1.) SASAN VS.

NLRC [Applicability of Rules on Evidence]

G.R. No. 176240; Oct. 17, 2008

FACTS: On July 23, 2001, the petitioner filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC of Cebu
separate complaints against E-PCIBank for illegal dismissal with claims of separation pay,
service incentive leave pay, allowances, and damages. Despite attempts to reach an amicable
settlement, the parties failed to come to an agreement. The petitioners argued that they had
already become regular employees of E-PCIBank, having done janitorial and messengerial work
for more than one year.

E-PCIBank argued that it entered into a Contract of Service with Helpmate Inc. (HI), an
independent job contractor; that it was the latter who paid the petitioners' salaries and exercised
direct control and supervision over them. HI asserted that the Contract of Service had already
expired on July 15, 2000 and was not renewed. HI alleged that it ordered the petitioners to
transfer to Able Services and Puritan, however, the petitioners did not comply. HI argued that
since the petitioners were not dismissed either actually or constructively, thus, the complaints
filed have no basis.

The Labor Arbiter held that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not
possess the required substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or
service under its own account and responsibility as required under the Labor Code. Thus, HI is a
labor-only contractor, and the real employer of the petitioners is E-PCIBank. The Labor Arbiter
ruled in favor of the petitioners awarding them P606K.

HI appealed to the NLRC and presented documentary evidence which it did not present before
the Labor Arbiter. It offered as evidence that it was an independent contractor: (a) Certificate of
Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock from P1.5M to P20M; (b) Audited Financial
Statement with assets of P20.9M; (c) TCT 110173 in the name of HI valued at P1.1M; and (d)
Tax Declaration showing it had a commercial bldg. valued at P2.5M. The NLRC admitted the
evidence and deleted the Labor Arbiter’s award except for the 13th month pay. The CA affirmed
the decision of the NLRC, holding that the complaint for illegal dismissal was prematurely filed.

ISSUE: WON the NLRC erred in accepting and appreciating the pieces of evidence presented
only on appeal?

RULING: NO. Technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor officials should
use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without
regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. The submission of
additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its new Rules of Procedure. After all,
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The
submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter
could submit counter-evidence.

As for the argument of the petitioner invoking the best evidence rule, the Court did not agree.
The respondent sent certified true copies of the pieces of evidence to the petitioners, which is
acceptable under the Rules of Court. For the sake of argument, if the petitioners did receive mere
photocopies, the same result would arise. Again, technical rules on evidence do not apply to
labor cases. The petitioners had the opportunity to present counter-evidence to the documentary
evidence presented by HI. Failing to do so, they can no longer challenge the decision finding HI
as an independent job contractor.

Hence, the decision of the CA was affirmed.

2.) GSIS VS. VILLAVIZA [Applicability of Rules on Evidence]

G.R. No. 180291; July 27, 2010

FACTS: Winston Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS, filed separate formal
charges against Dinnah Villaviza, Elizabeth Duque, Adronico Echavez… for grave misconduct
and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Service. Garcie alleged that on May 27,
2005, the respondent, wearing a red shirt together with some employees, marched just outside
the office of the investigation unit in a mass demonstration/rally. Some of the employees
badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS management and defiantly raised clenched fists.

The 7 respondents were given three days to explain why they should not be administratively
dealt with. The respondents argued that there was no mass demonstration; that their actions were
spontaneous after learning that their former President (Mario Molina) was there. Villaviza
presented a letter (not under oath) that she had a scheduled pre-hearing at the GSIS-IU. Garcia
found all 7 respondents guilty of the charges and imposed a penalty of 1yr. suspension plus
accessory penalties.

On appeal, the CSC found the respondents guilty of a lesser offense of violation of reasonable
office rules and regulations and reduced the penalty to reprimand. The CSC held that there was
no evidence to find the respondents guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
Service. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the CSC. The CA held that the petitioners
failed to prove that the supposed concerted activity of the respondents resulted in work stoppage
and caused prejudice to the public service. Only about twenty out of more than a hundred
employees at the main office, joined the activity sought to be punished.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in affirming the decision of the CSC?

