be International Journal of

Transpersonal Studies
Volume 35(1), 2016
2016 年第 35 卷（第 1 期）

Table of Contents
目录
Participatory Transpersonalism: Transformative Relational Process,
Not the Structure of Ultimate Reality (Editor’s Introduction)—Glenn Hartelius iii

参与式超个人主义（Participatory Transpersonalism）：转化的关系性过程，
一个不涉及终极现实的结构（编辑导语）—格伦·哈特柳斯（Glenn Hartelius） iii

Application of the Spiritual Intelligence Self-Report Inventory (SISRI-24) Among Hong

Kong University Students—Arita W. Y. Chan & Angela F Y. Siu 1

灵性智力自评量表（SISRI-24）在香港大学学生中的应用—有田 W. Y. 陈（Arita W. Y.
Chan）和安吉拉 F Y. 萧（Angela F Y. Siu） 1

The Effect of Internally versus Externally Focused Balance Training on Mindfulness

Kathleen J. Pantano & Jeremy E. C. Genovese 13

内外聚焦平衡训练对正念能力的影响
凯瑟琳·J·潘塔诺（Kathleen J. Pantano）和杰里米·E·C·热诺维斯（Jeremy E. C. Genovese）
13

Going Berserk: Battle Trance and Ecstatic Holy Warriors in the

变得狂暴：欧洲黑魔法传统中的

European War Magic Tradition—Jenny Wade 21

战斗恍惚和狂暴圣战士—珍妮·韦德（Jenny Wade） 21

Harnessing the Placebo Effect: A New Model for Mind-Body Healing Mechanisms
Gabriel Crane 39

利用安慰剂效应：一种身心康复机制新模型
加布里埃尔·克兰（Gabriel Crane） 39

Liminality and Ritual in Biographical Work:

传记作品中的封闭性和仪式性：

A Theoretical Framework for Cancer Survivorship—Alix Sleight 52

癌症生存的理论框架—阿历克斯·斯莱特（Alix Sleight） 52

SPECIAL TOPIC: Black Psychology & Spirituality

专题：黑人心理与灵性

Introduction to the Special Topic Section: Black Psychology and Spirituality

Angelina Graham 62

专题部分简介：黑人心理与灵性
安吉丽娜·格雷厄姆（Angelina Graham） 62

A Critical Analysis of African-Centered Psychology: From Ism to Praxis

A. Ebede-Ndi 65

非洲中心主义心理学批判分析：从理论到实践

A.埃贝德-恩迪（A. Ebede-Ndi） 65

Feeling Seen: A Pathway to Transformation—Michaela Simpson 78

感受被看到：转化之路—米凯拉·辛普森（Michaela Simpson） 78

Prayer Songs: Therapy that Aided a People’s Survival—Bisola Marignay 91

祈祷歌：帮助人们生存的疗法——比索拉·马里涅（Bisola Marignay） 91

Womanist Preservation: An Analysis of Black Women’s Spiritual Coping

Angelina Graham 105

女权主义者保护性：分析黑人女性的灵性应对

安吉丽娜·格雷厄姆（Angelina Graham） 105

African-Centered Transpersonal Self in Diaspora and Psycho-spiritual Wellness:

 A Sankofa Perspective—Adeeba D. Deterville 117

以非洲为中心的散居侨民超个人自我与心理灵性健康：

桑科法透视图—阿迪巴·D·德特维尔（Adeeba D. Deterville） 117

Eurocentric Beauty Standards, Patriarchal Gender Norms, and Racist Depictions of

Black Female Sexuality—Arisika Razak 128

以欧洲为中心的美丽标准、父权性别规范和对黑人女性性特征的种族主义描述
—阿里西卡·拉扎克（Arisika Razak） 128

Considerations and Caveats for the Use of Placebo Responses in Clinical Care:
Minding the Matter of Mechanisms—and Morality—in Medical Treatment
(Response to Crane’s Model for Mind-Body Healing Mechanisms)—James Giordano 146

临床治疗中使用安慰剂反应的注意事项和警告：
关注医疗中的机制和道德问题（回复克兰的身心康复机制模型）—詹姆斯·佐丹诺（James
Giordan） 146

Letter in Response to Editor’s Introduction, “Nonduality: Not One, Not Two, but Many”
Judith Blackstone 150

关于编辑导语：“不二”：不是一个，不是两个，而是许多”的回信
朱迪思·布莱克斯通（Judith Blackstone） 150

Book Review: The African Unconscious: Roots of Ancient Mysticism and Modern Psychology,
by Bruce Bynum—Angelina Graham 155

书评：非洲的无意识：古代神秘主义与现代心理学的根源，作者：布鲁斯·拜纳姆
（Bruce Bynum）—安吉丽娜·格雷厄姆（Angelina Graham） 155
 The International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
Volume 35, Issue 1, 2016

2016 年第 35 卷第 1 期

Main Editor Publisher

主编 出版商

Floraglades Foundation, Incorporated

Glenn Hartelius
弗罗拉格拉德斯基金会公司（Floraglades
格伦·哈特利斯（Glenn Hartelius）
Foundation, Incorporated）

Senior Editor
1270 Tom Coker Road
高级编辑

Harris Friedman

哈里斯·弗里德曼（Harris Fried- LaBelle, FL 33935

man）

Coordinating Editor © 2016 by Floraglades Foundation

协作编辑 ©2016，由弗罗拉格拉德斯基金会公司提供

Les Lancaster All Rights Reserved

莱斯·兰开斯特（Les Lancaster） 版权所有

Research Editor ISSN (Print) 1321-0122

研究编辑 ISSN（印刷版）1321-0122

Adam Rock ISSN (Electronic) 1942-3241

亚当·洛克（Adam Rock） ISSN（电子）1942-3241

4 International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

 Editors Emeriti Board of Editors

荣誉编辑 编辑委员会

Manuel Almendro (Spain)

Don Diespecker
曼努埃尔·阿尔门德罗（Manuel Almendro）
唐·迪斯派克（Don Diespecker）
（西班牙）

Rosemarie Anderson (USA)

Philippe Gross
罗斯玛丽·安德森（Rosemarie Anderson）
菲利普·格罗斯（Philippe Gross）
（美国）

Douglas A. MacDonald Liora Birnbaum (Israel)

