My Publication in Euro As

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.
net/publication/275689164
Iran’s Foreign Policy Approach toward the Central Asia and Caucasus
Article · February 2015
CITATIONS READS
0 903
1 author:
Mahdieh Aghazadeh
Istanbul Aydin University
8 PUBLICATIONS 9 CITATIONS
SEE PROFILE
Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
Turkish Public & Elite Perception Towards Iran View project
All content following this page was uploaded by Mahdieh Aghazadeh on 02 May 2015.
The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

EURASIAN UNIVERSITIES UNION
Academic
JOURNAL
Winter - 2015
ISSN: 2147 - 2149
Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015

Istanbul/Turkey
CONCESSIONNAIRE ON BEHALF EURAS
Dr. Mustafa AYDIN

Eurasian Universities Union
President
EDITOR IN CHIEF
Muzaffer BACA
Eurasian Universities Union
E-mail: euras@euras-edu.org
EDITORIAL BOARD
Kurban Kurbanmagamedov, The Institute Of Moscow State Open University, Dagestan

Saimat Salmanova, The Institute Of Moscow State Open University, Dagestan
Firuz Demir Yaşamış, American University in the Emirates, UAE
Anastas Angjeli, Mediterranean University Of Albania, Albania
Fabio L. Grassi, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy
Zeynep Banu Dalaman, Istanbul Aydin University, Turkey
Sulo Haderi, Mediterranean University Of Albania, Albania
Mahdieh Aghazadehkhoei, İstanbul Aydın University, Turkey
Tabagari Sergo, David Tvildiani Medical University, Georgia
Aurelian A.Bondrea, Spuri Haret University, Romania
Özüm Sezin Uzun, Istanbul Aydin University, Turkey
Georgescu Stefan, Andrei Saguna University, Romania
Filiz Katman, Istanbul Aydin University, Turkey
Agron Beka, European Collage Juridica, Kosovo
Judit Hidasi, Budapest Business School, Hungary
Ibrahim Gashi, University of Prishtina, Kosovo
Zafer Aslan, Istanbul Aydın University, Turkey
Kürşat Güleş, Selçuk University, Turkey
Avdi Smajljaj, Epoka University, Albania
Ateş Uslu, Istanbul University, Turkey
Faisal Aftab, Bahria University, Pakistan
Bekir Çınar, Epoka University, Albania
EDITORIAL OFFICE
Euras Secretariat
E-mail: euras@euras-edu.org
EURAS TEAM
Dr. Mustafa AYDIN, President
Muzaffer BACA, General Secretary
Handan TEZKANLI, General Coordinator
İpek ÇALIŞIR, Communication Coordinator
Miraç ŞAHIN, Project Coordinator
DESIGN
The Visual Design Department of Istanbul Aydin University
PUBLISHER
Eurasian Universities Union (EURAS)
ISSN: 2147-2149
ADDRESS
Beşyol Mah. Inönü Caddesi No: 38

Sefaköy, Küçükçekmece 34295 Istanbul / TURKEY
Tel: +90 212 411 61 68
Fax: +90 212 411 62 49
Website: www.euras-edu.org
Academic Journal is an international peer – reviewed journal and published quarterly. The opinions,
thoughts, postulations or proposals within the articles are but reflections of the authors and do not, in
any way, represent those of the Eurasian Universities Union.
CONTENT
• Editorial
Muzaffer BACA…………………………..………………………………....………....................…8-9
• Youth Gangs: Not Just an American Phenomenon

Prof.Dr.Finn-Aage ESBENSEN…………..……………………………………............…............10-22
• Arbitration and Conflict Resolution in Antiquity (500 Bc- 350bc)

Adil CALAP - Özcan ERDOĞAN.……………...…………….…….............................................23-52
• Quantum Jumps in the Renewable Energy Technologies

Prof.Dr.Hayrettin KILIÇ………………………………………............…...............................….53-69
• The Arab Spring and the Balance of Power in the Middle East
Marian ZIDARU-Stefan GEORGESCU………………………………………………............….70-88
• Clustering G-20 Countries Using the Euclidian Method and Fuzzy Logic
Esra DEMİR - Çiğdem ÖZARI…………………………………………...........….......................89-95
• Iran’s Foreign Policy Approach Towards the Central Asia and the Caucasus
Mahdieh AGHAZADEH…..………………………………………………..............................96-102
• Unpacking Crime Over the Life Course: Causes of Offending in a High Risk Sample of Women
Lee Ann SLOCUM - Sally S. SIMPSON………………………………………………..……103-110
• Students’ Social Mobility in the Dialogue of Education and Culture in Modern University
Leila Munirova…….……………………………………………………..............................….111-120
Dr. Mustafa AYDIN
The President of Eurasian Universities Union
EURASIAN UNIVERSITIES UNION ACTIVITIES IMPACT
ON THE REGION IS OBVIOUS
Eurasian Universities Union, established in 2008, managed to promote the intellectual capacity of
the region and contributed by the best for the educational capacity building.
By networking more than 80 prominent universities all over region we managed to transfer the
knowledge and best practices between the member universities and benefit them from the experi-
ences that their partners benefited.
By organizing regional conferences as in Dubai, Bucharest, Baku and Komrat we managed to

draw the attention of international stakeholders on education to the issues related with these re-
gions and mobilize them for better results.
Through students and academicians exchanges, cultural interaction between members was the
highest priority and it helped for strengthening bilateral relations and promoting peace in our
region.
Involving prominent leaders to the Leaders Conferences programs we launched helped very much
to introduce the regional strategic importance to the World.
Our publications, conferences and projects will be a step forward to intensify our activities in
more areas as transforming EURAS to a regional play maker on educational capacity building
and development.
Main targets of the new re-scheduling must be the promotion of peace and dialogue in the region
through universities whom we are encouraging to take part in a more actively way for the settle-
ment of issues as democratization, human rights, worldwide and regional peace, environment and
cultural sustainability.
Eurasian Universities Union proved its capacity on such structuring and invites all members to
mobilize their academic network and student’s capacity for more accurate and concentrated to
regional issues campaigns.
The region, hosting the 2/3 of World population must have a more powerful voice, at least on
academic sphere, for the world events and submit its opinion and intellectual treasure to influ-
ence these events for brooder benefit of the humankind and eliminate in-equalities on worldwide
extend.
We do believe that EURAS Journal will continue to be a platform to submit the research and
academic papers of our academicians to the world intellectual circles and prove once again that
we the academicians of Eurasian Region are capable to generate projects and programs not only
affecting our region but on worldwide basis.
Dr. Mustafa AYDIN

EURAS President
THE GREAT GREEK PHILOSOPHER DEMOCRITUS SAYS
(What we Think We Become)...It is the reality of life. If you don’t dream you can’t develop
yourself or contribute to the humanity.
Eurasian Universities Union was our dream for years. It was for the developments and
prosperity of the nations that lost the great race of development in the 20th Century.
When launched EURAS the founding members were just seven, from Turkey, Azerbaijan,
Romania and Moldova.
WE organized our last General Assembly on 7th November 2014 and the members are
84..
Our prominent new members as La Sapienza University from Italy, a University operat-
ing for centuries have increased our capacity for contributing to the academic capacity of
EURAS.
We have new members from all over Eurasia as from Afghanistan, Philippines, South
Korea, UK and other far east Asian territories.
We became a very powerful family with a strong voice concerning the regional issues and
settlements we are offering through our scientific and academic infrastructure.
Through the conferences we are organizing on regional basis we are focused to influence
8 Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015

the public opinion for better solutions and involvement.
By launching a new member status-Observer member, we started to involve United Na-

tions, World Bank, European Union, OSCE and other international organizations to the
activities of Eurasian universities Union. That integrated EURAS in a more powerful way
to the World agendas.
As an example we organized the Conference about (Security of Europe and Turkey Role)
together with OSCE in Istanbul.
For the Year 2015, we will focus mostly on the regional issues in Balkans, Caucasus and
Central Asia. In this framework conferences about Balkan interests are organized in Tira-
na, Belgrade and Istanbul.
This year we are planning the Annual Youth Festival of EURAS in a member country and
we are waiting for the candidate member s to inform us about their plans and involvement
capacity.
As EURAS What we thought we become..
It is now the turn of our members with their great ideas and proposals to develop our ac-
tivities and capacity and EURAS General Secretariat is keen to implement them
With my best regards
Muzaffer BACA
Secretary General
Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015 9

“Youth Gangs: Not Just an American Phenomenon”
Prof.Dr.Finn-Aage Esbensen
Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice
University of Missouri-St. Louis
ABSTRACT
Gang research has a long history in the United States and gangs are often portrayed as an American
problem. Much of the gang literature and gang lore would lead one to believe that the stereotypical
gang is organized, hierarchical, territorial, and racially/ethnically homogeneous and that gang
members are male, members of racial/ethnic minority groups concentrated in economically and
socially marginalized neighborhoods. These stereotypes have contributed to a belief that gangs are
not found in a number of communities in the USA or in other countries. The truth of the matter is
that gangs come in many shapes and sizes and gang members represent the communities in which
they reside. A relatively recent emergence of comparative and multi-method research conducted as
part of the Eurogang Program of Research suggests that gangs not only exist throughout the world
but that they are remarkably similar in terms of gang and gang member characteristics.
“Youth Gangs: Not Just an American Phenomenon”

Gang research in the United States of America can be traced back to the seminal work by
Thrasher (1927). Over the ensuing years, most gang research has relied on case studies (including
ethnographies, in depth studies of individuals and/or groups) that have provided rich, descriptive
accounts of gang members and gangs. More recently, largely stimulated by the work of Walter
Miller in the 1970s, gang researchers drew from law enforcement data to address the extent and
nature of gangs and associated illegal activity. Journalists and the mass media have also been
intrigued with gangs and have introduced the general population to gangs (including the gangs of the
American Wild West, such as Jesse James’ gang in the Midwest and the Hole in the Wall Gang
featuring Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid but also including more current images introduced in
films such as Colors and in Gangsta Rap videos). Many of the ethnographic and contemporary
journalistic accounts have focused on gangs in traditional “gang” cities including Chicago, Los
Angeles, and New York City. These various sources of information have contributed to a
1


stereotypical image of gangs and gang members: members are generally viewed as males of
racial/ethnic minority status residing in impoverished urban settings (see, for example, the work of
Esbensen and Tusinski, 2007). One over-riding notion is that these gangs are an American
phenomenon that does not exist in other nations.
The past 25+ years have witnessed a shift in gang research. Survey methodology, including
cross-sectional and longitudinal studies utilizing in-person interviews of youth in general samples,
self-administered questionnaires completed by students in school, and interviews with incarcerated
samples, has been incorporated into the study of gangs. Findings from these research projects have
challenges the stereotypical picture of gangs and gang members (Esbensen and Huizinga, 1993;
Esbensen and Winfree, 1998; Fagan, 1989; Thornberry et al., 1993).
While gang research has a long history and tradition in the USA, there is a lack of consensus
about what constitutes a gang or a gang member. These definitional issues have received
considerable attention (for a review of the definitional debate, consult Curry et al., 2014; Klein and
Maxson, 2006). One common refrain used by law enforcement representatives defies definition and
relies on description: “if it walks like a duck, talks like a duck, and looks like a duck; it’s a duck.”
This approach of relying upon the physical characteristics of potential gang members may have some
utility but caution must be urged. True, some gangs and gang members have denotable
characteristics such as favoring one color (often blue or red), specific tattoos and hand signals to
identify members, and wearing specific clothing. But, with the dissemination of culture and language
through mass media and social media, such clothing styles, tattoos, and other “gang” symbols have
been adopted by non-gang youth. So, while it may look like a duck, it may not be a duck. This
reliance upon descriptive characteristics could well result in an over-identification of youth as gang
involved. A better approach to defining gangs and gang members is required.
One potential definition is provided by the US Department of Justice. DOJ developed a

working definition of a “gang” as a group or association of three or more persons who may have a
common identifying sign, symbol, or name and who are involved in criminal activity which creates
an atmosphere of fear and intimidation” (GAO, 2009). This definition continues to rely on
descriptive characteristics, which could be used to identify sports teams such as the Swiss National
Football team. The inclusion of “involvement in criminal activity and creates an atmosphere of fear
and intimidation” begins to narrow the scope of interest but may still include groups that would not
or should not be considered gangs. This is a rather important issue given the introduction of
2


enhanced sentencing guidelines for gang-involved crimes and/or crimes committed by gang
members. Being identified as a gang member can result in many more years in prison. With such
real-world consequences, it is essential that the label of gang member be correctly applied. I will
return to this topic later in this chapter.
As mentioned above, there has been and continues to be debate about how to define gangs
and gang membership. Researchers in the American context have adopted the self-nomination
method. Similar to self-reported delinquency, the researcher relies upon the study participant to
indicate whether or not they are a gang member. This self-nomination technique (also used by law
enforcement) has proven to be particularly robust, especially in American gang research (see, for
example, Esbensen et al. 2001). However, how well does such an approach work in different
languages and different cultures?
Gangs Outside of the USA

During the 1990s gangs and gang culture proliferated. At the same time the USA experienced
a drastic increase in youth violence, drug sales, and overall homicide rate. Some suggest that these
two phenomena were inter-related and that gangs were involved with the distribution of crack
cocaine and that this drug trade was particularly violent (see, for instance, the volume by Blumstein
and Wallman, 2000). Two Los Angeles-based gangs, the Bloods and Crips, contributed to the notion
that gangs were establishing satellite sets while creating a national drug and crime distribution
network. Gangsta rap was widely disseminated and music videos popularized the “gangster” look
(e.g., wearing specific colors, wearing a hat in a certain manner, hanging a bandana out of your
pocket, sagging your pants, etc.) leading to the impression that gangs were developing everywhere.
The question raised by these “wannabes” was whether they were “real” gangs and gang members or
simply imitating this American phenomenon.
By the mid- to late 1990s, gang research in the United States had expanded beyond the
traditional gang cities and found that gangs and gang-involved youth were found in a variety of
settings, including large urban areas, the suburbs and small cities, and even in rural areas (e.g., Egley
et al., 2004; Esbensen and Peterson Lynskey, 2001). Several researchers wondered if other countries,
especially within Europe, were experiencing this same emergence or identification of gangs (e.g.,
Klein et al., 2001). In an attempt to address this question, a group of approximately 50 researchers
and policy makers from the USA and throughout Europe convened a workshop in 1998. In the
course of this three-day meeting, it became clear that in order to answer this question, there would be
3


a need for agreement on a definition as well as more systematic research. Some European researchers
commented: we don’t have gangs like you do in the US. This was an interesting observation because
it highlighted the extent to which those individuals were responding to the stereotypical image of
gangs presented in the media and not the empirical reality that not all gangs are large, hierarchical,
organized, and territorial. This initial meeting in Germany led to the formation of the Eurogang
Program of Research which has produced a number of research instruments (Weerman et al., 2009)
as well as four volumes describing gang research in Europe and the United States as well as several
comparative research projects (e.g., Decker and Weerman, 2005; Esbensen and Maxson, 2012; van
Gemert et al. 2008; Klein et al., 2001).
Over the course of four years (five meetings and numerous email and telephone exchanges),
this group of researchers agreed on a nominal definition of gangs: “a street gang is any durable,
street-oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal activities is part of its group identity.
This definition incorporates the following defining elements of a gang. The group must consist of 1)
3 or more people, 2) who are mostly between the ages of 12 and 25 years of age, 3) spend a lot of
time in public places, 4) been in existence for more than 3 months, and, importantly, 5) accept and
actually participate in illegal activity. One objective of this definition was to define the key elements
of a gang rather than description of characteristics.
Early research conducted by these international scholars tended to be qualitative accounts

similar to those produced by American ethnographers studying gangs. These case studies tended to
mirror the findings from the American qualitative research that had been traditionally conducted in
single sites (usually New York, Chicago, Los Angeles but also including St. Louis) and confirmed
the impression that gangs were disproportionately male and immigrant groups. Some examples of
these studies follow. In the Netherlands, van Gemert (2001) described a Moroccan gang thusly: “Of
the 24 members … all are Moroccan with the exception of a Dutch, a Surinamese, and a Dutch
Philippine boy… the three non-Moroccan boys are ‘Moroccanized’.” Mares (2001) described the
group he studied in Manchester, UK as “(a)bout 80 percent of the gang members are of ethnic
descent, mostly Afro-Caribbean.” Lien’s (2001) description of Oslo gangs further highlights the
ethnic status of the members: “Immigrant gangs, both homogeneous and multiethnic, represent a new
phenomenon that has emerged during the eighties. The most famous of these is a gang composed of
Pakistani youths called the Young Guns …. came to the attention of the media … through a series of
fights with other gangs, among them a Pakistani group called the ‘Killers’, a Filipino gang called the
‘Outsiders.’”
4


In addition to agreeing on a common definition, the Eurogang Program of Research also

encouraged researchers to adopt the instruments that had been developed for use in multi-method,
multi-site studies (Weerman et al., 2009). The importance of multiple methods research is
underscored by the ethnographic studies that, like their American counterparts, focused attention on
males and racial/ethnic minorities. To what extent were these studies representative of gangs in those
countries? The quotes from qualitative research highlight the similarity to media generated picture.
However, a growing body of research finds that gang members are representative of the communities
from which they hail (Esbensen and Carson, 2012). As survey studies have moved beyond the
traditional gang cities and out of “high-risk” neighborhoods and included wider representation of
youth, the emerging picture is not consistent with the stereotypical picture painted by the media or
even that depicted in the qualitative research. For example, studies have increasingly identified girls
in gangs, ranging from around 25% to 50% with the norm being more in the 33% range. Studies in
the USA, the UK, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands (and recently also in China
and Trinidad Tobago) consistently report that girls account for one quarter to one-half of all youth
gang members (Bendixen et al., 2005; Esbensen and Weerman, 2005; Gatti et al., 2011; Huizinga
and Schumann, 2001; Pedersen and Lindstadt, 2012; Pyrooz et al., 2012; Weerman, 2012).
These largely school-based surveys conducted in numerous nations during the past decade
also cast doubt on the notion that gangs consist primarily of immigrant or minority youth. Klein
concluded that “While both scholars and practitioners often specify gang differences according to
ethnic backgrounds or neighborhood (community) characteristics, my own experience and a good
deal of research suggest that group processes trump ethnicity and neighborhood” (2012:296). In their
comparison of gang-involved youth in the Netherlands and the USA, Esbensen and Weerman (2005),
for instance, found native born Dutch to be proportionately represented in youth gangs. In addition to
the sex and ethnic background of gang members relative to non-gang members, the various studies
utilizing the Eurogang definition have reported the presence of youth gangs in all nations studied.
The prevalence rates vary but generally hover between five and 10 percent of youth being classified
as gang involved. The International Self-Report Delinquency study was conducted in 30 nations
across the globe. They report gang prevalence rates ranging from a low of 0.4 to a high of 16.8
percent (Gatti et al., 2011; Haymoz et al., 2013). Clearly the American phenomenon of youth gangs
is not exclusively the domain of the American setting.
Gangs and Delinquent Behavior

5


The prevalence rates vary but generally hover between five and 10 percent of youth being classified
as gang involved. The International Self-Report Delinquency study was conducted in 30 nations
across the globe. They report gang prevalence rates ranging from a low of 0.4 to a high of 16.8
percent (Gatti et al., 2011; Haymoz et al., 2013). Clearly the American phenomenon of youth gangs
is not exclusively the domain of the American setting.
Gangs and Delinquent Behavior

5

One of the reasons that gangs are of interest to researchers and practitioners is that they
commit a disproportionate amount of crime. You will recall from the Eurogang definition that a
defining element of that definition was that it was okay to commit illegal acts and that doing so was
part of the group identity. Some might argue that this aspect of the definition makes it tautological to
say that gang members are more delinquent than non-gang members. Two points are relevant: 1) the
difference in offending rates exist even when involvement in illegal behavior is not part of the
definition (e.g., Esbensen et al., 2001) and 2) the order of magnitude in the differences in offending
rates is such that it cannot be attributed solely to definitional issues. Several studies have found that
gang boys and girls commit approximately four times as many offenses as their non-gang
counterparts but the ratio increases with severity of offending (Esbensen and Weerman, 2005;
Huizinga and Schumann, 2001; Pedersen and Lindstadt, 2012). In the American context, two large
studies reported that the gang members in those samples, while accounting for a minority of the
sample, accounted for more than 75 percent of violent offenses (Huizinga et al., 2003; Thornberry,
1998). It is important to note that gang girls are also engaged in the delinquent activity of the gang;
they are not just affiliates who stand by while the boys fight.
One factor that has been related to levels of offending by gang members is the sex
composition of the gangs. To date, only studies in the US and the Netherlands have examined this
feature but results were similar. First, a minority of gangs are exclusively male or female. The
relative distribution of girls and boys in gangs seem to influence group dynamics, including
delinquency. Female offending is higher among girls who are in majority male gangs rather than sex-
balanced gangs. Likewise, boys in sex balanced gangs commit fewer crimes than those in majority
male gangs (e.g., Peterson et al., 2001; Peterson and Carson, 2012; Weerman, 2012).
Gang Member Stability – The gang effect

With the introduction of longitudinal studies including gang involved youth, researchers have
been able to examine a number of issues associated with gang membership. For example, what are
the risk factors contributing to joining a gang? What are the consequences of leaving the gang? Are
youth delinquent prior to joining the gang or does the gang facilitate delinquent involvement? While
cross-sectional studies of youth can provide a lot of information and provide a snapshot of their lives,
longitudinal studies allow for examining changes and stability over time. Two early panel studies
(that is, following the same individuals across time) highlighted the fact that gangs enhance youths’
involvement in crime. While the gang members had slightly higher rates of delinquency prior to
joining the gang, those rates skyrocketed during the time the youth was in the gang and then declined
6

upon leaving the gang (Esbensen and Huizinga, 1993; Thornberry et al., 1993). Since publication of
these findings, they have been replicated in other panel studies conducted in the US (Battin et al.,
1998; Gordon et al., 2004; Melde and Esbensen, 2011, 2013, 2014; Peterson et al., 2004; Thornberry
et al., 2003), Canada (Gatti et al., 2005), and Norway (Bendixen et al., 2005).
In addition to identification of the enhancement effect, these studies highlighted the fact that
gang membership is a relatively transient experience for most gang youth. Contrary to the media
generated myth that “once in a gang, in a gang for life” or “blood in, blood out,” most gang youth
were members of the gang for less than one year (Esbensen and Huizinga, 1993; Thornberry et al.
1993, 2003).
Risk Factors
On important question is: why do youth join gangs? In the preceding sections of this chapter,
it has been noted that gangs are found in a variety of settings and in all nations studied. These gang
youth are representative of the larger adolescent population and the majority of youth who join a
gang, remain in the gang for a relatively short period of time. Are the youth who join gangs in some
way different from those youth who do not? To answer this question, researchers have examined risk
factors that may be predictive of gang joining. To date, most of this research has been conducted in
the USA but there is a growing body of research in Europe that suggests that the risk factors as
similar across different national contexts (e.g., Bendixen et al., 2004; Esbensen and Weerman, 2005;
Pedersen and Lindstadt, 2012)
Risk factors are generally categorized into five different domains: neighborhood, family,
school, peers, and individual. To date, risk factors in all five domains have been linked to gang
joining and youth are at greater risk the more risk factors they possess across different domains (see,
for example, Esbensen et al., 2010). Risk factor research is hindered by the fact that different
researchers employ different measures of similar concepts but an important finding is that regardless
of how risk factors are operationalized, they tend to produce the same or similar results. In their
comparative research, Esbensen and Weerman (2005) examined factors associated with gang
membership in a sample of students from the USA and another from the Netherlands. To measure
“parental monitoring” the Dutch students responded to the following three questions: 1) At home, I
have to do what my parents say; 2) I know what is and what is not allowed for me at home; and 3)
My parents know where I go to outside the home. In contrast, the American students responded to
the following four questions: 1) When I go someplace, I leave a note for my parents or call them to
7


tell them where I am; 2) My parents know where I am when I am not at home or at school; 3) I know
how to get in touch with my parents if they are not at home; and 4) My parents know who I am with
if I am not at home. In spite of these different measures, the concept of parental monitoring is
identified as a risk factor in both samples. Other risk factors that have very similar patterns in the two
studies include: peer delinquency and peer pressure, parental attachment, school commitment,
impulsivity, risk seeking, and moral attitudes. To date, similar risk factors have been identified in
studies conducted in the USA, the Netherlands, Denmark, Canada, and China.
Summary
In this brief chapter I have addressed several themes related to the phenomenon of youth
gangs. First, definition matters: just because it walks like a duck, looks like a duck, and quacks like a
duck, doesn’t mean it’s a duck. It is important to have defining elements that move beyond sheer
description of a gang. In the American context, self-definition works well. For comparative research,
however, a common definition that identifies key characteristics that distinguish gangs from other
groups is necessary. The Eurogang Program of Research provides one definition that has received
considerable support (http://www.umsl.edu/ccj/Eurogang/euroganghome.html). Just as definition
matters, so too does research methodology. Single methods can provide important information but
researchers will benefit from incorporating multiple methods. Such an approach will provide, for
instance, a broad overview of the gang situation using school-based surveys while obtaining more
nuanced and contextual information by incorporating ethnographic and/or expert surveys.
While the history of gang research has tended to report on single-method, single-site
research, it is important for understanding the youth gang problem to include not only
mixed/multiple methods but to include multiple sites within nations and across nations. To date,
studies have suggested considerable robustness and consistency in the nature and extent of the gang
problem. Prevalence rates, when using a common definition, indicate gangs exist to varying degrees
in all nations studied. Interestingly, especially given stereotypes, girls account for a sizable
percentage (generally around 30 – 35%) of gang members. And, based on relatively recent research,
other stereotypical depictions of youth gangs are called into question:
1) Gangs are not solely a minority or immigrant problem;
2) Gangs are found outside of economically distressed urban areas;
3) A common set of risk factors appear to be associated with gang membership;
4) Involvement in delinquent behavior and especially violence is closely associated with
gang joining; and
8


5) Gang membership is a transitory stage in adolescence – that is, the average youth belongs
to the gang for less than one year.
Much has been learned with respect to youth gangs during the past two decades. Continued
collaboration and expansion of research to more countries will help to establish if the youth gang
phenomenon transcends all national boundaries or if cultural and societal differences persist. To date,
the emerging comparative research holds promise and, as we move forward, perhaps this
comparative approach will be successful in identifying strategies to reduce the prevalence and
negative consequences of youth gangs.
REFERENCES
1. Battin, Sara R., Karl G. Hill, Robert D. Abbott, Richard F. Catalano, and J. David Hawkins.
(1998). “The Contribution of Gang Membership to Delinquency beyond Delinquent Friends.”
Criminology 36:93-115.
2. Bendixen, Mons, Inger M. Endresen, and Dan Olweus. (2006). “Joining and Leaving Gangs.
3. Selection and Facilitation Effects on Self-Reported Antisocial Behaviour in Early
Adolescence.”
4. European Journal of Criminology 3: 85–114.
5. Blumstein, Albert and Joel Wallman. (2000). The crime drop in America. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
6. Curry, G, David, Scott H. Decker, and David C. Pyrooz (2014). Confronting Gangs; Crime
and Community, 3rd edition, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
7. Decker, Scott H. and Frank M. Weerman (2005), European Street Gangs and Troublesome
Youth Groups. Alta Mira Press.
8. Egley, Arlen, Jr., James C. Howell, and Aline K. Major. (2004). “Recent patterns in gang
problems in the United States: Results from the 1996 - 2002 National Youth Gang Survey.”
Pp. 90-108 in Finn-Aage Esbensen, Stephen G. Tibbetts, and Larry Gaines (eds.) American
Youth Gangs at the Millennium. Long grove, IL: Waveland Press.
9. Esbensen, Finn-Aage and Dena Carson. (2012). “Who Are the Gangsters?: An examination
of the age, race/ethnicity, sex, and immigration status of self-reported gang members in a
seven city study of American youth.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 28:462-478.
10. Esbensen, Finn-Aage and David Huizinga (1993). “Gangs, drugs, and delinquency in a
sample of urban youth.” Criminology 31:565-587.
9


11. Esbensen, Finn-Aage and Cheryl L. Maxson. (2012), Youth Gangs in International
Perspective: Results from the Eurogang Program of Research. New York, NY: Springer.
12. Esbensen, Finn-Aage and Dana Peterson Lynskey. (2001). “Youth Gang Members in a
School Survey.” Pp. 93-114 in Malcolm Klein, Hans-Jurgen Kerner, Cheryl Maxson, and
Elmar Weitekamp (eds.) The Eurogang Paradox: Street Gangs and Youth Groups in the U.S.
and Europe. Amsterdam: Kluwer Press.
13. Esbensen, Finn-Aage, Dana Peterson, Terrance J. Taylor, and Adrienne Freng. (2010).
Youth Violence: Sex and Race Differences in Offending, Victimization, and Gang
Membership. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
14. Esbensen, Finn-Aage and Karin Tusinski. (2007). “Youth gangs in the print media.” Journal
of Crime and Popular Culture 14:21-38.
15. Esbensen, Finn-Aage and Frank M. Weerman. (2005). A Cross-National Comparison of
Youth Gangs and Troublesome Youth Groups in the United States and the Netherlands.”
European Journal of Criminology 2:5-37.
16. Esbensen, Finn-Aage and L. Thomas Winfree, Jr. (1998). “Race and Gender Differences
between Gang and Nongang Youth: Results from a multisite survey.’ Justice Quarterly
15:505-526.
17. Esbensen, Finn-Aage, L. Thomas Winfree, Jr., Ni He, and Terrance J. Taylor. (2001).
“Youth Gangs and Definitional Issues: When is a gang a gang, and why does it matter?”
Crime and Delinquency 47:105-130.
18. Fagan, Jeffrey. (1989). “The social organization of drug use and drug dealing among urban
gangs. Criminology 27:633-669.
19. Gatti, Uberto, Sandrine Haymoz, and H. Schadee. (2011). “Deviant Youth Groups in 30
Countries: Results from the second international self-report delinquency study.” International
Criminal Justice Review 16:1667-182.
20. Gatti, Uberto, Tremblay, R. E., Vitaro, F., & McDuff, P. (2005). “Youth Gangs, Delinquency
and Drug Use: A Test of the Selection, Facilitation, and Enhancement Hypotheses.” Journal
of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 46:1178-1190.
21. van Gemert, Frank. (2001). “Crips in Orange: Gangs and groups in the Netherlands.” Pp. 145
– 152 in Malcolm Klein, Hans-Jurgen Kerner, Cheryl Maxson, and Elmar Weitekamp (eds.)
The Eurogang Paradox: Street Gangs and Youth Groups in the U.S. and Europe.
Amsterdam: Kluwer Press.
22. van Gemert, Frank, Dana Peterson, and Inger-Lise Lien. (2008). Youth Gangs, Migration,
and Ethnicity. Willan Publishing.
10


23. Gordon, Rachel A., Benjamin B. Lahey, Eriko Kawai, Rolf Loeber, Magda Stouthamer-
Loeber, and David P. Farrington. (2004). “Antisocial Behavior and Youth Gang Membership:
Selection and socialization.” Criminology 42:55-88.
24. Haymoz, Sandrine, Cheryl L. Maxson, and Martin Killias. (2014). “Street Gang Participation
in Europe: A comparison of correlates.” European Journal of Criminology 11:559-681.
25. Huizinga, David and Karl F. Schumann, (2001). “Gang Membership in Bremen and Denver:
Comparative longitudinal data.” Pp. 231-246 in M.W. Klein, H.-J. Kerner, C.L. Maxson, and
E.G.M Weitekamp (eds.) The Eurogang Paradox: Street gangs and youth groups in the U.S.
and Europe. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishing.
26. Huizinga, David, Anne W. Weiher, Rachelle Espirutu, and Finn-Aage Esbensen. (2003).
“Delinquency and Crime: Some highlights from the Denver Youth Survey.” Pages 47-91 in
Terence P. Thornberry and Marvin D. Krohn (eds.) Taking Stock of Delinquency: An
overview of findings from contemporary longitudinal studies. New York: Kluwer
Academic/Plenum Publishers.
27. Klein, Malcolm W. (2012). “The Next Decade of Eurogang Program Research.” Pages 291-
301 in Finn-Aage Esbensen and Cheryl L. Maxson (eds.) Youth Gangs in International
Perspective: Results from the Eurogang Program of Research. New York: Springer.
28. Klein, Malcolm W., Hans-Juergen Kerner, Cheryl L. Maxson, and Elmar G.W. Weitekamp
(2001), The Eurogang Paradox: Street Gangs and Youth Groups in the U.S. and Europe.
Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
29. Klein, Malcolm W. and Cheryl L. Maxson. 2006). Street gang patterns and policies. New
York City, NY: Oxford University Press.
30. Lien, Inger-Lise. (2001). “The Concept of Honor, Conflict and Violent Behavior among
Youths in Oslo.” Pp. 165-174 in Malcolm Klein, Hans-Jurgen Kerner, Cheryl Maxson, and
31. Mares, Dennis, (2001). “Gangstas or Lager Louts? Working class street gangs in
Manchester.” Pp. 253-164 in Malcolm Klein, Hans-Jurgen Kerner, Cheryl Maxson, and
32. Melde, Chris and Finn-Aage Esbensen. (2011). “Gang Membership as a Turning Point in the
Life Course.” Criminology 49:513-552.
11


33. Melde, Chris and Finn-Aage Esbensen. (2013). “Gangs and Violence: Disentangling the
impact of gang membership on the level and nature of offending.” Journal of Quantitative
Criminology 29:143-166.
34. Melde, Chris and Finn-Aage Esbensen. (2014). "The Relative Impact of Gang Status
Transitions: Identifying the mechanisms of change in delinquency." Journal of Research in
Crime and Delinquency 51:349-376.
35. Pedersen, Maria Libak and Jonas Markus Lindstad. (2012). “The Danish Gang-Joining
Project: Methodological Issues and Preliminary Results.” Pp. 239-250 in Finn-Aage
Esbensen and Cheryl L. Maxson (eds.) Youth Gangs in International Perspective: Results
from the Eurogang Program of Research. New York: Springer.
36. Peterson, Dana, and Dena C. Carson. (2012). “The Sex Composition of Groups and Youths’
Delinquency: A Comparison of Gang and Non-gang Peer Groups.” Pp. 189-219 in Finn-Aage
Esbensen and Cheryl L. Maxson (eds.) Youth Gangs in International Perspective: Results
from the Eurogang Program of Research. New York: Springer.
37. Peterson, Dana, Jody Miller, and Finn-Aage Esbensen. (2001). “The Impact of Sex
Composition on Gang Member Attitudes and Behavior.” Criminology 39:411-440.
38. Peterson, Dana, Terrance J. Taylor, and Finn-Aage Esbensen. (2004). “Gang Membership
and Violent Victimization.” Justice Quarterly 21:793-815.
39. Pyrooz, David C., Andrew M. Fox, Charles M. Katz, and Scott H. Decker. (2012). “Gang
Organization, Offending, and Victimization: A Cross-National Comparison.” Pp.85-106 in
Finn-Aage Esbensen and Cheryl L. Maxson (eds.) Youth Gangs in International Perspective:
Results from the Eurogang Program of Research. New York: Springer.
40. Thornberry, Terence P. (1998). “Membership in Youth Gangs and Involvement in Serious
and Violent Offending.” Pp. 147-166 in Rolf Loeber and David P. Farrington (eds.) Serious
and Violent Juvenile Offenders: Risk factors and successful interventions. Thousand Oaks,
CA:Sage.
41. Thornberry, Terence P., Marvin D. Krohn, Alan J. Lizotte, and Deborah Chard-Wierschem.
(1993). “The role of juvenile gangs in facilitating delinquent behavior.” Journal or Research
in Crime and Delinquency 30:55-87.
42. Thornberry, Terence P., Marvin D. Krohn, Alan J. Lizotte, Carolyn A. Smith, and Kimberly
Tobin. (2003). Gangs and Delinquency in Developmental Perspective. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
43. Thrasher, Frederic. (1927). The gang: A study of 1,313 gangs in Chicago. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
12


44. Weerman, Frank M. (2012). “Are the Correlates and Effects of Gang Membership Sex-
Specific? Troublesome Youth Gangs and Delinquency Among Dutch Girls.” Pp.271-290 in
Finn-Aage Esbensen and Cheryl L. Maxson (eds.) Youth Gangs in International Perspective:
Results from the Eurogang Program of Research. New York: Springer.
45. Weerman, Frank M., Cheryl L. Maxson, Finn-Aage Esbensen, Judith Aldridge, Juanjo
Medina, & Frank van Gemert. (2009). Eurogang Program Manual: Background,
development, and use of the Eurogang instruments in multi-site, multi-method comparative
research. St. Louis, MO: University of Missouri-St. Louis.
13


ARBITRATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN ANTIQUITY (500 BC- 350BC)
Adil CALAP1 & Özcan ERDOĞAN2
Abstract
The common objective of the temple of Apollo at Delphi3 is associated with that of the United
Nations by some Constructivists in International Relations. Delphi and the external relations of the
city states on both sides of Aegean Sea in the age of Antiquity between 500 BC and 350 BC are
analyzed whether institutions of the Antiquity were capable of forming resolution of conflicts on the
basis of mutually agreed and recognized rules, customs and norms. Another objective of the study
reveals a cardinal fact that the city states within the context of slavery were function of the slavery
system created by the Persian Empire. The relative independence of the slavery city-states owns their
historical existence to the requirements of the slavery dependent on the Persian strategies. The
versatile relations of the temple of Apollo at Delphi with the city-states are revealed that they were
not strong enough to set incentives for forum and rules in organizing certain constructive cooperation
and common institutions among the city-states prior to and during the Peloponnesian wars (490 BC-
404 BC). Optimal approaches to the analysis of dispute prevention and dispute settlement process
particularly focusing on Peloponnesian wars may require distinguishing the various categories of
external political and military disputes in accordance with their underlying conflicts of interests.
Although some significant contributions by Constructivist Paradigm to the international relations
theory are appreciated, there is in Constructivism an idea that needs profoundly criticizing. There is a
claim, a point of view which this study opposes. In that respect this study concludes that Delphi was
permanently structurally incapable of carrying out a negotiation and arbitration approach to conflict
resolution. The role of Delphi was rather a key justifying role than the direct arbitration and

1
Senior Lecturer, Responsible for lecturing on courses in English, Department of International Relations, Karadeniz
Technical University.
2
Dr, Civil Service Chief Inspector, Interior Ministry Inspection Board, Ankara, Turkey
3
Delphi was one of the most important ancient religious temples devoted to the god Apollo. The site was settled in the
late Bronze Age (1500-1100 BC) but took on its religious importance from around 800 BC. The original name of the
temple was Pytho after the snake which Apollo was believed to have killed there. Located near the Gulf of Corinth, the
temple was home to the famous oracle of Apollo which gave cryptic predictions and guidance to representatives of city-
states including individuals. In 191 BC Delphi came under Roman control. For further information please see:
Hornblower, S. The Oxford Classical Dictionary. OUP, (Oxford, 2012).
14

negotiation role. Conflicting judgments invite the-re-evaluation of Constructivist theoretical

approach to the city-state relations in the Antiquity.
Key Words: Delphi, slavery, conflict Resolution, arbitration, Constructivism, Persians,

Peloponnesian Wars, Athenians, Spartans.
1.1 Introduction
Promoting historical consistency between the contemporary international institutions such as the
United Nations and the temple of Apollo at Delphi in the Antiquity is required to consider
historically distinctive natures of the structures in which international dispute settlement proceedings
partake. But this research study rather discusses the characteristics of Delphi than compare it to the
United Nations in terms of conflict resolution4.
This study aspires to make it clear that the possible explanation of the Delphi’s existing structure was
not on the basis that it had been run by incompetent people and that a change in morale and
performance would have solved the problem of slavery. The inadequacy in arbitration and amoral
approaches in the context of moral purpose was much more fundamental. Subsequently, the aim of
the argument seeks to state that the international structure for conflict resolution posited by
Constructivism in regard to Antiquity seems to be fragmented in its real image. It explicitly points
out why the Delphi was but an insufficient institution to account for relations based on her arbitrating
role. The external relations between the city states during the Peloponnesian war become the starting
point of enquiry.
It will be also argued that the behavior of Athenian city state5 with respect to her interests drawing
gains from slavery was only able to find its meaning in the existence of a continual war. Thus
identifying Athenian city state with a major actor in the pursuit of regulating power politics for the

4
The word conflict resolution is a method by which arbitration and litigation processes can be critically involved in
facilitating the peaceful ending of conflict. For further information, please see: Bercovitch, Jacob and Jackson, Richard,
Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century: Principles, Methods, and Approaches, (University of Michigan Press,
2009)
5
Athenian city state experienced its most glorious times during the 5th century BC before and during the reign of
Pericles. Throughout this period the Golden Age of Athenian city-‐state, Parthenon was build. Arts , Science, Philosophy,
Drama, developed to their highest point. The outbreak of the Peloponnesian war between the Athenians including her
allies and Sparta alongside with her allies put an end to this glory. For further information, please see: Meier C., Athens:
a portrait of the city in its Golden Age, translated by R. and R. Kimber (New York, 1998).
15


sake of her democratic system may be utterly misleading. Athenian city state was manifestly a
dominant element in the slavery system6. Meanwhile, the discussion is extended to the point at which
Athenian city state is identified as a power that inevitably and eventually gave rise to a counter-
structure which had been seeking out its basis of support and element of cohesion in the fragmented
part of the traditional social forces within the penetrating context of slavery.
To introduce the term arbitration recognized by most of the members of the system with reference to
the Delphi obscures the important difference between Antiquity and the 21st century, structurally
different kinds of periods. Despite the fact that Delphi’s obedience to the most powerful city-states
seems evident, this study accepts that the Delphi was a respectable institution, commanding a wide
measure of consent among the city states, and was able to provide some benefits to the city states up
to before the emergence of the slavery period anyway. However, that sort of influence attributed to
Delphi seems to have faded away before the dawn of the slavery era. Subsequently, consent wore
thin as the city states unevenly began to be dragged into a slavery system in which the element of
force and violence became predominant, and it was in the core of the slavery system that the
challenge to the Athenian power first became manifest.7 At the core was a ruthless competition
among the slavery city states represented as sudden eruptions of symptoms between the Athenians
and others including Megara while at the periphery was a constant fear of disintegration and
annihilation represented by the Sparta city state8.
Another goal of the study attempts to disclose a fact that the city states within the context of slavery
had emerged as an inevitable function of the slavery system under the expansive influence of Persian
Empire. The argument is extended to a point at which the structure and network of the city states in
connection to the temple of Apollo at Delphi had transformed into meeting the need of the slavery
which was being monitored by the Persians.
Since the main issue was whether or not the Delphi became an ineffective instrument into the hands
of the variable powers or whether she had moral purpose as insisted by Constructivists, two
important question which are raised in that study are: 1) what were the mechanisms forming
resolution of conflicts in that particular historical structure? And 2) what forms of state and external
relations had existed within that particular historical structure?

