Military Violence Against Civilians The Case of The Congolese and Zairean Military in The Pedicle 1890-1988

Board of Trustees, Boston University
Military Violence against Civilians: The Case of the Congolese and Zairean Military in the
Pedicle 1890-1988
Author(s): Mwelwa C. Musambachime
Source: The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1990), pp. 643-
664
Published by: Boston University African Studies Center
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/219502 .
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The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 23, 4 (1990) 643
MILITARY VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS:

THE CASE OF THE CONGOLESE AND ZAIREAN
MILITARY IN THE PEDICLE 1890-1988
By Mwelwa C. Musambachime
Violence is not power but [it is] an instrument of power.
- Hannah Arendt
The deciding factor in every social relation of power is, in the

last resort, the superiority of physical force.
- Wilhelm Liebknecht
In studying political organization, we have to deal with the

maintenance of social order, within a territorial framework by
organized exercise of coercive authority through the use, or
the possibility of use, of physical force . . . the policy and the
army are instruments by which coercion is exercised.
- A.R. Radcliffe-Brown1
These quotations underline the focus of our study: the use of violence as an
instrument of power. Max Weber's famous definition of power that "one actor [or
a number of actors] within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out
his [or her] own will despite resistance" helps to focus on the repressive or
manipulative processes of power and the conditions within which obedient wills
are created through the threat of the use of force.2 Force, as we shall see in this
paper, is a crucial element in a particular transformation or disposition, not
merely in the keeping of order among the citizens.3
Violence as an instrument of power is exercised by the army-one of the
most efficient instruments for establishing a ruler's influence. In his analysis of
patrimonial authority, Weber gives special attention to the structure and social
organization of the military forces. In doing so he identifies four basic types of
military organizations used in these particular situations. The first consists of
peasants, slaves, serfs, or other subordinates who are given land in exchange for
their services. This, he notes, is highly unstable, for once the dependents are
settled on the land, their involvement in agricultural work lessens their
1Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York, 1970) 35; Wilhelm Liebknecht, Karl Marx: Biographical
Memoirs (translated by Ernest Untermann) (Chicago, 1908) 301; M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard,eds.,
African Political Systems (London, 1969),xiv.
2Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Glencoe, 1947) 152; Max Weber,
"Politics as a Vocation" in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essay in Sociology
(London, 1951),55-61.
3Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Hammondsworth, 1969), 27-84; B. Marie Perinbam,
"Violence, Morality, and History in the Colonial Syndrome: Frantz Fanon's Perspectives," Journal of
Southern African Affairs, 3, 1 (January 1978), 7-34.

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POSITION OF THE CONGO PEDICLE

MILITARY VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS 645
effectiveness as fighters. Consequently, a ruler has to organize a military force to

protect his interests consisting of former slaves who are not involved in
agriculture and are cut off from the local society. Such an army is held together
by adequate and regular pay, without which it cannot function as a disciplined
force. Third is the recruitment of mercenaries, composed of foreigners having no
real contact with the subject population. And fourth is the formation of a
personal army recruited from the less privileged social strata, which is
transformed into a national army to protect the interests of the ruler.4
Weber's typology provides a useful starting point in our study of the use
of violence by the military against civilians with reference to the Belgian Congo
(now Zaire)-particularly in the area known as the Pedicle. Here, the Belgian
administrators were referred to as "Bula Matare" ("Breaker of rocks") by the
Africans to describe the brutality of their administration and maltreatment of
the colonized Africans. The Belgians proudly used this name to refer to their
administration.5 During the colonial period, the Congolese military closely
approximated the second and third types in Weber's typology while the post-
colonial military resembles the fourth. The Congolese military, as various studies
show, exercised brutal force and violence on the population-a legacy which
continues today.6
Crawford Young, who has made an extensive study of political processes
in the former Belgian Congo, advises that "no summary of the Congolese [or for
that matter the Zairean] political scene can ignore the instrument of force" and
violence associated with the army. The Congolese spoke the "language of pure
force," accompanied by violence and force.7 In this, the Congolese army were not
alone. Other armies and police forces in other parts of Africa, were products of
violent systems, as Allen and Barbara Isaacman, John MacCracken, and Phyllis
Martin have shown. In maintaining law and order, enforcing authority, and
protecting the interests of the colonial powers, the soldiers and policemen
employed intimidation, undisguised coercion, and violence to support their
4Quotedin C. WrightMills,The Power Elite (New York,1956),171.

