George Modelski-Evolutionary Paradigm For Global Politics

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Evolutionary Paradigm for Global Politics

Author(s): George Modelski


Reviewed work(s):
Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 3, Special Issue: Evolutionary Paradigms
in the Social Sciences (Sep., 1996), pp. 321-342
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association
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InternationalStudiesQuarterly(1996) 40, 321-342

EvolutionaryParadigm forGlobal Politics


GEORGE MODELSKI

University Seattle
ofWashington,

The evolutionary paradigmforglobalpoliticsherepresented consistsof


fourkeypropositions: (1) The globalpoliticalsystem is a populationof
a complexsystem
(2) globalpoliticsconstitutes
policiesor strategies; that
evolvesin specifiable
conditions;(3) accountingforglobalpoliticalevolu-
tionis a four-phasedlearningprocesswhosekeyoperatorsare variation
(innovation),cooperation, selection,and reinforcement; and (4) global
politicscoevolveswithglobal economics,community, and opinionet
cetera.The evolutionaryparadigmshedslightontwoprocesses inparticu-
lar:theformation atthegloballevel,andtheriseanddecline
ofinstitutions
ofworldpowers(thelongcycle).

Two propositionsare centralto thisarticle:

1. The institutionsofworldpoliticsevolve,thatis, theyundergo change subject


to identifiableevolutionaryprocesses;and
2. The riseand decline ofworldpowers(thelong cycle)is a mechanismofglobal
politicalevolution.

By institutionsof world politicswe mean constitutiveand widelyaccepted ar-


rangementsin respectto war and peace, nation-states, alliances,and international
organization,and to global leadershipand internationallaw. If we consider these
arrangementsin a sufficiently long perspective,say, over the span of the past
millennium,we cannotbut help noticingsignificant changes thathave occurredin
relation to these, that continue to affectthem, and that thereforeneed to be
understoodand explained. We need a structural-historical theoryofworldpolitics.
The riseand decline ofworldpowers,whichhas been the lead storyover thepast
fewcenturiesofworldpolitics,also needs to be understoodin a widerframework.
It is not the case of some eternalstruggleforpowerbut ratherthatofa mechanism
that in the recent past has mediated major changes in world political and social
organization.We need to see thelong cyclenot in isolationbut as a featureofworld
institutionalgrowth.
That iswhy,tobetterunderstandworldpoliticsin itstimedimensionin particular,
we require an evolutionaryframework. What mightbe the salientfeaturesof such
a paradigm?

Author'snote:This articletakesoffon the last twosectionsof "From Leadership to Organization:The Evolutionof


Global Politics"(Modelski, 1995a). It was presentedat theworkshopEvowoutionaryParadigmsin the Social Sciences at
the UniversityofWashington,Seattle,May 13-14, 1994.

01996 International
StudiesAssociation.
PublishedbyBlackwellPublishers, MA02142,USA,and 108CowleyRoad,OxfordOX4 1JF,UK.
238 MainStreet,Cambridge,

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322 ParadigmforGlobalPolitics
Evolutionary

EvolutionaryParadigms

TypesofEvolution
What is a paradigm? A paradigm is an exemplarypatternthat identifiesthe key
questionsand thefundamentalvariables;moregenerallyitis a setofcanons forthe
statementof problems of general significancethat is espoused, or shared, by a
researchcommunity.
Whatdoes thepatternexemplify?It representsa conceptionofthenaturalorder
of things,and specifieswhat, in a particularrealm, is to be normallyexpected.
Explanations then amount to showingwhyactual eventsdivergefrom"normal,"
thatis, "reasonable,"expectations.A paradigm defines,fora class of events,what
standsto reason.
An evolutionaryparadigm is one such pattern.KennethBoulding (1981:9, 25),
a socialscientist,describeditas "a patternoftheuniverse,""a patternin space-time."
Like Herbert Spencer beforehim,1Boulding saw thispatterncharacterizingnot
only the biologicalworld but also the physicaluniverse,viewed on the verylarge
scale ofcosmology,and also the socialworld.If,followingSpencer,cultureis added
to that list as a separate realm, also subjectto these considerations,fourtypesof
evolutionemerge-physical, biological,social,and cultural-whichcan be ranked
along a time axis according to the period of theirevolutionaryprocesses. Thus
cosmologyand geologyoperate on a timescale ofbillionsofyears;the storyof life,
and the animal kingdomon earth,is reckonedover tens and hundredsof million
years. Social organization,forhumans in particular,does not extend much over
hundredsofthousandyears,intosome million,and culturehas an even shortertime
span. All of thesemajor processestogethermake up evolution,but theyall need to
be kept distinct,too, ifonlybecause theirperiodsvary(Table 1).
That makes evolution a pervasive pattern of some considerable power and
generality.It is indispensablein graspinglong-rangeprocesses even though it is
not claimed to be a patternof everything and does not explain everyclass of event
or process. But does thatalso mean thatthe studyof evolutionnecessarilyinvolves
a hierarchyof sciences,and thatbiology,as the science of life,has an inherentor
overridingclaim on priorityof insightin evolutionarytheory?
Not necessarily.In the evolutionof evolutionarytheory,all branchesof knowl-
edge (thatare fieldsofculture)have participatedin thepast and continuedoing so.
In mid nineteenthcentury, biologistCharlesDarwincapturedpublicattentionwith
an account of the origin of the species, and his name came to be completely
identifiedwiththe concept of evolutionby naturalselection.But his own insights
and discoverieswere profoundlyshaped, not onlyby earlierworkin geology,such
as thatof Charles Lyell,whose principleof "uniformitarianism" (thatpast changes
are to be accountedforbyprocessesstillin operation)is basic to Darwin'swork,but
also by thatformative workin earlydemography,Thomas Malthus's"Essayon the
Principleof Population."Whatis more,sociologistHerbertSpencer developed his
own conceptof evolutioneven beforeDarwin'sworkhad appeared in print.
That is whyeach typeof evolutionmay also be regarded as occupyingits own
domain, and privilegedtime-space.The knowledgeof each contributesto evolu-
tionarytheory,and researchesmutuallycross-fertilize work on all others.While
evolutionary conceptionshaverecentlyhad particularly fullelaborationinbiological

I In The Principles HerbertSpencer ([1885], 1910:vol. 1, 3-7) distinguishedthreekindsof evolution:


ofSociology,
nonorganic,organic,and superorganic.In his essay "The DevelopmentHypothesis"(1852) he had alreadydefended
the "Theoryof Evolution"and rejectedspecial creation;in "Progress:Its Law and Cause" (1857) he argued thatthe
same law of evolution ("of the simple into complex") held in the physical,biological, social, and cultural realms
(reprintedin Spencer, 1910:1-62).

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GEORGE MODELSKI 323

TABLE 1. Types of Evolution

Types Complexsystems in therelevant


ofEvolution thatevolve time ftrame(years)

Physical Physicaluniverse Ten billion


(includingearth)

Biological Life on earth Hundred million


(organisms) (l OOm)

Social Behavior Million


(economic,political,societal,"cultural"*)

Cultural Human artifactsand memory Tens of thousand


(languages,arts& sciences,cities,tools
"cultural"= behaviorforthe reproductionof cultureand social institutions

theory,no one should forgetthe roles of geologyand astronomyin pioneeringthe


understandingof deep time. Claims to priorityor one-wayinfluenceby any one
fieldof evolutionarystudyneed to be treatedwithcaution.

Social Science EvolutionaryParadigms


The presentstudyis thereforelocated in social evolution,and in the social sciences,
and concernsglobal politicsas one subtypeof social evolutionaryprocess.Whatare
the essentialsof an evolutionaryparadigmforthe social sciences?2Accordingto R.
C. Lewontin,writingin theInternationalEncyclopediaoftheSocialSciences(1968:203):
There is a hierarchyof principlesin the evolutionaryworld view: change,order,
direction,
progress,and perfectibility.
Evolutionarytheoriesare distinguishedby how
manyof theseare successivelyincludedas essential.

These fiveprinciplesserveas a convenientframework fordiscussion.The argument


willbe that,forpresentpurposes,theessentialingredients of the evolutionarypara-
digm forthe social sciencesare onlytwo:change, and direction.Order, progress,
and perfectibility
are not essentialpartsof such a framework.

Change
The mostbasic evolutionaryconsiderationscenteraround "change."An evolution-
aryperspectiverepresents"a commitmentto the instability of the presentorder as
well as the past. In its simplestand irreducibleformevolutionismis the doctrine
that change of stateis an unvaryingcharacteristic of naturalsystemsand human
institutionsand thatsuch change followsimmutablelaws" (Lewontin,1968:203).
Change ofstatein societiesmeans change in theeconomic,political,societal,and
culturalstructuresthat constitutethem. Structuralchange is to be distinguished
fromroutinesthatcharacterizeall social life(thisdistinctionis central,forexample,
to the Nelson and Winter(1982) analysisof economic development).Structural
change commonlyrepresentsinnovationthatis a departurefromstandardoperat-
ing procedures,and thatiswhythestoryofsocialevolutionis a recordofinnovation.
But structuralchange, or the diffusionof innovation,also takes time,and that is

2 We have no standard evolutionaryparadigm for the social sciences. "Evolutionists"(for instance, Stephen
Sanderson, 1991) emphasize "stages"of social development;othersprivilegemechanismsof transformation.

