions from the basis
of his own experience and will only find what he is
searching for.
In 2005 key management within JKR changed and
new Director General, an excellent structural expert
himself, realized the potential structural risk resulting
out of this bridge and the structural findings.
In October 2005, LAP was appointed for final and
detail design for remedial works of the piers on the
basis of a complete critical analysis of design, con-
struction, material properties and maintenance. At
the same time the bridge was closed for traffic. The
focus of the remedial design concept was to eliminate
potential structural deficiencies, to relief the struc-
tures stresses and to provide appropriate response on
potential DEF occurrence.
The contract for remedial design was awarded
to a contractor on March 2006. Execution works
began after only a one month mobilization period in
April 2006.
During the following 6 months all 33 T-shaped
piers were structurally rehabilitated, with maximum
of 18 piers being remedied simultaneously. Site logis-
tics and strengthening sequence was most challeng-
ing, both for contractor, LAP site supervision and
client, while traffic on highway underneath the bridge
was fully ongoing. The strengthening principles will
be illustrated in chapter 7 in more detail.
In November 2006 the 100% strengthened and
rehabilitated bridge could be reopened to unlimited
traffic.
4 LOADING HISTORY OF THE CROSS HEADS
The cross heads carry the superstructure dead load
and final stage live loads (vertical and horizontal).
During construction, the gantry loads in addition to
the superstructure dead load are a major, sometimes
even governing load case.
4.1 Thermal loading due to curing of (mass)
concrete
The pouring in one shot of the massive cross-section
of the crossheads with 4.00 m in width and 3.50 m
in depth and the subsequent curing of the concrete
causes a heat development and distribution within the
member, arising from cement hydration. The applied
concrete mixture proved a high content of Portland
cement which promotes heat development. Tem-
perature gradients from cooling down outer surfaces
exposed to formwork or air while the inner core of the
structure is still hot causes internal tensile stresses,
which may exceed tensile strength of the immature
concrete. Special caution must therefore be under-
taken to control early thermal cracking by providing
sufficient reinforcement in size and arrangement to
control regular crack spacing as well as limit indi-
vidual cracks width. On the other hand concrete mix-
ture must be carefully selected to avoid excessive heat
development, e.g. by using cement with lower hydra-
tion heat development.

4.2 Loading during erection of the superstructure

The superstructure was erected using an overhead
erection gantry. The gantry was supported on the
cross head and carried the load of the precast super-
structure elements which were attached and winched
up into position. Once all 15 segments with a weight
of 80.8 tons each were in position and adjusted for
fit, line and level the external post-tensioning was
applied. Upon completion of stressing the completed
superstructure was lowered onto the piers transferring
the superstructure load from the gantry supports to
the permanent bearings.
After completion of the first superstructure, the
gantry was shifted in transverse direction to the adja-
cent carriageway for the erection of the second super-
structure in the same span using the same erection
sequence. Upon completion of the second superstruc-
ture the gantry was launched forward to the next pier
for the next span erection. This cycle was then repeated
starting from abutment A in the north and then pro-
ceeded until the entire viaduct was completed.
The crossheads are more or less symmetrically
loaded due to superstructure dead loads in the final
stage. In the erection stage however they are loaded
by high out of balance loads as well as Torsion result-
ing from the rear and font gantry nose beam supports.
(see figure 3).
The overall weight of 15 segments per span sums
up to 1212 tons, the overall erection gantry tonnage
sums up to 617 tons which is about half of the super-
structures weight.
The maximum loading coming from rear and front
gantry support occurs just prior to placement of post-
tensioned box girder onto the final bearings, i.e. when
the completed box girder is still fully supported by the
gantry. The total weight which is resting on the cross-
heads gantry support locations short before lowering
down the assembled superstructure to the final bear-
ings sums up to 1829 tons.
Both gantry supports are eccentric to centerlines of
the piers, therefore the gantry loadings generate high
Figure 3. principle sketch of erection stage with rear and
front gantry support.
torsion and high out of balance bending moments
especially at the front gantry support during the erec-
tion of the first superstructure. However since the
gantry progressed span by span, each pier suffers
clockwise torsion from front gantry support during
erection of this span, while suffering anticlockwise
torsion from rear gantry support during erection of
next span.
4.3 Loading transferred from the superstructure
while “in-service”
British Standard BS 5400 was applied for the bridge
design.
The design loads for the in-service condition
include dead load from superstructure and superim-
posed dead load comprising from asphalt surface and
parapets as well as live loads resulting from HA, and
HB 45 units load design vehicles both for serviceabil-
ity state (SLS) and ultimate limit state (ULS) with its
load combinations as specified in BS 5400.
The bridge is 11.50 m wide between the kerbs,
which acc. BS5400 corresponds to four notial design
lanes, although each deck of the bridge will actually
only be used as a three lane deck.
Figure 4 shows the governing HA/HB45 load
arrangement on a single span, which generates worst
case supporting forces to be transferred onto the bear-
ing pads, which in turn generates maximum cross-
heads in service stresses (bending, out of balance
moments, shear and torsion).