5Accordingto Vellut, MbulaMatarior BoulaMatariwasan imageof "a'colonialhero'who wantedto
be fearedfor his strengthandadmiredfor his wealth."Jean-LucVellut,"Miningin BelgianCongo,"in David
Birminghamand Phyllis Martin,eds., History of Central Africa, II (London,1983),162;see also his
"Materiaux pourreconstituerl'imagedu blancau CongoBeige 1900-1960," in J. L. Vellut, ed., Stereotypes
nationaux prejuge's raciaux xixeme et xxeme slecles (Louvaina la Neuve, 1982),91-116;See also J.
Crockaert,Bula Matari ou le Congo Belge (Brussels,1929);M. CrawfordYoung,The Politics of the
Congo: Decolonizationand Independence (Princeton,1965),98; Guy Burrows,The Curse of Central
Africa (London,1903),83.
6E.D. Morel,Red Rubber(London,1907),see also his King Leopold'sRule in Africa (London,1904);
L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan,The Rulers of Belgian Africa (Princeton,1979);CrawfordYoung and
ThomasTurner,The Rise and Decline of the Zairean State (Madison,1985),4-5;BryantShaw,"Fore
Publique:ForceUnique.The Militaryin the BelgianCongo1914-1939"(Ph.D.thesis,Universityof Wisconsin,
1984).
7Young,The Politics of the Congo,438.

predatory inclinations.8 What differentiates the Congolese army from these other
examples is the degree of violence. The use of force in the Belgian Congo which
had few parallels in Africa, and has been studied by a number of scholars. In
addition, there are a number of commentaries by visitors from the early 1900s.9
Origins
The beginning of the Belgian Congo as a colonial state began in 1876 when King
Leopold I of Belgium founded the International African State. In 1885, the name
was changed to Congo Free State. It had very flexible boundaries, which were
later legalized by treaties with Portugal, Britain, and Germany. The treaty to
formalize the boundary between North-East Rhodesia, North-West Rhodesia,
and the Congo Free State was signed on 12 May 1894 by Belgium and Great
Britain. The boundary as delimited covered the southern section of the Congo
Free State, which stretched from the southern shore of Lake Tanganyika to Lake
Mweru, then along the Luapula River to Lake Mweru, then along the Mpanta
Meridian (Latitude 11 41' S. Longitude 29 49' E) to the Congo-Zambezi watershed,
then along it to Longitude 24 E, which formed a tripartite boundary point
separating Angola, Congo Free State, and North-West Rhodesia.10 As so defined,
the boundary created a narrow piece of land known as the Pedicle, which jutted
between North-East and North-West Rhodesia, almost separating the two (see
map). The presence of the Pedicle created transportation difficulties between
North-East and North-West Rhodesia, prompting the British South African
Company (or BSAC), the administering power to appeal to the British
government for a readjustment of the boundary with Belgium.11 The BSAC made
several proposals which included exchange of land either along the northern
boundary between Lakes Mweru and Tanganyika or west of the Kafue River in
what is today the Zambian Copperbelt for the southern portion of the Pedicle,
which would allow the administration to establish its communication lines
between North-East and North-West Rhodesia on "firm ground." The Belgians
rejected all these proposals.12
The Congo Free State, as created by Leopold, fitted the Weberian
definition of a state "founded on the use of force," with the right to use it
8john MacCracken, "Coercionand Control in Nyasaland: Aspects of the History of a Colonial Force",
Journal of African History, 27, 1 (1986), 127-47; Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, Mozambique:
From Colonialism to Revolution (Boulder, 1983),29-31, 34, 37, 42; Phyllis Martin, "The Violence of Empire,"
in David Birmingham and Phyllis M. Martin, eds., History of Central Africa II (London, 1983),20-21.
9Ilunga Kabongo, "Ethnicity, Social Classes and the State in the Congo 1900-1965:The Case of the
Baluba" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California-Berkeley, 1973), 202-03; J.M. Moubray, In South
Central Africa (London, 1912),127-9;Reports by correspondents of the Livingstone Mail, 27 July 1912 and
4 January 1913.
10A. Castlein, The Congo State (New York, 1907), 23-26; P. Jentgen, Les frontieres du Congo Belge
(Brussels, 1962), 12; E. Hertslett, The Map of Africa by Treaty, II (London, 1967), 553; A. A. Keith, The
Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act (London, 1962), 6.
11Mwelwa C. Musambachime, "How the Kaputa Border Row Flared Up," Sunday Times, 15 July 1984,
5.
12Raymond L. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, II (London, 1965),497.