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324 ParadigmforGlobalPolitics
Evolutionary

why the observationof change in human institutionsinvariablyrequires a long


perspective.
Such an approach is clearlystructuralist, in thatit proposes thatthe persisting
clustersof social behaviorthatare subjectto social evolutionformemergentsocial
structureswhose propertiescannot be deduced fromthe parts composing them,
and in thatit focuseson transformations It emphasizeschange,
of these structures.
ratherthan "evolutionarystages"whichare oftenseen as the principalproductsof
evolutionanalysis,and oftenreified,or even personified,as in "capitalism."It is not
functionalist in thatit does not inquire into the functionsof persistingstructures,
but it does searchforexplanationsof change in these structures.
Distinguishing"structural" from"routine"change helps to get overthe problem
that Lewontinraises, of separating"real" change froma stasisthat has only the
appearance of change. But to assertthat evolutionis structuralchange does not
necessarilyimplythe statementthatorder is the naturaloutcome of evolutionary
processes. A more modest propositionwould stipulate that such processes are
concerned with adaptation, that is, they might cope with a set of identifiable
problems,in relationto whichtheymay,or maynot,be adaptive.

Directionality
Lewontin'sthirdprinciple(1968:204), direction,also is a basic one. "By direction
in evolutionwe mean the concept thatthereis some naturallinear order of states
of the systemand thatan evolutionary processcan be describedas passing through
successivestatesin thatorder" in a line thatis alwaysascendingor descending.
Is the scale on which such directionalitycan be measured differentiation, or
complexity,as HerbertSpencer firstproposed it? Over verylong periods,we can
observe both differentiation and increase in complexityin social systems.In the
evolution of the world systemof the past millennium,a prominentinstance of
differentiation has been the formationof the global and national systems,where
previouslytherewas onlyregionaland local organization.Arguably,too, theworld
systemwas less complex ca. 1000 thanitis going to be in theyear2000. But is such
differentiation and highercomplexitydue to evolution,and ifso, how?
Directionalitydoes not posit the existenceof a design,or blueprint;"genes are
much more like a recipe than like a blueprint"(Dawkins,1987:296), and it is not
teleological,in the sense of implyingsearchforevidence of such design in nature.
It does not lead to "lawsofhistory"proclaimingdevelopmentalsequences familiar
in, and rejectedby, the social sciences,such as thatof "feudalism-+ capitalism"
leading to the "finalgoal of socialism."
But directionalitydoes imply that evolution is not random and that it is a
cumulativeprocess,wherebya successionof small changes can bringabout great
transformations (Dawkins,1987:ch. 3). A recipe is a set of ingredients,and a set of
instructions.Instructionsorganize the process in time thus givingit a temporal
structure;evolution might be thoughtof as involvingsome such instructions.
Ingredientscompose the conditionsthatinduce evolution;theydefinethe spatial
aspect of thatprocess.
Directionalitycan be made more tractableat shortertimeframesifit is under-
stood to be the productof learning.J. W. Pringle(1951) has shownthatlearning
viewed as increased complexityof behavior over time may be thought of as
equivalentto organicevolution,usuallythoughtofas increasedstructural complex-
ity(in space); hence social evolutionis basicallyabout learningnew behavior (see
also Campbell, 1969; Schull, 1991). Successfulsocial learningproduces structural
change; a learning process, furthermore,is inherentlyphased, has a distinct
time-structure, hence direction.It mightthereforebe argued thatitis learningthat
givesdirectionality to evolutionaryprocesses.It could be seen as a "natural"process

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GEORGEMODELSKI 325

of trialand error,as iftheunwindingofan internallogicor programofadaptation,


one thatdoes notrequirethepostulationofa granddesignor purposefulintention,
but does call foran explanation.
Such an approach is neitherdeterministic nor does it assume randomness;it is
withoutprojectingforit a fixedcontentor a
probabilistic.3It favorsdirectionality
finitepurpose, and does not requirethe teleologicalassumptionof a finalgoal or
destination.It requires adjustmentto changing conditionsof the world system,
includingenvironment, population,urbanization,technology,and wealth,butdoes
not require the assumptionof a grand design. All it says is thatthe systemunder
studyproceeds on itswayin a certainmanner,and accordingto codes, or programs,
thatneed to be explicated.It obeysa setofrulesin thatitplaysout in a givennatural
and social environmentthatincludesotherprocessesand policieseach carryingout
theirown programs.All such a model does is to postulatean "innerlogic,"4thatis,
the formal-logicalrequirementthat the processes evince a time-structure that
constrainsthem.

and Perfectibility
Progress
There is a traditionof long standing(cf. reviewin Ginsberg,1961) that regards
progress as an essentialcharacteristic of evolution.Progressis not identicalwith
evolution,but is linkedto it:itis evolutionin a directionthatsatisfiescertaincriteria
of value. The prominentformulations of the idea of progressdate fromthe era of
the Enlightenment.The most famous among these formulationswere those of
Condorcet; and his criteria,which included equality,and peace, do not seem as
utopian as theywere once made out to be. Butwhetherthe studyofsocial evolution
can by itselfprovide the relevantcriteriaofvalue is a matterfordebate. And even
ifthe criteriawere agreed on, thereis room fordisagreementas to whetheror to
what degree the record of human history,be it of the twentiethcentury,the last
millennium,or thepast 10,000years,showsprogressin thehumancondition.Some
social evolutionistsmaintainthat any such claim is misplaced and that no such
progresshas in factoccurred.
These are mattersstillopen to discussion,both on empiricaland on theoretical
grounds. But they make it clear that it would be unwise to include progress,
movementin a "good" direction,among the essential traitsof social evolution.
Biologistshave had some difficulty specifyingpreciselywhat mightbe meant by
biologicalprogress.Sufficeitto saythata "learning"conceptionofthedirectionality
of evolutionkeeps open the possibilityofprogress,but leaves the determinationof
the precise characteristics of that progressto the analysisof cases. A "learning"
conceptionof social evolutionleaves room not onlyfor"materialist"components
(ofwealthand power),but also for"idealist"elements(oftruthand love) thatmake
fora well-roundedanalysis.
Lewontin'sfifthprinciple,perfectibility, is even more stringent.This again is a
criterionof Condorcet (a mathematician),who saw it as a limittowardwhich the
process mightbe moving,withoutever attainingit.Today evolutionis more often
viewed as an endless process with no ultimategoal or destination,and even a
"learning" conception stressesin the firstplace adaptation to currentproblems

3 C. R. Hallpike (1986:19 ff.)distinguishesfourtypesof themesin debates that have characterizedevolutionary


thought:(1) Whetherevolutionaryprocessesare endogenous,or exogenous; (2) whetherthe theoriesto explain them
or atomist;(3) whethertheyare materialistor idealist;and (4) whetherthe processesare
are or should be structuralist
deterministicor random (stochastic).In regardto directionality our positionis probabilisticratherthan determinist;
the otherthemesare touchedon elsewherein thisstudy.
4 Peter Corning(1983:43 ff.)calls this"teleonomy"(or internalteleology).RobertWesson reaches "beyondnatural
selection"to chaos theoryand views(1991:144) thegenome,whoseessence is self-organization, as an "attractor":a "set
of permittedstatesof a system.""The genome is ... a patternor a program"forbuildingan organism.

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326 Paradigmfor GlobalPolitics
Evolutionary

rather than final purpose. But as Lewontin points out (1968:206), if there is
directionality cannot be altogetherignored.
on some criterion,then perfectibility
Indeed, forsocialevolutionitraisestheproblemofa possiblelifecycleforthehuman
species. Could itbe programmedto die out at the end of such a cycle?