51
 Maximum crosshead cantilever bending moment
e.g. results to:

due to dead loads MDead = 76.50 MNm

due to live loads MLive = 31.50 MNm
total Mtot = 108.00 MNm

Horizontal loadings depend on and result from the

bearing lay out of the superstructure. Thermal elonga-
tion/shrinkage creating bearing friction forces as well
as other horizontal loadings due to acceleration/brak-
ing and wind are minor load effects, but these effects
must not be neglected. The resulting stresses are
superimposed by other horizontal local stresses such
splitting or spalling stresses underneath the bearings.
The accumulated stresses are of critical magnitude if
no adequate reinforcement is provided.
This is even more important for cyclic loadings.
Both vertical loads coming from live load design
vehicles as well as horizontal loads resulting from
bearing pattern are considered to be cyclic.

4.4 Effects of the load history on the observed

cracks
Both thermal effects and construction loadings had
not been sufficiently addressed in the design. Ther-
mal effects result in a mesh of micro cracks, weak-
ening the complete crossbeam envelope and in DEF
vulnerability.
The inclined shear cracks at the cross beam faces
are due to underestimated torsion loadings during
construction.
Ignorance of construction loadings and final
material composition is a general problem, because
concrete composition according to local availability
and construction equipment are not fully known in
the design phase or because there is a discontinuity in
the interface between design and construction. This
discontinuity between design and construction gener-
ally results from contractual liability reasons and not
from engineering reasons.
Contracts and attitudes between the parties
involved which disregard the success of the project as
a whole imply significant risk potentials.

5 DESIGN AND DETAILING OF THE CROSS

HEADS

The structural system of the T shaped pier seems to

Figure 4. Governing vehicle load arrangement for 4 notial
design lane analysis and resulting supporting forces on
bearings.
be quite simple. Bending moments and shear forces
at governing sections can be determined and designed
for by hand calculation.
The determination of internal stresses resulting
from the local application and introduction of the
bearing forces into the cross head section however is
rather complex.

52
5.1 Strut and tie model versus FE analysis
Due to the fact that the loads are not applied as line
loads across the section but in terms of single loads
along the edges of the cantilever, the internal load
path actually corresponds to a strut and tie space
frame with compression and tensile forces in three
directions. This space frame reproduces the load path
from the bearings through the cross head to the pier
junction and through the pier and the raft into the
piles. The space frame model includes both the glo-
bal force actions and the internal thrust actions due
to the local deviation of the load path. Both compres-
sion struts and tensile ties need to be analyzed and all
tensile forces need to be covered by properly detailed
and anchored reinforcement.
“The Art of Detailing”, published by the late Pro-
fessor Fritz Leonhardt [1] more than 40 years ago
describes the engineering concept of strut and tie
modeling in detail. Structural design on the basis of
strut and tie modeling has now been incorporated in
the relevant provisions of Eurocode 2.
Figure 5. Finite Element Analysis of the cross head.
Figure 6. Strut and Tie Space Frame Model of the cross
head.
53
A comparison between the results of a finite ele-
ment analysis and a strut and tie model is shown in
Figs. 5 and 6. Even though both approaches provide
equal results in terms of equilibrium, the finite ele-
ment analysis requires a significant amount of inter-
pretation and is much more susceptible to human
error than the strut and tie model. The finite element
analysis should rather be used as a tool to verify
the alignment of the strut and tie model. Detailing
according to the strut and tie model however is quite
simple, and the necessity of reinforcement in three
dimensions is obvious.
An erroneous interpretation of the finite analysis
model could suggest that transverse reinforcement
between the bearings and splitting reinforcement
underneath the bearings would not be needed because
the concrete tensile stresses are low. The integral of
these stresses however results in large forces. FE
analysis determines the governing tensile stresses
in a concrete zone which is pre-cracked due to ther-
mal reasons and which is considerably intersected by
the reinforcement, Fig. 7. Due to this intersection of
rebars there is virtually no concrete section left which
could transfer tensile stresses. This does not comply
with the suppositions of the FE analysis.
The superposition of individually negligible hori-
zontal loadings from bearing friction, braking, wind,
horizontal temperature gradients etc. add up to sig-
nificant stresses and result in fatigue failure of non
reinforced concrete sections. The sudden and brittle
collapse of the bridge seat of the Reichsbruecke in
Vienna 1976, Fig. 8, demonstrates that this may hap-
pen even after years of operation.
The lack of sufficient transverse reinforcement
and of proper splitting reinforcement is responsible
for the two longitudinal separating cross head cracks
and the diagonal cracks underneath the bearings.
Blind faith in even highly sophisticated FE compu-
ter analyses implies significant risk potentials.
Figure 7. Tensile zone in concrete intersected by rebars.

