North American Philosophical Publications

University of Illinois Press

Wittgenstein's Theory of Language as Picture

Author(s): Jay F. Rosenberg
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Jan., 1968), pp. 18-30
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical
Publications
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 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Volume 5, Number i, January I968

II. WITTGENSTEIN'S THEORY OF LANGUAGE

AS PICTURE
JAY F. ROSENBERG*

AMONG the most rejected of Tractarian doc reality, in order to be able to depict it
1A trineshas been the thesis that propositions are correctly or incorrectly--in the way it does,
(or must be) "pictures" (specifically, "logical is its pictorial form.
pictures") of theworld. I am convinced, however, 2. I8 What any picture, of whatever form, must
that the Tractarian theory of language as picture have in common with reality, in order to be
contains a salvageable core of important insights able to depict it-correctly or incorrectly
which shed considerable light upon that tangled in any way at all, is logical form, i.e., the
knot of issueswhich constitutes theCorrespondence form of reality.
Theory of Truth. In this paper I attempt partially 2. I9 Logical pictures can depict the world.
to unravel that knot. The first portions of the paper a simple example of
Let us begin by hypothesizing
are primarily exegetical in character. The later picturing:
non-linguistic
portions, however, assume a critical, as well as
constructive, dimension. CANVAS I: Schematic cat on mat.
CANVAS2: Square over circle.
THE ACTUAL SITUATION: Cat on mat.
PICTURING IN GENERAL
In the situation, we find a cat seated upon a mat.
"A proposition," claimsWittgenstein, "is a pic and
The cat and the mat are distinguishable
ture of reality" (4.0I). "The possibility of all
distinguished elements of the situation, anld they
imagery, of all our pictorial modes of expression, is
stand in a determinate relation, the one upon the
contained in the logic of depiction" (4.0I5). But other. We tend naturally to distinguish two
what is a picture, and what is the "logic of depic
"elements" on each of the canvases as well. On the
tion" ? The chain of propositions from 2. I2 to 2. 19
first canvas, we find what we shall call a picture-cat
gives the skeleton ofWittgenstein's answer.
and a picture-mat; on the second, a circle and a
2.12 A picture is a model of reality. square. Is either canvas a picture of the situation?
2.13 In a picture objects have the elements of the To answer this question, we must recognize that
picture corresponding to them. picturing is something which we do. "We picture
2.14 What constitutes a picture is that its facts to ourselves" (2.i). Picturing is an activity,
elements are related to one another in a and, what ismore important, a rule-governed activity.
determinate way. "We picture facts to ourselves" by correlating in a
2.15 The fact that the elements of a picture are rule-regulated way diverse elements of the natural
related to one another in a determinate way order-the "picture elements" (e.g., configurations
represents that things are related to one of paint on canvas)-with various other elements of
another in the same way. the natural order-the "situation elements" (e.g.,
Let us call this connection of its elements cats, mats, dogs, logs, etc.). Thus, the question of
the structure of the picture, and let us call whether either canvas is a picture is the question of
the possibility of this structure the pictorial whether there exist accepted rules or conventions
form of the picture. ("laws of projection"-cf. 4.0141) which enable us
2.I6 If a fact is to be a picture, it must have to interpret the canvas as depicting.
something in common with what it depicts. The requisite conventions, Wittgenstein tells us,
2. I 7 What a picture must have in common with are of two sorts:
* I am indebted to the Smith Fund of the University of North Carolina for financial assistanice in preparing this paper for
publication.
I8

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 WITTGENSTEIN S THEORY OF LANGUAGE AS PICTURE I9

(a) Rules of correspondence(2.13) which corre (D) Only pictures depict situations.Only in the
late distinct "elements" which may occur context of a picture-i.e., in the presence of
on a canvas qua picture (the picture rules of correspondence-is a picture
elements) with "elements" of various pos element correlatedwith a situation-element
sible situations (the situation-elements), in theworld.
i.e., with other items in the world. (E) A picture cannot and does not depict the
(b) Rules of characterization(2.14-2.15) which laws of projection in virtue of which it is the
correlate possible determinate relationships picture which it is.
among picture-elements with possible de
By establishing the appropriate dictionary, we are
terminate relationships among the situa
already in a position to read off a large part of the
tion-elements towhich they are correlated
Tractarian theory of propositions from the theory
by the rules of correspondence.
of picturing-in-generalwhich we have elucidated:
In the case of the first canvas, there is an accepted
(A') . . . a proposition is a propositional sign in
set of rules already operative within our society (a
its projective relation to the world (3.12).
fact which I have already exploited in supposing
(B') What constitutes a propositional sign is that
the situation to be presented pictorially): in a
in it its elements (the words) stand
(ai) The rules of correspondence correlate determinate relation to one another (3.I4).
picture-cats (i.e., piles of paint of that (C') The configuration of objects in a situation
shape) with cats and picture-mats (i.e., corresponds to the configuration of simple
piles of paint of that other shape) with mats. signs in the propositional sign (3.21).
(bi) The rules of characterization tell us that the (D') Only propositions have sense; only in the
fact that the picture-cat is (pictorially) nexus of a proposition does a name have
above and overlapping the picture-mat is to be meaning (3.3).
correlated with the (possible, and in this (E') Propositions cannot represent logical form:
case actual) situation of the cat's being on it ismirrored in them.
the mat. What finds its reflection in language, lan
guage cannot represent (4.12 I).
In the case of the second canvas, we do not yet
have, although we can introduce, the appropriate It should be noted, however, that the fit between
laws of projection. We might decide, for example, our account and that of the Tractatus is not a
that precise one. Most significantly, there is slippage
between the correlation of picture-elements with
(a2) The rules of correspondence are to correlate
words in (B) and (B') and that of picture-elements
circles with cats and squares with mats.
with simple-signs or names (cf. 3.202) in (C) and (C'),
(b2) The rules of characterization are to cor
(D) and (D'). The transition is a crucial one in the
relate the fact that the circle is (pictorially)
Tractatus, for 3.I4 marks the boundary between
below the square with the (possible, and
again in this case actual) situation of the
Wittgenstein's discussion of language-in-general
and his discussion of the ideal or logically perspi
cat's being on the mat.
cuous language which is the key to the Tractatus as a
The general theory of picturing which emerges whole.' To understand how this move is to be tied
from these examples may be summarized as in with the logic of depiction, we must turn to our
follows: secondmajor topic.
(A) A picture is a canvas related to the world
by the laws of projection.
PERSPICUOUSDEPICTION
(B) A canvas consistsof picture-elements stand
ing in a determinate relation to one another Let us begin by examining a third dimension of
(C) The configuration of picture-elements on convention in the logic of depiction which has so
the canvas is correlated by the rules of far gone unmentioned. We noted earlier that we
characterization with the determinate rela tend naturally to divide each of the canvases into
tionship of the elements of the (possible) two "elements." But these elements have, in each
situationwhich is depicted. case, what we may call components which may also
1That this is so, I have argued at some length in "New Perspectives on the Tractatus," Dialogue, vol. 4 (I966), pp. 506-517.

