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Freezing Out the Public: Elite and Media Framing of the U.S. Anti-Nuclear
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Article  in  Political Communication · January 1993

DOI: 10.1080/10584609.1993.9962973

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Politicat Communication, Volume 10, pp. 155-173 1058-4«a9/93 $10.00 + .00
Printed In the UK. All rights reserved. Copyright © 1993 Taylor & Francis

Freezing Out the Public: Elite and Media Framing

of the U.S. Anti-Nuclear Movement

ROBERT M. ENTMAN
ANDREW ROJECKI
Northwestern University
Evanston, IL 60208

Introduction

The Importance of News Frames

Political scientist Murray Edelman (1964, 1988) has described the strong ten-
dency for pressure from below, organized and unorganized, to receive a sym-
bolic response from government leaders and agencies. He has argued that
much of the ostensibly democratic process of poiicymaking is a ritual designed
to calm public anxieties while maintaining existing power relationships.
Edelman has not, however, provided a detailed exploration of the mass media's
role in implementing symbolic politics. This case study of the nuclear freeze
movement suggests exactly how the news media maintain public quiescence
and even support in the face of a government policy that opposes stable and
perhaps deeply felt majority opinion—opinion actively voiced by a large, orga-
nized, and determinedly mainstream political movement.
Unfavorable media coverage of a movement discourages involvement by
those ordinary citizens who support the initiative but remain outside its activi-
ties; these potential recruits may not be able to tell that they are part of a
majority. The dearth of favorable publicity diminishes any sense among either
movement members or inactive supporters that they might legitimately de-
mand a place on the agenda and a positive and concrete government
response—or that they might legitimately vote against officials who fail to re-
spond. In this way negative media treatment appears to reduce the pressure
elites feel to act favorably on the proposal, providing political cover for a sym-
bolic rather than concrete government response.
We find several kinds of judgments apparently made by journalists that
filter into the news and, in turn, likely affect the movement's ability to build
consensus and mobilize participation. These we call journalists' framing judg-
ments, which journalists make in the course of selecting and conveying infor-
mation about the movement. The judgments, we believe, are heavily influ-
enced by elite sources and, it appears, by an underlying professional ideology
ambivalent toward public participation: Although in theory supportive of mass
involvement, the coverage suggests journalists harbor suspicions of mass
movements once they organize to exert political power (cf. Citlin, 1980).

755
756 Robert M. Et)tmati and Atidrew Rojecki

Edelman's (1993) work highlights the impacts of media frames on the pub-
lic's perceptions of and responses to policy issues:

The character, causes, and consequences of any phenomenon be-

come radically different as changes are made in what is prominently
displayed, what is repressed, and especially in how observations are
classified. Far from being stable, the social world is . . . a kaleido-
scope of potential realities, any of which can be readily evoked by
altering the ways in which observations are framed and categorized.
Because alternative categorizations win support for specific political
beliefs and policies, classification schemes are central to political
maneuver and political persuasion (forthcoming)

His theories suggest that the elements the media choose to highlight in cover-
ing a movement will centrally affect its abihty to influence public opinion and
policy.
For a movement with national ambitions, grass roots networks can help
spread information, but the media will be crucial for getting the word out to
the mass of potential supporters. Given the "logic of collective action," incen-
tives for an individual to participate actively in any movement are inherently
fragile (Olson, 1965)\- hence, unfavorable media assessments can seriously
weaken a group's recruitment efforts. The media's reactions do affect whether
a movement will be able to spread its appeal among the citizenry. Irrespective
of recruiting success, the news helps determine whether elites feel pressure to
support the movement's policy goals, because positive coverage can convey
that citizen sentiments are favorable and that the issue is a high public priority
(cf. Bennett, 1993).
Our analysis of the U.S. anti-nuclear movement suggests seven evaluative
dimensions of news messages that are likely to affect a movement's ability to
garner public support and shape elites' calculations. These messages arise out
of subjective framing judgments that journalists seem to make in the course of
selecting and conveying information:

1. Rationality-emotionality: whether the movement is driven by intellectu-

ally sound policy ideas as opposed to emotionality.
2. Expertise: whether the movement has the technical capacity to analyze
and recommend valid policy.
3. Public support: how many Americans agree with movement goals.
4. Partisanship: whether movement participants seek to influence policy
through the use of political strategy and power.
5. Unity: the degree of agreement among those pursuing the movement
goal.

^Collective movements suffer from a "free rider" problem. Logic suggests to peo-
ple that they can benefit from (free ride on) the movement's achievements without
doing anything, because any one individual's failure to join will have no appreciable
effect on its probability of success. In the light of such strong counter-incentives for
individuals to join, we suggest negative media coverage can significantly compound the
inherent difficulties of movement recruitment.
 Elite and Media Framing: The U.S. Anti-Nuclear Movement 157

6. Extremism: whether participants deviate from the mainstream.

7. Power: whether the movement is likely to influence government policy.

The particular impact of these framing judgments arises from their unequal
application. In Edelrhan's (1993) words, the media's framing means that "what
is prominently displayed, what is repressed, and . . . how observations are
classified" (forthcoming) differs dramatically for the nuclear freeze movement
as compared with government elites. Journalists consistently assessed the
movement and mass opinion but were far less diligent and singular in their
critiques of the Reagan administration officials and Congress members who
made decisions about the movement's proposal. That is, the media in general
belittled the public and its involvement, whereas critiques of elite opinion
were rare, muted, and inconsistent in freeze coverage. The only dimension in
which elites faced frequent negative judgments was unity, which is discussed
more fully below.
Throughout, we attempt to show both how the nuclear freeze movement
was framed and how similar and plausible framing judgments about elites
were generally not conveyed. In analyzing frames, it is as necessary to identify
omissions in coverage as inclusions (Entman, 1993). Describing voids in the
news requires us to include critical observations about the Reagan administra-
tion; these should not be taken as a blanket endorsement of the freeze or
condemnation of the administration. In retrospect, it seems reasonable to ar-
gue that the path to nuclear arms reduction that the government actually took
turned out to work better than a freeze would have. Our purpose is not to
praise The Nuclear Freeze Movement but to generate theoretical insight.