whenever it pleased those in power.13 Force and violence were freely used to cow
the African population and drive them into the collection of rubber and ivory,
which went to enrich Leopold's account. To ensure that there was no interruption
in the flow of these goods and to maintain law and "order and ... enforce its
command," the Congo Free State established the Force Publique in 1885, which
performed both military and police functions. Initially all the recruits in the
Force Publique were foreign Africans from East Africa (Zanzibar, Somalia, and
Ethiopia) and West Africa (Nigeria, Gold Coast, Dahomey, and Sierra Leone),
who were commonly referred to as Hausa. They were labor migrants as well as
mercenaries similar to those employed by East African traders who operated in
the parts of the Congo before the establishment of the colonial state.l4
In 1885, recruitment of the Congolese into the Force Publique began. At
first it was voluntary but due to the low pay being offered-30 centimes a day
(amounting to 9 francs) for first enlistment and 55 centimes per day (amounting
to 16 francs, 50 centimes) per month, only one-third of what was paid to
government and railway employees-few volunteers offered themselves.15 To
augment the number of volunteers, the government resorted to conscription.
Chiefs were asked to send conscripts, and usually slaves, impoverished people,
prisoners, criminals, the chronically ill, and mentally disturbed in the community
were sent.l6 This state of affairs continued throughout the colonial period. The
annual report on the army for 1954 noted that "many recruits from urban centers
were assigned to the army because of their undesirable traits. The Territorial
administration often recruited them in the Force rather than send them back to
the villages."17 The Commission for the Protection of Natives in 1919 stated that
when the administration recruited directly, "the hunt for men throws terror into
the villages, provokes rebellions, and arouses towards the Administration a state
of surly defiance and hostility."18 The Force Publique was unpopular among the
Congolese, as statistics given by Raymond Buell indicated.19
Initially, a large portion of recruits in the Force Publique came from the
Azande, Batetela, and Bangala groups from the North-east part of the Congo,
regarded by the Belgians as the most aggressive and warlike of the Congolese
ethnic groups.20 According to one source, the Belgians hoped to turn to a "loftier
cause the enthusiasm [these groups showed] in their domestic struggles."21 After
13Gannand Duignan, The Rulers of Belgian Africa, 73; 225; Buell, The Native Problem, II, 496.
1Gann and Duignan, The Rulers of Belgian Africa, 73.
5Buell, The Native Problem, II, 497.

16Ibid., 497; Gann and Duignan, The Rulers of Belgian Africa, 76-77.
17Belgian Congo, Rapport sur l'administration de la Colonie (Brussels, 1954), 49.
18Belgian Congo, Bulletin Official du Congo Belge 1920, 647, quoted in Buell, Native Problem, II,
497.
19RaymondBuell gives the breakdown of the Camp at Elisabethville which had about 565 soldiers: 363
were conscripts (64 percent); 66 volunteers (11.1percent); 86 enlisted (15 percent)-50 of whom had served 16
years or more and 36 had served more than seven years. Buell, Native Problem, II, 497.
20Gann and Duignan, The Rulers of Belgian Africa, 76; Young, The Politics of the Congo, 438.
21Anonymous, "Mutiniere au Congo,"in Bulletin Militaire (March, 1947), 21.

the mutiny in the Batetela groups in Luluaborg in 1896, enlistment spread to

other ethnic groups in the Congo.22 And using a policy of social distance which
was also widely used in Mozambique, the Rhodesias and South Africa, the
recruits in the Force Publique were "deliberately posted away from their own
area [of origin] lest they [would] be swayed by local sympathies."23In short the
soldiers became foreigners among the Congolese people.
The Force Publique soldiers performed the same functions as soldiers and
policemen in other parts of Africa. Writing about the Nyasaland police, John
MacCracken has observed that they served as
as frontline troops in the struggle to uphold the authority of

government, the police played a crucial role in sustaining
imperial control at the cheapest possible cost. Through their
employment, the state was able to ensure that hut tax was
paid, labour was coerced, workers discipline and European
property protected.24
Apart from these responsibilities, the Force Publique soldiers also

supervised the building of government posts and construction of roads. Above all,
they preserved the entity of the colonial state.25
In employing social distance, the Belgians also saw to it that the Force
Publique was alienated from the Congolese masses. This was strongly enforced
by the Belgian officers who sought to instill in the troops an esprit de corps based
on loyalty to the state. They encouraged the use of Lingala, a lingua franca used
by traders trading in the Upper Congo and along the Congo River to enhance
the pride of the troops and create a sense of belonging to a military elite.26 An
article in the 1954 BulletinMilitairestressed this element:
the best remedy for subversion and corruption in the army is

the isolation of troops by inculcating a positive zealotry
towards their craft and mobility of military ideals [by teaching
them] to despise the masses who lack military discipline.27
This point was later touched on, in 1974, by General Molongya Mayikusa,
then chief of cabinet in the Ministry of Defence who observed that the Force
Publique
used to resemble an army of mercenaries who lived removed
from the population at large. This is reflected in the fact that
the soldier considered himself an elite, while viewing civilians
as nothing but "savages."The soldier [was] a person without
22Gann and Duignan, The Rulers of Belgian Africa, 76-77.
23Martin, "The Violence of the Empire,"16-17.

24MacCracken,"Coercionand Control,"127.
25Buell, Native Problem, II, 496.
26Anon., "Mutinerie au Congo,"21.