6
Please see: Chaniotis, Angelos, Ancient World At War, (Blackwell Publishing, 2005)
7
8
Please see: Meier, Christian, The Greek Discovery of Politics, (Cambridge, 1990)
16


The analysis of this study would also seek to include some explanatory discussions to the questions
raised above. In that case this essay will try to demonstrate that actions of the Delphi for conflict
resolutions were constrained and manipulated by the need of the slavery system. At this point, it will
be explained that it is preferable for Constructivism to revert to a distorted terminology attributed to
Aristotle in order to justify their statement.
This study will try to understand both what is this Greek city states that so draw the theoretical
studies in IR and what the theoretical studies in IR find there. Do they reconfirm the claims of
constructivists? Do the Greek city states persist a metaphor for the imaginable realm in which the
concepts of Constructivism have been placed? Can we read all the documents of the city-states as
accounts or witnesses of the actual international relations? Under the pressure of such questions, the
ancient city-states may offer this essay a chance to revision the concepts of constructivists. By
stepping back into the city states, into what is factual and historical, this paper will seek to analyze
nonfactual and ahistorical predicaments of constructivism.
2.1 Constructivism and a Network of Institutions as Arbitrators in Antiquity
Constructivists regard the period of the Greek city-states as the manifestation of the Hobbesian
nature of international relations; the primordial period of the international relations dominated by
anarchy, insecurity, constant possibility of war among the states.9 For instance, Alexander Wendt
claims that “Judging from the violence and high death rate of states in the past it seems clear that
world politics has often been Hobbesian.”10 By this statement he also means that the functions and
roles of the Greek city-states in essence are similar to those of the modern states. But, in that
discourse he spots only one problem which is about ‘ignoring important differences in the systemic
context’. However, he argues that those ‘important differences’ could be overcome provided “the
structure is conceptualized in cultural terms”11. Subsequently through that angle of the view, he
suggests that any valid transhistorical generalizations become possible.

9
For Further Information please see: Strauss, Leo, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, (The University of Chicago
Press, 1963)
10
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.279
11
Ibid., p.214
17


For Constructivists “it is only through the interaction of state agents that the structure of the
international system is produced, reproduced, and sometimes transformed.”12 That is, without the
interaction of state agents we could not mention of any change or transformation in the structure of
the international system. In another word, the structure of the international system, the patterns of
cooperation, changes and transformation in the structure of IR are all reduced to the interactions of
the state agents. Due to such an abstraction, they return to the Greek city states in order to seek the
nature and genesis of the contemporary fundamental institutions. That is, they isolate sociology from
history, and summarize that randomness governs IR. For in its most simplistic form, Constructivists
invent a fundamental institution of third-party arbitration to support their claims about patterns of
cooperation. Delphi is considered an interstate organization which is thought to have been produced
by the interactions of the Greek city-states agents. Did Delphi really an interstate organization
resemble the United Nations?
In his writing, moral codes, including those which attempt the simplification of universality are the
lateralization of Aristotle’s thoughts. As a consequence, this study sets out to de-moralize the moral
codes from the moralistic fallacy of constructivism which reads the Peloponnesian war in terms of
good and bad, right and wrong. This requires the fiction of a fixed subject (arbitration), the choosers
(city-states), and the fixer (oracles at Delphi). This moralistic fallacy is central to the myth of
institution, a kind of identification projection, the source of heroic behavior which was essential for
sustaining slavery of the city states..
2.2 Constructivism and City States
To the constructivists, the Greek city-states are usually a universal standard against which all events
are measured. For example, as a constructivist Christian Reus-Smit says that “The ancient Greek
system of city-states occupies a special place in the study of international relations. It stands as one
of the great analogues of the modern state system, a familiar world of independent states in which the
eternal varieties of international politics are thought to have appeared in their most rudimentary and
essential form.”13
In that context, Constructivists try to be highlighting the historically existence of patterns of

cooperation by means of an international institutions as their intellectual efforts are placed upon
thrashing out the differences between distinct periods of history. Like Alexander Wendt, Christian

12
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.365
13
Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of The State, (Princeton University Press, 1999), p.40
18


Reus-Smit as another constructivist thinker follows suit as well. By such a reductionist method, one
may witness that the structure and functions of the Greek city-states are subjected to an imagined
transhistorical generalization. Therefore, Christian Reus-Smit may be seen as complying with the
principle of Alexander Wendt, namely conceptualizing the structure and roles of the ancient city-
states in cultural terms, but implicitly in distorted ones.
Like modern states, Greek city-states are believed by Constructivists to have established a network
of institutions to facilitate cooperation, negotiations, and arbitrations. They are imagined to have
favored the practice of third party arbitration in the absence of experiencing ‘contractual
international law and multilateralism’. They argue that the Greek city-states were bound together by
the Oracles at Delphi similar to a constitutional structure by which the state is thought to gain her
social identity. “Arbitration was the core fundamental institution, but it was nested within a web of
lesser institutions.” says Christian Reus, “The oracle at Delphi and the periodic Olympic festivals are
the best known, yet least important politically… The Oracle was the paramount religious institution
in ancient Greece, and it often issued political advice to city-states… Delphi exerted greater political
influence through another type of interstate institution.”14
3.1 The Archaic Background of Delphi
In archaic Greece (750-480 BC) among city-states treaties and alliances including arbitration were
useful tools to avoid the violent resolution conflicts. Cities would appoint arbitrators to settle inter-
city conflicts15. A group of men would stand above the conflicting parties; enjoy an independent
third position acting as mediators to all concerned16. The highest religious authority the oracle of
Apollo in Delphi promoted principles of moderation even in warfare17.
The effectiveness of Delphi over the city-states might have happened to have materialized at a time
when there was almost no trade within and among the cities in which the division of labor including
the divided function and role of the city states was very low18. Among the native people was also
hostility toward any kind of the trade and trading relations. For instance the exportation of oil which
was the only exported product in Attica at the time was secured by law issued by Solon (658 BC-
538BC) who was an Athenian politician, lawmaker and poet. “This law is inscribed upon the first of

14
15
Please see: Aeger, S. L. Interstate Arbitration in the Greek World, (Berkeley, 1996)
16
Meier, Christian, The Greek Discovery of Politics, (Cambridge, 1990), p.28-52
17
Ibid. p.33
18
19


his tables, so that there seems to be some evidence for the tradition that the export of figs was
prohibited in ancient times.”19 Likewise, Thucydides suggests that in former times there was no
mercantile traffic.20 There were no any structures which could have a tradition of containing and
tolerating any sort of commerce except the enforced intervention by the law itself until the slavery
became a complicated and relatively accepted system. By then, in the absence of a well-developed
mercantile traffic, Delphi would be thought to have experienced its golden era21. The existence of
commercial relations at primitive levels between the city states might furnish the Delphi as great
institution of arbitration.
However, due to eventual developments of the trade including a complex development in the slavery
associated with the division of labor induced by the expansion of the Persian slavery system and the
slowly growing appearance of polarization between the cities and country, Delphi may seem to have
begun to effectively lose its traditional identity and respected cultural position22.
4.1 The Persians, the City-States and Delphi
In antiquity, old practices and methods occurred prior to the slavery period always co-existed
alongside the emerging slavery. The development in the distribution of slavery among the city-states
was uneven: The coastal area of the European side of the Aegean Sea had devolved into slavery
markets by the Persians; people living in Asia minor appeared to have been sold out as slaves, the
import and export of whom were organized by the city-states under the guidance of the Persian
Empire23. The growing power of the city-states and the enlarged slave markets existed were the
product and function of the Persians. The inlands in Asia Minor used to serve as mechanism that
would produce slaves who were considered rebels revolting against the Persian rule.24
Relatively after two centuries during which time the mode of slave production seems to have settled
down with its own specific contradictory institutions and conflicts, when we arrived at the period of
Pericles in Athens (461 BC-429 BC), Delphi had already been transformed into an instrument into
the hands of cities as vassal of either Athens or Sparta or Corinth. It was no longer a common

19
Plutarch, The Rise and Fall of Athens, (Penguin Books, 1964), p.66
20
Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harvard University Press,
2003), p.5
21
22
23
Please see: The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005)
24
20


respectable religious institution, had already lost her impartiality, but seems to have turned into an
instrument being controlled by the interests of the unstable nature of the alignments of the cities.
The Development of slavery and the competition for the process of enslaving people transformed the
nature of the relationships among the city-states in Greece under the pressure of the Persian Empire.
The instinct for slavery gave way to fear and anxiety for annihilation within each state. Military
balance had mixed with unrest and unsettled feelings about whether their city-states would resume
surviving the ruthless enslaving conditions25.
The persistence of the fear for the enslavement was so deep and acute that it lasted centuries. One
could observe the deep and irrational anxiety of the city states forty years after the end of
Peloponnesian War (432 BC- 404 BC). For example, with the strategy of enslaving the
Peloponnesians, Corinthians had designed another war against both Spartans and Athenians. But to
form an alliance with Argos, Corinthians had employed some fears of enslavement about Argos, and
convinced them of the intention of Athenians and Spartans, hence successfully drove the Argos to
war26. Empirical evidence shows that such fear about the enslavement had been an essential
provocation to move city-states to major wars.
4.2 The Persian Aims in the 490s BC and Delphi’s Misjudgment
The Delian League was formed late in 478 BC27. In the aftermath of the success of the Greek navies
and revolt of city states, in 479-478 BC the defeated Persians moved along the coast restoring order
in city after city in Asia Minor with fleet and army moving together28. It had ensured that the victory
of the city states on the European side against the Persians could have been prevented from spreading
over Minor Asia. Through the city-states in Minor Asia, did the Persians would aim at controlling the
functioning structure of slavery trade in the city-states on the European continent side of the Aegean
Sea. A similar strategy by the Persians had been applied in 469 BC. The goal of the resumption of
the Persian Empire over the city-states in Greece was reduced to a commitment to maintaining
slavery trades within and across the city states. The perceptual change in politics and actual
adjustments to economic development solidified in strategy and diplomacy of the Persians. The

25
26
Kagan, Donald, The Peloponnesian War, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p.200-201
27
28
The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005), p.135
21


Persians began applying a strategy in which they decided to see whether they could secure by
diplomacy something of what they had not been able to secure by force29.
The Persians’ purposes were twofold. They sought to secure undisputed control over all of Asia.
Secondly they wanted a settled order within Greece that would occasion them the least trouble.30
Since trouble had come from naval power, they would be best served by enforcing a system that
required city states to be autonomous. But autonomy would not flourish to be left to itself. When the
Persians’ agent city states would fail to keep control over the rest of the city states, the Persians
would and did intervene31. The ending of Peloponnesian wars explicitly refers to that reality. Those
who did not accept such a condition would have to be coerced by joint action. The peace of Thebes
in 366 illustrates this32. In 367 Thebans had sought to institute a Persians peace with themselves the
leading power, that is, peace and alliance.
By the mid-fifth century the city states in Greece was polarized due to the competition for slavery.
Two power blocks appeared to emerge, led by the Athens and Sparta33. Those seeking to remain
neutral were viewed with suspicion by both block members34. This polarization made arbitration and
consequently the peaceful resolution of conflicts almost impossible35.
Arbitration between two power blocks was unable to work since there had been no superior
institution or agency that had sufficient authority to be recognized by both power blocks members. In
addition the prevailing political culture would encourage violent conflict resolution rather than
peaceful resolution36. The arbitration clause in the ‘Thirty Years Treaty’ of 446 BC between two

29
Ibid., p.135
30
Please see: The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005)
31
Ibid., p.183
32
(Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 6. 10)
33
Sparta as a city state grew strong to become the dominant military land-power in ancient Greece around 650 BC. Sparta
led the campaign as the leader of the combined city-states forces during the Greco-Persian Wars at the beginning of the
fifth century. Between 431 and 404 BC, Sparta was the enemy of Athenian city-state throughout the Peloponnesian War
Sparta with the financial aid of the Persians emerged victorious. 34 years after the victory of the Spartans, Thebes
receiving the financial support of the Persians ended Sparta’s role in 371 BC. For further information, please see:
Cartledge Paul, Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300 to 362 BC (2 ed.), (Oxford: Routledge, 2002)
34
Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harward University Press,
2003), 5.84-114
35
Please see: Hackett, Sir John, gen. ed. Warfare in the Ancient World. New York: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1989
36
Kagan, Donald, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace, (New York, 1995), ch.1
22


power blocks failed to come into effect just before the eruption of the Peloponnesian war in 432
BC.37
The intervention of the Persians in the affairs of the Greek city states had profoundly transformed the
structure of the city states in which the function and role of Delphi appears significantly paralyzed
and changed. Such changes led the city-states to solidify their gains through more effective
institutions. The search for securing their gains through slavery happened to have polarized the
relations between city-states and the Persian Empire. That kind of polarization leading to revolts and
temporary alliances seems to harden the position of the Persians in a broader region.
In that sense, the Persian aim in the 490s BC was rather to begin the incorporation of mainland
Greece within the Empire. At the beginning of the fifth century BC, namely around 480 BC, Sparta
and Athens including other city states were allied to each other against the Persian Empire. As soon
as city-states on the European continent knew that Greece was to be invaded, they took effective
action to unite. Delphi clearly expected the city-states in Greece to be largely overrun, and issued
dire oracles38. Delphi clearly believed the Persians to defeat the united front of the city-states.
However, in 480-479 BC the Persians failed to win over the city-states. The power of the Persians
was confined to Asia39. And the dire prediction of the Delphi’s oracle had proved wrong.
5.1 Peloponnesian Wars
In the aftermath of the defeat of the Persian Empire, as happened before the war, Spartans had been
preoccupied with the population of their neighbor city, called Messenia that had been enslaved by
Spartans. As slave owners and land oriented power, Spartans were concerned with maintaining the
status quo. ‘They were unwilling to commit their forces too extensively overseas’40. Athenians took
over Spartans’ leadership, the confederacy of the Athenians and their allies, later known as the
Delian League, came into existence.41 The purpose of the Delian League was supposed to be mutual
protection against Persia. The autonomy of all member city states would be respected; and their
representatives took an oath of loyalty to the League- an oath which was permanently binding.42

37
Ibid., ch.1 Kagan, Donald, The Peloponnesian War, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005),
38
Heredotus, The History, translated by David Grene, (Colombia University Press, 1988)., 7. 136. 9
39
Ibid.
40
Michael Grant, The Classical Greeks, (Phoenix Press, 1988), p.29
41
Ibid., p.29-30
42
Ibid., p.31
23


The taxes by each member city states were being pooled in the island of Delos; but, Athenians
moved the treasury to Athens (454 BC), claiming monopoly over the accumulated taxes due to their
increasing naval power. They relied on trading slaves and the sea oriented and slave owned
commercial characteristic of their city state. Athens was rather an expansionist power. This
expansionist behavior may be related to the exploitation of the fears of the small city states through
the Delian League. It had consolidated her control over her allies under the pretext of mutual
protection against the Persians.
On the Peloponnesian peninsula, Spartans and her allies established another League in order to deal
with the growing power of the Athens and its allies.43 Due to the needs caused by the slavery, Athens
began to use the Delian League's navy for its own interests. The behavior of Athens had been
frequently challenged by the less powerful members of the League. The first Peloponnesian War
between two camps broke out in 461 BC and ended in 445 BC. That war was sealed off by a treaty
that ensures peace for 30 years. The treaty had been brokered by the rulers of both Spartans and
Athenians. No involvement of Delphi was present for the settlement. That is, in the process of
negotiation between two camps, Delphi was not an instrument for conflict settlement, but the certain
individuals from both Athenians and Spartans for resolving the issue of the first Peloponnesian war.
That peace agreement did not last long; the second Peloponnesian War broke out in 431 BC which
led to a catastrophe, engulfing at least 120 city states together, driving all those city-states into a very
brutal and cruel war..
5.2 The Second Peloponnesian War
Thucydides states that the cause of the second Peloponnesian war was the result of the growth of the
power of Athens and the worries and fears it caused in Sparta and her allies. Spartans worried about
the growing power of Athens, but they were also fearful that their slaves could have revolted in case
they got engaged in war44. Athens and Spartans were slave states; going to war may have provided
opportunities for the slaves to revolt. The possibility of such revolts were refraining both power from
entering into a devastating war. Meanwhile, one of the slavery city states called Corinth, who as
rivals were competing with Athens, considered and assumed that due to fear of Athens about slave
revolts, Athens could have avoided entering war. Overriding that belief, Corinth harnessed a revolt in
a city state called Epidamnus on the periphery to empower her position against Athens. In contrary to
what Corinth calculated Athens advocated the opposing groups in that city against the supporters of

43
Kagan, Donald, The Peloponnesian War, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p.332
44
Kagan, Donald, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Cornell University Press, 1969), p.354.
24


the Corinth and decided to go to war in 431 BC45. By 431 BC, Athens' heavy-handed control of the
Delian League helped prompt the outbreak of the Peloponnesian.46
Before Athenian offensive, Corinthians turned to Spartans for manpower. In order for Corinthians to
ally with Sparta against their enemy, they successfully exploited Spartans’ fear about the
enslavement by the Athenians. They had used the threat of the secession and the prospect of an
alliance with Sparta.47
In 431, the second Peloponnesian war broke out, a war in which most of the city states took part.48
The second Peloponnesian war ended with the defeat of the Athens and her allies in 404 BC. The
resultant end of war and developments after the war proved that none of the city states in reality won
the war but only the Persians who used to control the consequences of the war by her financial
assistance without the involvement of military power.49
5.3 Peloponnesian Wars and the Persians
Once the Peloponnesian wars began, seeking Persian aid was an obvious way for the Spartans and
her allies to counter Athens naval and financial superiority. The Spartans sent their ambassadors to
the Persians to seek the help of the Persian King50. Athenians sought to encourage the Persians to
maintain his neutrality51. The Peloponnesians people needed money to man large fleets, the
embassies to Persia sought Persian gold. But the Persian King gave nothing52. In a prolonged war,
the basic aim of the Persians was to see her formal clients and rivals weakened through war.
The Spartans had entered the war with a proclamation that they were freeing Greece53. They meant
freedom from Athenian rule, freedom from the enslavement process. The envoy with the message

45
G. E. M. De Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (Cornell University Press), 1972, p. 201-203
46
Toivo Koivukoski (eds.): Enduring Empire. Ancient Lessons for Global Politics. (London 2009)
47
Kagan Donald, The Peloponessian War, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p.200
48
W. A Hurtley, H. C. Darby, A Short History of Greece, (Cambridge University Press), p.17
49
For further information on the involvement of the Persians in Peloponessian War, please see: Xenophon, Hellenica,
Books 1-4, Translated by L. Brownson, (Harward University Press, 2003).
50
2003), 2.7.I
51
52
Ibid., p.142
53
2003), 2.8.4-4.85. I
25


was captured and sent to Athens. Athens’ counter-embassy was turned back by news of the Persian
King54.
In the first decade of the war, Persians had distanced themselves from the conflicting parties,
expecting them to weaken one another so that her domination in the region would come into
existence. However, after the Sicilian campaign55 Athens were believed to collapse in 413 BC. In the
next two years the Athenians confronted uprisings and upheavals at home56. Predictions that
Athenians could collapse turned out to be premature. The rest of Peloponnesian war was powerfully
shaped by the Persian Empire.57
Athenians had become a weak city state; but it was evident that the Spartans and their allies could
not win without building a fleet and defeating Athens at sea. This could be done only by gaining the
financial and military support of the Persians. The Athenians, too, needed money to rebuild their
fleet. After the war in Sicily, attention shifted eastward, to the king of Persia and the satraps of his
western provinces.58
In 412-411 BC it was certainly the case that Persian help for Sparta was less than generous and in
effect enabled Athens to continue the war. Persians played the city states off against each other59.
The reason why Persia did not exploit Athens’s preoccupation in the early years of the
Peloponnesian war was that Persian state saw it was to Persia’s advantage to fight it out. It was an
obvious strategy. From 411 BC to the end of the war the Persian King declined to intervene despite
the pleas of his son Cyrus60. Then came the change. In 407 BC Cyrus came down as commander to
conduct with the Spartans the war against Athens61. In 406 BC the Athenians made an approach to
Cyrus after the Spartan envoy declared that they had secured all they wanted from the Persian king62.

54
2003), 4.50. 3
55
Sicilian campaign of Athenians in 415 BC ended in the defeat of Athens. Athens met total destruction,-their army, their
ships and everything were destroyed. For further information, please see: 55 Kagan, Donald, The Peloponessian War,
(HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p.313-325.
56
Kagan, Donald, The Peloponessian War, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005),, p.325
57
Ibid. P.325
58
Ibid.,p.325-26
59
60
Cawkwell, George, The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, (Oxford University Press, 2005), p.155
61
Xenophon, Hellenica, Translated by Carleton L. Browson, Harward University Press, I. 4. 3
62
Xenophon, Hellenica, Translated by Carleton L. Browson, Harward University Press,I. 5. 8
26


The Athenian embassy had been turned down. Cyrus provided the money necessary for the
maintenance of the Peloponnesian fleet63.
Cyrus said to the leader of the Spartans, Lysander, that if funds provided by the Persian King ran out
he would use his own money64. Similarly, the battle in 406 BC was a fearful disaster for the
Peloponnesian fleet. Without the support of Cyrus, Sparta might have given up struggle. The Persian
King had lack of enthusiasm for the final defeat of Athens; he did not want to send naval force which
he had withdrawn in 411 BC. Cyrus told Lysander not to fight a sea- battle unless he has a far greater
number of ships65. Because, for the defeat of Athens, an overwhelming naval force had seemed
essential. The Persians were reluctant to allow the Spartans and her allies to finalize the war. The real
proof of the Persian King’s lack of enthusiasm for the final defeat of Athens is provided by his
failure to send again the naval force which he had withdrawn in 411 BC.66
Although Sparta was financially supported by the Persians for preparing the path leading to the
demise of the Athenians, the Persian Empire remained suspicious about the intention of Sparta after
the war. If Athenians were thrown out of Asia, the Spartans having liberated the city states of
mainland Greece would not leave the city states of Asia to the mercy of the Persians67.
6.1 Function of Delphi in Peloponnesian Wars
What was the function of Delphi in seeking a resettlement to the war? It may be noticed that Delphi
was not taken into account as a serious institution that could have brokered conflict resolution. The
events to the formulation and execution of the settlement between the city-states may unfold the role
and function of certain individuals and dynamics of the period on the basis of creating stability
through balance of power.
In 404 BC, Athenians accepted their defeat. Athenians could not postpone peace negotiations since
the pressure of hunger became intolerable. But, who was responsible for conflict resolution? Delphi?
Not at all. Theramenes, as an Athenian general, was held responsible by the Athenians for
negotiations and conflict resolution. Delphi is not mentioned of as an arbitrator between the Athens
and Sparta and her allies. Theramenes proposed to seek out Lysander, the leader of Sparta; because

63
2003), 2. 65.12
64
Xenophon, Hellenica, Translated by Carleton L. Browson, Harward University Press, 1. 5. 3
65
Ibid., 2. 1. 14
66
67
27


Sparta and her allies meant to destroy Athens and its people. Athenians voted him full powers to
negotiate peace. Theramenes found Lysander at Samos and stayed with him there for three months.68
He made significant progress in the long discussion with Lysander, and had been in a position to
achieve a more satisfactory peace. The Spartans agreed to a settlement that left Athens intact and its
people alive and free. Athenians was given an opportunity to remain autonomous. The reason for the
long discussion with Lysander was that Spartans tried to counter the argument of Corinthians and
Thebans. Because, Spartan allies proposed that ‘the city be levelled and the countryside left a posture
for sheep.’69 Their purpose was to become a hegemonic power in slavery, and accordingly they
wanted to enslave the Athenian people. However, Sparta in considering the expansion of both
Corinthians and Thebes felt threatened in the future, decided to form a balance between Athens and
her allies mainly Corinth and Thebe70.
The existence of Sparta was made dependent on the balance between these city-states as it was so
just before the outbreak of Peloponnesian wars. The conflict resolution, negotiation between Athens
and Sparta with her allies took hold due to the basic concerns of Sparta’s historical structure rather
than the intervention of Delphi according to some ethical values and concerns.
Meanwhile, the efforts of Sparta to counterbalance her close alliances with the restoration of Athens
also would stand to overlap with the interests of the Persian Empire. Persians did not let the Spartans
crush utterly Athens. Athens was left free to get on with the reestablishment of her power. Athenians
revived financial institutions of the Fifth century Empire and the Persia had been faced with the
return of Athenian power71. In that respect the Persians accepted the Spartan’s offer, the Persians
made Sparta counterbalance Athens.
After the final defeat of the Athenians in 404 BC, the Spartans decided to extend their power to the
city- states of Asia which were under control of the Persians72. Maintaining control over the politics
of the cities of the mainland Greece and seeking to liberate the cities of Asia from Persians control
were inconsistent and too much for Sparta to manage. The Spartan army had been obliged to
abandon the Asiatic cities. The naval victory of the Persian fleet in 394 BC set the seal on it all.

68
Kagan Donald, The Peloponessian War, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p.480-81
69
Plutarch, Lysander, 15-2
70
Kagan Donald, The Peloponessian War, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p.480-81
71
The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005), Ibid., p.168
72
Ibid., p.188
28


There would be no question of negotiations between Sparta and Persia. The Persians would arrange
things entirely to their own satisfactions. They abandoned and claim to the cities of Asia and they
accepted that ‘all the islands and the rest of the cities of Greece should be autonomous73. In 386 BC
the Persians peace settled the business. The Persian peace kept the Greeks out of Asia and
autonomous city-states until the king of Macedon took charge of Greece.74
6.2 The misperceived Function of Delphi by Constructivism in Peloponnesian Wars
Delphi used to tend to think of conflicts in terms of an aggressor and a victim. The aggressor was the
party who would set the conflict motion. They tended to think that the aggressor had a certain
objective to be reached and the victim’s objective was to resist the aggressor.75 This was the
simplistic view of a conflict. The aggressor was in the wrong and must have been resisted. It may
have been that the aggressor’s objective would offer special benefits to him; maybe that objective
might not disadvantage the victim76. They failed to look beyond the first stated objectives; they were
unable to look beyond the simple label of aggressor and victim.
In spite of a qualitative change in the function of Delphi from impartiality to partiality due to the
distribution of power among the city states shaped by the slavery, the constructivists, regardless of
the historical differentiation, consider that as their principle institutional practice, the city-states are
considered to have adopted arbitration for which Delphi is imagined as a main organization.
Constructivists go further by claiming that only ancient city-states embraced the decision of a third
party with more commitment and consistency in history. “The prevailing conception of the moral
purpose of the state,” argues Christian Reus-Smit, “which defined legitimate statehood in ancient
Greece, entailed a distinctive understanding of procedural justice, an understanding embodied in the
practice of interstate arbitration.”77 In order to verify, acknowledge and prove his proposition he
insists that “Aristotle was a self-empiricist.”78 All his propositions have been depended on whether
Aristotle79 was a self-empiricist.

73
Xenophon, Hellenica, Translated by Carleton L. Browson, Harward University Press, 4. 8.14
74
75
76
Please See: Ibid.
77
78
Ibid., p.46
79
Aristotle was born in 384 BC in Stagirus, a seaport on the coast of Thrase and died in 322 BC. Aristotle joined the
Athenian Academy to study under Plato, attended Plato’s lectures for twenty years. Plato.theorized that ultimate reality is
29


That said, he finds it very easy ethically to reduce Aristotle’s ethical and political writings to the
reflection of the essence of the social and political world in which Peloponnesian wars took place.
For instance, when Aristotle says “proper function of man consists in an activity of the soul in
conformity with a rational principle”80, the political implication of that statement is directly linked to
that of the ancient Greek people. It is not considered that it was ‘a generalization of proper function
of man’ in accordance with Aristotle’s doctrine, but the actualized ‘proper function of the Greek
people.’ And Aristotle’s rational principle concerning with the expression of reason as the perception
of good and evil, just and unjust is again linked by Constructivists to the articulation of moral claims
of the ancient Greek people. He argues that “the moral purpose of the ancient Greek city-states thus
lay in the cultivation of bios politikos, a form of communal life characterized by the rational pursuit
of justice through action and speech.”81
6.3 The Role of Friendship Instead of Delphi for Conflict Resolution
With the contribution of three cases, the space of questioning is extended to ‘moral purpose’ of the
city-states. Before the outbreak of the second Peloponnesian war, in 446 BC the Euboeans and the
Peloponnesian states concerted an uprising against the Athens while Attica was sieged by the Spartan
army. Pericles82 decided to avoid an engagement with the Spartan army commanded by Pleistoanax;
instead he sought to resolve it through the negotiation. Pericles “took note of the fact that Pleistoanax
was a very young man and that among his advisers he relied mainly on Cleandridas, whom the
ephors had sent out with him on account of the king’s youth to act as his tutor and adviser. Pericles
opened secret negotiations with Cleandridas and soon succeeded in corrupting him with bribes and
prevailing on him to withdraw the Peloponnesian army from Attica.”83 In here Pericles openly
violates the so-called rational principles, ending the conflict by means of bribery without the
interference of any Oracle issued at Delphi, or a third party arbitration.

only knowable through reason and reflection, and he located it in ideas or eternal forms. Aristotle differed from his
teacher, theorizing that ultimate reality is knowable through experience, residing in physical objects, and his writings
were often based on first-hand observation as well as on his doctrine. For further information, please see: Richard
Sorabji, ed. Aristotle Transformed (London, 1990)
80
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book I.8, 19.
81
82
Pericles (495 – 429 BC) was one of the most influential statesman and general of Athenian army during the so called
‘Golden Age’ of the Athenian city-state. Pericles converted the Delian League into an influential and powerful Athenian
city state, and led his countrymen during the first two years of the Peloponnesian War until he died of plague. The period
from 461 to 429 BC is known as the Age of Pericles. For further information, please see: Aird, Hamish (2004). Pericles:
The Rise and Fall of Athenian Democracy. The Rosen Publishing Group.
30


In another example, in 457 B.C when the Athenians under the rule of Pericles was about to be
defeated by the Spartans who invaded the district of Tanagra, Cimon, who was overthrown from the
power of Athena, ostracized and sent to exile by Pericles had been brought back after Pericles
proposed the decree to recall him. “Thereupon, Cimon returned from exile and negotiated a peace
between the two cities, for the Spartans were as well disposed towards him as they were hostile to
Pericles.”84 As a former leader of the Aristocrat party in Athens advocating an alliance with Sparta,
Cimon brokered a peace deal with their enemy. Again we could not see the influence of Delphi or
any kind of a third party except the contribution of a friendship and close connection between Cimon
as an Athenian and the Spartan king to a peaceful settlement. That is, peace between the city-states is
usually brokered by the certain individuals rather than by Delphi.
Furthermore, Delphi was held in check by the bribery that Spartans “had bribed the priestess at
Delphi constantly to answer the Lacedaemonians85, whenever they came to consult the oracle.”86 As
concerns arbitration, the role of the Delphi appears to have highlighted the need for justification of
aggression and offensive much more effective than the need for mediation and arbitration.
Delphi was never designed for the task of arbitration; but she was called upon to perform that task
because there was no other way of justifying the decision on war87. It may have been that the
structure might have been adequate at one time during the proslavery period, but the changes in the
structure and relations of city states appeared to make Delphi inadequate. The nature of the task had
profoundly changed. Conflict resolution during the slavery period had been very different from what
it used to be for the proslavery period.
7.1 Misjudgment of Morality of City-states by Constructivism
Christian Reus-Smit also refuses to accept that the so-called institution was arranged as an
instrument of power conflicts. In that sense he insists that “the institution does not appear to have
been reduced simply to an instrument of imperial power. The practice undoubtedly contributed to the
internal stability of imperial leagues, thus serving hegemonic interests. Hegemony seldom acted as

83
Plutarch, The Rise and Fall of Athens, (Penguin Books, 1964), p.188
84
Ibid., p.175
85
‘’In the classical period, the southern Peloponnese under Spartan control was commonly called ‘Laceonian (land). The
territory was also referred to as Lacedaemonians’’ Nigel M. Kennel, Spartans, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p.4
86
Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, Books V-VI, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harward University Press,
2003), p.31
87
31


arbitrators, though, and there is little evidence to suggest that decision were consistently slanted in
their favor. If they had been, the willingness of other states to submit to arbitration would surely have
vanned, leading to the institution’s steady erosion, which did not occur”88 Again we observe another
false generalization. For hegemony frequently would act as arbitrators instead of allowing any third
party like Delphi to resolve the matters, numerous events of which are indicated in the writings of
Thucydides.
Further, we also see Delphi advising not only on peace settlement but on waging war as well89. For
instance, when Athena tried to dominate over the other city-states by means of warships and internal
uprisings in 439 BC, Lacedaemonians decided to retaliate against Athenian military power.
Therefore, when Delphi was under the influence of Sparta, “The Lacedaemonians themselves, then,
had decided that the treaty had been broken and that the Athenians were in the wrong, and sending to
Delphi they asked the god if it would be advisable for them to go to war. The god answered them, as
it is said, that if they warred with all their might, victory would be theirs, and said that he himself
would help them, whether invoked or uninvoked.”90 As seen in Thucydides, Delphi seems to have
promised that the gods would come to the aid of Lacedaemonians should they have gone to war
against Athenians. The Spartans consulted the oracle of Apollo at Delphi91. What seems so important
is an explanation that Apollo offered to assist the Spartans and her allies in the war92. Delphi had
taken the side of Sparta and its allies. In 430 BC, the plague broke out in Athens. Thucydides claims
that the events were in accord with it93.
It is said that the ancient people believed that there was a connection between the plague and Delphic
Apollo’s explicit promise of support to Sparta.94 In the opinion of the people of Sparta and her allies,
Apollo had punished Athenians since they were in the wrong side. Apollo had been assisting
Peloponnesian League against Athenians and her allies; Delphi simply had decided to back and lead
them. Delphi was believed to motivate the opposing city states against the cruelty of Athenians.
Any neutral arbitration role of the Delphi was ruled out by the declaration above. Delphi harnesses
the values of the traditionally accepted religion to persuade the Spartans to go to war against

88
89
90
2003), p.197
91
2003), 1. 118
92
Ibid., 1.118
93
Ibid., 2.54.4-5
94
Please see: Palagia, Olga, Editor, Art in Athens During the Peloponessian War, (Cambridge University Press)
32


Athenians. In addition, in that statement were provocations that were not meant as truth. It also
exposes their traditional pattern in a way that the self-righteous attitude of the Delphi had to justify
whatever they regard as truths in their pattern of perceptions95. That kind of expression may be
extended to the point at which Delphi could be discarded as an arbitrator for conflict resolution.
What it means for the constructivist is ‘the institution’s steady erosion’ which is regarded as an
unacceptable episode for him. He wants to show how the relationships between the city-states should
be instead of trying to demonstrate how the Greek city-states were. And the ‘should be’ disguised by
saying “This is how the relationships between the ancient city-states really are; here is their basic
nature; this is what it is to be inter-state relations.” What does not fit in becomes entirely excluded. It
is almost impossible to consider Apollo Temple in Delphi Peace loving under the certain conditions
in which the supported party by Delphi sees the solution in resorting to violence.
So much was the fact. One last detail of story Thucydides tells us may solidify the meaning and
function of Delphi among the cities. In around 422 B.C when Athens was defeated by Spartans, they
had been enforced to accept the articles mainly concerning Delphi. The contents of the article reveal
that Athens had been killing Spartans who were in fear trying to consult Delphi; that the temple of
Apollo at Delphi lost its independence, was being run and conducted by Athens; that Athens
abolished their court of justice; that system of taxation belonging to Delphi had been constantly
submitted to Athens.96
8.1 Close Relations between Justification of War and Delphi
What was the function and role of Delphi? Was it serving a right cause on the basis of brokering
peaceful resolutions? Its role and functions could be made much clearer provided the focus was
placed upon the rejection of binding arbitration or binding agreements. Attempts to avoid war were
frequently linked with efforts to ensure the justice of one’s cause and thus to secure the support of
the gods if war proved inevitable97.
In the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians and her allies believed that they had justice and the gods on
their side because they had offered arbitration and Sparta and her allies refused it98. In contrary to
Athenians and her allies’ belief, Spartans and her allies could maintain that they had justice and the

95
96
Ibid., Books V-VI, P.33-39
97
98
Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harvard University Press,
2003), 1.140-41, 144-45
33


gods on their side; because they considered that Athens had been the first to break the peace treaty99.
What they most sought in any war was a justification which needed rectifying by Delphi or by the
similar religious institutions. The function and role of Delphi had been confined to a requirement that
would meet the justification of the war decision and action.
Reus Smith, who believes Delphi to be a negotiator and arbitrator, neglects even to mention the
Athenian consultation of the major oracular shrines at Dudona, Siwah before the Sicilian
expedition.100 Delphi was not mere religious institution that would monopolize the justification of the
course of the war in accordance with the interest of the powers that predominates the temple of
Apollo in Delphi, Other places such as Dudona and Siwah should have been taken into account as
alternatives to the Delphi.101 The functions and role of those places were the same as Delphi. Whilst
Delphi was under control of Spartans and her allies, Dudona and Siwah stood to serve the need for
Athenians and her allies in justifying their disposition in the war. But, those interstate religious
institutions would be recorded to play a role as neither arbitrators nor negotiators on behalf of the
parties involved in the war.
8.2 Delphi and Other Oracle Centers
Ancient people believed the plague to be imposed upon Athenians due to an oracle by Apollo,
because Athenians were considered unjust and sinful.102 If Apollo was assisting the Spartans, what
could be done to counter this event? In 430 BC, the Athenian naval expedition decides to capture
Epidaurus in order to seize control of the sanctuary of the healing god Asclepius. The Athenians
imported Asclepius’ cult from Epidaurus to Athens in 420 BC103.
To counter the situation indicated by Delphi the Athens set up another temple to creating oracle
beneficial to the Athenians. Delphic Apollo may have stated that he would assist the Spartans and
her allies at the outset of the war. But Athenians would seek to win Apollo’s support in appeasing
Delian Apollo. The need to turn to Delian Apollo was the most important explanation for the
decision in 426/25 BC to purify the sacred island of Delos (Apollo’s birthplace). The primary
104
Athenian motive for the purification was to win the good will of Apollo. It seems that the
Athenian motive was rather religious than politics. Because, there had been a second outbreak of the

99
Ibid., 1.140-41, 144-45
100
Please see: Palagia, Olga, Editor, Art in Athens During the Peloponessian War, (Cambridge University Press)
101
Ibid.
102
Ibid.
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid.
34


plague in 427-426 BC which had lasted almost a year105. In 422 BC Athenians expelled the living
Delians as well. Diodorus adds a political explanation106. Athenians accuses the Delians of secret
treaty negotiations with the Spartans. Religious and political motives were consistent, they reinforce
each other107.
On the eve of the Sicilian expedition the Athenians consulted three of the most authoritative oracles:
The oracle of Zeus at Siwah in Libya108, the oracle of Apollo at Delphi109, and the oracle of Zeus at
Dodona in Epirus110. The Athenian leader and general Cimon consulted Zeus in 451 BC111 , and
Dodona served as a suitable alternative to Delphi. There was nothing wrong in consulting those
oracles including Delphi. They used to consult more than one oracle on the same issue.
Hence, the Delphi was not in a position to play an important part in conflict resolution at all. The
temple in Delphi had grave disadvantages when it came to conflict resolution. Its idiom was very
simple: What its party (sometimes Sparta, sometimes Athena) supported was automatically right.
What the other part supported was automatically wrong and nonsense112. Matter could not be decided
on their merits because city loyalty and its power must have come first. Therefore the prevailing
thinking idiom was inadequate and dangerous argument mode. Instead of constructive mediation and
arbitration role there was attack and defence and the parading of righteousness. It follows that the
performance was not directed to resolving the conflicts at all but to making an impression on the
condemned city states. Such practices explicitly demonstrate that Delphi had been transformed into a
conflict performance arena.
In opposing oracles in Delphi, Athenians basically had attempted to revive the oldest oracle centers
in order to meet the need for the justification of their position in the war. The oracle of Zeus at Siwah
in Libya, and the oracle of Zeus at Dodona in Epirus had been reconstructed under the conditions of
Peloponnesian wars. Athenian and her ally’s leaderships had been able now to tell their own people
that gods/goddesses were backing them against Sparta and her allies that they were not alone in their
struggle that their cause was fair, just and truthful.