The Nuclear Freeze Movement

Turning now to the case, here is a word about the movement. It was started by
Randall Forsberg, an M.I.T. Ph.D. in military policy and arms control, who be-
lieved it was possible to force debate on Congress and the executive if grass
roots peace groups and, especially, the American middle class could be mobi-
lized. In December, 1979, Forsberg succeeded in convincing a national conven-
tion of peace groups to unite around her draft proposal, an argument for a
bilateral, technically verifiable freeze based on an analysis of American and
Soviet weapons that, she argued, would leave both sides at net parity of
strength. A national campaign was organized and Randy Kehler was appointed
as its head. Other groups like Physicians for Social Responisibility, Federation
of American Scientists, and Union of Concerned Scientists appeared later, in-
cluding Ground Zero, a nonpartisan organization seeking to educate Ameri-
cans on the effects of nuclear war, led by former National Security Council
staffer Roger Molander.
The public peak of the movement was a massive rally in June, 1982, that
brought 750,000 people to New York City to demonstrate on the eve of a
United Nations session, apparently the largest political demonstration in U.S.
history. A few months earlier, in March 1982, Senator Edward Kennedy (D. MA)
and others had introduced freeze resolutions in Congress. During the congres-
sional debate, the movement came under attack by the Reagan administration,
which claimed that a freeze would lock in Soviet superiority and that the move-
ment itself was supported by KGB funding.
758 Robert M. Entman and Andrew Rojecki

Although the House resolution eventually passed by a vote of 278 to 149,

practical support for implementing it dissolved as representatives failed to de-
cide on precisely which weapons were to be affected, and according to Robert
Leavitt (1983), "it became clear to all concerned that very few Representatives
were actually enthusiastic or thoroughgoing freeze supporters and that most
were simply responding to constituent pressure that (at the moment) de-
manded a general anti-Reagan military vote" (p. 5). The Senate resolution never
emerged from the Republican-dominated Foreign Relations Committee.
Tbe freeze vote in the House thus was a classic example of symbolic gratifi-
cation (Edelman, 1964). As Edelman might predict, government responded to
an aroused public by acting in apparent response to its concerns, thereby
quelling the unease and diffusing the arousal without threatening elite control
or altering actual policy outputs. Congress demonstrated the symbolic nature
of its response on July 20,1983, 2 months after endorsing a freeze, when the
House approved $2.6 billion to fund the MX land-based missile program (tbe
Senate voted $4.6 billion one week later). In the fall of 1983, tbe United States
began to deploy Pershing II and Tomahawk cruise missiles in England—both
concrete actions that violated the spirit of tbe freeze and heightened tensions
with the Soviet Union.
One of tbe freeze movement's distinguishing characteristics was its main-
stream base of support. Freeze strategists made it a point to eschew any hint of
radical symbolism or threat to tbe system's core values or legitimacy that tbe
media could exaggerate. Public opinion in favor of tbe freeze remained bigh
during and beyond this period. Indeed, Gallup polls showed freeze support
increasing from 71% to 78% between 1983 and 1984, tbe very period during
wbich tbe media implicitly declared the movement dead. Tbis wide support
does not belie tbe hypothesized dampening effect on tbe movement but
rather suggests precisely how the media belp to disconnect public opinion and
participation from pressure on government and thereby to encourage a sym-
bolic response. In fact, what makes tbis an interesting case tbeoretically is tbe
contrast between it and tbe 1960s antiwar movement. Tbe freeze movement
was moderate in tone and adult and middle class in leadership; equally impor-
tant, overwhelming majorities of the public seemed to approve it in polls.
Strictly on tbe basis of public support and moderation, we migbt expect cover-
age of the freeze to be more sympatbetic tban tbat of the 1960s peace move-
ment, whicb in a variety of ways, Gitlin (1980) found, news frames tended to
trivialize, discount, and marginalize (cf. Bennett, 1989).

The Database

Tbe data for tbe study came from tbe NEXIS database of all New York Times
and Time magazine stories between 1980 and 1983—the life span of tbe
movement—in wbicb the term nuclear freeze appeared in close juxtaposition
to tbe word movement.^ Hereafter, to avoid confusion, we call the Times
"NYT." Separate searches were also conducted for specific coverage of two key

^Stories selected by this criterion were then checked to make sure they referred
predominantly to the nuclear freeze issue and movement in the United States. Stories
mostly concerning the freeze movement or issue in Europe were thus not included.
 Elite and Media Framing: The U.S. Anti-Nuclear Movement 159

movement events: Ground Zero Week and the New York City demonstration,
both held in the spring of 1982. Guided by the previous research of Gitlin on
radical movements and of Bennett on the marginalization of public opinion,
we conducted a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the themes and frames
used to describe the movement, systematically searching for uses of the seven
framing judgments as well as decisions on who spoke for the movement and
whether the aim was to convey its substantive reasoning. We also searched for
deployment of the same framing judgments in coverage of government offi-
cials and other elites who appeared in the freeze stories.

Analysis

The two news sources are different enough in format and style to warrant
separate but parallel analyses. This permits us to contrast not only patterns of
coverage and attitudes toward the movement but also to analyze any differ-
ences that might be traceable to the different editorial styles of the publica-
tions. Because the important framing judgments vary somewhat with the de-
velopment of the movement and nature of its activities, the analysis is
organized chronologically; examples of the frames are provided as appropri-
ate.