RULING: NO. A perusal of Rule XI, Sec. 4 of the GSIS’ amended Policy and Procedural
Guidelines readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to file an answer merely translates to
a waiver of "his right to file an answer." There is nothing in the rule that says that the charges are
deemed admitted. It has not done away with the burden of the complainant to prove the charges
with clear and convincing evidence. It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that
the rules can be applied in a "suppletory character." Suppletory is defined as "supplying
deficiencies." It means that the provisions in the Rules of Court will be made to apply only
where there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule. There is, however, no such deficiency as
the rules of the GSIS are explicit in case of failure to file the required answer.

A perusal of the decisions of the CA and of the CSC will reveal that the case was resolved
against petitioners based, not on the absence of respondents' evidence, but on the weakness of
that of the petitioners. Hence, the decision of the CA was affirmed.

3.) PEOPLE VS. ANDAN [Exclusionary Rule]

G.R. NO. 11647; March 3, 1997

FACTS: Pablito Andan, alias Bobby, was accused of committing the crime of rape with
homicide. The prosecution established that on Feb. 19, 1994, at around 4pm, Marianne Gueverra,
a 20 year old nursing student was walking along their subdivision when the accused invited her
into his house, stating that his grandmother needed her blood pressure to be checked. Once
Marianne entered the house, the accused punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen
and raped her. The accused then hit her in the head with a concrete block and left her body in an
abandoned lot next to his home. Her body was discovered the next day, naked from the chest
down. The autopsy conducted by Dr. Bondoc showed that the cause of death was “traumatic
injuries” or Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral Contusions.

After apprehending the accused, he argued that he was merely a lookout; that his neighbors,
Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon killed Marianne. The accused was found with scratches on his
neck, chest and back. Upon meeting with the Mayor, the accused requested a private meeting
between them. Behind closed doors, the accused admitted to the Mayor that he killed Marianne.
The Mayor then opened the door in order for the media to witness his confession.

 On arraignment, however, the accused pleaded not guilty. He alleged that at the time the crime
was committed, he was in his parent’s home with his family. He further stated that when he was
caught by the police, he was beaten and was told to confess to the crime. The trial court found
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to death and to pay damages
worth P221K. On automatic review, the accused argued that the trial court erred in finding him
guilty of rape without any evidence to prove it.

ISSUE: WON the trial court correctly found the accused guilty of rape?

RULING: YES. The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of the
three policemen of the investigating team, the mayor of Baliuag and four news reporters to
whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral confessions. It was also based on photographs and
video footages of appellant's confessions and reenactments of the commission of the crime. It
should be stressed that the rights under Sec. 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution are accorded to
"any person under investigation for the commission of an offense." An investigation begins when
it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person
as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from
the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. When the police arrested appellant, they were
no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed, appellant was
already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house. This is clear from
the testimony of SPO4 Danilo S. Bugay, the police chief investigator of the crime.

Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before
the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and
control" over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However,
appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter.
In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk
to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the
mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his
guilt to him.

Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were
made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating
officer. The court has held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on
a televised interview are deemed voluntary an are admissible in evidence. Clearly, appellant's
confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police
authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. They
were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check
appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and
reenact the commission of the crime.

The court held that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12
(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between
the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its
agents.

4.) CADAJAS VS. PEOPLE [Exclusionary Rule]

G.R. NO. 147348; Nov. 16, 2021

FACTS: The petitioner, a 24yr. old, met the victim AAA(female), a 14yr. old, in the cafeteria
where he worked. They later became sweethearts. BBB(mother) discovered that Cadajas was
luring sexually to a motel. BBB also found that Cadajas was coaxing her daughter to send
pictures of her naked body. The petitioner was then charged in two criminal cases, one for child-
pornography and another for violation of R.A. 10175.

 The RTC found him guilty only of violating R.A. 10175(Cybercrime prevention) and sentenced
him to suffer reclusion temporal and to pay P1M. The CA affirmed. The petitioner argued that
the evidence presented by the prosecution is inadmissible, being in violation of his right to
privacy.

ISSUE: WON the evidence presented is admissible?