105
2003), 3.87
106
Diodorus Siculus, translated by C. H. Oldfather, The Library of History, (Harvard University Press, 1967), 12. 73. 1
107
Ibid. 12. 73. 1
108
Plutarch (1960). The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives. Ian Scott-Kilvert, trans. Baltimore: Penguin
109
Ibid.
110
Please see: Palagia, Olga, Editor, Art in Athens During the Peloponessian War, (Cambridge University Press
111
Plutarch (1960). The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives. Ian Scott-Kilvert, trans. Baltimore: Penguin Bo
112
35


8.3 Justice and Moral Purpose of City-states
Was the so-called rational pursuit of justice related to ‘the moral purpose of the ancient Greek city-
states’? Concept of justice has a specific historical content depending on the economic formation, on
the economic and social structures, and on the particular phase of cultural development. Outside of
these concrete historical definitions, this category is devoid of content and formal. What does the
justice of ancient people have in common with the modern international law? What is there in
common between the justice of ancient city-states and justice of international law preached by the
United Nations? What about economic motives in which calculation of interest had been mixed with
consideration of injustice? Did the Greek city-states act in the way of considering the rational
principle formulated by Aristotle when they were at war against each other? Was there really ‘a
distinctive understanding of procedural justice’ shared by them in the negotiations?
Reus considers Greek city-states on the basis of moral purpose by relying on Aristotle’s writings,
contemplates a form of communal life that envelopes city-states, and thus rationalizes it through the
so-called rational pursuit of justice. His suggestion lacks any sort of criteria or rational basis. For
Aristotle seems to refute Reus without great efforts by articulating most of the ancient people,
citizens of the city-states, as loyal to despotic rulers. In the ancient period, “Most people’s seem to
think that despotic rule is statesmanship, and are not ashamed to practice towards others treatment
which they declare to be unjust and detrimental for themselves; for in their own internal affairs they
demand just government, yet in their relations with other peoples they pay no attention to justice.”113
says Aristotle. In practice one may see the implementation of Aristotle’s statement in the policy of
Sparta. Plutarch indicates that ‘it is characteristic of Spartans to give priority to their country’s
interests; justice, as they see it and understand it, is only whatever they believe will advance
Sparta’’114 As seen in Aristotle’s statement, there was no rational pursuit of justice among the city-
states.
9.1 Aristotle’s Definition and Constructivism
In Aristotle’s definition, we cannot see any kind of moral purpose of any city-state in connection to
one another. On the contrary, in order for a state to experience a peaceful environment, Aristotle
recommends a single state in isolation alternative to the existing ones. As for individual happiness,
for the happiness of the state in relation to her neighbors Aristotle suggests self-sufficiency:

113
Aristotle, Politics, translated by H. Rackham, (Harvard University Press, 1998), p.545
114
Plutarch, On Sparta, translated by Richard J. A. Talbert, (Penguin Books, 1988), p.78
36


“Moreover it is possible even for a single state in isolation to be happy, that is one that is well
governed, in as much as it is conceivable that a state might be carried on somewhere in isolation,
enjoying good laws, and in such a state the system of the constitution will not be framed for the
purpose of war or of overpowering its enemies.”115
It is outside the scope of this study to discuss whether self-sufficiency or dependency or both is a
necessary condition for self-determining, however it may be plainly seen that Aristotle’s idealization
of a state in peace had never existed into practice, but only an idealized concept for Aristotle’s
doctrine to provide a valid and concrete reference system for the constitution of a state by making
generalization of the practical internal and external conditions of the then ancient societies. In
another word, peace was merely possible between the states provided they would have been isolated
from each other. That is, the coexistence of them for Aristotle was very manifestation of possible
war. Like a classical moralist, Aristotle did not seem aware that he was living in the antiquity; but,
the constructivists miss his moral values, underplaying his data, and overrating his doctrine as the
evidence of empirical facts. Aristotle’s definition of a city-state considered in a peaceful environment
exposes a cruel fact that the state of the city states in relation to each other was constantly the state of
war so long as the city states would coexist together. That kind of specific historical reality stands
against the claims by Constructivists.
9.2 Aristotle’s Morality and That of Ancient People
Could one convincingly refer to the point that the ancient people aimed at looking good to them? The
relationships between them and the gods may be referred to as functional. It means there may have
been no love in the affection as long as love itself is characterized in terms of utility. In order to
make it clear one may need to turn to Aristotle’s reasoning. As Aristotle argues friendships, he
considers the concern regarding the state of utility: “Hence in a friendship based on utility or on
pleasure men love their friend for their own good or their own pleasure, and not as being the person
loved, but as useful or agreeable. And therefore these friendships are based on accident, since the
friend is not loved for what he is, but as affording some benefit or pleasure as the case may be.”116
By accident, Aristotle means that “utility is not a permanent quality; it differs at different times.”117
Such a description may be applied to the relationship between the ancient people and their gods and
goddesses. When the particular conditions of the loyalty to the gods have passed away, the relation is

115
Ibid., p.547
116
Aristotle, Nichomeian Ethics, p.459
117
Ibid., p.459
37


dissolved, ‘having existed merely as a means to that end.’118 The loyalty of the ancient people to any
particular god or goddess is easily broken off, shifting from one god/goddess to the other depending
on the need and expectation of/from the particular event. The functionality of them has nothing to do
with any kind of morality. In that respect, the morality imposed upon the ancient people remains
merely a projection with which constructivists identify themselves. However, in the harsh and brute
reality of the antiquity one may witness something different in contrast to what is expected of.
Briefly, the systematic approach of Aristotle brings him inevitably face to face with many maverick
problems similar to the problem like whether a state in isolation for the happiness of her citizens and
for the sake of avoiding war was possible. Aristotle spends a long time thrashing out the paradoxes.
Despite the difficulties of resolving the paradoxes, Aristotle sticks to a belief system by which he
manages to touch on a dimension of science which differentiates from the reflection of the mind of
the ancient people. But, the poverty of the constructivists needs to interpret Aristotle’s belief system
as the empirical work. Unfortunately, the Constructivists may not notice that moralism of
Constructivism plagues sociology and history, which tends to be both normative and descriptive
since Constructivists have carried the metaphor of the institution of international law back in history
to Thucydides and Oracles of Apollo temple at Delphi.
In brief, the moralist Aristotle had explained what a moral state had to do. But, the Athenians,
Spartans, and the rest of the Greek world had not done it by not acting throughout their social and
political lives according to the strictest ideals of Aristotle’s virtue. Aristotle’s ethics, as a whole,
consisted partly of observation and partly of doctrine. He appears to have used his observations to
bring the fact in to feed his ruminations about moral values. So it may be stated that the brute facts of
the ancient city-states are frequently and deliberately bypassed among constructivists as well to
ignore certain questions. But, their explanations do not remove the brute fact that the cultural,
politics, economics and religious issues119of the ancient slave societies were not that of the modern
world.
9.3 The Question of Morality in Slavery Societies
In the ineffective and disqualified institution of Delphi, What kind of morality, on which the
arbitration was supposed to be based, does Christian Reus mention of in regard to Oracle of Apollo?

118
119
For further information of devision of labour please see Piero Sraffa, Editor, The Works and Correspondence of David
Ricardo, Cambridge University Press, 1952
38


Was it a morality of Hermes where cheating belongs, of Ares where raging destruction belongs, of
Dionysus where victimization belongs?120 The necessity that shapes the norm of gods gives a
necessity to each of their imaginable positions and prevents any single one from overstepping the
limits conditioned by the slave labor system and presented by the images themselves. The function
and role of Delphi is unfortunately assumed to have carried out certain tasks towards peace and
conflict resolution although in practice the principles of the Delphic perspective could not be
expected to have gone beyond the myth itself and were not general rule for all conduct and conflict
between the city-states121. There was no place the oracles at the Delphi could have stood beyond the
reach of myths which involved them in their positions according to the interests of the dominant city.
By considering morals as the claims of the imaginal arbitration, morality itself becomes imaginable.
In the daily life of the antiquity, morality had been rooted in gods/goddesses images and
gods/goddesses images were moral powers. These images reminded them that they were not alone in
their brutal experience of life; in their choices and decisions they were reflecting mythic stances of
gods/ goddesses. But the moralities were not designated to implement justice; because they were not
willing to apply justice. Displays of indifference to justice were a means of self-preservation for the
Athenians and for the rest of the city-states, who found themselves without prospects and exposed
constantly to the brutal forces of so-called fate. The consciousness of the Athenians had been
consumed by regarding superior themselves to the others. It was a needed preconception in justifying
slavery as a defence mechanism. Meanwhile, that form of defence mechanism had generated and
reproduced its own moral values through power politics which were justified and reflected in the
moral values themselves.
The archetypal viewpoint of mythological stance of the gods/goddesses was supposed to have
attempted to shift the focus of the Greeks from the question of good and evil together122.
Subsequently one may easily claim that the Greeks had not looked to myths morally, but looked at
moralities mythically. For the more effectively justice is hidden in society, the more zealously it is
sought in divine good123. What it may mean is that for any action they were not concerned with
morality, but with the interpretation of event in regard to respective gods/goddesses according to
their desire and conditions, etc. Mythical understanding conjures forces that are not personal, not
rational, and perhaps not altogether human. Such an understanding thus becomes crucial since myths

120
Please see Homer, The Iliad, The Odyssey, translated by Robert Fitzgerald, (Oxford University Press, 1984)
121
122
Please see: Nigel, M. Kennel, Spartans, (Wiley-‐Blackwell, 2010
123
Ibid.
39


set the unruly imagination on course; that is, they were therapeutic. And why? Because they were
thought to have spoken truth as long as justification was at stake.
10.1 Conclusion
The Constructivism may be really complacent about the Delphi’s existing structure; because they
believe the Delphi to be an excellent institution. However, the Delphi in reality had not been
designed for conflict resolution. The Delphi was not capable of carrying out the functions attributed
to it by Constructivism.
The group of the city states had organized into a structure that seems to have directed the activities of
the city states in a very devastating and destructive way in which the design of the Delphi was
conceptualized towards making contributions to the ends of war. In such a vital period conflict
resolution had never been in sight.
In addition, political authority and religious institutions were inseparable in the city-states’ life.124
The ancient population of the city-states would regard religious motives as mere pretext for
pragmatic political actions. The potential manipulators would harness the gods as powerful tools.
Both the Spartans and Athenians including the rest of the city-states employed religion as a political
weapon. They also believed the gods themselves were taking an active role in the war and that
support of the gods could be either won or lost by human actions.
The increasing complexity of the slavery world inevitably invalidated Delphi, forcing it to
misperceive and misjudge the events. Delphi lacks the key qualities as an arbitrator; because as a
third party the Delphi appears to look at the situation from either party other than from the third party
angle. That is, Delphi as a third party with no impartiality was like judge or negotiator. It was not a
body on the basis of being a creative impartial designer that could have been expected to be
approaching things independently of judge and partial negotiator.
Delphi did not have the structures necessary for the resolution of conflicts. The Structures of the
Delphi had been designed for proslavery period. It had been inadequate, incompetence and ill will
for the existing slavery city states.
It is revealed that the Delphi organization could not perform the third party role in the design of
conflicts. Its historical nature rules that role out due to historically different periods. Briefly Delphi

124
Please see Palagia, Olga, Edt., Art in Athens During the Peloponessian War, Cambridge University Press
40


did not appear to have provided a structure to carry out a reasonable approach to conflict resolution.
It shows a remarkable lack of vision and outdated capacity.
What is more dangerous is the belief on the part of the Delphi that an inadequate structure is thought
to be adequate. That belief completely blocks the search for a better understanding of Antiquity.
When Reus Smith seems to be no longer able to deny the existence of fragmentary autonomous
systems and no longer able to deal with actual contemporary international relations, then there arises
the fantasy of returning to Greek city states system. For the return to Greek city states system offers a
way of coping when the main institutions of the international system cannot hold and things fall
apart. A return to Greek city states has been an ideological response to the challenge of breakdown; it
offers a model of disintegrated integration. Briefly, the ancient world was a world plagued by
constant war without the presence of independent and reliable third parties as arbitrators.
The analysis of some certain events demonstrates that Delphi’s and the city states’ methods of
solving major disputes and conflicts had been crude and primitive, inadequate and destructive.
Instead of resolving conflicts in a constructive manner; the attempt and efforts in general led to a
further chaos and messy events.
REFERENCES
1. Aeger, S. L. Interstate Arbitration in the Greek World, (Berkeley, 1996);

2. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge University Press,
1999),
3. Aird, Hamish (2004). Pericles: The Rise and Fall of Athenian Democracy, (The Rosen
Publishing Group, 2004);
4. Aristotle, Politics, translated by H. Rackham, (Harvard University Press, 1998);
5. Bercovitch, Jacob and Jackson, Richard, Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century:
Principles, Methods, and Approaches, (University of Michigan Press, 2009);
6. Cartledge Paul, Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300 to 362 BC (2 ed.),
7. (Oxford: Routledge, 2002);
8. Cawkwell, George, The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, (Oxford University Press, 2005);
9. Chaniotis, Angelos, Ancient World at War, (Blackwell Publishing, 2005);
10. Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of The State, (Princeton University Press, 1999);
41


11. Diodorus Siculus, translated by C. H. Oldfather, The Library of History, (Harvard University
Press, 1967)
12. Green, Peter, The Greco-Persian Wars. (University of California Press, 1996)
13. Hackett, Sir John, gen. ed. Warfare in the Ancient World. (New York: Sidgwick & Jackson,
1989);
14. Heredotus, The History, translated by David Grene, (Colombia University Press, 1988);
15. Homer, The Iliad, The Odyssey, translated by Robert Fitzgerald, (Oxford University Press,
1984);
16. Hornblower, S. The Oxford Classical Dictionary. OUP, (Oxford, 2012);
17. Grant, Michael, The Classical Greeks, (Phoenix Press, 1988),
18. Kagan Donald, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace, (New York, 1995);
19. Kagan, Donald, The Peloponnesian War, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005);
20. Kagan, Donald, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Cornell University Press, 1969);
21. M. Kennel, Nigel, Spartans, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010);
22. Meier, Christian, The Greek Discovery of Politics, (Cambridge, 1990);
23. Meier Christian., Athens: a portrait of the city in its Golden Age, translated by R. and R.
Kimber (New York, 1998);
24. Palagia, Olga, Editor, Art in Athens During the Peloponessian War, (Cambridge University
Press);
25. Plutarch (1960). The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives. Ian Scott-Kilvert, trans.
Baltimore: Penguin;
26. Plutarch, On Sparta, translated by Richard J. A. Talbert, (Penguin Books, 1988);
27. Plutarch, Lives, Bernadotte Perrin, trans. (Harward University Press, 2006);
28. Sage, Michael M. Warfare in Ancient Greece: a Sourcebook. (London: Routledge, 1996);
29. Strauss, Leo, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, (The University of Chicago Press, 1963);
30. Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith,
(Harward University Press, 2003);
31. Toivo Koivukoski (eds.): Enduring Empire. Ancient Lessons for Global Politics. (London
2009);
32. Xenophon, Hellenica, Translated by Carleton L. Browson, (Harward University Press,
2003).
33. W. A Hurtley, H. C. Darby, A Short History of Greece, (Cambridge University Press),
42


READING RESOURCES
 Adcock, Sir Frank and D. J. Mosley. Diplomacy in Ancient Greece. London: Thames and
Hudson, 1975;
 Cargill, J. The Second Athenian League: Alliance or Empire? Berkeley: The University of
California Press, 1981;
 Cartledge, Paul. Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta. London: Duckworth, 1987.
 Casson, Lionel. The Ancient Mariners. Sea Farers and Sea Fighters of Ancient Times. 2nd
Edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991;
 Ferrill, Arther. The Origins of War : from the Stone Age to Alexander the Great. New York:
Thames and Hudson, 1985;
 Karavites, Peter. Capitulations and Greek Interstate Relations: The Reflection of Humanistic
Ideals in Political Events. Hypomnemata, hft. 71. Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1982;
 Thomsen, Rudi. Eisphora: A Study of Direct Taxation in Ancient Athens. Copenagen:
Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1964;
 Torr, Cecil. The Ancient Ships. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1897; reprint ed.,
Chicago: Argonaut, 1964;
 W. G. Forrest, A History of Sparta, (Paperbacks, 2002).
43


.QUANTUM JUMPS IN THE RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES.
Prof.Dr.Hayrettin Kilic, Istanbul Aydin University
Fossil Fuels Resources Are Finite, Renewable Energy Resources Last Indefinitely
Introduction:
As we enter the new millennium, population explosion, increasing worldwide energy demands and
rapid climate change are now threatening our fragile environment as at no other time in known
history. There is an urgent need for research and education to focus on the complex and direct link
between energy and the environment and for the continuing promotion of transference of renewable
energy technology and its infrastructure development from developed to developing countries.
Within the framework of this global view, energy and environmental policy issues can no longer be
viewed in isolation. National security, climate change and energy economics are convergent
rationales that provide a global platform for scientists and politicians alike; scientific measured data
on atmospheric changes reflects facts, but still open to interpretation from special interest groups.
For millions of years, prior to the industrial revolution, the carbon dioxide concentration in our
atmosphere was about 100-250 parts per million (ppm), but in the last 200 hundred years the
concentration has significantly increased to 380 ppm. According to United States Energy
Information Administration (EIA); “World energy-related annual carbon dioxide emissions rise from
30.2 billion metric tons in 2008 to 35.2 billion metric tons in 2020 and 43.2 billion metric tons in
2035, an increase of 43 percent over the projection period.” (U.S. EIA. (2010a). 2009 EIA-860.).
In the last hundred years, world population increased from 1.6 billion to 7.1 billion, and the
consumption of commercial energy increased by more than 100 times the levels in the early 1900’s.
If the world economy expands to meet the aspirations of countries around the globe, the demand for
energy in this century is likely to increase substantially even if strenuous efforts are made to increase
the efficiency of fossil fuel utilization. According to global energy demand scenario, EIA. (2010a)
adopted for this century, “the world marketed energy consumption [is expected to grow] by 53
percent from 2008 to 2035 and global electricity production would double by the year 2025 and more
than triple by 2050.” If existing energy trends continue as predicted “reserves could supply only
petroleum needs for 50-60 years, natural gas for 60-80 years, and coal for 200 years and uranium for
40 years.” By contrast, renewable energy resources, including biomass, hydro, geothermal, solar,
44

wind, ocean thermal, wave and tidal action, are naturally replenishing. They are virtually
inexhaustible in duration, and not susceptible to geo-political conflicts.
Based on current financial, technological, and political constraints, energy resource distribution and
diversification must be based on exploiting and implementing existing energy sources with focus on
renewable energy and supporting infrastructure. Knowledge of how energy is used is essential in
understanding the importance of improving energy efficiency and alleviating the wide range of
energy related environmental problems. Industrialized nations have an important role to play in
providing commercially viable alternative technologies, implanting new, sustainable, more efficient
energy policies and generating innovative financial mechanism to overcome inadequate, inefficient
energy supplies and widespread lack of efficient and modern energy infrastructure.
Energy is lost at every stage of production, distribution and use. In general, two thirds of potential
energy in fossil fuels is lost to incomplete and inefficient energy extraction, and largely wasted in
thermal heat generation. New technologies, such as fuel cells and other renewables aim to boost
energy conversion to approximately 2/3 of total available energy. However, adapting newer
technologies in general does not mean improving energy efficiency, proper energy management
practices can minimize energy waste. Until recently, investment in energy efficiency was not a
priority. Developing nations focused on increasing supply quickly not managing supplies to
maximize service. The use of more efficient appliances and processes could result in energy savings
of as much as 50% over the life time of equipment, according the US Office of Technology
Assessment; on the supply side, a 50% increase in power plant efficiency and decrease in
transmission loss of about 6% is possible and obtainable with current technologies and know-how.
With 20% increase in end use efficiency, these efforts could cut electricity generation needs by more
than 40%, leading to tremendous capital investments savings and dramatically reducing the need to
utilize dirty carbon heavy sources of energy, such as coal and risky nuclear energy.
Although, some of renewable energy resources,especially wind, solar, are subject to limited amount
of energy per unit time, they are for the most part immune to geopolitical uncertainties, it is difficult
to block the sun from a resource competitor or plug geothermal resources and stop/redirect the wind
and running rivers. Of all the renewable energy resources, solar is by far the most abundant. At any
given time, 162,000 terawatts of solar energy reaches the earth; 1 hour of sunlight could theoretically
provide all of the world population energy needs for 1 year. Wind power and solar radiation has no
national boundaries and cannot be manipulated by radical regimes and corporations, at least not for
the foreseeable future. During the development of wind power technology, between 1981 and 2001
45


the capital cost of wind power dropped by a factor of about four, and solar photovoltaic energy cost
decreased by a factor of more than ten. The installed global renewable energy capacity has more than
quadrupled between 2000 and 2010.
Every year an assessment or updated projections for international energy trends for the first half of
21 st century is published by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Although these
projections do not incorporate geopolitical fluctuations and regional armed conflicts that might affect
energy markets, it provides most valuable data for the past energy production-consumption as well as
future projections to energy policy makers and analysts, both in government and in the private sector.
The Objective of this paper is to convey the latest projections appearing in the International Energy
Outlook, DOE/EIA- IEO-2011 Reference case which are not predictions of what will happen, but
what may happen given the specific assumptions and methodologies used for any particular scenario.
The IEO 2011 Reference case projections and other data presented in this article is based on
business-as-usual trend scenarios, as well as known technological and demographic world population
trends.
In order to place renewable energy in the future spectrum of existing energy resources, it is
imperative to point out the latest IEO (2011) findings for global energy trends over the first half of
this century.”The world marketed energy consumption [is expected to grow] by 53 percent from
2008 to 2035. Total world energy use [is expected to rise] from 505 quadrillion British thermal units
(Btu) in 2008 to 619 quadrillion Btu in 2020 and 770 quadrillion Btu in 2035”. Much of the growth
in energy consumption occurs in countries outside the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (non-OECD nations), where demand is driven by strong long-term economic growth.
In the reference case, energy use in non-OECD nations increases by 85 percent, as compared with an
increase of 18 percent for the OECD economies
Due to rapid increase in energy consumption among the developing world, it is clear that an
effective, encouraging and innovative financing tools need to be developed for renewable energy
industry to invest in developing world.
Renewable energy sources are proven to be more sustainable against to future energy volatility,
which serve as an inspiration for the investors. In fact, in the last two decades, private investment in
renewable energy grew rapidly in part to impressive new advances in renewable energy technologies,
and steady decrease in levelized cost (LCOE), shown in figure 1 below.
46


Figure 1
For instant, from 2004 to 2008, global private-sector investment in solar energy increased by more
than a factor of 25. These investments set the foundation for the rapid expansion of the industry in
2004. According to US-DOE SunShot initiative reports “Compound Global Annual Growth rate
(CAGR) for renewable energy source between 2000 and 2010 for renewable energy is given in the
following table 1. (REN21 – Renewables 2011 Global Status Report).
Table 1:
Renewable Energy CAGR
Wind 27.1%
Solar Photovoltaic 39.8%
Concentrated Solar Power 10.3%
Geothermal 3.2%
Biomass 5.3%
Hydro 17.6
Renewable energy-generation is also inherently safer than fossil fuel, which minimize the
environmental risks and liability for investors and local communities. Previously projected LCOE
and global grow show that 16%–34% of the PV and wind market by 2012 is already accomplished.
Total global renewable energy investment in 2005 of $2.5 billion marked a 256% increase over the
$702 million of investment in 2004. In 2008, global private-sector investment in solar energy
47


technology reached to $16 billion. In the same time period, global average Photo-voltaic (PV)
module prices dropped 23% from $4.75/W in 1998 to $3.65/W in 2008. (NREL
http://www.nrel.gov/csp/solarpaces/by_country.cfm). (LCOE, is the ratio of an electricity-generation
systems amortized lifetime costs including installed cost plus lifetime Operation and maintenance
cost to the system's lifetime electricity generation)
Development: Overview of global renewable energy resources and electric energy

An important characteristic of renewable energy is that there is no point price of cost of fuel. A
single price for renewable energy does not exist but rather a price of interval or range, depending on
the type of renewable resources. In the past few decades, wind and solar were considered intermittent
electricity generating technologies useful only when resources
are available. However, new-innovative energy storage methods such as pumped hydro,
Figure 2
Figure 2
compressed air, advance batteries, thermal storage are being developed to store excess power and
reuse it. During the down times in Europe more than 5 percent and in Japan more than 10 percent
of excess renewable energy is stored. In the US about 20 gigawatts of energy is stored annually
using pumped hydro technique. Although capital costs of solar power are higher than the other
energy resources, wind has the lowest capital investment requirements. Government policies or
48


incentives often provide the primary economic motivation for construction of renewable
generation facilities.
Over the last 25 years the cost of generating electricity from utility-scale wind systems has dropped
by more than 80 percent. Figure 2 (DOE/EIA-0484- 2011) shows that, once wind or solar power
plants are built their operating costs generally are much lower than the operating costs for fossil fuel-
fired power plants, and most importantly they are almost free of market manipulations. In addition,
many developed countries, particularly those in Europe and USA, have government policies that
include, feed-in tariffs (FITs), tax incentives, and market share quotas, design to encourage the
construction of such renewable electricity facilities.
Renewable energy is the fastest-growing source of electricity generation, including hydropower,

renewable energy accounts for 21% of all annual global electricity generation.
Wind power capacity has developed very rapidly in recent years, on average approximately by 30%
per year during the last 10 years. Thus, at present, total wind power capacity is doubled every three
years According to the IEO 2011 Reference case, (table 2). “Total generation from renewable
resources increases by 3.1 percent annually, and the renewable share of world electricity generation
is expected to grow from 19 percent in 2008 to 23 percent in 2035, and if this trend continues into
the future, 4.6 trillion kilowatt hours of new renewable generation added over the projection period”.
It is important to point out that the IEO 2011 projections for renewable energy sources include only
marketed renewables. Non-marketed (noncommercial) biomass from plant and animal resources is
not included in the projections, and off-grid renewables produced and consumed at the site, such as
off-grid (PV) panels are not included.
Table 2: Worldwide Renewable Electricity Generation as a Percent of Total Generation
Renewab
le
All Renewab
Solar Bio Geo Generati
Year Hydro Wind Renewab le (excl.
PV mass thermal on
les Hydro)
(excl.
Hydro)
49


(MM
kWh)
2000 16.8% 0.0% 1.2% 0.3% 0.3% 18.7% 1.9% 274,019
2001 17.3% 0.0% 1.3% 0.4% 0.3% 19.3% 2.1% 304,469
2002 17.1% 0.0% 1.2% 0.5% 0.3% 19.2% 2.1% 324,827
2003 18.0% 0.0% 1.2% 0.7% 0.3% 20.2% 2.2% 348,777
2004 17.3% 0.0% 1.1% 0.8% 0.3% 19.5% 2.2% 371,028
2005 16.9% 0.0% 1.2% 0.9% 0.3% 19.4% 2.5% 427,880
2006 16.7% 0.1% 1.2% 1.1% 0.3% 19.4% 2.7% 485,477
2007 17.4% 0.1% 1.3% 1.3% 0.3% 20.3% 2.9% 552,703
2008 17.8% 0.1% 1.3% 1.7% 0.3% 21.1% 3.4% 642,327
2009 17.8% 0.1% 1.3% 2.1% 0.3% 21.7% 3.9% 766,333
2010 17.7% 0.3% 1.4% 2.5% 0.3% 22.3% 4.6% 932,590
The production of power is the single most important factor for calculating the cost per generated
unit of power. The cost of conventional electricity production is determined by three components,
fuel cost, operating & maintenance costs and Capital cost. However, due to steady decline of capital
cost of global renewable electricity installations (excluding hydropower) renewable resources have
more than quadrupled from 2000–2010 (table.3). Including hydropower, renewable energy accounts
for 21% of all global electricity generation; without hydropower, renewable energy accounts for
3.8% of global generation.
In general, energy market projections are subject to much uncertainty. Many of the events that shape
fossil fuel energy markets are control by energy corporations and cannot be anticipated. Although,
renewable portfolio standards including official definition of feed in tariff applicable to renewable
energy source may be different in the different countries, wind and solar energy are not subject to
much uncertainty and they are the fastest growing renewable energy technologies worldwide. Wind
produced electrical energy grew by a factor of 11 and solar PV electrical generation grew by a factor
of more than 28 between 2000 and 2010. In 1980’s cost of wind power was 30 cents/Kwh, currently
in certain locations cost of wind electricity is about 5 cents/Kwh.
50


Table 3: World Renewable Cumulative Electricity Capacity Percent Increase from the Previous Year
:( U.S Global Renewable Energy Development | September 2011)
Year Hydro Solar CSP Wind Geot Biomass Renewable All

PV herm (excl. Renewa
al Hydro) bles
2000 0% 22% 0% 31% 0% 6% 11% 1%
2001 5% 29% 0% 33% 0% 8% 15% 6%
2002 2% 33% 0% 29% 2% 0% 11% 3%
2003 9% 25% 0% 29% 9% -3% 11% 9%
2004 1% 33% 0% 20% 0% 0% 10% 1%
2005 2% 38% 0% 23% 4% 13% 18% 4%
2006 2% 32% 0% 25% 3% 7% 17% 4%
2007 9% 5% 5% 27% 0% 6% 17% 10%
2008 4% 71% 14% 29% 4% 4% 22% 6%
2009 4% 62% 22% 31% 7% 4% 25% 7%
2010 3% 90% 83% 25% 3% 15% 27% 8%
Most renewable energy growth in OECD countries comes from non-hydroelectric sources, especially
wind, solar and biomass. Global interest in advanced water power such as tidal, river and ocean
current, and ocean wave energy is beginning to grow; with many prototype projects particularly
proof-of-mechanism studies are in testing stages. Given historical and current social-economic and
geopolitical realized scenarios, global fossil fuel prices will continue to increase over time.
Generating electricity from fossil fuels has proven to be highly vulnerable to not only price changes
but also political changes. For the developing countries, we need to translate these global concerns
into action, and effective and innovative financing needs to be developed for encouraging renewable
energy industry to invest in developing countries.
Hydroelectric: Strong growth in hydroelectric generation, primarily from mid- to large-scale power
plants, is expected in China, India, Brazil, Turkey and a number of nations in Southeast Asia,
including Malaysia and Vietnam. In non-OECD countries, hydroelectric power is expected to be the
predominant source of renewable electricity growth, and if trend that continues in this century, an
51


estimate of 4.6 trillion kilowatt hours of new renewable generation will be added over the projection
period, 2.5 trillion kilowatt hours (55 percent) of which will be produced by hydroelectric power
Wind: Worldwide, wind energy is one of the fastest growing renewable energy technologies,
between 2000 and 2010, wind energy generation worldwide increased by a factor of 11. According
to IEO 2011 figures, the contribution of wind energy has grown constantly over the past decade,
from 18 giga watts of net installed capacity at the end of 2000 to 121 giga watts at the end of 2008,
and 1.3 trillion kilowatt hours electrical energy produce by wind power plants. As of 2010, the
countries with major wind energy installed capacity are indicated in table 4.
USA 40.267 MW
Canada 4.009 MW
Denmark 3.752 MW
U.K 5.204 MW
France 5.660 MW
Spain 20.676 MW
Germany 27.214 MW
Italy 5.797 MW
India 13.065 MW
China 42.287 MW
Table 4: (Sources: GWEC – Global Wind 2010 Report, REN21, GWEC, LBNL 59).
Growth rates for wind-powered generation also are high in non-OECD countries. The most
substantial additions to electricity supply generated from wind power are expected for China. In
2010, China surpassed the United States as the world leader in cumulative installed wind capacity,
with more than 42 GW installed.
52


Solar: Solar power technologies were not historically cost-effective; they were considered a “niche”
source of renewable energy. However, with advances in technology, solar power can be economical
where electricity prices are especially high, where peak load pricing occurs, or where government
incentives are available. In Europe, generous feed-in tariffs, which obligate the retail utilities to
purchase electricity from renewable producers, have been responsible for “Solar Bubble” driving
down the price of solar panels in Europe.
Following table 5. Shows solar energy installed capacity of major industrial countries (2010).
USA 2.660 MW
Czech Rep. 1.953 MW
Italy 3.494 MW
Japan 3.622 MW
China 893 MW
Germany 17.193 MW
France 1.025 MW
Spain 4.317 MW
Table 5: (Source: SEIA/GTM, GTM, EPIA).
The global PV market has accelerated over the past decade, with PV shipments averaging 53%
annual growth and reaching 17 gigawatts (GW) in 2010, bringing cumulative shipments to about 40
GW in 2010. The market share for crystalline-silicon PV was 95%, compared with 5% for thin-film
PV. By the end of 2010, thin-film technology accounted for 13% of global PV shipments (3% a-Si,
8% CdTe, and 2% CIGS). Figure 3 below shows that annual PV Cell/Module shipment (GW/Year),
that China and Taiwan are the market leaders with nearly 60% of the global PV cell production
combined. Source; (DOE-SunShot Vision Study – February 2012)
53


Figure 3: Annual PV Cell/Module Shipments (GW/Year)

Concentrating Solar Power (CSP): Globally, the most suitable sites for CSP plants are arid lands
within 35° north and south of the equator. By December 2010, global CSP capacity increased to
about 1,300 MW. Most of the capacity additions during 2009–2010 were in Spain, and at the end of
2010, Spain accounted for about 57% of all global CSP capacity. Parabolic trough technology
accounted for about 96% of global CSP capacity at the end of 2010; tower technology accounted for
3%. (NREL. (2011a). Concentrating Solar Power Plants by Country)
Geothermal: As a base-load source of energy, geothermal is distinct from other renewables such as
wind and solar, because it can provide consistent electricity. Global Geothermal Electricity Capacity
is steadily increasing, as of 2009 following table 6 shows major geothermal power plants that are in
operation in all continentals. (IEO 2011)
Table 6:
Iceland 575 MW
U.S 3.102 MW
Japan 536 MW
Italy 843 MW
Mexico 958 MW
Philippines 1.904 MW
Indonesia 1.197 MW
54