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20 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

be taken into account by the rules of correspon into a configuration of used picture
dence and characterization. A picture-cat, for elements all of which are simple.
example, has as components two picture-ears, a
picture-tail, a picture-head, and a picture-body The corresponding conclusion for propositions
occurs in the Tractarian claim:
plus a set of picture whiskers all of which are taken
account of by our everyday rulesof correspondence. (F') The requirement that simple signs be
A picture-cat, in other words, is a picture possible is the requirement that sense be
element which has as components distinguishable determinate (3.23).
picture-elementswhich are effectively takenaccount
of by the laws of projection. Analogously, theThis is the linguistic nervusprobandiof theWittgen
square on the second canvas may be regarded as steinian transcendental deduction of objects
consisting of four component picture-elements, the (2.02ff.), the key proposition of which repeats the
four sides. These, however, are not taken effective linguistic requirement of 3.23 in an ontological
account of by the laws of projection which we have setting:
specified for the case of the second canvas. We may 2.02II If the world had no substance, then
thus effect a cross-classificationof picture-elements: whether a proposition had sense would
First, depend on whether another proposition
(I) Picture-elements effectively taken account was true.
of by the laws of projection. I shall have more to say about this argument later.
as opposed to My immediate purpose here is to demonstrate that
thismajor Tractarian theme, too, is interwoven
(II) Picture-elements not so taken account of, with and naturally motivated by Wittgenstein's
and, secondly, under each heading: conception of the logic of depiction.
I have characterized used picture-elements as
(i) Picture-elements no component of which is
those which are effectively taken account of by the
distinguished by us as a picture-element laws of projection while maintaining a discreet
(i.e., which we take as "simples")
silence as to whether it is primarily the rules of
as opposed to correspondence or the rules of characterization
which are at issue here. It is clear that we may
(ii) Picture-elements some (or all) of the com
establish on this basis a further dichotomization of
ponents of which are themselves distin
the class of used picture-elements:
guished by us as picture-elements (i.e.,
which we take as "complexes"). (a) Those which are mentioned by (occur as
Let us call picture-elements of class (I) "used" correlates under) the rules of corres
picture-elements and those of class (II) "unused," pondence
and let us call picture-elements of class (i) "simple" as opposed to
and those of class (ii) "complex" picture-elements.
Must a canvas, if it is to be used as a picture, be (,B) Those which are not mentioned by the
conceptually carved up into simple picture rules of correspondence but which figure
elements? We may argue, I believe, that in the case exclusively in the application of the rules
of used picture-elements, such must be the case, for, of characterization.
if there were an infinite regress of distinguishable
Let us call picture-elements of the class (a) "S
and distinguished used picture-elements, then in
elements" and those of the class (,) "P-elements"
order to know from a study of the canvas which
to remind us, for reasons which should soon be
determinate situation was being depicted, we
clear of the logical subject(s) and predicate of a
should have to recognize and perform an infinite
proposition.
number of correlations. But this, of course, we
Until now, we have met no picture-elements
cannot do. The conclusion of this line of argument
which are members of the class (,B), the class of
we may enshrine in a further assertion of the logic
P-elements, characterized above. To illustrate this
of depiction: class of used picture-elements, let us introduce the
(F) If a canvas is to depict a specific deter example of the third canvas which, under appro
minate situation, it must be partitionable priate laws of projection, is to be yet another picture

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 WITTGENSTEIN S THEORY OF LANGUAGE AS PICTURE 2I

of the situation of the cat's being on the mat. We tively to the left and the right of an 'R']
thus hypothesize: says that aRb."

CANVAS 3: Triangle between square and circle. The P-elements of a picture (and, correspondingly,
the predicate and relation signs of a proposition)
We tend most naturally to distinguish in the third then have a function in the language which is
canvas threepicture-elements-a square, a triangle, categoricallydifferentfrom that of the S-elements
and a circle in left-to-right linear order. If this is so, (referringexpressions). It is this insightwhich pro
then our first impulse should be to protest that, vides the resolution of Bradley's Regress and forms
viewed as a candidate picture of the situation, the the groundwork of the ideal or perspicuous lan
canvas contains one picture-element toomany, for guage which Wittgenstein sketches and deploys in
our normal assay of the situation yields two elements the Tractatus.2
(the cat and the mat) and there seems to be no way We balk when it is first proposed that the third
of establishing the correlations required to get on canvas be regarded as a picture of the situation.
with the business of depicting. Put thus bluntly the And, although we have seen that it can be so
difficulty is transparent, for to argue in this regarded, I submit that we should find the manner
manner is to tacitly accept the premiss that all of doing so awkward and, in a clear sense, unperspic
threepicture-elements are used picture-elements of uous. The basic difficulty is that there is nothing
the class (a), i.e., correlates under the rules of about the canvas to indicate that the function of the
correspondence.But there is, of course, no necessity to triangle in the process of depiction is categorically
view all three distinguished picture-elements as different from that of the circle and the square. Let
S-elements. We may instead decide to adopt as us re-examine our classification of picture-elements
rulesof correspondencegoverning the third canvas to see whether it can provide us with a guide for
the same rules which we employed in the case of the codifying our intuitive notion of pictorial perspi
second canvas: cuity. The over-all breakdown, then, is this:
(a3) The rules of correspondence are to corre (I) Used picture-elements
late circles with cats and squares with (i) Simpleused picture-elements
mats. (a) S-elements (correspondence corre
lates)
And, if we wish to continue to regard the triangle
(S) P-elements (characterization cor
as a used picture-element, we may do so since the
relates)
option remains of treating it as a P-element and
which tell us
establishing rules of characterization (ii) complexused picture-elements
that: (a) S-elements
(O) P-elements
(b3) The fact that the square and the circle
stand respectively to the left and the right of a (II) Unusedpicture-elements
triangle is to be correlated with the (pos (i) simple unused picture-elements
sible) situation of the cat's being on the (ii) complex unused picture-elements
mat. It is clear that the entire class (II) of unused
picture-elements can be disregarded. Since they
This, it should be apparent, is the pure pictorial
are not taken into consideration by the laws of pro
counterpart of that most-discussed Tractarian pro
position: jection governing the process of depiction, unused
picture-elements play no role in the canvas qua
3.1432 Instead of, "The complex sign 'aRb' says picture, and, consequently, it accordswell with our
that a stands to b in the relation R", we intuitions that a perspicuous picture should be en
ought to put "That 'a' stands to 'b' in a tirely free of unused picture-elements excepting
certain relation [viz: standing respec thosewhich are indispensable components of used
2For an amplified discussion of thisand relatedmatters, see I. Copi, "Objects, Properties, andRelations in the Tractatus,"Mind,
vol. 67 (1958), pp. 145-I65; the discussion by Erik Stenius of the "true key," pp. 130-133 of Wittgenstein'sTractatus, (Ithaca
and Oxford, I960), and the excellent independent treatment inWilfrid Sellars' "Naming and Saying," reprinted as ch. 7 of
Science,Perception,andReality (New York, I963), as well asmy own "New Perspectives on the Tractatus," loc.cit. For the sorts of
philosophical difficulties which are precipitated by failure to observe the distinctions which Wittgenstein draws in the Tractatus,
seemy paper, "Bergmann on Time-Showing and Saying," forthcoming inMind.