RULING: YES. The right to privacy concerns itself between a private person and intrusions
made by the State. It does not concern itself with the interactions of two or more private persons.
By giving his password to AAA, there can be no expectation of privacy on the part of Cadajas.
Also, the petitioner failed to object to the photos presented in the trial court. Thus, the objection
is deemed waived. The evidence presented is therefore admissible into evidence.

The petitioner was found guilty of child-pornography and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

5.) PEOPLE VS. GATARIN [Dying Declaration]

G.R. NO. 198022; April 7, 2014

FACTS: Sonny Gatarin and Eduardo Quisayas were charged with robbery with homicide. The
information alleged that at 8:00pm on Nev. 3, 2004, in Mabini, Batangas, the accused, armed
with a bladed weapon, robbed and killed Januario Castillo taking with them P20,000.00.

The prosecution presented five witnesses, including the victim’s wife, Maria Castillo. It was
established that Howel Umali, who witnessed the incident, was on his way home when he saw
Junario being mauled by two persons. SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel apprehended only
Quisayas since Gatarin was able to escape, and took the victim to the hospital where the victim
allegedly told them the identities of the perpetrators, being both the accused.

The RTC found Quisayas guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The court gave credence to Maria
Catillo’s testimony as to the amount of money taken from Januario. It also held the statements
made by Junario moments before his death was part of the res gestae. The CA affirmed the
decision, but added that the statements were also considered as a dying declaration.

ISSUE: WON the lower courts erred in admitting the statements of Januario as part of the res
gestae and a dying declaration?

RULING: NO. The accused is guilty not of robbery with homicide, but of murder. The
prosecution falied to prove the existence of roberry. Based on the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, specifically Maria Castillo, she was not present during the incident and no proof was
shown that Januario has the alleged P20,000.00 at that time. It was clear from the fact that there
was no evidence to prove that robbery took place.

Here, not all requisites for the admissibility of the dying declaration are present. It was not
shown that the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death. The test is whether
the declarant has abandoned all hope of survival and looked on death as certainly impending.
However, even if the statements are not admissible as a dying declaration, it still forms part of
the res gestae. The test for res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or axclamation is so
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as
part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony.

Hence, the accused was found guilty of the crime of murder instead of robbery with homicide.

6.) BAUTISTA VS. CA [Opinion Rule]

G.R. NO. 214453; Aug. 11, 2004

 FACTS: The case involves a property situated in Maceda st., Sampaloc, Manila, previously
owned and registered in the name of Cesar Morelos. Cesar died in 1982, leaving no children.
During his lifetime, he sold the subject property to Laura Morelos Bautista, evidenced by a deed
of absolute sale. The private respondent, Fernando Morelos, who claimed to be the illegitimate
child of Cesar Morelos with Angelina Lim-Gue, filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
sale and damages before the RTC of Manila.

At trial, Fernando presented witnesses, Francisco Cruz, Chief Examiner of the PC-INP Crime
Laboratory, to prove that the signature and thumb print in the deed of sale were forged, and
Major Baraulio Monge, Chief of the Fingerprint Division of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory. The
former testified that the signature of Cesar did not match those of other documents which he
signed; he compared the signature in the deed with another signature of Cesar made five days
before the signature in issue. Monge testified that the fingerprint on the deed of sale also did not
match that of Cesar. The petitioner presented the witness to the deed, Carmelita Marcelino, to
testify on the validity thereof. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner and dismissed the
complaint for insufficiency of evidence. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision and declared
the deed of sale null and void.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in finding the deed of sale executed by Cesar Morelos null and
void?

RULING: YES. As a general rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear,
positive and convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. Citing
“Heirs of Severa Gregorio VS. CA”, the court stated that due to the technicality of the procedure
involved in the examination of the forged documents, the expertise of questioned document
examiners is usually helpful; however, resort to such examiners is not mandatory and is not
indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting. Hence, a finding of forgery does not
depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts.

The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuiness of a questioned signature is certainly much
less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue.
Here, the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud.
As against the testimony of a person who witnessed the signing of the document, the opinion of
an expert constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best. Also, Cruz failed to state the
basis for his statement that the signature was forged. He merely concluded that the signature was
a forgery without citing any factual basis for arriving at that conclusion.