Other Renewable Fuels: Ethanol, corn ethanol production continues to expand rapidly in the
Other Renewable Fuels: Ethanol, corn ethanol production continues to expand rapidly in the
United States. Between
Other Renewable 2000 andcorn
Fuels: Ethanol, 2010, production
ethanol production increased
continuesnearly 8 times.
to expand rapidly Ethanol
in the
United States. Between 2000 and 2010, production increased
Other Renewable Fuels: Ethanol, corn ethanol production continues to expand rapidly nearly 8 times. Ethanol
in the
production
United grewBetween
States. nearly 19% 2000 in and
20102010, to reach 13,000 million
production gallons
increased per 8year.
nearly Ethanol
times. has
Ethanol
production
United grewBetween
States. nearly 19% 2000 in and
20102010, to reach 13,000 million
production gallons
increased per 8year.
nearly Ethanol
times. has
Ethanol
steadily increased
production its percentage
grew nearly 19% in 2010of theto overall
reachgasoline pool, and
13,000 million was 9.4%
gallons in 2010.
per year. In 2010,
Ethanol has
steadily increased
production its percentage
grew nearly 19% in 2010of theto overall
reachgasoline pool, and
13,000 million was 9.4%
gallons in 2010.
per year. In 2010,
Ethanol has
the United
steadily States produced
increased its percentage 56.5% of theof the world’s
overall ethanol,
gasoline pool,followed
and wasby Brazil
9.4% at 30.1%,
in 2010. the
In 2010,
the United States produced 56.5% of the world’s ethanol, followed
steadily increased its percentage of the overall gasoline pool, and was 9.4% in 2010. In 2010, by Brazil at 30.1%, the
European
the UnitedUnion Statesatproduced
5.1%, China 56.5%at 2.4%,
of the world’s ethanol, followed by Brazil at 30.1%, the
European
the UnitedUnionStatesatproduced
5.1%, China 56.5%at 2.4%,
of the world’s ethanol, followed by Brazil at 30.1%, the
European Union at 5.1%, China at 2.4%,
European Union at 5.1%, China at 2.4%,
Global Ethanol Production; Top three Countries (2010) Ethanol Production (millions of
Global Ethanol Production; Top three Countries (2010) Ethanol Production (millions of
gallons/year)
Global Ethanol is Production;
Canada: 357; TopEU: 1,177;
three United(2010)
Countries States:Ethanol
13,000;Production
China: 54.(millions
Biodieselof
gallons/year)
Global Ethanol is Production;
Canada: 357; TopEU: 1,177;
three United(2010)
Countries States:Ethanol
13,000;Production
China: 54.(millions
Biodieselof
production globally
gallons/year) is Canada: grew 357;
more EU: than 1,177;
14% inUnited2010; States:
Germany leads China:
13,000; the world54. in Biodiesel
biodiesel
production globally
gallons/year) is Canada: grew 357;
more EU: than 1,177;
14% inUnited2010; States:
Germany leads China:
13,000; the world54. in Biodiesel
biodiesel
production, globally
production followedgrew by Brazil,
more than Argentina
14% inand 2010;France. Biodiesel
Germany has world
leads the expanded from a
in biodiesel
production, followed by Brazil, Argentina and France.
production globally grew more than 14% in 2010; Germany leads the world in biodiesel Biodiesel has expanded from a
relatively
production,small production
followed base inArgentina
by Brazil, 2000, to a and total France.
U.S. production
Biodieselof has315 expanded
million gallons
from ina
relatively small
production, production
followed base inArgentina
by Brazil, 2000, to a and total France.
U.S. production
Biodieselof has315 expanded
million gallons
from ina
2010. However,
relatively biodiesel isbase
small production still in
a small
2000,percentage of theproduction
to a total U.S. alternativeoffuel
315pool in the
million U.S., as
gallons in
2010. However,
relatively biodiesel isbase
small production still in
a small
2000,percentage of theproduction
to a total U.S. alternativeoffuel
315pool in the
million U.S., as
gallons in
over
2010.40 times more
However, ethanoliswas
biodiesel stillproduced in 2010. Biodiesel
a small percentage production
of the alternative inpool
fuel the U.S.
in thein U.S.,
2010 as is
over 40 times more ethanol was produced in 2010. Biodiesel production
2010. However, biodiesel is still a small percentage of the alternative fuel pool in the U.S., as in the U.S. in 2010 is
63
overtimes what more
40 times it wasethanol
in 2001.was There are over
produced in 1,000
2010. stationary fuel cell (hydrogen)
Biodiesel production in the U.S. installations
in 2010 is
63 times
over what more
40 times it wasethanol
in 2001.was There are over
produced in 1,000
2010. stationary fuel cell (hydrogen)
Biodiesel production in the U.S. installations
in 2010 is
worldwide,
63 times what 22itofwas
which are greater
in 2001. There are thanover1 MW
1,000instationary
capacity. fuel
(Renewable Fuels installations
cell (hydrogen) Association
worldwide,
63 times what 22itofwas
which are greater
in 2001. There are thanover1 MW
1,000instationary
capacity. fuel
(Renewable Fuels installations
cell (hydrogen) Association
(RFA),
worldwide, 201122 Ethanol
of which Industry Outlook).
are greater than 1 MW in capacity. (Renewable Fuels Association
(RFA), 201122
worldwide, Ethanol
of which Industry Outlook).
are greater than 1 MW in capacity. (Renewable Fuels Association
(RFA), 2011 Ethanol Industry Outlook).
(RFA), 2011 Ethanol Industry Outlook).
Geo-political renewable energy trends
Geo-political renewable energy trends
World net electricity
Geo-political renewable generation trends by 84 percent in the IEO2011 Reference case, from
energyincreases
World net electricity
Geo-political renewable generation trends by 84 percent in the IEO2011 Reference case, from
energyincreases
19.1
Worldtrillion kilowatt generation
net electricity hours in 2008 to 25.5
increases by trillion
84 percent kilowatt
in thehours
IEO2011in 2020 and 35.2
Reference case,trillion
from
World net electricity generation increases by 84 percent in the IEO2011 Reference case,trillion
19.1 trillion kilowatt hours in 2008 to 25.5 trillion kilowatt hours in 2020 and 35.2 from
kilowatt
19.1 trillionhours in 2035.
kilowatt It is in
hours clear
2008 that
to electricity
25.5 trillionis the world’s
kilowatt fastest-growing
hours in 2020 andform 35.2 of end-
trillion
kilowatt
19.1 hours
trillion in 2035.
kilowatt It is in
hours clear
2008 that
to electricity
25.5 trillionis the world’s
kilowatt fastest-growing
hours in 2020 andform 35.2 of end-
trillion
use energy
kilowatt consumption,
hours in 2035. Itasisitclearhas been for the pastisseveral
that electricity decades.
the world’s In the Reference
fastest-growing formcase, net
of end-
use energy
kilowatt consumption,
hours in 2035. Itasisitclearhas been for the pastisseveral
that electricity decades.
the world’s In the Reference
fastest-growing formcase, net
of end-
electricity
use energygeneration
consumption, worldwide
as it hasrises
beenby for2.3
thepercent per year
past several on average
decades. In the from 2008 case,
Reference to 2035,
net
electricity
use energygeneration
consumption, worldwide
as it hasrises
beenby for2.3
thepercent per year
past several on average
decades. In the from 2008 case,
Reference to 2035,
net
while totalgeneration
electricity world energy demand
worldwide rises grows
by 2.3 by percent
1.6 percent per on
per year year. The strongest
average from 2008growthto 2035,in
electricity world energy demand
worldwide rises grows
by 2.3 by percent
1.6 percent per on
per year year. The strongest
average from 2008growthto 2035,in
electricity
world energy is projected
demandforgrows non- OECD
by 1.6 countries.
percent per Non-OECD
year. Theelectricity
strongest generation
growth in
electricity
world energy is projected
demandforgrows non- OECD
by 1.6 countries.
percent per Non-OECD
year. Theelectricity
strongest generation
growth in
increases
electricityby an average
generation annual rate
is projected forofnon-
3.3 percent in the Reference
OECD countries. Non-OECD case which is almost
electricity twice
generation
increases by an average annual rate of 3.3 percent in the Reference
electricity generation is projected for non- OECD countries. Non-OECD electricity generation case which is almost twice
the increase
increases by anrate for OECD
average annualcountries.
rate of 3.3 However
percent inmost of these case
the Reference predictions
which isare based
almost on
twice
the increase
increases by anrate for OECD
average annualcountries.
rate of 3.3 However
percent inmost of these case
the Reference predictions
which isare based
almost on
twice
business
the increase as usual andOECD
rate for did notcountries.
include the externalities
However most ofsuch theseas;predictions
water supply, are land
baseduse,on
business
the increaseas usual andOECD
rate for did notcountries.
include the externalities
However most ofsuch theseas;predictions
water supply, are land
baseduse,on
wildlife,
business as resource
usual and availability,
did not includereliability, thermal pollution,
the externalities such as;waterwater pollution,
supply, land nuclear
use,
wildlife, as
business resource
usual and availability,
did not includereliability, thermal pollution,
the externalities such as;waterwater pollution,
supply, land nuclear
use,
proliferation,
wildlife, resource and geo-politic fluctuations
availability, .
reliability, thermal pollution, water pollution, nuclear
proliferation,
wildlife, and geo-politic
resource fluctuations
availability, .
reliability, thermal pollution, water pollution, nuclear
proliferation, and geo-politic fluctuations .
proliferation, and geo-politic fluctuations .
North America; Canada has plentiful of renewable energy resources, and generates
North America; Canada has plentiful of renewable energy resources, and generates
significant
North part of Canada
America; its electricity from hydropower
has plentiful of renewable dams, energy
and alsoresources,
has the fastest growing
and generates
significant
North part of Canada
America; its electricity from hydropower
has plentiful of renewable dams, energy
and alsoresources,
has the fastest growing
and generates
significant part of its electricity from hydropower 55 dams, and also has the fastest growing
significant
part of its electricity from hydropower 55 dams, and also has the fastest growing

64 Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015 55
55

renewable energy companies. In United Sates, investment in renewable energy has grown
renewable energy companies. In United Sates, investment in renewable energy has grown
renewable energy
dramatically in the companies.
past decade,In United
and Sates,
in 2010 investment
annual in reached
investment renewable energy
more has billion.
than $28 grown
dramatically in the past decade, and in 2010 annual investment reached more than $28 billion.
dramatically
In 2010 in thein the past decade,
United States, and
windin and
2010solar
annual investment (PV)
photovoltaic reached
weremore than
two of $28
the billion.
fastest
In 2010 in the United States, wind and solar photovoltaic (PV) were two of the fastest
In 2010 generation
growing in the United States, wind
technologies. and solar
In 2010, photovoltaic
cumulative (PV) were
wind capacity two ofbythe
increased 15%fastest
and
growing generation technologies. In 2010, cumulative wind capacity increased by 15% and
growing generation
cumulative solar PVtechnologies.
capacity grewIn 71%
2010,from
cumulative wind capacity
the previous increased
year. U.S. ventureby 15% and
capital
cumulative solar PV capacity grew 71% from the previous year. U.S. venture capital and
cumulative
private solar
equity PV capacity
investment grewtechnology
in solar 71% fromcompanies
the previous
has year. U.S. from
increased venture
$40capital
millionand
in
private equity investment in solar technology companies has increased from $40 million in
private
2001 to equity investment
more than in solar
$1.7 billion technology companies has increased from $40 million in
in 2010.
2001 to more than $1.7 billion in 2010.
2001 to more than $1.7 billion in 2010.
Europe: Renewable energy is OECD Europe’s fastest-growing source of electricity
Europe: Renewable energy is OECD Europe’s fastest-growing source of electricity
Europe: Renewable
generation. As indicatedenergy is OECDcase,
in the Reference Europe’s fastest-growing
renewable energy growthsource of electricity
is expected to be 2.5
generation. As indicated in the Reference case, renewable energy growth is expected to be 2.5
generation.
percent per As
yearindicated
through in the Reference
2035; case, renewable
where the majority energy is
of this growth growth
almostis entirely
expectedfrom
to bewind
2.5
percent per year through 2035; where the majority of this growth is almost entirely from wind
percent
and perOECD
solar. year through 2035;
Europe’s where
leading the majority
position of thisingrowth
worldwide is almost
wind power entirely
capacity from wind
is maintained
and solar. OECD Europe’s leading position worldwide in wind power capacity is maintained
and solar.
through OECD
2035, withEurope’s
growth inleading
wind position worldwide
generation averagingin6.4wind powerper
percent capacity is maintained
year, for example, a
through 2035, with growth in wind generation averaging 6.4 percent per year, for example, a
through
small 2035,Denmark
nation with growthhas in
onewind generation
of the averaging
world largest wind6.4farms.
percent per year,
Strong for in
growth example,
offshorea
small nation Denmark has one of the world largest wind farms. Strong growth in offshore
small capacity
wind nation Denmark has one
is underway, withof themegawatts
883 world largest
addedwind
to thefarms. Strong
grid in 2010,growth in offshore
representing a 51-
wind capacity is underway, with 883 megawatts added to the grid in 2010, representing a 51-
wind capacity
percent is over
increase underway, with 883
the amount megawatts
of capacity added
added to the grid
in 2009. in 2010,
Germany representing
is the a 51-
leader of Solar
percent increase over the amount of capacity added in 2009. Germany is the leader of Solar
percent increase
photovoltaic over the%
accounting amount of capacity
47 (1.328 MW) ofadded in 2009.
the world Germany
market is the in
installation leader
2007.of Spain
Solar
photovoltaic accounting % 47 (1.328 MW) of the world market installation in 2007. Spain
photovoltaic
and Italy haveaccounting
the largest%installed
47 (1.328PVMW) of the
capacity world market
in Europe. installation
(European in 2007.
Photovoltaic Spain
Industry
and Italy have the largest installed PV capacity in Europe. (European Photovoltaic Industry
and Italy have
Association the largest
(EPIA) installed
– Global MarketPV capacity
Outlook for in Europe. (European
Photovoltaic Photovoltaic Industry
until 2015,)
Association (EPIA) – Global Market Outlook for Photovoltaic until 2015,)
Association (EPIA) – Global Market Outlook for Photovoltaic until 2015,)
Other Non-OECD Europe and Eurasia: Although hydroelectric projects dominate the
Other Non-OECD Europe and Eurasia: Although hydroelectric projects dominate the
Other
renewableNon-OECD
energy mixEurope and Eurasia:
in non-OECD Asia, Although
generationhydroelectric projects dominate
from no hydroelectric the
renewable
renewable energy mix in non-OECD Asia, generation from no hydroelectric renewable
renewable
energy energy
sources, mix in wind,
especially non-OECD Asia,to generation
is expected from noInhydroelectric
grow significantly. the IEO2011 renewable
Reference
energy sources, especially wind, is expected to grow significantly. In the IEO2011 Reference
energy electricity
case,” sources, especially
generationwind,
fromiswind
expected to in
plants grow significantly.
China is expectedIntothegrowIEO2011 Reference
by 14.2 percent
case,” electricity generation from wind plants in China is expected to grow by 14.2 percent
case,” electricity
per year, from 12generation from wind plants
billion kilowatt-hours in 2008in China
to 447isbillion
expected to grow by in
kilowatt-hours 14.2 percent
2035”. In
per year, from 12 billion kilowatt-hours in 2008 to 447 billion kilowatt-hours in 2035”. In
per year, from
addition, 12 billion
government kilowatt-hours
policies in China inand 2008 to 447
India are billion kilowatt-hours
encouraging in 2035”.
the growth In
of solar
addition, government policies in China and India are encouraging the growth of solar
addition, government
generation. Under its policies
“Golden in Sun”China and India
program, are encouraging
the Chinese Ministry the growth plans
of Finance of solar
to
generation. Under its “Golden Sun” program, the Chinese Ministry of Finance plans to
generation.
subsidize 50Under
percentits
of “Golden Sun” program,
the construction the Chinese Ministry
costs for grid-connected of Finance plans to
solar plants.
subsidize 50 percent of the construction costs for grid-connected solar plants.
subsidize 50 percent
India’s National of Mission,
Solar the construction
launchedcosts
in for grid-connected
November solarto
2009, aims plants.
have 20 gig watts of
India’s National Solar Mission, launched in November 2009, aims to have 20 gig watts of
India’s National
installed Solar Mission,
solar capacity (both PV launched
and solar in November
thermal) 2009,100
by 2020, aimsgigtowatts
haveby202030,
gig watts
and 200of
installed solar capacity (both PV and solar thermal) by 2020, 100 gig watts by 2030, and 200
installed
gig wattssolar capacity
by 2050. (both and
Australia PV and
Newsolar thermal)
Zealand, as a by 2020,rely
region, 100on gigcoal
watts
forby 2030,
about 66and 200
percent
gig watts by 2050. Australia and New Zealand, as a region, rely on coal for about 66 percent
gig watts by 2050.
of electricity Australia
generation, and largely
based New Zealand, as a region,
on Australia’s richrely on coal for
Renewable about 66 in
generation percent
non-
of electricity generation, based largely on Australia’s rich Renewable generation in non-
of electricity
OECD Europegeneration, based
and Eurasia, largely
almost on Australia’s
entirely rich Renewable
from hydropower facilities,generation
increasesinbynon-
an
OECD Europe and Eurasia, almost entirely from hydropower facilities, increases by an
OECD
average Europe and Eurasia,
of 1.9 percent per year.almost entirely from hydropower facilities, increases by an
average of 1.9 percent per year.
average of 1.9 percent per year. 56
56

After Fukushima nuclear accident, 52 of 54 nuclear reactors in Japan are still shut down.
Soon after accident, Prime Minister Naoto Kan stated that the plan to increase the nuclear
power share of the country’s electricity supply, from about 26 percent at present to 50 percent
by 2030, “will have to be set aside”. Instead, the Japanese government plans to pursue
anaggressive expansion of renewable energy capacity, especially solar power from which
electricity generation increases by 11.5 percent per year from 2008 to 2035, making solar
power Japan’s fastest-growing source of renewable energy.
Central and South America: Electricity generation in Central and South America is shown
to increase by 2.4 percent per year in the IEO2011 Reference case, from 1.0 trillion Kilowatt-
hours in 2008 to 1.9 trillion kilowatt-hours in 2035. The electricity generation in Central and
South America is dominated by hydroelectric power, which accounted for nearly two-thirds of
the region’s total net electricity generation in 2008. However, the first steps of wind
development are now taking place in Brazil. In fact, hydropower ProviIn, as of December
2009, held its first supply tender exclusively for wind farms. At the event, 1.8 gig watts of
capacity were purchased, for development by mid-2012. In the IEO2011 Reference case, wind
power generation in Brazil is expected to grow by 10.8 percent per year, from 530 million
kilowatt-hours in 2008 to 8,508 million kilowatt-hours in 2035.
Africa: Demand for electricity in Africa grows at an average annual rate of 3.0 percent in the
IEO2011 Reference case. Fossil-fuel-fired generation supplied 81 percent of the region’s total
electricity in 2008, and reliance on fossil fuels is expected to continue through 2035.
Generation from hydropower and other marketed renewable energy sources is expected to
grow relatively slowly in Africa. The region’s consumption of marketed renewable energy is
expected to grow by 2.9 percent per year from 2008 to 2035.
Discussion and recommendations

The last 100 years of international energy markets experience show that fossil fuel energy
markets are complex, and influenced by uneven distribution of global energy production and
consumption. In addition, national and international regulations, and limitations on producer
and consumer market behavior during the times of global and regional conflicts show that
difficulties are political not necessarily technological. In the light of latest geopolitical
developments in the Middle East and North Africa, existing energy market projections are
57


subject to much more uncertainties than ever before. As a result, energy prices swings will not
be in response to small changes in demand anymore, but many of the future unforeseen geo-
political events that may shape fossil fuel energy markets that are random and cannot be
anticipated
Global logic dictates that energy diversification has to be based on expanding existing energy
sources with a special focus on exploiting renewable energy sources. Although countries
haves different and often conflicting goals and interests in every step of energy policies and
production, they all converged on the unquestionable fact that, in this century, difficulties
involved with energy policies are driven by geopolitical uncertainties.
Therefore, generating electricity from fossil fuels and nuclear energy is highly vulnerable to
fuel cost which has been subject to political/external manipulations. To establish a fair
comparison of the different electricity production activities in this century, all internal and
external costs to society need to be taken into account as well. Hence, it is important to
identify external effects of different energy systems and to minimize their social costs.
Uncertainties relating to future fossil fuel prices imply a considerable risk for future
generation costs of conventional power plants. The non-reversible environmental and social
costs of fossil fuel power and nuclear energy systems make these technologies less
competitive in comparison with renewable energy as the externalities are included.
In fact that, Prof. Mark Z. Jacobson at the Department of Civil and Environmental
Engineering, Stanford University, California USA, conducted a most comprehensive research
project in which 11 different externalities-categories considered in evaluating existing energy
resources which are; “The electric power sources considered here include solar photovoltaics
(PV),Concentrated solar power (CSP), wind turbines, geothermal power plants, hydroelectric
power plants, wave devices, tidal turbines, nuclear power plants, and coal power plants fitted
with carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology. The two liquid fuel options considered are
corn-E85 (85% ethanol; 15% gasoline) and cellulosic-E85”.
The major purpose of this research was to provide quantitative information to policy makers
and investors about the most effective solutions to the problems associated with climate
change and externalities so that better decisions about clean energy policies can be provided.
“This review evaluates and ranks 12 combinations of electric power and fuel sources from

among 9 electric power sources, 2 liquid fuel sources, and 3 vehicle technologies, with respect
to their ability to address climate, air pollution, and energy problems simultaneously. The
review also evaluates the impacts of each on water supply, land use, wildlife, resource
availability, thermal pollution, water chemical pollution, nuclear proliferation, and under
nutrition”.” Wind-BEVs performed best in seven out of 11 categories, including
mortality, climate-relevant emissions, footprint, water consumption, effects on wildlife,
thermal pollution, and water chemical pollution”.
“Costs are not examined since policy decisions should be based on the ability of a technology
to address a problem rather than costs (e.g., the U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970
prohibit the use of cost as a basis for determining regulations required to meet air pollution
standards) and because costs of new technologies will change over time, particularly as they
are used on a large scale. Similarly, costs of existing fossil fuels are generally increasing,
making it difficult to estimate the competitiveness of new technologies in the short or long
term”.
The findings of this important research, ranked the wind and solar power as the best energy
sources in 21st century, and ranking is summarized as follows; “ In sum, the use of wind,
CSP, geothermal, tidal, solar, wave, and hydroelectric to provide electricity for BEVs
and HFCVs result in the most benefit and least impact among the options considered.
Coal-CCS and nuclear provide less benefit with greater negative impacts.
“The biofuel options provide no certain benefit and result in significant negative impacts.
Because sufficient clean natural resources (e.g., wind, sunlight, hot water, ocean energy,
gravitational energy) exists to power all energy for the world, the results here suggest that the
diversion of attention to the less efficient or non-efficient options represents an opportunity
cost that delays solutions to climate and air pollution health problems”. Mark Z. Jacobson,”
Review of Solutions to Global 1 Warming, Air Pollution, and Energy Security”. Energy
Environ. Sci., 2009, doi: 10.1039/b809990C
Nuclear energy and climate change: Based on a review of 103 new and old lifecycle studies of
nuclear energy, Dr. Jacobson estimates that mean lifecycle emissions of nuclear reactors as 40
g CO2 per kWh, the range appears to be low but within reason. “Nuclear power plant
emissions include those due to uranium mining, enrichment, and transport and waste disposal
59

gravitational energy) exists to power all energy for the world, the results here suggest that the
diversion of attention to the less efficient or non-efficient options represents an opportunity
cost that delays solutions to climate and air pollution health problems”. Mark Z. Jacobson,”
Review of Solutions to Global 1 Warming, Air Pollution, and Energy Security”. Energy
Environ. Sci., 2009, doi: 10.1039/b809990C
Nuclear energy and climate change: Based on a review of 103 new and old lifecycle studies of
nuclear energy, Dr. Jacobson estimates that mean lifecycle emissions of nuclear reactors as 40
g CO2 per kWh, the range appears to be low but within reason. “Nuclear power plant

emissions include those due to uranium mining, enrichment, and transport and waste disposal
as well as those due to construction, operation,
59 and decommissioning of the reactors. We
estimate the lifecycle emissions of new nuclear power plants as 9–70 g CO2e kWh_1, with
the lower number from an industry estimate 49 and the upper number slightly above the
average of 66 g CO2e kWh”
Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons: The Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
has been signed by 190 countries. “Here, we detail the link between nuclear energy and
nuclear weapons and estimate the emissions of nuclear explosions attributable to nuclear
energy. The primary limitation to building a nuclear weapon is the availability of purified
fissionable fuel (highly-enriched uranium or plutonium). Worldwide, nine countries have
known nuclear weapons stockpiles (US, Russia, UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel,
North Korea). In addition, Iran is pursuing uranium enrichment, and 32 other countries have
sufficient fissionable material to produce weapons. “However Among the 42 countries with
fissionable material, 22 have facilities as part of their civilian nuclear energy program, either
to produce highly-enriched uranium or to separate plutonium, and facilities in 13 countries are
active. Thus, the ability of states to produce nuclear weapons today follows directly from their
ability to produce nuclear power. In fact, producing material for a weapon requires merely
operating a civilian nuclear power plant together with a sophisticated plutonium separation
facility.
Finally, in the last 100 years, production, distribution, and use of fossil fuels and nuclear
energy not only caused irreversible global climate changes, depletion of ozone layer, and
polluted land and oceans, but also replaced the national borders, created regional wars, and
forced migrations of many indigenes people. By contrast, renewable energy resources,
including biomass, hydro, geothermal, solar, wind, is naturally replenishing. They are
virtually inexhaustible in duration; internal costs such as fuel are practically unchanged during
their life time, and not susceptible to geo-political conflicts.

THE ARAB
THE ARAB SPRING SPRING AND AND THE THE BALANCE BALANCE OF OF POWERPOWER IN IN THE
THE MIDDLE MIDDLE
THE ARAB SPRING AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE
THE ARAB SPRING AND THEEAST EAST
BALANCE OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE
THE ARAB SPRING AND THEEAST BALANCE OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE
EAST
EAST Marian Zidaru,
Marian Zidaru, Ştefan Ştefan Georgescu
Georgescu
Marian Zidaru, Ştefan Georgescu
Marian Zidaru, Ştefan Georgescu
TheThe series series of of protests protests and and demonstrations
demonstrations across acrossMarian the Middle
the MiddleZidaru, EastŞtefan
East and North
and Georgescu
North Africa
Africa
The series of protests and demonstrations across the Middle East and North Africa
has has become become The series known
known of as as protests thethe "Arab "Arab Spring". As
Spring".
and demonstrations As ofof across
November
November 2011, governments
2011,
the Middle governments
East and North haveAfrica
have been
been
has become The series knownof as protests the "Arab Spring". As of across
and demonstrations November 2011, governments
the Middle East and North haveAfricabeen
has overthrown
overthrown becomein inknown three countries:
three countries:
as the "Arab Tunisia,
Tunisia,
Spring". Egypt
Egypt and
Asand Libya.
of Libya.
November The geopolitical
The geopolitical
2011, implications
implications
governments have of of the
the
been
overthrown
has becomeinknown three countries: as the "Arab Tunisia,
Spring".EgyptAsand of Libya.
November The geopolitical
2011, governments implications have ofbeen the
protests have
protests
overthrown have in three drawncountries:
drawn global attention.
global attention.
Tunisia, Egypt This article
This article
and Libya. analyzes
analyzes the possible
the
The geopolitical possibleimplications
evolution in
evolution in the
of the
protests have
overthrown in three drawncountries: global attention. Tunisia, Egypt This articleand Libya. analyzes the possibleimplications
The geopolitical evolution in of the
protests
regional balance
regional have
balance drawn ofof power power global of of the theattention.Middle This
Middle East and
East article
and North
North analyzes
Africa.the possible evolution in the
Africa.
protests
regional balance have drawn of power global of the attention.Middle This East and article
North analyzes
Africa. the possible evolution in the
regional balance of power of the Middle East and North Africa.
regional
Key words: words: balance ArabofSpring, power Middle of the Middle East and ofNorth
powerAfrica.
Key Arab Spring, Middle East, East, balance
balance of power
Key words: Arab Spring, Middle East, balance of power
Key words: Arab Spring, Middle East, balance of power
Key words: Due Arab to its itsSpring, important Middle East, balance
geopolitical of power
location (linking Asian, Asian, African African and and European
European
Due to important geopolitical location (linking
Due to its important geopolitical location (linking Asian, African and European
continents)
continents) Due and to its
and toto important its diversified
its diversified geopolitical
rich natural
rich location
natural resources
resources(linking theAsian,
the indigenous
indigenous African and European
inhabitants
inhabitants of the
of the
continents) Due and to its to important its diversified geopolitical
rich natural locationresources(linking the Asian,
indigenous African and European
inhabitants of the
continents)
Middle Eastern
Middle Eastern and region to
region its diversified hadhad been been subjected rich natural
subjected resources the
to multi-forms
to multi-forms of indigenous
of colonial campaigns
colonial inhabitants
campaigns of the
since
since the
continents)
Middle Eastern and region to its diversified had been subjected rich natural resources the
to multi-forms of indigenous
colonial campaigns inhabitants of the
since
Middle
beginning
beginning Eastern of of ancient ancient region times.
times. had These been subjected
These inhabitantstowere
inhabitants multi-forms
were subjectedofto
subjected tocolonial campaigns
ruthless military
ruthless since the
military occupations,
occupations,
Middle
beginning Eastern of ancient region times. had These been subjected inhabitantstowere multi-forms
subjectedofto colonial campaigns
ruthless military since the
occupations,
beginning
genocides,ofpersecutions,
genocides, ancient times.oppressions,
persecutions, These inhabitants
oppressions, enslavements,were subjected
enslavements, and ethnic
and to ruthless
ethnic cleansing.
cleansing. military Yetoccupations,
Yet the people
the people
beginning
genocides, ofpersecutions, ancient times.oppressions, These inhabitants enslavements,were subjected and ethnic to ruthless
cleansing. military Yetoccupations,
the people
genocides,
nevernever surrendered surrendered persecutions, nor gave
nor gave oppressions, up. They
up. They struggledenslavements,
struggled theirand
for their
for freedom
freedomethnicand andcleansing.
independence
independence Yet the and people
and fought
fought
genocides,
never surrendered persecutions, nor gaveoppressions, up. They struggled enslavements, for theirand freedomethnicand cleansing.
independence Yet theand people
fought
never
all all colonial colonial surrendered powersnor
powers oneone gave after
after up.the the They struggled
other.
other. Since the
Since for
the their
beginning
beginning freedom and
2011independence
of 2011
of we are
we are witnessing and fought
witnessing their
their
never
all colonial surrendered powersnor one gave after up.the Theyother.struggled
Since the for their
beginning freedom and independence
of 2011 we are witnessing and fought their
all latest
latest colonial regionally-sweeping
regionally-sweeping powers one after fight
fight the againstother. Since
against local the
local beginning
ruling
ruling regimesofthat
regimes 2011
that arewe
are are witnessing
subservient
subservient their
to foreign
to foreign
all
latest colonial regionally-sweeping powers one after fight the againstother. Since local the rulingbeginning
regimesofthat 2011 arewe are witnessing
subservient their
to foreign
latest
powers.
powers. regionally-sweeping This has
This has become become known fight
knownagainst thelocal
as the
as Arabruling
Arab Spring.
Spring. regimes that are subservient
Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, like all
like theirtoprevious
all their foreign
previous
latest
powers. regionally-sweeping
This has become known fight against as the local Arab rulingSpring.regimes that are subservient
Unfortunately, like all theirtoprevious foreign
powers.
struggles,This
struggles, there
there hasis isbecome aa poisonous poisonous knownsnake as thein
snake inArab Spring. Unfortunately,
the background,
the background, which covertly
which like all
covertly is their
is previous
directing
directing and
and
powers.
struggles,This there hasisbecome a poisonous knownsnake as theinArab Spring. Unfortunately,
the background, which covertly like all is their
directingpreviousand
struggles,
orchestrating
orchestrating there thisisArab
this Arab a poisonous Spring to
Spring snake
to reap
reap its itsinfruits
the for
fruits background,
for itself .. which covertly is directing and
itself 1
1
struggles,
orchestrating there thisisArab a poisonous Spring to reap snakeitsinfruits the for itself11.
background, which covertly is directing and
orchestrating this Arab Spring to reap its fruits for itself1.
orchestrating Many this
Many analysts
analysts Arab believe Spring
believetothe reap
the its fruitschanges
dramatic
dramatic for itselfthat
changes . the
that the global
global international
international system system is is
Many analysts believe the dramatic changes that the global international system is
undergoing
undergoing Manynow now analysts areare aa believe continuation
continuation the dramatic
of aa long-term
of changesreconfiguration
long-term that the globalof
reconfiguration ofinternational
the world
the world thatthatsystem
started
started is
undergoing Manynow analysts are a believe continuation the dramatic
of a long-term changesreconfiguration
that the globalofinternational the world that system
started is
undergoing
back back in in the thenow 1980s.
1980s. are aThe The continuation process is
process of spreading
is a long-termalong
spreading reconfiguration
along top-downof pattern
aa top-down the world
pattern andthat
and started
gradually
gradually
undergoing
back in thenow 1980s. are aThe continuation process isof spreading a long-termalong reconfiguration
a top-downof pattern the world andthat started
gradually
back embracing
embracing in the increasingly
increasingly 1980s. The more
more process regions.
regions. is However,
spreadingititalong
However, is highly
is highly a top-down
likely that
likely thatpattern
there are
there areand alsogradually
also changes
changes
back in the
embracing increasingly 1980s. The more process regions. is However,
spreadingitalong is highly a top-down
likely that pattern there areand alsogradually
changes
embracing
working along
working along increasingly thethe bottom-up bottom-up more regions. model and
model However,
and influencing
influencing it is highlythe entire
the likelyglobal
entire that there
global are also changes
international
international system,
system,
embracingalong
working increasingly the bottom-up more regions. model and However,influencing it is highly
the entire likelyglobalthat there are also changes
working
whichwhich is is manifest along
manifest thein inbottom-up thethe turbulent turbulent model events
events andoccurring
influencing
occurring the entire
in various
in various places
places global
22
2..
working
which is manifest along theinbottom-up the turbulent modelevents andoccurring
influencing the entire
in various places global
. international system,
which is manifest in the turbulent events occurring in various places22.
which isThe The manifest structure
structure in the of of Middle turbulent
Middle Eastern events military
Eastern occurring
military in various
forces
forces suggests
suggests places that. the
that the Arab
Arab revolt
revolt is is likely
likely
The structure of Middle Eastern military forces suggests that the Arab revolt is likely
to to be be met met Thewith with structure repeated
repeated of Middle violence
violence Eastern military forces
and bloodshed
and bloodshed suggests that
and potentially
and potentially civil
civil thewar
warArab in revolt
in countries
countries is likely
with
with
to be met Thewith structure repeated of Middle violence Eastern military forces
and bloodshed suggests that
and potentially civil thewar Arab in revolt
countries is likely
with
to be met with repeated violence and bloodshed and potentially civil war in countries with
be
to met
with
repeated
violence
and bloodshed and potentially civil war in countries with
11 Dr.
Elias
Dr. Akleh,
Elias Akleh,
The
The
Snake
Snake
behind
behind
the
the Arab
Arab Spring
Spring http://www.intifada-palestine.com/2011/11/the-snake-
http://www.intifada-palestine.com/2011/11/the-snake-
1
Dr. Elias Akleh, The Snake behind the Arab Spring http://www.intifada-palestine.com/2011/11/the-snake-
behind-the-arab-spring/
1behind-the-arab-spring/
2 behind-the-arab-spring/
2 Dr.
Elias
Akleh,
The
Snake
behind
the Arab Spring http://www.intifada-palestine.com/2011/11/the-snake-
1 http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Moving-From-the-Bottom-Up-and-Back-Down-Again-15327
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Moving-From-the-Bottom-Up-and-Back-Down-Again-15327
Dr. Elias Akleh, The Snake behind the Arab Spring http://www.intifada-palestine.com/2011/11/the-snake-
2behind-the-arab-spring/
2
behind-the-arab-spring/ 1
1
70 Volume:3,
2 No:1, Winter 2015
1

1
1

competing military forces. That raises the prospect of a decade of instability and strife in a
geo-strategically crucial part of the world3.
geo-strategically crucial part of the world33.
geo-strategically crucial part of the world .
As of November 2011, governments have been overthrown in three countries.
Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on 14 January following the
Tunisian revolution protests. In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak resigned on 11 February
2011 after 18 days of massive protests, ending his 30-year presidency. The Libyan leader
Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown on 23 August 2011, after the National Transitional
Council (NTC) took control of Bab al-Azizia. He was killed on 20 October 2011, in his
hometown of Sirte after the NTC took control of the city.
During this period of regional unrest, several leaders announced their intentions to step
down at the end of their current terms. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir announced that he
would not seek re-election in 201544, as did Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, whose term
would not seek re-election in 20154, as did Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, whose term
would not seek re-election in 2015 , as did Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, whose term
ends in 2014, although there have been increasingly violent demonstrations demanding his
ends in 2014, although there have been increasingly violent demonstrations demanding his
ends in 2014, although5 there have been increasingly violent demonstrations demanding his
immediate resignation . Protests in Jordan have also caused the sacking of two successive
immediate resignation5. Protests in Jordan have also caused the sacking of two successive
immediate resignation5. Protests6 in Jordan have also caused the sacking of two successive
governments by King Abdullah . Another leader, President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen,
governments by King Abdullah66. Another leader, President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen,
governments by King Abdullah . Another leader, President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen,
announced on 23 April that he would step down within 30 days in exchange for immunity, a
deal the Yemeni opposition informally accepted on 26 April; Saleh then reneged on the deal,
prolonging the Yemeni uprising77. The Arab Spring novelty lies in the spontaneous secular
prolonging the Yemeni uprising7. The Arab Spring novelty lies in the spontaneous secular
prolonging the Yemeni uprising . The Arab Spring novelty lies in the spontaneous secular
mass movement of young people, mostly educated and liberal, which was not instigated by
external influences. This was especially evident in Egypt and Tunisia. At the same time, a few
similarities are not a basis for equating what happened in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen,
Bahrain and other countries. In some cases it was the revolutionary movement of the youth
and middle class, in other situations it was the activity of insurgent tribes, and in still other
cases it was a revolt of a religious section, etc88.
cases it was a revolt of a religious section, etc8.
cases it was a revolt of a religious section, etc .
The geopolitical implications of the protests have drawn global attention9. While
The geopolitical implications of the protests have drawn global attention99. While
The geopolitical implications of the protests have drawn global attention . While
everyone was worrying about the collapse of the “balance of power” in the region with the