Macro-and Microevolution
This discussionleaves us withtwomain evolutionaryprinciples:structuralchange,
and formal-logicaldirectionality.It remains to point out that these are broadly
equivalentto the twomajor divisionsofbiologicaltheory:macro-and microevolu-
tion.These are verybasic distinctions, even ifthedividingline betweenmacro and
micro,descriptionand explanation,is not as sharp as it mightbe thoughtto be.
Biological theorists(such as Ayala, 1982; Pollard, 1984) commonlynow divide
evolutionary(or thesynthetic) theoryintotwoareas,macroevolutionand microevo-
lution. Macroevolution,meaning the evolutionof all livinggroups,considersthe
questionofwhetherevolutionhas occurredand bywhatpathways.It was called the
theoryof descentby Darwin(who definedevolutionas descentwithmodification),
and sometimesis called the factof evolution,witha strongdescriptiveelement.
Darwin's "tree of life"is the mostgeneral graphicrepresentationof the observed
factsof evolutionarychange.
Microevolutionis thestudyofthemechanismofevolution.Darwinsuggestedthat
natural selection is a chief mechanismthat explains the nonrandom aspects of
evolution,and thussuppliesa principalexplanationforthe observedvarietyof life
forms,but we now thinkof it as one among such mechanisms.These mechanisms
can be thoughtof as supplyingthe directionality of evolution.
The discussion of Lewontin's principles has now brought the subject down
essentiallytowherebiologicaltheoryalso findsitself.But do we wishto draw,in our
own analysis,a sharp distinctionbetweenmicro-and macroevolution,betweenfact
and explanation? Probablynot,because the boundaries betweendescriptionand
explanationare not reallythatsharp; good description,and classification,implya
good theory,and convincingexplanationsneed to be testedagainstdata collected
on thebasis of a theoreticalscheme.What is more,macroanalysisrequiresreliable
knowledgeof microconditions, and vice versa.
How do such distinctionsapply to the studyof social evolution?Are conditions
such thatan "evolutionaryanalogy"is in factjustified?

versusDarwin
Comte-Spencer
Since the second halfof the nineteenthcentury,twoconceptionsof evolutionary
theoryhave existedside byside: theComte-Spencerian,and theDarwinian.Auguste
Comte, and afterhim, Herbert Spencer, proposed thathuman evolutionpassed
throughmajor stagesofsocial development.Also referredto as "evolutionism,"this
viewemphasized major stagesthatmightbe manifestedin thehistoryofhumanity,
and could thereforebe regarded as a formof "macroevolutionary" analysis.
The Darwinian model elucidated a centralcausal mechanismof evolution to
and change in populations,butavoided thetemptationforquick
explain continuity
explanationsof sociohistoricalprocesses. It centeredon the analysisof selection,
and forthatreason has also been referredto as selectionism.In the social sciences,
Darwinianselectionismis a formof "microevolutionary" analysis.
Over time,the Comte-Spencerianprogramfellintodisuse,even ifthe problem
itwas intended to tackle,understandinglarge-scalechange in human affairs,has
not disappeared. But in mid twentiethcentury,Darwiniantheoryexperienced a
strongrevivaland reinvigorationthrougha "modern synthesis"(Huxley, [1942],
1974) thatfollowedtherevolutionin geneticsand thatwas followedbythediscovery

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GEORGE MODELSKI 327

ofDNA, whichin turnhas been subjectto muchcriticalanalysis(e.g., Pollard,1984),


and whichalso has exertedmuch influenceon the social sciences.
Our projecthere is to combinethesetwoconceptions.Darwinianmicromechan-
isms of search and selection,as adapted to the social context,which have now
become an accepted partof social science(cf.Nelson and Winter,1982; or Elster's
treatmentof selection,1989), are also stronglyrepresentedin our model, albeit in
novel forms.It is the "macroevolutionary" component of this project that raises
largerquestionsand deservescloser scrutiny, because it paints,in broad strokes,a
"big picture"ofglobalpoliticalevolutionin theComte-Spencerianmanner,butwith
new conceptsand in a waythatalso requiresDarwinismforitsvalidity.
All in all, thisdoes not implythatevolutionarybiology(as well as physics,and
culturaltheory)and the social sciencesmusthave an identicalevolutionarytheory.
The question is not how much like biological systemsare social systems,or how
much social behavioris rooted in biology.Nor is thatquestionpart of the debates
thathave centeredaround Social Darwinism(cf.Campbell, 1969), even thoughit
is fairto assume (withouttakingon a commitmentto biologicaldeterminism)that
social behaviorhas a significantbiologicalcomponent.
Instead, the questionis: Given thatthe theoreticalbasis ofbiologyis micro-and
macroevolution,in the sense that both change and directionalityare essential
componentsof evolutionarytheory,what additionalusefulanalogies mightthere
be forthesocial sciences,ifthesocialsystemofthehumanspecies,mutatismutandis,
is viewed as subject to evolutionaryprocesses?There are importantdifferences
betweenbiological organisms(not to mentionthe physicaluniverse,and culture)
and societies,and theyargueforkeeping,at thisstage,theseveralrealmsanalytically
distinct.
There is also the considerationthat, in the case of the social sciences, the
structuresthatundergo change are not unitarybut are differentiated into at least
economics,politics,society,and culture.Accordingly, thereis notonlytheevolution
of each of these structuresto be considered each in its own right,but also the
relationshipamong theseevolvingstructures, each proceedingat itsown pace, but
sensitive,and adaptive to, developmentsin each of the otherprocesses.This is not
a problem(howtheevolutionofone speciesaffectsthatofothers)thatis apparently
much or commonlystudied in biology:hence the problem of coevolution-how
and itsdirectionrelatesto the others.That is
change in one set of social structures
whycoevolutionmaybe added to macro-and microevolution.

RationalChoiceversusEvolutionary
Paradigm
Evolutionaryparadigmsforsocial sciencesembodyno claim to universalsolution
foreveryproblem.They are fittedto deal withsome importantproblems,but for
manyothersare not necessarilytheprimeremedy.Ultimately, and in thelong run,
thevariousparadigmsshould be mutuallycompatible,being attemptsto studythe
enormouselephant of social lifefroma numberof different directions.But in the
shorterrun,such compatibility maynot be immediatelyattainable.
In the social sciences today one importantparadigm is that representedby
rationalchoice theories(cf. Elster,1989). It has an excellentpedigree, and a fine
methodology,contemporaryneoclassical economics being one of its successful
incarnations.How does itcontrastwithevolutionarytheory?
Most basically,rationalchoice is the studyof decision,that is, of actions to be
taken in the lightof given preferences,and constraints.Its time perspectivesare
those of the rationaldecision maker,whichmightoftenbe severelydiscountedby
lack of knowledgeor limitedby shorttimehorizons. Even more fundamentally,
rationalchoice theoriesofferno purchaseon social structureor structural change,
and have difficultywithprocessesthathave timeand directionality as theiressential

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328 ParadigmforGlobalPolitics
Evolutionary

Neoclassical economistshave not had much successin dealing with


characteristics.
long-termeconomicdevelopment,structural unemployment, and turnoverin lead-
ing sectors.In political science, neorealistshave had some trouble coping with
structuralchange at the global level.
The differencesbetweenevolutionaryand rationalchoice approaches (see also
Modelski and Thompson, 1996:136) mightbe summarizedas follows:

Evolutionary Rational
Choice

(timehorizon)
Perspective Long-term Short-term

Focusofexplanation Institutions, Decisions,


transitions equilibrium

Choiceprocess Trialanderror Rational


search/selection maximization

schema
Ends-means Bothpreferences Givenconstraints
andconstraints andpreferences,
arevariable choiceofmeans

In otherwords,rationalchoice theorymightyieldbetterinsightsin the analysis


of individualdecisionsand policychoices,but evolutionaryapproaches should give
superiorresultsin thestudyoflong-rangesocialprocesses,and ofstructural change
in particular.Evolutionaryapproaches do not require the postulateof rationality;
theyallow forthepossibilityof trialand errorsolutionsbysocial selection.But they
also supplythe contextwithinwhichpolicydecisions mustbe formulated,just as
microchoicesprovidea sound basis fortheunderstandingof greatmovements.
Such an approach places both "ends" and "means" togetherat the center of
analysis.Both values and ideas, and power,both idealist (agendas, free societies)
economic) componentsof social processes,are
and materialist(politico-strategic,
equally implicatedin thisanalysis.This is notjust a case of tryingto have it both
ways,in themannerofeclecticism,butrathera deliberatestrategyto coverthefour
dimensionsof enduringsocial experience.5

WhatNeedsExplaining?
Whatproblemsin the studyofworldpoliticsare particularly suitedto an evolution-
aryapproach? Global politicsevolutionmightbe definedas the theoryaccounting
forthe appearance of politicalorganizationat the global level,and the processes
bywhichglobal politicalstructures have acquired theirpresentform.Thereforethe
short answer is: structuralchange at the global level. That which changes, via
mechanismstobe determined,is theglobalpoliticalsystem,and theprocessappears
inTable 1 as a subsetof(world)politicalevolution.6Not nation-states,
notcountries,
but the global politicalsectorof theworldsystem.

5 This is the(late,evolutionary,
butnotfunctionalist)Parsonianconceptionofsocial systems, thoughTalcottParsons
did not employthe notionof dimension.We conjecturethatthe dimensionsof social processesreflectthe fourbasic
forcesof nature(gravity,strongforce,electromagnetism, and weak force).In recentdecades, muchofphysicsresearch
has been concernedwithspecifyingconditionsunder whichthese forcesachieve (electroweak,grand,and complete)
"unification"(cf. Horgan, 1994).
6 In thepresentarticlewe specifyan evolutionarymodel forglobal politics.But thesame basic model helps elucidate
notjust world politics,and itsinteractionwithglobal economicsand community, but also worldsystemevolutionover
the last fivemillennia(cf.Modelski,1995b).