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 22 AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHIICAL
QUARTERLY
(G) In a picture, a situation may (G') In a proposition, a thought
picture-elements. We have, further, already argued be depicted in such a way can be expressed in such a
that a canvas, if it is to depict a specific determinate that the distinguished pic- way that elements of the
ture-elements correspond propositional sign corres
situation, must be regarded as uniquely parti one-for-one with the distin- pond to objects of the
tioned into a configuration of used picture-elements guished situation-elements. thought. (3.2)

all of which are simple. We may safely add the (I-I) The picture-elements em- (H') The simple signs employed
uniqueness condition since, if the canvas is viewed ployed in (perspicuous) pic- in propositions of an ideal
tures are used simple S- language [as characterized
alternatively under two partitionings into two dis elements. in 3.21 are called names.
tinct sets of picture-elements each with appropriate (3.202)

situation-correlates, we would again not know (J) The configuration of pic- (J') The configuration of ob
ture-elements on the canvas jects in a situation corres
which determinate situation was being depicted. is correlated by the rules of ponds to the configuration
We may further restrict our considerations to the characterization with the of simple signs in the pro
relationship of the situation- positional sign. (3.2 I)
case in which we have a single set of rules. The point elements isl the situation
here is that picture-elements (circles, squares, depicted.

picture-cats, and the like) are repeatables, of the (K) In a picture, the used simple (K') In a proposition, a name is
S-elements are correlated the representative of an
nature of types rather than tokens. ('A' is the same by the rules of correspon- object. (3.22)
sign as 'A'. 3.203). If we had two sets of corres dence with the distinguished
elements of the situation
pondence rules-the first correlating, say, circles depicted.
with cats, and the second correlating circles with
(L) A simple picture-element is (L') A name cannot be dissected
dogs-we would again not know in a given case an element no component any further by means of a
which determinate situation was being depicted. of which is distinguished as definition: it is a primitive
a picture-element. sign. (3.26)
These requirements give us the analogue of Witt
(M) A picture consists of a con- (M') An elementary proposition
genstein's 3.25: "A proposition has one and only
figuration of used simple S- consists of names. It is a
one complete analysis." elements viewed under the nexus, a concatenation, of
rules of correspondence and names. (4.22)
We may consequently consider any picture characterization.
which is a candidate perspicuous picture as con
sisting of a unique set of simple picture-elements all
of which are used. But are these used, simple Before we can begin to put these Tractarian insights
picture-elements to be S-elements only, or both to work for us, however, we must complete one
S-elements and P-elements? (They cannot, of additional exegetical task. Let us turn, then, to our
course, all be P-elements.) Here Wittgenstein thirdmajor topic.
brings his key insight to bear. S-elements and
P-elements, in any picture which contains both, LOGICAL FORM
perform categorically different functions. Conse
quently, any picture which represents their pic "What a picture must have in common with
torial (linguistic) functions by categorically similar reality," Wittgenstein tells us, "in order to be able
items is unperspicuous. But S-elements and P to depict it-correctly or incorrectly-in the way
elements are categorically alike-they are both it does, is its pictorial form" (2. 17). The form is the
piles of paint on canvas or ink on paper. Conse possibility of the structure or connection of the dis
quently, any picture which contains both S-elements tinguished picture-elements (2.15). We have ex
and P-elements is unperspicuous. A picture is pers amined pictures of two logical structures, two
picuous, on this account, if and only if all distin "'pictorial forms." The first type, canvases one and
guished picture-elements are used simple S-elemcnts. two, was the pictorial counterpart of the ideal lan
In such a picture, there is an isomorphism between guage whose structure is sketched in the Tractatus.
distinguished picture-elements and distinct elements In these canvases, all distinguished picture-elements
of the situation as we conceive it. The ideal or were used simple elements of the S-type as, in the
perspicuous language envisioned by Wittgenstein Tractarian ideal language, all the non-logical syn
in the Tractatus is constructed in accordance with tactical units are names. The "pictorial form" of
these principles. this first, perspicuous, mode of depiction consisted
By establishing the appropriate dictionary, we in the possibility of deploying these distinguished
may read the characterization of an elementary picture-elements in configurations in such a way
proposition in the ideal language of the Tractatus that, under appropriate rules of characterization,
out of the view of perspicuous depiction which we the canvas might be regarded as depicting the
have developed. specific determinate situation with which we began.