道格拉斯·A·麦克唐纳 利奥拉·伯恩鲍姆（Liora Birnbaum）（以色

（Douglas A. MacDonald） 列）

Laura Boggio Gilot (Italy)

Sam Shapiro
劳拉·博吉奥·吉洛特（Laura Boggio Gilot）
山姆·夏皮罗（Sam Shapiro）
（意大利）

Jacek Brewczynski (USA)

Honorary Editor
雅切克·布雷克辛斯基（Jacek Brewczynski）
名誉编辑
（美国）

Stanley Krippner
Soren Brier (Denmark)
斯坦利·克里普纳
索伦·布里尔（Soren Brier）（丹麦）
（Stanley Krippner）

Elias Capriles (Venezuela)

Guest Special Topic Editor
埃利亚斯·卡普里莱斯（Elias Capriles）
嘉宾专题编辑
（委内瑞拉）

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 5

 Angelina Graham
Michael Daniels (UK)
安吉丽娜·格雷厄姆
迈克尔·丹尼尔斯（Michael Daniels）（英国）
（Angelina Graham）

Associate Editor John Davis (USA)

副编辑 约翰·戴维斯（John Davis）（美国）

Courtenay Crouch Wlodzislaw Duch (Poland)

库特奈·克劳奇（Courtenay 沃洛齐斯瓦夫·杜赫（Wlodzislaw Duch）

Crouch） （波兰）

Assistant Editors James Fadiman (USA)

助理编辑 詹姆斯·法迪曼（James Fadiman）（美国）

Sean Avila Saiter Jorge N. Ferrer (Spain/USA)

肖恩·阿维拉·赛特（Sean Avila 豪尔赫·N·费雷尔（Jorge N. Ferrer）

Saiter） （西班牙/美国）

Christine Brooks Joachim Galuska (Germany)

克里斯汀·布鲁克斯 乔希姆·加卢斯卡（Joachim Galuska）（德

（Christine Brooks） 国）

Ted Esser David Y. F. Ho (Hong Kong, China)

泰德·埃塞尔（Ted Esser） 大卫·Y. F. 何（David Y. F. Ho）（中国香港）

Marie Thouin Daniel Holland (USA)

玛丽·图因（Marie Thouin） 丹尼尔·霍兰德（Daniel Holland）（美国）

Circulation Editor Chad Johnson (USA)

发行编辑 查德·约翰逊（Chad Johnson）（美国）

6 International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

 Adrian Andreescu Bruno G. Just (Australia)

阿德里安·安德列斯库 布鲁诺·G·贾斯特（Bruno G. Just）

（Adrian Andreescu） （澳大利亚）

Associate Managing Editors Sean Kelly (USA)

助理执行主编 肖恩·凯利（Sean Kelly）（美国）

Zachary Bertone
Jeffrey Kuentzel (USA)
扎卡里·贝尔托内
杰弗里·昆策尔（Jeffrey Kuentzel）（美国）
（Zachary Bertone）

S. K. Kiran Kumar (India)

Tiana Cicco
S. K. 基兰·库马尔（S. K. Kiran Kumar）（印
蒂安娜·西科（Tiana Cicco）
度）

Gabriel Crane Charles Laughlin (Canada/USA)

加布里埃尔·克兰（Gabriel 查尔斯·劳克林（Charles Laughlin）

Crane） （加拿大/美国）

Olga Louchakova (USA)

Heidi Fraser
奥尔加·卢查科娃（Olga Louchakova）（美
海蒂·弗雷泽（Heidi Fraser）
国）

Alex Palecek Vladimir Maykov (Russia)

亚历克斯·帕莱切克（Alex 弗拉基米尔·梅科夫（Vladimir Maykov）

Palecek） （俄罗斯）

Axel A. Randrup (Denmark)

Tim Schipke
阿克塞尔·A·兰德鲁普（Axel A. Randrup）
蒂姆·施普克（Tim Schipke）
（丹麦）

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 7

 Jennifer Simmons Vitor Rodriguez (Portugal)

詹妮弗·西蒙斯（Jennifer 维托·罗德里格斯（Vitor Rodriguez）（葡萄

Simmons） 牙）

Brent Dean Robbins (USA)

Rochelle Suri
布伦特·迪恩·罗宾斯（Brent Dean Robbins）
罗谢尔·苏里（Rochelle Suri）
（美国）

Brian Wheeler Mario Simoes (Portugal)

布莱恩·惠勒（Brian Wheeler） 马里奥·西莫斯（Mario Simoes）（葡萄牙）

Elizabeth Teklinski
Charles Tart (USA)
伊丽莎白·特克林斯基（Elizabeth
查尔斯·塔特（Charles Tart）（美国）
Teklinski）

Jennifer Simmons
Rosanna Vitale (Canada)
詹妮弗·西蒙斯（Jennifer
罗莎娜·维塔莱（Rosanna Vitale）（加拿大）
Simmons）

Intern John Welwood (USA)

实习生 约翰·威尔伍德（John Welwood）（美国）

Chrysalis Hyon
Caifang Jeremy Zhu (China)
克莉瑟莉丝·伊翁（Chrysalis
蔡芳·杰里米·朱（中国）
Hyon）

8 International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

 Participatory Transpersonalism:
Transformative Relational Process,
Not the Structure of Ultimate Reality
参与式超个人主义：
转化的关系性过程，一个不涉及终极现实的结构

