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Constructivism Critical Pointers For Tourism Studies
Constructivism Critical Pointers For Tourism Studies
1116–1137, 2012
0160-7383/$ - see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Printed in Great Britain
www.elsevier.com/locate/atoures
doi:10.1016/j.annals.2011.12.010
CONSTRUCTIONISM
Critical Pointers for Tourism Studies
Tomas Pernecky
Auckland University of Technology, New Zealand
Abstract: This paper critically examines the application, pitfalls and prospects of construc-
tionism in Tourism Studies. It explains what constructionism is and how it can be utilised
in the study of tourism. The article debunks some of the myths associated with this approach
to knowing and argues that enquiry embedded in constructionist epistemology is both realist
and relativist. The reader is guided through possible methodological challenges and con-
cerns and is offered a mind map of promising constructionist directions for future research.
It is hoped that the conceptual and philosophical nature of this paper encourages further
constructionist explorations into tourism. Keywords: constructionism, constructivism, episte-
mology, realism, relativism. Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
INTRODUCTION
Tourism researchers are in the business of generating knowledge,
and constructionism is one theory of knowledge. It is an epistemology,
telling us about the nature, possibility and scope of knowledge (Crotty,
1998). In recent years, however, the constructionist ‘‘tag’’ has been
increasingly appearing across social sciences and in a range of research
approaches: it has become expansive and unstructured (Holstein &
Gubrium, 2011). Kukla (2000) draws on the work of Hacking (1999)
and opens his text Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Science by
noting the heterogeneous list of items described as socially con-
structed; some examples include Japan, gender, illness, emotions, real-
ity and the self. It has been depicted as a paradigm (Denzin & Lincoln,
1998, 2000a, 2003b, 2011; Guba & Lincoln, 1989, 2004; Lincoln &
Guba, 2003; Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011), as a method of scientific
inquiry (Loseke, 1999), as a technique (Haimes & Williams, 1998), as a
methodological matter (Golinski, 1998; Heiner, 2002), as epistemology
(Crotty, 1998), and more recently as a ‘‘mosaic of research efforts’’
which are bound by certain philosophical, theoretical, methodological,
and empirical understandings (Holstein and Gubrium, 2011, p. 341).
In addition, construction analyses are said to have been motivated by
both socio-political and metaphysical aims (Hacking, 1998). The key
1116
T. Pernecky/Annals of Tourism Research 39 (2012) 1116–1137 1117
task ahead of this paper is to navigate through this maze and offer con-
ceptual scaffolding for readers in Tourism Studies.
Constructionism comes by different names and in various combina-
tions, most commonly encapsulated by the term social constructionism
(see for example Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Burr, 2003; Gergen,
2001, 2009), but also constructivism (some of the thinkers operating
with this term include Denzin & Lincoln, 2000b; Kukla, 2000; Lincoln,
1990; Schwandt, 1994), and the label adopted in this paper construction-
ism (used for instance by Crotty, 1998; Holstein & Gubrium, 2008,
2011). There are also other variations such as Goodman’s (1978)
self-invented term constructionalism. The long list of adjectives available
in the literature: radical, critical, cultural, social, material, cognitive,
scientific, realist, naturalistic, post-modernist, feminist, discursive,
strong, very strong, contextual; further signals that the claims and
use of constructionism are neither universal, nor that it is something
which transcends disciplines. This issue remains unresolved in tourism,
leaving the field with a greater need for theoretical and methodologi-
cal sophistication. The scarcity of philosophical discourse in tourism
has been noted by Tribe (2004), and others have commented on the
lack of philosophical clarity and researchers’ vagueness in regard to
the explication of the underlying assumptions of their work (Jamal &
Hill, 2002; Pernecky & Jamal, 2010).
