HEGEMONIES IN THE WORLD-SYSTEM: AN

EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF HEGEMONIC

SEQUENCES FROM THE 16TH TO 20TH CENTURY
ROY KWON
University of California–Riverside

ABSTRACT: Both the world-economy perspective in sociology and the

world politics perspective in political science recognize the importance of
examining the rise and fall of world powers, and generally agree on the
main causal mechanisms responsible for the rise and fall process. However,
there is much less convergence between these perspectives on the indicators
used to measure the relative power of nation-states. Thus, although in
agreement over theory, there is much less agreement on the identity and
timing of hegemonies. This article attempts to overcome this impasse by
creating a hegemony index to assess the power structure of the capitalist
world-system. Though results support the world-economy view of three
hegemons since the 16th century, findings also contradict this perspective
and show that England is the most powerful nation during two successive
hegemonic sequences. Conclusions highlight the possibility of hegemonic
resuccession, while supplementary analysis provides evidence of U.S. re-
succession since the 1980s.
Keywords: hegemony; hegemonic sequence; world-systems; world
politics; world powers; long cycles; K-waves

As early as the 1970s, world-systems theorists argued that the United States was in
a period of hegemonic decline and claimed that this downward trend would con-
tinue in the years to come. With the stagnation of the U.S. economy, its military’s
defeat during the Vietnam War, and Washington’s diminishing influence as evi-
denced by the lack of support for its war in Iraq, the predictions of world-systems
scholars seem to be coming to fruition. But for students of the world-systems tradi-
tion, the U.S. decline isn’t so much a prediction as it is the unfolding of a long-term
historical process that has been institutionalized in the world-economy since at
least the 16th century.

Address correspondence to: Roy Kwon, Institute for Research on World-Systems, College Building South, University
of California–Riverside, Riverside, CA 92521; e-mail: roykwon@gmail.com.

Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 54, Issue 4, pp. 593–617, ISSN 0731-1214, electronic ISSN 1533-8673.
© 2011 by Pacific Sociological Association. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photo-
copy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, at
http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintinfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525/sop.2011.54.4.593.
594  SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES  Volume 54, Number 4, 2011

In the past, scholars traditionally disagreed on the specific elements at work

in the rise and fall of hegemonic nation-states, but competing perspectives have
recently come to a general consensus regarding these mechanisms.1 However,
although social scientists are largely in agreement on the elements that are respon-
sible for the rise and fall process, competing perspectives still disagree on both
the identity and timing of hegemonies. These disagreements arise, primarily, from
the different focus of the main disciplines engaged in this debate. On one side
are political scientists and pundits of the world politics literature who stress the
role of military power in their conceptualization of world leaders; on the other
side are sociologists who focus on economic power in their conceptualization of
hegemonies. These specific differences can be seen in Table 1, which summarizes
the periodizations of the world-economy perspective as exemplified by Hopkins
and Wallerstein (1979) and the world politics perspective as articulated by Mod-
elski (1987).2
Although there are many similarities between these periodization schemes, this
article concentrates on three critical differences. First, the world-economy perspec-
tive identifies three hegemonies (the Netherlands, England, and the United States)
since the 16th century, while the world politics perspective identifies four world
leaders (Portugal, the Netherlands, England, and the United States). Second, while
there is debate within the world-economy literature as to whether the Hapsburg
or Genoa is the most powerful polity during the 16th century, world politics schol-
ars see Portugal as the world leader during this period. Finally, whereas world-
economy students assess the 18th century as a period of intense hegemonic com-
petition, world politics claims that this era is the first of two successive leadership
phases enjoyed by the British.

TABLE 1
Competing Perspectives of Hegemony and Leadership
World-Economya World Politicsb

Hegemony Leadership World

Cycle Hegemony Cycle Leader

Hapsburg/Genoac 1450–1575 1526–1556 Portugal 1494–1580 1516–1540

The Netherlands 1575–1672 1620–1650 The Netherlands 1580–1688 1609–1640
No Hegemon 1672–1798 (No Hegemon) England I 1688–1792 1714–1740
England 1798–1897 1850–1873 England II 1792–1914 1815–1850
United States 1897– 1945–1967 United States 1914– 1945–1973
Source: Hegemonies and corresponding cycles are from Hopkins and Wallerstein (1979), while world leaders and cor-
responding cycles are from Modelski (1987).
a. Wallerstein (1984) adjusts Hopkins and Wallerstein’s dating of hegemonies to 1620–1672 for the Netherlands, 1815–
1873 for England, and 1945–1967 for the United States.
b. Modelski and Thompson (1996) adjust Modelski’s dating of world leadership cycles to 1430–1609 for Portugal,
1540–1714 for the Netherlands, 1640–1815 for England I, 1740–1945 for England II, and 1850– for the United States. In
this new dating scheme, Modelski and Thompson view leadership cycles as overlapping, with the decline of the old
world leader unfolding in concert with the ascendancy of the new world leader.
c. Timing based on Hapsburg cycle from Misra and Boswell (1997). World-systems scholars note that the Hapsburg
is not a hegemon but a political empire. Still others claim that the Genoese are the most powerful political alliance
during this period (see Arrighi 1994).
Hegemonies in the World-System  595

In light of these differences, and in order to further amalgamate the sociological

and political science literatures, this article tests these periodizations of hegemony
by compiling a “hegemony index” that combines estimates of economic and mili-
tary power for the years 1500 to 1945. In line with Wallerstein (1984:38), this article
conceptualizes hegemony as a “situation in which the ongoing rivalry between
so-called ‘great powers’ is so unbalanced … one power can largely impose its
rules and its wishes in the economic, political, military, diplomatic, and even cul-
tural arenas.” Thus, although the author recognizes that hegemony is a multidi-
mensional concept, an examination of the combined effects of the economic and
military dimensions of power should shed light on both the identity and timing
of hegemonies. Furthermore, given the time period covered in this article, it is
important to note that the author is concerned with the rise and fall process in the
modern world-system and not world-systems in general.

Kondratiev Waves, Innovation Theory, and War Cycles

The literature review starts here by outlining the relationship between inno-
vation and war, two of the main causal mechanisms at work in the rise and fall
process. But before beginning the review of the literature, a brief discussion of
K-waves serves as a natural starting point. The K-wave is named after Russian
economist Nikolai Kondratiev who—while not the first to consider the possibility
of economic cycles—is credited as being the first to present the academic commu-
nity with empirical evidence for the existence of a recurrent 40- to 60-year business
cycle. Utilizing price and production data mostly from England and the United
States, Kondratiev demonstrates that the economy exhibits consistent cyclical pat-
terns characterized by phases of economic expansion and stagnation (Kondratiev
1935). Since his seminal investigation, K-waves have influenced the work of many
prominent scholars. Specifically, while Kondratiev’s own theoretical explana-
tion saw fluctuations in capital investments as the major cause of these economic
cycles, others built on his observations and developed theories of economic inno-
vation and war.
Joseph Schumpeter (1939) is the first to explicate a theory of development that
sees the expansion–stagnation relationship of the K-wave as the result of eco-
nomic innovations. Theories of innovation argue that periods of extended eco-
nomic growth take place when there is a geographical clustering of innovations
and capital accumulation, resulting in the multiplier effect of capital investment
(Mensch 1978). But these innovations eventually become geographically dispersed
throughout the world-economy, the consequence of which is an elevated level of
economic competition and declining rates of profitability. Thus, while the con-
centration of profitable innovations propelled the world-economy to a period of
economic expansion, the dispersion of these formerly monopolized innovations
reverses this process and the world-economy stagnates (Rostow 1978). This stag-
nation persists until a new cluster of innovations are created to reinstitute the high
levels of profitability that is enjoyed during the expansion phase.
Like Schumpeter’s theory of innovations, Aakerman (1932) utilizes the idea of
K-waves to build a theory of war and development. But while Aakerman views
596  SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES  Volume 54, Number 4, 2011