Discovering and Legitimating the Movement

Both publications begin their coverage of the U.S. freeze movement as it

emerges from the religious community and both grant legitimacy to the move-
ment as it enters what they consider the mainstream—middle-class America. In
the very earliest stages, coverage almost certainly helps the movement garner
support. However, as the movement gathers adherents, the tenor of coverage
changes: It appears that the news grants legitimacy to participation by move-
ments with little institutionalized power in politics but only so long as they
steer clear of effective political action.
New York Times. Although the NYT is first on the scene, it does not focus
much attention on the movement itself. During the course of 3 years' cover-
age, there are 22 front page stories that mention the American freeze move-
ment. Roger Molander—the organizer of Ground Zero—is named three times
in these 22 stories, and Kehler, the head of the nuclear freeze campaign, three.
The name of Forsberg, the founder and chief leader of the movement, never
appears on page one of the NYT. By contrast. Secretary of State Al Haig is
mentioned 8 times. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger is mentioned 6,
and Reagan himself, 44.
To ensure that patterns of coverage for page one of the NYT were not
wholly atypical, we also conducted searches for stories on the freeze move-
ment in the Washington Post and Newsweek. Table 1 shows the number of
stories retrieved using the terms nuclear freeze and movement paired with
names associated with the movement as well as the top executive branch lead-
ers. There is a remarkable similarity in the total numbers of stories found and

This yielded 243 stories in the NYT and 71 in Time, for the period January 1,1980
through December 31,1983.
760 Robert M. Entman and Andrew Rojecki

Table 1
Stories Citing Key Spokespersons for Freeze Movement and Government,
1980-1983
Washington
NY Times Post Newsweek Time Total

Movement 10.55% 11.29% 15.79% 17.95% 11.90%

(n) (21) (21) (6) (7) (55)
Government 89.45% 88.71% 84.21% 82.05% 88.10%
in) (178) (165) (32) (32) (407)
Total n 199 186 38 39 462

Note. Movement spokespersons searched for were Randall Forsberg, Randy

Kehler, and Roger Molander. Government spokespersons were Alexander
Haig, George Schultz, Ronald Reagan, and Gasper Weinberger. This table
shows numbers of stories mentioning both the nuclear freeze movement and
one of those just named. A total of 356 stories in the four outlets named only
government spokespersons without mentioning Forsberg, Kehler, or
Molander—thus, in 77% of stories mentioning the freeze movement and
spokespersons, only the top government spokespersons were cited.

in the actors named across the national media sources. In all cases, discourse
is dominated by elite voices, though slightly less so in the newsweeklies than
in the dailies. Many of the 55 mentions of freeze spokespersons actually name
Roger Molander, whom the media lump together with freeze leaders even
though he and his nonpolitical organization oppose the freeze (more on this
below).
Gonsider now the text of the coverage. The first NYT story appears on
November 8, 1981. Using Gatholic Bishop Leory T. Matthiesen's attempt to
close down a Texas nuclear bomb factory as a news peg, the story grants legiti-
macy to the movement by noting that it has crossed over traditional pacifist
(i.e., extremist) boundaries and hence deserves attention rather than the appar-
ently usual neglect: "Some members of the movement are pacifists but many
are not" (NYT, September 8,1981, p. 1). This is followed by a story on Novem-
ber 12 that describes a nationwide college teach-in on the dangers of nuclear
war sponsored by the Union of Goncerned Scientists. Establishing a pattern
that endures until the New York Gity demonstration in June, 1982, the NYT
contrasts what it considers a responsible mainstream movement with the New
Left movement of the 1960s, noting that "both the mood and the oratory were
notably different from the 196O's student-led demonstrations" (NYT, November
12, 1981, p. 18).
Both the NYT and Time tie their early coverage closely to assessments of
movement extremism and are initially favorable on this dimension, likely
boosting the movement's ability to recruit support.
Ttme. Time runs its first freeze story on January 4,1982. It repeats a number
of the NYT news pegs, including Matthiesen. Like the NYT story, it legitimizes
the movement in an identical way, on the extremism dimension: "The move-
 Elite and Media Framing: The U.S. Anti-Nuclear Movement 161

ment is not limited to predictable leftist or pacifist church circles; it has en-
tered the religious mainstream" (Time, January 4,1982, p. 66).
The judgment on extremism yields a pattern in both publications of legiti-
mizing certain participants in the movement, while implicitly discrediting or
ignoring others (cf. Gitlin, 1980). Other especially important framing criteria
that affect the movement's ability to mobilize support are rationality, expertise,
partisanship, and power. In general, friendly coverage is accorded to those
who confine themselves to either symbolic or educational efforts—who are
unlikely to exert real power.
In the movement's establishment period. Time's editors seem taken with
the quaint miniatures of New England town-hall meetings that are more
models of civics textbook politics than they are of effective political action
(March 15,1982, p. 16). The tone of initial stories is wistful, a nostalgic look at
preindustrial, rural American democracy in its most idealized form, described
by Gans (1979, p. 44) as one of the enduring values of American journalism.
Application of this value to the early manifestations of the freeze movement
probably gave |t a boost. Isolated in remote enclaves like Vermont, the move-
ment posed no threat to the White House agenda and seemed unlikely to
influence public policy concretely. It might well have remained the subject of
sporadic but favorable feature reportage were it not for the success of the
movement in garnering active supporters—in partial consequence of just such
positive coverage—and thus threatening to exert real power.
Time's major cover story on the freeze movement appears on March 29,
1982. In it. Time's editors explicitly draw a circle of legitimacy around a portion
of the movement's followers:

Advocates of a bilateral freeze on the development and deployment

of nuclear weapons include some peacenik activists who led pro-
tests against U.S. involvement in the Viet Nam War a decade ago.
But the new movement is far more broadly based; it includes
more bishops than Berrigans, doctors and lawyers with impeccable
Establishment credentials, archconservatives as well as diehard lib-
erals, and such knowledgeable experts as retired Admiral Noel Gay-
ler, former director of the supersecret National Security Agency, and
former SALT II Negotiator Paul Warnke (p. 10).