faith or soul, torturers of the civil population, and furthermore

ignorant. The antagonism was exploited to a point where the
military and the civil populations, though united by blood,
thoroughly and profoundly detested one another....28
The Congolese soldiers drank excessively, beat up civilians, stole their

valuables, set fire to villages, and raped women at will. They also supplemented
their low wages by extorting food, chickens, livestock, fish and beer from the
local people. Others made false arrests as a prelude to extorting bribes.29 They
disregarded with impunity, the authority of chiefs and headmen while carrying
out their duties. Their uniform was associated with terror. The method used did
not bother the officials as long as the quotas were met. Some soldiers, according
to Buell's and Moubray's accounts, became "tyrants," levying rubber and ivory on
their own account as well as their masters'.30 No action was taken against them.
A report in the Livingstone Mail gives an example of the policemen:
[The] Native policemen do as they like-preying on other

natives.... This sort of thing occurs openly even in the
presence of Europeans who are not anxious to parade their
altruism, but take pains to conceal their disgust. If such
conditions obtain in towns, what must be the state of things
outside where these tyrants are not even under such
ineffective restraint as their inexperienced officers care to
exercise.31
The answer is that they were worse. To meet quotas and have a surplus
for themselves, the soldiers employed various methods: holding chiefs, women,
and children for ransom, burning villages as a form of warning or punishment,
and flogging. The Force Publique attained a notorious reputation for indiscipline
and violence.32 Dugald Campbell, a missionary in charge at Johnston Falls-
27Young and Turner, The Rise, 363, 449.

28Quoted in Young and Turner, The Rise and Decline, 263.
29According to Buell, the Force Publique were paid 30 centimes a day (about 9 francs per month), on
first enlistment. On the second it rose to 55 centimes (16-50 francs per month). These wages were a third of
what government paid. The low salaries were supplemented by payments of four yards of blue cloth to the
soldier and another four to the wife. The cost of one man in the Force Publique was estimated by Buell to
be about i21 per year, while in Uganda it was £36. Buell, Native Problem, II, 496, 498.
30Ibid., 498; Moubray, In South Central Africa, 127-28; Livingstone Mail, 27 July 1912, 4 January
1913.
31Livingstone Mail, 27 July 1912. In a report to the high commissioner for South Africa, the resident
commissioner recalled after a tour of Katanga that "I was told the conduct of the native police leaves much
to be desired and that in their dealings with the native they are inadequately controlled by their officers.
Such defects as may exist in the administration of the native would seem however as a rule to be due to
ineffectiveness rather than any 'mauvaise volont6' on the part of the Europeans." National Archives of
Zambia (NAZ), BS 3/405: Resident Commissioner Salisbury to High Commissioner, 29 September 1917;
Moubray, In South Central Africa, 128.
32Buell, Native Problem, 497.

Mambilima on the lower Luapula has left a graphic account of the state of
affairs:
I have made a journey myself [to several parts of Katanga]

and found the [soldiers] everywhere living like kings,
plundering, killing and burning villages in the name of the
State'. .. Every time I made representations they were
declared impossible or the answer was "I shall ask my head
sentry to make inquiries," the head sentries being one of the
worst blackguards in the country. Nothing was ever proved.
He could not believe that his soldiers could be guilty of such
misconduct or "well, they must have carte blanche or the
natives would not respect the State." Sometimes "Might is
Right" would be the curt reply.33
With officials giving the soldiers carte blanche to act as they pleased, the
pillaging and plunder in the countryside reached such proportions that
administrative officials and soldiers and administrative stations were shunned.34
A number of villages living along the boundary quickly moved to North-East
Rhodesia. "The wholesale exodus," reported Campbell, "is due to Belgian raiding
and maltreatment of natives."35These atrocities only stopped after the issue of
"red rubber" was given wide publicity in Europe by Morel and others. Although
the Belgian officers deplored their behavior, they appeared incapable of
enforcing discipline. As a result, the Force Publique attained a notorious
reputation for indiscipline and violence.
The Force Publique were also deployed in the Pedicle. Here they held
senior positions commanding troops drawn from the local ethnic groups (Yeke,
Sanga, Nyamwezi, and Lunda) who enlisted for three years. These troops were,
according to one source, a more "well trained .. . efficient and reliable force than
what the British had in North West Rhodesia or North East Rhodesia." In the
Pedicle they were stationed at Kalonga and Sakania.36
Military Violence along the Sokontwe-SerenjeRoad
The presence of the Congo Pedicle created an immediate problem for the British
South Africa Company: that of communication between Fort Rosebery and
Ndola and between Fort Rosebery and Serenje. The area between Serenje and
Sokontwe, which lay in North-East Rhodesia, was covered by the Bangweulu
Swamps making it impossible to have road communication linking the two
administrative stations. In spite of this difficulty, Harrington, the native
commissioner at Fort Rosebery constructed a road between Fort Rosebery and
33Quoted in E. D. Morel, Red Rubber (London, 1919),45.
34Dugald Campbell, in the Echoes of Service (September, 1898), 92.

35See example, Red Rubber and King Leopolds.
36NAZ/BS1/83 Vol. I: J. E. Stephenson, Ndola, to Administrator (North-East Rhodesia), 23 August 1903;

NAZ/B S1/85 Vol. II: H. Harrington to, Fort Rosebery to Administrator 13 July 1903.

