Papademetriou - Performative Meaning of the Word παρρησία in Ancient Greek and in the Greek Bible

Part 1
Parrhesia in Antiquity
Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

Heruntergeladen von Brill.com06/02/2022 12:54:03PM
via Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin
Chapter 2
The Performative Meaning of the Word παρρησία in

Ancient Greek and in the Greek Bible
Kyriakoula Papademetriou
1 Introduction
Although the sense of the word παρρησία has so far been the subject of several
scholars studying ancient Greek language and culture, and while various of its
aspects have been explored (philological, philosophical, theological), it nev-
ertheless provides an interesting research issue since it seems that a further
analysis of the word could display certain subtle aspects which promise a more
thorough knowledge.
In our study, as suggested by its title, an examination of the word is presented
through the perspective of the science of Pragmatics.1 Within the framework
of Pragmatics, the usage of language is considered on the base of communica-
tion aspects, such as the intentions and objectives of the persons involved in
a conversation (the interlocutors), the relations between them, their knowl-
edge and their assumptions about the world, and especially these assumptions
that are mutually recognized by both interlocutors. The words of the text are
explored as expressions of interactions in the social process, as sayings which
function as agents that perform and accomplish acts of the speaker, and which
in turn receive responses from the public to whom they are addressed.
We call performative the meaning resulting from this empirical, so to
speak, approach to the sense of παρρησία, which, however, does not ignore the
established methods of lexical examination of the word, but rather utilizes and
builds on those methods. The reason why we prefer to use this approach to
examine the word is because παρρησία is associated predominantly with the
social environment in which it was created and occasionally used, so that its
complete meaning should be drawn from the study of the relation between the
linguistic sense and the communicative force that the use of the word had for
its contemporary speakers and perceivers.
For a better understanding of our proposed term ‘performative meaning,’
let me briefly recall the main principles of Pragmatics, and especially of the
1 See George Yule, Pragmatics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 3–8.
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi:10.1163/9789004376090_003

16 Papademetriou
theory of speech acts,2 on which our approach is based, and which are implied
in the negotiation of the issue below:
a) Performative utterances are these through which things are not merely
described nor simply give information, but through which the intention
is to perform operations and incite results.
b) Verbal acts of particular interest for the matter concerned are assertive
ones, in which the speaker assumes responsibility for his sayings, and
declarative ones, in which the speaker, through his utterance, substanti-
ates what he refers to by acting upon the utterance.
c) In order for a speech act to be efficient (successful), the circumstances
and conditions of performing the act must be fulfilled. The main condi-
tions of this success ( felicity conditions) are 1) the speaker should have the
ability to perform the speech act, 2) the listener should be able to par-
ticipate in the performance, and 3) the speech act should be performed
sincerely, i.e. the speaker should really intend to carry out the future act.
d) The success of a performative utterance is determined by the general
principle of cooperation (cooperative principle), according to which the
listener perceives more notions than those resulting from a close seman-
tic analysis of the sentences.
According to all of the above criteria, in order to proceed to a pragmatic analy-
sis of the word παρρησία we must not limit ourselves only to the evidence of the
texts, but rather we need to look into historical information for the association
2 The reference works are: John L. Austin, How to do things with words (eds. M. Sbisà and
J.O. Urmson, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 21975); J.R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in
the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); H.P. Grice,
“Logic and Conversation,” in Syntax and Semantics (eds. P. Cole and J.L. Morgan; New York:
Academic Press, 1975), 41–58; id., Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1989). For the biblical application of the theory see e.g. Anthony Thiselton,
«The Parables as Language-event: Some Comments on Fuch’s “Hermeneutics in the Light
of Linguistic Philosophy,” Scottish Journal of Theology 23 (1970):437–460; id., New Horizons
in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1992); J.G. DuPlessis, “Speech Act Analysis and New Testament
Interpretation with Special Reference to G.N. Leech’s Pragmatic Principles” in Text and
Interpretation: New Approaches to the Criticism of the New Testament (eds. P.J. Hartin and
J.-H. Petzer; Leiden: Brill 1991), 129–142; J.E. Botha, Jesus and the Samaritan Woman: A Speech
Act Reading of John 4:1–42 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991); D. Neufeld, Reconceiving Texts as Speech
Acts: An Analysis of 1 John (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994); D. Tovey, Narrative Art and Act in the
Fourth Gospel (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997). See also the thorough study of
R.S. Briggs, Words in Action. Speech Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation (Edinburgh: T&T
Clark, 2001); and the dissertation of B.G. Upton, Hearing Mark’s Endings: Listening to Popular
Ancient Texts through Speech Act Analysis (Leiden: Brill 2006).

The Performative Meaning of the Word παρρησία 17
of the term within the social-historical and cultural conditions that gave birth
to it, and in which it was used from antiquity until the New Testament era.
2 The Roots of the Word Παρρησία
The word παρρησία is a diachronic Greek word, which first occurs in texts of
the Athenian democracy and mostly, in texts that represent this democracy
par excellence, in dramatic poetry and rhetorical speeches.3 Every valid lexi-
con of ancient Greek gives three meanings for the word παρρησία: freedom
of speech and action, openness, and boldness of speech.4 However, there are
linguistic indications that the field of its meanings should be investigated to
deepen our understandings of the term.
According to the etymology suggested by the Lexicons, the w. παρρησία is
derived from the pronoun πᾶν = the whole, and the noun ῥῆσις = word; there-
fore, it is a paronym, a parasynthesis, that is, an indirect compound. The sense
resulting from this etymology is that the word means the possibility of freely
saying any word. However, this sense does not offer any semantic clarity for
the original meaning. Which is the ultimate notion embedded within the orig-
inal word: freedom of speech or free speech? Also, does the word express a
descriptive attribute, or even an evaluative one; and in the second case, does
it express a positive or a negative attribute? Moreover, a survey of the ancient
textual evidence yields a wide spectrum of meanings ranging from full free-
dom in speech to boldness of speech, with some further aspects being con-
sidered under clearness of speech, on down to the sincerity of speech, and
traveling even further to the confidence of speech. Eventually, these meanings
are observed as switching—normally by a negative adjective—in the dialectic,
obtaining the perpetration of insolence, indiscretion, and even of vilification.
3 Michel Foucault has presented a fascinating analysis of the notion of parrhesia in the
ancient original texts from a political and philosophical perspective: Michel Foucault,
The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982–1983 (New York:
Picador, 2011).
4 See representatively LSJ, The Online Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English Lexicon, s.v.;
J.H. Moulton and G. Milligan, The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament Illustrated from the Papyri
and Other Non-Literary Sources (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957), s.v. 497; F.W. Danker et al.
[BDAG], A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 32000), π 5720; J. Lust, E. Eynikel and K. Hauspie,
A Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint: Revised Edition (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaf,
2003), s.v. 928; T. Muraoka, A Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint (Leuven: Peeters, 2009),
s.v. 537. For a panoramic examination of the word see H. Schlier, “παρρησία,” Theological
Dictionary of the New Testament 5:871–886.