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 WITTGENSTEIN S THEORY OF LANGUAGE AS PICTURE 23

As we analyzed it, the second type of picture,
canvas three, contained in addition a picture
element of the P-type. This was the pure pictorial
counterpart of the language of Principia Mathe
matica in which predicate and relation signs, as well
as names, are employed as primary non-logical
syntactic units. And we have seen, too, that appro
priate rules of characterization may be drawn for
canvases of this second type which will enable them,
too, to have "pictorial form" adequate for the
depiction of the situation originally described.
But the commitmentswhich Wittgenstein makes
in his sketch of the logic of depiction go deep
enough to cut across the distinctions we have
drawn between these two sorts of pictorial form.
For, he tells us, "What any picture, of whatever
form, must have in common with reality, to be able
to depict it-correctly or incorrectly-in any way at jection proposed by our hypothetical objector will
all, is logical form, i.e., the form of reality" (2. i8,
my italics). "Every picture is at the same time a
logical one" (2. i82). And it is logical pictures alone
which can depict the world (2.19). What, then, is number of various situations more or less similar to
"logical form"? To come to grips with this ques
tion,we must introduce yet another exhibit. Since near or under the mat, the dog's being on the mat, the
every picture is a logical picture as well, we must,
to strip the notion of logical form free of the general
notion of depiction, consider a canvas which is not tions governing the mode of depiction forwhich
and cannot be a picture of the situation originally
specified.We now hypothesize:
CANVAS 4: A dot in a blank field.
A consideration of the fourth canvas enables us
to make the requisite points quite quickly. In line
with the reasoningwhich we have heretofore em
ployed, the fourth canvas yields, upon examination,
only onepicture-element-the dot. Where, in the
case of canvas three, we balked when it was pro
posed as a picture of the specified situation on the
grounds that it contained one picture-element too
many, in this case, we again balk, I submit, because
the fourth canvas contains one picture-element too
few. But here is the crucial difference, for there is
no category into which we can place this single
picture-element, consonant with the classification
of picture-elements which we have developed,
which will enable us to set laws of projection in
terms of which the fourth canvas may be regarded
as a picture of the situation. If we regard it as an
S-element, we are at a loss as to how to establish
appropriate rules of characterization; and we
cannot regard it as a P-element without having
our disposal some further picture-elements to fall
under the purview of the rules of correspondence
which any rule of characterization must pre
suppose.
It might be suggested that the law of projection
appropriate to this case simply read:
(c4) The dot is to be correlated with the situ
ation of the cat's being on the mat (or: the
fact that the cat is on the mat).
The proposal of our hypothetical objector, then,
amounts to the suggestion that we dispense with,
or at least step outside of, our previous charac
terization of the logic of depiction and the set of
categories which we developed in terms of that dis
cussion, for (c4), it should be apparent, is neither a
rule of correspondence nor a rule of characteriza
tion as we have described them.
Let us grant, for the moment, that the law of pro
do the job,for this canvas and in this situation. But it is
an everyday and thoroughlyunphilosophical com
monplace that there are in the world an indefinite
the cat's being on the mat, e.g., the cat's being
cat's being on the sofa and so on ad infinitum. And
the question naturally arises: What do the conven
the fourth canvas is taken to be an example tell us
about the depiction of thesesituations?How, under
the laws of projection of which (c4) is but one, are
these related situations to be pictured? Here our
hypothetical objector is faced with a dilemma:
Either the remaining members of the set of laws of pro
jection are rules of correspondence and rules of
characterization of the sorts (a) and (b) described
above, in which case we already have a set of
cat-correlate picture-elements, a set of mat
correlate picture-elements, and laws correlating
configurations of these with determinate cat-mat
relationships.
or the remaining laws of projection are logically
and structurally on a par with the example (c4).
The result, if the first horn is swallowed, is that the
additionallaw (c4) is superfluous and dispensable,
for the fourth canvas then does a job which can be
equally and more perspicuously done by a canvas
constructed in accordance with the ordinary rules
of correspondence and characterization. If the
second horn is chosen, however, the upshot is that
the set of laws of projection can be adequate to our
at life situation only at the cost of becoming infinite.
But this is no genuine option at all but, rather, an
absurdity, first because an infinity of distinct laws

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 24 AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL
QUARTERLY
of projection could not, in a finite human lifetime, expressing a proposition with only one constituent?
be learned, and secondly, because such a "picture But then how could that be the same proposition as
language" would not and could not fulfill the the one we express by saying "The cat is on themat,"
cardinal requirement of enabling us to depict new since ours has three constituents ?4
situations as we come upon them in the world.
(4.027: "It belongs to the essence of a proposition
Pitcher proceeds to present the correspondence
theorist with a three-cornered dilemma:
that it should be able to communicate a new sense
to us." 4.03: "A proposition must use old expres Are we to insist that the two sentences "The cat is on
sions to communicate a new sense.") Language, in the mat" and "Catamat" both express the same pro
other words, is essentiallycombinatorial. position although conceding that the former has three
It is precisely upon the combinatorial aspects of constituents while the latter has only one? . . .But then
language thatWittgenstein focuses in the Tractatus. since the correspondence (as congruity) of two things
(See:3.I41, 4.032, 4.04.) Wittgenstein phrases his x andy involves some pairing of the respective parts of
requirements in terms of propositions alone, but, x andy, if one of these two propositions corresponds to
as we have seen, the demands of articulation and the state of affairs, it is difficult to see how the other
possibly could.
logical complexity are demands of language as a
whole. As a minimum, we must distinguish in a or Shall we say, then, that the two sentences "The cat is
picture sufficient picture-elements to enable a set on themat" and "Catamat" express one and the same
of these, as S-elements, to stand in one-to-one cor proposition, the number of whose constituents has no
respondence with the conceptually distinguished necessary connection with the number of expressions
elements of the situation depicted. The fourth can in either of the two sentences?
vas does not possess the requisite logical (mathe
or Shall we abandon the search for the number of constit
matical) multiplicity to depict the situation
uents of a proposition and contend that the question
originally described; the first, second, and third
of how many constituents a proposition has is a wholly
canvases all do. It is this "logical segmentation,"
arbitrary one having no right answer? But then we
this "mathematical multiplicity"-and the possi would seem to be abandoning at the same time all
bility of establishing adequate laws of projection hope of construing truth in terms of correspondence
which it guarantees-that constitutes the logical as-congruity....
form common to the first three canvases and the
situation, but lacking in the fourth canvas. And By now it should be clear that we need not swallow
this, I believe, is part of the salvageable and valu any of Pitcher's three options. Pitcher claims to
able core of the Correspondence Theory of Truth, have invented a foreign language. The proper res
over and above that which has been captured in ponse to his trilemma is to put his powers of in
the Semantic Theory.3 vention to the test. How, in his language, are we to
assert that the cat is under or near the mat, that the
dog is on the mat or on the log, or that the cat is on
MATHEMATICAL MULTIPLICITY-PROPOSITIONS the floor or the log? Is the resemblance of "cata
AS LOGICAL PICTURES mat" to our English sentence merely coincidental,
or does the language yield up such further one
The Tractarian doctrine of logical pictures has
word sentences as "catumat," "catemat," "doga
been dismissed largely on the basis of a single per
mat," "dogalog," "catafloor," and "catalog" to
suasive argument which grows out of Wittgen
describe the related situations enumerated above?
atein's self-criticism in paragraphs I9-20 of the
The doctrine of propositions as logical pictures, in
Investigations. Perhaps the clearest exposition of this
brief, is not a doctrine about what a propositional
argument is the one given by George Pitcher:
sign must be like, but rather a doctrine about what
a language must be like if it is to be adequate for
There is a foreign language-I have just invented it
in which the proposition we express by saying "The describing the world as we conceive it.Whether a
cat is on the mat" is expressed by the one-word proposition is logically segmented and mathe
sentence "Catamat." Are we to say that when a matically complex is not something which can be
speaker of this new language says "Catamat" he is read off from the propositional sign taken in and of
3 In this connection, see also "Truth and 'Correspondence'" byWilfrid Sellars, reprinted as ch. VI of Science,Perception,and
Reality, op. cit. The whole of the present study is greatly indebted to this penetrating and significant paper.
4 In his introduction to Truth (Englewood Cliffs, I964), pp. 12-13.