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GEORGE MODELSKI 329

Moreover,ifa distinctionis drawnbetweeninstitutions (the rules of the game)


and organizations(the actorsor playersin thatgame, pursuingstrategies)(as does,
e.g., North, 1990), twokindsof change willbe recognized:in major actors,and in
basic institutions of global politics.A mostprominentinstanceof change in actors
over the mostrecent500 yearshas been the rise and selectionof successiveworld
powers (the most recentbeing thatof the United States)whichhas provided the
basic pulse of global politics.
The other,longer-rangeprocesshas been thatof institutional change. A super-
ficial glance at world politicssuggeststo some onlookers nothingbut a chaos of
perpetual "comingand going,"but in factthereis a patternto it: the successionof
worldpowersnotonlyinvolvedsuccessfulcopingswitha parade ofglobal problems,
but also powered basic institutionalchange. For in the past 1,000 years, global
politicshas moved steadilyon a path towardgreaterglobal organization,beginning
with failed attemptsat world empire that overshadowedthe earlier centuriesof
worldsystemhistory, continuingwiththeriseofthenation-statesystem,and moving
increasinglyinto foraystowardworld organizationthat are also likelyto extend
considerablyintothe future.In otherwords,in takinga long viewofworldpolitics,
we can perceivenotjust changes in actors,but also changes in basic institutions.
The outline of thatprocess,portrayedin the thirdcolumn of Table 2, showsa
successionof leading powers,centralto the global politicsof theirtime,grouped
into blocs of four,each representingperiods withcharacteristicformsof global
organization.The firstperiod, Eurasian-centered,is thatof the establishmentof
preconditions,and itsdefiningfeatureis thefailureof the Mongol designforworld
empire.The second period,West-Europeanin spatialorientation,showsthelaying
down of a nucleus of an emerging global systemin that area, withworldwide
repercussions.The thirdperiod,opening about 1850, is the startof global political
organization,seriouslytakingoffafter1945. Each period marksa transitionto new
institutions,and new rules of politicalorganization.
Studentsof thisfieldthereforeconfrontthefactthatglobal politicsis subjectnot
just to routineprocesses,but also to substantialand continuousstructuralchange
at more thanone level; and thebasic questionbecomes:Whatexplains suchchange
in the past millenniumso thatthe process can be projected into the near future?
For in that millenniumthe formand substance of global organizationhas (a)
changed substantially,inter alia, from a condition of minimal or nonexistent
structureand low connectivityto one of substantialstructurein conditions of
substantially higherconnectivity today.Moreover,thatdevelopmenthas been not
merelyone of change, but also one thathas shown(b) directionality (ratherthan
randomness), in that the change has embodied search for innovativeformsof
organization(appropriate,interalia, to an expanding population), and has also
tracedan orderlypath in space, and exhibiteda temporalstructure.
Put differently,significantaspectsofworldpoliticshave been about institutional
innovation,and about mechanismsand agentsof such innovation.Because global
politicshas been subjectto an evolutionaryprocess,an evolutionaryparadigm is
likelyto affordthebest answersto questionsabout thatprocess,and tojustifysome
confidenceforprojectionsinto the future.Such a paradigm accommodates and
privileges (diachronic) studies across time, as in long-rangeprocesses, but also
requires (synchronic)at-one-point-in-time studies of conditions that favor and
governevolution.
All thisrepresentsthe claim thattheoretical(Darwinian)biologyand the theo-
reticalsocial sciences are "equivalent,albeit different
examples of the use of one
and the same general theoreticalcalculus (or model), the theoreticalstructureof
whichremainsthe same" (Schmid,1987:82). Arguably,therefore,thissame model
aids in understandingsocial processesand structures in general,but in the formu-
lationhere attempted,thebasic propositionsofevolutionary theorywillbe specified

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330 ParadigmforGlobalPolitics
Evolutionary

TABLE 2. The Coevolutionof Politics,Economics,Community,


and Opinion in the Global System(930-2100)

GlobalSystem Lineage
Democratic LongCycles K-waves
Process (model
societies, (world
powers (global
(opinion) andopposition) andantecedents) sectors)
leading

930
CONSTRUCTION EXPERIMENTS PRECONDITIONS SUNG BREAKTHROUGH
(EurasianTransition)
Renaissance DI Sung Reforms LC1 NorthernSung KI Printing
(Neo-Confucian) K2 National mkt
LC2 SouthernSung K3 Adm.fisc.fr.
K4 Marit.trade

COMMERCIAL-
NAUTICAL REVOLUTION
D2 Italian LC3 Genoa K5 Champagne fairs
Republican K6 Black Sea trade
(Imperial- LC4 Venice K7 Galleyfleets
monarchical) K8 Pepper

GLOBAL NUCLEUS FRAMEWORK OF


(WestEuropean) GLOBAL TRADE
Enlightenment D3 Dutch LC5 Portugal K9 Guinea gold
Reformed K10 Indian spices
(Counter- LC6 Dutch Republic K 11Atlantic,Baltic
reformed) K12 Asian trade

INDUSTRIAL TAKE-OFF
D4 British LC7 BritainI K13 Am.plant.
Liberal K14 Amerasiantr.
(Absolutist) LC8 BritainII K15 Cottonmanuf.
K16 Steam,rail
1850
DEMOCRACY GLOBAL ORGANIZATION INFORMATION AGE
(Post-WestEuropean)
World opinion D5 Democratic LC9 United States K17 Electr.,chem.
groundwork K18 Electronics,auto
LCI0 K19 Informationinds
K20
Note:The numbered K-waves,
longcycles, and phasesoftheDemocraticLineageare actor-driven
(nonlinear)
mechanisms oftheirrespective
evolutionary thoseactuating
processes, globalpolitics, community,
economics, and
globalsystem The CAPITALIZEDheadings(CONSTRUCTION,etc.)refertoperiodsofthoseprocesses;
formation.
a newsetofbasicrulesandinstitutions.
eachperiodrepresents

and
It is theseevolvingglobal structures,
as applicable to global politicalstructures.
not individualpolitiesor societies,thatare the subjects(or unit)of theevolutionary
process.

EvolutionaryGlobal Politics
Let us propose here, in respectto global politics,a process model of evolutionary
change.A processisa sequence,orstring,ofevents,andwefittheglobalpoliticalprocess
intothecausal structureoftheworldwhichwe taketo be an evolutionary one.
It is a processmodel because itsinglesout foremphasischangesover timerather
than static"stagesof development"thatsuch changes mightbe said to be bringing

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GEORGE MODELSKI 331

about. But allowances are also made fora multilevelanalysis,both of change of


actorsand of change in basic institutions
ofworldpolitics.
As applied to politicaleventsat the global level, the process model consistsof
foursetsofbasic expectations:

1. The global politicalsystemis a populationof strategies;


2. Global politicsis a complex systemthatevolvesin specifiableconditions;
3. Accountingforglobal politicalevolutionis a learningprocess,of which the
key operators are variation(innovation),cooperation,selection,and rein-
forcement;and
4. Global politicscoevolveswithglobal economics,community,and opinion et
cetera.

These are thebasic propositionsthatcomprisethepresentevolutionaryparadigm;


theymightbe called the "hard core," in Imre Lakatos's sense,of thisevolutionary
researchprogram.Taken together,these fourpropositionsoffera frameworkfor
the explanationof structuralchange in worldpolitics.

as a PopulationofStrategies
1. GlobalPoliticalSystem
The starting pointforevolutionary viewedas a set
analysisis theglobalpoliticalsystem
of policies(or strategies)forthe (collective)managementof global problems.These
policiesmay(conceptually) be carriedbya varietyofactorsor agents:worldempires;
or nation-states
city-states exercising,or aspiringto, global leadership;alliancesand
coalitions;internationalregimes;and worldorganizations.But the emphasisat this
point is not on actors (that affordthe ingredientsfor policy)but on the policies
themselves viewedas setsofinstructions, or programsofglobalpotential.
The instructions embodied in global policies providethe basis forthe standard
operatingrules,or routines,oftheglobal politicalsystem.Such routinesreproduce
themselvesthroughprocessesof socializationand training.Variationand innova-
tion in these routinesis the materialforglobal politicalevolution,and occurs as
generationsof policies succeed each other.
That whichexperiencesglobalpoliticalevolutionis thesocial organizationofthe
human species; which makes it clear that nation-statesare not the basic units of
worldpolitics,even thoughcertainnation-statesmayat timesbe carriersof global
policies.That also means thatpolicies of nation-statessuch as the United Statesor
Japan became principal units of evolutionaryanalysisonly insofaras theywere
vehiclesor indicatorsof global politicalchange. Their evolutionaryfitness,ifany,
is a component of the global process. Similar considerationsapply to evolution
viewedregionally,or locally,whose operationshouldbe specifiedin relationto the
global level.It mightbe supposed thattheworkingofevolutionary processesis most
markedat the species level.