18 Papademetriou
These remarks, combined with the fact that the word παρρησία is mentioned
almost always in a context of both political and public life, suggest that the
meaning of the word should be largely dependent on extralingual and extra-
textual factors, which, thus, bind the relation of the word to certain social con-
ventions of its users.
3 The Ancient Greek Social Context
Remarkable as it is that the word παρρησία occurs neither in the Homeric texts
nor in the texts coming from the ancient aristocracy or oligarchy, this omis-
sion might be explained because within these societies the freedom of speech
was not an actual question. The members of the elite had the right to speak
freely in the assemblies and they considered this their privilege based on sta-
tus and distinction.5 But neither in Sparta does παρρησία occur as a word or
as a meaning: in the ancient works that focus on the social status of Sparta
the only talk is about ἐλευθεριότης (special freedom, because of nobility) and
ὁμοιότης (relative equality, similarity) between the members of the Spartan
assemblies, not about ἰσηγορία (equality of speech), not even about ἐλευθερία
(natural freedom).6
Παρρησία as an actual word occurs in ancient texts when the right of every
citizen to speak in public freely became an important feature of democratic
freedom. It became a right when someone could say what he thought of speech
as right pertaining to all the citizens and not only the best ones, in favor of the
δῆμος and not only in favor of the ἄριστοι.7 As it was probable that occasionally
παρρησία might have been abused some conditions were imposed.
According to several historical studies, παρρησία was an attribute, which
every citizen of the classical polis should have, in order to practice success-
fully his democratic rights, that is to speak freely in the ἐκκλησία and in any
public place.8 It is mentioned along with the ἰσηγορία and the ἐλευθερία, which
5 Cf. Kurt A. Raaflaub, “Aristocracy and Freedom of Speech in the Graeco-Roman world,” in
Free Speech in Classical Antiquity (eds. Ineke Sluiter and Ralph M. Rosen; Leiden: Brill, 2004),
41–61, 44–46.
6 See Plutarch, Lycurgus, 6.3 (Perrin, Loeb Classical Library): “When the multitude was thus
assembled, no one of them was permitted to make a motion, but the motion laid before
them by the senators and kings could be accepted or rejected by the people. (Τοῦ δὲ πλήθους
ἀθροισθέντος εἰπεῖν μὲν οὐδενὶ γνώμην τῶν ἄλλων ἐφεῖτο, τήν δ’ ὑπὸ τῶν γερόντων καὶ τῶν βασιλέων
προτεθεῖσαν ἐπικρῖναι κύριος ἦν ὁ δῆμος.)
7 Cf. Raaflaub, “Aristocracy and Freedom,” 51–54.
8 See Kurt A. Raaflaub, The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece: Revised and Updated
Revision (University of Chicago Press, 2004), 223: “Parrhesia thus describes the chief charac-
teristic of the fully entitled citizen; free speech is almost synonymous with citizenship.”

were privileges of the Athenian democracy.9 While one side of παρρησία, that
of being granted as a privilege of the state is evident, still there was another
component to it, completing and integrating the first; it appears that παρρησία
was gained, in a way, by the citizen himself.
As it is known,10 during the sessions of the ἐκκλησία any Athenian citizen
had the right to take the floor and submit proposals under certain conditions:
he ought to have both an Athenian father and an Athenian mother, he ought
to be an adult, he should not have been accused of dishonesty (ἀτιμία) and he
should not have submitted an illegal proposal. If someone dared to violate the
rules, any other citizen could ask the president to take away the floor from him
or to impose some penalties on him.
Particularly, in the case of an accused who would ask to speak, someone
could interrupt him on the condition that the accused would undertake an
additional trial against his qualifications for παρρησία (a demand for test:
δοκιμασίας ἐπαγγελία); through this process, the accused was exposed to the risk
of a definitive penalty, but the accuser was also exposed to the risk of the
penalty for an insolent demand. Thus, the democratic polity turned away the
unworthy, and simultaneously it protected the freedom of the speech against
sycophants. Also, in the case of someone who initiated an unlawful proposal,
the body of prytaneis (πρυτάνεις) had the right to reject it and that might lead
the initiator to the courts. Moreover, after three such condemnations, the citi-
zen would eventually lose his right to initiate any proposal in the future.
Obviously, in the above cases, the accused citizens lost the παρρησία, which
the institutions of the city ensured. Similarly, παρρησία could be challenged
not only during the institutional functions of the ἐκκλησία, but also dur-
ing every social and public action implicating an audience and a persuasive
speech, namely a rhetoric situation. Whether that would be in the courts or
during a celebration or even in a discussion, the man who would maintain a
point should be blameless according to the manners of the city, so as to enjoy
the right of the παρρησία and not to be repressed in speaking.
9 See Plato, Respublica, 557Β (Shorey, Loeb Classical Library): “To begin with, are they not
free? and is not the city chock-full of liberty and freedom of speech? and has not every
man licence to do as he likes?” (Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν δὴ ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἡ πόλις μεστὴ
καὶ παρρησίας γίγνεται, καὶ ἐξουσία ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν ὅτί τις βούλεται;) Cf. Polybius, Historiae,
2.38.6 (Paton, Loeb Classical Library): “One could not find a political system and principle
so favourable to equality and freedom of speech, in a word so sincerely democratic, as
that of the Achaean league.” (Ἰσηγορίας καὶ παρρησίας καὶ καθόλου δημοκρατίας ἀληθινῆς
σύστημα καὶ προαίρεσιν εἰλικρινεστέραν οὐκ ἄν εὕροι τις τῆς παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ὑπαρχούσης.)
10 For a comprehensive presentation of the data see Gustave Glotz, The Greek City and its
Institutions (Transl. by N. Mallinson; London: Trubner, 1929), 152–180.

20 Papademetriou
In the next part of this paper, we will deal with this ‘other’ side of the mean-
ing of παρρησία, which depends upon the speaker’s quality and which might
provide us with a better understanding of the word’s meaning in representa-
tive ancient Greek passages.
4 The Classical Textual Evidence
The first documented condition of enjoying παρρησία, and the most well-
known, is the status of being a free man and not a slave. “He cannot speak his
mind … This is a slave’s lot you speak of, not to say what one thinks,” Euripides
says in Phoinissai (Phoenician Women).11
Another known condition was to be male, since women, along with slaves
and foreigners, did not participate in the democratic processes and were
excluded from the right of ἰσηγορία and of expressing their opinion regarding
public affairs.12 Thus, Eteocles, the king of Thebes in Aeschylus’ tragedy Seven
against Thebes, repeatedly orders the virgins of the city, who constitute the
chorus of the tragedy, to cease public expression of their emotions and fear for
the public matter of the siege of the city, and to “keep inside and do no harm!
It is for the man to take care of business outside the house; let no woman make
decrees (μὴ γυνὴ βουλευέτω) in those matters.”13 There is no instance of the
word παρρησία in the text, but its meaning is ‘pragmatically’ present, as well as
its social condition.14
Nevertheless, besides the above mentioned legal cases, in a number of an-
cient Greek passages the pragmatic functions of presupposition and entail-
ment15 suggest that παρρησία depended on requirements and restrictions, and
11 Euripides, Phoinissai (Phoenician Women), 391–392 (Coleridge, Perseus Digital Library):
ΠΟ: Oὐκ ἔχει παρρησίαν. ΙΟ: Δούλου τόδ’ εἶπας, μὴ λέγειν ἅ τις φρονεῖ. Cf. Id. Ion, 670–675;
Hippolytus, 421–424.
12 See more in Hanna M. Roisman, “Women’s Free Speech in the Greek tragedy” in Free
Speech in Classical Antiquity (eds. Ineke Sluiter and Ralph M. Rosen; Leiden: Brill, 2004),
91–113.
13 Aeschylus, Seven against Thebes, 200–201; cf. 230–232 (Smyth, Perseus Digital Library).
14 Α reference of a word or a phrase in a conversation to an entity in the world that is not
named and that is conventionally associated, within a socio-culturally defined communi-
ty, with these words is recognized via inference by the members of this society who share
a common socio-cultural knowledge. This pragmatic association is aided by the linguistic
context, the co-text, and based on the principles of the reference and inference. See more
in George Yule, Pragmatics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 17–24.
15 In Pragmatics, “presupposition is something the speaker assumes to be the case prior to
making an utterance. Entailment is something that logically follows from what is asserted
in the utterance.” For the successful function of these two principles it is required the

that it was critically determined by the quality of the speaker and not only by
external authorities. Some examples will be provided.
In Euripides’ Bacchae (Bacchants) the messenger asks the king if he could
speak in παρρησία about Bacchae’s terrible deeds, because he was afraid of his
anger; and Pentheus, the king, urged him to speak, “for it is not right to be angry
with the just.”16 Apparently, something that grants παρρησία, even in front of a
formidable king, is justice.
On the other hand, Demosthenes asks the Atheneans in the III Philippic
that “if I utter some home-truths with freedom (ἐν παρρησίᾳ), I shall not there-
by incur your displeasure (μηδεμίαν μοι διὰ τοῦτο παρ’ ἡμῶν ὀργὴν γενέσθαι).”17 In
other words, Demosthenes appeals to be heard without anger, since he will tell
the truth.
Again, in the Funeral Demosthenes maintains that παρρησία depends on
speaking the truth:
Democracies, however, possess many other just and noble features, to

which right-minded men hold fast and in particular it is impossible to
deter freedom of speech (παρρησία), which depends upon speaking the
truth, from exposing the truth. For neither it is possible for those who
commit a shameful act to appease all the citizens; so that even the lone
individual, uttering the deserved reproach, makes the guilty wince.18
A speaker’s display of justice and truth with παρρησία (παρρησιαστής) bestows