The references to Vietnam and peacenik activists set up a sort of negative

standard against which subsequent arguments and opinions will be tested. As
in the case of the 1960s peace movement, the media here impose a boundary
between acceptable dissent (then, Eugene McGarthy supporters) and imper-
missible protest (Gitlin, 1980).
One or two spokespersons or leaders come to personify the movement's
goals. These become the pegs that support later coverage of the movement.
Although the March 29 story alludes to Randall Forsberg as the author of the
freeze proposal, there is no account of her being the chief freeze strategist or
any coverage on the major groups at the heart of the movement such as the
American Friends or Glergy and Laity Goncerned. Instead, it identifies two
groups that "exemplify the passions and concerns of the nuclear-freeze move-
ment": Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) and Ground Zero. PSR is led
762 Robert M. Entman and Andrew Rojecki

by Dr. Helen Caldicott, "zealous opponent of all things nuclear." The organiza-
tion's nfiission is to educate people on the medical effects of nuclear explo-
sions. This educational goal is also the mission of Ground Zero, which the
magazine anoints as its representative of the freeze. Words such as passions
and zealous attached to the putatively more extreme Caldicott exemplify fre-
quently recurring negative judgments on the rationality of the putatively emo-
tional freeze proponents.
Created and led by Roger Molander, a former nuclear strategy specialist on
the National Security Council, Ground Zero (GZ) is "strictly educational and
takes no position on any disarmament proposals." Molander, in fact, does not
support the freeze.^ Despite this opposition, Molander becomes Time's leadihg
spokesperson for the freeze movement. (Recall that Randall Forsberg is the
freeze's chief strategist and Randy Kehler its national coordinator.) In anointing
the nonpolitical Molander as the chief movement leader, 77me reinforces the
framing judgment against the partisanship of the movement, that is, against its
use of political techniques to advance a defined policy goal. In the course of 71
stories. Time mentions Molander 19 times whereas Forsberg gets 7 mentions
and Kehler 3. In contrast to the New York Times, the newsmagazine manages,
despite its much smaller news hole, more frequent mention of freeze move-
ment spokespersons indicating that it focuses somewhat more attention on the
movement and less on officialdom.

Marginalizing the Movement

Ground Zero week and the New York City demonstration comprised the public
zenith of the American freeze movement. During these events, public partici-
pation was at its most focused, providing the press with a variety of news pegs
on which to hang their frames. As we shall see, however, the emphases are on
the whimsical and bizarre, thus repressing the partisan or political elements
and goals of the movement and diminishing its likely effectiveness.
New York Times. In NYT stories on Ground Zero, published the week of
April 17,1982, Molander pushes the apolitical theme. He avoids a position on
the freeze except to say that arms agreements with Soviets are less important
than trust between the two superpowers. The absence of a defined political
strategy and goal makes Ground Zero an appealing diversion—even President
Reagan supports it. The proclaimed mission of GZ is merely to make people
aware of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, which is hardly a matter for
debate. Some of the GZ articles mention public empowerment but the overall
thrust is to discourage participation. In an April 17 story, for example, Molan-
der is quoted as saying that he has "confidence in the public" (p. 8). Neverthe-
less, the antipartisan theme surfaces in a front-page GZ story (April 18), which
notes that many freeze advocates favor direct political action but goes on that
others "acknowledged the possibility that entering the political process as a
lobbying group might fragment the movement, which has been growing rap-
idly" (p. 1).
Nearly one third of the front-page article on Ground Zero is a catalog of
whimsical events of that week. These include a run-for-your-life race in which

^See, for example. New York Ttmes, April 18,1982, p. A1.

 Elite atid Media Fratning: The U.S. Anti-Nuclear Movetnetit 163

participants prove that people cannot outrun the blast wave of an exploding
nuclear weapon, a bicycle fall-out marathon, a hot-air balloon launch over Law-
rence livermore Laboratory, puppets-for-peace shows in Albuquerque, and a
"swim for peace" by a seal to demonstrate that animals are no better equipped
than humans to survive a nuclear war. Such coverage tends to trivialize orga-
nized mass application of political power to advance a defined policy objec-
tive.
The following week, the NYT covers New York City CZ events. Nearly half
of this coverage also emphasizes the sideshow activities, against which is oddly
juxtaposed mention of elite support for the movement. The NYT article begins:

With guitar, saxophone, tambourines and drums providing a com-

pelling beat, the singers belted out their message: "If you love your
baby, if you love your friend, you know this arms race has got to
end." The singing at the New School in Greenwich Village Monday
night was one of a host of activities in the metropolitan area con-
nected with Ground Zero Week, a nationally organized effort to ed-
ucate the public about the nuclear arms peril (April 23,1982, p. 18).

It continues in this tone:

While the turnout on many college campuses for lectures and films
was only modest, off-campus activities drew slightly larger and older
crowds. The artistic offerings ranged from spectral modern dance
pieces to a "Die-In" staged yesterday afternoon by 30 Columbia Uni-
versity students on the Morningside Heights campus. The students,
their faces painted white, lay on the ground as if struck by a nuclear
bomb while a band played funereal music (p. 18).