Hence, the petition was granted. the Decision of the CA was reversed and set aside, and the RTC
decision was reinstated.

7.) PEOPLE VS. BERNAL [Declaration Against Interest]

G.R. NO. 113685; June 19, 1997

FACTS: Theodore Bernal, together with two others, were charged with the crime of kidnapping.
The information alleged that they kidnapped Bienvenido Openda while he was drinking with his
friends in Davao.

Salito Enriquez testified that the victim had an affair with the accused’s wife. The defense argued
that Openda was a drug pusher and was merely arrested. The RTC found Bernal guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. The accused challenged the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in giving
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution which were allegedly illusory.

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in convicting the accused?

RULING: NO. Regardless if the body of the victim was never found, this does not negate the
charge of kidnapping. What is important to be established is the fact of seizure.

 The prosecution sufficiently showed that Bernal and the two other unidentified persons abducted
Openda on Aug. 5, 1991. Adonis Sagarino, a childhood friend and neighbor of the victim,
testified that he overheard the accused dispatching one of them to the store where the victim was
to check if he was still there. After the accused left, Openda was subsequently obducted. Roberto
Racasa, a resident of Bucana, Davao City, also testified that Bernal arrived at the store and asked
for one “Payat”, pertaining to Openda, then subsequently handcuffed him and took him away.

The declaration made by Openda to Enriquez regarding his affair with Bernal’s wife is
considered a declaration against interest. Such a declaration is admissible when: (a) The
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (b) It relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;
(c) At the time he made said declaration, the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to
his aforsaid interest; and (d) The declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration
to be true.

Hence, the conviction of the accused was affirmed in toto.

8..) JISON VS. CA [Family Reputation]

G.R. NO. 124853; Feb. 24, 1998

FACTS: On March 13, 1985, Monina Jison alleged that the petitioner, Francisco Jison, was
married to a certain Lilian Lopez Jison since 1940; that in 1946, Francisco got Esperanza
Amolar, the nanny of Francisco’s daughter, pregnant. As a result thereof, Monina was born on
Aug, 6, 1946. By the acts of Francisco and his family, Monina enjoyed constinuos, implied
recognition as an illegitimate daughter. By reason of Francisco’s refusal to recognize Monina,
she filed an action for judicial declaration of her illigitemate status. Francisco alleged that he
could not have had a sexual affair with Amolar since she had ceased to be employed in 1944; that
after she left in October of 1944, he never heard from her again.

At trial, Monina presented 11 witnesses, mostly laborers of Francisco, to testify on matter that
would prove that Francisco was her father. They testified that they hid Monina from Francisco’s
wife under his orders. They further testified that Francisco and his family paid for Monina’s
education. Lastly, they testified that Monina was “reputedly the daughter of Francisco”. Monina,
40 years old during the trial, testified that Francisco paid for her schooling as well as medical
expenses whe incured from 1952 to 1955.

The trial court dismissed the complaint with costs against Monina. It found the allegations
regarding the relationship between Francisco and Amolar to be improbable; that the birth and
baptismal certificates of Monina were of low probative value, especially due to the misspellings
therein. It also found the testimonies presented by Monina to be hearsay and self-serving.

On appeal, the CA found that Monina presented overwhelming evidence to prove that she was
the illegitimate daughter of Francisco; that the testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela Casabuena
and Dominador Savariz alone were enough to prove filiation. Thus, the decision of the RTC was
set aside.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in reversing the decision of the RTC, declaring Monina the
illegitimate child of Francisco Jison?

RULING: NO. There is overwhelming evidence that Francisco fathered Monina and has
recognized her as his daughter and that Monina has been enjoying the open and continuous
possession of the status as Francisco’s illegitimate daughter. Through the testimonies of the
witnesses presented by Monina, the following were sufficiently established: (a) Francisco was
Monina’s father and she was conceived at the time her mother was under the former’s
employment; (b) Francisco recognized Monina as his illegitimate daughter through his overt acts
and conduct; and (c) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout
the years publicly, spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner.