Figure 8. Collapse of the Reichsbruecke Vienna.
5.2 Detailing of reinforcement
The reinforcement of the crossbeam is shown in Fig. 9.
The top two layers of the crossbeam T40 bars at
a spacing of 120 mm were lapped over the column,
i.e. at the location of maximum bending moments.
The lap length was chosen at its minima allowed acc.
to BS 5400.
The necessary lap length according to the German
DIN Code and US AASHTO codes in an area with
“unfavourable bond condition”, i.e. “top reinforce-
ment so placed that more than 30.5 cm of concrete
are cast below” would be about 1.8 times longer and
would require transverse stirrups to anchor splitting
forces from the transmission of the forces between
the lapped bars. The transmission of the forces from
each bar of approximately 500 kN to the surrounding
concrete induces significant tensile splitting stresses
normal to the bar axes.
Due to the extremely high concentration of lap
splices, the remaining concrete strips between the
bars are to small to transfer the high transmission
forces, Fig. 10. Bond failure of this lap splice was
anavoidable.
Locating the laps outside the maximum bending
moment zone and staggering hooked laps accordingly
would have complied with the art of detailing rules [1].
The column bars were not lapped with the cross-
beam bars, so that there is no sufficient reinforcement
to resist the transfer of the cantilever moment
between crossbeam and column due to eccentric
crossbeam loadings during construction. Overall sta-
bility is still possible as long as the eccentricity of
the normal force in the column produces a bending
moment of equal magnitude. Horizontal cracks above
the pier underneath the onionskin mesh however are
54
Figure 9. Reinforcement of the cross beam.
Figure 10. Transmission of forces between lapped bars [2].
due to this unreinforced section between column and
crossbeam.
6 CONCRETE COMPOSITION
AND MAINTENANCE
The 3,5 m by 4,0 m cross-section of the cross head is
massive concrete section which would have required
particular concrete composition with low cement
contents and cooling of the fresh concrete to avoid
temperatures of more than 70°C due to the liberated
hydration heat.
High hydration temperatures do not only result in
internal stresses and cause early cracking but also
create optimal conditions for ettringite crystalliza-
tion. Both primary ettringite formation at the start
of hydration and ettringite formation in the hardened
concrete texture may occur. The latter is referred to as
delayed ettringite formation, DEF.
There is a controversial discussion in literature on
whether the expansion caused by ettringite was the
primary cause of texture damage or whether it was a
subsequent manifestation of prior damage. Regarding
the examined concrete composition of the relevant
piers (maximum cement content 560 kg/m³, SO2 con-
tent about 3%), the ettringite density of 1,77 g/cm³
corresponds to a volume of some 5% ettringite per
cubic metre of concrete on the average. Contrasted with
an average pore volume of 13%, the maximum amount
of ettringite that can be formed is significantly smaller
than the total pore volume. Damages of the concrete
texture due to DEF are therefore very unlikely.
There is no doubt however that the ingress of
moisture and water into concrete cracks due to ten-
sile stresses promotes the local accumulation of
newly formed ettringite on the flanks of these cracks.
Recrystallized ettringite is thus seen not as the cause
of damage but rather as its consequence.
Due to defective piping of the drainage of the
bridge superstructure over the piers, the crossbeams
were regularly flooded and wetted in the rainy sea-
son. In addition, the local humidity is very high.
Water and moisture induced ettringite formation thus
expanded the original excessive cracking from struc-
tural deficiencies.
Ettringite formation can be stopped after elastic
grouting of the existing cracks and waterproofing of
the pier head surface.
7 REHABILITATION
7.1 General
Since the identified main crack patterns were
addressed to have systematic structural causes, and
since every pier was built according the same draw-
ing, it was required to apply strengthening and reha-
bilitation procedures to every pier, regardless of the
present degree of cracking excess. It would have
been only a matter of time, once cracking excess
would have propagated, since the stability could only
be explained by assuming concrete tensile strength,
which is not known as a reliable concretes property
while bearing cyclic loadings.
Following was the sequence of strengthening pro-
cedure for each and every pier:
1. Securing the crossbeam structure with a temporary,
horizontal and external tie-frame to release the
bending stresses by temporary post-tensioning up
to 18 MN stressing force. The tie-frame was at same
time providing the working platform. Temporary
vertical supports were not accepted, since the high-
way below the bridge must be in full operation.
2. Grouting of all detected cracks with epoxy resin to
fill the voids.
3. Transverse post-tensioning of crossheads with
prestressing bars to compensate the lack of trans-
verse reinforcement and to stress cracks faces of
longitudinal cracks against grout.
4. Replacing and removal of highly and undefined
cracked concrete within lap-splice area down to
3rd layer of lap-splice reinforcement by means of
hydro-water-jetting.
55
5. Add lacking vertical reinforcement legs, adhe-
sively bonded within concrete member to take
the tensile component forces, resulting from lap-
splice action according Figure 10.
6. Placing of self compacting concrete to close
the highly reinforced lap-splice area in order to
achieve best bond conditions for load transfer
within lap splice.
7. Apply moderate permanent post-tensioning force
for crack control by 18 externally bonded CFRP
tendons, each stressed to 400 kN.
8. Seal and finish the surface for waterproofing
reasons to take necessary actions in terms of sus-
pected DEF problems.
7.2 Installation of tie-frame
Since no vertical support was accepted, to relieve the
structure during strengthening, an external tie-frame
was installed, which could be stressed up to 18 MN.
This external horizontal force introduction on the end
faces of the crossbeam allowed a stepwise relieve of
the internal reinforcement stresses, without chang-
ing the statical system. The total resultant force of
the external tie-frame was at same level than the top
tension force within the reinforcement layers result-
ing out of cantilever bending moment. The tie-frame
together with end buttress including working platform
with a total weight of 80 tons were lifted in one piece
during night (Fig. 11).
Immediately after the tie-frame and the buttresses
were installed in final position, the tie-frame stressing
works commenced. Strands aligned within the main
chords of the tie-frame were stressed to 65% UTS to
secure the structure.
7.3 Grouting of detected cracks
All cracks were grouted with epoxy resin. The
grouting works were carried out sequentially and
directionally from the bottom of the cross-head to
the top. At some piers the epoxy resin could easily be
pumped at the onion shell-like cracks over a length of
4 m through the complete pier section.
The maximum quantity which was pumped into
one packer was about 60 litres which was an indica-
tion of –beside cracks-poorly compacted concrete as
well as presence of large honey combs.
7.4 Transverse post-tensioning
A total of 15 nos. of prestressing bars per pier diam-
eter 32 and 40 mm respectively were to be installed to
cater for insufficient transverse reinforcement below
the bearings.
The location of the existing reinforcement was
checked to identify the optimized coring location in
order to avoid, cutting or damaging of existing vertical