self-confidence upon him, which enables him to speak with boldness in public
or in front of authorities or even in private during a debate. This can be dis-
cerned through a pragmatic approach to the following passages.
In Euripides’ Electra, Clytaemnestra urges her daughter, Electra, to speak
with παρρησία about her father, Agamemnon’s, death. Electra replies by empha-
sizing the privilege of παρρησία and by repeating and clarifying it: “Remember,
mother, those last words of yours, giving me frankness towards you,” and “Then
will you treat me badly, when you hear it?”19 There is something in these words
that, while not said, is implied, and this is Electra’s confidence about the truth
and fairness of her defiant speech for which she claims παρρησία.
function of the principles of cooperation and the implicature between the speakers. See
more in George Yule, Pragmatics, 25–46.
16 Euripides, Bacchae (Bacchants), 668–669 and 673 (transl. T.A. Buckley).
17 Demosthenes, ΙΙΙ Philippic, 9.3 (Vince, Loeb Classical Library); cf. Isocrates, Panathe-
naicus, 96.
18 Demosthenes, Funeral, 26 (N.W. DeWitt and N.J. DeWitt, Loeb Classical Library).
19 Euripides, Electra, 1049–1057 (transl. E.P. Coleridge).

22 Papademetriou
Another example from Euripides is in his Hippolytus, when Phaedra refers

to the παρρησία enjoyed by the Athenians, whose descent is from citizen par-
ents. She states that the loss of παρρησία results in the loss of self-confidence
and boldness of mind: “For it enslaves a man, even he is bold of heart, when he
is conscious of sins committed by his mother or father.”20
It is easy to understand under these semantic conditions Socrates’ παρρησία,
whose only concern was to look for and to speak of the truth. According to
Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates thinks that the partners in a dialectical discussion
ought to implement three criteria: ἐπιστήμη (knowledge), εὔνοια (goodwill to-
wards the partners) and παρρησία (frankness), which rids them from shame
and invests them with boldness.21
For Aristotle παρρησία is not a virtue but it falls under the category of how
one speaks, and to whom he speaks. Thus, it is more a practical trait and in-
volves both ethics and politics, jointly.22
The example, however, most pertinent to our topic is Socrates’ statement in
Plato’s Laws that the State requires “a bold man who, valuing candor (παρρησία)
above all else, will declare what he deems best for city and citizens … acting
alone by himself with no man to help him save, as his solitary leader,” as “this is a
task especially for God (were it possible that orders should come from him).”23
The aforementioned evidence leads to some important clarifications of
the meaning of παρρησία in antiquity. The first inference is that παρρησία is
used not in an exclusively political context, but equally in wider a-political,
social, and even private contexts. The second inference is that παρρησία en-
sured freedom from fear of causing offense or of being ashamed.24 The third
inference is that παρρησία is a matter of self-confidence and a reason for bold-
ness.25 Moreover, the speakers refer to παρρησία in order to present themselves
20 Euripides, Hippolytos, 424–425 (transl. D. Kovacs).

21 Plato, Gorgias, 487a.b (transl. W.R.M. Lamb).
22 See J.J. Mulhern, “Παρρησία in Aristotle” in Free Speech in Classical Antiquity (eds. Ineke
Sluiter and Ralph M. Rosen; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 313–339.
23 Plato, Laws, 835c (R.G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library).
24 See D. Carter, “Citizen attribute, negative right: A conceptual difference between ancient
and modern ideas for freedom of speech”, in Free Speech in Classical Antiquity (eds. Ineke
Sluiter and Ralph M. Rosen; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 197–220: “Parrhêsia meant a tendency to
say everything, uninhibited by any fear. This might be the fear of tyrannical authority; it
might also be the fear of the usual rules of discourse that prevent shame for the speaker
or offense for the listener” (202).
25 Sometimes, the w. παρρησία was used in a pejorative sense to denote “untutored” παρρησία,
like in Euripides, Orestis, 902–905, where the speaker does not appear to know the proto-
col of Athenian democracy.

as respectable and credible. Therefore, a performative speech act is apparent

in the usage of the word.
4.1 Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman Context

Leaving classical antiquity, the word παρρησία does not appear to lose
those pragmatic conditions inhering to its usage during Hellenistic times.
Furthermore, it was developed by Epicureans so as to particularly reference a
virtue between friends, who should have the courage to use sincere language
in their relations.26 The most interesting case of the usage of the word during
this period is the Cynic παρρησία, which is associated with the shamefulness
practice of these philosophers.27 Nevertheless, this shift of the meaning from
the public and political field to the private and moral one does not abolish
the original semantic component of the word that is the prerequisite of a per-
sonal qualification for the practice of παρρησία, either as a moral teacher or as
a genuine friend.
Romans present παρρησία as libertas (freedom) and licentia (licence) with
reference to the public area28 and rhetoricians consider its moral aspect. The
scholarly writers of the Jewish-Greek literature receive this double legacy of
political and moral context for the use of the word and adjust it to analogous
Jewish conceptions.
Josephus usually uses the word in its classical meaning, as it has been indi-
cated above. It is easy to identify this in passages like the following:29
26 The Epicurean philosopher Philodemus wrote the work Περὶ παρρησίας (On Frank Speech),
the only ancient work known with this title. There he treats παρρησία as an educational
method that uses criticism for moral improvement. In this context, frankness became
the opposite of flattery. Cf. Plutarch’s work, How to tell a flatterer from a friend, 51c (transl.
F.C. Babbitt, Loeb Classical Library), where παρρησία is characterized as “the language of
friendship especially (as an animal has its peculiar cry)”.
27 See Leif E. Vaage, “Like Dogs Barking: Cynic παρρησία and Shameless Ascetism,” Semeia 57
(1992): 25–39: “Cynic parrhesia and anaideia were thus two sides of a single scarred coin:
a mode of personal training I propose we call the ‘asceticism transgression’.” (35).
28 See, especially, Giuseppe Scarpat, Parrhesia. Storia del Termine et delle sue Traduzioni
in Latino (Brescia: Paideia, 1964). Cf. Ch. Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome
During the Late Republic and Early Principate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1950), 7: “In fact, it is the notion of restraint and moderation that distinguishes libertas
from licentia, whose salient feature is arbitrariness; and libertas untempered by modera-
tion degenerates into licentia.”
29 Flavius Josephus, The Jewish Antiquities, books 1–19 (transl. H. St. J. Thackeray et al.; Loeb
Classical Library; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930–1965). The word was some-
times used in a pejorative sense to denote the abuse of the granted right, like in Josephus,
Ant. 15.239.1, where Mariamne’s unbounded liberty is referred as ἀσύμμετρος (improper)
παρρησία and is explained because “she was most indulgently used by the king, out of

24 Papademetriou
– AJ 2.131.3: “for, being conscious of no crime, they spoke boldly, supposing

that they ran no risk” (οὐδὲν γὰρ αὑτοῖς συνειδότες ἦγον παρρησίαν, ὡς ἐδόκουν,
ἀκίνδυνον).
– AJ 4.210.3: “while the laws will speak with great authority to sinners, in that
they forwarn them what they will have to suffer” (οἵ τε νόμοι πολλὴν πρὸς
ἁμαρτάνοντας ἕξουσι παρρησίαν, ὡς προλεγόντων αὐτοῖς ἃ πείσονται).
– AJ 5.38.1–39.3: “Seeing his army thus cast down … Joshua frankly appealed
to God: It was from no confindence in ourselves that we were induced to
subjugate this land by arms; nay, it was Moses, they servant, who incited
us thereto” (Βλέπων δὲ οὕτως ὁ Ἰησοῦς τήν τε στρατιὰν καταπεπληγυῖαν καὶ
περὶ τῶν ὅλων πονηρὰν ἤδη τὴν ἐλπίδα λαμβάνουσαν 5.39 παρρησίαν λαμβά-
νει πρὸς τὸν θεόν· «ἡμεῖς γὰρ εἶπεν οὐχ ὑπ᾽ αὐθαδείας προήχθημεν ὥστε ταύτην
ὑπάγεσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις τὴν γῆν, ἀλλὰ Μωυσέος τοῦ σοῦ δούλου πρὸς τοῦθ᾽ ἡμᾶς
ἐξεγείραντος).
But in this period some particularities can be observed in the meaning of
παρρησία according to the new data of public life. As democratic institutions
changed, παρρησία increasingly concerned the rhetoric practices as well as the
social, public and private life.
This particular meaning of the word is clearly denoted in a passage of a later
work (but based on classical wisdom). It is ascribed to Plutarch and is called
The Education of the Children, where the descent of a good parent is considered
as a useful repository of παρρησία, since the offspring will not fear insults. Here,
the definition of παρρησία is characteristic:
And I should advise those desirous of becoming fathers of notable off-