Editor’s Introduction

编辑导语

9 International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 35(1), 2016 ernational

It may be a luminous interlude with a beloved, a moment of radiant silence, or ecstatic union with
a phrase of music or the wide open world—something larger and more alive than anything imagi-
nable. Time stops, grace descends as a lucent mist, and something within you feels the heart of the
world. These moments, however fleeting, sustain the soul; they inspire and help to make life worth
living. Yet what do they mean? Perhaps these are merely the side effect of some happenstance
chemical event in the brain (cf. Persinger, 2001), and maybe cultural stories of mystical experiences
and exceptional capacities are just tales made up to explain suggestion and neural noise.
它可能是与心爱的人的光辉插曲，可能是灿烂的沉默时刻，也可能是与一段音乐或广阔的
开放世界的欣喜若狂的结合—某种比任何可以想象的都更大、更有活力的东西。时间停止
下来，优雅就像明亮的薄雾一样落下，你内心的某些东西感受到了世界的中心。这些时
刻，无论多么转瞬即逝，都支撑着灵魂；它们激励和帮助我们让生活变得有意义。然而，
它们意味着什么呢？也许这些仅仅是大脑中偶然发生的化学事件的副作用（cf. Persinger,
2001），也许讲述神秘经历和特殊能力的文化故事仅仅是为了解释暗示和神经噪声而编造
的故事。
While it oversimplifies, this dismissiveness is close to much conventional academic stance toward
such reports, whether in religious studies or psychology. This attitude is understandable given the
difficulty of obtaining empirical evidence for the cognitive value of such experiences. Counter to
this position are claims that these experiences open the door to a hidden inner dimension that sci-
ence and psychology must either dismiss or accept on faith, which takes the topic out of the sphere
of scientific inquiry altogether (Friedman, 2002). Yet there may be a way to consider these ephem-
eral moments with an evidence-based science that neither accepts nor rejects uncritically. To fash-
ion this is a task that a transpersonal approach to psychology may be able to take up (cf. Hartelius,
2014a)—and it is to this end that a careful focus on philosophy is necessary.
虽然它过于简单化，但无论是在宗教研究还是心理学方面，这种对此类报告的漠视都接近
于许多传统的学术立场。考虑到这种经历的认知价值很难获得经验证据，这种态度是可以
理解的。与这一观点相反的是，有人声称，这些经历打开了通往隐藏的内在维度的大门，
科学和心理学必须要么对此置之不理，要么基于信仰接受这一维度，这就把这个话题完全
带出了科学研究的领域（Friedman, 2002）然而，也许有一种方法，可以用一种以证据为
基础的科学来考虑这些短暂的时刻，既不无批判地接受，也不无批判地拒绝。要塑造这一
点，心理学的超个人方法也许能够承担起这项任务（cf. Hartelius, 2014a）-正是为了这个目
的，对哲学认真关注是必要的。
Imagine you are standing across from a painting at a museum. You might describe it in ways that

10
someone standing next to you could affirm as accurate, or perhaps supplement with slightly differ-
ent words: “That is a Rembrandt, a painting showing the bust of a young woman against a dark
background, with shadow on part of her face. It looks like she is wearing a pearl necklace.” A
hundred people might look at the same painting and be able to agree, more or less, with this de-
scription.
想象一下，你正站在博物馆里的一幅画对面。你以站在你旁边的人为基准来描述，或者加
以不同的话来补充：“那是一幅伦勃朗的画，画的是一位年轻女子的半身像，背景是黑
色，她的部分脸部有阴影。看起来她戴着一条珍珠项链。”一百个人看同一幅画，可能会
或多或少地认同这一描述。
This is what generally counts as objective knowledge—descriptions of things that pretty much
anyone could agree on. This assumes that the world is made of objects, of things that can appear
roughly the same to many observers. Yet diaphanous glimpses that seem to lift out of ordinary
experience are not concrete things, so they are quietly demoted to the status of subjective day-
dreams and imagination. Given their power within human experience, however, it seems negligent
to dismiss their legitimacy so simply.
这就是通常被认为是客观认识的东西—对几乎所有人都能认同的事情的描述。这假设世界
是由物体组成的，是由许多观察者看来大致相同的事物组成的。然而，那些看似超越一般
经验的隐约感受并不是具体的事物，所以它们被悄悄地降格为主观的白日梦和想象。然
而，考虑到它们在人类经验中的力量，如此简单地否定它们的合法性似乎是过失的。
Standing in the museum there is a sense in which you are here, as observer, and the painting is
there, on the wall, as an object. In objective knowledge, your personal hereness and your relation-
ship with the painting is more or less taken for granted, based on the assumptions that standing in
front of a painting is the right way to relate to it and that anyone who was here would see much the
same thing. If you were a postmodernist, you might challenge these assumptions by thinking of all
the other ways you could be in relationship with the painting: you might invert it or view it through
a kaleidoscope, you might take a photo of it, turn the colors wild and alive, cut the image into slices
and rearrange them in a way that evokes a throbbing animate force. Or, you might consider that a
person not oriented to fine arts might think a “Rembrandt” was a new kind of digital printer, or that
a newborn might see only vague patterns of dark and light. All of this play can lead to fresh and
creative approaches to the world, and can also be used to deconstruct or reconstruct any piece of
information, leaving no effective consensus and no reliable knowledge (e.g., Rorty, 1979). While
postmodern approaches can thus challenge existing orthodoxies and resulting false paradoxes, they

11
are less helpful in developing productive ways of understanding experiences that are already mar-
ginalized and poorly understood.
站在博物馆里，有一种感觉，你在这里，作为观察者，而这幅画在那里，在墙上，作为一
个对象。在客观认识上，你的个人存在性以及你与这幅画的关系或多或少被认为是理所当
然的，这是基于这样的假设，即站在一幅画面前是与它联系的正确方式，任何在场的人都
会看到大致相同的东西。如果你是一名后现代主义者，你可能会挑战这些假设，想一想你
与这幅画的所有其他联系方式：你可以颠倒它，或者通过万花筒观看它，你可能会给它拍
一张照片，把颜色变得丰富而鲜活，把图像切成几片，然后以一种唤起一种悸动的生命力
的方式重新排列。或者，你可能会认为一个不喜欢美术的人可能会认为“伦勃朗”是一种新
型的数字印刷机，或者一个新生儿可能只看到模糊的黑暗和光明的图案。所有这些行为都
可能为世界带来新鲜的创造性的方法，也可以用来解构或重构任何信息片段，但不会留下
有效的共识和可靠的认知。（e.g., Rorty, 1979）虽然后现代方法因此可以挑战现有的正统
观念和由此产生的虚假悖论，但它们在发展富有成效的理解经验方式方面帮助较小，因为
这些理解经验方式已经被边缘化和很少被理解。