Figure 11a. External tie-frame stressed up to 18MN, to
relieve the structure during strengthening, allowed to open
the lap splice.
Figure 11b. Lifting procedure of 80 tons tie-frame incl.
working platform.
reinforcement bars. The anchorages of the transverse
stressing bars had to be placed inbetween the gap of
the 3rd to 4th CFRP tendon layer, later running lon-
gitudinally on both sides of the cross-head. Therefore
it was extremely important to limit the drilling devia-
tion over the length of 4 m through the crosshead to
only 20 mm. However this was successfully achieved
by the competent coring subcontractor.
The bars were stressed to 65% UTS, grouted and
final anchor head corrosion protection was applied.
7.5 Lap splice strengthening
The most important remedial work procedure was the
rehabilitation of the lap-splice. To allow to open the
lap-splice without any vertical support of the canti-
lever ends the temporary prestressing force, horizon-
tally introduced by tie-frame jacking was increased to
18MN, which represents the ultimate tensile force of
the top two reinforcement layers.
56
For structural safety reasons the lap splice was
opened in two steps: First opening of the centre sec-
tion with a width of 2 m and repair of that section
(Area I). Then opening of the adjacent areas followed,
each with an approximate width of 1m (Area II).
A high pressure water jetting unit was set up below
the flyover serving two demolition areas simulta-
neously. The area of the lap splice was completely
covered to prevent parts from falling onto the traf-
fic below the flyover structure. Specially designed
temporary drain channels were installed to collect the
waste water and divert it to a collection tank for sub-
sequent cleaning purposes.
Initially, the concrete cover was removed by
water jetting to expose the top reinforcement bars.
250 mm deep pilot holes each with a spacing of
250 mm were drilled around the perimeter of Area 1.
These pilot holes helped to speed up and control the
consistency of the water jetting process. Finally all
bars with diameter 40 mm were fully exposed with
a minimum clearance of 20 mm to all sides. For
proper bonding purposes all rebar was cleaned of
cement slurry and loose particles. A full lap-splice
mapping followed.
The main purpose of the remedial exercise was to
repair the deficiencies in the lap splice area. All of the
T40 rebar were generally lapped in a vertical manner
at the maximum bending moment area.
To prevent the concrete in the splice zone from
spalling off, additional transverse (vertical) reinforce-
ment (U-Bars) needed to be installed as the existing
stirrup reinforcement was insufficient.
To install the additional U-bar reinforcment, holes
were drilled into the concrete between the T40 bars
and bond-anchored with epoxy resin.
7.6 Pouring and closing lap splice with self
compacting concrete (SCC)
After the U-bars were installed the lap splice area was
closed by self compacting concrete (SCC). SCC was
chosen for the following 5 reasons:
− The spacing between the spliced bars was expected
to vary substantially.
− The early concrete strength had to be high to
allow re-opening of the flyover soon after concrete
placement.
− The bonding quality of the concrete has to be
extremely good in the lap splice area.
− Since relatively small concrete quantities were
required and for quality assurance reasons the
aggregates for the SCC had to be supplied in sacks
and mixed on site.
− Requirement of low shrinkage properties.
All lap splices had to be concreted during week-
ends when the flyover could be temporarily closed
for traffic. to give the SCC sufficient hardening time
until reopening of the flyover for traffic.
 The SCC was mixed on top of scaffolding situated
on top of the flyover. The concrete was discharged
directly from the scaffolding through a PVC-pipe into
the lap-splice area. Because of the required shifting of
the scaffolding the mixer was later on installed on a
truck which could easily service up to 6 piers in one
night.
To achieve the required mix parameters (e.g. fresh
concrete temperature, viscosity, flow spread etc.) it
was important to implement the following additional
measures:
− Cooling of the pre-packed mixture in an air-
conditioned container for about 24 hours.
− Cooling of the water to a predetermined
temperature.
A strict QC/QA procedure was established to
garantee satisfactory SCC properties.
After curing time of the SCC the temporary tie-
frame post-tensioning force was relieved from 18MN
down to 9MN to get the lap-splice activated.