H
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Sokontwe on the upper Luapula in 1901.37And Hector Croad constructed another

road linking Serenje to the Luombwa, where it crosses the Mpanta Meridian. This
point and Sokontwe were separated by a distance of 40 miles (about 64
kilometers), which lay in the Pedicle.38 The use of this stretch required
permission from the Belgian authorities. The alternative route was to go from
Serenje to Mpika, Kasama, and Luena (a forerunner to Luwingu) before reaching
Fort Rosebery-a distance of nearly 1,000 kilometers, which took three to four
weeks as opposed to five to six days between Fort Rosebery and Serenje via
Sokontwe.39 Permission was granted on a number of conditions requiring those
using the road to be in possession of a pass issued by the native commissioner's
office, and not to carry a gun or recruit labor in the Pedicle. The route was
opened in January 1902 and was largely used by mail runners employed by the
BSAC administration, porters employed by the African Lakes Corporation to
transport merchandise from Fort Jameson to Fort Rosebery for distribution in
their shops in Mweru-Luapula, and by large caravans of porters engaged by the
Tanganyika Concessions Limited to transport goods from the port of Chinde on
the Indian Ocean and from Karonga on the northern part of Lake Nyasa to
Kambove in Katanga, where the company was involved in prospecting for
copper and other minerals.40
Although porters, mail runners, and caravans observed the conditions laid
down by Major Weyns who was in charge of the operations of the Comite'
Spe'cial du Katanga (CSK), their security was not assured at all. Almost
immediately after the opening of the route, reports started reaching the native
commissioner at Fort Rosebery that mail runners and caravans were being
attacked, beaten, and robbed by Congolese soldiers. Mail bags were seized and
scattered while loads of merchandise were impounded. Some mail runners and
porters were mutilated and in some cases murdered.41 According to Robert
Wright, a trader operating in the Sokintwe area, these soldiers "roamed about
uncontrolled" committing atrocities. They "instilled fear [in the local people] who
were terrified in dread of their visits."42 European traders were not spared either.
Several were attacked and beaten, and their goods stolen; two were known to
have been murdered.43 In 1903, the frequency of attacks increased. In June,
another attack occurred. H. T. Harrington, native commissioner for Luapula, filed
a report with the administrator as follows:
37NAZ/KDF 3/1: Mweru-Luapula District Note Book (MLDN), Vol. 1, p. 496; Vol. III, p. 496; Vol II, p.
498.
38H. C. Dann, The Romance of Posts of Rhodesia, British Central Africa and Nyasaland
(London, 1940), 63-64, 90.
39NAZ/BS1/83 Vol I; Administrator to Secretary (BSAC), 7 July 1902.
40NAZ/KDF 3/1: MLDNB Vol. I, p. 496.
41NAZ/BS1/83 Vol II: Harrington to Administrator, 13 July 1903.
42Robert Wright, "Trading on the Luapula 1900-1904 Part I," Northern Rhodesia Journal, 5, 2 (1962),
268; 489-90.
43NAZ/BS3/85: Administrator to Secretary, BSAC, 7 July 1902: J. Wills, to Civil Commissioner, 18 July
1902; Wright, "Trading," 489-90.

I had to go to the Belgian station at Kalonga. There has been

trouble again on the mail road again, our mail carriers were
knocked down, their uniform torn off and mail bags carried
off.... It was [on the] orders of the Belgian Police.44
On 13 July, he filed another report on the
assault by the Belgian Police on two British South African

Company mail carriers on the road between sokontwi (sic) and
the Luwombo (sic) River. The mail carriers started off from
Sokontwi with the Fort Jameson mail on the morning of 20th
of June, they were supplied with a pass as was required by the
Belgians. At Paula's Village, 10 miles along the road they were
met by men of Bula Matar [chef de poste, Kalonga] who asked
what they were doing. They answered that they were
Sokontwi mail carriers. They were knocked down, their
uniforms torn off, the mail taken from them also they were
beaten and tied up and kept there til about 4:00 p.m.... when
they were to go on their way... by Kalonga Police out of
uniform and they had a gun.45
Harrington went to see the chef de poste, who regretted the incidence and
apologized. He also assured that such incidences would not occur. This of course
was of little value because "he seemed to have little control over his askari
[soldiers] who seem to do much as they please and were none too respectful
towards me."46The attacks continued. On one occasion, in August 1903, Robert
Wright had to fire on the Congolese soldiers attacking a caravan to scare them
off. As a result of his action, the road was closed, disrupting traffic between
Serenje and Sokontwe.47 It was reopened soon after some negotiations. This
became a pattern which was a forerunner to what was to happen frequently after
1960.
The beating of porters and mail runners and the frequent closures of the
road did not please the North-East Rhodesia administrators. On 7 July 1903, the
administrator wrote to the secretary of the BSAC requesting him to ask the
Foreign Office to "obtain from the Congo Government, either an admission of
our right of way or a definite and permanent arrangement which will enable us
to maintain communication across the Pedicle." He went on to add that
Free and uninterrupted communication between Sokontwe and

Serenje is most desirable for both administrative and
commercial reasons and I do not think the Congo
Government can refuse to accede to such a reasonable and
necessary arrangement, especially in view of the fact that
passage of travellers and merchandise and mail from the
44NAZ/BS1/83 Vol. II: Harrington to Administrator, 27, 1902.
45NAZ/BS1/83 Vol. II: Harrington to Administrator, 13 July 1902.
46NAZ/BS1/83 Vol. II: Harrington to Administrator, 13 July 1903.