The focus on education is lauded by both publications, but their coverage

of the freeze events serves ironically not to educate readers about the substan-
tive case made but about the carnival-like atmosphere of the demonstrations.
For example, in its front-page coverage of the June 12 freeze demonstration of
750,000—in an article nearly 1,700 words long—the NYT makes only two brief
references to the speeches given at the rally in Central Park. The greater part of
the article—replete with references to the 1960s—focuses on the logistics of
moving the crowd and descriptions of the participants. By highlighting logis-
tics and "color," the coverage disembodies the march from its political pur-
pose, illustrating the antipartisan framing judgment and paralleling Gitlin's
(1980) finding on the 1960s. At the same time the coverage renders quite diffi-
cult achievement of the event's chief aim: conveying information about nu-
clear arms policy through media that might mobilize involvement of freeze
supporters outside the movement. The antagonism toward partisan political
activity by an organized mass movement also misleadingly implies that the
Reagan administration's arms policies are uninfluenced by its own political
calculations and partisan interests (see Hersh, 1986; Talbott, 1984), thereby
cloaking it in the legitimizing mantle of nonpartisanship.
Accompanying editorial commentary places the movement in a double
bind: As it gains widespread support, it is charged with a variety of political
764 Robert M. Etittnan and Andrew Rojecki

sins that accompany popularity; yet had it not gained such support it would
have remained politically impotent In its editorial on the day of the march, the
NYT acknowledges the widespread support of the American public for the
freeze but says that "the very size and fervor of this movement make it inartic-
ulate" (June 13, 1982, p. 22). It cautions the public to come to terms with the
intellectual issues surrounding arms control: "The nuclear nations still have
much to learn from citizens who march and mobilize—if those citizens now
master the arcane vocabulary and logic of stable deterrence. Anxiety is not
enough" (June 13,1982, p. 22).
This quote illustrates two im balanced framing judgments that coverage fre-
quently makes, asserting that the freeze analysis emerges from emotion not
rationality and questioning the movement's expertise while making no such
assessment of administration officials.^ The media focus on the fears of freeze
participants rather than on the rationally defensible policy designed by well-
credentialed exjserts that aim to reduce the danger.
By contrast, the highest levels of the Reagan administration were heavily
populated with members of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), a
sort of elite-level social movement. The Committee had been established in the
mid-1970s by Norman Podhoretz, Paul Nitze, and Eugene Rostow, who re-
cruited a number of conservative intellectuals to develop a counterweight to
detente, which they considered dangerous to American interests. CPD publica-
tions and statements made alarming assertions about nuclear war and Ameri-
can vulnerability; the very name seemed designed to invoke and provoke anxi-
ety. The CPD warned that the Soviets aimed to achieve nuclear superiority over
the United States and believed they could vanquish the nation in a nuclear
war. A CPD member himself, Ronald Reagan appointed over 50 CPD colleagues
to key government positions (Scheer, 1982, p. 39). The CPD's empirical claims
on Soviet strength and intentions and U.S. weakness were seriously chal-
lenged by many defense analysts (e.g.. Stubbing, 1986), but media coverage of
the freeze overlooks the anxious tone and the problematic quality of evidence
animating CPD analyses, perhaps because of its elite status. President Reagan's
(occasionally reported) ignorance of specific weapons systems and other policy
details is not used in freeze movement stories to question whether he pos-
sesses sufficient expertise to serve as final arbiter of American policy.
This is not to argue that critiques of Reagan's hawkish defense posture are
absent from the news; news stories and especially commentary regularly take
issue with the administration's orientation. Such coverage might have rein-
forced public tendencies to back nuclear arms limitation. However, the criti-
cism rarely occurs in stories about the freeze movement. Other coverage also
uncritically promotes Reagan's framing of the Soviet Union (e.g., Entman,
1991). In this way, we believe, the media on balance diminished the likelihood
of active public participation in the movement and dampened pressure on
Congressional elites to support the freeze.

Gamson (1992, p. 33) on the need for "hot cognitions" and emotional involve-
ment to sustain political movements. Gamson also finds that media frames tend to
discourage movement participation, but based on focus group analysis he believes the
media's negative stance toward movements is less effective at stifling their political
influence than we do.
 Elite and Media Framing: The U.S. Anti-Nuclear Movement 165

Characterizations of the public's but not the administration's rationality,

treating only public views as significantly rooted in fearful emotion, dele-
gitimizes the impact of the freeze movement or its proposal on Reagan and his
officials. We counted all references to "fear," "worry," or "anxiety" (and cog-
nates) linked to the public and those linked to elites. Table 2 shows the per-
centage of instances in which the public-versus-elite sources are linked to
these emotions. The bulk of the fear, anxiety, or worry is attributed to the
public. The news repeatedly portrays the pro-freeze public as driven by these
negative emotional reactions to nuclear horror.
Time. Time covers Ground Zero Week (April 17-24, 1982) in a short article.
The writer refers to the sponsor, Roger Molander, as a man of reason and the
article lauds him for his "deliberately low-key approach" (77me, May 3,1982, p.
21). Nevertheless, the story describes mixed and somewhat disappointing
results of CZ events (spotty turnout). Near the conclusion, the article reiterates
Molander's opposition to a specific freeze proposal and mentions the adminis-
tration's objections.
The magazine devotes coverage to the New York City freeze demonstration
Gune 12,1982) before and after the event. The "before" story focuses on logis-
tics and preparations and reiterates the frames developed over the previous 3
months. It uses the absence of the freeze opponent Molander—whom it had
certified as a freeze leader despite his opposition—to conclude that the move-
ment is in trouble:

Unlike the antiwar protesters of a decade ago, most of whom were

young, white and middle-class, the freeze movement has attracted
followers from across the socioeconomic spectrum. So far, this has
been a source of vitality and political strength. But with upwards of
100 organizations either participating in this weekend's rally or lend-
ing their support, divisions have inevitably begun to appear.
Notably absent on June 12, for instance, will be representatives
of the Washington, D.C.-based Ground Zero, which has done much
to stir national concern over nuclear arms. Explains Founder Roger
Molander: "We are trying to maintain our character as an education
organization, not a political organization or advocacy group" (Time,
June 14,1982, p. 14).

The story concludes that the rally "poses serious risks":

If the demonstrators seem too radical, or even a little kooky, the

antinuclear coalition could lose some of its broad-based support.
Moreover, now that President Reagan has announced that a new
round of strategic-arms talks with the Soviets will begin June 29, the
movement could lose its momentum (p. 14).