spring to abstain from random cohabitation with women; I mean with
such women as courtesans and concubines. For those who are not well-
born, whether on the father’s or the mother’s side, have an indelible dis-
grace in their low birth, which accompanies them throughout their lines,
and offers to anyone desiring to use it a ready subject of reproach and
insult … A goodly treasure, then, is honourable birth, and such a man
may speak his mind freely, a thing which should be held of the highest
account by those who wish to have issue lawfully begotten. In the nature
of things, the spirits of those whose blood is base or counterfeit are con-
stantly being brought down and humbled …30
his fondness for her, and did not expect that he could do any hard thing to her” (cf. Ant.
15.240.4).
30 Plutarch, De liberis educantis, 2. A–D (F.C. Babbitt, Loeb Classical Library).

Even a rather rare and literary word, it occurs in the colloquial Hellenistic
Koine language of this era. In a papyrus letter of the second century CE to his
brother Valerius [---], Valerius Gemellus seeks to resolve a disagreement which
has arisen between them. Eventually, Gemellus will gain παρρησία as the result
of reconciliation and rapprochement with his brother:31
εἴπε̣[ρ] ̣[- ca.13 -]
σε ἀγνοῶ ὀφείλεις μοι συνχωρεῖν [τοῦτο μόνον. παρα-]
κληθείς, ἄδελφε, διαλλάγηθί μοι ὅπω̣ [ς χρήσωμαι καὶ ἐν]
τῇ στρατείᾳ τῇ σῇ παρησίᾳ(*). τὸ δὴ λ̣ [οιπὸν μὴ εἶχές με]
μηδ’ ἑξῆς ἀδελφῷ ἐξ οὗ ἐπεξενώθη[ν; ἀλλ’ ἔχω σε δίκην] (10)
ὡσ̣ ίου(*) ἀδ[ε]λ̣ φ[ο]ῦ ὡς τὸν Σαραπι(*). μάλιστα [δέ τις ἄλλη]
ἐλπὶς οὐκ ἔστιν ὡς ἡ παρησία(*) τῶν ἀδελφῶ[ν καὶ τῶν]
ἰδίων.
Even if I do not know …, you ought to grant me [this one favor]. In re-
sponse to my entreaty, brother, be reconciled with me so that I may
[enjoy] your confidence [also while I am in] service. Besides, [you have
not even regarded me] as befits a brother, have you now, from the time
that I left home? But [I regard you, in the manner] of a pious brother, as
I do Sarapis. Above all, there is [no other] hope like the candid inter-
course of brothers and one’s own people.
In the inscriptions of this period the word παρρησία is also used with pragmatic
connotations presented in the classical texts. It is attested in honorary inten-
tions as an attribute of the honored man, who had παρρησία
– “because of the descent”:
(ὁ διασημότατος [Λυκιάρ]χης, ἀ-
νὴρ ἐκ τῶν πρωτευόντων ἐν τῇ [ἐπαρχ]είᾳ, διά
τε γένους παρησίαν {²⁶παρρησίαν})32
– “because he had responded successfully to the needs of his city as a town
ruler”:
(κα<ὶ> εὐδοκιμ̣ η̣κὼς ἐν ταῖς χρείαις ἁπάσαις κ[ε]-
[κ]όσμηκε τὸν αὑτοῦ β̣ίον τῆι καλλίστηι παρρησίαι)33
31 P.Mich. 8.502 (Koptos, Koptite nome, province of Egypt. 101–200 AD), 6–13. The four aster-
isks refer to the apparatus of the publication of this papyrus, as following: l. 9 παρρησίᾳ ‖
l. 11 ὁσίου ‖ l. 11 Σάραπι<ν> ‖ l. 12 παρρησία ‖ l. 13 ποιήσῃς.
32 TAM II 905 (Lycia, E., Rhodiapolis. 152/153 AD), col. XVIII.60.1.
33 IvP I 224 (Mysia [Kaïkos], Pergamon. 151–150 BCE or shortly after?), 10.

26 Papademetriou
– “because he behaved with justice towards the underprivileged and he “acted

promptly in favor of the interests of the city”:
(ἔν τε
τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὢν δίκαιος καὶ εὐσεβῆ γνώμην ἔχων καὶ ἁ[ρ]-
μοζούσῃ παρρησίᾳ χρώμενος εἰς ἐπίστασιν καθέσπακεν [ὅ]-
σον ἐπ’ αὐτῷ τοὺς ἐπιβαροῦντας, καὶ τοῖςἀδίκως κινδυν[εύου]-
σι δικαίαν παρέχεται βοήθειαν, [π]άν[τως] τε ἐν παντὶ καιρ[ῷ] πρό-
θυμον ἁτὸν ἐπιδίδωσιν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα).34
It is apparent that in these vernacular texts the very meaning of the word
παρρησία is one’s ability to be blameless and efficient in the management of
public affairs. Παρρησία does not mean only a political privilege: neither mere
boldness nor confidence nor sincerity; nevertheless, virtue of the pragmatic
implication and of the cultural schema of the era, it means a specific per-
sonal quality that entails all these and constitutes a component attribute of a
civil dignitary.
The best response to the political duties as a condition for a public officer’s
παρρησία clearly occurs in Philo’s Legatio to Gaium, where he reasserted his own
παρρησία and he presented himself as an exemplar of παρρησία against Gaius’
indifference and ridiculing attitude. Philo in this text addresses a Roman im-
perial audience and he manages to combine the philosopher’s judgment and
detachment with the rhetorical argument of the ambassador’s παρρησία, in
order to protect the Jewish rights and the Temple from Claudius.35
But, Plutarch, also, associates the skilled and cautious use of παρρησία with
the ‘public welfare,’36 because being able to finesse one’s superiors would help
in the protection of the community under imperial rule. This rhetorical use
of παρρησία mostly concerns the ambassadors who represented their com-
munities to imperial officials and asserted a special independence, authority,
and, thereby, need of παρρησία, in the presence of Roman power.
The aforementioned examples of the usage of the word παρρησία in
Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman sources suggest the following: παρρησία is es-
tablished as both the language of friendship and of criticism; it is associated
34 IG XII,5 860 (Cyclades, excl. Delos: Tenos. first c. BC), 49–54. Cf. IScM III 7 (Skythia Minor,
Kallatis [Mangalia], Kostena Rjanka ca 253 BCE), 13–15; IG V,1 547 (Lakonia and Messenia:
Lakonike, Sparta. ca 210 AD), 1–5; Agora 16 224[1] (Attica), 19–21.
35 Evangeline Zephyr Lyons argues in favor of this aspect, examining the whole Legatio in
“Hellenic Philosophers as Ambassadors to the Roman Empire: Performance, Parrhesia
and Power” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2011), 58–103.
36 See in particular Plutarch’s How to tell a flatterer from a friend, 65f–74e, which is primarily
concerned with how to delicately and properly use παρρησία among your social superiors.
Cf. Dana Farah Fields, “The Rhetoric of Παρρησία in Roman Greece” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton
University, 2009).