Congo Free State through North East Rhodesia endured many

years absolutely free and unrestricted.48
Although the Rhodesian officials knew that the Congo Free State officials were
"determined to make things as unpleasant as possible" for them, they did not wish
to retaliate in kind by stopping the transit of mails and good from Karonga to
Kambove.49 They continued to plead with the Belgian officials to keep the road
open. The road continued to operate in a state of insecurity until September 1910.
Caravans were regularly stopped, with traders beaten and robbed. When the
Rhodesian authorities brought too many complaints to the Belgian authorities,
the latter's response was to close the road without prior warning and reopen it
whenever it suited them. The Rhodesian authorities were completely helpless to
do anything.50
Between 1904 and 1910, the road assumed an additional importance in that
it was now being used by recruited and voluntary labor to travel to Broken Hill
(now Kabwe) Mine, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa to work either in the
mines or on the farms. Mining and agriculture required an abundant supply of
cheap labor. To tap this labor, the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau was formed in
1904 and in the same year, started recruiting labor for Southern Rhodesia from
both North-East and North-West Rhodesia. Labor recruited from the area lying
between Sokontwe and Lake Mweru used the Sokontwe-Serenje road. Returning
migrants carried boxes "weighing 50 to 60 lbs containing the usual collection of
clothes . ..[and] the usual ... household utensils and very often a sewing machine
or bicycle."51 Some of these were ambushed by the Congolese soldiers who
arrested them on trivial charges, and intimidated, harassed, and beat them up
before stealing their goods.52 Numerous complaints were made to the Rhodesian
officials on the insecurity of the road. As a solution to the problem, a proposal
was made to construct the Serenje-Sokontwe road within North-East Rhodesia.
Surveys were conducted and estimates made; however, the lack of sufficient
funds made it impossible to construct the road.53 It had to wait for independent
Zambia, using Chinese aid, to finally construct the road which now links Serenje
with Mansa.54 The outbreak of sleeping sickness in 1908/09 along the upper
47Wright, "Trading,"489-90.
48NAZ/BS1/83 Vol. II: Administrator to Secretary BSAC, 7 July 1903.
49NAZ/KDF 3/1: MLDNB Vol. III, p. 16.
50NAZ/MLDNB, Vol. III, 496; Dugald Campbell's letter to the Board of Directors of the Plymouth
Brethren, published in the Echoes of Service, (1904), 317.
51Archives of the Council of World Missions: London Missionary Society: Central Africa
(ACWM/LMS/CA: H.C. Nutter, Annual Report for Mbereshi Mission from 1919:Interview: Safeli Chibwe,
Mansa, 27 March 1975.
52Interview: Mwansa Nsakanya, Chisembe, 19 April 1975.
53Mwelwa C. Musambachime"Originsof the Samya-SerenjeRoad" unpublished paper, 10-14:NAZ/KSK
3/1: Serenje District Notebook, Vol. I, p. 72.
54The road took over ten years to complete; it was opened in 1983.

Luapula River forced the administration to look for an alternative route to link
North-East and North-West Rhodesia.55
Kapalala-Sakania Road
The problems faced by labor migrants on the Sokontwe-Serenje road forced

many to look for an alternate route. They found one linking Kapalala with
Sakania and Sakania with Ndola. It was merely a footpath but it reduced the
number of days taken to reach Ndola via Serenje from fourteen to only three or
four days.56 By 1908, the Native Labour Bureau and other recruiting agents for
Bwana Mkubwa were using the path to ferry their labor to employment
centers.57 In 1909 when the railway line reached Ndola and made it into a
terminus for Mweru-Luapula, the route assumed additional importance. Goods
destined for Fort Rosebery, Kawambwa Chienge, and Luwingu were left at Ndola
to be transported to Fort Rosebery and other destinations by porters across the
Pedicle. This was further enhanced during the First World War when it became
an important transit route for ferrying war materials to the front. In 1916, the
Northern Rhodesia administration sought and got permission from the governor
general of the Belgian Congo to upgrade the route to an all-weather gravel road
to allow motorized transport to move faster in carrying food and material
between Ndola and Kabunda.58 In addition, a large number of recruits to and
from employment centers in Ndola, Broken Hill, Southern Rhodesia and South
Africa used the route. The pattern of incidents occurring along the Serenje-
Sokontwe road were duplicated. Soldiers deployed at Sakania and Kabunda often
waylaid caravans and returning migrants. In 1911, the Livingstone Mail carried an
article stating that "small parties of one or two [migrant workers] returning home
ran the [risk of arrest by the Askaris]. The Native Police conduct their inquiries
with fixed bayonets at the ready and their white soldiers with loaded revolvers in
either hand."59 In such circumstances, migrant workers who continued the
practice of carrying boxes or huge loads were asked to unload their goods and
produce receipts for each item. Those which could not be authenticated were
confiscated. Customs duty was paid on sewing machines and bicycles. Unlucky
migrants were beaten and robbed of their money and goods-even if they had
passes authorizing them to pass through the Pedicle.60 Those found without
passes were arrested on the spot and jailed for a month. They were then deployed
55On the impact of sleeping sickness, see Mwelwa C. Musambachime, "Social and Economic Effects of
Sleeping Sickness,"African Economic History, 10, (1981).
56Nsakanya.
57Interview: Joseph Pardon Mansa, 26 April 1975;NAZ/KDF 3/1 MLDNB, Vol. III, 496.
58Nsakanya;Pardon;Chambala Kafutu, Mansa, 21 April 1975.
59Livingstone Mail, :9 December 1911.