Figure 13. Permanent steel buttresses stressed against end

7.7 Permanent longitudinal post-tensioning
by CFRP tendons
The cross-heads were permanently prestressed
with 18 Nos. of CFRP tendons, each prestressed to
400kN. CFRP-tendons were chosen for the following
reasons:
− Easy handling of the tendons due to its light
weight.
− High durability in the hot and humid climate of
Malaysia.
− Easy bonding of the tendons with the surface of the
concrete, which increases the factor of safety dur-
ing the ULS and provides crack control and cracks
width limitation.
The tension force was applied in incremental steps,
to allow filling the gap behind the CFRP-tendons
with adhesive. Starting with each 6 CFRP tendons on
side faces the top 6 tendons were installed. During
this stressing process, while increasing the permanent
CFRP post-tensioning force, the temporary tie-frame
Figure 12. Opened lap splice additionally reinforced by
vertical U-Bars.
faces of crossbeam by 18 Nos. of CFRP tendons.
stressing force was simultaneously relieved by dein-
stallation strand by strand.
Finally the tie-frame was lowered down. Fig. 13
shows the anchorage detail and the final situation,
where the steel buttress installed on both end faces of
the crossbeam are permanently interconnected by 18
post-tensioned CFRP tendons, properly covered and
protected against mechanical impact.
8 CONCLUSIONS
Structural design, construction process, selection of mate-
rials and maintenance are susceptible to human error. Thor-
ough risk analysis is required to prevent severe defects or
failures due to the accumulation of these errors.
The paper presents the focuses of a chain of errors
which could have been prevented by means of thor-
ough failure mode and effect analyses (FMEA).
Dominant errors were
• Imperfect loading assumptions
• Blind application of code provisions
• Blind faith in FE analysis
• Ignorance of the art of detailing
• Inconsistency of the interface between design and
the construction process
• Inadequate material selection
• Inadequate contractual relationships
• Inadequate maintenance.
Even the first steps of the rehabilitation process
were again governed by human error, especially due
to legal and liability reasons.

57
 The prevention of the errors described requires
a fundamental change in economical competition
standards. Applied science has to dominate short
dated profit considerations, not vice versa.
REFERENCES
[1] Fritz Leonhardt, “über die Kunst des Bewehrens von
Stahlbetontragwerken”, Beton- und Stahlbetonbau, Vol
60, 1965, No. 8, pp. 181–192; No. 9, pp. 212–220.
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58
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