12
It is for this conundrum that participatory thought within transpersonal psychology (Ferrer, 2002),
drawing deeply on feminist thought, seems to offer a way forward. From this standpoint, reality is
not objective in the conventional sense that it is separate from me or that I can stand back from it
and take it in like a painting on the wall, and yet it is not merely subjective in the sense that it is
just something made up in the mind. Reality is actual, real, but you and I are part of it, immersed
in it, not observers who can stand back from it and give an objective account; the public space is
woven of relationships rather than constructed of separate objects (cf. Thayer-Bacon, 2003, 2010).
Reality is being on the canvas and in the painting, and my relational perspective is necessarily
colored by my location (cf. Harding, 1991, 2004).
正是为了解决这一难题，超个人心理学中的参与式思想（participatory thought）（Ferrer,
2002）似乎提供了一条前进的道路，它深深地借鉴了女权主义思想（feminist thought）。
从这个角度看，现实并不是传统意义上的客观，即它与我是分开的，或者我可以置身事
外，像墙上的画一样欣赏它，但对像又不仅是主观的，它不只是头脑中形成的东西。现实
是实实在在的，但你和我都是其中的一部分，沉浸在其中，而不是可以远离它并给出客观
解释的观察者；公共空间是由关系编织而不是由单独的对象构成的（cf. Thayer-Bacon,
2003, 2010）。现实存在于画布和画中，我的关系视角必然被我的位置所影响（cf. Harding,
1991, 2004）。
To apply this to the metaphor of a Rembrandt painting, even if I am able to see the whole painting,
it is from the standpoint of a particular location within the painting. If I am situated in what an art
historian might describe as the dark background color typical of Rembrandt’s work, then the area
around me may seem dark, with lighter areas visible elsewhere; if I am located in one of the painted
pearls, I might describe the foreground as bright and lustrous, surrounded by dark areas farther out.
My situatedness on the painting means I cannot escape the fact that my experience is limited by
location, nor the fact that universal knowledge—which implies knowledge either from no specific
location (Nagel, 1989) or from a detached location deemed authoritative—is impossible for anyone
to attain; however, I can expand my understanding through dialogue and relationship. In fact, the
same locatedness that makes universal knowledge unreachable makes relationship both necessary
and possible. For this reason a participatory approach foregrounds the values that inform relation-
ship, and holds interest in speculations about universals or ultimates primarily as these represent
co-created distillations of their respective value system.
套用伦勃朗画作的比喻，即使我能看到整个画作，它也是从画作中某个特定位置的角度出
发的。如果我身处艺术历史学家所描述的伦勃朗作品中典型的深色背景色中，那么我周围

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 13

的区域可能看起来很暗，在其他地方可以看到较亮的区域；如果我位于其中一颗绘制的珍
珠中，我可能会将前景描述为明亮而有光泽，被更远处的黑暗区域包围。我在这幅画上的
处境意味着我无法逃避我的经验受到位置限制的事实，也无法逃脱普遍认知不基于某一特
定位置的事实（Nagel, 1989），和这个脱离的但被认为是权威的位置并不能存在的事实；
然而，我可以通过对话和关系来扩大我的理解。事实上，这个无法获得普遍认知的同一位
置性，使得关系既是必要的，也是可能的。出于这个原因，参与式方法突出了影响关系的
价值观，并关注普遍或终极的推论，主要是因为这些推论代表了其各自价值体系的共同创
造的精髓。
In this sense, participatory thought invites transpersonal psychology to a radical shift of focus away
from concern with objective universal truth about transcendent reality, and toward a consideration
of how a particular culturally situated vision fosters transformative development of individuals and
communities, and cultivates compassion, respect, and symmetrical relationship. It invites an ap-
proach to knowledge that holds inclusiveness and diversity not only as preferable and socially
moral, but as imperative and indispensable for effective knowledge creation (Hartelius, 2014b).
Efforts to reframe participatory thought as yet another iteration of a perennial philosophy, which
asserts privileged knowledge about the objective nature of ultimate reality (e.g., Abramson, 2015),
fail to grasp the nature of a participatory stance toward the ontological status of any and all visions
of ultimacy.
在这个意义上，参与式思想促使超个人心理学从关注超越现实的客观普遍真理，转向考虑
特定的文化背景如何促进个人和社区的变革性发展，并培养同情心、尊重和对称关系。它
要求采用一种认知方法，认为包容性和多样性不仅是可取的和符合社会道德的，而且是有
效创造知识必不可少的（Hartelius, 2014b）试图将参与式思想重新构建为常青哲学的又一
次迭代，这种哲学主张对终极现实的客观本质的特权知识（e.g., Abramson, 2015），未能
对终极（ultimacy）的任何和所有愿景的本体论地位抓住参与式立场的本质。
The early field of transpersonal psychology sought to add to humanistic psychology by considering
not only the primacy of human experience and relationship, but also the “farther reaches of human
nature” (Maslow, 1969, p. 1), including peak experience, transcendent experience, ultimate veri-
ties, and transcendent values. Shortly after the inception of the field, Ken Wilber (1975) proposed
that all of these aspirations might point toward a transcendent nondual ultimate dimension beyond
the dualities of human sense experience—an ultimate that was the ontological source and goal of
all human spirituality.
超个人心理学的早期领域不仅考虑到人类经验和关系的至高无上，而且还考虑到“人性的