6H. C. Marshall, "Water Transport in the Bangweulu Swamps,"Northern Rhodesia Journal, 3, 3
(1956), 189; NAZ/ZA1/9/18/38: E. H. Goodall, Provincial Commissioner (PC), Ndola, to Secretary of Native
Affairs (SNA), Livingstone, 12 November 1930;This, and other abuses to which Northern Rhodesians were
subjected is graphically portrayed in a fictional novel by U. C. Chishimba, Namweleu: The Story of the
Legendary African Lion, (Lusaka, 1988), 109-17.

either on public projects, collecting firewood for the soldiers and European
officials, or cleaning the surroundings of Sakania, Kalonga, and Kabunda.61 There
was no avenue for appeal. On release, complaints were made to Northern
Rhodesian officials at Fort Rosebery.62 To avoid these experiences, many labor
migrants wanting to pass through the Pedicle were, according to the general
manager of Bwana Mkubwa Mine, forced to "travel by night because they were
afraid of Congo Police who arrest them and are said to ill-treat them."63 Some
were caught by lions and leopards.64
The harassment of Northern Rhodesians was not only a preserve for the
Force Publique soldiers. In a number of cases villagers living in villages along the
route often posed as soldiers in order to steal from the transiting migrants. Some
of these villagers became "professional thieves" who made a living by robbing
Northern Rhodesians. In 1914 the district conmmissioner for Mweru-Luapula made
the following report:
Complaints have been received from time to time of thefts of

loads on the Ndola-Fort Rosebery Road. These crimes appear
to be th, worK of a gang of professional thieves who live
partly ivnCongo territory and partly in Sokontwe's country . . .
who carry on their operations on that portion of the road
which passes through Congo territory between Sakania and
[Kabunda]. In some cases these thieves have to resort to
personal violence. Fort Rosebery traders have suffered from
these thefts, also native repatriates returning from Southern
Rhodesia and Elisabethville. The highway robberies and thefts
are by no means new, but have been in existence-off and on-
for the past eight or nine years.65
The complaints increased in number during the period of the First World
War, as many Northern Rhodesians elected to seek wage labor rather than be
conscripted as war porters. Others who served as war porters did not want to be
recalled because conditions were very poor. They left their villages to seek wage
labor along the line of rail or in Southern Rhodesia. The flow of labor migrants
across the Pedicle increased with the beginning of mining activities on the
Copperbelt in 1926.66 The number of complaints received was on the increase.67
61NAZ/ZA1/9/18/38: PC to SNA, 22 September 1930. 111-17.Nsakanya. This according to Buell, was

what all prisoners were expected to do. Buell, Native Problem, II, 498.
62Nsakanya;Interview Mwape Chanda, Mansa, 7 August 1979.

63NAZ/ZA1/9/18/38: J. A. Andrews, Compound Manager, Bwana Mkumbwa Mining Company, to
Manager, Ndola, 7 November 1930.This was confirmed by oral sources.
64NAZ/ZA1/19/18/38: Lieutenant Payson, BSAC Polic, Report on the Ndola Fort Rosebery Route,
September, 1915.
65NAZ/ZA7/3/4: Quarterly Report for the period 1 July to 30 September 1914 for Fort Rosebery Sub
District.
66Nsakanya;Pardon;Chanda.

For the Northern Rhodesian officials, the problem was compounded by a very
high turnover of Belgian officers sent to Kalonga. The native commissioner at
Fort Rosebery worked extremely hard to establish personal contact with the chef
de poste at Kalonga and to draw his attention to some of the complaints so that
they could be investigated. In a number of cases, the two officials even worked
out measures to ensure the safety of the migrants. In some cases it worked, in
others it did not. The native commissioner's frustration is reflected in this report
for January 1926:
I again visited the Chef du Poste at Kalonga on 12 January. I

found that the official with whom I had reached an agreement
in October had been replaced by another, M. Sobet, who stated
that he could not observe the agreement to accept passes
signed by chiefs. He said that passes even issued by me, were
insufficient proof of identity.68
The frustrations of the Northern Rhodesia administrative officials were

summed up by the provincial commissioner who noted that it was "extremely
hard to deal with such variable people as Belgians; every official seems to be a
law into himself. The Belgians, I suppose, dislike our people [transiting the
Pedicle]."69The numerous complaints passed on to him drew this conclusion:
Some of the complaints emanate from the dislike of a failure
to obey by the Northern Rhodesian natives of some more
strict Congo regulations. Our people are not subject to many
restrictions . . . and they do not appreciate that certain
restrictions have to be complied with when [transiting the
Congo Pedicle].70
In 1930, following the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in Southern