economic development as the consequence of war, Imbert (1959) and other more
recent accounts observe an opposite causal relationship. Imbert begins his explana-
tion of war by starting with Schumpeter’s observation that upswings in the world-
economy are the result of economic innovations. As the world-economy expands,
so too does the demand for raw materials as production levels increase to keep up
with growing consumer demand. This growing need for natural resources results
in a global scramble for colonial territories as competitive hostilities intensify and
increase the likelihood of war. Additionally, economic expansions also provide the
resources necessary for nations to engage in war, as a majority of intense wars
since the 16th century have taken place during expansionary phases of the K-wave
(Goldstein 1985; 1988; 1991a).
While the K-wave literature (and all its variants) is a mainstay in world-systems
analysis, it is far more controversial among liberal economists who reject the notion
of economic cycles altogether. For example, neoclassical theories of development
treat innovations as historical accidents. These scholars argue that innovations are
exogenous to the study of economic development and claim that growth is pri-
marily the function of capital inputs and production (Solow 1957).3 Furthermore,
although prominent economist Simon Kuznets is more sympathetic to the idea of
business cycles, he rejects the idea of K-waves on grounds that they are largely
unproven and lack sufficient theory (Kuznets 1941; [1940] 1967).4
Though it is true that K-wave studies were sparse and highly constrained by
lack of adequate data during the early 20th century (Goldstein 1988:21–23), a large
body of work converges around the view that K-waves exist. Recent empirical
investigations provide concrete evidence of economic cycles in a variety of ele-
ments ranging from growth, innovations, technology, production, capital, prices,
trade, resources, wages, and employment (Forrester 1977; Freeman and Soete 1997;
Goldstein 1987; Mandel 1980; Misra and Boswell 1997; Thompson and Zuk 1982).
Furthermore, although Kondratiev and other scholars study K-waves only up to
the industrial revolution (van Duijin 1983), some argue that these economic cycles
extend back to the 16th century (Braudel 1984b) and still others claim that they
extend to the 10th century in Sung China (Modelski and Thompson 1996:142–76).
For a review of past literature, see Barr (1979); for recent work, see Korotayev and
Tsirel (2010) and Perez (2003).

Hegemonic Sequence
Using the works referenced above, world-systems scholars begin the rise and
fall narrative with the idea that an ascendant state rises to power by achieving a
competitive advantage in the world-economy that is based on a cluster of social
and technical innovations (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1979). These innovations
amplify the process of accumulation by either increasing the (1) rate of exploita-
tion, (2) size of potential markets, or (3) turnover rate of workers; but innovations
can also decrease the (4) cost of capital or (5) number of economic competitors
(Mandel 1975). Furthermore, not only do these innovations accelerate the pro-
duction capacities of the lead economy, they also result in a multiplier effect that
generates the resources upon which further development is achieved. Ultimately,
Hegemonies in the World-System  597

thanks to an initial advantage in production and an eventual advantage in finance,

this lead economy becomes the focus of the world-economy and the engine upon
which the development of other states come to depend (Chase-Dunn 1998).
The economic advantage of the ascendant state, however, is not enough to
achieve hegemony, and most theorists view war as central to the rise and fall
dynamics (Modelski 1978). As the general level of economic prosperity increases
during the expansionary phase, multiple contenders arise to challenge other core
nations during a period of hegemonic competition. This hegemonic competition is
the direct result of sustained economic development, as this increases the need for
raw materials. Under such circumstances, world powers engage in a race for raw
materials peripheries to ensure that national development will not be constrained
by a lack of natural resources (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005). Historically, these
phases of hegemonic competition take place via a global war between coalitions of
allies (Modelski and Thompson 1996; Thompson 1988). After the decisive triumph
of the victorious coalition, the ascendant state remains the only core contender
with the economic and military resources necessary to enforce a postwar world
order (i.e., hegemony).
But hegemony is a temporary condition and all hegemons decline. This process
of decline results from the spread of the technological innovations that were previ-
ously the foundation of the hegemon’s supremacy. Most importantly, the dispersion
of innovations lead to decreasing levels of profitability for the industries around
which the innovations are based and a new lead sector must be created to reinstitute
the process of accumulation (Freeman, Clark, and Soete 1982). However, this new
lead sector is unlikely to develop within the economy of the declining hegemon as
it is increasingly subject to the problem of institutional inertia, making it extremely
difficult for the declining hegemon to change the direction of its national economy
(Chase-Dunn 1998). Instead, the declining hegemon attempts a series of “fixes” that
are designed to reinvigorate the industries of their previous investments (Harvey
1982; Silver 2003).5 While the old hegemon may temporarily retain its advantage in
the world-economy as a result of its enormous pool of accumulated capital, new core
contenders with new economic innovations eventually arise to surpass the declining
hegemon and repeat the rise and fall process.
The literature review ends here with a summary of the relationship between
K-waves, innovations, and war as depicted in Table 2. Consistent with the account
offered above, each K-wave posses a lead sector and corresponding innovation
that is responsible for each economic upswing. Furthermore, “war peaks” are also
concentrated around expansionary phases of the K-wave given the high inter-
state competition for raw materials peripheries and nations’ increased ability to
wage war. While Table 2 does not represent a comprehensive listing of all scholars
engaged in this debate, it incorporates many of the most widely cited works in
their respective fields.

Data and Analysis

This investigation constructs a hegemony index designed to examine the
rise and fall of hegemons from 1500 to 1945. There are two primary categories
598  SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES  Volume 54, Number 4, 2011

TABLE 2
K-waves, Innovations, and War Peaks
Lead Sectors and Innovations Great Wars and War Peak Yearsa
1495–1508 S
1509–1528 E Spice Trade – Exploration First and Second War of Charles V,
Voyages 1521–1529
1529–1538 S
1539–1558 E American Silver – Colonial Fifth War of Charles V, 1552–1556
Conquest
1559–1574 S
1575–1594 E Baltic Trade – Fluyt Ships Dutch Revolt and Armada, 1593–1604b
1595–1620 S
1621–1649 E Asian Trade – East India Thirty Years War, 1635–1648
Company
1650–1688 S
1689–1719 E Atlantic Trade – Slave Grand Alliance and Spanish Succession,
Plantations 1688–1713
1720–1746 S
1747–1761 E Colonial Trades – Colonial Seven Years, 1755–1763
Expansions
1762–1789 S
1790–1813 E Cotton Textiles – French Revolution and Napoleon,
Mechanization 1803–1815
1814–1847 S
1848–1871 E Railroads – Factory/Wage Crimean and Franco–Prussian, 1853–1871
System
1872–1892 S
1893–1916 E Steel – Mass Production World War I, 1914–1918
1917–1939 S
1940–1967 E Autos – Multinational World War II, 1939–1945
Corporation
1968– S
Source: K-waves from Goldstein (1988); lead sectors from Modelski and Thompson (1996) with the exception of
“American Silver,” which is from Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000); accumulation innovations from Boswell (1987)
and Modelski and Thompson (1996); great wars and war peaks from Goldstein (1988).
Note: “S” denotes economic stagnation, while “E” denotes economic expansion.
a. Goldstein’s dates do not necessarily represent the entire duration of a war but the “peaks” of war as measured by
the number of battle causalities; Goldstein defines “great war” as those wars that involve at least two great powers.
b. Goldstein does not include the Dutch Revolt in his listing of Great Wars but is included here given the importance
of this war in the rise and fall literature; also included is the Crimean War based on the observation that (1) it included
three of the major powers in England, France, and Russia, and (2) this war is also the most intense war during the
1800s since after the Napoleonic Wars (Levy 1983).