Evolve
2. ComplexSystems
Most basically this argumentrestsupon the conjecturethat the global political
systemis a complex system,and thereforeit evolves. The explanation of the
evolutionof global politicsrestsupon the global political systembelonging to a
larger class of phenomena, that of complex systems,all potential subjects of
evolution.The argumenthas twoaspects: (1) global politicsevolvesbecause it is a
complex system,and (2) it evolveswhen "necessaryconditions"are best satisfied.

Complexity.The directionalityof evolutionarypolitics is that which Davies


(1984:239-40) calls "organizedcomplexity."The basic distinctionis betweencom-

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332 Evolutionary forGlobalPolitics
Paradigm

plex systemsand others that may be either orderly or chaotic. Ordered (or
equilibrium)systemsfollowa fixedpatternand have no flexibility or capacityfor
change; chaoticsystemsare disorderedand unpredictable.Complex systemsstand
at the "edge of chaos" but are not themselveschaotic;theyhave sufficient capacity
forchange to adapt to newconditions.That is,in thepresentcase, itis theargument
thatworldpoliticsis neitheran equilibrium(or near-equilibrium)system,as postu-
lated in traditional"balance of power"accounts,nor an anarchicone, in the sense
ofbeing chaotic,but is in factfluid,farfromequilibrium,and flexible,one inwhich
order arises throughfluctuations.7
Complex organizationof livingorganismscan be shownto arise spontaneously
given the existenceof an ensemble, that is, a large collectionof similarsystems.
Complexityhas been definedas the abilityto make transitions,thatis, to evolve.
Accordingto MurrayGell-Mann,a "complex adaptive system"is a collectionof
simple partsthatinteractto forma complexwhole capable of learningabout, and
reactingto, the outsideworld.8
In the present case, the relevantcollectionis the population of strategiesor
policies,past,present,and future.That wayexperimentswilloccurwithalternative
strategiesuntil,in favorableconditions,innovationcomes along thatis selectedout
and thencumulatesthroughamplification. The accumulationof countlessinnova-
tions,large and small,leads to systemsas intricateas modernmarketeconomiesor
freedemocraticcommunities.
To showdirectionality, or future-orientation, or "naturalness,"thereis no need
to embracedeterminism or assume"progress,"as in "evolutionism";buttopostulate
onlythattheevolutionary processunfoldsin accordancewithan innerlogic and/or
sequential structure,in thateach phase createsthe conditionsforthe next,always
respondingto new conditionsin the environment.Such a process requires some
capacityto anticipatethe futurebut no greatermotivationotherthan "searchfora
betterlife,"or as Adam Smithput it,when accountingforwhatpromptshumanity
to save, the ever-present"desireforbetteringour condition."
A complementaryassumptionis thatof "sensitivedependence on initialcondi-
tions":thatthebeginningformshave an importanteffecton thecourseof develop-
ment in that theyhelp cumulatethe resultsof early changes, a basic reason for
examiningcarefullythe timepath of structuralchange whichwe also thinkof as
path-dependent. David (1988:18) describesprocesseswhose outcomes are path-
dependent as those dynamicprocesses in which the position and motion of the
system,and itsconstituentsubsystems, are "sensitiveto initialconditions."They are
characterizedby nonergodicity(theydo notpass throughall the statescompatible
with the energyof the systemover the course of time) and irreversibility.Both
path-dependencyand future-orientation referto the factthatthe processesunder
studyhave a temporalstructure.

7 Note, though,the recentfindingby Diana Richards(1993:62) that"the evolutionof power" in the international
systemis "a chaoticprocess."This was based on a diagnostictestto determinewhetherthe (Modelski-Thompson)sea
powerconcentrationtimeserieswas the resultofa stochasticor a chaoticprocess.
8 Accordingto MurrayGell-Mann(1994), complexity theoryrestson twoideas: (1) Complexityis notmerelya quality
to be noted but a quantitythatcan be measured.Complex systemstendover timeto giveriseto morecomplex systems.
But as systemsbecome morecomplex,theygiveriseto "emergentproperties"thatmaynotbe understood.(2) Complex
adaptive systemsare everywherealike; forinstance,the processof learning-testinga model against realityand then
modifyingit to suit-occurs at different timescales throughoutbiology.
9 Citing Brian Arthur,David (1988:39) describes structuresthat produce strong "historicallock-ins"as those
characterizedby a source of local positivefeedback,a source of perturbationsor fluctuations,and somethingcausing
the progressivediminutionin the comparativestrengthof random perturbations.The initial state of the system
combinedwiththe ensuingfluctuations acts to push the dynamicsinto the domain of one of asymptoticstates(stable
attractors,or emergentstructures), and thusto "select"the structurethatthe systemeventuallylocks into.These are
conditionsfavoringevolution.

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GEORGE MODELSKI 333

Conditions ofEvolution.If it is now establishedthat complex systemsare both


path-dependentand future-oriented, the question then becomes: What are the
optimumconditionsrequiredforthe occurrenceof evolution?
Even though there is no need to invokethe postulateof progress,there is no
reason to believe thatevolutionis a randomprocess,a matterof luckyaccident,or
"manna fromheaven."Ratherwe suppose thatin thepresenceofcertainconditions
political evolution(or political learning)will tend to occur. For Charles Darwin,
theseconditionsincludedboth Malthusianpopulationgrowthand certainenviron-
mental conditions.According to Ervin Laszlo (1991:110), "Evolution is not an
accident but occurs necessarilywhenevercertain parametricrequirementshave
been fulfilled."These are forcomplex systems:openness to energyflows,diversity
in components,catalyticcycles,and feedback.A chiefcharacteristicof complex
systemsis heterogeneity.
Whatmighttheserequirementsbe forsocial systems?In regardto global politics,
it has been argued (Modelski, 1987, 1995a) thatthe necessaryand sufficient policy
conditionsfor the rise, that is, selection,of one nation-stateto leadership in the
global political systemin the past half-millennium have been politico-military
organizationof global reach, lead economy,a cooperativesociety,and openness
and responsivenessto global problems.These are (local) conditionsthat made it
possible forsome nation-statesto get ahead ofothersin the competitionforglobal
statusin a heterogeneousworld system.To the degree thatlong cycleshave been
thedriversofpoliticalevolution,thesehave also been theconditionsofinstitutional
development.Thus theyalso serveas guides to policymaking,and to institution-
building.
More broadlyspeaking,theyare also conditionsthatapply to the evolutionof
worldinstitutions, and to global politicalevolutionin the nextcentury.The nearer
the global systemapproximates(not uniformly but at least in some of itsregions)
such conditions,suitablygeneralized,as adequate politicalorganization,matched
by a world economic infrastructure of a maturingworld markethospitableto the
rise of new lead industrialsectors,in the contextof an emergingglobal democratic
community,and while respondingto global problems,the more likelyis political
evolutionto proceed at a smoothand measured pace. Even more generallythese
mightbe argued to be theconditionsofevolutionary developmentin all dimensions
of society.
Thus itis importantto specifytheseconditionswithsome care. All in all, thereis
no denying the most basic postulate of this approach, that political evolution
necessarilyoccursin conditionsof complexity.That also means thatthis is not an
attemptto explainevolutionas thegenerationofcomplexity, norto seekto measure
its progressby thatyardstick;ratherto take social evolutionto be the propertyof
complex systemsthat,as occasionsand conditionsdemand, maygrowmore or less
complex,but thatflourishbestin certainspecifiableconditions.It is theelucidation
ofconditionshospitableto evolutionthatis a firstpriority oftheevolutionary theory.

Questions.What expectations does this set up in respect to our field? Most


basically,thatglobal politicsis subjectto an evolutionaryprocess; thatit is subject
to evolution,and capable of evolution.Global politicsis not, and has neverbeen
since itsinception,frozenintoa stasisof a systempopulated by"preformed"states
of unclear originand uncertainfuture.Ratherit is the constantlychangingglobal
political systemof the human species withsome partsof it evolvingat fasterrates
thanothers.Withinit,distinctpolicylineagesor linesofdescentcan be distinguished
thatcarrytheevolutionary process.An evolutionarytreeofworldpoliticaldevelop-
mentmightclarify suchconcepts;itwouldassertthecommondescentofpopulations
of policies, and theircommon originvia a branchingprocess (of differentiation).

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334 Evolutionary forGlobalPolitics
Paradigm

That is whywe mightviewthe evolutionof the entireworldsystemas one process


(Modelski, 1995b).
Pre-evolutionarybiologistsregarded each individual species as having been
created"preformed";specieswereimmutableproductions,and had been separately
created (Aristotlehaving originallyposed the question whetherthe embryowas
preformed,a miniatureindividual,or differentiated froman amorphous initial
state). The preformationdoctrinewas widelyheld until early in the nineteenth
centurywhen epigenesis (development involvinggradual differentiation of an
initiallyundifferentiatedentity)was finallydemonstratedby Karl von Baer. It now
"stands to reason" that studentsof world politicscan no longer startwith "pre-
formed" states as basic units, but must fine-tunetheir analysis in light of the
long-termvariabilityof politicalinstitutionsbyrefiningthe conceptualequipment
thathandles change.