3 http://www.middle-east-studies.net/?p=22784


3 "Party: Bashir is not standing for re-election". Gulf Times. 22 February 2011. Retrieved 22 February 2011.
45 "Party: Bashir is not standing for re-election". Gulf Times. 22 February 2011. Retrieved 22 February 2011.
"Iraq PM
5 "Party: plansisno
Bashir re-election".
not standing forVoice of Russia.
re-election". 5 February
Gulf Times. 222011. Retrieved
February 2011.27 February222011.
Retrieved February 2011.
56 "Iraq PM plans no re-election". Voice of Russia. 5 February 2011. Retrieved 27 February 2011.
"Jordan
6 "Iraq PMking appoints
plans no new PM, Voice
re-election". government
of quits".
Russia. 5 Reuters. 2011.
February 1 February 2011.27Retrieved
Retrieved February 22011.
February 2011.
67 "Jordan king
Almasmari, appoints
Hakim new
(26new PM,
April government
2011). quits".
"Yemenquits". Reuters.
Protesters 1
Accept February 2011.
Deal". The Retrieved
Wall 2 February
Street Journal. 2011. 27
Retrieved
7 "Jordan kingHakim
appoints PM, government Reuters. 1 February 2011. Retrieved 2 February 2011.
Almasmari,
7April 2011. Hakim (26 April 2011). "Yemen Protesters Accept Deal". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 27
(26 April 2011). "Yemen Protesters Accept Deal". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved
Almasmari,
April
8 2011. 27
April 2011.
AFP 27 January 2011 (28 January 1986). "Unrest across the Arab world". Vancouver Sun. Canada. Retrieved
9 AFP 27 January 2011 (28 January 1986). "Unrest across the Arab world". Vancouver Sun. Canada. Retrieved
29AFP
January 2011. 2011 (28 January 1986). "Unrest across the Arab world". Vancouver Sun. Canada. Retrieved
27 January
29 January 2011.
29 January 2011.
2
2

fear that Iran were acquiring a bomb, the “Arab Spring” is already breaking the balance, albeit
with other results, making the future of the Middle East increasingly uncertain. Even the
fear that Iran were acquiring a bomb, the “Arab Spring” is already breaking the balance, albeit
Assad regime in Syria that was regarded as an anti-US and anti-Israel advocate, seemed to
with other results, making the future of the Middle East increasingly uncertain. Even the
have contributed to the maintenance of stability up until now. On Naqba Day of this year,
Assad regime in Syria that was regarded as an anti-US and anti-Israel advocate, seemed to
Syria hoped to send a strong message to the West by allowing Palestinian activists and
have contributed to the maintenance of stability up until now. On Naqba Day of this year,
refugees to enter the Golan Heights. This had never happened under the Assad regime and it
Syria hoped to send a strong message to the West by allowing Palestinian activists and
implies that the fall of Bashar may have serious consequences for Israel. The “stable” order in
refugees to enter the Golan Heights. This had never happened under the Assad regime and it
the Middle East that was taken for granted by the West is starting to falter, and is now
implies that the fall of Bashar may have serious consequences for Israel. The “stable” order in
revealing its limits. In terms of realism, the “Arab Spring” will bring serious security issues to
the Middle East that was taken for granted by the West is starting to falter, and is now
Israel and would, at some point, convince the Jewish State that they would have to make
revealing its limits. In terms of realism, the “Arab Spring” will bring serious security issues to
peace with Arab states if they wish to survival. In terms of liberalism, it was a gesture that the
Israel and would, at some point, convince the Jewish State that they would have to make
US will support the Arab people’s pursuit of “self-determination10.
peace with Arab states if they wish to survival. In terms of liberalism, it was a gesture that the
US will support the Arab people’s pursuit of “self-determination10.
In contrast to climatic spring, the Arab Spring did not end with the beginning of summer.
The main difficulty in predicting its consequences is the lack of clarity about the layout of
In contrast to climatic spring, the Arab Spring did not end with the beginning of summer.
new regimes in Arab countries affected by popular unrest. One can consider three possible
The main difficulty in predicting its consequences is the lack of clarity about the layout of
scenarios here:
new regimes in Arab countries affected by popular unrest. One can consider three possible
scenarios here:
• a democratic regime;
• an Islamic regime;
• a democratic regime;
• a new and quite possibly military dictatorship.
• an Islamic regime;
• a new and quite possibly military dictatorship.
Theoretically, there is a fourth scenario, albeit rather improbable but not entirely
impossible, that implies uncontrollability and chaos. We need to scrutinize the fact that the
Theoretically, there is a fourth scenario, albeit rather improbable but not entirely
Arab monarchies have in all evidence withstood the onslaught of protest-motivated activism,
impossible, that implies uncontrollability and chaos. We need to scrutinize the fact that the
which simultaneously victimized Arab republics with democratic institutions that are rather
Arab monarchies have in all evidence withstood the onslaught of protest-motivated activism,
formal and are strictly controlled by the authoritarian regimes. The essence of the matter is
which simultaneously victimized Arab republics with democratic institutions that are rather
larger than the financial and economic capabilities of the monarchies, as they differ from one
formal and are strictly controlled by the authoritarian regimes. The essence of the matter is
place to another. The factor of legitimacy plays a tangible role in this case. A full-fledged
larger than the financial and economic capabilities of the monarchies, as they differ from one
monarchical regime has more legitimacy than a republic that does not hold democratic
place to another. The factor of legitimacy plays a tangible role in this case. A full-fledged
elections, which legitimize state power. Along with this, some monarchical regimes are less
monarchical regime has more legitimacy than a republic that does not hold democratic
authoritarian than republics ruled by dictators. In this respect we can compare the Jordanian
elections, which legitimize state power. Along with this, some monarchical regimes are less
authoritarian than republics ruled by dictators. In this respect we can compare the Jordanian

10
http://arabsthink.com/2011/09/25/the-long-term-perspectives-of-obama%E2%80%99s-unclear-middle-east-
policy/

10
http://arabsthink.com/2011/09/25/the-long-term-perspectives-of-obama%E2%80%99s-unclear-middle-east-
policy/
3
72
3

and Moroccan monarchy with republics like Muammar Gadhafi's Libya, Al Assad's Syria and
and Moroccan monarchy with republics like Muammar Gadhafi's Libya, Al Assad's Syria and
Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
Another obvious result is the unprecedented strengthening of two countries located on the
Another obvious result is the unprecedented strengthening of two countries located on the
outskirts of the Middle East – Iran and especially Turkey. Turkey under Prime Minister Recep
outskirts of the Middle East – Iran and especially Turkey. Turkey under Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, whose enlightened Justice and Development Party was once again reelected
Tayyip Erdogan, whose enlightened Justice and Development Party was once again reelected
on June 12, 2011, wants to unite Islamic and European values and has scored significant
on June 12, 2011, wants to unite Islamic and European values and has scored significant
successes in economic development. It is often said that Turkey is turning into a model for
successes in economic development. It is often said that Turkey is turning into a model for
countries like Tunisia and particularly Egypt. At the same time, the new elites there have
countries like Tunisia and particularly Egypt. At the same time, the new elites there have
undertaken a thorough scrutiny of the post-Communist experience of Central European and
undertaken a thorough scrutiny of the post-Communist experience of Central European and
East European countries.
East European countries.
Israel, has conclusively established itself as a dominant military power, but the critical
Israel, has conclusively established itself as a dominant military power, but the critical
situation in the Middle East conflict voids this advantage of value in many ways. The world
situation in the Middle East conflict voids this advantage of value in many ways. The world
community has failed to assess in full the recent rehearsals, including a test by the Syrians of
community has failed to assess in full the recent rehearsals, including a test by the Syrians of
a peaceful assault against the border with the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (a similar
a peaceful assault against the border with the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (a similar
attempt was made from Lebanese territory). One of the top leaders in the Palestinian
attempt was made from Lebanese territory). One of the top leaders in the Palestinian
resistance movement told that the Palestinians can mobilize up to 500,000 people if they find
resistance movement told that the Palestinians can mobilize up to 500,000 people if they find
it necessary to stage a peaceful breakthrough march. These “angry young men” will not even
it necessary to stage a peaceful breakthrough march. These “angry young men” will not even
be armed with sticks or stones, as they are not supposed to commit acts of violence against the
be armed with sticks or stones, as they are not supposed to commit acts of violence against the
Israelis.
Israelis.
Quite unexpectedly for the West democratic revolutions have swept the Arab world, a
Quite unexpectedly for the West democratic revolutions have swept the Arab world, a
region the West thought would never change and where it had long buried the idea of
region the West thought would never change and where it had long buried the idea of
exporting democracy. The educated and liberal youth became the main actors in the events in
exporting democracy. The educated and liberal youth became the main actors in the events in
Tunisia and Egypt. The West interprets the results as its own victory and something that has
Tunisia and Egypt. The West interprets the results as its own victory and something that has
reaffirmed the attractiveness of liberal democratic values, which previously caused resentment
reaffirmed the attractiveness of liberal democratic values, which previously caused resentment
in the East, and the Western model of society on the whole11 . It has started allocating sizeable,
in the East, and the Western model of society on the whole11. It has started allocating sizeable,
albeit insufficient, resources to support Arab countries where democratic regimes might take
albeit insufficient, resources to support Arab countries where democratic regimes might take
root. The U.S. understands that these regimes may show strong anti-Israeli and anti-American
root. The U.S. understands that these regimes may show strong anti-Israeli and anti-American
sentiment in their policies. In addition, Islamic political forces will have to play a crucial role
sentiment in their policies. In addition, Islamic political forces will have to play a crucial role
in these transforming societies, although no one will venture to predict the degree of that
in these transforming societies, although no one will venture to predict the degree of that

11 Vitaly
Naumkin,
Moving
From
the
Bottom Up and Back Down Again
11
Vitaly Naumkin, Moving From the Bottom Up and Back Down Again
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Moving-From-the-Bottom-Up-and-Back-Down-Again-15327 accesed August
06 2014. accesed August
06 2014.
4

influence even for the short term. For example in Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood comes in power
influence even for the short term. For example in Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood comes in power
through free
influence even election. for the short Another term. example is the situation
For example in Egypt, from MuslimSyria and Iraq incomes
Brotherhood whichinIslamic
power
through free election. Another example is the situation from Syria and Iraq in which Islamic
political free
through forces election. have strong Another position. example is the situation from Syria and Iraq in which Islamic
political forces have strong position.
political forces have strong position.
The considerable rise of the Islamic factor embodies one more vector of influence of
The considerable rise of the Islamic factor embodies one more vector of influence of
the events The considerable in the Arab rise world of the on Islamic
the transformation
factor embodies of the
oneglobal international
more vector system.
of influence of
the events in the Arab world on the transformation of the global international system.
Naturally,
the events this in the will Arab have an world immediate on the impact on European
transformation of theUnion
global countries, as it will
international fuel
system.
Naturally, this will have an immediate impact on European Union countries, as it will fuel
additional migration
Naturally, this will have froman theimmediate Middle East and North
impact Africa. Immigration
on European Union countries,is already
as it awill
serious
fuel
additional migration from the Middle East and North Africa. Immigration is already a serious
problem for
additional migration Europe,from sincethe it Middle is transforming
East and well-shaped
North Africa.European Immigration institutions
is already such as the
a serious
problem for Europe, since it is transforming well-shaped European institutions such as the
Schengen
problem for zone Europe, and thesince overall it isatmosphere transforming of European
well-shaped politics. It is enough
European to take
institutions a look
such as theat
Schengen zone and the overall atmosphere of European politics. It is enough to take a look at
the resultszone
Schengen of elections and the overall in one EU country of
atmosphere after another politics.
European where the It isdemand
enoughfor populist
to take a lookanti-
at
the results of elections in one EU country after another where the demand for populist anti-
immigrant
the results parties of elections is growing. in one EU country after another where the demand for populist anti-
immigrant parties is growing.
immigrant parties is growing.
It cannot be ruled out that a kind of dichotomy between traditional authoritarian
It cannot be ruled out that a kind of dichotomy between traditional authoritarian
monarchies It cannot and new be ruled democratic out that regimes
a kindespousing
of dichotomy values between
close to traditional
Western ones, although
authoritarian
monarchies and new democratic regimes espousing values close to Western ones, although
not always friendly
monarchies and newtodemocratic them, will regimes appear inespousing
the Arab values world if this to
close scenario
Western is enacted.
ones, althoughThere
not always friendly to them, will appear in the Arab world if this scenario is enacted. There
will always
not likely be friendly a showdown to them,between will appear two development
in the Arab world tendencies.
if this One of them
scenario is secularism
is enacted. There
will likely be a showdown between two development tendencies. One of them is secularism
12
with likely
will an Islamic be a face; showdown the other between is Islamic development. tendencies. One of them is secularism
two clericalism
with an Islamic face; the other is Islamic clericalism12.
with an Islamic face; the other is Islamic clericalism12.
Syria, Iran and the Balance of Power in the Middle East.
We are now moving toward a reckoning with the consequences of American troops
We are now moving toward a reckoning with the consequences of American troops
withdrawal We from are now Iraq.moving The reckoning toward aconcerns reckoning thewith potential for a massiveof
the consequences shift in the balance
American troops
withdrawal from Iraq. The reckoning concerns the potential for a massive shift in the balance
of power infrom
withdrawal the Iraq. region, Thewith reckoning Iran moving
concernsfrom a fairly marginal
the potential for a massivepowershiftto inpotentially
the balancea
of power in the region, with Iran moving from a fairly marginal power to potentially a
dominant
of power in power. the region, As thewith process unfolds,from
Iran moving the a United States and
fairly marginal powerIsrael are makinga
to potentially
dominant power. As the process unfolds, the United States and Israel are making
countermoves.
dominant power. Questions As theremain process whether thesethe
unfolds, countermoves
United States will and
stabilize
Israeltheare region and
making
countermoves. Questions remain whether these countermoves will stabilize the region and
whether or how
countermoves. Questions far Iran remain will gowhether in its these
response. Iran has been
countermoves preparingtheforregion
will stabilize the U.S.
and
whether or how far Iran will go in its response. Iran has been preparing for the U.S.
withdrawal.
whether or While how far it isIran unreasonable will go in simply to say thatIran
its response. Iranhas
will been
dominate Iraq, itfor
preparing is fair
thetoU.S.
say
withdrawal. While it is unreasonable simply to say that Iran will dominate Iraq, it is fair to say
Tehran will While
withdrawal. have tremendous it is unreasonable influence in Baghdad
simply to say that to Iran
the point of being Iraq,
will dominate able ittoisblock
fair toIraqi
say
Tehran will have tremendous influence in Baghdad to the point of being able to block Iraqi
initiatives
Tehran willIran have opposes. tremendous This influence influence will increase to
in Baghdad as the
the point
U.S. withdrawal
of being able concludes
to blockand it
Iraqi
initiatives Iran opposes. This influence will increase as the U.S. withdrawal concludes and it
becomes clear
initiatives Iran opposes. there willThis be no suddenwill
influence reversal
increase in the withdrawal
as the policy. Iraqi
U.S. withdrawal concludespoliticians'
and it
becomes clear there will be no sudden reversal in the withdrawal policy. Iraqi politicians'
calculus must
becomes clear account there will forbethe nonearness of Iranian
sudden reversal power
in the and the policy.
withdrawal increasingIraqidistance and
politicians'
calculus must account for the nearness of Iranian power and the increasing distance and
irrelevance
calculus must of account Americanforpower. the nearness Resisting of Iran
Iranian underpowertheseand
conditions likely would
the increasing distanceprove
and
irrelevance of American power. Resisting Iran under these conditions likely would prove
ineffective and
irrelevance of American dangerous.power. Some,Resisting like the Iran
Kurds, underbelieve
thesethey have guarantees
conditions likely would from the
prove
ineffective and dangerous. Some, like the Kurds, believe they have guarantees from the
ineffective
and
dangerous.
Some,
like the Kurds, believe they have guarantees from the
12 Ibidem,

12
Ibidem,

12
Ibidem, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Moving-From-the-Bottom-Up-and-Back-Down-Again-15327 5

5

Americans and that substantial investment in Kurdish oil by American companies means
those commitments will be honored. A look at the map, however, shows how difficult it
would be for the United States to do so. The Baghdad regime has arrested Sunni leaders while
the Shia, not all of whom are pro-Iranian by any means, knows the price of overenthusiastic
resistance. The situation in Syria complicates all of this. The minority Alawite sect has
dominated the Syrian government since 1970, when the current president's father - who
headed the Syrian air force - staged a coup. The Alawites are a heterodox Muslim sect related
to a Shiite offshoot and make up about 7 percent of the country's population, which is mostly
Sunni. The new Alawite government was secular, socialist and built around the military.
When Islam rose as a political force in the Arab world, the Syrians -- alienated from the Sadat
regime in Egypt -- saw Iran as a bulwark. The Iranian Islamist regime gave the Syrian secular
regime immunity against Shiite fundamentalists in Lebanon. The Iranians also gave Syria
support in Lebanon, and more important, in its suppression of Syria's Sunni majority.
Syria and Iran were particularly aligned in Lebanon. In the early 1980s, after the
Khomeini revolution, the Iranians sought to increase their influence in the Islamic world by
supporting radical Shiite forces. Hezbollah was one of these. Syria had invaded Lebanon in
1975 on behalf of the Christians and opposed the Palestine Liberation Organization. Syria
regarded Lebanon as historically part of Syria, and sought to assert its influence over it. Via
Iran, Hezbollah became an instrument of Syrian power in Lebanon.
Iran and Syria, therefore, entered a long-term if not altogether stable alliance that has
lasted to this day. In the current unrest in Syria, the Saudis and Turks in addition to the
Americans all have been hostile to the regime of President Bashar al Assad. Iran is the one
country that on the whole has remained supportive of the current Syrian government.
There is good reason for this. Prior to the uprising, the precise relationship between
Syria and Iran was variable. Syria was able to act autonomously in its dealings with Iran and
Iran's proxies in Lebanon. While an important backer of groups like Hezbollah, the al Assad
regime in many ways checked Hezbollah's power in Lebanon, with the Syrians playing the
dominant role there. The Syrian uprising has put the al Assad regime on the defensive,
however, making it more interested in a firm, stable relationship with Iran. Damascus finds
itself isolated in the Sunni world, with Turkey and the Arab League against it. Iran - and
intriguingly, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki - has constituted al Assad's exterior
support.
6

Thus far al Assad has resisted his enemies. Though some mid- to low-ranking Sunnis
have defected, his military remains largely intact; this is because the Alawites control key
units. Events in Libya drove home to an embattled Syrian leadership -- and even to some of
its adversaries within the military -- the consequences of losing. The military has held
together, and an unarmed or poorly armed populace, no matter how large, cannot defeat an
intact military force. The key for those who would see al Assad fall is to divide the military.
If al Assad survives - and at the moment, wishful thinking by outsiders aside, he is

surviving - Iran will be the big winner. If Iraq falls under substantial Iranian influence, and the
al Assad regime - isolated from most countries but supported by Tehran - survives in Syria,
then Iran could emerge with a sphere of influence stretching from western Afghanistan to the
Mediterranean (the latter via Hezbollah). Achieving this would not require deploying Iranian
conventional forces - al Assad's survival alone would suffice. However, the prospect of a
Syrian regime beholden to Iran would open up the possibility of the westward deployment of
Iranian forces, and that possibility alone would have significant repercussions.
Consider the map were this sphere of influence to exist. The northern borders of Saudi
Arabia and Jordan would about this sphere, as would Turkey's southern border. It remains
unclear, of course, just how well Iran could manage this sphere and what type of force it could
project into it. Maps alone will not provide an understanding of the problem. But they do
point to the problem. And the problem is the potential - not certain - creation of a block under
Iranian influence that would cut through a huge swath of strategic territory.
It should be remembered that in addition to Iran's covert network of militant proxies,

Iran's conventional forces are substantial. While they could not confront U.S. armored
divisions and survive, there are no U.S. armored divisions on the ground between Iran and
Lebanon. Iran's ability to bring sufficient force to bear in such a sphere increases the risks to
the Saudis in particular. Iran's goal is to increase the risk such that Saudi Arabia would
calculate that accommodation is more prudent than resistance. Changing the map can help
achieve this.
It follows that those frightened by this prospect - the United States, Israel, Saudi
Arabia and Turkey - would seek to stymie it. At present, the place to block it no longer is Iraq,
where Iran already has the upper hand. Instead, it is Syria. And the key move in Syria is to do
everything possible to bring about al Assad's overthrow.

7

Until recently, the most significant opposition activity appeared to be outside of Syria,
with much of the resistance reported in the media coming from externally based opposition
groups.Until
The recently,
degree oftheeffective opposition
most significant was never
opposition clear.appeared
activity Certainly, theoutside
to be Sunni of
majority
Syria,
opposes
with andofhates
much the al Assad
the resistance regime.
reported Butmedia
in the opposition
comingand emotion
from do not
externally bring
based down a
opposition
regime consisting
groups. The degreeof men fighting opposition
of effective for their lives.
wasAnd it wasn't
never clear. clear that the
Certainly, theresistance was as
Sunni majority
strong as and
opposes the outside propaganda
hates the al Assad claimed.
regime. But opposition and emotion do not bring down a
regime consisting of men fighting for their lives. And it wasn't clear that the resistance was as
It is interesting that an apparent increase in activity from armed activists - or the
strong as the outside propaganda claimed.
introduction of new forces -occurred at the same time relations between Iran on one side and
the United
It is States and Israel
interesting on apparent
that an the otherincrease
were deteriorating. The deterioration
in activity from began
armed activists - orwith
the
charges that of
introduction an new
Iranian covert
forces operation
-occurred at thetosame
assassinate the Saudi
time relations ambassador
between Iran ontoone
theside
United
and
States
the had been
United Statesuncovered,
and Israel followed by allegations
on the other by the Bahraini
were deteriorating. governmentbegan
The deterioration of Iranian
with
operatives
charges thatorganizing
an Iranianattacks
covert in Bahrain.toItassassinate
operation proceeded the
to an International
Saudi ambassadorAtomic
to the Energy
United
Agencyhad
States report
beenonuncovered,
Iran's progress toward
followed byaallegations
nuclear device, followed
by the bygovernment
Bahraini the Nov. 19 of
explosion
Iranian
at an Iranian
operatives missile facility
organizing thatBahrain.
attacks in the Israelis have not-so-quietly
It proceeded hinted was
to an International theirEnergy
Atomic work.
Whetherreport
Agency any ofon
these areprogress
Iran's true, thetoward
psychological pressure
a nuclear device,onfollowed
Iran is building and appears
by the Nov. to be
19 explosion
13
orchestrated
at an Iranian . missile facility that the Israelis have not-so-quietly hinted was their work.
Whether any of these are true, the psychological pressure on Iran is building and appears to be
The US and France, particularly, had pushed for many harsh sanctions against Syria
orchestrated13.
through the UN. But they could not obtain a military interference under the excuse of
protecting
TheSyrian
US andcitizens,
France,asparticularly,
was done in Libya,
had because
pushed of the
for many Russian
harsh and Chinese
sanctions veto
against Syria
threat.
throughSothetheUN.
ArabBut
League
they was
couldpushed to playa pressuring
not obtain active role under
military interference in Syria.
the The Syrian
excuse of
government had accepted
protecting Syrian citizens, the Arabdone
as was League plan. The
in Libya, oppositional
because Syrian and
of the Russian National Council
Chinese veto
rejected thethe
threat. So plan andLeague
Arab intensified
wasitspushed
violence
to against the Syrianactive
play pressuring armyrole
inviting harshThe
in Syria. retaliation.
Syrian
So the Arab had
government League suspended
accepted Syria’s
the Arab membership
League plan. Theand threatenedSyrian
oppositional economic and political
National Council
sanctions.
rejected theItplan
has and
become obvious
intensified its that the Syrian
violence againstoppositional groups
the Syrian army are divided
inviting and have
harsh retaliation.
different aspirations
So the Arab Leaguesome of themSyria’s
suspended are conflicting and and
membership confusing. This economic
threatened division and
andconfusion
political
are due to the
sanctions. background
It has of each oppositional
become obvious group.
that the Syrian The genuine
oppositional oppositional
groups groups
are divided and reject
have
any foreign
different interference
aspirations somefearing
of themthe
are same fate ofand
conflicting Libya, and seek
confusing. This drastic
divisionreform through
and confusion
14
dialogue
are due to .the background of each oppositional group. The genuine oppositional groups reject
any foreign interference fearing the same fate of Libya, and seek drastic reform through
dialogue14.

13
http://www.middle-east-studies.net/?p=22784
14
Dr. Elias Akleh, The Snake Behind the Arab Spring http://www.intifada-palestine.com/2011/11/the-snake-

13
14
http://www.middle-east-studies.net/?p=22784 8
Dr. Elias Akleh, The Snake Behind the Arab Spring http://www.intifada-palestine.com/2011/11/the-snake-
8

Israel
Israel Position.
Israel Position.
Position.
Israel Position.
Israel—surrounded
Israel—surrounded by
Israel—surrounded by
by aaa newly
newly unstable
newly unstable Arab
unstable Arab world
Arab world and
world and confronting
confronting aaa Palestinian
and confronting Palestinian
Palestinian
march toward
march toward
toward statehood—faces
Israel—surrounded
statehood—faces uncertainty
by a uncertainty
uncertainty on
newly unstable every front.
Arab front.
on every
every If
worldIf
front. the
Ifand Israeli-Palestinian
theconfronting peace
a Palestinian
Israeli-Palestinian peace
march statehood—faces on the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process
march
process were
processtoward in
were in
were better shape
instatehood—faces
better shape
better and
shape and it
and it had bold
ituncertainty
had bold
had Palestinian
bold Palestinian
Palestinian and
on every front. Israeli
and Israeli
and Israeli leaders
If theleaders willing and
Israeli-Palestinian
leaders willing and
willing able to
peace
and able
able to
to
find common
process were in
find common
find common ground,
ground,
ground, it
better it would
itshape
would
would help
andhelp
help to
it had relieve
to relieve
to relieve some of
bold Palestinian
some of
some the
of the
the impending
andimpending
impending pressure.
Israeli leaders But
willing
pressure.
pressure. it
Butand
But doesn’t.
able to
it doesn’t.
it doesn’t.
Weak
find leaders,
Weakcommon big gaps
leaders,ground, on the
it would
big gaps
gaps core
help
on the
the issues
to relieve
core and
and aaaofPalestinian
issues some Palestinian Noah’s
the impending
Palestinian Ark,
pressure.
Noah’s in
Ark, But which the
it doesn’t.
in which
which the
Weak leaders, big on core issues and Noah’s Ark, in the
Palestinian
Weak
Palestinian
Palestinian national
leaders,
national
national movement
big movement
gaps on the
movement has
has two
hascore
two of everything
two issues
of everything
of everything (prime
and a Palestinianministers,
Noah’s
(prime ministers,
(prime ministers, constitutions,
Ark, in which
constitutions,
constitutions, security
the
security
security
services),
Palestinianwill
services), will
services), will pose
national
pose huge challenges
pose movement
huge challenges
huge challenges to
toofaaaeverything
has twoto breakthrough
breakthrough
breakthrough agreement.
(prime America,
ministers,America,
agreement.
agreement. now
constitutions,
America, fighting
now security
now fighting
fighting
three wars,
services),
three wars, burdened
wars,will
burdened with
pose huge other priorities
with challenges to a and
other priorities
priorities and election
breakthrough
and politics, won’t
agreement.
election politics,
politics, be able
won’tAmerica,
be able to
now
able to
to redeem an
fighting
redeem an
three burdened with other election won’t be redeem an
agreement
three
agreement
agreement neither
wars, neither
burdened
neither side
side is
sidewith willing
is willing
is willing or able
other priorities
or able
or to
able to pay
toand
pay for. The
payelection
for. The
for. The Jews
politics, will
Jews will
Jews won’t
will keep
keep
keep their
be their state,
able to
their but
redeem
state,
state, the
an
but the
but the
15
region in
agreement
region in
region which
in which
which they
neither
they
they live
side
live will
liveiswill
will never
willing
never let
neverorlet them
letable
them
them completely
to completely
pay for. The
completely enjoy
Jews
enjoy
enjoy it
it ... keep their state, but the
15will
it15
region in which they live will never let them completely enjoy it15.
Of
Of all
Of all the
all the players
the players in
players in this
in this game,
this game, Israel's
game, Israel's position
Israel's position is
position is the
is the most
the most complex.
most complex. Israel
complex. Israel has
Israel has had
has had aaa
had
decent,
decent, Of
decent, albeit
albeit
albeit covert,
all the
covert,
covert, working
players
working
working relationship
in this game, Israel'swith
relationship
relationship with
with the
the Syrians
position
the is the most
Syrians
Syrians going
going
going back
back to
complex.
back to
to their
Israel hasmutual
their
their had a
mutual
mutual
hostility
decent,
hostility toward
hostility albeit
toward Yasser
towardcovert,
Yasser Arafat.
Arafat. For
Yasserworking
Arafat. For
For Israel,
Israel, Syria
relationship
Israel, Syria
Syria has
with
has been
hasthe
been
been the
the devil
Syrians
the going
devil
devil they know.
theyback
they know.
know.to The
theiridea
The
The of
of aaa
mutual
idea
idea of
Sunni
Sunni government
hostility
Sunni government
government controlled
toward Yasser Arafat.by
controlled
controlled by the
byFor
the Muslim
theIsrael,
Muslim
Muslim Brotherhood
Syria has been the
Brotherhood
Brotherhood on
on their
on devil
their northeastern
their they know. The
northeastern
northeastern frontier was
idea of
frontier
frontier wasa
was
frightening;
Sunni
frightening;
frightening; they
they preferred
government
they preferred
preferred al
al Assad.
controlled
al by the But
Assad.
Assad. But
But given
Muslim
given the
the shift
the shift in
givenBrotherhood
shift in the
in the
the regional
on their
regional
regional balance
balance of
northeastern
balance of power,
offrontier the
power,was
power, the
the
Israeli
Israeli view
frightening;
Israeli view is
is also
view they
is also
also changing.
preferred
changing.
changing. The
The Sunni
al Assad.
The Sunni
Sunni Islamist
But given
Islamist
Islamist threat
the shift in has
threat
threat has
has weakened
the regional
weakened
weakened in
in the
in theofpast
balance
the past
past decade
power, the
decade
decade
relative
Israeli
relative to
to the
relativeview
to theisIranian
the Iranian
Iranian Shiite
Shiite threat.
also changing.
Shiite The Playing
threat.
threat. Playing
Playing things
things forward,
Sunni Islamist
things forward,
forward, the
threat has
the threat
threat of
the weakened
threat of aaa in
of hostile Sunni
the past
hostile
hostile force
Sunnidecade
Sunni force
force
in Syria
relative
in Syria
in is
Syria to
is less
is the
less worrisome
lessIranian
worrisome
worrisome than
Shiitethan
than an
threat. emboldened
Playing things
an emboldened
an emboldened Iranian
Iranian
Iranian presence
forward,
presence
presence on
the threat
on Israel's northern
of a hostile
on Israel's
Israel's frontier.
Sunni
northern
northern force
frontier.
frontier.
This
in
This
This explains
Syria is lesswhy
explains
explains why
why the
the architects
worrisome
the than anof
architects
architects of Israel's
Israel's foreign
ofemboldened
Israel's foreign
foreign policy,
Iranian
policy,
policy, such
suchonas
presence
such as Defense
asIsrael's
Defense
Defense Minister
northern
Minister
Minister Ehud
frontier.
Ehud
Ehud
Barak,
This
Barak, have
have been
Barak,explains
have why saying
been
been saying
saying that
that we
the architects
that weofare
we are
are seeing
Israel's
seeing
seeing acceleration
foreign
acceleration
acceleration toward
policy, such
toward
towardas the
the
the end
end of
Defense
end of
of the
the regime.
Minister
the Ehud
regime.
regime.
Regardless
Barak, haveof
Regardless
Regardless of its
its preferred
of been
its saying outcome,
preferred
preferred outcome,
outcome, Israel
that we are
Israel
Israel cannot
seeing
cannot influence
influence events
cannotacceleration
influence toward
events
events inside
the Syria.
inside
inside end ofInstead,
Syria.
Syria. Instead,
Instead, Israel
the regime.
Israel
Israel
is
is adjusting
is adjustingofto
Regardless
adjusting toitsaaapreferred
to reality
reality where
reality where
where the
outcome,
the threat
the Israel
threat of
of Iran
threatcannot
of Iran reshaping
Iraninfluence
reshaping
reshaping the
events politics
the inside
the of
of the
politicsSyria.
politics of region
Instead,
the
the has
regionIsrael
region has
has
become
is
become
become paramount
adjusting
paramount
paramount 16..
16
to a reality
16 . where the threat of Iran reshaping the politics of the region has
become paramount16.
Israel’s
Israel’s first
Israel’s first strategic
first strategic priority
strategic priority has
priority has always
has always been
always been and
been and remains
and remains security—its
remains security—its physical,
security—its physical,
physical,
material and
and social
materialIsrael’s firstwell-being.
social In
In the
the current
strategic priority
well-being. set
set of
has always
current crises
of been in
in the
crisesand Middle
remains
the East,
East, Israel
Israel will
Middlesecurity—its need
physical,
will need
material and social well-being. In the current set of crises in the Middle East, Israel will need
to
to look
look at
material three
atand things:
social
three One,
One, it
it must
well-being.
things: In thefind
must the
the right
current
find set of
right tone and
andincontent
crises
tone for
for its
the Middle
content relationship
itsEast, with
Israel will
relationship with its
need
its
to look at three things: One, it must find the right tone and content for its relationship with its
two
to peace
twolook
peace partners,
at three
partners, Egypt
things: One,
Egypt and Jordan.
it must
and Jordan. Two,
find the the
Two, rightimmediate
the challenges
tone and content
immediate for with
challenges both
both Lebanon
its relationship
with withand
Lebanon its
and
two peace partners, Egypt and Jordan. Two, the immediate challenges with both Lebanon and
Syria
two are
are quite
Syriapeace severe.
partners,
quite Lebanon
Egypt
severe. has
has the
and Jordan.
Lebanon most
Two,
the the immediate
most destabilizing
immediate challenges potential.
with
destabilizing Israel
both Lebanon
potential. can
Israel and
can
Syria are quite severe. Lebanon has the most immediate destabilizing potential. Israel can
neither
Syria find
neitherare partners
quite
find in
in Lebanon,
severe.
partners Lebanon nor
Lebanon, has an
nor theopening
an for
for diplomacy.
most immediate
opening In
In the
the minuet
destabilizing
diplomacy. that
potential.
minuet that Israel and
can
and
neither find partners in Lebanon, nor an opening for diplomacy. In the minuet that Israel and
neither
find partners in Lebanon, nor an opening for diplomacy. In the minuet that Israel and

15
15 http://www.momentmag.com/moment/issues/2011/06/IsraelsNextMove.html
15 http://www.momentmag.com/moment/issues/2011/06/IsraelsNextMove.html
http://www.momentmag.com/moment/issues/2011/06/IsraelsNextMove.html
16
16
16
16
http://www.middle-east-studies.net/?p=22784 9
9
9
78 Volume:3,
No:1, Winter 2015
9

Hezbollah dance all the time, Israel has to define what its red lines really are and what it
should do if they’re crossed. The issue is very much deterrence. With Syria, questions of
diplomacy always lurk. The defense establishment continues to believe the Syrian track
should be given priority, but the political echelon disagrees because of Syria’s relationship
with Iran. Natan Sharansky argues that you can’t make peace with dictators, but despite what
happened in Egypt, whether or not the other government is democratic can’t be the basis for
negotiations. In the real world, there are things you can’t control, so you consider if your
opponent is stable, if you can trust him, if an agreement is likely to last for a long time. Israel
has gotten 30 years of peace with Egypt, so it is not sure it’s such a bad thing if it can get that
with Syria. Israel could use the new developments in the region to its advantage against Iran,
first and foremost by restarting peace negotiations with the Palestinians and stopping
settlement activity. This would seriously boost Israel’s position with the new government of
Egypt, whom Iran is trying to court, and complicate Iran’s efforts to boost its position in other
countries such as Lebanon by presenting itself as the leader of what it calls the “resistance
movement.” Most important, it would make it difficult for the Iranian government to use the
Palestinian-Israeli card to distract attention from internal troubles. The current regime’s loss
of legitimacy would be magnified, which would also decrease Iran’s influence abroad. Even if
there were peace with the Palestinians, Iran would not recognize Israel, but it would have to
face a very bleak reality in which it was weakened.
Peace would also mean that Israel would find it easier to become part of an anti-Iran
nuclear camp in the region. As we saw from WikiLeaks, countries such as Qatar, Saudi
Arabia and even Bahrain are as much, if not more, against Iran’s nuclear aspirations as Israel
is. But they are not willing to join Israel’s camp because they don’t agree with Israel’s current
strategy toward the Palestinians.
For Iran’s leadership, peace between Israel and the Palestinians is a nightmare that
Israel can deliver on a silver plate, through FedEx, flying through Turkey. It’s important for
Israel to have some regional partners in the predominantly Muslim Middle East to legitimize
the notion that peace with Israel is okay. It’s a mistake for Israel to treat Turkey as a newly
Islamist country. With eight to nine percent economic growth and expanding ties with its
neighbors, Turkey has increasingly become a regional power, offering a significant alternative
and probably a long-term strategic rival to Iran. The Mavi Marmara [flotilla] incident was a
bigger deal than it needed to be; Israel went out of its way to insult the Turkish ambassador in

Jerusalem, and it needs to find a way to undo some damage, even if it means apologizing for
the flotilla affair and offering compensation to the families. Turks are angry, particularly at
the Netanyahu administration, but they don’t call Israel’s existence into question. Israel must
take Turkey seriously—it’ll be around for the long term. You never know when it’s going to
come in handy. One day Israel might want to pass a message to Iran or Hezbollah or Hamas
through a trusted friend. Right now, Israel doesn’t have that, even though the United States.
One thing Israel can do to bring Turkey back into a constructive role, to reduce Iran’s sway in
the region and to curb Hezbollah’s clout would be to make a concerted effort to get an Israeli-
Syrian peace deal going, assuming circumstances in Syria make that possible. Syria wants
Turkey to mediate. The deal is 90 percent done—they just have to go back to the 2000
negotiations and reopen that chapter. Most of it is in writing. But Israel will need to swallow
hard and give up the Golan Heights 17. Iran is, of course, used to psychological campaigns.
We continue to believe that while Iran might be close to a nuclear device that could explode
underground under carefully controlled conditions; its ability to create a stable, robust nuclear
weapon that could function outside a laboratory setting (which is what an underground test is)
is a ways off. This includes being able to load a fragile experimental system on a delivery
vehicle and expecting it to explode. It might even be intercepted and create a casus belli for a
counterstrike. The main Iranian threat is not nuclear18. It might become so, but even without
nuclear weapons, Iran remains a threat. Ahmadinejad's administration has been dogged by
allegations of a fraudulent election, which handed him a second four-year term in office in
2009. Iran has also been hit by a wave of sanctions by the US and the European Union over
its nuclear programme, which many Western states suspect is intended to make an atomic
bomb19.
The Oil Monarchy Position.
Saudi Arabia is the most important oil-rich country. There were — it’s the most repressive,
extremist, strongest center of Islamic fundamentalism, missionaries who spread ultra-radical
Islamism from jihads and so on. But they’re obedient, they’re reliable, so they can do what
they like. There was a planned protest in Saudi Arabia. The police presence was so
overwhelming and intimidating that literally nobody even was willing to show up in the

17
18
Syria, Iran and the Balance of Power in the Middle East http://www.ihavenet.com/World-‐Middle-‐East-‐
Syria-‐Iran-‐and-‐the-‐Balance-‐of-‐Power-‐in-‐the-‐Middle-‐East-‐SFOR.h
19
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/05/201156113955925329.html

streets of Riyadh. The same in Kuwait. There was a small demonstration, very quickly
crushed.ofActually,
streets Riyadh. the
Themost
sameinteresting
in Kuwait.case in many
There was arespects is Bahrain. Bahrain
small demonstration, very is quite
quickly
importantActually,
crushed. for two reasons.
the mostOne reason, which
interesting hasmany
case in been respects
reported,isisBahrain.
that it’s the homeisport
Bahrain of
quite
20
the U.S. Fifth
important Fleet,
for two majorOne
reasons. military force
reason, in the
which has region . The US
been reported, has it’s
is that possibly the port
the home largest
of
marine/air forceFleet,
the U.S. Fifth base in Bahrain,
major where
military the in
force Fifth
theFleet provides
region 20
. Thesupport
US hastopossibly
all war ships of the
the largest
US Naval Forces
marine/air Central
force base Command
in Bahrain, (USNACENT)
where to provides
the Fifth Fleet patrol thesupport
PersiantoGulf andships
all war the Indian
of the
21
Ocean
US Naval. Another more fundamental
Forces Central Command reason is that Bahrain
(USNACENT) is about
to patrol 70 percent
the Persian Gulf Shiite,
and theand it’s
Indian
right across
Ocean 21 the causeway
. Another from eastern
more fundamental reasonSaudi
is thatArabia,
Bahrainwhich also
is about 70 ispercent
majority Shiite
Shiite, and and
it’s
happens to be
right across thewhere most from
causeway of Saudi oil Saudi
eastern is. Saudi Arabia,
Arabia, of course,
which is the main
also is majority energy
Shiite and
resource,
happens tohasbebeen since
where the of
most '40s. By curious
Saudi oil is. accident of history
Saudi Arabia, and geography,
of course, the world's
is the main energy
major energy
resource, resources
has been sinceare
thelocated
'40s. Bypretty much
curious in Shiite
accident regions.and
of history They’re a minority
geography, in the
the world's
Middle East, but
major energy they happen
resources to be where
are located prettythe oil is,
much in right
Shiitearound theThey’re
regions. northernapart of thein
minority Gulf.
the
That’s eastern
Middle Saudi
East, but theyArabia,
happensouthern Iraqthe
to be where andoilsouthwestern Iran.the
is, right around And there’spart
northern beenofathe
concern
Gulf.
among plannersSaudi
That’s eastern for aArabia,
long time that there
southern Iraqmight be a move towards
and southwestern some
Iran. And sort of
there’s tacit
been alliance
a concern
in theseplanners
among Shiite regions moving
for a long time towards
that thereindependence and controlling
might be a move the sort
towards some bulkofoftacit
the alliance
world’s
oil. That’s
in these obviously
Shiite regionsintolerable. So, going
moving towards back to Bahrain,
independence there was the
and controlling an uprising, tentworld’s
bulk of the city in
the
oil. central square, like
That’s obviously Tahrir Square.
intolerable. The back
So, going Saudi-led military
to Bahrain, forces
there wasinvaded Bahrain,
an uprising, tent giving
city in
the securitysquare,
the central forces like
thereTahrir
the opportunity
Square. ThetoSaudi-led
crush it violently, destroyed
military forces the Bahrain,
invaded tent city,giving
even
destroyed
the securitytheforces
Pearl,there
which
theisopportunity
the symboltoofcrush
Bahrain; invaded destroyed
it violently, the major the
hospital complex,
tent city, even
threw out the
destroyed the Pearl,
patients and is
which thethe
doctors;
symbolbeen regularly,
of Bahrain; every the
invaded day,major
arresting human
hospital rights
complex,
22
activists,
threw outtorturing them,and
the patients occasionally a sort
the doctors; beenof aregularly,
pat on the every
wrist, day,
but nothing much
arresting human . Torights
keep
the statustorturing
activists, quo in them,
Bahrain Obama’sa administration
occasionally sort of a pat on encouraged
the wrist, butGulf States
nothing muchto22.send the
To keep
Peninsula
the status Shield
quo inForce to Bahrain
Bahrain to crush
Obama’s the demonstrators.
administration SaudiGulf
encouraged Arabia, Qatar
States to and
sendUAE
the
23
were happy
Peninsula to oblige
Shield Forceand send their
to Bahrain troopsthetodemonstrators.
to crush Bahrain . That’s
Saudivery muchQatar
Arabia, the Carothers
and UAE
principle.
were happy If to
actions
obligecorrespond
and send to American
their troops tostrategic
Bahrainand
23 economic
. That’s veryobjectives,
much thethat’s OK.
Carothers
24
America
principle.can have elegant
If actions rhetoric,
correspond to but what matters
American are facts
strategic .
and economic objectives, that’s OK.
America can have elegant rhetoric, but what matters are facts24.