of measures that are used to evaluate power distributions in the world-system:

attribute-based (Babones 2009; Kentor 2000; Rubinson 1976) and network-based
(Bollen and Appold 1993; Clark and Beckfield 2009; Mahutga and Smith 2011; Sny-
der and Kick 1979). The former utilizes measures such as GDP and military expen-
ditures, while the latter utilizes indicators that capture the relationship between
states such as diplomatic exchanges and treaty memberships. While it may be
ideal to utilize both attribute- and network-based measures—especially given the
wide use of the latter (see Alderson and Nielsen 1999; Beckfield 2008; Lee, Nielsen,
and Alderson 2007)—network-based measures are temporally limited, often only
Hegemonies in the World-System  599

extending back to the early 19th century. Thus, attribute-based measures are used
given the temporal scope of the current analysis.
As discussed in earlier sections, the world-economy perspective sees economic
power as the central component of hegemony, whereas the world politics perspec-
tive stresses the role of military power. Given the different focus of these perspec-
tives, it is not surprising that previous quantitative assessments of hegemony use
GDP and GDPpc (Chase-Dunn, Jorgenson, Reifer, and Lio 2005) as well as military
power (Modelski and Thompson 1988) separately in the identification of hege-
monies.6 The exception is Kentor (2000), who produces a measure of power in the
world-system by z-score standardizing GDP, GDPpc, and military expenditures,
which are then summed to obtain a composite measure. Kentor’s work is novel
in that he is one of the few to combine measures of economic and military power
to study power in the world-system. However, Kentor’s data are limited in that
they allow his analysis to extend back to only 1820. Continuing and expanding
upon these works, the current study combines measures of economic and military
power to create a hegemony index that extends to the 16th century.
The description of the data begins with a discussion of the economic variables,
GDP and GDPpc. GDPpc is the most commonly used measure of economic devel-
opment (Kentor and Boswell 2003), and is particularly important here as coun-
tries with a higher GDPpc typically possess advanced technologies and the skilled
labor force necessary to engage in capital intensive forms of “core production”
(Chase-Dunn 1981). On the other hand, total GDP reflects the economic size of a
country by combining economic development with population size. GDP is used
in previous studies as an alternative measure of economic power, since states with
a larger population and economy possess greater “weight” in the world-economy
(Borocz 2009:90) and can mobilize a comparatively larger military force (Chase-
Dunn et al. 2005:241).
GDP and GDPpc information is taken from Maddison (2007), which is available
online at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/. Maddison’s data make it possible
to compare the economic size and development of nation-states over an extended
period, by creating a cross-nationally comparable dataset that includes GDP informa-
tion converted into Geary-Khamis purchasing power parities at 1990 levels. However,
Maddison’s estimates are not without its shortcomings as information prior to 1820 is
only available in 100- to 120-year intervals during the years 1500, 1600, 1700, and 1820,
and this shortage of information requires the interpolation of data.
To ensure the accuracy of Maddison’s data, these estimates are compared to the
widely utilized Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2009). According
to the additional diagnostics, the correlation for the GDP and GDPpc data from
Maddison and Penn World Tables for 1950 to 2007, range from .977 to .999 for all
countries examined. Although these additional tests do not fully ensure the accu-
racy of Maddison’s data—especially in light of the fact that comparable economic
information for years prior to 1950 are unavailable—this provides at least some
assurance that Maddison’s estimates are similar to the Penn World Tables.
Military power is measured by utilizing estimates of seapower. Many argue
seapower is the best measure of global military supremacy given its ability to cap-
ture national military capacity and global military reach, both of which allow a
state to define and defend its world order (Boswell 1995; Modelski and Thompson
600  SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES  Volume 54, Number 4, 2011

1988; Wallerstein 1984).7 The best source for seapower information is Modelski
and Thompson (1988), who identify the relative strength of naval powers by using
estimates of warships. They compute seapower by dividing a nation’s number of
warships by the total number of warships in the possession of all other European
naval powers for every year, respectively. Unlike Maddison’s economic estimates,
Modelski and Thompson’s seapower estimates did not require interpolation as
they provide yearly figures of warship proportions.
After acquiring this information, extensive steps are taken to ensure that the
hegemony index is properly scaled by converting both GDP and GDPpc into mea-
sures that are simultaneously unbiased and easily interpretable. GDPpc is con-
verted into a ratio by dividing national GDPpc estimates by the average world
GDPpc for every year. The advantage of this GDPpc ratio is that it creates an
“interpretation friendly” scale by reducing the absolute value of GDPpc while
retaining the development differences between nations. Like GDPpc, total GDP
is also converted into an adjusted measure by taking the natural log of GDP to
decrease the undue weight that would be given to countries with disproportion-
ately large populations.8 Finally, the seapower data did not require any conver-
sions, as these estimates are reported by Modelski and Thompson as a proportion
of total warships.
After performing the transformations, the hegemony index is created by multi-
plying GDP, GDPpc, and seapower for every country and year, respectively. While
previous studies measure power in the world-system by summing standardized
scores of economic and military power (e.g., Kentor 2000), the current study does
not see the effect of military and economic power as additive. Instead, the author
argues that the interaction of economic and military power has catalyzing effects
that are more accurately captured by multiplying these measures to obtain an
interaction effect.
Eight countries are chosen for the analysis given this investigation’s interest
in the political/military interaction network of Europe (Chase-Dunn and Hall
1997:53), including England, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia,
Spain, and the United States.9 While it is possible to interpolate GDP and GDPpc
information for the entire 446-year period examined, seapower figures are only
available for countries during certain periods and this restricted the ability to esti-
mate the hegemony index. However, seapower figures are available during critical
time periods and missing information is inconsequential for the final analysis. For
example, seapower information for the United States starts in the early 19th cen-
tury. But given that the hegemonic ascendancy of the United States did not begin
until after the American Revolution, the lack of information for years prior to early
1800 did not substantially harm the investigation.
To the extent that the borders of states remains relatively stable, Maddison’s GDP
and Modelski and Thompson’s seapower estimates should provide an accurate
assessment of economic and military strength. But if these borders did not remain
stable, an adjustment has to be made to take the shifting of national borders and
alliances into consideration. While the borders of most states remain reasonably
consistent, Spain is the only nation in the investigation that experiences frequent
territorial shifts. Spain controlled various territories in Europe during the 16th to
Hegemonies in the World-System  601

18th centuries through a range of political and military activities beginning with
the ascension of Charles V to the throne of Spain in 1516. Adjustments for Spain’s
changing political alliances are especially important for the world-economy litera-
ture, which gives a central role to the Hapsburgs during the 16th century.10
In order to calculate a combined hegemony index for all countries that are a
part of the various Spanish alliances, steps are taken to merge GDP, GDPpc, and
seapower information for the House of Hapsburg, Iberian Union, and Hapsburg
Spain.11 Although combining this information is a relatively simple process that
requires the summation of information across countries, the estimation of Italy’s
economy is more difficult given that it was divided into a southern Hapsburg and
northern non-Hapsburg.
To remedy this issue, steps are taken to ensure that a proper percentage of the
Italian economy is included in the estimation of the Hapsburg economy. To esti-
mate these figures, the total population of major Italian cities located in Haps-
burg territories are summed and divided by the total population of all other major
Italian cities by using Maddison’s (2001) population estimates of Italy. According
to these estimates, approximately 47 percent of Italy’s population resided in the
Hapsburg half of Italy in 1500. This estimate of 47 percent is utilized to calculate
the proportion of Italy’s GDP and population that is included in the estimation
of the House of Hapsburg’s economy. These Italian Hapsburg estimates are then
combined with all other Hapsburg territories in order to obtain GDP and GDPpc
estimates for all territories taken together.
Unlike Maddison’s data, seapower information from Modelski and Thompson
is much more limited across countries. Seapower information is missing for all
House of Hapsburg territories with the exception of Spain, and while non-Spanish
Hapsburg territories were not naval powers during the early to mid-16th century
and likely lacked an extensive navy, it is important to note that this shortage of
seapower data may result in an unduly low Hapsburg hegemony index. The
Iberian Union and Spanish Hapsburg also suffered from a similar shortage of
seapower information as the Iberian Union’s seapower estimates include Spain
and Portugal but is missing Italy, while the Spanish Hapsburg includes Spain but
is also missing Italy.
Using the data and measurements discussed, the main goal is to identify the
identity and duration of hegemonies and hegemonic sequences, which necessi-
tates an empirical designation of these concepts. World-systems scholars typically
view hegemony as both an absolute and relational concept, and although an eco-
nomic and military advantage is certainly necessary for hegemony, a state can
be considered a hegemon only when its advantage “is so unbalanced” that it can
dominate the world-economy (Wallerstein 1984:38). Following this conceptualiza-
tion of hegemony, hegemons are identified by using three criteria: First, a state has
to acquire an absolute advantage in both GDPpc and seapower; second, nations
also need to achieve a hegemony index that is twice the score of its nearest com-
petitor; and finally, advantages in these two criteria must persist for at least 20
years in duration. The criteria used to identify hegemonic sequences, however,
are far less restrictive and only require that a state achieve the highest hegemony
index for a minimum of 20 years.
602  SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES  Volume 54, Number 4, 2011