This article aims to cast more light on the fuzzy and partial under-
standing of constructionism in tourism academia. The overarching
goal is to establish a firmer ground and install philosophical and meth-
odological building blocks, upon which future constructionist research
can be erected. The paper starts with a review of existing construction-
ist literature in tourism, then highlights potential methodological
pitfalls, and concludes with a preliminary mind map of possible direc-
tions in the field. In order to fully appreciate the diverse approaches
united under the constructionist rubric, a strong emphasis is placed
on untangling the available stances towards reality and the mistaken
view that constructionism collectively proposes that things are not real,
or that there is no reality at all. To establish a sense of consistency
throughout this article, the term ‘‘constructionism’’, as opposed to
‘‘constructivism’’, is used by the author as it is shown later that each
label can signify different things. However, the references to the works
of other scholars discussed in this paper will remain accurate as per the
terminology used by the original authors.
too rigid, plus the authors’ blurring of boundaries between the inter-
pretivist, the hermeneutic and the constructivist paradigms can be
misleading. While constructionism ought not to be divorced from
other philosophical movements such as phenomenology, hermeneu-
tics and poststructuralism (Golinski, 1998); for it was founded within
these intellectual traditions (Blaikie, 1993); to converge these into a
paradigm creates an avalanche of challenges and concerns. Schwandt
(2000) for example posits that there are vast ontological, epistemolog-
ical and methodological differences between both interpretivism and
social constructionism. According to him, ‘‘interpretivists argue that
it is possible to understand the subjective meaning of action (grasping
the actor’s beliefs, desires, and so on) yet do so in an objective
manner’’ (p. 193). In his view, interpretivists reconstruct the self-
understandings of actors while social constructionists reject the naı̈ve
realist view of representation. Thus a constructionist constructs knowl-
edge, whilst an interpretivist gains knowledge about the meaning of
human action.
To further demonstrate the shortcomings of approaching construc-
tionism as a paradigm, it is valuable to look at developments in
different fields. If we were to investigate the current literature in Inter-
national Relations Theory, Barkin (2010) does the seemingly incon-
ceivable and combines realism with constructivism to create a hybrid
he labels Realist Constructivism. Barkin suggests that a realist worldview
can benefit from constructivist research methods, and in turn, con-
structivist research is compatible with realism. Although this amalgam-
ation may at first appear somewhat mistaken, the connection between
constructionism and realism demands further scrutiny. Realism, taken
as the ontological doctrine asserting that reality exists outside of the
mind and that the world exists independently of our knowledge of it,
has been by some thinkers assigned to positivistic and post-positivistic
approaches (Guba & Lincoln, 2004; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Construc-
tivism, as we are told by Denzin and Lincoln (2000b), (2003a) demands
relativist ontology, subjectivist epistemology and hermeneutic method-
ology. Realism, however, must not be confused with objectivism. Objec-
tivism is an epistemological notion which posits that meaning exists in
objects independently of consciousness (for detailed explanations see
for example Crotty, 1998).
Thus whilst it is reasonable to say that many constructionists discard
objectivism, the connection between constructionism and realism is far
more knotty and is prone to confusion. What this highlights, is that
when working with Denzin and Lincoln’s conceptualisation of con-
structivism as a paradigm, Barkin’s (2010) realist constructionism ceases
to have a place on their paradigm continuum, as in their view, realism
has no place in constructivist enquiry. But this is not to say that Barkin
got the wrong end of the stick. Crotty (1998, p. 63) makes a very bold
statement by asserting that constructionism in epistemology is compat-
ible with realism in ontology. Similarly, Slife and Williams (1995) see
social constructivist ontology as falling into the realist category and ex-
plain that the focus of a constructionist is not on an ‘‘imaginary’’ world
but a world in which we all take part and make sense of. Patomaki and
T. Pernecky/Annals of Tourism Research 39 (2012) 1116–1137 1123
Wright (2000, p. 223) reach the conclusion that all theories of knowl-
edge work with some sort of assumption about the world, hence ‘‘the
question is not of whether to be a realist, but of what kind of realist to
be’’. Other constructionist writers even draw similarities between logi-
cal positivism and social constructionism (e.g. the work of Hibberd,
2005). To make this point very clear, the following quotations gathered
from constructionist thinkers and commentators further suggest the
ontological similitude between constructionism and realism with
regard to the existence of reality:
Social constructionists are principally concerned with explaining how
people experience and describe the world in which they live. Social
constructionists look for common forms of understanding, common
‘‘constructs’’, or views of the world, that are created and shared by
most people in a society (Slife & Williams, 1995, p. 78).
Burr (1998) takes a more direct approach towards combating the
mistaken criticism of constructionism:
Critics of constructionism appear to be contesting the idea that the
world is a figment of our imaginations and has no materiality, which
was never constructionism’s claim (Burr, 1998, p. 23).