Mechanisms
3. Evolutionary
The thirdpropositionproceeds towardconceptualizingtheworkingofthisprocess
over time.It asks howand why,whatare themechanisms;and replies,in termsthat
reachbeyondDarwiniananalysis,thatthebasicevolutionary operatorsare four-not
only the Darwinian staples of selectionand variation,but also cooperation and
amplification-whichjointly constitutea coherent set. The fourdo not operate
haphazardlybut appear in sequencesthatextendovertimeand constitutelearning
processes (see Table 3). 10
Selectionis, of course,the classicalDarwinianmechanism,so much so thatsome
discussionssuch as Elster's(1989) conveythe impressionthatit is the onlyevolu-
tionarymechanismthatcounts.But Darwinhimselfgave equal billingto variation,
being thatwhichsets the entireprocess in motion;and WalterBagehot's ([1872],
1948) early social and political interpretationof Darwinismcertainlygave it a
prominentplace. However, genetic mutationbeing also seen as an apparently
random process, it oftenoccupied a less conspicuousrole, less subjectto control
thanselection.Today, innovationis generallyseen as thesourceofvariationin social
evolution,and itsindependentimportanceis nowbeginningto be widelyappreci-
ated.
Emphasison selectionand whatsome sawas necessaryconcomitants,"survivalof
the fittest,"conflictand war,jarred manyand led to arguments,one of the early
ones being PeterKropotkin'sMutualAid:A FactorinEvolution
([1914],1972), placing
cooperation at the center of the evolutionaryscheme. Robert Axelrod's (1984)
simulationsshowedcooperationnot onlyto be possibleamong rationalegoists,but
also to be subjectto evolutionarychange. Studiesof synergy(Corning, 1983) have
pointed in the same direction.More broadly,we mightregard "self-organization"
as a fundamentalattributeof all evolutionaryprocesses,and regard it, as Stuart
Kauffman(1995) has argued, as equal in importanceto selection.We therefore
regard cooperationas one of the necessaryconditionsof evolutionaryfitness,and
of survival.
Finally,also implicitin Darwin'sframework was thenotionofselectiveadvantage,
or differential survival,the reinforcement and amplificationexperienced by "se-
lected" programs,as maintained,forexample, by Donald Campbell (1969:73) for
"retention":"a mechanismforthe preservation,duplicationor propagationof the
positively selected variety." "Operant conditioning . . . is clearly an evolutionary

10 See earliercommentson theanalogyofevolutionand learning;thisis learningviewed


as innovative
problem-solving,
and not merelyas a cognitiveprocess.Note, too, the distinctionbetweenconditionsconduciveto evolution,discussed
in section2, and mechanismsof evolutionin section3, basicallytwoways(synchronicand diachronic)of viewingthe
same phenomenon.

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GEORGE MODELSKI 335

TABLE 3. EvolutionaryMechanismsof Global PoliticalProcesses

EvolutionaryMechanisms
Process, (phasesofvariation,
cooperation,
Basic Unit selection,
reinforcement)

RISE OF WORLD POWERS


Traces the emergenceof Each such learningcycleof some
carriersof global policies, 120 yearsconsistsoffourphases
i.a. Portugal(1420-1540), of about 30 yearseach:
Dutch Republic,Britain, Agenda-change
United States Coalitioning
Macrodecision
Execution

GLOBAL INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION


Traces the emergenceofthe Each such period of the global
successiveparadigmaticsystems polityprocess (of some 500 years)
of rules,norms,and values in consistsoffourphases, each a
the global system: long cycle,e.g., in theWest
Proto-imperial930-1420 European period:
(Eurasian transitionperiod Informational(Portugal,
of "preconditions") discoveries)
Westphalian1420-1850 Social (Dutch
(WestEuropean period of Republic,integration)
global nucleus) balance ofpower)
Democratic 1850-2200 Political(BritainI, states,
(post-WestEuropean period Economic (BritainII,
of global organization) industrial,trade)
Note:The datescitedrefertotheemergence(orlearning) 1420-1850meansthat
period,thus,e.g.,Westphalian
the"Westphalian"
system, inthefifteenth
originating wasselectedca. 1640-1740,
century, reachedmaturity
by1850,
and is nowcompeting
withtheemerging democraticsystem.

mechanism... a mechanismof reinforcement wherebya habit is selected 'within'


a particularorganism"(Van Parijs,1981:96). Reinforcement takesplace wherethere
is capacityto learn,and is essentialto all learning,and so it is to social evolution.
By synthesizingthese classicconceptions,the presentaccount suggestsnot only
thatthesocial evolutionary processutilizesall fourmechanismsand thatall fourare
itsnecessarycomponents.1It also proposes thatthesefourmechanismsare closely
and meaningfullyrelated to one another,and may be best understood if seen
workingin sequences, startingwithvariation,throughcooperationand selection,
to reinforcement and retention.But even though theyare interdependent,their
close relationshipis oftenobscuredby the factthateach fallswithinthe domain of
a differentsocial scientific
discipline.Verybroadlyspeaking,variation"belongs"to
culturalstudies;cooperationto severalsocialsciences,includingsociology;selection
raises problems of politics; and reinforcement, of economics. "The attempted
integrationof these diverse mechanismsin the studyof evolutionaryprocesses
representsan ambitiousand riskysynthesis"(Andersen,1994:14).

GlobalPoliticalEvolution.The basic unitsof analysisin regardto global political


processes,as previouslyargued, are not nation-states, empires,or worldorganiza-
tion,but persistentglobal politicalstrategies(or policyroutines).We regard forms

11A comparableconceptionis thatofE. S. Andersen(1994:14), whodefinesan "evolutionary-economic"


explanation
as one that"can be shownto include" mechanismsof "preservationand transmission," "variety-creation,"
"selection,"
and "segregationbetweendifferent 'populations.'"

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336 Evolutionary
ParadigmforGlobalPolitics

of global organization,such as world empire,or global leadership,as carriersof


tightclusters(or populations)of strategiesthatmayor maynotexperiencechange.
Studentsof internationalpoliticsare conditionedto thinkof states,and nonstate
actors, as the fundamentalunits of analysis.Such a view might serve as a first
approximation,and oftensufficesas a shorthandexpression.But on close analysis
it cannotwithstandscrutiny.Organizationssuch as statesuse individuals,but they
act throughpolicies.The interplayof global policies constitutesthe global political
system.It is changes in these policies, changes that alter standard operating
procedures,thatneed to be subjectedto the greatestscrutiny.
The essentialsof an evolutionarylearningprocess,or "calculus,"12mightthere-
forebe formulatedas follows:
(a) The startingpoint is a population of global politicalstrategies(or policies)
thatpersist(thatis,successfully reproducethemselves)."Persistence"(or reproduc-
tion) means the transmissionof a program,or code, or set of generatingrules,to
the next generationof strategies.Persistenceof strategiesneed not be, in and of
itself,problematicforan evolutionary theory,because itis accountedforbythebasic
inertiaof all social systems.
(b) Over time,some ifnotmostofthesestrategieswillbe reproducedin a routine
fashion,by copying;but otherswillundergo change, forexample, by experiment
or chance mutation,or willbe proposed as innovationsby policyentrepreneursin
response to demands forthe solutionof global problems.These are the sourcesof
VARIATION thatintroduceinnovationintothepopulation of strategies.
(c) In complex evolvingsystems,innovationswillengendercooperative,combi-
natorialor synergistic (cf.Corning,1983) effects.Strategiesthatbecome the focus
of effectivealliances have a betterchance of surviving.Such COOPERATION,
combinations,and coalitions are more probable in free societies,and are not
random.
(d) The politicaland social environment ofthispopulationofstrategies(and not,
in the firstplace, "nature,"or the "naturalenvironment")mightthenbe regarded
as comprisinga selectivefactoror mechanismthathelps todeterminecausallywhich
partsof the programwillpersist,and whichpolicies shallbe substitutedforbynew
programs.In global politics,SELECTION has been most directlythe product of
macrodecision,and in the past, decisions of global war; more generally,for all
political systems,electionsare the selectivemechanismpar excellence. In global
economics,there is the competitiveenvironmentof the world market;in global
community formation, thecontestofideologiesforthebuildingof"model societies."
(e) This completes the process of revisingthe code, and all that remains is
REINFORCEMENT (thatis,reward,combinedwithpunishmentfornonselection),
such thatthe resultis a set of revisedstrategiesthatare then diffused,via mecha-
nismsof amplification,and transmitted via a systemof inheritance,in successive
generations of policies.
One example ofan evolutionary learningprocessexhibitingthesecharacteristics
is thelong cycleofglobalpolitics(Modelski,1990, 1995a; Modelskiand Thompson,
1996; see also Table 2). This (learning)cycleis a nonlinearprocessthatcomprises
fourphases, each one ofwhichmanifests,and bringsto the fore,the operationof
one evolutionarymechanism.The firstof thesephases is "Agenda-change,"which
through"variation"bringspolicyinnovationontotheglobalagenda. "Coalitioning"
manifeststhe importanceofcooperativeactionin global affairs."Macrodecision"is
the selectionprocessof thatsystem;and "Execution"is an opportunityforamplifi-
cation,diffusionof innovations,and thebuildingof memory.