As mentioned in previous sections, there are a number of works that attempt to

measure power distributions in the world-system. However, none of these works
attempt to elaborate a quantitative designation of a hegemonic nation-state, which
results in a lack of an empirical basis on which to build a designation of hegemony.
Thus, it becomes necessary to provide an explanation of the three criteria utilized.
First, the decision to exclude a lead in GDP from the first criterion is based on
the world-systems contention that a lead economy is the foundation of hegemony.
While it is reasonable to argue that GDPpc can be used as an adequate measure
of the intensity with which a nation engages in innovative forms of “core produc-
tion,” total GDP is highly correlated with population size and does not necessarily
gauge a nation’s involvement with the lead sectors of the world-economy. How-
ever, although GDP is excluded from the first criterion, it is included in the hege-
mony index itself based on the observation that each successive hegemon has been
larger (in an absolute sense) than previous hegemons as required by the capitalist
cycle of accumulation (Arrighi 2007; also, see Note 8).
Second, the decision to require a nation-state to possess a hegemony index that
is two times larger than its nearest competitor is premised on the fact that world-
systems scholars observe that hegemony represents a state of “unbalanced” power
distributions between nation-states (Wallerstein 1984:38). With such theoretical
assessments of what hegemony represents, it would be questionable to identify
hegemons as those nation-states that achieve a simple advantage in the hegemony
index. Instead, this article requires a nation-state to achieve an index two times
larger than its nearest competitor as this can reflect the large power differentials
considered essential by the theoretical literature.
Finally, the last criterion requires nation-states to satisfy the first two criteria
for a minimum of 20 years. As shown in the literature review, both sociologists
and political scientists consider K-waves an essential element in the rise and fall
dynamics. K-waves are composed of an expansion and stagnation phase that per-
sists for 20–25 years in duration, respectively, and most scholars argue that hege-
mony takes place during a single expansionary phase (Hopkins and Wallerstein
1979; Modelski 1987). This is depicted in Table 1, which shows that past hege-
mons and world leaders reigned for no less than 22 years. All things considered, a
20-year minimum seems to fit well within this theoretical framework.

RESULTS
The results of the analyses are summarized in a set of tables and the hegemony
index is illustrated in Figure 1.12 When Figure 1 is examined visually, there are
three clear “peaks” in the hegemony index in the Netherlands, England, and the
United States. The Dutch peak begins during the turn of the 17th century and lasts
well into the middle of that century; the British peak starts in the mid-18th cen-
tury and lasts approximately three times the duration of the Dutch peak until late
1800s; finally, the U.S. cycle begins immediately after the fall of England during
the early 20th century. While Portugal also has a slightly elevated hegemony index
that extends from the early to mid-16th century, this advantage does not seem visu-
ally substantial. Furthermore, Figure 1 seems to indicate that the second half of
both the 16th and 17th century is a period of high hegemonic competition. In other
Hegemonies in the World-System  603

18

16

14

12
Hegemony Index

10

1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1945
1830
1840
1850
1740
1750
1760
1770
1780
1790
1800
1810
1820
1710
1720
1730
1650
1660
1670
1680
1690
1700
1590
1600
1610
1620
1630
1640
1500
1510
1520
1530
1540
1550
1560
1570
1580

Portugal Spain Netherlands England France USA Germany Russia

Note: Figures represent each nation’s hegemony index reported in 10-year intervals.

FIGURE 1
Hegemonic Sequence, 1500–1945

words, the hegemony index is such that no state or political alliance can be iden-
tified as achieving a clear advantage. The raw hegemony scores are available in
Appendix A.
Before analyzing the first critical division between world-economy and world
politics, it is necessary to state that world-economy scholars do not consider the
Hapsburgs a hegemon.13 When comparing Portugal and the House of Hapsburg,
Table 3 shows that the former is the clear seapower from 1502 to 1576 and the lat-
ter the largest economy from 1516 to 1558. Furthermore, although the Netherlands
has the highest GDPpc until 1832, it is important to remember that the Nether-
lands was a Hapsburg territory beginning in 1516. Thus, when discounting the
Netherlands during the years it was under Spanish rule, the Hapsburgs also has
the highest GDPpc from 1516 to 1580. But even with the Hapsburg advantage in
both economic measures, Portuguese naval superiority is such that the hegemony
index gives a slight advantage to Portugal from 1502 to 1546.
These results lend support for two critical observations. First, the Portuguese
are not hegemonic during the 16th century as proposed by Modelski.14 While Por-
tugal is the unquestioned naval power for much of the 16th century, its economy
was never the “lead economy” as indicated by Portugal’s low GDPpc. But while
the Portuguese are not hegemonic according to this article’s criteria, the evidence
indicates that Portugal is the most powerful nation in world-system from 1502 to
1546. However, this second observation must be taken with caution as a consid-
erable amount of missing seapower information may have underestimated the
Hapsburg hegemony index.
At this point it is also important to test the possibility that the Genoese are
hegemonic during the 16th century, especially given that the world-economy per-
spective seems to be divided as to whether the Hapsburgs or Genoa is the most
604  SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES  Volume 54, Number 4, 2011

powerful polity of this period. The economic data summarized in Appendix B

indicate that Genoa has the highest GDPpc during the early 16th century. And
although the data indicate that the Netherlands likely surpassed Genoa around
1557 (based on interpolated estimates), the Dutch did not gain de facto indepen-
dence from the Hapsburg Empire until 1581. All things taken together, these
results provide enough evidence to assert that Genoa was the most developed
economy until at least the mid-16th century. However, when re-estimating the
hegemony index for select polities using just GDP and GDPpc (given the lack
of seapower estimates for Genoa), the index of the highly advanced but much
smaller Genoa seems to be dwarfed by the index of the moderately advanced but
much larger Hapsburgs. All-in-all, there is an inadequate amount of evidence to
conclude that the Genoese are hegemonic or even the strongest polity during the
era in question.
Moving on to the next query, the second question seeks to adjudicate one of the
most glaring differences between world-economy and world politics. That is, this
article seeks to uncover whether the British are hegemonic during the 18th and 19th
century. According to Table 4, England acquires an uninterrupted advantage in
the hegemony index that lasts from 1708 to 1918, confirming that England is the
strongest nation during the 18th and 19th centuries. England’s hegemony index is
also twice that of its nearest competitor during two different periods, once in 1723
to 1777 and again in 1782 to 1918. But England’s strength during the 18th century
is primarily based on naval superiority, retaining an advantage in seapower for
an impressive 200+ years from 1702 to 1918. However, it is only in 1833 that Eng-
land surpassed the Dutch economy to possess the highest GDPpc, and the British
would enjoy this GDPpc advantage until they were surpassed by the United States
in 1930. When all these things are taken together, the hegemony criteria indicate
that England is hegemonic only from 1833 to 1918.15
These results provide support for the following conclusions. First, it is unlikely
that England was hegemonic during the 18th century. While there is support for the
world politics contention that England is the strongest nation in the world-system
throughout most of the 1700s, this strength is largely the result of its dispropor-
tionate seapower. And although England’s naval power led to its advantage in
the hegemony index, British GDPpc levels are far behind that of the Dutch. Thus,
results indicate a lack of evidence to validate the claim that England is hegemonic
in the 18th century.
Second, there is also little support for the world-economy argument that the 18th
century is mired in hegemonic competition. That is, while the analysis provides
support for Hopkins and Wallerstein’s (1979:498) contention that there exists a
period of intense hegemonic competition in the late 17th century—evidenced by
the fact that both England and the Netherlands share the title of strongest nation-
state (measured by the hegemony index)—this “no hegemon” phase only lasted
from 1679 to 1707, as the world-system began to congeal around British power
during the Wars of the Grand Alliance. Interestingly, Table 3 also provides evi-
dence of a slightly longer “no hegemon” phase during the late 16th century with
England, Hapsburg, and Portugal, each having the highest hegemony index at
different years throughout this period. All things considered, the “no hegemon”
phase of the 16th century lasted from 1547 to 1600.
Hegemonies in the World-System  605