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 WITTGENSTEIN S THEORY OF LANGUAGE AS PICTURE 25

itself, for the proposition is not the propositional as for propositions descriptive of the natural order.
sign taken in abstracto. Just as a correspondence In the sense in which
must be established between usedpicture-elements
The cat is on the mat
and elements of the situation as we conceptualize it,
so must a correspondence be established, not mirrors the logical multiplicity of the situation
between distinguishable constituents of a proposi which it depicts, so, surely.
tional sign and the elements of the situation
Two is less than three
described, but rather between the world and those
constituents of the propositional sign which are mirrors the logical multiplicity of the situation
affectively taken account of by the laws of projec which it depicts.5 Yet there can be no doubt that
tion which govern the sign as a symbol of a used Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, conceives of picturing
language system.We may consequently counter as something that is essentially and particularly the
Pitcher's trilemma with a dilemma of our own: job of propositions descriptive of the naturalorder
the propositions, for example, of natural science. Is
Either "Catamat" is logically articulated and
there a second, deeper, sense of "picturing" in
mathematically complex in the sense
which we might argue that statements about the
which we have specified above.
natural order do, while statements about the logical
or "Catamat" is at best a code-word, in
or conceptual order do not, picture the world ?
telligible only in terms of its translata
I believe that such an account can be elicited from
bility into a language the propositions of
the Tractatus. To do so, however, we must first turn
which do possess the requisite logical seg
our attention to a puzzle which has been generated
mentation.
by our account thus far of Wittgenstein's pro
And it is a significant exegetical point, I think, to ceedings.
note thatWittgenstein in the Tractatusanticipated In the section on Perspicuous Depiction, I under
both Pitcher's challenge and its resolution: took to reconstruct the linguisticmoment ofWitt
genstein's transcendentaldeduction of simples.The
3.I43 Although a propositional sign is a fact,
conclusion at which we arrived was that, if a picture
this is obscured by the usual form of ex
is to depict a determinate situation (i.e., if we can
pression inwriting or print. know from the picture whichdeterminate situation
For in a printed proposition, for example, is being depicted), then the picture must be con
no essential difference is apparent between
ceptually dissected into a unique set of used, simple
a propositional sign and a word.
picture-elements. The corresponding Tractarian
But, point for language is that, if an elementary propo
sition is to have a determinate sense, itmust consist
4.032 Even the proposition, Ambulo, is compo of a unique configuration of names.
site: for its stem with a different ending
yields a different sense, and so does its 4.221 It is obvious that the analysis of proposi
ending with a different stem. tions must bring us to elementary pro
positions which consist of names in
immediate combination.
Two CONCEPTS OF SIMPLICITY
But now, interestingly enough, we may observe that
We have located, then, one sense in which lan the linguistic facet ofWittgenstein's transcendental
guage can be held to be a picture of the world (as deduction of simples, as I have interpreted it,
we conceive it). But now it would appear that this appears to be perfectly sound. Needless to say, I do
claim is interesting only insofar as it has been denied, not wish to take this conclusion as providing
for surely the qualification of conceptual relativity grounds for the reassertion of Tractarian atomism
robs our conclusion of much of its excitement. as a viable ontology. But it is a matter of record
More significantly, though, we must note that the that, in the Tractatus,Wittgenstein inferred from
sense of "picturing" which we have located and the linguistic demands of the transcendental deduc
argued for obtains as much in the case of proposi tion the necessity of an atomistic ontology of
tions descriptive of the logical or conceptual order absolutely simple objects. If we wish tomaintain the
5The point iswell-made in Sellars' "Truth and
'Correspondence'," op. cit. The development which follows was inspired,
by, and in part parallels, Sellars' explorations.