 It must be noted, however, that the documentary evidence presented by Monina is not sufficient
evidence to prove filiation. As a rule, without the father intervening in the birth certificate, there
is no proof of filiation. Under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, objects which
may be used as evidence as proof of pedigree refers to articles which represent, in effect, a
family’s joint statement of belief as to the pedigree of a person. These object being “openly
exhibited and well known to the family”. Thus, the private documents presented by Monina does
not fall within the rule.

In sum, Monina has proved her filiation with the petitioner. The decision of the CA was affirmed.

9.) PEOPLE VS. DURANAN [Opinion Rule]

G.R. NO. 134074-75; Jan. 16, 2001

FACTS: Two criminal informations were filed against Emiliano Duranan, charging him with the
crime of rape. The prosecution presented the complainant, Nympha Lozada, her mother, and
Camp Crame Medico-legal Officer Dr. Rosalinda Cosidon. Nympha Lozada, a 25 year old
woman, was considered as a mental retardate and was only able to finish the 6th grade. She was
unemployed and lived in her parent’s apartment where the accused also resided.

On March 7, 1994, while Nympha was atanding by the door of her grandfather’s house, the
accused grabbed her by the neck and dragged her to the bathroom and raped her. The following
day, the accused again dragged Nympha to his room and raped her. Virginia Lozada testified that
she saw her daughter leave the bathroom together with the accused, and confronted him about it.
After finding out what happened, she went to Camp Karingal to file their affidavits. Dr. Cosidon
testified that the victim’s genitalia was inflamed caused by friction from intercourse.

The defense filed a demurrer to evidence, which was denied by the court. The defense presented
the accused, his wife, and his roommates. The accused raised the defense of alibi. He alleged that
the case was filed by the victim’s family only to evict him from the apartment. The trial court
found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The accused argued that
there was a lack of a psychological examination to determine the victim’s mental age as required
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in convicting the accused?

RULING: NO. Under Section 53, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, the opinion of an
ordinary witness may be received in evidence regarding… (a) The identity of a person about
whom he or she has adequate knowledge. The mother of the victim, although not a psychiatrist,
if she knows the mental and physical condition of the party, how she was born, what she is
suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter. The statement
of Virginia on her daughter being “quite intelligent”, merely refers to the latter’s ability to tell
others of what happened to her.

Hence, the decision of the RTC was affirmed.

10.) BOBBY AVELINO VS. PEOPLE [Opinion Rule]

G.R. NO. 181444; June 17, 2013

FACTS: Bobby Avelino, Ricardo Tolentino, Farouk Musa, Renato Meneses, Benjamin Elbona
and Dominic Apan were charged with the crime of murder before the RTC of Manila. Only
Avelino, Meneses, Elbona, and Musa were tried since the rest of the co-accused remained at-
large.

The information alleged that around 2pm in Sept. of 2000, Renato Sosas, employee of Avelino,
was ordered to call the appellant’s co-accused to his warehouse in Tondo. Sosas then heard
appellant utter “Papatayin si Chairman”. That On October 5, 2000, while Chairman Generoso
Hispano was traversing Muelle Del Rio and 2nd street im his jeep, a man blocked him and fired

at him. Alfredo Manalangsang, a witness for the prosecution, saw the incident. The accused
presented PO2 Anthony Galang, Adonis Bantiling and SOCO PSI Lito Cabamongan.

The RTC found Avelino guilty beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the rest of his co-accused
for the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. The accused argued that the CA erred in disregarding the
inconsistencies between the statements of Manalangsang and SOCO PSI Cabamongan regarding
the position of the gunman.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in affirming the conviction of the accused?

RULING: NO. Manalangsang unequivocally identified the accused as the gunman. He was
identified because he revealed his face when he pulled down the bonnet he was wearing. The
argument of the accused regarding the upward trajectory of the bullet based on the medical report
has no merit. Said trajectory does not negate the veracity of Manalangsang’s testimony.

The opinion of SOCO PSI Cabamongan was correctly disregarded by the CA. Since
Cabamongan was presented as an ordinary witness, his opinion is immaterial. Expert evidence is
admissible only if: (a) The matter to be testified to is one that requires expertise; and (b) The
witness has been qualified as an expert. The defense failed to make the necessary qualification
upon presenting Cabamongan during trial.

Hence, the petition was denied.