20
Noam Chomsky: "The U.S. and Its Allies Will Do Anything to Prevent Democracy in the Arab World

http://www.democracynow.org/seo/2011/5/11/noam_chomsky_the_us_and_its
20
21
Dr. Noam Elias Chomsky: Akleh, The "The Snake U.S.Behind and Its the Arab
Allies Spring
Will http://www.intifada-palestine.com/2011/11/the-snake-
Do Anything to Prevent Democracy in the Arab World
22
21
Dr. Noam EliasChomsky: Akleh, The "The Snake U.S.Behind and Itsthe Arab
Allies Spring
22
23
Allies Spring
24
23
Allies Spring
24
http://www.democracynow.org/seo/2011/5/11/noam_chomsky_the_us_and_its 12


USA
USA Position
Position
USA
USA Position
Position
USA The
The current Positionescalation
current escalation originated originated in in the the American
American decision decision to to withdraw
withdraw from from IraqIraq and and was
was
The
intensified
The currentby current escalation events originated in the American decision to withdraw from Iraq and was
intensified byescalation events in in originated Syria.
Syria. If If Iran in the
Iran abandoned
American
abandoned its nuclear
nuclear program
its decision to withdraw
program tomorrow,
from Iraq
tomorrow, the
the situation
and was
situation
intensified
would The currentby byescalation events in originated Syria. If Iran
Iran
in the abandoned
American its and
nuclear
decision program
to withdraw tomorrow,
from the
Iraq situation
and was
would remain
intensified remain events as
as complex. complex. in Syria. Iran
IranIfhas has the upper
upper hand,
theabandoned hand, its nuclear
and the
the United
program
United States,
tomorrow,
States, Israel,
Israel,the Turkey and
situation
Turkey and
would
intensified
Saudi
would Arabia remain
remain byall as are
events
as complex.
complex. looking in Syria. Iran
Iran at If
howhas
Iran
has theabandoned
to
the upper
turn the
upper hand,
tables.
hand, and
its and
nuclear the United
the United
program States,
tomorrow,
States, Israel,the
Israel, Turkey and
situation
Turkey and
Saudi Arabia all are looking at how to turn the tables.
Saudi Arabia
would
Saudi Arabia remainall all as are are complex. lookingIran
looking at how
at howhas to to turn
theturn the hand,
upper
the tables.and the United States, Israel, Turkey and
tables.
Saudi Arabia At
At this thisall point,
point, are looking they
they appear appear at how to
to be following
to turn
be the tables.
following aa two-pronged
two-pronged strategy: strategy: Increase
Increase pressure
pressure on on
Iran At this point, they appear to be following a two-pronged strategy: Increase pressure on
Iran to to make At thisit
make it point, recalculate
recalculate they appear its
its vulnerability, vulnerability, to be following and
and bring down
down the
a two-pronged
bring the Syrian
strategy:
Syrian government to
to limit
Increase pressure
government limit theon
the
Iran
consequences to
to make itof make
At this it point, recalculate Iranian they appear its vulnerability, to be and
following bring
a down
two-pronged the Syrian
strategy:government
Increase to limit
pressure the
on
Iran
consequences ofrecalculate Iranian influence influence its vulnerability, in
in Iraq.
Iraq. Whether
and bringthe
Whether thedown Syrian
the regime
Syrian Syrian can
regime be
be brought
government
can brought down
to limit
downthe is
is
consequences
Iran
problematic.
consequences to make itLibya's of
of recalculate Iranian
Iranian Moammar influence
influence its vulnerability, in
Gadhafi
in Iraq.
Iraq. Whether
and bring
would
Whether the
have
thedown Syrian
the regime
survived
Syrian Syrian
if
regime NATOcan
can be
government brought
hadn't
be brought down
to limit
intervened.
down is
the
is
problematic. Libya's Moammar Gadhafi would have survived if NATO hadn't intervened.
problematic.
consequences
NATO Libya's of Iranian Moammar influenceGadhafi in Iraq. would Whether have
the survived
Syrianthan if NATO
regime behadn't
canMoreover, broughtintervened.
aadown is
NATO could
problematic. could Libya's intervene
intervene Moammar in
in Syria, Syria, Gadhafi but
but SyriaSyriawould is
is more
more complex
have
complex survived thanifLibya.
NATO
Libya. hadn't
Moreover, second
intervened.
second
NATO
problematic. could
attack Libya's interveneon Moammar in
in Syria, but
but Syria
Gadhafi Syriawould is more complex
have survived than
thanifLibya.
NATO Moreover,
hadn't aa second
intervened.
NATO
NATO could attack intervene on an an Arab Arab Syria, state
state designed designed to
tois change
more
change its
its government
complex government would
Libya.
would have
have unintended
Moreover, second
unintended
NATO
consequences, attack
could
attack intervene on no an matter Arab in how Syria, state
statemuch designed
but Syria the to
tois change
more its
complex government
than Libya. would have
have unintended
Moreover, a second
NATO
consequences, on no an matter Arab how designed
much the Arabs
Arabs change fear
fear itsthe
thegovernmentIranians
Iranians at the
the moment.
at would moment. Wars
Wars are
unintended are
consequences,
NATO
unpredictable; attack on no an matter Arab how state much
designed the Arabs
to change fear the
its Iranians
government at the
would moment.
have Wars
unintended are
unpredictable; they
consequences, they no matter are
are not nothow the
the first muchoption.
first the Arabs
option. Therefore
Therefore fear thethe likely Iranians
likely solution
at theis
solution covert
covert support
ismoment. Wars are
support for
for
unpredictable;
consequences,
the they no matter are not how the first
much option.
the Therefore
Arabs fear the likely
Iranianssolution
at the is covert
moment. support
Wars for
are
the Sunni opposition funneled through Lebanon and possibly Turkey and Jordan. It will be
unpredictable; Sunni opposition they are funneled not the through
first option. Lebanon
Therefore and possibly
the likely Turkey
solution andis Jordan.
covert It
support will for
be
the
unpredictable;
interesting
the Sunni
Sunni opposition
opposition to see theyifare the funneled
funneled not Turks the first through option.
participate.
through Lebanon
Therefore
Far
Lebanon more and
and possibly
the likelyTurkey
interesting
possibly solution
will
Turkey beand
and Jordan.
isseeing
covert
Jordan. It
support
whether
It will
will be
for
this
be
interesting to see if the Turks participate. Far more interesting will be seeing whether this
interesting
the
works. Sunni opposition to
to see if
if the funneled Turks participate.
through Far
Lebanon more and interesting
possibly will
Turkey beand seeing
Jordan. whether willthis
Itdecades. be
works. Syrian
interesting Syrian see intelligence
intelligence the Turks has
hasparticipate. penetrated
penetratedFar its
itsmore Sunni
Sunniinteresting opposition
opposition willeffectively
be seeing
effectively for
whether
for decades.this
works.
interesting
Mounting Syrian aatosecret see intelligence ifcampaign the Turks has penetrated
participate.
against the Far its
itsmore Sunni interestingopposition effectively
willeffectively
be for
seeingsuccess
whether decades.this
works.
Mounting Syrian secret intelligence campaignhas penetrated
against the regime
regime would
Sunni
wouldopposition be
be difficult,
difficult, and
and its for
its success by
by no
decades. no
Mounting
works.
means Syrian a secret secret intelligence campaign has against
penetrated the regime
regimeitsit is would
Sunni be difficult,
opposition and
effectively itsIran
success
for by no
decades. no
means assured. Still, that is the next move. But it is not the last move. To put Iran back into its
Mounting assured. a Still, campaign that is the next
against move.
the But not
would the last
be move.
difficult, To andput its back
success into
by its
means
Mounting
box, assured. a secret Still, campaign that is the next
against move.
the But
regime it is not
would the last
be move.
difficult, To andput Iran
its back
success into
by its
no
box, something
means something assured. Still, must
mustthat be
be done is the about
done next move.
about the
the IraqiBut political
Iraqi it is not the
political situation. Given
last move.
situation. Given To theput U.S.
the withdrawal,
Iran back
U.S. into its
withdrawal,
box,
means
Washington something assured. has Still, must little that be influence done
is the about
next
there. the
move.
theAll Iraqi
But
of political
it
the is not the situation.
last Given
move. To the
put U.S.
Iran withdrawal,
back into its
box,
Washington something has must little be influence done about there. Iraqi
All the relationships
of political relationships situation.the United
Given
the United the States built
built were
U.S. withdrawal,
States were
Washington
box,
predicated something has must little be influence done there.
about All
theAll of
Iraqi the
politicalrelationships situation. the United
Given States
the States built
U.S. withdrawal, were
predicated on
Washington onhas American
American little influence power
power protecting there.
protecting the
of
thethe relationships.
relationships
relationships. With
the
With the
United
the Americans
Americans gone,
built
gone,were the
the
predicated
Washington
foundation on of has American
those little influence power protecting
there. All the
of relationships.
the relationships With
the the
UnitedAmericans
States gone,
built the
were
predicated
foundation on of American those relationships relationships power protecting dissolves.
dissolves.the And
And even
even with
relationships. with Syria,
With the
Syria, the balance
balance of
the Americans power
of gone,
powerthe is
is
foundation
predicated
shifting
foundation 25 on
. of those
American relationships power dissolves.
protecting theAnd even
relationships. with Syria,
With the
the balance
Americans of power
gone, is
the
shifting25 25
. of those relationships dissolves. And even with Syria, the balance of power is
shifting
foundation
shifting . 25. of those relationships dissolves. And even with Syria, the balance of power is
shifting25 In
In. Noam Noam Chomsky Chomsky opinion opinion the the U.S.U.S. andand its its allies
allies will will do
do anything
anything they they cancan toto prevent
prevent
authentic Indemocracy
In Noam Chomsky
Noam Chomsky in the opinion
Arab
opinion world. the U.S.
the U.S.
The and
reason
and its is
its allies
that
allies will
across
will do the
do anything
region,
anything they
an
they can toto prevent
overwhelming
can prevent
authentic democracy in the Arab world. The reason is that across the region, an overwhelming
authenticIndemocracy
majority democracy Noampopulation Chomsky in the the Arab Arab
opinion world. the The and
U.S. reason its isis that
allies across
will do the region,
anything an
they overwhelming
caninterests.
to prevent
majority of
authentic of the the population in regards
regards world. the
the United
The
United reasonStates
States as
as the
that main
mainthethreat
across
the region,
threat to
to an their
their interests. In
overwhelming In
majority
authentic
fact,
majority opposition of
of democracy the population
the population
to U.S. in the policy regards
Arab
regards is world.
so the
high
the United
Thethat
United reason
a States as the
is that
considerable
States as the main
across threat
thethreat
majority
main region,to an
think
to their
the
their interests.
overwhelming
region
interests. wouldIn
In
fact, opposition to U.S. policy is so high that a considerable majority think the region would
fact,more
majority
be
fact, opposition
opposition secureof the population to Iran
if
to U.S.had
U.S. policy
policy regards
nuclear is so
is soweapons.
high
the
high that In
United
that aaStates
considerable
Egypt,asthe
considerable the majority
themost
main threatthink
important
majority the region
to country,
think their
the region
interests. would
that’s
wouldIn
80
be more secure if Iran had nuclear weapons. In Egypt, most important country, that’s 80
be more
fact,
percent. more opposition secure if
Similar if
to figures Iran U.S.had had policyelsewhere. nuclear weapons.
is soweapons.
high that In
There In Egypt,
a considerable theregion
most important
majority country,
think country,
the region that’s
aa would80
be
percent. secure
Similar figures Iran elsewhere. nuclear There are are somesomeEgypt, in
in thethe the most
region who
who regard
importantregard Iran Iran asasthat’s threat
80
threat
percent.
be
percent. more Similar Similar
secure iffigures figures Iran had elsewhere.
elsewhere. nuclear weapons. There are
There are In some
someEgypt, in the
in the region
theregion who regard
most important
who regard Iran as
country,
Iran asthat’s
aa threat
threat
80

percent. Similar figures elsewhere. There are some in the region who regard Iran as a threat
25
25 S yria,
I ran
a nd
t he
B alance
o f P ower
in the Middle East http://www.ihavenet.com/World-‐Middle-‐East-‐
S yria, I ran a nd t he B alance o f P ower in the Middle East http://www.ihavenet.com/World-‐Middle-‐East-‐
25 S yria, a nd t he B alance o f P ower in the Middle East http://www.ihavenet.com/World-‐Middle-‐East-‐

25
Syria, IIran
Syria-‐Iran-‐and-‐the-‐Balance-‐of-‐Power-‐in-‐the-‐Middle-‐East-‐SFOR.h ran and the Balance of Power in the Middle East http://www.ihavenet.com/World-‐Middle-‐East-‐
25
Syria, Iran and the Balance of Power in the Middle 13
Syria-‐Iran-‐and-‐the-‐Balance-‐of-‐Power-‐in-‐the-‐Middle-‐East-‐SFOR.h East http://www.ihavenet.com/World-‐Middle-‐East-‐
13

Syria-‐Iran-‐and-‐the-‐Balance-‐of-‐Power-‐in-‐the-‐Middle-‐East-‐SFOR.h 13

13

— about 10 percent. So, the U.S. and its allies are not going to want governments which are
responsive to the will of the people. If that happens, not only will the U.S. not control the
region, but it will be thrown out. It is obviously an intolerable result. As long as they can
control their populations, fine. They can have campaigns of hatred; American friendly
— about will
dictators 10 percent. So,under
keep them the U.S. and its
control. alliesthe
That’s arereaction
not going
not to
justwant governments
of the diplomatic which
serviceare
in
responsive to the will or
the State Department of of
thethe
people.
mediaIfwho
thatreported
happens,this,
not but
onlyalso
willofthe
theU.S. not intellectual
general control the
region, but itInwill
community. fact,becoverage
thrown out. It is polls
of these obviously an intolerable
is precisely zero in result. As long
the United as they
States, can
literally.
control their
There are populations,
a few commentsfine. They can but
in England, have campaigns
very little. It of
justhatred;
doesn’tAmerican friendly
matter what the
dictators
populationwill keep as
thinks, them
longunder control.
as they’re That’s
under the 26
control reaction
. not just of the diplomatic service in
the State Department or of the media who reported this, but also of the general intellectual
The United
community. In fact,States has three
coverage choices.
of these polls Accept the evolution
is precisely and
zero in the try toStates,
United live with what
literally.
emerges.
There areAttempt
a few to make a deal
comments with Iran -but
in England, a very
verypainful
little. and costly
It just one. Or
doesn’t go to what
matter war. The
the
first assumes
population Washington
thinks, as long can live with
as they’re what
under emerges.
control 26
. The second depends on whether Iran is
interested in dealing with the United States. The third depends on having enough power to
wage a The United
war and States Iran's
to absorb has three choices.
retaliatory Accept
strikes, the evolution
particularly in theand tryoftoHormuz.
Strait live withAllwhat
are
emerges. so
dubious, Attempt to make
toppling a deal
al Assad with IranIt-changes
is critical. a very painful andand
the game costly
theone. Or go to But
momentum. war.even
The
first is
that assumes Washington
enormously difficultcan
andlive with
laden what
with emerges. The second depends on whether Iran is
risks.
interested in dealing with the United States. The third depends on having enough power to
wage a The
war 2011
and toglobal
absorbinternational system
Iran's retaliatory has not
strikes, only demonstrated
particularly itsof
in the Strait unpreparedness to
Hormuz. All are
promptly
dubious, soreact to changes
toppling thatisnocritical.
al Assad one could have predicted,
It changes the game but
and on
thetop of that there
momentum. But is its
even
insufficient governability.
that is enormously difficult Given
and ladenthewith
conditions
risks. of increasing divergence and uncertainty,
common claims about the formation of a “global government” comprising leading
The 2011
international global
players are international
utopian. The system has not only
use of military force,demonstrated
including in its
theunpreparedness to
form that has not
promptly
received areact to changes
mandate that no one institutions,
from international could have predicted, but on top
did not disappear intoofthethat there
past afteris the
its
insufficient
George governability.
W. Bush Givenhad
administration thebowed
conditions of increasing
out. Today more thandivergence and uncertainty,
ever unconventional threats
common
to claimssecurity,
international about the
suchformation of extremism,
as religious a “global terrorism,
government”
drug comprising leading
trafficking and the
international
possibility of players are utopian.
new regional Theofuse
outbursts of military
instability, force,quite
remain including in27the
pressing . form that has not
received a mandate from international institutions, did not disappear into the past after the
George W. Bush administration had bowed out. Today more than ever unconventional threats
to international security, such as religious extremism, terrorism, drug trafficking and the
possibility of new regional outbursts of instability, remain quite pressing27.

26
27
14

26
27
14

We are now in the final act of Iraq, and it is even more painful than imagined. Laying this
alongside the European crisis makes the idea of a systemic crisis in the global system very
real28.
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
"[ISIS have] probably eclipsed Al-Qaeda, which for all intents and purposes, started with a
big bang on September 11th and sort of went downhill," noted Ed Blanche, a terrorism expert,
in an interview with Al Arabiya News, adding that ISIS has learnt a lot from the al-Qaeda
movement. Reportedly, ISIS was formed in 2004 as a branch of al-Qaeda, however, it evolved
into a self-sufficient organization soon after. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring the
radical movement has strengthened and expanded significantly. According to Al Arabiya, in
late 2013 tensions arose between al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri and ISIS leader Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi. Eventually, al-Qaeda cut off all relations with ISIS in February 2014.
Meanwhile the US intelligence officials have reported that ISIS militants are demonstrating
"good" governing skills in conquered regions. Apparently, the Islamic State has adopted
Hezbollah's strategy, "devoting considerable human and financial resources toward keeping
essential services like electricity, water, and sewage functioning in their territory," Foreign
Policy notes. Moreover, extremists are improving region's infrastructure by building new
roads, opening hospitals and initiating small-business programs, the media outlet stresses. At
the same time the ISIS is enforcing harsh and inhuman laws, murdering Christians, Shia and
representatives of other religious minorities because of their beliefs. ISIS have a state-building
agenda and an understanding of the importance of effective governance," underscored David
Kilcullen, a counterinsurgency expert, as quoted by Foreign Policy. On the other hand, the
movement may soon face serious obstacles, some experts claim. While ISIS is enjoying
increasing support from the radical Sunnis, its "land-grabbing" strategy may considerably
decelerate its growth, deems David Mack, a former US ambassador. ISIS is a Sunni militant
group, which had been fighting in Syria until recently, led an attack on the western and
northern regions of Iraq. ISIS militants captured Mosul, the capital of the northern Iraqi
province of Manawa, a part of the Salah al-Din province, including its administrative center,
the city of Tikrit and other territories. The militants also announced their intention to march

28
Syria, Iran and the Balance of Power in the Middle East http://www.ihavenet.com/World-‐Middle-‐East-‐

15

on Baghdad. Recently ISIS declared Caliphate in captured territory and renamed itself as
"Islamic State"29.
Islamic State militants are carrying out "a wave of ethnic cleansing" against minorities in
on Baghdad. Recently ISIS declared Caliphate in captured territory and renamed itself as
northern Iraq. 29
ISIS and allied Sunni rebels have seized large swathes of Iraq and Syria.
"Islamic State" .
Thousands of people have been killed, the majority of them civilians, and more than a million
have been
Islamic forced
State to fleeare
militants their homes out
carrying in recent months.
"a wave At least
of ethnic 1,000 members
cleansing" against of the Yazidi
minorities in
faith are Iraq.
northern thought
ISISto and
haveallied
been Sunni
killed rebels
in recent
haveweeks,
seized with
largeclose to 2,750
swathes kidnapped
of Iraq or
and Syria.
enslaved.
ThousandsFollowing
of peoplean ISIS
have attack
been on an
killed, theIraqi air force
majority basecivilians,
of them near the city
and of Tikrit,
more thanmore than
a million
1,500 young
have been soldiers
forced went
to flee missing;
their homesmany bodies
in recent were subsequently
months. At least 1,000found in theofDijla
members River.
the Yazidi
At least
faith are650 male inmates
thought to have ofbeen
Badouch
killedPrison in Mosul
in recent were
weeks, murdered
with close toby2,750
ISIS; kidnapped
witnesses say
or
inmates
enslaved.claiming
FollowingtoanbeISIS
Sunni were
attack transported
on an away,
Iraqi air force while
base near Shia or of
the city members of other
Tikrit, more than
religious andsoldiers
1,500 young ethnic communities
went missing;were
manyordered into ditches
bodies were and shot.
subsequently foundThe mainly
in the Dijla Yazidi
River.
village
At leastof Cotcho,
650 south ofofSinjar,
male inmates BadouchwasPrison
attacked by ISIS
in Mosul fighters;
were survivors
murdered saywitnesses
by ISIS; at least 100
say
men wereclaiming
inmates killed, and hundreds
to be Sunni of women
were and children
transported away,were abducted
while or. In
Shia 30 Iraq, theofUnited
members other
States hasand
religious several advantages
ethnic that could
communities were make airstrikes
ordered against
into ditches andtheshot.
Islamic
TheState reasonably
mainly Yazidi
effective,
village of including reliable
Cotcho, south Kurdish
of Sinjar, wasallies, the by
attacked chance of standing
ISIS fighters; up U.S.-trained
survivors say at leastIraqi
100
defense
men wereforces, intelligence
killed, assets,
and hundreds of U.S. special
women and operators on the
children were ground,30and
abducted . In at leastthea chance
Iraq, United
to forgehas
States a political reconciliation
several advantages thatincould
Baghdad that
make might ease
airstrikes the disaffection
against the Islamic and
Statealienation of
reasonably
Iraqi Sunnis
effective, on whichreliable
including ISIS now feeds.allies,
Kurdish Syria has
the none of of
chance these. And none
standing are soon coming,
up U.S.-trained Iraqi
even if forces,
defense the United States gets
intelligence serious
assets, about operators
U.S. special training and equipping
on the ground, those
and atelusive Syrian
least a chance
moderates or creating
to forge a political an entirely in
reconciliation new militarythat
Baghdad force. Syria
might hasthealways
ease been a and
disaffection witches' brew of
alienation
negatives.
Iraqi And
Sunnis onit's tough
which to see
ISIS nowthat changing
feeds. Syria now, even of
has none with a belated
these. and more
And none focused
are soon U.S.
coming,
effort iftothe
even provide
Unitedweapons and serious
States gets support about
to the training
moderateandrebels. Just look
equipping thoseatelusive
a few Syrian
of the
obstacles toorconsistent
moderates creating ansupport:
entirelyanew
dizzying array
military of Syria
force. divided
hasand dysfunctional
always rebel brew
been a witches' groups,
of
external backers
negatives. whose
And it's toughmotives are changing
to see that diametrically
now,opposed (see:
even with Saudi Arabia
a belated andfocused
and more Qatar),U.S.
and
a Free to
effort Syrian Army
provide that in and
weapons supportoftothetheMonkey
the words Cage's
moderate MarcJust
rebels. Lynch
lookwas
at aalways
few ofmore
the
obstacles to consistent support: a dizzying array of divided and dysfunctional rebel groups,
external backers whose motives are diametrically opposed (see: Saudi Arabia and Qatar), and
a Free Syrian Army that in the words of the Monkey Cage's Marc Lynch was always more

29
Islamic State Growing Larger Than Al-Qaeda Ever Thought They Could - Experts
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2014/08/mil-140826-
rianovosti04.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e1196%2egy0ao050ku%2e13h0
30
Iraq crisis: Islamic State accused of ethnic cleansing
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29026491

29
Islamic State Growing Larger Than Al-Qaeda Ever Thought16 They Could - Experts
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2014/08/mil-140826-

rianovosti04.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e1196%2egy0ao050ku%2e13h0
30
Iraq crisis: Islamic State accused of ethnic cleansing
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29026491
16

fiction than reality. This landscape has fueled the Islamic State's rise and has simultaneously
limited the effectiveness of outside intervention, including airstrikes31.
fiction than reality. This landscape has fueled the Islamic State's rise and has simultaneously
limited Nine
the effectiveness of outside
NATO states, intervention,
including the US,including airstrikesbegan
and Australia 31.
discussions on 5th
September 2014, at NATO Summit in Wales, to form a military coalition to fight ISIS. The
Nine NATO states, including the US, and Australia began discussions on 5th
meeting stopped short of committing to supply “boots on the ground” but discussed other
September 2014, at NATO Summit in Wales, to form a military coalition to fight ISIS. The
military options including coordinated air strikes and greater efforts to train and support the
meeting stopped short of committing to supply “boots on the ground” but discussed other
Iraqi forces where necessary32.
military options including coordinated air strikes and greater efforts to train and support the
Iraqi forces where necessary32.
CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS
The Arab Spring was a historic moment in the politics of the Middle East but its long-term
impact remains unpredictable. With the decline in the popular influence of Marxism and state-
The Arab Spring was a historic moment in the politics of the Middle East but its long-term
driven agendas for revolutions from above, there has been a shift away from political
impact remains unpredictable. With the decline in the popular influence of Marxism and state-
mobilization designed to push for social transformation. The demands for full citizenship, for
driven agendas for revolutions from above, there has been a shift away from political
the recognition of individual political rights, were a powerful unifying. The internationally
mobilization designed to push for social transformation. The demands for full citizenship, for
dominant cliché of an Arab Spring revolutionary was a young, network-savvy, college
the recognition of individual political rights, were a powerful unifying. The internationally
educated member of the middle class theme across the Arab revolutions. The ‘demonstration
dominant cliché of an Arab Spring revolutionary was a young, network-savvy, college
effect’ which drove protest from Tunisia into Libya and Egypt and then on into the Gulf was
educated member of the middle class theme across the Arab revolutions. The ‘demonstration
powered by an older form of technology, satellite television. Al Jazeera was heralded as
effect’ which drove protest from Tunisia into Libya and Egypt and then on into the Gulf was
revolutionary when it launched in 1996. However, its long-terms effects may if anything has
powered by an older form of technology, satellite television. Al Jazeera was heralded as
been more influential. Broadly comparable to the Sawat al-Arab radio station under Nasser,
revolutionary when it launched in 1996. However, its long-terms effects may if anything has
Al Jazeera and other Arab satellite stations played a key role in recreating a region-wide Arab
been more influential. Broadly comparable to the Sawat al-Arab radio station under Nasser,
public sphere, which amplified the demonstration effect of Ben Ali’s departure.
Al Jazeera and other Arab satellite stations played a key role in recreating a region-wide Arab
public
The sphere,
events of which amplified
the Arab Spring the
havedemonstration
given hope toeffect of Ben
millions Ali’s departure.
of people across the Middle East
and beyond that meaningful political change for the better is a distinct possibility. Those said,
The events of the Arab Spring have given hope to millions of people across the Middle East
of all the Arab countries effected by this wave of political protest, only two, Egypt and
and beyond that meaningful political change for the better is a distinct possibility. Those said,
Tunisia, are now in what looks like political transitions to a more representative form of
of all the Arab countries effected by this wave of political protest, only two, Egypt and
government. Two more, Syria and Libya, were driven into civil war with Yemen also showing
Tunisia, are now in what looks like political transitions to a more representative form of
government.
Two
more,
Syria
and Libya, were driven into civil war with Yemen also showing
31
Aron Arab Miller, The Islamic State’s home-field advantage,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/08/25/the_islamic_state_home_field_advantage_syria_iraq_
32 Sam
Jones,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2f4e5522-34e6-11e4-aa47-
31
Aron
00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=crm/email/201495/nbe/WorldNews/product&siteedition=intl#axzz3CX2k5iVo Arab Miller, The Islamic State’s home-field advantage,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/08/25/the_islamic_state_home_field_advantage_syria_iraq_
32
Sam Jones, 17
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2f4e5522-34e6-11e4-aa47-
86
00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=crm/email/201495/nbe/WorldNews/product&siteedition=intl#axzz3CX2k5iVo
17

some signs of following them. The rest of the countries of the Middle East retain the ruling
some signshad
elites they of following
before the them. The rest
Arab Spring of the countries of the Middle East retain the ruling
started.
elites they had before the Arab Spring started.
The balance of power in this region suffered a little change. The basis for U.S. dominance in
The balance
the region of power
rested in this
on both region(i.e.,
capacity suffered a little
military change.
power) The basis for
and legitimacy. As U.S. dominancethe
for legitimacy, in
the
pastregion
severalrested on bothadministrations
presidential capacity (i.e., military power)
have tried andthe
to gain legitimacy. AsArab
“buy-in” of for legitimacy, the
states for U.S.
past severalbecause
hegemony presidential administrations
that would havesecurity
bring greater tried to gain
and athe “buy-in” of
resolution of the
Arab states
“core for U.S.
dispute in
hegemony
the region –because that wouldconflict.
the Arab-Israeli bring greater security
The U.S. andfulfilled
has not a resolution
theseofpromises,
the “coreand
dispute in
in fact,
the region – the
U.S. wars in Arab-Israeli conflict.
the region have erodedThesupport.
U.S. hasInstead,
not fulfilled these States
the United promises, and
today is in fact,
widely
the
seenU.S. wars
in the in the
Middle region
East have eroded
as enabling support.
an Israeli Instead,
national the United
security doctrineStates today isregional
that requires widely
seen in the for
hegemony Middle
IsraelEast as enabling
as well an Israeli
as the United national
States, security
with the meansdoctrine that requires
of permanent regional
occupation and
hegemony
the freedomfor
forIsrael
Israelastowell
use as the United
military forceStates, with the
unilaterally andmeans of permanent occupation and
disproportionately.
the freedom for Israel to use military force unilaterally and disproportionately.
References:
References:
1. AFP 27 January 2011 (28 January 1986). "Unrest across the Arab world". Vancouver
AFP Canada.
1. Sun. 27 January 2011 (28
Retrieved 29January 2011. "Unrest across the Arab world". Vancouver
January1986).
2. Sun. Canada.Hakim
Almasmari, Retrieved 29 January
(26 April 2011).2011.
"Yemen Protesters Accept Deal". The Wall Street
Almasmari,
2. Journal. Hakim27
Retrieved (26April
April2011.
2011). "Yemen Protesters Accept Deal". The Wall Street
Journal.
3. "Arab Retrieved
Spring – Who27lost
April 2011. The Economist. 1 March 2011. Retrieved 9 March
Egypt?".
2011. Spring – Who lost Egypt?". The Economist. 1 March 2011. Retrieved 9 March
3. "Arab
2011.
4. "Democracy's hard spring". The Economist. 10 March 2011.
"Democracy's
4. Noueihed,
5. Lin hard
(19 January The Economist.
spring".2011). "Peddler's10 March 2011.
martyrdom launched Tunisia's
Noueihed, Lin
5. revolution". (19 January
Reuters. 2011). "Peddler's
UK. Retrieved martyrdom
1 February 2011. launched Tunisia's
Dr. Elias Akleh,
6. revolution". "The
Reuters. UK. Retrieved
Snake behind1the
February 2011. http://www.intifada-
Arab Spring"
Dr. Elias Akleh, "The Snake behind the Arab Spring"
6. palestine.com/2011/11/the-snake-behind-the-arab- http://www.intifada-
spring/
palestine.com/2011/11/the-snake-behind-the-arab-
7. "Iraq spring/ 2011. Retrieved 27
PM plans no re-election". Voice of Russia. 5 February
7. "Iraq PM 2011.
February plans no re-election". Voice of Russia. 5 February 2011. Retrieved 27
February 2011.
8. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Spring -‐ cite_ref-‐46"Jordan king appoints new
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Spring
8. PM, -‐ cite_ref-‐46"Jordan
government quits". Reuters. 1 February 2011. king appoints
Retrieved 2 February 2011. new
PM, government
9. Miller, quits".
Aaron. "What Reuters.Next
Is Israel’s 1 February
Move in2011. Retrieved
the New 2 February
Middle 2011.
East?". Moment
9. Miller, Aaron.
Magazine. "WhatMagazine.
Moment Is Israel’sRetrieved
Next Move in the New Middle East?". Moment
5/6/2011
Magazine. Moment Magazine. Retrieved 5/6/2011

18

10. Noam Chomsky: "The U.S. and Its Allies Will Do Anything to Prevent Democracy in
the Arab World"
"Party: Bashir is not standing for re-election". Gulf Times. 22 February 2011. Retrieved 22
February 2011.
11. Syria, Iran and the Balance of Power in the Middle East
http://www.ihavenet.com/World-Middle-East-Syria-Iran-and-the-Balance- of-Power-
in-the-Middle-East-SFOR.h
12. "The Arab awakening reaches Syria". The Economist.
13. White, Gregory (13 February 2011). "Bahrain Now Bracing For Its Own Day Of Rage
After Giving Every Family $2,660 Fails". Business Insider. Retrieved 13 February
2011.
14. http://www.momentmag.com/moment/issues/2011/06/IsraelsNextMove.html
15. http://www.middle-east-studies.net/?p=22784
16. http://www.momentmag.com/moment/issues/2011/06/IsraelsNextMove.html
17. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/05/201156113955925329.html
18. http://www.democracynow.org/seo/2011/5/11/noam_chomsky_the_us_and_its
19. http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Moving-From-the-Bottom-Up-and-Back-Down-
Again-15327
19

Clustering G-20 Countries using the Euclidian Method and Fuzzy Logic
Clustering G-20 Countries using the Euclidian Method and Fuzzy Logic
Esra DEMİR
Student, Istanbul Aydın University, Istanbul, Turkey
Beşyol Mah.Inönü Cad.No: 38, Sefaköy-KüçükçekmeceEsra / İSTANBUL
DEMİR
Tel: +90-212-4441428 Fax: +90-212-425575
Student, Istanbul Aydın University, Istanbul, Turkey
Beşyol Mah.Inönü Cad.No: 38, Sefaköy-Küçükçekmece / İSTANBUL
Tel: +90-212-4441428 Fax: Çiğdem ÖZARI
+90-212-425575
Assistant Prof Economics and Finance, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Science
Istanbul Aydın University,Çiğdem
Istanbul,ÖZARI
Turkey
Assistant Prof Economics and Finance, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Science
Istanbul E-mail: cigdemozari@aydin.edu.tr
Aydın University, Istanbul, Turkey
Tel: +90-212-4441428 Fax: +90-212-425575
E-mail: cigdemozari@aydin.edu.tr
Tel: +90-212-4441428 Fax: +90-212-425575
Abstract
In this study, we cluster G-20 countries with Euclidean distance with parameters: gross
Abstract
domestic product per capita (GDP-PC), IMPORT (%GDP), EXPORT (%GDP), Human
Development Index we
In this study, (HDI),
clusterOPENNESS
G-20 countriesand
withTechnology (TECH).with
Euclidean distance These are leading
parameters: gross
parameters
domestic product per capita (GDP-PC), IMPORT (%GDP), EXPORT (%GDP),1996
that indicates development of countries. We use the data between years and
Human
2008. Our aim is to cluster G-20 countries with similar macroeconomic
Development Index (HDI), OPENNESS and Technology (TECH). These are leading properties and
compare them
parameters thatregarding
indicatestodevelopment
the relationsofbetween various
countries. clusters
We use usingbetween
the data fuzzy algorithms.
years 1996 and
2008. Our aim is to cluster G-20 countries with similar macroeconomic properties and
compare them
Keyword: regarding
Clustering, to theLogic,
Fuzzy relations between
G-20, HDI. various clusters using fuzzy algorithms.
Keyword: Clustering, Fuzzy Logic, G-20, HDI.