The third and final question addresses the number of hegemons there are since
the 16th century. Though previous sections demonstrate that England is hegemonic
TABLE 3
Result Summary, 16th and 17th Centuriesa
16th Century 17th Century

England England
GDP No GDP No
GDPpc No GDPpc No
Seapower 1500–1501, 1564– Seapower 1649–1663,
1565, 1577–1580 1665–1666
Hegemony Index 1501, 1547–1548, Hegemony Index 1679, 1681,
1550, 1560–1578 1686, 1698
Hegemony Index (2×) No Hegemony Index (2×) No
Hegemony No Hegemony No

Portugal France
GDP No GDP 1569–1772
GDPpc No GDPpc No
Seapower 1502–1576 Seapower 1670–1701
Hegemony Index 1502–1546, 1549, Hegemony Index No
1551–1559
Hegemony Index (2×) 1502–1515 Hegemony Index (2×) No
Hegemony No Hegemony No

The Netherlands Netherlands 1569–1772

GDP No GDP No
GDPpc 1500–1832 GDPpc 1500–1832
Seapower No Seapower 1601–1648, 1664,
1667–1669
Hegemony Index 1579–1581, 1589 Hegemony Index 1601–1678, 1680,
1682–1697,
1699–1707
Hegemony Index (2×) No Hegemony Index (2×) 1608–1645
Hegemony No Hegemony 1608–1645

Hapsburg
GDP 1516–1558
GDPpcb No
Seapower 1581–1600
Hegemony Index 1582–1588,
1590–1600
Hegemony Index (2×) No
Hegemony No
Note: Table displays the years a polity had an advantage in each respective category.
a. GDP = advantage in total GDP; GDPpc = advantage in GDPpc; Seapower = advantage in seapower; Hegemony
Index = advantage in the hegemony index; Hegemony Index (2×) = advantage in hegemony index and score is at least
two times larger than nearest competitor; Hegemony = all criteria for hegemony are met.
b. The House of Hapsburg had the second highest GDPpc after the Netherlands, but it is important to keep in mind
that the Netherlands was a territory of the House of Hapsburg. When taking this into consideration and removing
the Netherlands from our list, the House of Hapsburg (1516–1558) and Hapsburg Spain (1559–1580) had the highest
GDPpc during this period.
606  SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES  Volume 54, Number 4, 2011

in the 1800s, this article has yet to examine the Netherlands and the United States.
Using the same criteria, both the Netherlands and the United States are found
to be hegemonic, the former from 1608 to 1648 and the latter since 1943. As seen
in Table 3 the Dutch have the highest GDPpc from 1500 to 1832, the strongest
navy from 1601 to 1648, and a hegemony index two times the size of its nearest
competitor from 1608 to 1645. As for the United States, Table 4 indicates it has the
highest GDPpc since 1930, is the supreme naval power since 1919, and possesses
a hegemony index twice as high as its nearest competitor since 1943. All things
considered, the results confirm the world-economy listing of three hegemonies in
the Netherlands, England, and the United States.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The political science and sociological literatures have come to a general consensus
regarding the main theoretical components of the hegemonic rise and fall process.
And while the ideas of these competing perspectives have merged into a relatively
unified theory, this amalgamation has not produced a similar convergence in the
identification and timing of hegemonies. Instead, each retains its original mea-
sures to identify hegemonic nation-states, with sociologists relying on estimates of
economic power and political scientists utilizing measures of military power. This
article fills this gap in the literature by combing both of these indicators to create
a hegemony index designed to measure power distributions in the world-system
since the 16th century.
Overall, there is enough evidence to support the conclusion that there are three
hegemons in the modern world-system. Whereas world politics typically lists four
world leaders including Portugal, the evidence in this article indicates a minimal
level of support for the contention that the Portuguese were hegemonic. While not
hegemonic, there is some evidence supporting the contention that Portugal is the
strongest nation during the 16th century due to its superior navy, but these conclu-
sions must remain preliminary given the inadequate seapower data for competing
powers. Furthermore, the world politics assertion that England is hegemonic dur-
ing the 18th and 19th centuries also lacks support as the hegemony index indicates
that England is hegemonic only during the 1800s.
Although a majority of the results validate world-economy contentions, the
most critical finding does not agree with either world-economy or world poli-
tics. While findings support the former’s claim of an intense period of hegemonic
competition beginning in the late 17th century, results show less support for the
contention that this period lasted until the end of the 1700s. Instead, England is, by
far, the most powerful nation-state during most of the 18th century. And although
the British cannot be considered hegemonic as claimed by world politics schol-
ars, it has possession of the strongest navy and is more than two times stronger
than its nearest competitor as indicated by the hegemony index. In short, England
is the strongest nation-state in the world-system for two successive hegemonic
sequences but is hegemonic only during one sequence.
This article now discusses the implications of the findings for the rise and fall
literature. As discussed in previous sections, K-waves, innovations, and war play a
Hegemonies in the World-System  607

TABLE 4
Result Summary, 18th, 19th, and 20th Centuriesa
18th and 19th Centuries 20th Century

England England
GDP 1853–1870 GDP No
GDPpc 1833–1929 GDPpc 1833–1929
Seapower 1702–1918, 1940 Seapower 1702–1918, 1940
Hegemony Index 1708–1918 Hegemony Index 1708–1918
Hegemony Index (2×) 1723–1777, 1782–1918 Hegemony Index (2×) 1782–1918
Hegemony 1833–1918 Hegemony 1833–1918

France USA
GDP 1569–1772 GDP 1871–
GDPpc No GDPpc 1930–
Seapower 1670–1701 Seapower 1919–
Hegemony Index No Hegemony Index 1919–
Hegemony Index (2×) No Hegemony Index (2x) 1943–
Hegemony No Hegemony 1943–

The Netherlands
GDP No
GDPpc 1500–1832
Seapower No
Hegemony Index 1699–1707
Hegemony Index (2×) No
Hegemony No
Note: Table displays the years a polity had an advantage in each respective category.
a. GDP = advantage in total GDP; GDPpc = advantage in GDPpc; Seapower = advantage in seapower; Hegemony
Index = advantage in the hegemony index; Hegemony Index (2×) = advantage in hegemony index and score is at
least two times larger than nearest competitor; Hegemony = all criteria for hegemony are met.

central role in the rise and fall process, and the results in this article help to establish
a concrete theory of their interconnection. According to the summary of results in
Table 5, each hegemonic sequence is initiated by a war of ascendancy as these con-
flicts correspond extremely well with the dating of hegemonic sequences. Every
war of ascendancy starts prior to the beginning of a new hegemonic sequence,
and these wars typically end before or shortly after the start of the sequence.16
While it is exceedingly difficult to claim a causal relationship based on the results
presented in this article, the findings provide preliminary evidence for the conten-
tion that the “upward swing” of the rise and fall process is initiated by periods of
intense military competition. There are five wars of ascendancy in Table 5 as taken
from Goldstein (1988).
Although there are five wars of ascendancy, Goldstein’s list of great wars
includes an additional set of wars that are traditionally not addressed by the
world-systems literature. These wars cannot be ignored given that they are often
more intense (higher number of battle casualties) than wars of ascendancy. Upon
closer examination, the author observes that world powers experience their peaks
during these wars and also begin to decline shortly thereafter. For example, the
608  SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES  Volume 54, Number 4, 2011

TABLE 5
Hegemonic Sequence and War
  Sequence Hegemony War of Ascendancy and Consolidation
A: Italy and the Indian Ocean, 1494–1516
Portugal 1502–1546 C: Wars of Charles V, 1521–1556
No Hegemona 1547–1600
A: Dutch Revolt and Armada, 1593–1604
The Netherlands 1601–1678 1608–1645 C: Thirty Years, 1635–1648
No Hegemonb 1679–1707
A: Grand Alliance and Spanish Succession,
1688–1713
England I 1708–1791 C: Seven Years, 1755–1763
A: French Revolution and Napoleon, 1803–1815
England II 1792–1918 1833–1918 C: Crimean and Franco-Prussian, 1853–1871
A: World War I, 1914–1918
United States 1919–0000 1943–0000 C: World War II, 1939–1945
Source: Wars are from Goldstein (1988); these dates do not represent the entire duration of a war but the “peaks” of
war as measured by the number of battle causalities; Goldstein defines “great war” as those wars that involve at
least two great powers.
Note: A = War of Ascendancy; C = War of Consolidation.
a. England, the Netherlands, and Spain lead at different times throughout this period.
b. England and Netherlands lead at different times through this period.