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 26 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

conclusion that the elementary propositions of a answer consistentwith Tractarian principles is that
language adequate for the telling of a determinate we cannot. But to see that this is so, we must re
world storymust be uniquely analyzable into con examine in detail the Tractarian concept of simpli
figuration of names, then, we have a problem. We city.
nust first provide some account ofWittgenstein's Names are the simplest sort of referring expres
commitment to ontological simples, and, secondly, sions. They are referentially simple. Elementary
demonstrate that our own position is innocent of propositions are the simplest sort of propositions.
such a commitment. But since, forWittgenstein, propositions do not
The best way to begin is, surely, to become denote (see: 3.I43, 3.I44), the simplicity of an
as clear as possible concerning exactly what we elementary proposition cannot be referential sim
have demonstrated. It is only this: That if lan plicity. A fully analyzed elementary proposition is
guage is to have a determinate sense, it must con a configuration of names. (4.22: "An elementary
tain simple syntactic units of a certain sort proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a con
specifically, it must contain denoting expressions catenation, of names.") Logical constants are not
(referring expressions) no well-formed part of names (4.0312; 4.44I). So an elementary proposi
which is a denoting expression (referring expres tion isnot truth-functionally complex. In the Trac
sion). Let us call this the demand for referential tatus,however, all inferenceis truth-functional.
simplicityand speak of such denoting expressions
as referentialsimples. Now Wittgenstein clearly 5.11 If all the truth-grounds that are common
of a denoting to a number of propositions are at the
thinks that the referential simplicity
expression guarantees the ontologicalsimplicity of same time truth-grounds of a certain pro
its denotatum. As we have reconstructed the argu position, then we say that the truth of that
ment, however, there appears to be no reason to proposition follows from the truth of the
draw this conclusion. After all, we have been others.
speaking all along of depicting situations as we 5.12 In particular, the truth of a proposition
conceive them, and there is nothing to prevent us 'p' follows from the truth of another pro
from reconceptualizing the situation which we position 'q' if all the truth-grounds of the
wish to describe in an ontologically "finer-grained" latter are truth-groundsof the former.
manner and offering a redescription in terms of (Compare 5.121, 5.152.) since an
Consequently,
this reconceptualization. Cannot we replace any elementary proposition is not truth-functionally
elementary proposition (consisting of a configura complex, no elementary proposition follows from any
tion of names) with a conjunction of elementary otherelementary
proposition:
propositions which (i) offer a redescription of the
same situation, (ii) are jointly equivalent to the 5.I34 One elementary proposition cannot be
original elementary proposition, but (iii) are con deduced from another,
figuration of names denoting parts or componenztsof and no elernentary proposition is inconsistent with any
the original putative ontological simples? Wittgen otherelementary
proposition:
stein himself provides a possible example of such a
replacement in ? 6o of the Investigations. Consider a 4.211 It is a sign of a proposition's being
broom, which we baptize "Tom," lying in a elementary that there can be no elemen
corner, which we baptize "Clyde." Cannot we tary proposition contradicting it.
replace the elementary proposition (Compare 6.3751.) It will not be inappropriate,
Tom is in Clyde then, if we call the simplicity of elementary propo
sitions inferential simplicity and speak of elementary
(consisting of two names "Tom" and "Clyde"
propositions as inferential simples.
standing respectively to the left and right of an "is
It is the inferential simplicity of elementary pro
in") with the conjunction of elementary proposi
positions which gives rise toWittgenstein's view of
tions the independence of atomic facts or atomic states
Dick is in Clyde & Harry is in Clyde & Dick is of affairs (Sachverhdlte).
fastened to Harry
4.2 I The simplest kind of proposition, an
where "Dick" denotes the brush and "Harry" the elementary proposition, asserts the exis
stick of our broom Tom? Surprisingly, the only tence of a state of affairs (Sachverhalt).

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 WITTGENSTEIN S THEORY OF LANGUAGE AS PICTURE 27

But, since one elementary proposition cannot be them. (i), then, qualifies as a configuration of
deduced fronm another, names; it is an elementary proposition. It would
appear, however, that (i) both implies and is
2.062 From the existence or non-existence of one implied by
state of affairs it is impossible to infer the
existence or non-existence of another, (2) b is south of a
which qualifies equally as an elementary proposi
(Compare: 5.I35) and, hence, tion. At this point, there are a variety of options
2.06i States of affairs are independent of one open toWittgenstein:
another.
(A) He can hold to the position that elemen
1.2 I Each item can be the case or not the case
tary propositions are inferentially simple
while everything else remains the same.
and, hence conclude either
But, more significantly, we can now show that it (Ai) that (i) and (2) are not, as they
isWittgenstein's commitment to inferentialsimples appear to be, elementary proposi
which commits him to the puzzling objects of his tions,
atomistic ontology. We asked whether an elemen or (A2) that (i) does not, as it appears to,
tary proposition, p, could not be replaced with a imply (2);
conjuction of elementary or (B) He can hold that (i) does imply (2) and
propositions, q, & q2 &
... &q., which are jointly equivalent top but which that (i) and (2) are elementary proposi
are configurations of names denoting parts or tions, in which case he must reject the
components of the original putative ontological principle that elementary propositions are
simples denoted by the names occurring in p. But inferentially simple and with it the principle
if p is to be equivalent to q1 & q2 & ... &q", then thatall inferenceis truth-functional.
the two propositions must mutually imply one
In the Tractatus,
Wittgenstein opts for (Ai), holding
another. That is, p must follow from the conjunc
that (i) and (2) are only apparently elementary
tion, and the conjunction must follow from p, which
propositions and are actually "not fully analyzed,"
implies that q1must follow from p and q2must follow
but, at best, in the Tractatus this is simply an article
from p and . .. and qnmust follow from p. But, ex
of faith.
hypothesi, p is an elemnentary proposition and so is
Option (Ai) is thus doubly untenable, for it
each qj, and no elementary proposition follows from any
leads not only to the paradoxical atomistic onto
otherelementary
proposition.Elementary propositions
logy which builds its picture of the world on a
are inferentially simple. Consequently, the crucial
foundation of absolute simples which mnust exist if
replacement step which would enable us to escape
language is to picture the world but of which no
the Tractarian commitment to atomistic onto
examples are ever forthcoming, but also gives rise
logical simples cannot, consistently with Trac
to the Tractarian notion of analysis which was so
tarian principles, be taken.
In the Tractatus, then, we find Wittgenstein justifiably attacked by Wittgenstein himself in the
com
mitted both to the necessity of referential simples in
Investigations
as being essentially incompletable.
Does option (A2) fare any better? A contem
language and to the necessity of inferential simples
in language. But when we turn to the Tractatus with
poraryWittgensteinian with comparable inferen
tial commitments (call him "Hempel") might
the hope of finding an argument to support the
argue for (A2) as follows:
demand for inferential simples parallel to the
transcendental deduction mobilized in support of
If (2) is to follow from (i) simpliciter, then there
referential simples, we are curiously disappointed.
must be a principle of inference which authorizes the
To survey the alternatives, let us consider, as a deduction. This cannot be a formal rule of inference,
test case, the proposition that a is north of b. for no formal rule is adequate to the job. Consequently,
Consistent with our acceptance of the Tractarian itmust be what Carnap has called, at various times, a
view of language, we regard "is north of" as a ,naterial rule of inference, a P-rule, or a conformation
P-element, and consider rule. But I am committed to the principle that all
rules of inferenceare formal rules of inferenceand, hence,
(I) a is north of b
hold that (2) does not follow from (i) simpliciter but
as consisting of two names ('a' and 'b') standing in only in the sense that "Socrates ismortal"follows from
the relation of having an "is north of" between "Socrates is a man."