Here, the frame, rooted in judgments of partisanship, rationality, unity, and

extremism, is staked out to exclude those who are too radical or kooky, and
once more assessments are imbalanced. Reagan's supporters demonstrably
include radical conservatives well outside the mainstream (cf. Wills, 1987, pp.
287, 323); such coalition partners are not used to delegitimize the Reagan posi-
766 Robert M. Entman and Andrew Rojecki

Table 2
Fear, Anxiety, and Worry References in New York Times and Time Freeze
Stories,
1980-1983

Public Elite Numbers

New York Times 79% 21% 48

(n - 38) (n - 10)
Time 59% 41% 46
(n-27) (n - 19)
Totals 69% 31% 94
(n - 65) (n - 29)

Note. All freeze movement stories were searched for occurrences of the
terms fear, worry, and anxiety (and cognates). Then the actors to whom these
emotions were attributed were identified. "Elite" actors were president.
Congress members, experts, and executive branch officials. "Public" actors
were references to "Americans," "the public," "citizens," "voters," "electorate,"
or quotes of nonexpert people outside government.

tion. Also, note that the freeze's political strength is here measured by its
public support, without mention that polls show the administration's position
to be weak by that standard.
One week later, when the after-demonstration story appears, it is shorter
and less prominent (p. 24 vs. p. 14). Recalling that this was the largest political
demonstration in U.S. history, such placement illustrates how framing judg-
ments of a movement's power and rationality can affect critical decisions on
story play. The opening paragraph of the story condenses subsequent themes:

There is something about emotionally charged political movements:

until they mobilize enormous crowds of adherents in one place on
one day, they do not feel quite bona fide. Last weekend in New York
City, the diffuse U.S. antinuclear arms movement produced its first
such mass spectacle when 15,000 protesters paraded past the nearly
empty United Nations complex and then joined 350,000 more com-
patriots for a rally-cum-concert in Central Park. The Saturday dem-
onstration. New York's largest ever, was well planned and peaceful
(Time, June 21, 1982, p. 24).

The major theme emphasizes the movement's lack of power, an image of impo-
tence reinforced by the description of an "emotionally charged" and "diffuse"
event that was a "mass spectacle." The article describes the seemingly empty
gesture of parading past a nearly vacant United Nations building, trivializes it
as a "rally-cum concert," and belittles its public support by reporting participa-
tion at less than half the police estimate, calling it New York's rather than the
nation's largest-ever demonstration.
Two short paragraphs describe the speakers and speeches at the rally in-
cluding William Sloan Coffin, Coretta King, Orson Welles, and Randall Fors-
 Elite and Media Framing: The U.S. Anti-Nuclear Movement 167

berg (characterized as one of several speakers taking a "pointedly political

tack," Time, June 21,1982, p. 24). The article then describes some of the partici-
pants in the rally, part of what Time calls an "earnest horde." Like the NYT, the
newsmagazine story focuses on the whimsical activities of unusual participants
as well as the more serious minded who threaten to shut down the United
Nations for a day.
Recall that the article of the previous week had set up a "kooky" test for the
rally participants: if too many were perceived as being extreme or unusual, the
movement might lose its momentum. The coverage then emphasizes just these
features and neglects the substance of the movement and the demeanor of its
majority. Additionally, the coverage includes repeated references to the New
Left movement of the 1960s. In total, there are 72 invocations of Vietnam-era
symbolic language in Time's freeze coverage over the 3 years studied. These
include such explicit references as "1960s," "peaceniks," "Vietnam," and "pro-
test" as well as implicit symbols such as "guitars," "concerts," and "dances."
These descriptors implicitly equate this mainstream movement to one de-
picted as extreme, calling forth 1960s schematic understandings or stereotypes
for the quite distinct freeze. Even if polls show the public mostly supports the
freeze proposal despite such coverage, this treatment delegitimizes mass par-
ticipation in a political movement that would pressure leaders to respond
more than symbolically; in this way the coverage also discourages the institu-
tionalization (long-term survival) of the freeze movement. Media coverage
helps to isolate the freeze movement from its wide political base and from
public opinion, misrepresenting the public to itself.
There is irony here: The movement reaches and overtly demonstrates its
peak and by so doing apparently creates an elite backlash that leads to the
movement's and the proposal's downfall. Echoing the theme of the NYT edito-
rial discussed above. Time's editors invoke the same double bind in which a
broad base of support is paradoxically diagnosed as a liability, registering jour-
nalists' framing judgment on the movement's unity:

The broad appeal of the antinuclear arms movement, which up to

now had been its main strength, may have become its most serious
weakness. With so many constituents to please, the movement
seems uncertain about what to do next {Time, June 28,1992, p. 37).

The same article supplies no supporting evidence for this negative perspec-
tive; no movement leaders are quoted. However, Roger Molander—again, a
freeze opponent—is quoted. Described as "the single most visible and
thoughtful leader in the nebulous movement," and the leader of "a scrupu-
lously non-partisan antinuclear education campaign" who understands that "it
is hard for an impassioned mass movement to accommodate either slow prac-
tical progress or technical complexity," Molander is permitted a long quote in
which he says that "thoughtful people" don't know the answer. In this way the
Molander quote suggests that the movement and its public supporters are not
thoughtful (perhaps not rational) and lack sufficient expertise legitimately to
speak on this complex issue.
Picking up this theme of insufficient expertise, the article continues and
768 Robert M. Entman and Andrew Rojecki

develops what is to become the dominant theme—first articulated in the Times

editorial—from the New York City demonstration on:

Yet the very simplicity of the freeze proposal has helped attract so
many millions of sympathizers. More precise or complicated nuclear
arms control prescriptions—shelving plans for land-based cruise
missiles in Europe, say—would not make inspirational rallying cries.
And although the movement's freeze resolutions call for "bilateral-
ism," the daunting difficulties implicit in U.S.-Soviet negotiations
are rarely given more than glancing, wishful consideration (Time,
June 21, 1982, p. 37).