Dutch cycle lasts from 1601 to 1678 and experiences two major wars with the
Dutch Revolt/War of the Armada and the Thirty Years War. While the Dutch cycle
began in 1601 towards the end of the Dutch Revolt/War of the Armada, Dutch
power came to its apex in 1640 during the Thirty Years War. Furthermore, while
the Thirty Years War propelled the Netherlands to the pinnacle of its power, the
Dutch also began to decline shortly after reaching its apex.
In light of these observations, this second set of wars should be considered
wars of consolidation. While the Dutch ascended to power with the defeat of the
Hapsburg Empire during the Dutch Revolt/War of the Armada, they were able to
further consolidate their power given the preoccupation of Spain with France, Eng-
land, and Germany, among others, during the Thirty Years War (Taylor 1994:30–31).
The Netherlands also began to decline shortly after the Thirty Years War until it
was eventually surpassed by England a few decades after. Although the literature
does not give a great amount of attention to this second set of wars, choosing
instead to concentrate on the wars that propel nations to positions of power, the
author argues that these wars of consolidation serve as the “upper turning point”
of the rise and fall process.
Similar to the strong confirmation of the war–hegemony relationship, the evi-
dence linking K-waves to the hegemonic sequence is also substantial. Modelski
and Thompson (1996:3) argue that each leadership/hegemony cycle corresponds
with two full K-waves, and this investigation finds support for this two K-wave
pattern beginning with the Portuguese sequence in the early 1500s.17 For example,
when observing the rise of Dutch hegemony as depicted in Figure 2, the expan-
sion phase of the first K-wave gives rise to the Dutch Revolt/War of the Armada
(war of ascendancy), which greatly increases the Dutch hegemony index. Then,
Hegemonies in the World-System  609

18 Portuguese Dutch English English US C

Sequence Sequence Sequence I Sequence II Sequence
16

14

12
Hegemony Index

10
CC
8 C

C C
6
C CC A
4 A
A A A
CC
2 C A A
A AA A
A
0
1500
1510
1520
1530
1540
1550
1560
1570
1580
1590
1600
1610
1620
1630
1640
1650
1660
1670
1680
1690
1700
1710
1720
1730
1740
1750
1760
1770
1780
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1945
Source: Timing of wars and K-waves from Goldstein (1988).
Note: Figure represents all hegemonic sequences from 1500 to 1945 reported in 10-year intervals; dashed inverse-U
represents K-waves; dashed vertical lines indicate the end of each hegemonic sequence; A = Wars of Ascendancy;
C = Wars of Consolidation.

FIGURE 2
K-Waves, Wars, and Hegemonic Sequences, 1500–1945

the expansion phase of the second Dutch K-wave provides momentum for the
Thirty Years War (war of consolidation), the effects of which further amplify Dutch
power. But as the second Dutch K-wave enters into its stagnation phase, Dutch
hegemony rapidly dissipates until it is eventually surpassed by England during
the first K-wave of the English sequence.
From these observations, it seems clear that the relationship between K-waves,
war, and hegemony is such that the hegemony index (a) substantially increases
during the war of ascendancy, which is initiated by the expansion phase of the first
K-wave; (b) amplifies in relative intensity during the war of consolidation, which
is initiated by the expansion phase of the second K-wave; and (c) significantly
decreases during the stagnation phase of the second K-wave as the hegemon’s
economy struggles to create new profit-enhancing innovations. These claims are
confirmed in Table 6, which tests these arguments by examining fluctuations in
the hegemony index. Reusing Dutch hegemony as an illustration, Table 6 shows
that the Netherlands hegemony index increased by 83.8 percent during the Dutch
Revolt/War of the Armada. Dutch power then reaches its height with the Thirty
Years War as the hegemony index increases by 26.5 percent. But after reaching its
apex during the war of consolidation, the Dutch hegemony index declines 55.0
percent by the end of the stagnation phase of the second K-wave.
Finally, while Modelski and Thompson’s seapower data end in 1945, this
article extends the hegemony index to 2008 with seapower data provided by
William R. Thompson (see Reuveny and Thompson 2008 for recent usage).
Whereas Modelski and Thompson provide seapower information for all naval
610  SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES  Volume 54, Number 4, 2011

TABLE 6
Test of Hegemony, War, and K-wave Relationship
War of Ascendancy

Before War After War % Change

Portugal 1.55 1.88 21.3%

The Netherlands 1.85 3.40 83.8%
England I 2.25 4.03 79.1%
England II 4.29 7.61 77.4%
United States 2.14 8.75 308.9%

War of Consolidation

Before War Height of Hegemony % Change

Portugal 1.36 1.64 20.6%

The Netherlands 4.60 5.82 26.5%
England I 3.61 4.58 26.9%
England II 7.36 9.89 34.4%
United States 8.75 27.43 213.5%

Second K-Wave

Height of
Hegemony End of K-Wave % Change

Portugal 1.64 1.30 –20.7%

The Netherlands 5.82 2.62 –55.0%
England I 4.58 3.61 –21.2%
England II 9.89 8.12 –17.9%
United States — — —
Note: Table 1 displays each nation’s raw hegemony index and the hegemony index rate of change for each respective
period; timing of periods was taken from Table 2; the raw hegemony values used to estimate each period’s rate of
change represent scores taken from within 2 years of actual dates.

powers for years prior to 1945, the U.S. seapower index used in this supplemen-
tary analysis only compares countries with seapower indices over .10 (nations
in possession of more than 10 percent of all warships). Thus, many relatively
strong nations are not included in the estimation of these proportions as only
the United States and Russia have control of more than 10 percent of all war-
ships after 1945. As a result, it is important to acknowledge that this seapower
index overestimates the strength of U.S. hegemony for the post–World War II
era. Nevertheless, these estimates can provide a relatively accurate sense of the
recent fluctuations in U.S. power.
As outlined in Figure 3, the United States rapidly ascends to power and jumps
onto the world scene after World War I. U.S. power then reaches its peak dur-
ing the 1940s to 1950s after World War II, during which time it saw a prolonged
decrease of its power until 1980. Unexpectedly, however, the United States is able
to increase its economic and military power from 1980 until 2001, when it, once
again, begins to decline until present times. While the two K-wave–one sequence
Hegemonies in the World-System  611

30

25

20

15

10

0
1900

1905

1910

1915

1920

1925

1930

1935

1940

1945

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005
Note: Figure represents U.S. hegemony index from 1900 to 2008.

FIGURE 3
U.S. Hegemonic Sequence, 1900–2008

logic would predict that the U.S. cycle should end in the 1980s, the resurgence
of American power seems to indicate that the United States successfully (at least
temporarily) succeeded itself much like the United Kingdom during the late 18th
century. But unlike England’s re-succession, which was based on the industrial
revolution, the source of U.S. re-succession seems unsustainable as it is largely
based on dollar seignority and the global projection of its military power.
In closing, this article attempts to bridge the world-economy and world poli-
tics literatures by combining each school’s preferred measure of power to create
a hegemony index designed to determine the identity and timing of hegemonies.
This article also extends the rise and fall literature by utilizing empirical observa-
tions to formulate a theory that describes the specific manner in which the rise and
fall process unfolds together with K-waves, innovation, and war. In light of the
findings, future research should focus on the implications of this article for studies
that attempt to project the future trajectory of the world-system. To this end, it is
interesting that there is a clearly observable resurgence of U.S. power from early
1980 to early 2000, especially in light of the finding that England succeeded itself
to be the most powerful nation-state during two hegemonic sequences in the 18th
and 19th centuries. It is important to take heed of the evidence in this article and
recognize that history shows there is a real possibility of U.S. re-succession.