12 Cf. also Schmid's1987 (pp. 83-85) model.

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GEORGE MODELSKI 337

But theturnover oflead powersis no morethana mechanismofworldinstitutional


change. Such changeat theglobalpoliticallevelmaybe reckonedin fourlong cycles,
each cycle (drivenby one global power,competingagainstothers)representinga
characteristic evolutionary phase of the global politicsprocess,and fourlong cycles
constituting a distinctperiodof globalpoliticalevolution.The WestEuropeanperiod
of global politics(fifteenth-nineteenthcentury;cf.Table 2), comprisedof the Portu-
guese,Dutch,and twoBritishlongcycles,mightbe thoughtofas havingbeen formative
both of the nucleusof the globalsystemand of thebasic elementsof the nation-state
system,definedbyrulesofinternational law(forming whatsome call theWestphalian
system).Each of these cyclesmightalso be regardedas havingactivatedsuccessive
evolutionary mechanismsat thegloballevel:thePortuguese, thoseofvariationthrough
discoveries;theDutch,thoseofcooperationincreating, withBritain,thenucleusofthe
global system;and the twoBritishcyclesfirstselectingthe new international system,
based on balance of powerstrategies, and thenamplifying it throughindustrialand
tradeexpansion.In otherwords,we observe(as in Table 3) theworkingof the same
fourevolutionary mechanismson the scalesofbothone worldpowerrisingto global
leadershipand theinstitutional complexoftheworldpolityin formation.
Hence we argue that evolutionaryprocesses involvethe same mechanismsin
differentsettingsand in differenttime frames.Thatis, the process of changing
policies,or institutions,is not homogeneousbut passes througha number(four)of
distinctand sequenced phases ofa learningexperience,each stronglylinkedto one
of the evolutionarymechanisms.Such phases are (in one formor another) the
propertyofall social evolutionary processesbecause theyare all learningprocesses.

Periodiity.A generationis a keytemporalunitof evolution,because evolutionary


processesare measuredin termsofsuchgenerations, and generationalturnoverseems
a basicsourceofperiodicity. The measuredgenerations inquestionare thoseofpolicies
or strategies.But it mightalso be assumedthatstructural change is closelylinkedto
generationalturnover, or the comingand goingof generationsof organisms,and of
humans.If a generationis reckonedas the replacementperiod,thatis, the interval
duringwhicha generationreplacesitself, thenin (human)socialsystems theintervalis
of the order of twenty-five to thirtyyears,and is the basic temporalunit of (social)
evolutionaryprocesses. Generations,moreover,are basic units of social learning
processes.It is thesephases,and generationalsequencesofphases,thatconstitute the
mostimportantmaterialfortheanalysisofpolicyand institutional change.
The factof regularityof the long cycle,and of related global processes,is now
quitewelldocumented.Whatare theexplanationsofthatregularity? In and ofitself,
it may not be altogethersurprising.According to Paul Davies (1984:57, 241),
"Periodic motion,or oscillation,is perhaps the mostwidespreadexample of order
in physics";indeed, "Physicalsystemswhichdisplayexponentialbehaviorare also
likelyto displayperiodic 'sinusoidal'behavior."
The factofperiodicity, or oscillation,or betterstill,a constantrateofevolutionary
change, in turnaccounts forthe synchronythatcan be observed in coevolution.
Both global politicsand the global economycan be called "oscillators"because, as
shown,theyexecuteperiodicbehavior.In physics,as in biology,it is now takenfor
grantedthat"coupled oscillatorstend towardsynchrony." As thereare reasons to
believethattheglobalpoliticaland economicsystemsare significantly coupled, they
might also be expected to synchronizetheir behavior. By extension the same
argumentapplies to processesbywhichcooperationevolvesat the global level,that
is, the processesof global communityformation.
All thisposes the questionofthe mechanismofsuch regularity, and suggeststhe
intriguinghypothesisofa social-evolutionary clock.A lead in thismatteris provided
by biologistswho recentlyfound evidence of evolutionarymolecular clocks (in
Dobzhansky,Ayala, Stebbins,and Valentine,1977:308-13; Ayala, 1984). Regular

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338 Evolutionary forGlobalPolitics
Paradigm

changes in molecularstructure havebeen foundto pace evolutionary processesover


verylong timespans (millionsofyears).
The assumptionofa constantrateofevolutionarychange (fora givenprocess) is
crucial to this analysis. But it is not confinedonly to molecular biology. That
assumptionwas recentlyemployedwithgood resultsin the massive studyof the
genetichistoryand geographyofthe human speciesby Luca Cavalli-Sforzaand his
associates(1994:33). Whatis more,as theypointout, studiesof "geneticdistance,"
used to inferwhen two populations shared a common ancestor, show a close
correspondence with, and are supported by the results of, work on linguistic
evolution.Indeed, linguistshave used the same (though independentlyderived)
logic of a "linguisticclock" (Jones,1993:111) to unravelthe originsof the world's
languages, the pioneeringworkbeing thatof MorrisSwadesh (1971), who based
"glottochronology" (historyof the differentiation of languages) on the "relatively
constantrhythmof substitution" in a basic vocabulary.
A postulatedsocial-evolutionary clockmightbe stochasticin character,governed
by a constantprobabilityof a certainamount of mutation;at the level of social
processes,whynot conceive of innovationsthat mightclusterin particulartime
periods?Such bunchingshavebeen notedin theliteratureon innovations,and have
had so farno clear explanation.They mightpossiblybe linkedto theorganization,
in time,of social processes.
Such a clockcould also be metronomic, thatis,timingsuchchange.The determina-
tion of calendars has been basic to the emergenceof civilization,and also highly
politicized.For instance,thesuccessionofdynasties, as in ancientEgypt,or in China,
have been clear markersofworldtime.For centuries,history was writtenas political
history,and as a storyofpoliticalregimes.The morerecenttrendsin historiography,
whichemphasizesocial and economictrends,enrichour understandingof the past,
but do not negate the "time-keeper"or "time-setter" effectof politicalprocesses.
Possiblysomeevolutionary processes,suchas thelongcycle,mightservetotimeothers.

Nesting. Basic to this analysis is the insightthat evolutionaryprocesses and


mechanismsoperate simultaneously, thoughat different speeds, at more than one
level.As previouslyargued (also Modelski,1987, 1995a), in regardto global politics,
twosuch levelsmightbe distinguished:one is theactorlevel,at which,in each long
cycle,a new actor has been selected forglobal leadership,or its equivalent.The
level,wherea global polityprocess operates,each period
other is the institutional
of which representsthe cooperativesearch and amplifiedselectionof a revised
institutionalframework,the adoption of new rules, and the reorderingof the
constraintsdefiningthesystem.That iswhyinTable 2 thethird(long cycle)column
showsthreeperiods of the global polity,those of Eurasian Transition,West Euro-
pean, and Post-WestEuropean, each ofwhichrepresentsthe search fora new set
ofbasic rules,and an evolutionary processofa restructured kind.Table 3 showsthe
nestingof thesefourfoldevolutionary mechanismsand in particularhow each long
cycle,oftheriseofone worldpower,is composed offourphases,and howfourlong
cyclesin turnadd up to one period of institutional evolutionat the global level.At
a yet more inclusivelevel, these threeperiods of the global politymighteach be
seen as exhibitingtheworkingof the same evolutionarymechanismsat the world
systemlevel as eras ofworldorder.
but theyare also
These two global levels are, of course, analyticallydistinct,13
substantiallyrelated in a "nesting"fashionon a basis of self-similarity.14That is,

13 We should note,too, thatat theworldlevel,global politicsis nestedin thethird,Global, phase oftheworldsystem


process(startingabout 1000). The firsttwohave been called the Near Eastern(-3500 - -1200) and the Eurasian (-1200
- 1000) phases.
14 These are termsborrowedfromchaos theory(Gleick,1987).

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GEORGE MODELSKI 339

these processes are structurallysimilar,but differin scale and duration.What is


more, the greater(institutional)process mightbe seen to enfoldthe smaller(long
cycles),whileon theotherhand, thesmaller,whilenestingwithinthelargerprocess,
mightalso be seen to drive it. It is the specificationof the calendar of events(or
sequences of events) at the two levels of the global process that is the other top
priorityof evolutionarytheory.

Questions. Whatadditionalquestionsand expectationsdoes thisdiscussionplace


on the agenda of scholarship?First,that world politics is subject to learning
processes of determinatestructurethatare steadilychangingit. Second, it tellsus
thattime is a cardinal dimensionof thatfield,and thatno eventor policymaybe
considered in ignoranceof thatfactorbecause eventsand policies have duration,
and sequential order, and call forcoordination.Attentionto such "temporality"
highlightsthe constancyand ubiquityof evolutionarychange, and the importance
of synchronization.