14 International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

更深层次”（Maslow, 1969, p. 1），以此试图增加人本主义心理学的内容，包括巅峰体验
（peak experience）、超越体验、终极真理和超越价值。该领域创立后不久，肯·威尔伯
（Ken Wilber, 1975）提出，所有这些传统的愿望都可能指向超越人类二元经验的终极维
度，即不二体验。该终极真相是所有人类灵性的本体论来源和目标。
This perennialist philosophy gained wide acceptance within the transpersonal community and re-
mained as a dominant viewpoint (Rothberg, 1986) until challenges by Ferrer (1998, 2002, 2009,
2011a) and others (Hartelius, 2015a; Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013; Rothberg & Kelly, 1998; Schneider,
1987, 1989), and the development of participatory thought as an alternate (Ferrer, 2002; Ferrer &
Sherman, 2008), gained considerable influence (Ferrer, 2011b). Critiques of Wilber’s (e.g., 2000,
2006) integral theory include concerns that it is metaphysical in the sense that no independent
evidence can be mustered to support the primacy of the structure of reality that Wilber asserts, and
hierarchical in the sense that ultimate truth claims for one version of reality reduces the status of
all other versions; furthermore, it fails to resolve the Cartesian tension that, in a modernist context,
devalues mystical, spiritual, and other exceptional experiences as merely subjective constructions.
这种常青主义哲学在超个人社区中获得了广泛的接受，并一直是占主导地位的观点
（Rothberg, 1986），直到费雷尔（1998, 2002, 2009, 2011a）和其他人（Hartelius, 2015a;
Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013; Rothberg & Kelly, 1998; Schneider, 1987, 1989）提出的质疑以及作
为替代思想的参与式思想的发展（Ferrer, 2002; Ferrer & Sherman, 2008）获得相当大的影响
（Ferrer, 2011b）对威尔伯（e.g., 2000, 2006）整体理论的批评包括，它是形而上学的，因
为没有独立的证据能够支持威尔伯主张的现实结构的首要地位，在某种意义上说，终极真
理声称一个真相的版本并降低了所有其他版本的地位；此外，它未能解决笛卡尔的主客间
的紧张关系，即在现代主义背景下，将神秘、灵性和其他特殊的经验贬低为仅仅是主观的
构建。
In response to these and other critiques Wilber (2000, 2006) has attempted to argue that his integral
theory has moved away from perennialism and transcended metaphysics. These tactics can be re-
butted as ineffectual because they rely on limited definitions of these terms tailored to suit Wilber’s
purposes rather than on conventional understandings (Ferrer, 2011a; Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013; Har-
telius, 2015a). In a notable recent exchange John Abramson (2014), a proponent of Wilber’s inte-
gral theory, argued that Hartelius and Ferrer (2013) had misunderstood Wilber’s work. After a
response by Hartelius (2015a), Abramson’s (2015) rejoinder was to abandon his original line of
argument and argue instead that participatory was another version of perennialism, with Ferrer’s
Mystery proposed as another instance of Wilber’s nondual ultimate.

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 15

作为对这些和其他批评的回应，威尔伯（2000, 2006）试图争辩说，他的整体理论摆脱了
常青主义，超越了形而上学。这些策略可以被认为是无效的，因为它们依赖于这些术语针
对威尔伯目的设定的有限定义，而不是一般的理解（Ferrer, 2011a; Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013;
Hartelius, 2015a）在最近一次引人注目的交锋中，威尔伯整合理论的支持者约翰·艾布拉姆
森（John Abramson, 2014）争辩说，哈特利斯和费雷尔（2013）误解了威尔伯的工作。在
哈特利斯（2015a）回应之后，艾布拉姆森（2015）的反驳是放弃他原来的论点，转而认
为参与性是另一种版本的常青主义，费雷尔的《神秘》是威尔伯不二终极的另一个例子。

Many of the shortcomings of this characterization of Ferrer’s thought have already been identified
in some detail (Hartelius, 2015b), but what deserves further articulation is the fact that a perenni-
alist author such as Abramson employs a type of ontological claim about the nature of ultimate
reality that is largely counter to the thrust of participatory thought. This distinction, though con-
ceptually subtle, is central to the dichotomy between participatory and perennialist approaches. It
is subtle because participatory thought allows for multiple culturally-situated ontological claims
about ultimate reality (e.g., Ferrer, 2011a) just as a perennialist approach does (e.g., Wilber, 2006).
The difference is not only in how this apparent tension is resolved, but also and more importantly,
in the assumptions that inform a solution.
对费雷尔思想的这种定性的许多缺点已经被详细地指出了（Hartelius, 2015b），但值得进
一步阐明的是，像艾布拉姆森这样的常青主义作家对终极现实的本质采用了一种本体论主
张，这在很大程度上与参与式思想的主旨背道而驰。这一区别虽然概念上是微妙的，但却
是参与式方法和常青主义方法之间的二分法的核心。之所以微妙，是因为参与式思想允许
对终极现实进行多种文化背景的本体论主张（e.g., Ferrer, 2011a），就像常青主义方法一
样（(e.g., Wilber, 2006）不同之处不仅在于这种明显的紧张关系是如何解决的，更重要的
是，提供解决方案的假设也是不同的。
A perennialist approach considers multiple culturally-situated claims about the nature of reality to
be imperfect reflections of an underlying nondual source. This nondual is something that exists in
the same way that an object exists in conventional modernist thought: The object exists in itself,
without reference to, dependence on, or relationship with any other, whether object or subject (cf.
en soi, Sartre, 1943); a rock is a rock is a rock, whether it exists at the bottom of a stream or
tumbling though interstellar space, or whether it sits on the altar of a meditator. The nondual of
integral theory is held to exist in a manner where existence itself is objective in this way: this non-
dual exists in itself, as unchanging source (cf. Wilber, 2006), unaffected by the creation to which

16 International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

it gives rise, or the many traditions that bear it witness.
常青主义的方法认为，关于现实本质的多个文化背景的主张是对潜在的不二来源的不完美
反映。这种不二的存在方式与物体在传统现代主义思想中的存在方式相同：客体本身存
在，而不涉及或依赖任何其他客体或主体或者与之存在关系（cf. en soi, Sartre, 1943）；岩
石就是岩石，无论它是存在于溪流的底部，还是在星际空间中翻滚，或者它是否坐在冥想
者的祭坛上。整合理论的不二被认为是以这样一种方式存在的，即存在本身是客观的：这
种不二本身就是作为不变的源泉而存在的（cf. Wilber, 2006），不受它的创造物的影响，
或它所见证的许多传统的影响。
In participatory thought, however, existence is not self-existent, but relational: The object is not
primary, but something that arises, as it were, out of a network of relationships, a sort of intersub-
jective field. A rock is a rock because I have relationship with it—and it with me—and I simulta-
neously have relationships within a community where other, similar relationships exist, where the
notion and language of “rock” have developed. In other words, an ontological claim within partic-
ipatory thought is radically different than an ontological claim within a perennialist system because
the very notion of what constitutes existence is different.
然而，在参与式思想中，存在不是自我存在，而是关系性的：客体不是主要的，而是某种
可以说是从关系网络中产生的东西，这是一种主观间的领域。石头之所以是石头，是因为
我和它有关系—它和我也有关系—我同时在一个存在其他相似关系的社区里建立了关系，
其中“岩石”的概念和语言已经发展起来。换句话说，参与式思想中的本体论主张与常青主
义体系中的本体论主张截然不同，因为构成存在的概念是不同的。
An Ontologial claim within participatory thought, then, is a claim about the existence of a particular
relationship, or relational field, and the dynamic relational processes that arise within it. If I come
to a rock with the needs and actions of a geologist, the process that exists as that relationship may
be quite different than if I come as a subsistence tribesperson seeking a tool for grinding grain.
Both relational processes actually exist, both are ontologically real, and each will impact its partic-
ipants in differing ways—ways that in turn will shape the processes of the relational field. In this
way the whole is more of a self-transforming or autopoietic (cf. Maturana & Varela, 1980) rela-
tional process than a collection of objects governed by rules.
因此，参与式思想中的本体论主张是关于特定关系或关系领域的存在，以及在其中出现的
动态关系过程的主张。如果我带着地质学家的需要和行动来到一块岩石前，那么以这种关
系存在的过程，可能与我作为寻找磨谷工具的勉强生存的部落人来到这块岩石的情形截然
不同。这两个关系过程实际上都是存在的，在本体论上都是真实的，而且每一个过程都会