Acknowledgments: The author thanks Matthew Mahutga, Kirk Lawrence, the

editors of Sociological Perspectives, and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful
insight on previous drafts of this paper. A special word of thanks is necessary for
Christopher Chase-Dunn, who provided guidance during both the conceptualiza-
tion and construction stage of this paper.
612  SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES  Volume 54, Number 4, 2011

APPENDIX A
Hegemony Index
The United
Portugal Spain England France Russia Germany
Netherlands States

1500 0.709 0.810 1.244 1.483

1510 2.066 0.813 0.236 0.469
1520 1.555 0.859 0.900 0.641
1530 1.832 0.851 0.625 0.612
1540 1.856 0.893 0.751 0.511
1550 1.361 0.912 1.366 0.802
1560 1.431 0.945 1.440 0.705
1570 1.334 0.973 1.486 0.783
1580 0.706 0.769 1.951 1.900 0.127
1590 2.415 2.042 1.567 0.000
1600 2.264 2.353 1.741 0.000
1610 0.786 4.422 2.018 0.000
1620 1.491 4.303 1.325 0.180
1630 1.143 4.524 1.095 0.823
1640 0.284 5.820 1.380 0.890
1650 0.822 3.242 2.645 0.988
1660 0.608 3.819 3.052 0.878
1670 0.395 3.537 2.107 2.054
1680 0.410 2.617 2.591 2.294
1690 0.426 2.905 2.256 2.505
1700 0.403 3.111 2.729 2.172
1710 0.000 3.290 3.650 1.976
1720 0.122 2.906 4.592 0.628 0.536
1730 0.627 2.167 4.241 1.036 0.395
1740 0.906 1.395 4.410 1.288 0.382
1750 0.826 1.427 4.321 1.408 0.332
1760 1.195 1.110 4.266 1.403 0.242
1770 1.074 0.594 4.498 1.987 0.289
1780 1.240 0.799 3.904 2.092 0.292
1790 1.080 0.880 3.642 1.633 0.841
1800 1.158 0.479 4.477 1.394 0.815
1810 1.641 0.439 5.710 2.048 0.882
1820 6.869 1.559 0.433 0.738
1830 6.869 2.162 0.468 0.811
1840 7.007 2.014 0.844 1.074
1850 7.525 2.194 0.971 1.084
1860 8.447 3.261 0.875 0.613
1870 8.748 3.058 1.052 0.817
1880 9.608 2.796 0.810 0.534 0.449
1890 9.903 2.445 1.069 0.541 0.536
1900 7.353 2.057 2.709 0.529 1.184
1910 8.322 0.584 3.918 0.208 2.969
1920 6.970 0.811 7.943 0.240 0.000
1930 6.106 1.408 6.920 0.235 0.364
1940 5.275 1.368 5.832 0.339 1.400
1945 6.724 0.317 17.883 0.397 0.000
Note: Bolded values represent highest hegemony index of time period.
Hegemonies in the World-System  613

APPENDIX B
Hegemony Estimates for Select 16th Century Powers
Genoa Spaina The Netherlands Portugal

GDPpc 1500 1,100 826 761 606

1600 1,100 939 1,381 740
GDP (Millions) 1500 66 13,286 723 606
1600 78 14,616 2,072 814
Hegemony Indexb 1500 3.53 5.97 3.81 2.97
1600 3.49 6.53 7.64 3.61
Source: Maddison (2007).
Note: GDP and GDPpc estimates represent 1990 Geary-Khamis $.
a. Estimates for Spain represent the House of Hapsburg in 1500 and the Iberian Union in 1600.
b. Unlike the hegemony index of Table 4, the version utilized here does not include seapower.

NOTES
  1. For a review of the similarities, refer to Boswell (1995).
  2. Modelski rejects the term hegemony and chooses to use the term leadership in its stead.
He argues that the classic Greek usage of hegemony implies a form of domination that
is overbearing, not “normal,” and not in the general interest of all parties involved in
the relationship. In contrast to hegemony, Modelski argues the term leadership implies
that the function of the world leader is simultaneously “normal,” necessary, and neither
overbearing nor imperialistic (Modelski 1987:17–18). Ironically, the world-systems con-
ceptualization of hegemony shares many similarities with Modelski’s conceptualiza-
tion of leadership.
  3. This bitter sentiment of economists results from the fact that the logic of K-waves ques-
tions the neoclassical contention that development is linear and incessantly sustainable.
  4. Kuznets argues that economic cycles exist, but saw them being much shorter than
the K-wave at 20–30 years in duration. However, the “Kuznets wave” is not widely
accepted as it provides a periodization scheme that often lists expansionary phases dur-
ing periods of stagnation and vice versa (Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995).
  5. Harvey (1982) refers to this process as a “spatial fix” and stresses the role of geographi-
cal relocation in the attempt to boost profitability. Silver (2003) uses the term “product
fix,” which sees both spatial and technological/organizational fixes as central to this
process.
  6. While political scientists traditionally employ land-based measures of military power,
George Modelski and William Thompson use seapower and argue that it is a more
accurate measure of global military capability (Modelski and Thompson 1988:11–13).
  7. Modelski (1995) recognizes that seapower alone is not enough to measure military
supremacy and argues that naval superiority must be accompanied by diplomacy, good
intelligence, and proper leadership. But for Modelski (1995:30), seapower remains the
best measure of global military power and reach given that it offers “a form of military
hardware that is measurable and therefore … useful as [an] indicator of global pur-
pose.”
  8. Alternative conversions of GDP are also utilized to estimate the hegemony index, but
these measures often produced unreliable results, i.e. results that do not agree with
either sociology or political science. For example, when using total GDP as a proportion
of world GDP, the hegemony index indicates that France is hegemonic during much of
614  SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES  Volume 54, Number 4, 2011

the 16th and 17th centuries, while the Netherlands is never able to attain an index above
that of Spain or France during the 17th century.
  9. Japan’s index is also estimated but is inconsequential for the interpretation of results.
10. While some world-systems scholars include the Hapsburg in their list of hegemonies
(Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000; Boswell and Sweat 1991; Hopkins and Wallerstein
1979), they note that the Hapsburg is not a hegemon but an imperial world polity.
11. House of Hapsburg includes Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Hapsburg Italy, and
Austria from 1516–1558; Iberian Union includes Spain, Hapsburg Italy, and Portugal
from 1581–1640; and Spanish Hapsburg includes Spain and Hapsburg Italy from 1559–
1580 and 1641–1713. Lack of GDP information for other House of Hapsburg territories,
such as Luxemburg and Hungary, rendered these regions unavailable for inclusion.
12. The hegemony index for all years and countries are available upon request.
13. Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997:27) distinguish between empires and hegemonies by
associating the former with tributary modes of accumulation and the latter with capi-
talist modes of accumulation. For example, historian Paul Kennedy (1989) recognizes
that there is a shift during the 16th to 17th century whereby the strength of “Great Pow-
ers” is no longer characterized by political coercion (e.g., Hapsburgs), but through
short-term economic alliances based on the interests of the national economy (e.g.,
England).
14. It is important to note that Modelski denied at public conferences the assertion that he
considers Portugal a hegemon (Boswell 1995:Note 3). But it is equally important to rec-
ognize that Modelski’s usage of the term leadership is very similar to the world-economy
school’s usage of the term hegemony (refer to Note 2).
15. Braudel (1984a) argues that London is the financial capital of the world starting in 1773.
Even if we accept Braudel’s dating scheme and consider England the top economy as
early as the 1770s, there is still an insufficient amount of evidence to validate the world
politics argument that England was hegemonic during 1714 to 1740 (see Table 1).
16. The literature uses the terms great power wars (Goldstein 1991b) and global wars (Model-
ski 1999) to describe these periods of intense war and world power transition.
17. Hopkins and Wallerstein (1979) and Wallerstein (2004) also date their hegemonic cycles
to correspond with two K-waves.