The same Time Oune 21,1992, p. 37) article points out that although all the
divergent groups in the movement are in favor of the freeze, beyond that goal
there are disagreements. These stem from the dozens of "divergent factions"
riding the "antinuclear bandwagon" who want to promote everything from
government day-care funding to African development. Here we see, as for the
antiwar coverage (Gitlin, 1980), an assessment of unity and an emphasis on
discord when covering the movement but not when reporting government
officials. The freeze movement is indeed a diverse and contentious coalition,
but even within the Reagan administration there is considerable tension be-
tween those favoring serious negotiation and those opposing it (Talbott, 1984),
although the latter remain in control. Moreover, the larger Reagan movement,
like all presidential coalitions, is riven with conflicts between such factions as
the social libertarians and social conservatives, the right-wing populists and
the Wall Street traditionalists. Similarly, some members of the community of
arms control experts favor the freeze or proposals close to it, whereas others
do not; among both groups, unity on issues ranging from gun control to abor-
tion could probably not be found. If groups had to demonstrate consensus
across all of their members' policy preferences before becoming effective, no
political coalitions or presidential campaigns would be possible.
Freeze adherents might have argued for a positive framing: that their ability
to claim the allegiance of a large majority of citizens who are divided along
other lines demonstrates the impressive power of the idea to fuse an unlikely
coalition. Judging freeze proponents but not the Reagan administration, the
CPD, or the arms control experts by an unrealistic standard of homogeneous
unity further delegitimizes the movement.
Compounding this effect might be the implicit denunciation of "inspira-
tional rallying cries." Freeze supporters might complain that when Reagan of-
fers inspiring visions and slogans to rally his supporters, he is labeled "the
Great Communicator." They might argue that it seems acceptable for elites to
engage in emotional, symbolic, simplifying rhetoric but not for a mass-based
movement. In this way, freeze members might say, media frames narrow the
communicative options for building a grassroots public sphere, delimiting the
techniques that movements can use to bring ordinary people into public
space. Media practice seems to provide elites a much broader range of legiti-
mate communicative options, with less danger of being downgraded for parti-
sanship, emotionality, or insufficient expertise.
In one further imbalanced judgment, this and many other passages take the
 Elite and Media Framing: The U.S. Anti-Nuclear Movement 169

movement to task for neglecting "daunting difficulties" in arms negotiations.

However, a pro-freeze framing would note that the Reagan administration's
negotiating positions during this era are themselves simplistic. This stance is
indeed central to its overall arms control strategy—in itself intellectually
defensible—which inyolves pushing a U.S. arms buildup while delaying prog-
ress in negotiation until American forces regain what administration officials
regard as superiority (cf. Talbott, 1984, pp. 247-248; Wills, 1987, pp. 346, 353).
The media hold the movement responsible for coming up with an integrated,
comprehensive arms control proposal that would survive critical scrutiny and
yet be acceptable to both sides. If freeze members were framing coverage,
they might note that the U.S. government also fails to accomplish this mission.
They might also argue that the daunting difficulties of such matters as abortion
and civil rights have not prevented movements from speaking on their con-
cerns without proposing ways to solve all the dilemmas surrounding their is-
sues simultaneously. Movements rarely generate supporters by publicizing de-
tailed position papers to which all members must fully and knowledgeably
subscribe.
The final irony is that, as we have shown, the media afford the movement's
spokespersons little opportunity to convey the specifics and rationales of Fors-
berg's detailed proposal, even if they had possessed all the answers. Nor did
opinion polls provide the public with minutely detailed policy options; even if
the public possessed highly sophisticated and differentiated opinions in sup-
port of the freeze, polls would not reveal thenfi.

Judging Elites

We explored the freeze stories specifically to see how framing judgments on

the seven dimensions were deployed with respect to foreign policy elites.^ In
general, unlike stories focusing on the movement itself, stories on elites re-
sponding to the freeze proposal or to political pressure exerted by the move-
ment, came in many different contexts and from many more actors. A stratified
structure of discourse took place within the NYT, with the most prominent
national coverage focused on elite discourse. Inside, on the metropolitan New
York pages (as well as in the suburban sections), local movement actors popu-
lated the discourse, and the coverage contained more criticism of government
policy and officials voiced by the locals. However, the localized nature of the
coverage muffled their voices and left the national image of the movement
inchoate and disconnected. Our analysis found that criticism of elites on the
seven dimensions rarely occurred in the national sections of the NYT or in
Time.
The one matter on which elites received repeated knocks was unity. There
was clear conflict in Washington on whether the Soviets enjoyed nuclear supe-
riority and it was conveyed by the press, as was a sense that elites were some-
what split over how to handle the Soviets. However, the absence of unity on
comparative arms strength in particular and on overall policy toward the Soviet
Union in general, was not described as a serious weakness, except insofar as it

exploration included content analyzing a 25% sample of the total of 314 sto-
ries in NYT and Time for framing judgments of elites.
770 Robert M. Entman and Andrew Rojecki

permitted the freeze movement to flourish. Thus, elites, and particularly the
Reagan administration, despite dealing with internal division and external
pressure to modify policies, largely escaped framing judgments that seriously
weakened their political position. The press did not accord the movement this
deference. Rather, the judgment of divisions within the movement became a
self-replicating frame that impaired the ability of the movement to connect
with its majority base of support among the public. News coverage did not
connect the administration's lack of unity to public opinion and thus left the
administration freer to pursue its policies.
There are also a few references to a lack of foreign policy expertise among
close Reagan advisors, mostly in longer think pieces published in the NYT
Sunday magazine. For example, in an article examining U.S. negotiating policy
at the START talks, Leslie Gelb made several recommendations to then Presi-
dent Reagan in hopes of penetrating the inner circle of advisors who "don't
have much of a background in the highly complex field of strategic arms" {NYT
Magazine, June 27, 1982, p. 17). However, these assessments did not percolate
to the prominent daily coverage nor were they contrasted with Forsberg's ex-
pertise.