with the authority and the dignity of the person who speaks, and it becomes
a rhetorical argument. Furthermore, the person who has παρρησία is able to
represent others to protect them from the authorities. Obviously, there is a per-
formative use of the word, since the speaker, by evoking his παρρησία, seeks to
be considered reliable.
5 The Usage of Παρρησία in the Septuagint
The ancient Jewish society was not familiar with the concept of παρρησία in
the Greek political sense because of its different political structures and social
institutions. However, the ability to speak and act without fear and shame was
expressed through relational phrases such as ‘in front of public eyes,’ ‘with
upright stature’ and ‘with uncovered face.’ Syntagmas like these respectively
referred to’publicly,’ ‘boldly,’ and ‘confidently,’ or closer to the Jewish expres-
sion, to speak and act openly, visibly, and manifestly.37 Certainly, the Jewish
notion concerning the Hellenized Jews would not have any difficulty in com-
paring and aligning these analogous meanings of the two languages, while
implementing an appropriation of the Greek word by an adjustment of its
meaning to Jewish conception.
Similar semantic varieties have been observed by socio-linguistic research38
within bilingual or multilingual societies and they are ranked at the so-called
dimension of the language contact, during which several interference phe-
nomena are present.39 Usually, interference occurs from the language with
higher status to the language with lower status, and in the Septuagint trans-
lation Greek was rather the giver than the receiver; additionally, it might be
37 See W.C. van Unnik, “The Semitic background of παρρησία in the New Testament”, in
W.C. van Unnik, Sparsa Collecta (Leiden: Brill, 1980): 291–306, 296ff.
38 Sociolinguistics is associated with Pragmatics, since it studies the relation between lan-
guage and society. These two disciplines, although coming from different origins, meet
in the empirical approach of the language and they overlap, as well as complement
each other. Pragmatics studies what the words might mean within a concrete contex-
tual frame, involving where, when and under which conventions, and what is the mean-
ing that is communicated without wording. Socio-linguistics studies the variation in the
meaning of the words due to the differentiation of the users and the social agents, such
as different culture, bilingualism and communication parameters. On the main subject of
Sociolinguistics, see Peter Trudgill, “Sociolinguistics: An Overview” (eds. Ulrich Ammon,
Norbert Dittmar, Klaus J. Mattheier, Peter Trudgill, Sociolinguistics. An International
Handbook of the Science of Language and Society 1/1 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 22004), 1–5.
39 See G.H.R. Horsley, New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity, vol. 5 (Macquarie
University; The Ancient History Documentary Research Centre, 1989), 6ff.

28 Papademetriou
noted that classic Greek and its literary language heritage had enjoyed a higher
prestige and, therefore, preference by the Septuagint translators.
Alongside these considerations of lingual prestige, the Septuagint transla-
tion might be recognized rather as a register, according to Halliday’s term:40
namely, a language form that is determined by the particular situation in
which the writer finds himself regarding the context and the subject; con-
cretely, according to the intention of the Translators to self-identify the Jewish
community and to protect it within the Hellenistic environment by cultural
adaptations.41 One of these in the field of vocabulary may be the word and the
meaning of παρρησία. Nevertheless, in the process of this cultural transfer the
word meaning is modified, as it loses elements of Greek reality and receives
elements of Jewish mind.
Furthermore, regarding the Septuagint use of the word, it must be taken
into account that Judaism introduces to human history the idea of God as a
person, who claims to have παρρησία towards his people and who demands, on
the other hand, that they have παρρησία towards him. Another difference with
the Greek use is that the conditions and the presuppositions for someone’s
παρρησία are his relation and his attitude towards God and God’s law. But the
original meaning of παρρησία, as it was presented in the Ancient Greek, can be
traced in the word: it is one’s quality of being blameless and just, which in turn
grants him confidence and boldness.
The word occurs in Septuagint twelve (12) times as a noun and five (5)
times as a verb. In three (3) instances it refers to God (Lev 26.13; Ps 11(12).5(6);
93(94).1), once to the personified Wisdom (Prov 1.20), and once to man’s
παρρησία towards God (Job 27.10). The word also occurs several times in the
contexts of public and social affairs. There are 6 occurrences of the word which
are not found in the Hebrew Bible (Wis. 5.1; Sir 6.11; 22.25; 1 Macc 4.18; 3 Macc
4.1; 7.12; 4 Macc 10.5). Additionally, the passages of Esth 8.12s; Ps 11.6; and Prov
10.10; 13.5; 20.9 are without any Hebrew parallel. Actually, the Hebrew words
which are translated as παρρησία feature a certain variety of meaning and oc-
casionally lack equivalence:
1. The unique word ‫קֹומ ִמּיּות‬
ְ (komemiyut)—‘upright’ is translated as μετὰ
παρρησίας in Lev 26.13: I broke the band of your yoke, and brought you forth
openly. In this case, the word παρρησία might have been chosen by the Greek
translator either in reference to God’s loyalty towards his people, as he fulfills
40 M.A. Halliday, Language as Social Semiotic: The Social Interpretation of Language and
Meaning (London: Arnold, 1978), 110–111.
41 See Tessa Rajak, Translation and Survival: The Greek Bible of the Ancient Jewish Diaspora
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 152ff.

his promises to them, or in reference to the people’s certainty and confidence

that their God is faithful and caused them to walk upright. Furthermore, both
references could be implied here, following a relationship of cause and result
(God’s παρρησία results in the people’s παρρησία), through a ‘figure of common,’
which is a kind of brachylogy.
2. The word ‫( ענג‬hitp, anag)—‘to have delight, joy in something,’ (which is
translated as κατατρυφᾶν in Ps 36.4, 11 and as τρυφᾶν in Isa 66.11), is translated as
παρρησίαν and παρρησιασθήσῃ ἔναντι Κυρίου (Job 22.26; 27.10, where the Hebrew
verb is ‘iinag): “you shall have boldness before the Lord, looking up cheerfully
to heaven” (Job 22.26) and “has he any confidence before him?” (Job 27.10).
In this case, the word παρρησία has been chosen by the Greek translator in
reference to one’s privilege of enjoying God’s attention. It is noteworthy that
the sense of delight could be traced in the Septuagint ad hoc, from the adverb
ἱλαρῶς, joyfully.
3. The word ‫קֹולּה‬
ָ ‫( ִּת ֵּתן‬titten kolah)—‘speak boldly’ in Prov 1.20 f. is trans-
lated properly παρρησίαν ἄγειν (ἐν δὲ πλατείαις παρρησίαν ἄγει): “in the broad
places speaks boldly”.
4. The word ‫( יפע‬hi, jafa, from the verb yiifta)—‘to shine forth,’ ‘to appear
in brightness’ is translated as (ὁ θεὸς ἐκδικήσεων Kύριος, ὁ Θεὸς ἐκδικήσεων)
ἐπαρρησιάσατο in Ps 93.1: “The Lord is a God of vengeance; the God of
vengeance has declared himself”. The Hebrew word is used for manifesta-
tion and epiphanies of Yahweh and is translated ἐμφαίνεσθαι at Ps 79.2 and
ἐπιφαίνεσθαι at Deut 33.2. In this case, again, the word παρρησία might occur
in the Septuagint with reference to God’s fidelity, which he has the pleasure to
demonstrate.
Although the word preserves the ancient Greek meaning of the ability of
someone to speak without fear and shame, in the Septuagint texts the con-
ditions for this have been changed. The one’s authority is derived by his
association with God and his faithfulness to his law; the just, the wise, and the
pious display great παρρησία, so as to receive a kind of privilege. Alongside the
follower’s παρρησία, God is the one who has παρρησία, because he has fidelity
to his promises and does marvelous works in favor of his people. Because of
this, God’s παρρησία usually means the epiphany of his majesty and his divine
intervention in the history of Israel.
6 The New Testament Usage of Παρρησία
It is probable that the Jewish notion was passed on into the Greek concept
of the word παρρησία with the result that a new modified meaning emerged.