REFERENCES
Aakerman, Johan. 1932. Economic Progress and Economic Crises. London: Macmillian.
Alderson, Arthur S. and Francois Nielsen. 1999. “Income Inequality, Development, and
Dependence: A Reconsideration.” American Sociological Review 64(4):606–31.
Arrighi, Giovanni. 1994. The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our
Times. New York: Verso.
———. 2007. Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century. New York: Verso.
Babones, Salvatore. 2009. The International Structure of Income: Its Implications for Economic
Growth. Germany: VDM.
Barr, Kenneth. 1979. “Long Waves: A Selective Annotative Bibliography.” Review 2(4):675–
718.
Beckfield, Jason. 2008. “The Dual World Polity: Fragmentation and Integration in the Net-
work of Intergovernmental Organizations.” Social Forces 55(3):419–42.
Bollen, Kenneth A. and Stephen J Appold. 1993. “National Industrial Structure and the Global
System.” American Sociological Review 58(2):283–301.
Hegemonies in the World-System  615

Borocz, Jozsef. 2009. “The ‘Rise of China’ and the Changing World Income Distribution.” Pp.
86–108 in China and the Transformation of Global Capitalism, edited by H.-F. Hung. Balti-
more, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Boswell, Terry. 1987. “Accumulation Innovations in the American Economy: The Affinity for
Japanese Solutions to the Current Crisis.” Pp. 95–126 in America’s Changing Role in the
World-System, edited by T. Boswell and A. Bergesen. New York: Praeger.
———. 1995. “Hegemony and Bifurcation Points in World History.” Journal of World-Systems
Research 1(15).
——— and Christopher Chase-Dunn. 2000. The Spiral of Capitalism and Socialism: Toward
Global Democracy. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
——— and Mike Sweat. 1991. “Hegemony, Long Waves, and Major Wars: A Time Series Anal-
ysis of Systemic Dynamics, 1496–1967.” International Studies Quarterly 35(2):123–49.
Braudel, Fernand. 1984a. Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century. New York: Harper &
Row.
———. 1984b. The Perspective of the World. London: Collins.
Bunker, Steven G. and Paul S. Ciccantell. 2005. Globalization and the Race for Resources. Balti-
more, MD: Johns Hopkins University.
Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 1981. “Interstate System and Capitalist World-Economy: One
Logic or Two?” International Studies Quarterly 25(1):19–42.
———. 1998. Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy. Lanham, MD: Rowan & Little-
field Publishers, Inc.
——— and Peter Grimes. 1995. “World-Systems Analysis.” Annual Review of Sociology 21:387–
417.
——— and Thomas D. Hall. 1997. Rise and Demise: Comparing World-Systems. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
———. Andrew K. Jorgenson, Thomas E. Reifer, and Shoon Lio. 2005. “The Trajectory of the
United States in the World-System: A Quantitative Reflection.” Sociological Perspectives
48(2):233–54.
Clark, Rob and Jason Beckfield. 2009. “A New Trichotomous Measure of World-System Posi-
tion Using the International Trade Network.” International Journal of Comparative Sociol-
ogy 50(1):5–38.
Forrester, Jay W. 1977. “Growth Cycles.” De Economist 125(4):525–43.
Freeman, Christopher, John Clark, and Luc Soete. 1982. Unemployment and Technical Innova-
tion. London: Frances Pinter.
——— and Luc Soete. 1997. The Economics of Industrial Innovation. New York: Routledge.
Goldstein, Joshua S. 1985. “Kondratieff Waves as War Cycles.” International Studies Quarterly
29(4):411–44.
———. 1987. “Long Cycles in War, Production, Prices, and Wages: New Empirical Evidence.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 31(4):573–600.
———. 1988. Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age. New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
versity Press.
———. 1991a. “A War-Economy Theory of the Long Wave.” Pp. 303–25 in Business Cycles:
Theories, Evidence and Analysis, edited by N. Thygesen, K. Velupillai, and S. Zambelli.
New York: New York University Press.
———. 1991b. “The Possibility of Cycles in International Relations.” International Studies
Quarterly 35(4):477–80.
Harvey, David. 1982. The Limits to Capital. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Heston, Alan, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten. 2009. Penn World Table Version 6.3. Center
for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of
Pennsylvania, August.
616  SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES  Volume 54, Number 4, 2011

Hopkins, Terence K. and Immanuel Wallerstein. 1979. “Cyclical Rhythms and Secular Trends
of the Capitalist World-Economy: Some Premises, Hypotheses, and Questions.” Review
2(4):483–500.
Imbert, Gaston. 1959. Des Mouvements de Longue Duree Kondratieff. Aix-en-Provence: La
Pensee Universitaire.
Kennedy, Paul. 1989. The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict
from 1500 to 2000. London: Fontana Press.
Kentor, Jeffrey. 2000. Capital and Coercion. New York: Garland.
——— and Terry Boswell. 2003. “Foreign Capital Dependence and Development: A New
Direction.” American Sociological Review 68(2):301–13.
Kondratiev, Nikolai. 1935. “The Long Waves in Economic Life.” Review of Economic Statistics
17(6):105–15.
Korotayev, Andrey V. and Sergey V. Tsirel. 2010. “A Spectral Analysis of World GDP Dynam-
ics: Kondratieff Waves, Kuznets Swings, Jugular and Kitchin Cycles in Global Eco-
nomic Development, and the 2008–2009 Economic Crisis.” Structure and Dynamics 4(1).
Kuznets, Simon S. 1941. “Schumpeter’s Business Cycles.” American Economic Review
30(2):257–71.
———. 1967 [1940]. Secular Movements in Production and Prices. New York: Augustus Kelly.
Lee, Cheol-Sung, Francois Nielsen, and Arthur S. Alderson. 2007. “Income Inequality, Global
Economy and the State.” Social Forces 86(1):77–111.
Levy, Jack S. 1983. War in the Modern Great Power System. Lexington: University of Kentucky
Press.
Maddison, Angus. 2001. The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris: Development
Centre of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development.
———. 2007. Contours of the World Economy, 1-2030 AD: Essays in Macro-Economic History.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Mahutga, Matthew C. and David A. Smith. 2011. “Globalization, the Structure of the World
Economy and Economic Development.” Social Science Research 40(1):257–72
Mandel, Ernest. 1975. Late Capitalism. London: New Left Books.
———. 1980. Long Waves of Capitalist Development. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Mensch, Gerhard. 1978. Stalemate in Technology. Cambridge, MA: Ballenger.
Misra, Joya and Terry Boswell. 1997. “Dutch Hegemony during the Age of Mercantilism.”
Acta Politica: International Journal of Political Science 32(2):174–209.
Modelski, George. 1978. “The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State.” Compara-
tive Studies in Society and History 20(2):214–35.
———. 1987. Long Cycles in World Politics. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.
———. 1995. “The Evolution of Global Politics.” Journal of World-Systems Research 1(15).
———. 1999. “From Leadership to Organization: The Evolution of Global Politics.” Pp. 11–39
in The Future of Global Conflict, edited by V. Bornschier and C. Chase-Dunn. London:
Sage Studies in International Sociology.
——— and William R. Thompson. 1988. Sea Power in Global Politics, 1494–1993. Seattle, WA:
University of Washington Press.
——— and William R. Thompson. 1996. Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Coevolution of
Global Politics and Economics. Colombia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
Perez, Carlota. 2003. Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and
Golden Ages. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Reuveny, Rafael and William R. Thompson. 2008. “Uneven Economic Growth and the World
Economy’s North-South Stratification.” International Studies Quarterly 52(3):579–605.
Hegemonies in the World-System  617

Rostow, Walt W. 1978. The World Economy: History and Prospects. Austin: University of Texas
Press.
Rubinson, Richard. 1976. “The World-Economy and the Distribution of Income within
States.” American Sociological Review 41(4):638–59.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1939. Business Cycles. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Silver, Beverly. 2003. Forces of Labor: Workers’ Movements and Globalization since 1870. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Snyder, David and Edward Kick. 1979. “Structural Position in the World System and Eco-
nomic Growth, 1955–1970: A Multiple-Network Analysis of Transnational Interac-
tions.” The American Journal of Sociology 84(5):1096–126.
Solow, Robert H. 1957. “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function.” Review
of Economics and Statistics 39(3):312–20.
Taylor, Peter J. 1994. “Ten Years that Shook the World? The United Provinces as First Hege-
monic State.” Sociological Perspectives 37(1):25–46.
Thompson, William R. 1988. On Global War. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
——— and L. Gary Zuk. 1982. “War, Inflation, and the Kondratieff Long Wave.” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 26(4):621–44.
van Duijin, J. J. 1983. The Long Wave in Economic Life. London: George Allen and Unwin.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1984. The Politics of the World Economy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
———. 2004. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.