Summary of Coverage Patterns

Our analysis reveals some contrasts in coverage by the two outlets. Front-page
coverage of the New York Times was largely an official record of elite views and
reactions to a nearly invisible movement whose activities could only be dis-
cerned in less visible interior articles. Here the prose and angle highlighted the
dramatic and eccentric elements iii the movement, despite the movement's
staid constituency and purpose. Time's coverage focused more on movement
participants, probably because its reporters had nfiore time to assemble stories
from a greater variety of sources. Nevertheless, the magazine's editors came to
the same conclusions as those of the New York Times, that the nuclear weap-
ons policies of the nation should not be dictated by the anxieties of an amor-
phous movement, one purportedly riven by discord.

Public Opinion

Throughout and beyond the campaign, public opinion remained consistently

in favor of the freeze. Nevertheless, as Bennett (1989) would predict, public
opinion got little voice in either publication. As he found for the issue of aid to
the Nicaraguan contras, polling evidence indicated public opposition to the
administration, yet it was marginalized. In the NYT's 243 stories during the 3-
year period, there were only 10 stories that mentioned public opinion on the
freeze. There were only four such stories in the newsmagazine. When they did
refer to public opinion, the media tended to frame the majority voice in ways
that discounted it, thus compounding the marginalization of public opinion
and of the freeze. In a major front-page story two weeks before the New York
demonstration, for example, public opinion was shown to be overwhelmingly
in favor of the freeze (NYT, May 30,1982). The story reported that the success
of the freeze movement would depend on whose version of Soviet strength
 Elite and Media Framing: The U.S. Anti-Nuclear Movement 171

the public believed. Based on this angle, a White House official was quoted as
saying that "this issue is very much up for grabs" (NYT, May 30, 1992, p. 1).
However, comparative Soviet strength was not a material issue for the freeze
campaign. The movement insisted that there were enough weapons on both
sides, that it was time to stop their development. The NYT accepted the adiriin-
istration definition of the problem, thereby downplaying the political meaning
of the poll results.
This story also provides an example of how survey data are differentially
deployed, more often taken seriously when the numbers support the adminis-
tration than when they do not. Thus, the poll is used to show the public as
being "confused" about Reagan's position: "Almost a third thought, accurately,
that he opposed a freeze; almost a third thought he favored it, and almost 40
percent did not know where Mr. Reagan stood on the issue" (NYT, May 30,
1992, p. 1). Although such data do indeed suggest widespread ignorance, the
meaning of that finding is debatable. It could be taken as strong evidence that
the administration was succeeding in its goal to obfuscate its stand on the
policy issue (e.g., by having Reagan publicly support the educational Ground
Zero campaign, whose image the media had melded with that of the freeze).
Such a reading is further supported by the story's noting that White House
advisors were "encouraged" by the poll's finding that almost 60% of the re-
spondents said the freeze was "too complicated" for the public to decide. By
finding this result encouraging, the White House signaled its preference for
public quiescence—hardly surprising given the majority's apparent opposition
to Reagan on the freeze.
The "too complicated" response suggests that three-fifths of the public
accepted its own delegitirhation as a participant in policy debate, which bol-
sters our reading that freeze coverage undermined mass participation. Clearly
considerable training and intelligence are needed to negotiate detailed arms
control agreements. However, some might argue that failing to have such ex-
pertise no more disqualifies the public from voicing a view on the general
direction of arms control policy than failing to have advanced degrees in eco-
nomics renders illegitimate public input on equally complicated tax policy.
The selective framing and deployment of poll data might have affected
elites' political calculations as it influenced the public's voting behavior. The
perception that vast and aroused majorities favored a freeze could have in-
duced fear of electoral fall-out in Congress, and that might have moved the
body to more concrete action (cf. Entman, 1989, Chapter 4). More frequent and
favorable reporting of public opinion data could also have elevated the freeze
as a criterion for voters' evaluations of the President. Instead, as Reagan's land-
slide 1984 reelection suggests, most voters apparently favored other elements
of the Reagan presidency despite his freeze position or failed to judge him on
the freeze issue. Part of this outcome may be traceable to ignorance of
Reagan's actual stand on the issue. With 70% of Americans not knowing
Reagan opposed the freeze or thinking he supported it, many pro-freeze voters
must have discarded the issue as a criterion for deciding between Mondale
and Reagan. For others, judging Reagan on the basis of the freeze issue would
seem illegitimate because media coverage gave the impression that ordinary
Americans had no right to apply their anxious feelings to such complicated
issues. The mechanisms linking voting choice to issue preference are intricate
772 Robert M. Entmar) and Andrew Rojecki

and, despite decades of scholarly research, still poorly understood, so we can

do no more than advance this hypothesized effect of freeze coverage as a
plausible proposition for future research.

Conclusion

When elites and a majority of the public support the president, we can expect
journalism to be cautious in separating itself from the government line. How-
ever, the nuclear freeze presented a more auspicious context for autonomous
journalism. Polls indicated the freeze proposal was supported by a large major-
ity of Americans and at least some elites. Nevertheless, the framing judgments
made and deployed in the text by the New York Times and Time magazine in
freeze coverage reveal patterns that inhibited movement success. Neither the
daily nor the magazine maligned the general goal of slowing the nuclear arms
race, but they both consistently called into question the underpinnings of the
mobilized mass pressure needed to induce genuine rather than symbolic gov-
ernment responsiveness.
If journalism can generate autonomy of official discourse, especially in the
presence of a supportive audience, news coverage should have bolstered the
freeze. Instead, news of the movement seemed to help the Reagan administra-
tion maintain political support despite opposing the freeze. Equally important,
the coverage tended to delegitimize pulilic participation in organized political
movements. It is in such a context that symbolic politics can succeed and
flourish.

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