1. Introduction
The Group of Twenty (G-20) is made up of the finance ministers and central bank
1. Introduction
governors of nineteen countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany,
France,TheUnited
Group Kingdom,
of Twenty India, Indonesia,
(G-20) is madeItaly,
up ofJapan, Korea,ministers
the finance Mexico,and Russian,
central Saudi
bank
Arabia, Turkey, United States, South Africa. The European
governors of nineteen countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Union, who is represented
China, by the
Germany,
th
rotating
France, council
United presidency
Kingdom, and the Indonesia,
India, European Central Bank, is
Italy, Japan, the 20Mexico,
Korea, memberRussian,
of G-20. Saudi
G-20
was established in 1999, in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis,
Arabia, Turkey, United States, South Africa. The European Union, who is represented by the to bring together
major
rotatingadvanced and emerging
council presidency and economies
the European to Central
stabilizeBank,
the global financial
is the 20 th
membermarket. Since
of G-20. its
G-20
inception, G-20 holds annual Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors'
was established in 1999, in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, to bring together Meetings and
discusses measures
major advanced andtoemerging
promote the financialtostability
economies stabilizeof the
the world
globaland to achieve
financial a sustainable
market. Since its
economic growth and development. G-20 brings together important
inception, G-20 holds annual Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors' Meetings industrial and emerging
and
market countries
discusses measuresfrom all regions
to promote theoffinancial
the world. All member
stability countries
of the world and represent
to achieveapproximately
a1sustainable
ninety per growth
economic cent ofandglobal gross national
development. G-20product, eighty per
brings together cent of industrial
important world tradeandasemerging
well as
two-thirds of the world's population. G-20's economic weight and broad membership
market countries from all regions of the world. All member countries represent approximately gives it
aninety
high per
degree of legitimacy and influence over the management of the global
cent of global gross national product, eighty per cent of world trade as well as economy
1 and
financial system.
two-thirds of the world's population. G-20's economic weight and broad membership gives it
a high
degree
of
legitimacy
and
influence over the management of the global economy and
1
Including
financial system. European Union intra-trade
1
1
Including European Union intra-trade
1

All nineteen members are among the top twenty eight economies as measured in gross
domestic product (GDP) at nominal prices in a list published by the IMF2 for 2010. The
countries
Allthat are notmembers
nineteen includedare
as among
membership
the topintwenty
G-20 are
eightSwitzerland,
economies Taiwan and Norway.
as measured in gross
Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Poland and Austria, which are included2 only as part of
domestic product (GDP) at nominal prices in a list published by the IMF for 2010. The
the European
countries Union
that are not as the lastasmember
included of G-20.
membership Even
in G-20 arethough some of
Switzerland, these and
Taiwan countries
Norway.as
Norway, Sweden have higher rank than some members of G-20.
Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Poland and Austria, which are included only as part of
the European Union as the last member of G-20. Even though some of these countries as
Norway,Our main have
Sweden goal is to determine
higher rank thaneffectiveness
some membersof these countries, and find a parameter to
of G-20.
distinguish countries when use a general formula or theory.
Our main goal is to determine effectiveness of these countries, and find a parameter to
distinguish countries when use a general formula or theory.
2. CLUSTERING
Various definitions of a cluster can be formulated, depending on the objective of

2. CLUSTERING
clustering. Generally, one may accept the view that a cluster is a group of objects that are
3
more similar
Variousto definitions
one anotherof than to members
a cluster can be of other
formulated, . The termon
clustersdepending “similarity” should
the objective of
be understood as mathematical similarity, measured in some well-defined
clustering. Generally, one may accept the view that a cluster is a group of objects that sense. In metric
are
spaces,similar
more similarity
to one is another
often defined
than toby means of
members of aother
distance norm.
clusters 3
. TheDistance can be measured
term “similarity” should
among the data vectors themselves, or as a distance from a
be understood as mathematical similarity, measured in some well-defined sense.data vector to some prototypical
In metric
object ofsimilarity
spaces, the cluster. The prototypes
is often defined by aremeansusually
of a not knownnorm.
distance beforehand,
Distanceandcanare
be sought by
measured
clustering algorithms simultaneously with the partitioning of the data.
among the data vectors themselves, or as a distance from a data vector to some prototypicalThe prototypes may be
vectors of the same dimension as the data objects, but they can also
object of the cluster. The prototypes are usually not known beforehand, and are sought by be defined as “higher-
level” geometrical
clustering algorithms objects, such as linear
simultaneously withorthenonlinear subspaces
partitioning of theor functions.
data. The prototypes may be
vectors of the same dimension as the data objects, but they can also be defined 4 as “higher-
In our study,
level” geometrical we cluster
objects, such asG-20
linearcountries
or nonlinear withsubspaces
Euclidean functions.with parameters:
or distance
gross domestic product per capita (GDP-PC), IMPORT (%GDP), EXPORT (%GDP), Human
5 6
Development
In our Index
study, (HDI) , OPENNESS
we cluster , Technology
G-20 countries (TECH). distance
with Euclidean We use4 thewithdata between
parameters:
7
years 1996 and 2008.
gross domestic product per capita (GDP-PC), IMPORT (%GDP), EXPORT (%GDP), Human
Development Index (HDI)5, OPENNESS6, Technology (TECH). We use the data between
When
years 1996 andwe cluster
2008. 7 G-20 countries with Euclidean distance with the parameters defined
above, we have obtained five clusters. Table 1.1 and 1.2 illustrates the statistical information
of fiveWhenclusters which G-20
we cluster constructed
countrieswith
withthe parameters
Euclidean GDP-PC,
distance with theIMPORT,
parameters EXPORT,
defined
OPENNESS,
above, we haveHDI and TECH.
obtained five clusters. Table 1.1 and 1.2 illustrates the statistical information
of five clusters which constructed with the parameters GDP-PC, IMPORT, EXPORT,
OPENNESS, HDI and TECH.

2
International Monetary Fund
3
Bezdek 1981; Jain and Dubes 1988
!!!
4
2Euclidean
International distance Monetary d(x,Fund y) = ! (x! − y! )!
5
3Human
Bezdek Development
1981; Jain andIndex
Dubes 1988
6
4The ratio of Import plus Export of the
!!!country over GDP
!
7Euclidean distance
http://data.worldbank.org/
d(x, y) = ! (x! − y! )
5
Human Development Index
6
The ratio of Import plus Export of the country over GDP
2
7
http://data.worldbank.org/

Table 1.1 Statistical Informations of Clusters
EXPORT GDP-PC IMPORT
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
1 29,4696 7,1204 29074,6909 7435,3478 28,5406 5,5535
2 30,3065 7,6224 6044,1987 7541,2501 24,2796 5,5900
3 11,5552 2,0215 36049,1361 5038,3626 12,7954 2,7864
4 15,0977 5,9570 3617,2989 2726,7937 14,3299 4,1762
5 32,2345 11,7091 6089,4775 3661,7956 28,5743 4,4148
Combined 25,6092 11,0445 16842,0156 14230,9120 23,5395 8,0794
Table 1.2: Statistical Informations of Clusters

OPENNESS HDI TECH
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
1 0,002099 0,000647 0,843367 0,038359 1,811578 0,494448
2 0,255337 0,348668 0,755364 0,073973 1,128670 0,468896
3 0,073461 0,246627 0,871948 0,024331 2,892958 0,283864
4 0,053567 0,129275 0,169658 0,169658 0,660805 0,273041
5 0,029645 0,080182 0,078792 0,078792 0,358043 0,289437
Combined 0,067119 0,195764 0,139253 0,139253 1,320523 0,901872
When we cluster G-20 countries, some countries are in the same cluster with hundred
percentages. Table 1.3 gives information about the countries which belong to a cluster with
hundred percentages.
Table 1.3: Countries Belong to Cluster with 100%

CLUSTERS COUNTRIES
Cluster 1 Australia
Cluster 2 China, Russian
Cluster 3 USA, Japan
Cluster 4 Brazil, Indonesia
Cluster 5 3 Korea, India
South Africa, Saudi Arabia,

However, some countries belong to the clusters with different percentages. In other
words, they are between clusters and they are countries which are not stable with respect to
clustering variables. Table 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 give the information for the countries which are
between clusters. Table 1.4 indicates the countries which are between Cluster 1 and Cluster 2.
Table 1.4: Between Clusters 1&2
COUNTRIES CLUSTER 1 CLUSTER 2
Cluster 4 Brazil, Indonesia
Cluster 5 South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Korea, India
However, some countries belong to the clusters with different percentages. In other
words, they are between clusters and they are countries which are not stable with respect to
clustering variables. Table 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 give the information for the countries which are
between clusters. Table 1.4 indicates the countries which are between Cluster 1 and Cluster 2.

Germany 91.7% 8.3%
France 92.3% 7.7%
United Kingdom 92.3% 7.7%
Italy 92.3% 7.7%
Canada 92.3% 7.7%
Table 1.5 indicates the countries which are between Cluster 2 and Cluster 5.

Mexico 8.3% 91.7%
Turkey 8.3% 91.7%
Table 1.6 indicates the countries which are between Cluster 2 and Cluster 4.

Argentina 8.3% 91.7%
3. FUZZY MODELING
In the computational world, there are two areas of logic: crisp logic and fuzzy logic.
The mathematical modeling of fuzzy concepts was presented by Zadeh8 in 1965. Zadeh's
contention is that meaning unnatural language a matter of degree. In the literature, there are

8
Fuzzy Sets, Information and Control
4


two kinds of justification for fuzzy system theory: (1) The real world is too complicated for
precise descriptions
two kinds to be obtained;
of justification for fuzzytherefore approximations
system theory: mustworld
(1) The real be introduced in order tofor
is too complicated
obtain a reasonable,
precise descriptionsyet to trackable
be obtained; model. (2) Asapproximations
therefore people tend tomusttechnology and information
be introduced in order to
areas,
obtainhuman knowledge
a reasonable, yet in a systematic
trackable model. manner acts intend
(2) As people cognitive model of
to technology andengineering
information
systems.
areas, human knowledge in a systematic manner acts in cognitive model of engineering
systems.
A fuzzy set is represented by a membership function defined on the universe of
discourse.AThe universe
fuzzy set isofrepresented
discourse isby theaspace where thefunction
membership fuzzy variables
defined are on estimated.
the universe Theof
membership
discourse. The function givesofthe
universe grade oris degree
discourse the spaceof membership
where the fuzzyfunction within
variables arethe set of any
estimated. The
element of thefunction
membership universegives of discourse.
the grade In this study;
or degree we have sixfunction
of membership fuzzy variables
within the(as set input
of any
variables)
element of whichthe are GDP of
universe perdiscourse.
capita, IMPORT, EXPORT,
In this study; OPENNESS,
we have six fuzzyHDI, TECH
variables (as(also
input
parameters
variables) which are GDP per capita, IMPORT, EXPORT, OPENNESS, HDI, TECH the
for clustering model). They can be seen as indicators that can separate (also
countries
parametersof G-20 in five (result
for clustering of clustering
model). They can model). In other
be seen words, wethat
as indicators havecan six separate
inputs andthe
each input, of
countries weG-20have infive
fivemembership functionsmodel).
(result of clustering that twoInofother
themwords,
are trapezoids
we have and three of
six inputs and
them
eachare
input,triangles.
we haveThe five trapezoid
membership membership
functions thatfunctions
two of represent that the variable
them are trapezoids and threeisof
"extremely
them are good" or "extremely
triangles. The trapezoidbad". The triangle membership
membership functionsthat
functions represent represent that the is
the variable
variable is "bad",
"extremely good" "good" or "normal".
or "extremely In addition,
bad". The triangle"normal" means the
membership variablerepresent
functions value is nearly
that the
average and
variable is "good" means or
"bad", "good" greater than average
"normal". plus"normal"
In addition, one standard
means deviation. "Bad"
the variable means
value the
is nearly
variable
averagevalues are between
and "good" meansaverage
greater and
thanaverage
averageminus standard
plus one deviation.
standard "Extremely
deviation. "Bad" means good"the
means thatvalues
variable the variable
are between values are greater
average and averagethan the
minusaverage
standardplusdeviation.
one standard deviation.
"Extremely good"
"Extremely
means thatbad" themeans
variablethatvalues
the variable values than
are greater are smaller than the
the average average
plus plus one standard
one standard deviation.
deviation.
"Extremely bad" means that the variable values are smaller than the average plus one standard
deviation.
We characterize each membership function by estimating the border points. First, we
have obtained statistical each
We characterize values such as expected
membership function by value, maximum,
estimating minimum,
the border points.standard
First, we
deviation of each input variables. By using these values, we have
have obtained statistical values such as expected value, maximum, minimum, standard decided the borders of each
membership function. Table 2.1 represents the basic statistics of each
deviation of each input variables. By using these values, we have decided the borders of each variable (input &
output).
membership function. Table 2.1 represents the basic statistics of each variable (input &
output).
Table 2.1: Range of the Variables

Table 2.1: Range of the Variables
MAX MIN MEAN ST.DEV
MAX MIN MEAN ST.DEV
GDP 10.79 6.01 9.07 1.31
GDP 10.79 6.01 9.07 1.31
IMPORT 54.19 8.37 24.32 8.2
IMPORT 54.19 8.37 24.32 8.2
EXPORT 67.96 6.57 26.67 11.24
EXPORT 67.96 6.57 26.67 11.24
OPENNESS 0.91 0 0.07 0.2
OPENNESS 0.91 0 0.07 0.2
HDI 0.93 0 0.74 0.14
HDI 0.93 0 0.74 0.14
TECH 3.44 0 1.32 0.9
TECH 3.44 0 1.32 0.9
For the next step of the modeling, we need to define the rules of the model. In general
for fuzzy For process; if we
the next stephave sixmodeling,
of the input variables
we need andtofive membership
define functions,
the rules of we In
the model. have 56
general
for fuzzy process; if we have six input variables and five membership functions, we have 56
rules.
rules.
At least four input variables must be “Extremely Bad” to make the output variable
“Extremely At Bad”. We define
least four input similar rules
variables withberespect
must to properties
“Extremely Bad” to of make
the input
the variables.
output variable
“Extremely Bad”. We define similar rules with respect to properties of the input variables.
5

We group the input variables and create three different fuzzy systems to find the final
output variable. GDP, IMPORT and EXPORT variables forms the first fuzzy system and with
same membership functions. OPENNESS and HDI form the second fuzzy system. The output
of the first fuzzy system and the output of the second fuzzy system with the TECH variable
form the third fuzzy system.
The following table shows the weights of the countries belonging to the five
membership function between 1996 and 2008.
Table 2.2. Weights of the Countries

Countrıes Ex.bad Bad Normal Good Ex.good
Argentina 0 0,15 0,77 0 0,08
Australia 0 0 0,15 0,77 0,08
Brazil 0,46 0,46 0 0,08 0
Canada 0 0 0 0,38 0,62
China 0 0 0,62 0,23 0,15
Germany 0 0 0 0,31 0,69
France 0 0 0 0,54 0,46
United 0 0 0 0,46 0,54

Kingdom
India 0,85 0,08 0 0,08 0
Indonesia 0,15 0,69 0 0,08 0,08
Italy 0 0 0,38 0,54 0,08
Japan 0 0 0 0,38 0,62
Korea 0 0 0,38 0,46 0,15
Mexico 0 0,31 0,62 0 0,08
Russian 0 0,31 0,62 0 0,08

Saudi Arabia 0 0,31 0,23 0 0,46
Turkey 0,08 0,54 0,31 0 0,08
United States 0 0 0 0,54 0,46
South Arfica 0,31 0,38 0,31 0 0
The first row of Table 2.2 shows that Argentina belongs to the NORMAL cluster for
ten years, belongs to BAD cluster two years and belongs to the EX GOOD cluster for only
one year for in the range of 1996 and 2008.
3. Conclusion
In this study, we cluster G-20 countries with parameters such as gross domestic
product per capita (GDP-PC), IMPORT (%GDP), EXPORT (%GDP), Human Development
Index (HDI), OPENNESS and Technology (TECH) and we found five different clusters and
some countries are between clusters. We can use these parameters (probabilities) when we
want to differ countries in any study. One of the most important discoveries in clustering
analysis presents those G-20 countries can distinguish.
References
[1] Çakmak Zeki, “Validity problem in Clustering and Consideration of the Results”,
Dumlupınar
University, Journal of Social Science, Vol:3, November, 1999, pp.187-205.
[2] Haack S., “Do we need fuzzy logic?” International Journal of Man-Mach. Studies, Vol. 11,
1979, pp.437-445.
[3] J.F. Baldwin, E.H. Mamdani and B.R. Gaines,” Fuzzy Logic and Fuzzy Reasoning in
Fuzzy
Reasoning and Its Applications”, London, Academic Press.
[4] Masatoshi Sakawa, Fuzzy Sets and Interactive Multi Objective Optimization, Newyork,
Plenum Press, 1993, s. 36.
[5] Mordia, K.V, J.T and Biby J.M, Multivariate Analysis, Academic Press, London, 1980.
[6] Patrick J.F Groenen, Uzay Kaymaky, Joost Van Rosmalen, ”Fuzzy Clustering with
Minkowski
Distance Functions”, 2006.
[7] Shu-Jen Chen, Chin-Lai Hwang, in collaboration with Frank P. Hwang, Fuzzy Multiple
Attribute Decision Making, Germany, 1992, Springer-Verlag, s. 42.
[8] Tormod Naes and Bjorn Helge Mevik, The Flexibility of Fuzzy Clustering Illustrated by
Examples; Journal of Chemo-metrics, 1999.
[9] Van Raan F.J., “Fatal attraction: Conceptual and methodological problems in the ranking
of
universities by bibliometric methods”, Scientometrics, Vol 62, No.1, 2004.
[10] Zadeh L.A., “Fuzzy Sets” Info. & Ctl, Vol. 8. 1965. Pp 338-353.
[11] Zadeh L.A., “Fuzzy Algorithms” Info. & Ctl, Vol. 12. 1968. Pp 94-102.

IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH TOWARDS THE CENTRAL ASIA AND
THE CAUCASUS
Mahdieh AGHAZADEH
ABSTRACT:
Regional cooperation is becoming important worldwide. After the dissolution of the
Soviet Union and acknowledging the independence of the 12 remaining republics, the
attention of many countries drew in this region. Nevertheless, Iran, as a country which has
cultural and historical ties with this region, and also as a bridge between landlocked central
Asian countries and the Persian Gulf, is not using its strategic geopolitical situation as part of
its foreign policy with focus on Central Asia and Caucasus. While keeping its ties with Russia,
Iran should acknowledge and use its capacity to increase its bilateral relations with Central
Asia and the Caucasus countries. It important to mention that by having an active role in
Central Asia, Iran can increases its regional power.
KEY WORDS: Iran’s foreign policy, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Geopolitics, Regional
Cooperation, International Relations.
INTRODUCTION
Iran’s foreign policy in Central Asia and Caucasus could be explained as policies to encounter
the western influence and accommodate its own interest in the region (Vatanka and Scholar,
2012); However, Iran was not much successful in the later. In order to counter western
influence, Iran followed cooperative policy with Russia. Although Iran received the support
of Russia for important issues like Iran’s nuclear program, but more active role for Iran in the
region is needed. Iran should balance its relation with Russia as well as gaining a foothold in
Central Asia and Caucasus with offering more cultural expansion and economic incentives.
This study provides an analytical view for answering the question of what has been Iran’s
foreign policy approach toward the Central Asia and the Caucasus and what it should be in
the future. This is important because of the growing importance of regional cooperation’s in
the world. In order to answer this question, the paper has been designed in four parts: first,
Iran’s cultural approach in her foreign policy toward the Central Asia and the Caucasus has
given. In second part the political approach and in the third part the economic approach has
been evaluated. Finally, in the last part conclusions are presented.

1

CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL APPROACH
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and acknowledging the independence of the 12
remaining republics, the attention of many countries drew in this strategic region. Central
Asia include five countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirgizstan and
Tajikistan which bordered with Russia from North, Iran and Afghanistan from South, Caspian
Sea from west and China from East. Modern Day Central Asia was a great part of the ancient
Transoxiana, the region between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. Transoxiana was one
of the satrapies of the Achaemenid dynasty of Persia under the name Sogdiana (Abolhassan
Shirazi, pp. 111-114).
According to Takmil Homayoun, from the ethnic view, Arians have habituated in part
of Transoxiana, but later they became under the influence of Turks. At the time being, except
Tajiks that mostly talk in Persian language and have Arian ethnic, the Cultural and linguistic
characteristics of the rest of the region is similar as Turks (Takmil Homayoun, 1992, p.33).
Iran has strong ethnic and cultural ties with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and
Uzbekistan. However, relations with Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan are tough. Tajikistan has
tenacious historically connections with Iran; the official language of the country is ‘Tajik’
which is a dialect of Persian language. Hence, Iran has a possibility of developing pan-Iranian
tendencies in Tajikistan. According to Efegil and A. Stone, Iran contributes to bringing to
power a pro-Iranian party in Tajikistan (Ertan and Stone, 2010, p.358). Turkmenistan has
been part of ancient Iran in the past. Therefore, there is a cultural interconnectivity among
Iranians and Turkmens as well.
But then despite having linguistic ties with Iranian Azeri’s, Azerbaijan links with Iran
is inappropriate. Because of the potential threat of separatist tendencies among Iranian Azeri
minorities, Iran is not favored with strong cultural ties with Azerbaijan. Furthermore, mostly
pan-Turkish people of Azerbaijan are somewhat hostile toward Iran (Ertan and Stone, 2010,
p.357). Uzbekistan official relations with Iran are also tense, but cultural ties cannot be
disregarded. There are still a group of Persian speaking people living in Samarkand and
Bukhara – two cities as cradle of Iranian civilization where today belongs to Uzbekistan.
Atayi and Shibani have summarized Iran’s Cultural interests in Central Asia and the
Caucasus as following: first, the revival of Islam in the region and reinforcement of close
2
cultural ties with each of the countries; Second, the revival of Persian language among the
region especially in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; Third, maintaining and preserving the
manuscripts and the historical remnants of the ancient Iran in the region; and the last
cooperation in closing Iran’s and the region’s identity (Atayi and Shibani, 2011, p.144).
POLITICAL APPROACH
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, there was a vacuum of power among the new
established countries in this region. The United States, as a single super power after the cold
war, as well as some neighbor countries like Iran and Turkey tried to fill this vacuum.
Although Iran had set a relatively good relation with most of the Central Asian and the
Caucasus countries, but the country’s foreign policy in this region can be explained as
countering the influence of the U.S. and competing with Turkey. Both Turkey and Iran are
trying to increase their influence in the region; however, turkey is enjoying western support as
well.
In her paper Turkish and Iranian interests and policies in the South Caucasus,
Evanthia Balla has well explained the trends of Iranian-Turkish competition and cooperation
in the Caucasus. She states that Armenia has developed strong political and economic ties
with Iran while Azerbaijan and Georgia seeks to reinforce their links with Turkey and the
west (Evanthia, 2013). In addition, Bahram Amir Ahmadian has described Iranian close
relation with Armenia as a “trump card which has been frequently played in the political game
between the west and the east” (Amir Ahmadian, 2013). Iran has established its close relation
with Armenia to confront pan-Turk tendencies. Iran’s supports for Armenia in Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict resulted to the loss of relations with Azerbaijan. In addition, supporting
Armenia implicitly raised Iranian-Turkish contest, considering Turkey as a main supporter of
Azerbaijan.
Armenia is not only having close ties with Iran, but also with Russia. In order to
naturalize the American influence in the region, Russia intensified its ties with Iran and
Armenia (Sharashenizade, 2011, p.3). Iran, on the other hand, emphasize on Russia’s role for
the regions security and stability. In addition, Russia was among the few countries which
supported Iran’s nuclear program. Therefore, Iran’s policy in the region seldom contradicts
with those of Russians. Thus, according to Svante E. Cornell, Iran’s influence in the region is
limited because Iran follows a defensive position (E. Cornell, 2003, p.6). In other words, due
3
98 Volume:3,
No:1, Winter 2015
to Russia’s desire to have more influence in Caucasus, Iran’s overall engagement has
decreased in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Alterman, et al. 2013, p.13). However, this
situation can be changed due to recent Iranian-western positive negotiations over Iranian
nuclear program and the ongoing improvement on the country’s relation with the west.
Iranian foreign policy in the Central Asia has realistic policy trends as it has in the
Caucasus. Since the Islamic revolution in 1979 and the idea of ‘Exporting the Islamic
Revolution’ articulated by the revolution leader- Ayatollah Khomeini, neighboring countries
were alarmed by the threat of the political Islam. After the cold war and independency of the
Central Asian countries, the fear of political Islam hindered their relation with Iran. In
addition, since the 11/9 and the ‘war on terrorism,’ the U.S. became politically and military
involved in the region. This brought about the new republican’s direct engagement against the
terrorism issue. For instant, Uzbekistan asked for the U.S. security in exchange for full
cooperation (E. Cornell and A. Spector, 2002, pp. 201-202). Consequently, given these points,
Iran’s regional role has been faded.
Same as in Caucasus, Turkey’s involvement in Central Asia has been presented in the
U.S. agenda. According to Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson, President George H. W. Bush
called Turkey as a model for Central Asian newly independent republics. By and large, this
policy has been continued on the years after. However, Turkey has much more geographically
and culturally limitation in Central Asia than in Caucasus (Pipes and Clawson, 1992, p.9). All
of which encourages Iran to work harder to enhance its image abroad so that it could have
more indirect influence in Central Asia and Caucasus as being a model for them instead of the
Turkish model. Again, recent proceedings in Iran’s nuclear negotiation with the west should
be one more reason for the country to use this opportunity and set its regional stand in
accordance with its real great potentials.
ECONOMIC APPROACH
Economic situation of the Central Asia is worse in compare with the time it was under
communism. According to the CIA world Fact book, All 5 countries GDP has declined in
comparison with what it was 90s. The practical approach to bring them off from this situation
would be finding ways to induce the Central Asian states to open their borders to each other
and to the outside world (Maynes, 2003, pp.2-4). Therefore, Iran’s role could be bold in this
regard. Iran has a special geopolitical situation as being a crossroads of transit routes from the
4
Central Asia and Caucasus to the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. Landlocked central Asian
Central Asia
Central Asia and Caucasus
Caucasus to the Persian
Persian Gulf
Gulf and
and the
the Middle East.
East. Landlocked
Landlocked central
central Asian
Asian
Countries canand
merely accesstotothe
the sea through the landMiddle
of their neighbors. Hence, because of
Countries
Countries can merely
can merely access to the
accesslocation,sea
to the sea through
through the land of their neighbors. Hence, because of
its convenient geopolitical Iran is thethe
bestland of their
country neighbors.
that Hence,
can provide the because of
direct link
its convenient
its convenient geopolitical
geopolitical location,
location, Iran
Iran is
is the best
best country
country that
that can
can provide
provide the
the direct
direct link
link
between five central Asian countries and the the
outside world.
between five
between five central
central Asian
Asian countries
countries and
and the
the outside
outside world.
world.
In addition, according to Muhammad Javed, Iran’s possession of huge oil and gas
In addition,
In addition, according toto Muhammad Javed,Javed, Iran’s
Iran’s possession
possession ofof huge
huge oiloil and
and gas
gas
resources is anotheraccording
advantage to Muhammad
cooperate with Central Asia and Caucasus countries. Iran
resources is
resources is another
another advantage
advantage toto cooperate
cooperate with
with Central Asia
Asia and
and Caucasus
Caucasus countries.
countries. Iran
Iran
has the technical know-how in oil and gas industryCentral
which is a great context for cooperation.
has the
has the technical
technical know-how
know-how in in oil
oil and
and gas
gas industry
industry which
which is
is aa great
great context
context for cooperation.
cooperation.
Furthermore, the region is a potential market for Iranian goods. Hence, therefor
is a wide range
Furthermore, the
Furthermore, the region
region is
is aa potential
potential market
market for
for Iranian
Iranian goods.
goods. Hence, there
there is aa wide
wide range
range
of economic cooperation fields among Iran, Central Asia and Hence,
Caucasus in isenergy sector,
of economic
of economic cooperation fields
fields among Iran,
Iran, Central
Central Asia
Asia and
and Caucasus
Caucasus inin energy
energy sector,
sector,
infrastructure cooperation
provision, trade andamong
commerce (Javed, 2002, pp.115-119).
infrastructure provision,
infrastructure provision, trade
trade and
and commerce
commerce (Javed,
(Javed, 2002,
2002, pp.115-119).
pp.115-119).
While Iran has considerable advantages for Central Asian and the Caucasus countries,
While Iran
While Iran has
has considerable
considerable advantages
advantages fforor Central
Central Asian
Asian and
and the
the Caucasus
Caucasus countries,
it was not successful to accomplish an effective foreign policy to cooperate properlycountries,
with this
it
it was not
was not successful
successful to accomplish
to accomplish an effective foreign policy to cooperate properly with this
region. A more proactive standpointanis effective
suggestedforeign policy
for Iran’s to cooperate
approach towardproperly
Centralwith
Asiathis
by
region. A more
region. A the
more proactive
proactive standpoint
standpoint is suggested for Iran’s approach toward Central Asia by
applying policy of making trust,isavoiding
suggested for Iran’sgoals,
ambitious approach towarddevelopment
economic Central Asiaand by
applying
applying the policy of making
the policyincentives trust,
of makingfortrust, avoiding
avoiding ambitious
ambitious togoals,
goals, economic
economic development
development and
and
giving investment Iranian businessmen’s do more investment in Central
giving
givingIninvestment
investment incentives for
for Iranian
incentives with Iranian businessmen’s to to do more
more investment in
in Central
Asia. addition, cooperation Central businessmen’s
Asia and Caucasus docountries investment
should increase Central
in the
Asia. In addition,
Asia. In addition, cooperation
cooperation with Central
with Central Asia and Caucasus countries should increase in
in the
Economic cooperation Organization (ECO)Asia and Caucasus
framework. countries should
The organizations wereincrease
founded the
on
Economic
Economic cooperation
cooperation Organization
Organization (ECO)
(ECO) framework. The organizations were founded on
1985 by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan and haveframework. The organizations
its headquarters wereECO
in Tehran-Iran. founded
aims on
to
1985 by Turkey,
1985 “sustainable Iran
by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan and have
and Pakistandevelopment its headquarters
and have itsforheadquarters in Tehran-Iran. ECO aims to
meet socio-economic people of theinregion.”
Tehran-Iran.
1
Iran ECO
shouldaims
playtoa
1
meet
meet “sustainable
“sustainable socio-economic
socio-economic development
development for
for people
people of the region.” 1 Iran should play a
dominant role in providing incentives to move the region of
to the region.”
an open Iranenvironment
market should playina
dominant
dominant role
role in providing
in more
providing incentives to to move the region to
to an
an open
open market
market environment
environment in
which welcomes trade incentives
and less trade move
tariffsthe
andregion
barriers. in
which welcomes more trade and less trade tariffs and
which welcomes more trade and less trade tariffs and barriers. barriers.
CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS
Although the dissolution of the Soviet Union has ended competition among the great powers
Although
Although the
the adissolution
dissolution of the Soviet
Soviet Union has ended
ended competition among the great powers
but it created new room of forthe
competitionUnion hasregional
among competition
powers. It isamong thethe
true that great powers
number of
but it created
but it created a new
a new room for
room for competition
competition among regional powers. It is true that the number of
regional powers interested in Central Asia among regionalgeopolitical
and Caucasus powers. It is true that the
advantages, butnumber of
it should
regional
regional powers interested in
in Central Asia
Asia and
and Caucasus geopolitical advantages, but
but it
it should
note thatpowers
Iran has interested
an especial Central
stand comparing Caucasus geopolitical
with others. advantages,
Nevertheless, the countries should
have
note that
noteused Iran
that its has
Irangreat an especial
has economic
an especialandstand
stand comparing
comparing with others.
with others. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the countries
thecultural
countries have
have
not geopolitical potential as well as strengthen links in
not used
not used its great
its with economic
great Central
economic and geopolitical
andand
geopolitical potential as well as strengthen cultural links in
her relation Asia Caucasus potential
countries.asItwell
is theas time
strengthen
to try cultural
to have links in
a more
her relation
her relation with
with Central Asia and Caucasus countries. It is the time to try to have a more
active role for IranCentral Asia and
in the region Caucasus
instead countries.
of having It isstand
defensive the time
againstto foreign
try to have a more
influence. It
active
active role for Iran in the region instead of having defensive stand against foreign influence. It
role for Iran in the region instead of having defensive stand against foreign influence. It

1
Economic Cooperation Organization’s official website, http://www.ecosecretariat.org/.

1
1 Economic
Economic Cooperation
Cooperation Organization’s
Organization’s official
official website,
website,5 http://www.ecosecretariat.org/.
http://www.ecosecretariat.org/.
5
5
100
should be note that achieving Iran’s goals in Central Asia and the Caucasus will not be
should beif note
possible Iran that achieving
undermine its Iran’s goals inwith
good relation Central AsiaHence,
Russia. and theIran
Caucasus
should will not its
balance be
possible if Iranboth
policies toward undermine
keepingits
its good relation
close ties with with Russia.
Russia Hence,itsIran
and increase should
overall balance its
engagement in
policies toward
the region. both keeping
Economic its close
incentives wouldties
bewith Russia
the first and
step in increase its overall
this regard: giving engagement in
Central Asian
the
and region. Economic
the Caucasus incentives
countries more would be the to
opportunities first stepIran’s
enjoy in thisgreat
regard: giving Central
geopolitical Asian
situation as a
and theway
transit Caucasus countries
for their moreThe
products. opportunities to enjoy
regional bridge Iran’s great
perspective geopolitical
in Iran’s situation
foreign policy as
cana
transit wayIran’s
increases for their products.
regional powerThe regional
both in the bridge
Centralperspective in Iran’s
Asia, Caucasus andforeign policy East
the Middle can
increases
regions. InIran’s regional
addition, power improve
Iran should both in the
the country’s
Central Asia, Caucasus
economic anditsthe
basis as Middle East
groundwork for
regions.
being an In addition,model
exclusive Iran should improveWith
in the region. the country’s
doing this,economic basis countries
Central Asian as its groundwork for
would show
being an exclusive
their interest model inmore
to cooperate the region. Withthemselves.
with Iran doing this, Central Asian recent
Furthermore, countries would show
proceedings in
their
Iran’sinterest
nuclear to cooperatewith
negotiation morethewith
westIran themselves.
should Furthermore,
be one more recent
reason for the proceedings
country in
to use this
Iran’s nuclear
opportunity andnegotiation with the
set its regional west
stand should be one
in accordance withmore reason
its real greatfor the country to use this
potentials.
opportunity and set its regional stand in accordance with its real great potentials.
REFERENCES
REFERENCES
Books
Books Alterman, Jon B, et al. The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus. Washington DC: Center for
Alterman,
Strategic Jon B,
International The Turkey,
et al. November
Studies, Russia, Iran Nexus. Washington DC: Center for
2013.
Strategic International
Javed, Muhammad.Studies,
TheNovember
emergence2013.
of the Central Asian Republics and their impact on
Javed,
South and WestMuhammad. The
Asia -Turkey, emergence
Iran, of Pakistan:
Pakistan. the Central Asian Republics
Pakistan and their impact
Research Repository, 2002.on
South and West Asia
Maleki, -Turkey,
Abbas. Iran,
“Iran.” in Pakistan.
the New Pakistan: Pakistan
Silk Roads: Research
Transport andRepository, 2002.
Trade in Greater
CentralMaleki, Abbas.
Asia. Edited “Iran.”
by S. in the
Frederick New
Starr, Silk Roads:
168-192. Transport
Washington DC: and Trade
Central in Greater
Asia-Caucasus
Central Asia.
Institute Edited
and Silk byStudies
Road S. Frederick Starr,
Program, 168-192. Washington DC: Central Asia-Caucasus
2007.
Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2007.
Journal Articles
JournalAbolhassan
Articles Shirazi, Habibollah. “Developing relation between Iran and the Central
Abolhassan
Asia and Caucasus: Shirazi,
offering Habibollah. “Developing
strategies.” Joghrafia relation
va Tosee between
(2005): Iran and the Central
111-140.
Asia and Caucasus:
Atayi, offering
Farhad strategies.”
and Azam Joghrafia
Shibani. va Tosee
“Iran and (2005):
Russia’s 111-140.and Competition
cooperation
themes Atayi,
in the Farhad
Central and
AsiaAzam Shibani. “Iran
in Geopolitical andCentral
frame.” Russia’s cooperation
Eurasian andVol.04,
Studies, Competition
No.08
themes
(2011): in the Central Asia in Geopolitical frame.” Central Eurasian Studies, Vol.04, No.08
131-152.
(2011):Balla,
131-152.
Evanthia. “Turkish and Iranian interests and policies in the South Caucasus.”
Balla,
Norwegian Evanthia. “Turkish
Peacebuilding and
Recourse Iranian
Center interests
(April 2013).and policies in the South Caucasus.”
Norwegian Peacebuilding
E. Cornell, SvanteRecourse CenterA.
and Regine (April 2013).“Central Asia: More than Islamic
Spector.
E. Cornell,
Extremist.” Svante Quaterly,
The Washington and Regine A. No.1
Vol.25, Spector. “Central
(2002): Asia: More than Islamic
193-206.
Extremist.” The Washington Quaterly, Vol.25,6 No.1 (2002): 193-206.
6
E.Cornell, Svante. “Regional Politics in Central Asia: the Changing Roles of Iran,
Turkey, Pakistan and China.” SARPA Foundation (2003): 1-30.
Efegil, Ertan and Leonard A. Stone. “Iran’s Interest in Central Asia: A Contemporary
Assessment.” Central Asian Survey, Vol.20, No.3 (2010): 353-365.
Laruelle, Marlene. “Israel and Central Asia: Opportunities and Limits for Partnership
in a Post-Arab Spring World.” The German Marshal Found of the United States (July 2012).
Maynes, Charles William. “America Discovers Central Asia.” Foreign Affairs (April
2003).
Payrouse, Sebastien and Sadykzhan Ibraimov. “Iran’s Central Asia Temptations.”
Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 10 (2010).
Peyrouse, Sebastien. “The Iranian Nuclear Crisis as Seen from Central Asia,” The
German Marshal Found of the United States (April 2012).
Pipes, Daniel and Patrick Clawson. “Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbors.” Foreign
Affairs (1992).
Sadegh-Zadeh, Kaweh. “Iran’s Strategy in the South Caucasus.” Caucasian Review of
International Affairs, Vol.2, No.1 (2008).
Sharashenizade, Tornike. “The Role of Iran in the South Caucasus.” Caucasus
Analytical Digest, No.30 (October 2011).
Takmil Homayoun, Naser. “A review of Asia and learning about the Central Asia.”
Motaleate Asiyaye Markazi va Ghafghaz (1992).
Tazmini, Ghoncheh, “The Islamic Revival in Central Asia: a Potent Force or a
Misconception,” Central Asian Survey, Vol.20, No.1 (2001): 63-83.
Vatanka, Alex and Adjunct Scholar, “Iranian Influence in the South Caucasus and the
Surrounding Region,” Middle East Institute, Vol. 10 (2012).
Online Recourses
Amir Ahmadian, Bahram. “Iran’s Opportunities and Challenges in Caucasus.” Iran
Review, July 06, 2011. Accessed December 03, 2013.
http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Iran%E2%80%99s_Opportunities_and_Challe
nges_in_Caucasus.htm.
Economic Cooperation Organization’s official website, http://www.ecosecretariat.org/.
7

Unpacking Crime over the Life Course: Causes of Offending in a High Risk Sample of
Women1
Lee Ann Slocum, University of Missouri St. Louis

Sally S. Simpson, University of Maryland, College, Park
Unpacking Crime over the Life Course: Causes of Offending in a High Risk Sample of
Unpacking
Women 1 Crime over the Life Course: Causes of Offending in a High Risk Sample of
ABSTRACT
Women 1
Researchers have consistently identified aLee direct