30 Papademetriou
However, other agents of its era, too, such as the current philosophical and
rhetorical usage of the word, have apparently influenced the New Testament
usage of the term.42 Within the New Testement the word παρρησία occurs
thirty-one (31) times as a noun and nine (9) times as a verb, for a total of forty
(40) occurances. These various usages can be found—in order of number of
repetition—in Acts (12), the Pauline Epistles (10), John (9), Hebrews (4), and
Mark (1).
Paul was the first who adopted the word παρρησία in the Christian tradi-
tion. The word is directly connected with his missionary work and conveys the
certainty that he performs a mission entrusted to him by God, as well as the
certainty that God himself guarantees the success of that mission in this world,
despite the difficulties (1 Thess 2.2; Phil 1.20),43 and the eternal glory in the es-
chata (2 Cor 3.12).44 The cause of Paul’s certainty and of this παρρησία is Christ,
who through his person and his work gives to the apostle the quality of having
42 See John T. Fitzgerald (ed.), Friendship, Flattery and Frankness of Speech: Studies on
Friendship in the New Testament World (Leiden: Brill, 1996), where four essays deal with
the use of παρρησία in the New Testament. The conclusion is that the New Testament writ-
ers were aware of the usage of the word by the Hellenistic philosophers and rhetoricians,
and they use it with the meaning of straight talking among friends, which promotes morally
the friendship. Especially, for the relation between Philodemus’ usage of the word and New
Testament usage, see Benjamin Fiore, “The Pastoral Epistles in the Light of Philodemus’
“On Frank Criticism” in Philodemus and the New Testament World (eds. J.T. Fitzgerald, Dirk
Obbink and Glenn S. Holland; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 271–294. J. Paul Sampley, “Paul’s Frank
Speech with the Galatians and the Corinthians” in Philodemus and the New Testament
(eds. Fitzgerald, Obbink and Holland), 295–322. Bruce W. Winter, “Philodemus and Paul
on rhetorical delivery (ὑπόκρισις)” in Philodemus and the New Testament (eds. Fitzgerald,
Obbink and Holland), 323–342. For earlier works on the New Testament usage of παρρησία,
cf. Michel Bouttier, “Sur la parrhesia dans le Nouveau Testament,” in Parola e Spirito. Studi
in onore di Settimio Cipriani, vol. I (ed. C.C. Marcheselli; Brescia: Paedeia Editrice Brescia,
1982), 611–621 and Stanley B. Marrow, “Parrhesia and the New Testament,” Catholic Biblical
Quarterly 44 (1982): 431–446.
43 1 Thess 2.2 ἀλλὰ προπαθόντες καὶ ὑβρισθέντες, καθὼς οἴδατε, ἐν Φιλίπποις ἐπαρρησιασάμεθα ἐν
τῷ θεῷ ἡμῶν λαλῆσαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν πολλῷ ἀγῶνι (NA 27). But although
we suffered earlier and were mistreated in Philippi, as you know, we had the παρρησία
(courage) in our God to declare to you the gospel of God in spite of much opposition
(NET). —Phil 1.20 κατὰ τὴν ἀποκαραδοκίαν καὶ ἐλπίδα μου, ὅτι ἐν οὐδενὶ αἰσχυνθήσομαι ἀλλ᾽
ἐν πάσῃ παρρησίᾳ ὡς πάντοτε καὶ νῦν μεγαλυνθήσεται Χριστὸς ἐν τῷ σώματί μου, εἴτε διὰ ζωῆς
εἴτε διὰ θανάτου (NA 27). My confident hope is that I will in no way be ashamed but that
with complete παρρησία (boldness), even now as always, Christ will be exalted in my body,
whether I live or die (NET).
44 2 Cor 3.11–12 εἰ γὰρ τὸ καταργούμενον διὰ δόξης, πολλῷ μᾶλλον τὸ μένον ἐν δόξῃ. Ἔχοντες οὖν
τοιαύτην ἐλπίδα πολλῇ παρρησίᾳ χρώμεθα (NA 27). For if what was made ineffective came
with glory, how much more has what remains come in glory! Therefore, since we have
such a hope, we behave with great παρρησία (boldness) (NET).

παρρησία (2 Cor 3.4).45 It is remarkable that this παρρησία is not only declared,
but has become reality in the apostle with the act of preaching amid difficul-
ties and controversies of the opponents of the apostle (ἐπαρρησιασάμεθα ἐν
πολλῷ ἀγῶνι, 1 Thess 2.2). Subsequently, the believers themselves become, for
Paul, a cause of παρρησία (2 Cor 7.3).46 Furthermore, Paul’s integrity and mis-
sionary labor are presented to the Christians, to whom the apostle preaches, as
a reason of παρρησία and as a ratio of authority (2 Cor 7.4).47
Actually, in the Pauline corpus, παρρησία undergoes a new modification in
its meaning, as it is associated with Jesus Christ’s personality and work, and
it recalls the Septuagint use and reference of the word of God. Alternately, in
the New Testament, it is now Jesus Christ who grants παρρησία to his apostles
(Eph 3.12), since they are genuine apostles, and because he is the one who has
παρρησία through his victory over the authorities of this world (Col 2.15). On
the other hand, Paul has παρρησίαν as a divine legatus (Philm 8) and he uses
the word in the rhetorical way.
In Acts, παρρησία concerns the attitude of the apostles in preaching the gos-
pel in front of the authorities, both Jewish and pagan, boldly and confidently
because of their belief in its truth and because of their faith in him who has
authorized them to preach. This is, thus, a clear case of the Greek sense of the
public action.
In John, παρρησία is a characteristic of Jesus’ behavior in performing his
work. The expression ἐν παρρησίᾳ means openly, publicly, the antonyms of se-
cretly (John 7.4; 11.54) or clearly, plainly, the opposite of ἐν παροιμίαις, ‘in fig-
ures’ (John 16.25; cf. Mark 8.32),48 but also, boldly and confidently. It is obvious
that Jesus speaks openly and plainly, because he is actually the beloved son of
God, while, on the other side, the Jews who have doubts on his reliability seek
for attestations:
45 2 Cor 3.4 Πεποίθησιν δὲ τοιαύτην ἔχομεν διὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν (ΝΑ 27). Now we have
such confidence in God through Christ (NET).
46 2 Cor 3.2 ἡ ἐπιστολὴ ἡμῶν ὑμεῖς ἐστε, ἐγγεγραμμένη ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν, γινωσκομένη καὶ
ἀναγινωσκομένη ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων (NA 27). You yourselves are our letter, written on
our hearts, known and read by everyone, (NET).
47 2 Cor 7.4 πολλή μοι παρρησία πρὸς ὑμᾶς, πολλή μοι καύχησις ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν (NA 27). I have great
παρρησία (confidence) in you; I take great pride on your behalf (NET).
48 Jonathan Bishop, “Parabole and Parrhesia in Mark,” Interpretation, 40 (1986): 39–52, sug-
gests that in Mark the παρρησίᾳ is used as the counterpart of the ἐν παραβολαῖς (“in par-
ables”) and both reproduce a contrast between two modes of discourse, based on which
the Markan text is structured: the discourse ἐν παραβολαῖς presents the divine mystery, the
discourse παρρησίᾳ explicates this mysterious revelation.

32 Papademetriou
Ἐκύκλωσαν οὖν αὐτὸν οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ ἔλεγον αὐτῷ· ἕως πότε τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν
αἴρεις; εἰ σὺ εἶ ὁ Xριστός, εἰπὲ ἡμῖν παρρησίᾳ. ἀπεκρίθη αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς· εἶπον
ὑμῖν καὶ οὐ πιστεύετε· τὰ ἔργα ἃ ἐγὼ ποιῶ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ πατρός μου ταῦτα
μαρτυρεῖ περὶ ἐμοῦ
John 10.24-25 NA 27
The Jewish leaders surrounded him and asked, “How long will you keep
us in suspense? If you are the Christ, tell us plainly.” Jesus replied, “I told
you and you do not believe. The deeds I do in my Father’s name testify
about me.
JOHN 10:24-25 NET
This is a case that indicates well the social dimensions of the meaning of the
word.
In 1 John 5.14 there is a definition of παρρησία: Καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ παρρησία
ἣν ἔχομεν πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι ἐάν τι αἰτώμεθα κατὰ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ, ἀκούει ἡμῶν.
“And this is the confidence that we have before him: that whenever we ask
anything according to his will, he hears us.” (1 Jo 5:14 NET). This case recalls the
usage of the word in Job 27.10: “Has he any confidence before him? Or will God
hear him as he calls upon him?
The way παρρησία is presented in Heb 4.16 and 10.19 is considerable:
Christians may come up to the throne of grace having παρρησία through Jesus’
blood and death. The participation in his sacrifice leads to the integration
of the believers into Christ’s body, therefore, ‘through him and in him’ (Col 1.16),
they can call upon to God with παρρησία and find response. This reminds us
of the Socratic statement for a divus man who in virtue of his justice will be
able to check the state with παρρησία and save it, and yet, this also reminds
us of the Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman sense of the representative man: the
ambassador who mediates for the people. Finally, this meaning echoes the
Septuagint meaning of God’s παρρησία who manifested himself through his
marvelous works in the history and caused his people to walk upright, on the
one hand, and on the other, the Septuagint meaning of the just man who has
the delight to look up boldly to the Lord.
It is remarkable that in the New Testament the word presents semantic rela-
tions with the following word-groups:
a) with the verb λαλῶ (speak) and λέγω (say), and with the noun λόγος
του Θεοῦ (word of the God) in reference to the boldness in the keryg-
ma (Mark 8.32; John 16.25. 18.20; Acts 4.13, 29; 9.27; 13.46; 28.31; Eph 6.19;
1 Thess. 2.2);