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28 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

On this view, the inference (6) c is north of d dis south of c

or, we may interpret it as
(i) a is north of b
(4b) (Vx) (Vy) ( that x is north ofy entails thaty is
south of x)
(2) b is south of a which does authorize the counterfactual (5) but
is an enthymeme. The proper and perspicuous form which is not derivable by the procedures of instan
of the argument supplies the missing premiss: tial induction simply. The upshot is that, if our
hypothetical objector admits synthetic counter
(i) a is north of b factual propositions into his language, then he is
(3) If a is north of b, then b is south of a not able to carry through his gambit of construing
the inference from (i) to (2) as enthymematic
(2) b is south of a without introducing the very material rules of in
ference which he is anxious to deny. For to say
and draws only upon modus ponens, a formal rule of
that, that x is north ofy entails thaty is south of x is
inference.
just to say that y's being south of x may be inferred
The claim, then, is that material rules of infer
from x's being north of y. Any language which con
ence are, at best, shorthand devices deriving their
tains synthetic (empirical) counterfactuals must be
authority from formal rules of inference and are, in
governed by material rules of inference of non-derivative
principle, dispensable in favor of formal rules of
inference together with additional premisses.6 But
authority.
Notice now that an individual's conception of
what licenses the introduction of (3) ? From
natural law is necessarily embodied in the material
whence comes its epistemic authority? It is, surely,
rules of inference which he espouses. For to hold
a substitution instance of
that, for example, lightning is the cause of thunder
(4) (Vx) (Vy) (If x is north ofy, theny is south
is to hold that, if it thunders then, of necessity, it has
of x).
lightened and that if it were to thunder then, of
But the same question arises, 'of course, for (4),
necessity, it would have lightened. It is, in other
and at this point we are met either by silence or by
words, to be prepared to infer from "It thunders at
an appeal to the procedures of instantial induction
t" to "It lightens at t-zat" and to be prepared to
for the establishing of (4).
assent to such inferences and the corresponding
But there is something fishy about grounding (4)
I believe, becomes conditionals counterfactually. But this, I have argued,
by induction. What is wrong,
requires the recognition of material rules of infer
clear when we reflect on the commitments implicit
ence of non-derivative authority.
in the innocent-seeming "If. . . then . . ." of (4).
be Thus, to return to our Tractarian themes, since
For, it must be granted, (4) must certainly
it is clear that the language which Wittgenstein
construed as strong enough to license the assertion
perspicuously reconstructs in the Tractatus makes
not only of
rich use of synthetic counterfactuals, for it is, after
(3) If a is north of b, then b is south of a.
all, our language and "In fact, all the propositions
but also of the counterfactual
of our everyday language, just as they stand, are
(5) If c were north of d, then d would be south of c.
in perfect logical order" (5.5563), we must reject
And what we need for (5) is not
both (Ai) and (A2) and embrace the alternative
(Vx) (Vy) (if x is north of y then, in point of fact,
(B). Consequently, the empirical, descriptive lan
y is south of x)
guage which we shall be considering in the balance
but rather
of this paper is one in which even elementary prop
(Vx) (Vy) (If x is north of y then, of necessity, y is
ositions (in the sense of propositions consisting of
south of x).
configurations of referential simples) are not in
The "If. . . then . . ." of (4), in other words, is ferentially simple, and in which our battery of
ambiguous. We can interpret it either as formal rules of inference is enriched with a battery
(4a) (Vx) (Vy) (x is north ofy - y is south of x) of material rules of inference, one of which non
which, indeed, is derivable by the procedures of derivatively authorizes the inference of the
instantial induction but which warrants, not (5), elementary proposition "b is south of a" from the
but only elementary proposition "a is north of b."

6The following line of argument is adapted from Sellars' "Inference andMeaning," Mind, vol. 62 (I953), pp. 3 I3-338.

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 WITTGENSTEIN S THEORY OF LANGUAGE AS PICTURE 29

INFERENCE AS PERFORMANCE-A WORLD regarded only as a chunk of wood of a certain size,