In her later writings, Burr (2003) further explains that there is no
unified denial of a physical world congregated under the term con-
structionism; she highlights that language, symbols or science cannot
offer complete, all-encompassing understandings:
The material world certainly exists, but it is not simply reflected in our
talk or other forms of signification (Burr, 2003, p. 92).
Weinberg (2008) touches on the plurality of understanding and
underscores our situatedness in, and relationship with, the world:
To my mind, constructionist research is not about evading the pre-
sumption to have validly described the world. It cannot be. Instead,
constructionism is about the recognition that things could be other-
wise and that we might make them so. It is about recognising that that
our theories are answerable to our common lives before, during, and
after their answerability to our common world (Weinberg, 2008, p.
35).
Finally, Gergen (2009) notes that constructionists are not in the busi-
ness of dismissing reality (or the existence of objects, people, nature)
but question the objective existence of meaningful reality:
Constructionism makes no denials concerning pollution, poverty, or
death. Constructionists don’t say, ‘‘death is not real’’, for example;
nor do they make any affirmations . . . constructionism doesn’t try to
rule on what is or is not fundamentally real. Whatever is, simply is
(Gergen, 2009, p. 161).
The above statements do not dismiss what is commonly called the
world, nature, environment, materiality, or what is often broadly
termed ‘‘reality’’. Many constructionists would not object to the claim
that we are surrounded by objects which exist, are tangible, and visible
to the human eye. Apart from the extreme cases of solipsism (the view
1124 T. Pernecky/Annals of Tourism Research 39 (2012) 1116–1137
that the world exists only in our imagination), both realists and
constructionists would acknowledge that experiencing a turbulent
flight over the Atlantic Ocean: the burning sensation of hot coffee that
just landed on the knees of a passenger, the flashing ‘‘fasten your seat-
belt’’ sign, and the bags falling from the luggage compartment; are not
a fantasy or a mere product of the imagination. Constructionists do not
necessarily dispute reality per se, what many a constructionist does re-
ject, is the possibility of objectivism and ‘‘objective knowledge’’: a view
that truth and meaning dwell in phenomena independently of con-
sciousness, and thus knowledge independent of the inquirer, the social
processes, and culture (Crotty, 1998). The crux of misunderstanding, it
appears, rests on the fact that one must distinguish between reality on
the one hand, and construction of meaning on the other. Loseke
(1999, p. 13) makes this clear by stating that ‘‘humans live in two
worlds: the physical world and the world of meaning’’. The implica-
tions of what has been said thus far are that constructionism is at once
realist and relativist, and ‘‘those who contrast constructionism and real-
ism are wide of the mark’’ (Crotty, 1998, p. 64). The next section casts
more light on the different types of realities we can distinguish in a
constructionist discourse.
social origin (Crotty, 1998). Figure 1 allows for this movement by using
the terms weak and strong constructionism.
It is also important to carefully examine what motivates the construc-
tionist enquiry as it can vary in terms of the scope, level or empirical
CONCLUSION
This paper has explored constructionist thought and practice across
a range of disciplines and fields in an attempt to highlight the scope
and complexity associated with this approach to knowing. The direc-
tion of this article is philosophical and conceptual, and was motivated
by the aim of broadening the partial understanding of constructionism
in tourism. By way of conclusion, there are several points that deserve
to be highlighted for the tourism reader.
First, scholars can navigate through different lines of reasoning,
and their constructionist explorations may be underpinned by various
interests. Much of the discourse on constructionism, including unfa-
vourable viewpoints, seems to have fixated on the issues of reality,
and in this regard the paper argues that parallels can be drawn be-
tween constructionism and realism in ontology. A distinction was
made between social facts and physical facts, objectivism and realism,
and the article puts forward that tourism researchers can move be-
tween its weak and strong forms. Notions disputing the existence of
reality which have been by some termed very strong constructivism
(e.g. Kukla, 2000) are not widely utilised in contemporary construc-
tionist work and fall into the category of solipsistic claims. This distinc-
tion is vital, as constructionism does indeed present a viable option
for tourism researchers; while its far-flung brunch (solipsism) is less
likely to yield much interest.
1132 T. Pernecky/Annals of Tourism Research 39 (2012) 1116–1137
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