b) with the name of the God and the person of Jesus Christ in reference to
the authority which has and grants παρρησία (Acts 9.27; 14.3; Eph 3.12;
6.20; Phlm 8; 1 Thess 2.2; Heb 4.16; 10.19; 1 John 5.14);
c) with the nouns ἐλπὶς (hope) and καύχησις (pride), and with the verbs
μεγαλύνομαι (be exalted) and οὐκ (ἐπ)αισχύνομαι (not to be ashamed) in
reference to the confidence on the value of their faith (2 Cor 3.12; 7.4;
Phil 1.20; 1 Tim 3.13; Heb 3.6; 1 John 2.28; cf. 1 John 3.21).
Certainly, these semantic relations might evoke the rhetorical usage of the
word, even the moral philosophical sense, but, in any case, the political notion
of a legitimate right is vivid. Apparently, the use of the word gestures ‘prag-
matically’ to an extratextual social reality, where παρρησία is associated with
the qualification of the speaker. Concretely, the word παρρησία and the verb
παρρησιάζομαι are associated with three kinds of speakers: a) with Jesus Christ,
b) with the apostles, c) with the Christians. Jesus Christ speaks and walks with
παρρησία, because he proves to have the appropriate features of the Christ;
thus, he does not hide himself, but he acts openly and publicly. The apostles
have παρρησία because they provide the credentials that they are genuine en-
voys of Christ. Christians can have παρρησία, because they are members of the
body of Jesus Christ. Therefore, the use of the word defines the character of the
Christian community, which constitutes the polity of a spiritual democracy.
7 Recapitulation
Following the route of the word παρρησία from the original political fields of
the Athenian democracy until the Graeco-Roman plains of the Hellenistic
Koine, we might ascertain the following points.
Παρρησία was established as a result of ἰσηγορία (the democratic right of
equality in public speaking) and it meant the ability for everyone to state his
opinion in public, even if that was in opposition to powerful men, primarily
for political reasons. Nevertheless, this ability could function properly under
certain conditions: there had to be a blameless and virtuous background, and
the speaker had to be righteousness and honest, otherwise he would be taken
away and he would be publicly shamed. These conditions were defined by the
law of the state above and beyond, but in addition to, the morals of the society.
These conditions, if valid, subsequently ensured for the speaker the bold-
ness and the bravery in front of the authorities, and they guaranteed the
truthfulness and sincerity of the speech. Thus, παρρησία became a claim for
rhetoricians and a demand for philosophers.

34 Papademetriou
In Hellenistic times παρρησία was mainly determined by the virtue of some-

one to successfully respond to the duties of a public work or a public office. This
notion was enhanced particularly in Graeco-Roman times, when a wide rank
of offices was developed in the Empire. Moreover, παρρησία became an ideal
for rhetoricians, as well as for ambassadors, who undertook the obligation to
protect their people against kings and emperors. This notion of παρρησία also
occurs in Graeco-Jewish literature.
The Septuagint text brings a modification to the meaning of παρρησία.
The translators do not often use the word, and when they do, there is not a
clear word-equivalence between the two languages. However, the words they
choose as a translation are associated with the notions of faithfulness and of
integrity; the difference with the Greek meaning is that these conditions refer
to the relation and the attitude towards God. Moreover, God is the one who
has παρρησία and this παρρησία sometimes means an epiphany of his majesty.
Bearing these features, the word enters the vocabulary of the New Testament.
The apostles claim παρρησία in preaching, but it is also claimed by Jesus
Christ through his sacrifice. He grants παρρησία to the participants in this sac-
rifice. Thus, παρρησία becomes a privilege for Christians, which enables them
to have an unashamed and fearlessly direct access to God.
8 Conclusion
Considering the diachronic route of the meaning of the word παρρησία until
New Testament times and taking into account the synchronic textual evi-
dence, it becomes clear that there is a shift of the original meaning from the
public and political sphere to the private and moral one. Nevertheless, the
original semantic characteristic of a social interaction, according to which
the community (secular or Christian) recognizes (or not) the right of a mem-
ber to practice παρρησία, is always present in the sense of the word. This her-
meneutical understanding is alleged from the combined consideration of
the contemporary socio-historical data and is ensured through a pragmatic
approach of the texts.
Furthermore, the performative meaning of the word renders comprehen-
sible all of the applicable meanings and explains the multiplicity of their
versions. Freedom of speech and free speech, courage and self-confidence,
clearness and sincerity, openness and honesty, senses with distinct differences,
are consolidated under the name of παρρησία when understood as a conse-
quence of its pragmatic significance.

9 Bibliography
9.1 Ancient Sources

Aeschylus, Aeschylus, with an English translation. Translated by H.W. Smyth in two
volumes. 1. Seven against Thebes, Perseus Digital Library (Cambridge, MA. Harvard
University Press, 1926).
Demosthenes, Demosthenes with an English translation. Translated by N.W. DeWitt
and N.J. DeWitt, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press:
1949).
Demosthenes, Demosthenes with an English translation. Translated by J.H. Vince, Loeb
Classical Library (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press: 1930).
Euripides, The Tragedies of Euripides. Translated by T.A. Buckley, Perseus Digital Library
(London: Henry G. Bohn, 1850).
Euripides, Complete Greek Drama. Vol. 2. Edited by Whitney J. Oates and Eugene
O’Neill, Jr. in two volumes and translated by E.P. Coleridge, Perseus Digital Library
(New York: Random House, 1938).
Euripides, Euripides with an English translation. Translated by D. Kovacs, Perseus
Digital Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).
Isocrates, Isocrates with an English translation in Three Volumes, Translated by G. Norlin,
Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press: 1980).
Josephus, Flavius, The Jewish Antiquities. Books 1–19. Translated by H. St. J. Thackeray
et al., Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930–1965).
Philodemus, On Frank Criticism. Introduction, translation and notes by David
Konstan, Diskin Clay, Clarence E. Glad, Johan C. Thorn, and James Ware. Edited by
J.T. Fitzgerald (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 2007).
Plato, Plato in Twelve Volumes. Vol. 3 translated by W.R.M. Lamb, Loeb Classical Library
(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press: 1967).
Plato, Plato in Twelve Volumes. Vols. 5 and 6 translated by Paul Shorey, Loeb Classical
Library (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press: 1969).
Plato, Plato in Twelve Volumes. Vols. 10 and 11 translated by R.G. Bury, Loeb Classical
Library (Cambridge, MA: 1967–1968).
Plutarch, Plutarch’s Moralia with an English translation in Fourteen Volumes. Vol. 1.
Translated by F.C. Babbitt, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA and London:
Harvard University Press, 1927).
Plutarch, Plutarch’s Lives with an English translation in Eleven Volumes. Vol. 1. Translated
by B. Perrin, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard
Polybius, The Histories. Translated by W.R. Paton. 6 vols., Loeb Classical Library
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

36 Papademetriou
9.2 Lexicons
Danker, F.W. et al. [BDAG], A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early
Christian literature, (3d ed.; Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
Kittel, G., and Friedrich, G. eds. Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. Translated
by G.W. Bromiley. 10 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1964–1976).
LSJ, The Online Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English Lexicon.
Lust, J., Eynikel, E. and Hauspie, K., A Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint: Revised
Edition (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2003).
Moulton, J.H. and G. Milligan, The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament Illustrated from
the Papyri and Other Non-Literary Sources (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957).
Muraoka, T., A Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint (Leuven: Peeters, 2009).
9.3 Secondary Literature