4. TheCoevolution
ofGlobalStructures
We have shown so far that global politicalprocesses can be studied, in the first
instance,as endogenous,but it is also clear thatthe conditionsthatfavorpolitical
evolutionin turndepend on otherevolutionary processesthatare exogenous to it.
Insofaras leadership in global politicsdepends in part on economic leadership,
thenthelead conditionofa candidateeconomyis a functionofitsabilityto produce
global leading sectors(in originatinga K-wave);in turn,leading sectorexpansion
nestsin yetotherexogenousprocesses(thatis,in thesame example,in theevolution
of the entireworldeconomy,and oftheworldsystem).Concretely,Britishpolitical
leadership ca. 1700-1850 was the productof the leading conditionof the British
economy.The pictureis complex indeed.
"Coevolution"is a termreferringto "diachronicchanges in twoor more inter-
acting objectsor systems";and Lumsden and Wilson (1981:367) have extended it
to include the reciprocaleffectsofgeneticand culturalevolution.In populationsof
policies we mightspeak not onlyof coevolutionof strategiesin global politicsand
economics,butalso ofpolicylineages.The relationshipofcoevolutionalso partakes
the characterof nestingbased on self-similarity.
We have determineda setofconditionsthatare "necessary"forselectionto global
leadership,and thatwilldeterminethe shape ofglobal organization.Asjust noted,
in the case of the politico-strategic
structure,the relevantprocess is, of course,
endogenous; thatorganizationrisesas part of the long cycle.For the threeother
conditions,however,recoursemustbe made to a set of conditionsthat,while also
evolutionary,are exogenous to the global politicalprocess. These mightalso be
called "interactioneffects"because studentsof internationalpolitical economy
habituallylay much stresson the interactionof politico-military with economic
factors.
In regard to the lead economy,as just mentioned,we need to consultdevelop-
mentsin the global economicsystem,and inquireintotheconditionsthatare likely
to fosternew global economic sectorsin particular.The coevolution of global
politics,economics, community,and opinion, shown in Table 2, is a schematic
(descriptive)representationoffourprocesses.The thirdcolumn,previouslynoted,
showslong cyclesthatmarktherise(and implicitly also thedecline) ofworldpowers
and their antecedents in the Early Modern period. The fourthcolumn shows
K-wavesthatare coordinatewithlong cyclesand thatchartthe rise and decline of
leading sectorsof the global economy;thesesectorshave been both industrialand
mercantile,representinginnovativespurts(or Schumpeterianshocks)in economic
and commercialorganization,centeredon thelead economy.Justas thelong cycle

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340 ParadigmforGlobalPolitics
Evolutionary

mightbe viewedas the mechanismpropellingthe global politicalprocess,K-waves


can be seen as the movingelementof the global economy;jointlytheyactivatethe
internationalpoliticaleconomy(fulldocumentationcan be foundin Modelski and
Thompson, 1996).
In regardto social organization,thereis need to look intothe riseand decline of
"model societies,"the shiftingfortunesof social movements,and the prospectsfor
a global democraticcommunity;the second column of Table 2 showsthe "model
societies"that (each accountingforone period of thatprocess) have been succes-
sivelyprominentin cumulatingfortheformationofa communityat the global level,
and have thusconstitutedtheoutlineofwhatmightbe called thedemocraticlineage.
Each entryalso reports the "opposition," social forces in resistance to which
emerged the successivemembers of the democraticlineage, viewed initiallyas
experiments.This processis in effectone ofglobal communityformation,commu-
nitybeing defined as a frameworkor patternof enduring cooperation. 5 It is
communityformationbecause the global communitythatis yetto emerge maybe
expected to do so around a nucleusformedby the experimentalsocietiesof recent
experience,amongwhoma democraticlineage mightbe traced;equallyimportant,
this communityformationis also coordinate with the political and economic
processesjust discussed.Atthemostgenerallevel,theevolutionoftheentireglobal
systemappears to be paced (as shown in the firstcolumn) by changes in the
conceptual and intellectualcurrentsthat shape the media, global opinion and
education.
Table 2 thereforedepictsglobal politicsof thepast millenniumas a coevolution-
aryprocess activatedby successiveworldpowers,interacting withparallel develop-
mentsin economyand community, and also displayingfundamentalchange at the
institutionallevel. The elementsof a global systemarose in Sung China afterthe
tenthcentury,and generatedtheMongols' attemptatworldempirein theEurasian
context.As thatattemptfailed,the process thenmoved,fromsmallbeginningsof
trial, error, and experiment,throughthe consolidation of a global nucleus in
WesternEurope, towarda conditionof greaterworld organizationin its current
Post-WestEuropean period. In turn,that process is shown to be supported,at
different but symmetric timescales,by relatedmovementsin the global economy,
and in the structureof the global community.In these respectsit also suggests
explanations for the collapse of Communism,and of the Soviet bloc in Eastern
Europe and in Russia in 1989-91.
So much for coevolution of global structuralprocesses. For an even more
complete picture,referencemustalso be made to developmentsat regional and
national levels. All in all, a complex task,which opens broad and ever-widening
vistasforevolutionarytheory.But it mightbe renderedmore tractablebecause the
conditionshospitable to evolution(specifiedin section 2 above) that define and
characterizecomplex systemsmaybe regardedas the initialproxiesforthesemore
wide rangingramifications.

Questions. How does thisdiscussionchangeexpectationsabout thenormalcourse


of global politics?It makes it clear thatstructuralchange at the global level is not
confinedto global politicsbut needs to be thoughtof as in close coordinationwith
global economics,community, and opinion,all ofthemchanging,albeitat different
rates,and withdifferent"ingredients."No longer is it possible to subsume such
effortsunder the umbrellaof "internationalpoliticaleconomy"alone. Transition
crisesin theseveralprocessessynchronize, and need tobe tackledcomprehensively.

to globalproblems,muchremainsto be betterunderstood,in particulartheprocesses


15 In regardto responsiveness
thatshape global opinion,culture,and worldvalues.

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GEORGEMODELSKI 341

Questions also arise that reach beyond global politics.This entire discussion
implicitlyproposes that,in itsbasics and mutatismutandis,thatframework might
also hold forglobal evolutionary processesin therealmoftheeconomy,society,and
opinion. Not in regard to all the problemsthatmightbe encountered,but specifi-
callyto those of long-rangeimportand transformational character.
Hence certaingeneral statementsabout global politicsmightalso be relevantfor
othersocial sciencesand mightbe seen as basic: thatforpurposes of evolutionary
inquiry,the basic unit of analysisis the human species in itspoliticalinteractions;
thatglobal politics,as well as global economy,community, and opinion,all evolve,
and flourishin certainspecifiableconditions,those involvingvariation,selection,
cooperation,and amplification;thatthe mechanismsof thatevolutionare (four-
phased) learningprocessesof determinateperiodicity;and thatat the global level
these processessystematically coevolvethroughcoactionand synchronization.

A ResearchProgram
So much for the "hard core" (in the Lakatosian sense) of the social evolutionary
researchprogramin regardto globalpolitics.It is actuatedbytheconceptionofthe
world systemas subject to evolutionaryprocess, in particularin regard to world
politics,and one that is drivenby the long cycleunderstood as a (phased, and
thereforealso periodic) selectionprocess. This is the heart of the "evolutionary
analogy" (see also Pringle,1951). "Analogiesare, of course,not sourcesof proof,
but sourcesof hypotheses"(Campbell, 1969:73).
The "hard core" of the program may not be directlytestable,but predictions
generated fromwithinit may be, and have given rise to a sustained research
program. It began with a demonstrationof the existence of long cycles as
historical-structuralregularitiesin worldpolitics(Thompson, 1988). The theory
predicted that at the close of each of the past fiveglobal wars one power would
emerge with a monopoly of sea power, a key element in the politico-strategic
organization forglobal reach thatis a necessarycondition of global leadership.
Research and measurement has confirmed that prediction (Modelski and
Thompson, 1988). Other research and documentarywork confirmedthat pre-
dictionwithqualitativematerial,and yetotherworkrelated to developmentsat
the regional level.
The nextstagewas thesearchforexplanation,and theadvancementofthethesis
thatlong cycleswerean instanceofan evolutionary process(Modelski,1990, 1995a).
Such workhas shownthatthe rise ofworldpowersmaybe understoodas a phased
learningprocess,as predictedby the "evolutionaryanalogy,"and flourishingbest
in conditionsthatmaybe interpretedas thosefavoringevolution.
A new stagewas enteredwiththe demonstrationthatthe global politicalprocess
(drivenby long cycles)is synchronouswiththe evolutionof the global economy
(Modelski and Thompson, 1996). There are groundsforthinkingthatcoevolution
of a similarkind can be shownwiththe global communityprocess (as proposed in
the second columnofTable 2), and evolutionofthe global systemas a whole (in the
firstcolumn).Anotherchallengeforthe evolutionaryparadigmis the construction
of a calendar of global politicsforthe twenty-first
century.

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