Annrelationship between childhood
Slocum, University of Missouri victimization
St. Louis
and adult offending. Less is known about how
Lee this
Ann early
Slocum, victimization
University operates
of
Sally S. Simpson, University of Maryland, College, Missouri together with
St. Louis
Park
later life experiences to influence offending Sally S. Simpson, University
and substance use in of Maryland,InCollege,
adulthood. Park
this research,
ABSTRACT
we first examine the independent effects of recent negative life experiences (exposure to
ABSTRACT
Researchers
severe stress,have consistently
dangerous identified conditions,
neighborhood a direct relationship between
interpersonal childhood
conflict, victimization
victimization) and
Researchers
and
childhood have
adult offending. consistently
victimization Less identified
onisadult
known a direct
about how
offending relationship
andthis
drugearly between
use.victimization
We then assess childhood
operates
whethervictimization
together
drugwith
use
and
lateradult
life offending.
experiences Less
to is known
influence about
offending how
and this early
substance victimization
use
serves as a link between stressful and traumatic life experiences and other types ofin operates
adulthood. In together
this with
research,
laterfirst
we life experiences
offending. examine
These the toindependent
influence
questions are offending
addressed and
effects of substance
recent
using use inalife
negative
data from adulthood.
experiences
multi-site In this
study research,
(exposure
called to
the
we first examine
severe stress,
Women’s the independent
dangerouswith
Experiences neighborhood effects of recent
conditions,
Violence Project, negative
whichinterpersonal
examines the life experiences
conflict, (exposure
victimization)
personal, situational, and to
severe stress,
childhood
community-level dangerous
victimization
factorsonneighborhood
adult are
that conditions,
offending and drug
associated interpersonal
withuse.women’s
We then conflict,
violentvictimization)
assess whether
offendingdrug and
use
and
childhood
serves as victimization
a link between on adult offending
stressful and and drug
traumatic use.
life We then
experiences
victimization. We find that both recent negative experiences and childhood victimization are assess
and whether
other drug
types use
of
serves as
offending. with
associated a link
These between
questions
increased stressful and
are addressed
offending traumatic
and drugusing
use indata life experiences
from a Moreover,
adulthood. and other
multi-site there types
study iscalled
evidence of
the
offending.
Women’s
that drug use These
Experiences questions
mediates withthe
both are addressed
Violence
long-and Project, using
whichdata
short-term from
examines
effects athe
of strain multi-site
personal,
on study called and
situational,
non-violent offending.the
Women’s
This workExperiences
community-level highlights with
factors
the needViolence
that for Project,
areresearchers
associated which
to with examines
study women’s
the the personal,
causes violent
of offendingsituational,
within and
offending and
the
community-level
victimization.
context of personal factors
We find that
that both
histories are
and recent associated
negativethat
to recognize with
experiences women’s
the effectsand violent
of childhood offending
childhood victimization
experiences can and
are
victimization.
associated
carry withWe
over into find that
increased
adulthood. both recent
offending andnegative
drug useexperiences
in adulthood. andMoreover,
childhood there
victimization
is evidenceare
associated
that drug use with increased
mediates bothoffending
the long-and and short-term
drug use ineffects
adulthood.
of strainMoreover, there isoffending.
on non-violent evidence
that drug
This workuse mediates the
highlights bothneed
the long-and short-term
for researchers effectsthe
to study of causes
strain onofnon-violent offending.
offending within the
Introduction
This work highlights the need for researchers to study the causes of offending within the
context of personal histories and to recognize that the effects of childhood experiences can
Traditionally,
context of into the
personal study of crime has been synonymous with the study of men.
histories and to recognize that the effects of childhood experiences can However in the
carry over adulthood.
last thirty years, there
carry over into adulthood. has been a growing interest in understanding female offending. The
work I am presenting today explores this issue by examining how women’s life experiences,
Introduction
both as children and adults, shape their involvement in criminal behavior and drug use. We
Introduction
Traditionally,
are particularly the interested
study of crime in the has influence
been synonymous
of traumaticwith the
andstudy of men.
stressful However inlike
experiences, the
Traditionally, the study of crime has been synonymous with the study
last thirty years, there has been a growing interest in understanding female offending. The
victimization. of men. However in the
last thirty
work I am years, theretoday
presenting has been a growing
explores interest
this issue in understanding
by examining how women’s female life
offending. The
experiences,
work
both
In I am
theasUnited presenting
children today
and adults,
States over the explores
shape this
last their issue by
involvement
30 years examining
the number in criminalhow
of women women’s
behavior life
andindrug
involved experiences,
the use. We
criminal
both as children
are particularly
justice system has and adults,
interested
surged. Fromshape
in the1980their involvement
influence
to 2011,of the in criminal
traumatic
numberand behavior and drug
stressfulin experiences,
of women use.
prison increased We
like
are particularly
victimization.
almost 600 percent interested
(Phillips, in 2012)
the influence of traumatic
and in 2012, over 200,000and stressful
women were experiences, like
incarcerated
victimization.
(Carson and Golinelli, 2013). While the number of men in prison also increased dramatically
In the United
during Statesthe
this period, over the lastfor30women
increase years the number
is nearly 1.5oftimes
women
thatinvolved
for menin(637%
the criminal
versus
In the United States
justice (Phillips,
419%) system has over the last 30 years the number of women involved
surged. From 1980 to 2011, the number of women in prison increased
2012). in the criminal
almost 600 percentsurged.
justice system has From
(Phillips, 2012)1980 andto in
2011, theover
2012, number of women
200,000 womeninwereprison increased
incarcerated
almost 600 percent (Phillips, 2012) and in 2012, over 200,000 women were
(Carson and Golinelli, 2013). While the number of men in prison also increased dramatically incarcerated
(Carson andperiod,
during this Golinelli,
the2013).
increaseWhile
for the number
women of men1.5
is nearly in times
prisonthat
alsofor
increased dramatically
men (637% versus
during this period, the
419%) (Phillips, 2012). increase for women is nearly 1.5 times that for men (637% versus
419%) (Phillips, 2012).
1
This research was supported by a grant from the National Consortium on Violence Research (NCOVR) to
professors Julie Horney, Sally Simpson, Rosemary Gartner, and Candace Kruttschnitt.
1
1
This research was supported by a grant from the National Consortium on Violence Research (NCOVR) to
1
professors Juliewas
This research Horney, Sally by
supported Simpson,
a grant Rosemary Gartner,Consortium
from the National and Candace
onKruttschnitt.
Violence Research (NCOVR) to
professors Julie Horney, Sally Simpson, Rosemary Gartner, and Candace Kruttschnitt.
1
Research indicates that two themes figure prominently into the lives of crime-involved
women.
The first theme is victimization. Almost half of female offenders in the United States
reported that they had been the victim of physical or sexual abuse, a higher rate of
victimization than observed in the general population (Ekstrand, 1999). Like female
offenders, male offenders have high rates of childhood victimization (Widom, 1989; Widom
and Maxfield, 2001), but there is some evidence that physical and sexual abuse may be
particularly salient for females who commit crime. For example, girls are more likely to link
their delinquent behavior to childhood abuse than boys (Belknap and Holsinger, 2006).
A second defining factor of female offenders in the United States is their high rates of drug
use. Approximately 60 percent of women in state prisons and jails reported using drugs in the
month prior to their arrest and approximately half reported using drugs on a daily basis
(Greenfeld and Snell, 1999). While substance abuse is prevalent among all offenders, women
incarcerated in state prisons report higher levels of use compared to their male counterparts,
regardless of how drug use is measured (Greenfeld and Snell, 1999). Improving outcomes for
women offenders begins by targeting their history of victimization and drug use. But to do
so, we need to understand the mechanisms through which these factors interact to influence
offending.
The purpose of this study is to examine how women’s experiences in childhood and
adulthood interact to influence their levels and patterns of offending and drug use. We divide
these experiences into two categories based on when they occurred. First we examine the
carryover effects of early childhood experiences, which we call distal factors. Given the high
rates of abuse reported by female offenders, we focus on childhood victimization. However,
adult experiences also matter; even serious offenders do not spend all their time engaging in
crime. Much offending is intermittent and current life circumstances influence whether a
women is offending at a particular time in her life. We call these recent circumstances that
influence movement into and out of offending proximal causes and they can include things
like periods of unemployment or living with a male partner. Unlike distal factors, which are
expected to have an enduring effect on problem behavior, the effects of proximal factors are
immediate and short-lived. In this work, the proximal factors we focus on include short-term
changes in exposure to stressful life experiences (including negative life events, victimization,
interpersonal conflict, and living in unsafe neighborhoods). Finally, we also explore whether
drug use serves as a link between stressful and traumatic life experiences and other types of
offending. Before I describe this research, it is important to discuss why we think
victimization and stressful life experiences should affect offending and drug use.
2
The link between women’s victimization in childhood and their adult offending has been
explained by the pathways perspective. The pathways perspective describes the various
developmental processes through which the negative consequences of abuse accumulate over
time (Brennan et al., 2012; Daly, 1994; Simpson, Yahner, and Dugan, 2008). In one path, the
link between childhood victimization and adult offending is alienation from parents and the
support they provide. Girls who are abused are more likely to run away from their homes at
an early age. These girls develop mental health problems like depression, and they use drugs
to help them deal with these issues. In adulthood, they support themselves and their drug
habit through offending. Other women end up offending in adulthood because childhood
victimization causes them to have difficulty controlling their emotions and behavior. These
girls respond to the abuse by acting out in school and engaging in delinquency. Over time,
they develop an aggressive demeanor which eventually leads to offending.
While the pathways perspective focuses on the enduring impact of childhood victimization,
other theories, like General Strain Theory (GST), are concerned with the more immediate
effects of negative life experiences. The essence of GST is that when individuals experience
strain, which is defined as being treated in an unjust manner, it generates negative emotions
(Agnew, 1992). Some people cope with these negative emotions using illicit means. For
example, the victim of violence may feel anger or fear and they may try to get rid of these
negative emotions by using drugs or retaliating against their attacker. One main difference
between GST and the pathways perspective is that GST tends to focus on the immediate
impact of stressors. For example, GST would predict that women should be more likely to
offend and use drugs in months when they experience strain (Slocum, Simpson, and Smith,
2005). Not all strains are equally likely to results in offending. Strains that are the most
criminogenic tend to be severe, chronic, and clustered together in time and include things like
violent victimization, chronic interpersonal conflict, and living in unsafe neighborhood
(Agnew 1992, 2001).
Drawing on these two perspectives, this research explores several interrelated questions.
First, as hypothesized by the pathways perspective, are women who were victimized in
childhood more likely to offend and use drugs compared to those who were not victimized?
Second, in accordance with GST, during months in which a woman is exposed to stressors, is
she more likely to offend or use drugs relative to months when she is not exposed to stressors?
Finally, what is the role of substance use in explaining the link between victimization/other
stressful life experiences and offending?
3
METHODS / DATA
We address these questions with survey data collected from a diverse sample of female
inmates who were interviewed in the United States and Canada. These interviews were
conducted as part of the Women’s Experiences with Violence (WEV) project, which uses
mixed-methods to document the neighborhood, personal, and situational contingencies
surrounding women’s violent victimization and offending. The survey covered a wide range
of topics including the women’s background and early life experiences such as victimization
in childhood. We also collected data on women’s recent life experiences. These data were
gathered using a life event calendar, which was used to collect information on each of the 36
months before the respondents’ current incarceration period (see Morris and Slocum, 2010).
We asked about monthly changes in life circumstances like living arrangements and
employment. We also asked them to report month-to-month changes in offending, substance
use, neighborhood conditions and severe stressors. In addition, women were asked to identify
the months in which they experienced violent victimization or serious interpersonal conflicts.
These data allow us to examine the short-term interplay between stressful life experiences that
occurred early and later in life and offending over time.
SAMPLE
In this study we used data from 695 incarcerated or jailed women who collectively provided
information about more than 20,000 months of their lives immediately prior to their
confinement. They had been charged with a wide variety of offenses, but the predominant
charges were related to drugs or alcohol. Although we cannot generalize our findings to all
women, or even all incarcerated women, our data allows us to explore the interplay between
child abuse, recent stressors and offending for female offenders. This could not be done with
a sample taken from the general population due to low base rates.
The sample is racially diverse. 46% of the women self-identified as black, 40% as white, and
10% as Native American, while the remaining 4% identified themselves as some other race or
ethnicity. The age of the respondents ranged from 18 to 62 and the women were on average
34 years of age.
4
VARIABLES
We studied women’s monthly involvement in three types of illegal behavior. Violent
offending includes things like robbery and physical attacks. Non-violent offending is
comprised of behaviors like theft and drug dealing. Finally, regular drug use measures
whether the respondent reported that she used serious drugs on at least a weekly basis. The
women reported engaging in violence in approximately 6 percent of their months on the street
(5.6%). As expected, the women in our sample were far more likely to engage in non-violent
crime, than to use violence. The women reporting engaging in non-violent crime in half of
the months in which they were on the street (50%), most commonly involvement in the drug
trade (31% of street-months), followed by property crime (18% of street-months) and
prostitution (15% of street-months). Regular, serious drug use is equally as prevalent (46%
of street-months).
We include measures of three different types of childhood victimization: Sexual, physical and
psychological. Sexual victimization was the least prevalent: 25 percent of the sample
reported experiencing some form of sexual victimization before 6th grade. Physical and
psychological aggression was more common, occurring in 33 percent and 40 percent of the
sample, respectively.
And finally, we have four measures that capture women’s exposure to recent stressors.
Our first measure captures the number of different stressful life experiences the respondents
reported in a given month. Our second variable measures unsafe neighborhood conditions.
This is a three item scale with higher values indicating the respondent perceived her
community as more dangerous. We include measures of victimization and interpersonal
conflict because they are considered to be particularly criminogenic. Victimization is a count
of the number of times the respondent reported being the victim of violence in the month.
However, not all serious interpersonal conflict results in violence, so we also capture near
violence, or incidents in which the respondent thought violence was likely to occur, but for
some reason it did not.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

We analyze our data using multilevel analysis. This technique allow us to simultaneously
examine differences in offending between women and as well as how a woman’s level of
offending changes over time. In our models, we control for a wide-range of variables that
have been linked to offending including, race, age, employment, and participation in
treatment.
5
Our first set of analyses explored the carryover effects of childhood victimization on adult
offending. We find that victimization in childhood exerts a significant influence on offending
even in adulthood. The long-term negative effects of sexual abuse are especially pervasive;
women who were sexually victimized were more likely to engage in all three types of illegal
behaviors that we studied. Additional analyses indicated that the relationship between sexual
abuse and non-violent offending is explained by drug use. This suggests women who were
abused in childhood are more likely to use drugs in adulthood. In turn they engage in
nonviolent crime, like drug dealing, in order to fund their drug habit. We also found that
women who were exposed to more severe physical abuse were more likely to engage in
violence. Psychological abuse has no effect on any of the types of offending we looked at.
Next we explored whether short-term changes in exposure to stressors are related to women’s
movement in and out of offending. We find that recent life experience also matter. Women
are more likely to offend and use drugs in months when they experience stressors, but certain
stressors are related to certain types of offending. For example, violence is related only to
negative life events, while property crime is more likely when women live in unsafe
neighborhoods and experience repeated interpersonal conflict. Drug use is linked to all three
of these types of stressors. Once again, we see that drug use mediates the relationship between
two types of stressors (stressful life experiences, interpersonal conflict) and offending,
suggesting that the women in our sample are likely to cope with stress by using drugs and the
money to buy drugs is obtained through illegal means.
DISCUSSION
Consistent with our expectations, our study shows that the deleterious consequences of
childhood victimization—especially sexual victimization—carry over into adulthood. This
form of abuse was associated with higher levels of both violent and non-violent offending and
substance use. The results suggest that, consistent with a pathways perspective, sexual abuse
creates long term mental health issues and women may self-medicate with drugs. In turn
drugs create an economic imperative that leads women to engage in nonviolent crime, like
theft, prostitution, and drug dealing, to fund their habit. The effect of sexual victimization on
violence, however, cannot be explained by drug use. The mechanism linking this form of
victimization to violence in adulthood is likely the inability to regulate emotions and reactions
to stress (Daly’s harmed and harming pathway, 1994) or deficient social processing such as a
bias toward attributing hostile intentions to others (Dodge, Bates, and Pettit, 1990).
We also found that women who were physically victimized in childhood were more violent as
adults, but this form of abuse was not related to other types of offending. This suggests that
the effects of physical abuse may operate through a different pathway than sexual
victimization, such early aggressive behavior or alcohol use (Widom, Schuck, and White,
2006).
6
Above and beyond childhood experiences, exposure to stressors in adulthood can account for
women moving in and out crime. Once again, drug use plays a central role in explaining
short-term changes in offending. Drug use is related to the widest variety of stressors.
Moreover it mediates the effect of stress on non-violent offending.
These results suggest that programs that seek to reduce women’s offending should address
their early victimization experiences. Ideally, childhood victimization should be identified
early and youth should receive help in dealing with the negative consequences of this
experience. In addition, teaching women pro-social strategies for managing the stressors they
encounter in their daily lives, including interpersonal conflict, may also help to reduce their
involvement in drug use and offending. Coping skills training has been identified as a
successful strategy for reducing the likelihood an inmate will re-offend after release (Lipsey
and Wilson, 1998). These coping skills could be behavioral, cognitive, or emotional in nature
(Agnew, 1992). For example, female inmates could be taught problem solving skills that
would help them to take prosocial actions directed at reducing the source of their stress. This
form of behavioral coping has generally been found to be effective at reducing negative
emotions that might lead to crime.
REFERENCES
Agnew, Robert. (1992). Foundation for a general strain theory of crime and
delinquency. Criminology 30: 47-88.
Agnew, Robert. (2001). Building on the foundation of general strain theory: Specifying the
types of strain most likely to lead to crime and delinquency. Journal of Research in Crime
and Delinquency 38: 319-361.
Agnew, Robert, (2006). Pressured into Crime: An Overview of General Strain Theory. Los
Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing Company.
Belknap, Joanne, and Kristi Holsinger. (2006). The gendered nature of risk factors for
delinquency. Feminist Criminology 1: 48-71.
Brennan, Tim, Markus Breitenbach, William Dieterich, Emily J. Salisbury, and Patricia Van
Voorhis. (2012). Women’s pathways to serious and habitual crime: A person-centered
analysis incorporating gender responsive factors. Criminal Justice and Behavior 39: 1481-
1508.
Carson, E Ann., and Daniela Golinelli. (2013). Prisoners in 2012: Trends in Admissions and
Releases, 1991 – 2012. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.
7
Daly, K. (1994). Gender, Crime, and Punishment. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Dodge, Kenneth A., John E. Bates, and Gregory S. Pettit. (1990). Mechanisms in the cycle of
violence. Science 250: 1678-1683.
Greenfeld, Lawrence A., and Tracy L. Snell. (1999). Women Offenders. Washington, DC: US
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Lipsey, Mark W., and David B. Wilson. (1998). Effective intervention for serious juvenile
offenders: A synthesis of research. In Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders: Risk Factors
and Successful Interventions, Rolf Loeber, David P. Farrington (Eds.), 313-345. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Morris, Nancy A., and Lee Ann Slocum. (2010). The validity of self-reported prevalence,
frequency, and timing of arrest: An evaluation of data collected using a life event
calendar. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 47: 210-240.
Phillips, Susan D. (2012). Fact Sheet: Incarcerated Women. The Sentencing Project.
Accessed online http://www.sentencingproject.org/detail/publication.cfm?publication_id=413
Simpson, Sally S., Jennifer L. Yahner, and Laura Dugan. (2008). Understanding women's
pathways to jail: Analyzing the lives of incarcerated women. Australian & New Zealand
Journal of Criminology 41: 84-108.
Slocum, Lee Ann, Sally S. Simpson, and Douglas A. Smith. (2005). Strained lives and crime:
Examining intra-‐individual variation in strain and offending in a sample of incarcerated
women. Criminology 43: 1067-1110.
Teague, Rosie, Paul Mazerolle, Margot Legosz, and Jennifer Sanderson. (2008). Linking
childhood exposure to physical abuse and adult offending: Examining mediating factors and
gendered relationships. Justice Quarterly 25: 313-348.
Widom, Cathy Spatz. (1989). Child abuse, neglect, and violent criminal
behavior. Criminology 27: 251-271.
Widom, Cathy Spatz, Amie M. Schuck, and Helene Raskin White. (2006). An examination of
pathways from childhood victimization to violence: The role of early aggression and
problematic alcohol use. Violence and Victims 21: 675-690.
8
Students’ Social Mobility in the Dialogue of Education and Culture in Modern
University.
University. Leila Munirova
University.
Education Department, UNESCO chair,
Leila Munirova
M.Akmullah Bashkir State Pedagogical
Leila University
Munirova
Education Department, UNESCO chair,
Education
M.Akmullah BashkirDepartment, UNESCO
State Pedagogical chair,
University
M.Akmullah Bashkir State Pedagogical University
Abstract
Abstract
The paper analyzes the problem of student mobility within the dialogue of cultures and
Abstract
education in Bashkortostan within the UNESCO evaluation in the structure of modern
The paper analyzes the problem of student mobility within the dialogue of cultures and
pedagogical
The university,
paper inanalyzes the theory
problemand technology of social
withinmobility in higher educational
education Bashkortostan withinof the
student mobility
UNESCO evaluation the
in dialogue of cultures
the structure and
of modern
community.inBashkir
education State Pedagogical
Bashkortostan within University
UNESCOofnamed after inM.the
Akmullah is working to
pedagogical university, theory and thetechnology evaluation
social mobility instructure of modern
higher educational
coordinate theuniversity,
pedagogical UNESCOtheory
movement,
and transnational
technology education in universities andeducational
schools of
community. Bashkir State Pedagogical Universityofnamed
socialafter
mobility in higher
M. Akmullah is working to
Bashkortostan
community. in the State
Bashkir context of mechanisms
Pedagogical for integration
University named socialM.and
after educational
Akmullah activities.
is working to
coordinate the UNESCO movement, transnational education in universities and schools of
The papers
coordinate focus is on
the inUNESCO border-crossing
movement, cultural
transnational research of
education the social mobility
in universities process
and schools in
of
Bashkortostan the context of mechanisms for integration social and educational activities.
modern university,
Bashkortostan in theglobally
context open to studentsfor
of mechanisms and youth from all areas in the large field of
The papers focus is on border-crossing culturalintegration social
research of and educational
the social activities.
mobility process in
global
The education
papers focus and
is cultural
on diversity. cultural research of the social mobility process in
border-crossing
modern university, globally open to students and youth from all areas in the large field of
moderneducation
global university,
andglobally
culturalopen to students and youth from all areas in the large field of
diversity.
Keywords: modern university ,social mobility, cultural diversity, cross-cultural management,
global education and cultural diversity.
higher education, educational environment, comparative education, professional competences,
Keywords: modern university ,social mobility, cultural diversity, cross-cultural management,
cultural studies
Keywords: as interdisciplinary
modern andmobility,
universityenvironment,
,social transnational currents,
cultural implementation and
diversity, evaluation
higher education, educational comparative education,cross-cultural management,
professional competences,
of educational
higher programmes of environment,
education, UNESCO. comparative education, professional competences,
cultural studies aseducational
interdisciplinary and transnational currents, implementation and evaluation
cultural studies as interdisciplinary
of educational programmes of UNESCO. and transnational currents, implementation and evaluation
of educational programmes of UNESCO.
Introduction
Introduction
Modern education is characterized by the development, integration of social mobility
Introduction
in the dialogue of cultures of East and West. Cultural and educational environment of higher
Modern education is characterized by the development, integration of social mobility
education requires
Modern appropriate solutions by
education to the
ensure the authenticity of Bashkir
of socialeducation
in the dialogue of cultures isofcharacterized development,
East and West. Cultural integration
and educational environment mobility
of higher
necessary
in the to
dialogueenter
of the national
cultures of Easteducation
and West. in the general
Cultural and context
educational of European
environment trends
of of
higher
education requires appropriate solutions to ensure the authenticity of Bashkir education
globalization.
education to Bashkir State Pedagogical
requires University named after M. Akmullah is working to
necessary enter appropriate
the nationalsolutions
educationtoinensure the authenticity
the general context ofofEuropean
Bashkir education
trends of
coordinate
necessary to UNESCO's
enter education
theState
national in universities
education andgeneral
in the schoolscontext
of Bashkortostan,
of European totrends
promote
of
globalization. Bashkir Pedagogical University named after M. Akmullah is working to
globalization. Bashkir State Pedagogical University named after M. Akmullah
coordinate UNESCO's education in universities and schools of Bashkortostan, to promote is working to
coordinate UNESCO's education in universities
1 and schools of Bashkortostan, to promote

1
1

UNESCO programmes within the dialogue of cultures, cross-border cooperation in the
multicultural diversity of youth activity.
Solidarity and multiculturalism in the Republic of Bashkortostan is studied as ethno

social portrait of modern youth in collaboration with the International Organization
TURKSOY as strengthening and developing cooperation in education, culture and sport of
Turkic-speaking countries and promotion of ethnic education through intercultural dialogue.
[1]
The study of ethno social portrait of modern youth of Bashkortostan supports the
integration of scientific research, improving the system of establishing internal and external
relationships in science, education, culture and arts, media, communication, sports and
tourism. Particular attention is paid to the formation of civic consciousness, culture, peace and
ethnic harmony, which is illuminated by solidarity and multiculturalism of modern youth in
the Republic of Bashkortostan. [3]
The aim of our investigation is the development of social mobility of students in the
context of Cultures and Education. More specific objectives of the project are the following:
- Training the future teacher in the knowledge of UNESCO movement and

transnational education in modern Pedagogical University;
- Development socialization and social skills among youth, the awareness of
similarities and differences in social problems in different European and Asian
countries;
- The academic and social mobility, professors, postgraduates and students exchanges
so that to make the university a region of peace, cooperation, prosperity and harmony;
- Inviting private-lecturers and leading scientists for presenting master classes within
the transnational education of sport and culture;
- carrying out joint scientific conferences, workshops and seminars, develop mutual
exchanges and cooperation in the fields of culture, art, education, science,
technologies, health, tourism, sport and other social and humanitarian spheres;
- organizing panel discussions and seminars of UNESCO within the context “Ethno
cultural education: historical traditions and cultural features”;
2
112 Volume:3,
No:1, Winter 2015
- providing organizational and technical support of realization the joint scientific,
projects, maintaining global and regional stability through academic research, policy
consultation, professional training, and cultural communication;
- Initiating the International Festivals of languages and peoples “Historical memory in
the dialogue of cultures ",creating favorable conditions for studying languages and
cultures;
- Creating tourist and regional routes “Etnosocialisation of young people in the
multicultural learning community”;
- Development and realization of joint students educational programs, UNESCO
actions on youth for 2014-2021, innovative youth-led and youth-oriented projects;
- Organizing Summer schools and International Youth Days within the transnational
education;
- Carrying out the Olympic sessions in the dialogue of cultures and global education of
East and West;
- Organizing Web-seminars, on-lines conferences, Intel-programs, e-learning, mobile-
pedagogy weeks, SMART schools within the project “ Youth in modern learning
community”;
- Expressing potential interest to support specific action projects with private and
public sector partners “Youth and social inclusion: civic engagement, dialogue
and skills development”, youth-moderated and interactive debates;
- Establishment the Capacity-building workshops offered in the fields of competence
of UNESCO (communication, education, culture, sciences) and notably placing an
accent on developing projects;
- Exchanging and sharing of know-how and of the experiences of young women and
men from different backgrounds, career paths and from all EURAS countries and
regions of the world;
- Interaction through numerous capacity-building sessions, plenary discussions, and
workshops on modern university topics, as well as one-to-one coaching and
mentoring made available by partners.
The theoretical and methodological basis of study is the anthropological, cultural,

systematic, comparative and competitive approaches to comparative education.
Comparative pedagogy reveals the positive and negative aspects of international
teaching experience, methods and forms of mutual enrichment of national cultures in
3
teaching the innovative educational activities. Theoretical and methodological basis
for comparative studies are the specific historical, cultural, ethno-psychological,
civilizational approaches to comparative education and educational theory and practice
in various countries and regions (D. Badarch, N.V. Bondarevskaya, B. L. Wulfson,
A.N. Dzhurinsky, V.P. Lapchinskaya, Z.A. Malkova, N.D. Nikandrov; “Yearbook of
Education” (Columbia University), “International Yearbook Training and Education,
International Journal of Teachers” (Germany), “Comparative Education”, “The world
of education” (“Le Monde Education”), “Review of Comparative Education”).[2]
The implementation of the comparative approach promotes students'

understanding laws of development the global educational research, strategies and
trends of teacher education in the modern world.
This helps students to master the ways of implementing the research position in their
professional activities as improvement of the quality assurance system of higher
education.
The innovative constructions allow creating comparative studies in the

framework of modern pedagogical university as a center for integration of science and
education, international cooperation in the modern world and the global society in the
context of grant policy, cultural exchanges, and programmes of UNESCO, IREX,
Fulbright, DAAD, Work and Travel, International Exhibitions “Education Abroad,
SALTO-Youth programmes. [4]
The realization of the comparative approach promotes students' professional

competence. Theoretical and methodological basis for comparative studies are the
specific historical, cultural, ethno-psychological, civilizational approaches to
comparative education and cross-cultural management (educational theory and
practice in various countries and regions, UNESCO-UNITWIN chairs, a network of
UNESCO Associated Schools, Education for All, the Bologna Process).
The UNESCO center "Social mobility of students within the dialogue of

cultures in global education" coordinates UNESCO education in universities and
schools of Bashkortostan, including best practices of UNESCO in educational
4

activities of universities, schools and adapting the best cross-cultural programmes
relevant to the challenges of UNESCO National Education. [5]
The UNESCO movement in Pedagogical University is positioned in the

following transnational context:
1. Education as the promotion of the UNESCO movement for middle and high
schools of Bashkortostan within the dialogue of cultures, inter-university cooperation
of the UNESCO Chairs, the UNESCO Associated Schools Network, achievement the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), a program "Education for all”, participation in the Bologna
process, European education, the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS),the
integration of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Center of Shanghai
Cooperation Organization Studies.
2.Science as the participation in scientific researches, international programmes

of UNESCO, grants, projects, conferences and forums in the development of
international and national mobility. The organization of international conferences ,
festivals, forums in the universe of EURAS, TURKSOY as Turkic-speaking education
and cooperation, the nomination of the Youth Unity of Bashkortostan such as
"UNESCO and international Education in the modern school of the Republic of
Bashkortostan", "Socio-cultural adaptation of the Turkish-speaking students in the
educational environment of modern university."
3.Culture as a research investigation of socio-cultural portrait of future teachers

in regional educational environment, individual trajectories of social adaptation of
migrant students, the study of problems of ethnic culture and intercultural
communication, youth subculture, ethno-socialization of young people in education of
the Republic of Bashkortostan (TURKSOY, the Ministry of Culture of Bashkortostan,
the House of Peoples' Friendship of the Republic of Bashkortostan, The National
Assembly - Kurultai). Sharing the historical and cultural heritage in international
cultural exchange programmes of UNESCO in the Turkic world, education and
activities of TURKSOY and the House of Friendship of Peoples in Bashkortostan,
AIESEC, the international exhibition "Education abroad" international cultural
5
festivals, international drama festivals of Turkic-speaking peoples "Tuganlyk",
musical creativity of Turkic youth "Ural-mono, Ural-Batyr".
4. Sport and tourism as a great process of socialization within the national

sports and educational environment, Olympic education, inclusive education, museum
and ethnographic tourism, mountain, water, skiing tourism, sport and culture festivals
(Ministry of Youth Policy, Sport and Tourism). Identification of high school as an
international sport, cultural and entertainment tourism center, development a common
strategy of cooperation in the dialogue of culture and sport.
5. Information and communication as the integration of media-communicative

education within the UNESCO Global MIL Assessment Framework, the creation of
electronic textbooks and educational portals, web-sites of sustainable society
development (The Youth Unity of Russia and Bashkortostan), the publication of
books, articles in the dialogue of cultures and civilizations of East and West, the
participation in comparative education webinars.
The simulation of social mobility within the competent format of culture and
sport provides the following typology of competences:
Cognitive competences:
·The main regularities of formation and development of education and culture

in the modern world;
· The object and the subject of Comparative Education as a science;
· The pedagogical works in comparative pedagogy, pedagogical patterns and

models;
· The innovative model of learning in foreign countries, the criteria for

international accreditation of the quality of educational programs;
· Rating of international cultural and educational centers in Russia,

Bashkortostan and abroad;

Social competences:
· Describing the main trajectories of the world education and culture in global,
regional and national levels;
· Determining the value of international experience within the education

system in Russia and Bashkortostan;
· Designing the educational process on modern cross-cultural concepts of

foreign countries.
Personal competences:
· Research positions in the professional improvement of the quality assurance

system of higher education;
·A system of methods and modalities for innovative educational and cultural

processes in the context of the transforming functions of Comparative Education.
The center organizes teacher training courses " The UNESCO movement in
modern rural schools” in the context of main issues in modern education and cultures
in the context of the international UNESCO development "Trends in the development
of UNESCO education in modern world", "Multicultural education, world culture
education", "Human Rights in Education", "UNESCO world education in different
countries", and the activities of scientific and educational resource center of UNESCO
in M. Akmullah Bashkir State Pedagogical University.
The university pays a special attention to the development of tolerance which

requires the study of the individual student's social portrait of Turkic-speaking
students in modern schools of Bashkortostan. The projects involve comparative
analysis of adaptation in Russia and foreign higher education in the Republic of
Bashkortostan in the dialogue of cultures and civilizations of East and West. [6]
The center cooperates with leading universities in St. Petersburg, Moscow,

Kaliningrad, Kazan, Yekaterinburg, Yakutsk implementing innovative projects of
UNESCO in the network of universities and UNESCO Chairs of EURAS countries in

the sphere of education to provide innovative high school renovation and improvement
of educational policy.
The particular attention is paid to the formation of civic consciousness, world

culture and interethnic harmony, which is illuminated by the media (participation in
TV programs “All Ufa”, radio programmes "Yuldash"). The socio-pedagogical project
"Solidarity, memory, identity" serves as the realization of civic engagement,
integration in a multicultural society, social mobility, youth ethno-socialization in a
multicultural educational environment (school principals, leaders of rural
communities, the heads of the rural cultural houses, directors of museums), as well as
transferring a scientific knowledge of cultural and educational institutions. [7]
Students, undergraduates and postgraduates of Bashkir State Pedagogical

University named after M. Akmullah have an opportunity to take part in conferences,
round tables, workshops on social and academic mobility in the structure of teacher
competent approach to education. The innovative models allow doing comparative
studies within the framework of modern pedagogical university as a center of
integration within science, education, culture, arts and sports as well as international
cooperation in modern world and the learning society. Also comparative studies are
held in the context of grant policy and international cultural exchange programmes of
UNESCO and EURAS, education within the activities of TURKSOY, the House of
Friendship of the Peoples and transnational organizations.
There were published the following monographs: "Methodology of ethno-

pedagogy" (Prof. Gayazov A.), "Comparative Education", "Training of a professional
competence of future teachers in the educational environment of modern university",
"UNESCO within the Education and Cultures in Modern Pedagogical University",
"International academic mobility programmes and the Associated UNESCO schools»
and also some articles on UNESCO problems in the context of modern education and
culture.[8]
Conclusion:
The paper focuses on methodology, theory and technology of cross-cultural

management in education, ethnic and religious tolerance and intercultural dialogue and
8

strengthening of ethnic and cultural unity of the peoples of Bashkortostan. There are
organized projects, programmes in the integration of festivals in modern Education,
Culture and Sport (creating social mobility of students in the dialogue of cultures and
sport, a personality socialization in sport - educational environment ("Professional
competence of future teacher in the educational environment of the university,"
"Comparative Education in the dialogue of cultures and peoples of the world "," Social
Portrait of modern Turkic-speaking youth”)) so that to share the best practice
examples and instigate youth debates on intercultural diversity in the UNESCO and
EURAS learning community.
References:
[1]A.Gayazov, The construction of "Education through life" and the innovative

development of modern educational system, Education: Tradition and Innovation,
no.1, pp.31-36, 2010.
[2]D. Johnson, R. Johnson, Cooperative Learning in the Classroom. Learning

together and alone: Cooperative, competitive, and individualistic learning .Boston:
Allyn & Bacon. Johnson Holubec, 1994.
[3]R.Munirov, Local Studies as a School Subject. Ufa, Vagant, 2003.
[4]L.Munirova,”Academic Student Mobility within the Dialogue of Cultures

and Sport Education in Bashkortostan”, in Proceedings of the 2nd INTERNATIONAL
HIGHER EDUCATION CONGRESS: YOK-2011, May21-23, 2011, Istanbul,
Turkey, 2011.pp.234-237.
[5]L. Munirova, A. Rainis,” Academic mobility of students in the dialogue of

culture and sport”, in Proceedings of the international scientific conference “Academic
Mobility: Challenges and Prospects”:May19-21, 2011, St. Petersburg, Russia,
2011.pp.63-67.
[6]L. Munirova, A. Rainis ,”Ethnic tolerance of Turkic students in sports and

educational environment of the university”, in Proceedings of the 2nd International
9
Forum "Strategy for the interaction of educational institutions and employers"
Parliamentary Assembly of the States - members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States: November 25-27, Saint-Petersburg State University of Service and
the economy. Sheffield Hallam University (UK), 2011.pp.51-57.
[7]L. Munirova, A. Rainis , Social Portrait of physical culture teachers

in modern rural school, in Proceedings of the 2nd International Congress ” Modern
problems of physical training education”: 27-29,2011, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal
University, Kaliningrad ,Russia, 2011.pp.135-138.
[8]Overcoming Inequality: Why Governance Matters, EFA Global Monitoring

Report. OXFORD University Press: UNESCO Publishing, France‚ 2012.

View publication stats

My Publication in Euro As

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

My Publication in Euro As

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

My Publication in Euro As

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

Article · February 2015

Turkish Public & Elite Perception Towards Iran View project

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

ISSN: 2147 - 2149

Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015

Dr. Mustafa AYDIN

Kurban Kurbanmagamedov, The Institute Of Moscow State Open University, Dagestan

Beşyol Mah. Inönü Caddesi No: 38

• Youth Gangs: Not Just an American Phenomenon

• Arbitration and Conflict Resolution in Antiquity (500 Bc- 350bc)

• Quantum Jumps in the Renewable Energy Technologies

By organizing regional conferences as in Dubai, Bucharest, Baku and Komrat we managed to

Dr. Mustafa AYDIN

8 Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015

By launching a new member status-Observer member, we started to involve United Na-

Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015 9

“Youth Gangs: Not Just an American Phenomenon”

Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice

University of Missouri-St. Louis

“Youth Gangs: Not Just an American Phenomenon”

One potential definition is provided by the US Department of Justice. DOJ developed a

Gangs Outside of the USA

Early research conducted by these international scholars tended to be qualitative accounts

In addition to agreeing on a common definition, the Eurogang Program of Research also

Gangs and Delinquent Behavior

14 Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015

Gangs and Delinquent Behavior

Gang Member Stability – The gang effect

ARBITRATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN ANTIQUITY (500 BC- 350BC)

Adil CALAP1 & Özcan ERDOĞAN2

negotiation role. Conflicting judgments invite the-re-evaluation of Constructivist theoretical

Key Words: Delphi, slavery, conflict Resolution, arbitration, Constructivism, Persians,

2.1 Constructivism and a Network of Institutions as Arbitrators in Antiquity

2.2 Constructivism and City States

In that context, Constructivists try to be highlighting the historically existence of patterns of

3.1 The Archaic Background of Delphi

4.1 The Persians, the City-States and Delphi

4.2 The Persian Aims in the 490s BC and Delphi’s Misjudgment

5.1 Peloponnesian Wars

5.2 The Second Peloponnesian War

5.3 Peloponnesian Wars and the Persians

6.1 Function of Delphi in Peloponnesian Wars

6.2 The misperceived Function of Delphi by Constructivism in Peloponnesian Wars

6.3 The Role of Friendship Instead of Delphi for Conflict Resolution

7.1 Misjudgment of Morality of City-states by Constructivism

8.1 Close Relations between Justification of War and Delphi

8.2 Delphi and Other Oracle Centers

8.3 Justice and Moral Purpose of City-states

9.1 Aristotle’s Definition and Constructivism

9.2 Aristotle’s Morality and That of Ancient People

9.3 The Question of Morality in Slavery Societies

1. Aeger, S. L. Interstate Arbitration in the Greek World, (Berkeley, 1996);

.QUANTUM JUMPS IN THE RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES.

Prof.Dr.Hayrettin Kilic, Istanbul Aydin University

Development: Overview of global renewable energy resources and electric energy

Renewable energy is the fastest-growing source of electricity generation, including hydropower,

Table 2: Worldwide Renewable Electricity Generation as a Percent of Total Generation