Austin, John L. How to do things with words (eds. M. Sbisà and J.O. Urmson, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 21975).
Bishop, Jonathan, “Parabole and parrhesia in Mark,” Interpretation 40 (1986): 39–52.
Botha, J.E., Jesus and the Samaritan Woman: A Speech Act Reading of John 4:1–42 (Leiden:
Brill, 1991).
Briggs, R.S., Words in Action. Speech Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation (Edinburgh:
T & T Clark, 2001).
Bouttier, Michel, “Sur la parrhesia dans le Nouveau Testament,” in Parola e Spirito.
Studi in onore di Settimio Cipriani 1. (ed. C.C. Marcheselli; Brescia: Paedeia Editrice
Brescia, 1982), 611–621.
Carter, D., “Citizen attribute, negative right: A conceptual difference between ancient
and modern ideas for freedom of speech,” in Free Speech in Classical Antiquity (eds.
Ineke Sluiter and Ralph M. Rosen; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 197–220.
Denis, A.-M. and Dejonge, M. eds. The Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs (Leiden: Brill,
1985).
DuPlessis, J.G., “Speech Act Analysis and New Testament Interpretation with Special
Reference to G.N. Leech’s Pragmatic Principles,” in Text and Interpretation: New
Approaches to the Criticism of the New Testament (eds. P.J. Hartin and J.-H. Petzer;
Leiden, 1991), 129–142.
Fields, Dana Farah, “The Rhetoric of Παρρησία in Roman Greece” (Ph.D. diss. Princeton
University, 2009).
Fiore, Benjamin, “The Pastoral Epistles in the Light of Philodemus’ ‘On Frank Criticism’,”
in Philodemus and the New Testament World (eds. J.T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink and
Glenn S. Holland; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 271–294.
Fitzgerald, J.T., Obbink, Dirk and Holland, Glenn S., eds. Philodemus and the New
Testament World (Leiden: Brill, 2004).

Foucault, Michel, The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France,
1982–1983 (New York: Picador, 2011).
Glotz, Gustave, The Greek City and its Institutions (transl. by N. Mallinson; London and
New York: 1929).
Grice, H.P., “Logic and Conversation,” in Syntax and Semantics (eds. P. Cole and
J.L. Morgan; New York: Academic Press, 1975), 41–58.
Grice, H.P., Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1989).
Halliday, M.A., Language as Social Semiotic: The Social Interpretation of Language and
Meaning (London: Arnold, 1978).
Horsley, G.H.R., New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity, vol. 5. Linguistic Essays
(Macquarie University; The Ancient History Documentary Research Centre, 1989).
Lyons, Evangeline Zephyr, “Hellenic Philosophers as Ambassadors to the Roman
Empire: Performance, Parrhesia, and Power” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2011).
Marrow, Stanley B., “Parrhesia and the New Testament,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 44
(1982): 431–446.
Mulhern, J.J., “Παρρησία in Aristotle,” in Free Speech in Classical Antiquity (eds. Ineke
Sluiter and Ralph M. Rosen; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 313–339.
Neufeld, D., Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: An Analysis of 1 John (Leiden: Brill, 1994).
Raaflaub, Kurt A., “Aristocracy and Freedom of Speech in the Graeco-Roman World,”
in Free Speech in Classical Antiquity (eds. Ineke Sluiter and Ralph M. Rosen; Leiden:
Brill, 2004), 41–61.
Rajak, Tessa, Translation and Survival: The Greek Bible of the Ancient Jewish Diaspora
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
Roisman, Hanna M., “Women’s Free Speech in the Greek Tragedy,” in Free Speech in
Classical Antiquity (eds. Ineke Sluiter and Ralph M. Rosen; Leiden: Brill, 2004),
91–113.
Sampley, J. Paul, “Paul’s Frank Speech with the Galatians and the Corinthians,” in
Philodemus and the New Testament world. (eds. J.T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink and
Searle, J.R., Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge
Scarpat, Giuseppe, Parrhesia. Storia del Termine et delle sue Traduzioni in Latino
(Brescia: Paideia, 1964).
Thiselton, Anthony, “The Parables as Language Event: Some Comments on Fuch’s
Hermeneutics in the Light of Linguistic Philosophy,” Scottish Journal of Theology 23
(1970): 437–460.
Thiselton, Anthony, New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of
Transforming Biblical Reading (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1992).

38 Papademetriou
Tovey, D., Narrative Art and Act in the Fourth Gospel (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic
Press, 1997).
Trudgill, Peter, “Sociolinguistics: An Overview,” in Sociolinguistics. An International
Handbook of the Science of Language and Society. Vol. 1/1 (eds. Ulrich Ammon,
Norbert Dittmar, Klaus J. Mattheier and Peter Trudgill; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,
22004), 1–5.
Unnik, W.C. van, “The Semitic Background of παρρησία in the New Testament,” in idem,
Sparsa Collecta (Leiden: Brill, 1980).
Upton, B.G., Hearing Mark’s Endings: Listening to Popular Ancient Texts through Speech
Act Analysis (Leiden: Brill, 2006).
Vaage, Leif E., “Like dogs barking: Cynic παρρησία and Shameless Sscetism,” Semeia 57
(1992): 25–39.
Winter, Bruce W., “Philodemus and Paul on Rhetorical Delivery (ὑπόκρισις),” in
Philodemus and the New Testament World (eds. J.T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink and
Wirszubski, Ch., Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early
Principate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950).
Yule, George, Pragmatics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
9.4 Papyri and Inscriptions

Agora 16 = Woodhead, A. Geoffrey, Inscriptions. The Decrees. (Princeton: American
School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1997).
IG V, 1 = Inscriptiones Graecae, V, 1. Inscriptiones Laconiae et Messeniae (Walter Kolbe,
ed.; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1913).
IG XII, 5 = Inscriptiones Graecae XII,5. Inscriptiones Cycladum (Friedrich Hiller von
Gaertringen, ed.;. 2 vols. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1903–1909).
IScM III = Inscriptiones Daciae et Scythiae Minoris antiquae. Series altera: Inscriptiones
Scythiae Minoris graecae et latinae. Vol. 3. Callatis et territorium (Alexandru Avram,
ed.; Bucharest: Institutul de Arheologia, 2000).
IvP I = Die Inschriften von Pergamon 2 vols. “Altertümer von Pergamon”, 8,1–2, Vol 1.
(Max Fränkel, ed.; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1890).
PMich VIII = Winter, J.G. and Youtie, H.C., PMich VIII (Ann Harbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1951).
PMich VIII = Winter, J.G.—Youtie, H.C., PMich VIII, 1951.
PMich VIII = Youtie, H.C., Scriptiunculae I, 1973.
For more info see online: http://aquila.zaw.uni-heidelberg.de/hgv/27112 and https://
www.trismegistos.org/tm/detail.php?quick=27112.
TAM I.I. = Tituli Asiae Minoris, I. Tituli Lyciae lingua Lycia conscripti (ed. Ernst Kalinka;
Vienna: Ö sterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1901).


Papademetriou - Performative Meaning of the Word παρρησία in Ancient Greek and in the Greek Bible

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Papademetriou - Performative Meaning of the Word παρρησία in Ancient Greek and in the Greek Bible

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Papademetriou - Performative Meaning of the Word παρρησία in Ancient Greek and in the Greek Bible

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Part 1

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

The Performative Meaning of the Word παρρησία in

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi:10.1163/9789004376090_003

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

2 The Roots of the Word Παρρησία

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

3 The Ancient Greek Social Context

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

4 The Classical Textual Evidence

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

Democracies, however, possess many other just and noble features, to

A speaker’s display of justice and truth with παρρησία (παρρησιαστής) bestows

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

Another example from Euripides is in his Hippolytus, when Phaedra refers

20 Euripides, Hippolytos, 424–425 (transl. D. Kovacs).

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

as respectable and credible. Therefore, a performative speech act is apparent

4.1 Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman Context

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

– AJ 2.131.3: “for, being conscious of no crime, they spoke boldly, supposing

And I should advise those desirous of becoming fathers of notable off-

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

– “because he behaved with justice towards the underprivileged and he “acted

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

5 The Usage of Παρρησία in the Septuagint

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

his promises to them, or in reference to the people’s certainty and confidence

6 The New Testament Usage of Παρρησία

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

In Hellenistic times παρρησία was mainly determined by the virtue of some-

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

9.1 Ancient Sources

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

9.3 Secondary Literature

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

9.4 Papyri and Inscriptions

Kyriakoula Papademetriou - 9789004376090

You might also like

20 Euripides, Hippolytos, 424–425 (transl. D. Kovacs).