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 17

以不同的方式影响其参与者，而这些方式反过来又会塑造关系领域的过程。通过这种方
式，整体更像是一种自我转化或自我再生的（cf. Maturana & Varela, 1980）关系过程，而
不是受规则支配的对象集合。
From this stance the nature of the existence is not objective: anything that exists is a transformative
relational process constituted and cocreated by its participants, and as participants differ and rela-
tional patterns evolve, what actually exists will necessarily shift. In this way, culturally-situated
ultimates actually exist and are ontologically real within particular relational fields; they will nec-
essarily differ between communities that participate in different relational fields. In Ferrer’s (e.g.,
2011) thought, then, multiple ontological claims regarding ultimacy can coexist because they are
claims relating to ontologically real relational processes, not self- existent objective-like referents.
从这个立场来看，存在的本质是不客观的：任何存在的东西都是由参与者构成和共同创造
的变革性关系过程，由于参与者的不同和关系模式的演变，实际存在的东西必然会发生变
化。这样，文化上的终极在特定的关系领域中实际上是存在的，并且在本体论上是真实
的；它们必然会在参与不同关系领域的社区之间有所不同。因此，在费雷尔（e.g., 2011）
的思想中，关于终极的多个本体论主张可以共存，因为它们是与本体论上真实的关系过程
有关的主张，而不是自我存在的类客体指称。
This critique of objective existence is closely related to the critique of universal knowledge claims
that has been developed in feminist thought (e.g., Haraway, 1988). A feminist approach argues that
knowers are always located in and colored by a particular place, time, context, history, and body
(Code, 1991; Harding, 1991), and that universal knowledge, which claims to be free from such
influences, is logically impossible. This stance resembles the earlier metaphor of how it is impos-
sible to describe a painting objectively from the standpoint of being part of the painting.
这种对客观存在的批判与女权主义思想中发展起来的对普遍知识主张的批判密切相关
（e.g., Haraway, 1988）。一种女权主义观点认为，知者总是位于特定的地点、时间、语
境、历史和身体中，并受其影响（Code，1991；Harding，1991），而声称不受这些影响
的普遍认知在逻辑上是不可能的。这一立场类似于早先的比喻，即从画作的一部分来看，
客观地描述这幅画是不可能的。
To the degree that this argument is correct, efforts at describing the nature of ultimate reality are
more about projecting one’s own location onto the whole than about perceiving what is true. Wil-
ber’s speculations about a nondual source are no better and no worse than any other mythology
that arises from a particular cultural location—in this case from the location of a White American
male interested in finding authoritative knowledge about ultimate reality as reflected in all spiritual

18 International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

traditions. While his system seeks to encompass a great many traditions, it addresses them from
the very particular viewpoint of a historically and culturally located, gender-bodied person (cf.
Code, 1991; Harding, 1991). Neither an inner feeling of certainty nor any number of other (pre-
dominantly male) thinkers offering similar speculations—his so-called perennial sages (Wilber,
2000)—make the case any stronger.
从某种程度上说，这个论点是正确的，描述终极现实本质的努力更多的是将自己的位置投
射到整体上，而不是感知什么是真实的。威尔伯对不二来源的推论并不比其他任何源于特
定文化定位的神话更好，也不更差，也就是对一位美国白人男性想要寻找反映在所有灵性
传统中的终极现实的权威认知的定位。虽然他的体系试图囊括许多传统，但它只从一个特
定的历史和文化，以及性别导向的非常特殊的观点来处理这些传统（cf. Code, 1991; Har-
ding, 1991）。无论是内心的确定感，还是其他许多（主要是男性）提出类似推论的思想
家—他所谓的“常青圣人”（perennial sages）（Wilber, 2000）—都不会让这一论据变得更
有说服力。
However, given that integral theory has already appropriated most spiritual traditions of any size,
it is no surprise that it should attempt to do the same with a competing theory that points to the
highly problematic shortcomings of its perennialist approach. Cultural appropriation is the exploi-
tation of other cultures by a more dominant culture (e.g., Ziff & Rao, 1997), as when European-
American culture takes on Native American elements of dress or practice, outside of the context of
an informed and mutually respectful relationship with the communities to whom these cultural
elements belong. Perennialism, which considers itself superior to every tradition and self-author-
ized to inform each tradition about its actual essence, is a strong example of cultural appropriation
(e.g., King, 2001). To claim that participatory thought is really just another version of perennialism
is an extension of this naturally appropriative stance.
然而，考虑到整体理论已经侵占了的大多数各样的灵性传统，难怪它会试图对一个竞争性
理论做同样的事情，因为它指出了其常青主义方法存在的严重问题。文化侵占是指一种更
占主导地位的文化对其他文化的利用（e.g., Ziff & Rao, 1997），例如当欧美文化在与这些
文化元素所属的社区建立知情和相互尊重的关系之外，擅自采用美国土著人的服饰或做
法。常青主义认为自己优于每一种传统，并自我授权告知每一种传统自己的实际本质，其
实就是文化侵占的有力例证（e.g., King, 2001）。声称参与式思想实际上只是常青主义的
另一个版本，就是这一自然侵占立场的延伸。
The basis for this argument by integral theorists, then, reveals its shortcoming: Abramson (2015)
claimed that participatory thought is perennialist in nature based on the assumption that Ferrer’s