STORY AS A WORLD PICTURE
Before we can proceed to elucidate our second
sense of "picturing," however, there is one last
fundamental Tractarian point with which we must
come to grips. Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus,
rejects the very idea of ruleof inference. Proposi
tions, themselves, he claims, provide the only pos
sible justifications for inferences, and
"Laws of inference," which are supposed to
justify inferences, as in the works of Frege and
Russell, have no sense, and would be super
fluous. (5.132.)
Since we have been speaking for quite some time of
rules of inference, we must attempt to give some
account of what such a rule is and what job it does.
As I see it, the crucial fact which Wittgenstein
loses sight of in his rejection of rules of inference as
superfluous is that inferring is a human activity. It is
something which a rational agent, a person, does
and, like all such doings, inference is thus appro
priately the subject of normative licenses and
constraints. To say that p and p v q entail or imply
that q is to say that q may be inferred from p and
p D q, and, consequently, is to speak in a language
which is essentially one of permissions and obliga
tions. But just what sort of a doing is inferring?
There are a variety of ways in which one can
describe a human activity. Consider, for example,
the different descriptionswhich might be given of a
game of chess. Typically, we describe such a game
normatively. A pawn on the chess board is regarded
as a piece having a determinate role in the game
and embodying specific moving and capturing
capabilities. Normatively, we say that the pawn
subject to certain constraints. It cannot advance
three spaces in a single move and it cannot move
diagonally except to capture.We may describe one
player's action at a particular point in the game as,
for example, advancing his queen's pawn one
space, thereby removing his king from check, and
simultaneously attacking his opponent's bishop.
This is, however, a radically different way in
which we might describe a game of chess. Under
this mode of description, a pawn on the board is
shape, and color. Viewed in this way, the language
of permissions and prohibitions is inappropriate.
There is nothing to prevent a player from moving
that piece of wood from this square to that one,
three spaces distant, nor from moving that same
piece of wood along a diagonal row of squares.
"Cannot" makes no sense here, for surely we can
put a piece of wood anywhere there is room for it.
The action which before was described as advanc
ing a queen's pawn, removing the king from check,
and attacking the opponent's bishop becomes,
under this new, "pared-down" mode of descrip
tion, the moving of a piece of wood of such-and
such shape and color from this point to that, in so
doing interposing that piece of wood spatially
between two other pieces of wood of various deter
minate shapes, and simultaneously placing that
piece of wood diagonally adjacent to another of
different shape and color. Let us call this an ex
tensional description of the game. In an extensional
description of the game of chess, the items which
are normatively viewed as rule-governed are regarded
merely as items of the natural order.7
Analogously, there are two ways of viewing the
activities of an individual playing the "language
game" of describing the world. We can consider
one of his linguistic productions-an utterance or
inscription-either normatively,as the subject of the
permissions and prohibitions embodied in the
formal and material inference rules of the language
(i.e., as a proposition), or extensionally as an item of
the natural order, a pile of ink, graphite, or chalk,
or a disturbance in the air (i.e., as a propositional
sign) .8
Rules of inference, as we are viewing them, are
is principles concerning the production and manipu
lation of items of the natural order (piles of ink,
etc.) which are, at the same time, linguistic items
just as rules of chess are principles concerning the
manipulation of items of the natural order (chunks
of wood, etc.) which are, at the same time, chess
pieces. A rule of inference is a license to utter or
inscribe, and the doing of which inferring consists is
just this uttering or inscribing, viewed normatively.
The formal rule modus ponens, for example, grants
the permission to produce a 'q'-item whenever one

7The reader should recall the distinction which we drew earlier between a canvas and a picture. Notice, however, that it is
perfectly correct to say that some canvases arepictures, just as it is perfectly correct to say that some pieces of wood arepawns.
It is only under a normativedescription that an action may be assessed as having been done well or poorly. (The reader who
finds the chess analogy overworked is invited to consider the differences between waving one's armsand signaling.)
8We see now that on this, Tractarian, reading of "proposition" and "propositional sign" it is perfectly correct to say that
some propositional signs arepropositions.

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30 AMERICAN PHILOSOPIHICAL QUARTERLY

has a 'p'-item and a "pDq"-item in one's world green at t1 in the world as he conceives it. Similarly,
story, and the material rule which we took as our the fact that, in the world as our describer con
test case grants the permission to produce a token ceives it, that a is north of b guarantees that b is
which is a "b is south of a"-item whenever one has south of a will be reflected in the regular occurrence
an "a is north of b"-item in one's world descrip of an "is south of" between a 'b' and an 'a'when
tion. (What counts as, e.g., an "a is north of b" ever an "is north of" occurs between an 'a' and
item depends upon what language one is speaking.) a 'b'.
Consider, then, an individual building up Names standing in linguistic relations corres
through time a written description of the world as pond one-for-one with their denotata conceived as
he conceives it. Let us suppose, too, that he actively standing in objective relations. This was our first
mobilizes the permissions and prohibitions of the sense of "picturing." But now we find that, in
rules of inference, formal and material, of his addition, the regularitiesamong the linguistic
language by actually committing to paper all the relations and properties of names (viewed exten
inscriptionswhich they allow him. Regarding his sionally) equally correspond one-for-one with the
inscriptionsextensionally, as objects of the natural regularities in nature as they are conceived by the
order simply, there is nothing to prevent him from describer and embodied in his espoused material
placing them in his world story arbitrarily. He rules of inferencewhich codify his conceptions of
might follow an "a is red at t1"with an "a is green natural necessity and natural law. This is our
at t1" or an "a is north of b" with a "b is not south of second sense of "picturing" in terms of which only
a," just as a chess player could move a such-and propositions descriptive of the natural order can
such shaped piece of wood three squares forward on picture the world. And this, I believe, constitutes a
a checkered cardboard surface.However, our hypo second salvageable insight from the classical Cor
thetical describer is amply providedwith principles respondenceTheory of Truth.
of inference, both formal and material, his espousal The requirement that propositions be logical
ofwhich constrainshis conceptual activities (carried pictures could only be understood as a demand
on in foro interno) in a manner which is necessarily generated by language as a whole thought of as an
of theworld which is
reflectedin thewritten description instrument applicable to the description of a world
the extensional product in the natural order of that con conceived of as determinate. In a parallel way, the
ceptualactivity.As Sellars has conveniently put it: requirement that descriptive language picture in
"Espousal of principles is reflected in uniformities our second sense can only be understood as a
of performance."9 demand generated by the concept of an evolving
We can see now how there can be a second sense total world story told in a language thought of as an
in which language, considered as an item of the instrument applicable to the description of a world
natural order and described extensionally, "pic conceived of as lawful.
tures," "mirrors," or "reflects" the world as our Broad and general theories of "the nature of
describerconceivesit. If our describer, for example, language" have been out of fashion since the time
views the principle of red-green incompatibility as of the Investigations. I hope to have shown in this
a principle of natural necessity in his lawful world, paper, however, that such theories, too, have their
his consequent espousal of the appropriatematerial proper philosophical place and that, if it is denied
rule of inference will guarantee that an 'a'which is them, we are in danger of overlooking many of the
to the left of an "is red at t1"will never occur to the keen insights of our philosophical predecessors-as
left of an "is green at t1" in his linguistic produc well as the ultimate ground of some of their most
tions just as an a which is red at t, cannot also be significantmistakes.

ofNorth
University Carolina Received
AprilI2,i967

9 "Truth and 'Correspondence'," op. Cit., p. 2 i6. Contrast our individual playing chess. His movements of pieces of wood
on a checkered cardboard surface reflect his espousal of and commitment to the normative principles governing the game of
chess.

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