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 19

notion of an unknown Mystery underlying human spirituality could be interpreted as making a
similar claim as perennialism about the objective nature of ultimate reality. Ferrer’s thought (2002),
on the other hand, is situated in an entirely different ontology, a transformed notion of what con-
stitutes existence. Ferrer has consistently distanced himself from perennialism based on this differ-
ence, having noted that objectivist assumptions about reality have deleterious impact on human
values and relationship and the cultivation of transformative potential. In participatory approaches
it is how an ultimate vision reflects and shapes these latter that has primacy, not how it might
inform speculations about an ultimate objective reality that, within participatory thought, has no
actual existence.
因此，整合理论家的这一论点的基础揭示了它的缺陷：艾布拉姆森（2015）声称，参与式
思想本质上是常青主义，其基于这样的假设，即费雷尔关于人类灵性背后的未知神秘的概
念可以被解读为对终极现实的客观本质提出了类似于常青主义的主张。另一方面，费雷尔
的思想（2002）位于一个完全不同的本体论中，一个关于什么构成存在的变革概念。基于
这种差异，费雷尔一直与常青主义保持距离，他注意到，对现实的客观主义假设对人类的
价值观和关系以及对变革潜力的培养产生了有害的影响。在参与式方法中，最重要的是终
极愿景如何反映和塑造后者，而不是它可能如何告知人们对参与式思想中并不实际存在的
终极客观现实的猜测。
The challenge that integral Perennialism set out to resolve is nevertheless a worthy one: to construct
a philosophical context in which both science and scholarship can engage with those aspects of
being human that are both subtler and more powerful than the mundane rhythms of daily life. By
offering a frame in which objects are the product of relationships, rather than vice-versa, mystical,
spiritual, and exceptional human experiences can be considered as actually-existing relational
events (cf. Ferrer, 2008) rather than non-existing objects. By offering a critical frame that nonethe-
less grants ontological reality to these events, it becomes reasonable to seek ways that these phe-
nomena might be examined with a scientific method that is rigorous in traditional ways yet subtly
transformed by application within a novel philosophical context (cf. Hartelius, 2007). Here, then,
may be the seeds of a psychology that can pursue inquiry into presence, attention, intuition, crea-
tivity, experiences of elevation, transcendence and awakening, and the subtle dynamics of mind
and relationship, in a way that does not diminish those phenomena through the application of ill-
fitting tools of analysis. The result may be not only a deeper understanding of these exceptional
human experiences and capacities, but a revision of the psychological notion of what it is to be
human (Hartelius, Caplan, & Rardin, 2007).
然而，整合常青主义着手解决的挑战仍然是值得的：构建一种哲学背景，在这种背景下，

20 International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

科学和学术都可以接触到人类的那些方面，这些方面比日常生活的平凡节奏更微妙、更强
大。通过提供一个对象是关系的产物而不是相反的框架，神秘、灵性和特殊的人类体验可
以被认为是实际存在的关系事件（参见。Ferrer，2008），而非不存在的对象。通过给这
些事件提供一个批判性的框架，同时赋予这些事件本体论上的真实性，寻求一种科学方法
来研究这些现象是合理的，这种科学方法在传统方法中是严格的，但通过在新的哲学背景
下应用发生了微妙的转变（cf. Hartelius, 2007）。因此，这里可能是一种心理学的种子，
它可以探索存在、注意力、直觉、创造力、提升、超越和觉醒的经验，以及心智和关系的
微妙动态，而不是通过应用不恰当的分析工具来减少这些现象。其结果可能不仅是对这些
非凡的人类体验和能力有了更深入的理解，而且也是对什么是人类的心理学概念的修正
（Hartelius, Caplan, & Rardin, 2007）。

In This Issue

本期亮点

In 1985 Linda Meyers published a paper in the Journal of Black Psychology entitled, Transpersonal
Psychology: The Role of the Afrocentric Paradigm. This paper pointed out the fact that the sort of
integral worldview favored by transpersonal psychology existed in the African world view and in
psychological theory deriving from that world view. On discovering this paper in the literature, I
went directly to the Journal of Transpersonal Psychology to see what response this might have
drawn. Here was an invitation to expand beyond the approaches of East and West, and include
another great swath of human culture. There was, however, no sign of a response from the transper-
sonal community in its main journals. It is my hope that the Special Topic Section, edited by Ange-
lina Graham, may serve as a belated response that acknowledges the importance— indeed the in-
dispensability—of the contribution and participation of Black psychology in any comprehensive
approach to transpersonal psychology.
1985 年，琳达·迈耶斯（Linda Meyers）在《Journal of Black Psychology》上发表了一篇题
为“超个人心理学：非中心范式的作用”的论文。该文指出，超个人心理学所推崇的那种整
体世界观存在于非洲世界观及其衍生出的心理学理论中。我在文献中发现这篇论文后，直
接去了《Journal of Black Psychology》，看看这篇论文可能会引起什么样的反应。这吸引
着我们超越东西方的方法，包容另一大片伟大的人类文化。然而，在其主要期刊上，没有
超个人社区做出回应的迹象。我希望，由安吉丽娜·格雷厄姆编辑的专题栏目可能是一个
迟来的回应，该专题栏目承认黑人心理学在任何一种全面的超个人心理学方法中的贡献和

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 21

参与的重要性，甚至是不可或缺的。
In addition to this special section, introduced elsewhere by its editor, this issue offers a number of
engaging papers in its general section, as well as book reviews and responses to the editor that are
worthy of attention.
除了编辑在其他地方介绍的这个专题栏目外，本期期刊在其常规栏目提供了一些引人入胜
的论文，以及值得关注的书评和给编辑的回复。
First of these is a paper that presents validation for a Chinese version of a spiritual intelligence
scale. This paper, by Arita Chan and Angela Siu, is descriptively titled, “Application of the Spir-
itual Intelligence SelfReport Inventory (SISRI-24) Among Hong Kong University Students,” and
represents a piece of the important work of bringing transpersonally relevant concepts into diverse
cultural contexts. It also reflects the importance of scale development and other empirical research
for whole person approaches to psychology.
首先是一篇对灵性智商量表中文版进行验证的论文。这份由有田·陈和安吉拉·萧撰写的论
文被描述为“灵性智力自评量表（SISRI-24）在香港大学生中的应用”，代表了将超个人相
关概念带入不同文化背景的一项重要工作。这也反映了量表开发和其他实证研究对全人心
理学方法的重要性。
Kathleen Pantano and Jeremy Genovese offer a novel study that inverts prior research: instead of
considering the impact of internally- or externally- focused attention on a task such as balance
training, their research tests the imact of different forms of attentional focus on the development of
mindfulness. This paper, entitled, “The Effect of Internally versus Externally Focused Balance
Training on Mindfulness,” breaks important new ground on the relationship between attentional
focus and mindfulness in a manner that promises to lead to future research.
凯瑟琳·潘塔诺和杰里米·热诺维斯提供了一项新颖的研究，颠覆了之前的研究：他们的研
究没有考虑内部或外部集中注意力对平衡训练等任务的影响，而是测试了不同形式的注意
力集中对正念发展的影响。这篇题为“内外聚焦的平衡训练对正念的影响”的论文，在注意
力集中和正念之间的关系上开辟了重要的新天地，有望引领未来的研究。
Following this is a truly engaging paper on the Norse war magic phenomenon of beserkergang, a
type of invulnerability magic that has often been considered either mythic or the result of intoxica-
tion. Author Jenny Wade makes a careful, detailed, and far-ranging scholarly case for this phenom-
enon as a transpersonal state of consciousness that confers remarkable abilities far beyond conven-
tional human capacities. This paper, titled, “Going Berserk: Battle Trance and Ecstatic Holy War-
riors in the European War Magic Tradition,” includes both ancient and contemporary sources, and

22 International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

offers evidence for the limitations of such states.
继而是一篇真正引人入胜的关于北欧战争魔法现象 beserkergang 的论文，这是一种常被
认为是神话或陶醉的结果的无敌魔法。作家珍妮·韦德对这一现象进行了仔细、详细和广
泛的学术研究，认为这是一种超个人的意识状态，赋予了远远超出常规人类能力的非凡能
力。这篇论文的标题是“变得狂暴：欧洲黑魔法传统中的战斗恍惚和狂暴圣战士”，包括古
代和当代的来源，并为这些国家的局限性提供了证据。
Gabriel Crane’s paper, “Harnessing the Placebo Effect: A New Model for Mind-Body Healing
Mechanisms,” is a refreshingly thorough and balanced consideration of the difficult and often con-
tentious topic of the placebo effect. Weaving together developments from transpersonal theory with
empirical research, Crane critiques contemporary models of the phenomenon and offers a satisfy-
ing reframe on this elusive yet powerful process.
加布里埃尔·克兰的论文“利用安慰剂效应：一种身心康复机制新模型”是对安慰剂效应这
一困难且经常引起争议的话题进行了令人耳目一新的全面和平衡的考虑。将超个人理论的
发展与实证研究结合在一起，克兰批评了当代的现象模型，并对这一难以捉摸但强大的过
程提供了令人满意的重新框架。
In a related paper, Alix Sleight provides a theoretical frame to help understand the power and lim-
itations of meaning-making in cancer patients. This paper, “Liminality and Ritual in Biographical
work: A Theoretical Framework for Cancer Survivorship,” considers the potentially disruptive im-
pact of cancer on the personal narrative, and how ritual processes can help to resolve this in ways
that promote wellbeing and quality of life in ways that truly enhance the lives of cancer patients
and cancer survivors.
在一篇相关论文中，阿历克斯·斯莱特提供了一个理论框架，帮助理解癌症患者意义形成
的力量和局限性。该论文“传记作品中的封闭性和仪式性：癌症生存的理论框架”考虑了癌
症对个人叙述的潜在破坏性影响，以及仪式过程如何能够帮助解决这一问题，从而以真正
改善癌症患者和癌症幸存者的生活的方式增进福祉和生活质量。
Glenn Hartelius, Main Editor
格伦·
哈特利乌斯，主编
California Institute of Integral Studies
加州整合大学（California Institute of Integral Studies）

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 23

 Acknowledgments
致谢

Appreciation is due to Jorge N. Ferrer, Harris L. Friedman, and Michaela Aizer for their review of
earlier versions of this essay.
感谢豪尔赫·N·费雷尔、哈里斯·L·弗里德曼和米凯拉·艾泽对本文早期版本作出评论。

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About the Author

作者简介

Glenn Hartelius, PhD, is Founding Director of a new online PhD program in Integral and
Transpersonal Psychology at the California Institute of Integral Studies (CIIS) in San Francisco,
where he serves as Associate Professor. He is also leading an initiative to develop a new research
facility at CIIS for research in whole person neuroscience. In addition to his work as main editor
for the International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, he is co-editor of The Wiley-Blackwell
Handbook of Transpersonal Psychology and Secretary of the International Transpersonal Associ-
ation. His research on the definition and scope of transpersonal psychology has helped to define
the field. He has also taught at the Institute of Transpersonal Psychology, Naropa University,
Saybrook University, and Middlesex University in the UK.
格伦·哈特利乌斯博士是旧金山加州整合大学一项新的整合和超个人心理学在线博士项目
的创始主任，担任副教授。他还领导着一个项目，在 CIIS 开发一个新的研究设施用于全

26 International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

人神经科学的研究。除了担任 International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 的主编外，他还
是《威利-布莱克威尔超个人心理学手册》（Wiley-Blackwell Handbook of Transpersonal
Psychology）的联合主编和国际超个人协会的秘书。他对超个人心理学的定义和范围的研
究为定义这一领域提供了帮助。他还在超个人心理学学院（Institute of Transpersonal Psy-
chology）、纳罗帕大学（Naropa University）、赛布鲁克大学（Saybrook University）和英
国米德尔塞克斯大学（Middlesex University in the UK）任教。

About the Journal

期刊简介

The International Journal of Transpersonal Studies is a peer-reviewed academic journal in print

since 1981. It is sponsored by the California Institute of Integral Studies, published by Floraglades
Foundation, and serves as the official publication of the International Transpersonal Association.
The journal is available online at www. transpersonalstudies.org, and in print through www.
lulu.com (search for IJTS)
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 是创立于 1981 年的同行评审学术期刊，由加州
整合大学主办，Floraglades Foundation 出版，是国际超个人学会 (International Transpersonal
Association) 的官方出版物。读者可通过 www. transpersonalstudies.org 阅读电子版，或在
www. lulu.com 查阅纸质版（搜索 IJTS）。

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 27