Province and Bulozi and venereal diseases in Elisabethville, a cordon was placed
on the movement of people and goods across the Pedicle. Africans travelling to
and from the Copperbelt were required to carry in addition to the identity
certificate (chitupa) and a pass (laissez passer), medical certificates certifying them
free from venereal and other contagious diseases. These documents had to be
checked and validated at either Sakania or Kalonga border posts. Due to poor
publicity, these requirements were not known by many Northern Rhodesian
travellers. The result was that those who did not "have Congo medical certificates
stamped on their Registration certificates were detained and imprisoned for
67For example, in 1926, the magistrate at Fort Rosebery, reported that "the Belgian Representative at
Kabunda [actually the administrative centre was Kalonga] has a reputation for treating carriers very harshly."
NAZ/ZA1/5/1: Magistrate, Fort Rosebery to Secretary for Native Affairs, (SNA), 18 August 1926.
68NAZ/ZA1/5/: NC, Fort Rosebery to SNA, 9 October 1926.

69NAZ/ZA7/3/26/8: Annual Report for Fort Rosebery District for the Year ending 32 March 1927.
70ZA7/3/26/8: D. C., Fort Rosebery to SNA, 28 October 1926.

evading" the regulations.71 Commenting on the situation, the provincial

commissioner for Mweru-Luapula observed that the
Belgian authorities adhere very strictly to the regulations

imposed by them and in the case of [Northern Rhodesian]
natives whether innocently or otherwise caught in any act of
evasion, the punishment . is severe, usually two months in
gaol.72
The magistrate for Fort Rosebery District collected a number of

complaints from those arrested, which have left a graphic description of the
suffering the Northern Rhodesians experienced at the hands of the Congolese
officials. Let us begin with Katungi Kamulema, a Henga from Karonga District
in what is today Northern Malawi, who reported that:
The Belgian Askare [police] arrest larger numbers of

travellers who cross the Congo strip to come to the
Copperbelt [without the medical certificates]. They are put in
the gaol and are forced to work. They are guarded by armed
Askari. They are forced to work for two months and then let
go. They do all sorts of work, road repairing, gardening,
carrying of wood and water, etc. They (sic) are many
Rhodesian natives at Belgian Bomas [at Sakania and
Kalonga].73
And Kafwanda, a Lunda from Kawambwa reported that:
I went to Ndola for work last rains [1929].... On my return, I

got to Sakania. On arrival at Kabunda the Belgian Officials ...
sentenced us to 15 days' imprisonment and a fine of 15 francs
each drawing water, cutting firewood, hoeing, etc. We
completed a month and were then released.... I lost my box
which contained 3 pairs of shorts (khaki), 3 women cloths, 2
shirts, 1 pair trousers, 2 vests, 1 sweater, 2 hats, 2 children's
dresses, 2 colored handkerchiefs and 10 pieces of soap. I value
these articles at 43 4s 6.74
And others had this to say:
We were in the Congo not far from the border .. . [when] two
Askari accompanied by a Belgian official arrested us. We had
our necks tied together with a rope to prevent us from
escaping and marched to Sakania under escort. On arrival ...
we were put in the gaol.... The Belgian official told us our
71NAZ/ZA1/9/18/38:Andrews to Manager, Bwana Mkubwa, 7 November 1930.
72NAZ/ZA1/9/18/38: PC, Fort Rosebery to SNA, 22 September 1930.

73NAZ/ZA1/9/18/38: Depositions by the NC, Fort Rosebery, 14 September 1930.

passes ought to have been signed by a doctor. We were put in

neck-chains [and] worked on the road . . . drawing water, and
wood cutting-all kinds of work. We were fined 7s each in
English money, then let go.75
And Lameck Sichone of Isoka, who was in a group of twenty men and
women arrested in the Pedicle, had this to say:
We were on a native path. We met a native orderly and

messenger [who] demanded [the] production of our "fitupas"
[registration certificates] as we were on our way to Ndola.
They said you must come along to the Boma to have your
fitupa stamped. They tied us in twos and threes and we went
to the Boma at Kabunda.... The official told the police to
take us to the gaol and put neck irons on us.... We were sent
to work on building, hoeing, drawing water.... we worked as
convicts for two weeks.76
Similarly, Northern Rhodesians who attempted to transport fish to Ndola

were arrested and jailed. Here is a testimony of what Kunda of Fort Rosebery
experienced:
I and three others from my village decided to come to Ndola

to sell dried fish.... we crossed the border [into] Congo Belge.
... We were arrested by Belgian Askari.... They did not tell
us why they were arresting us. They beat us with their hands,
but we managed to escape to Serenje District. We sold our fish
there .... I do not know why we were ill-treated by the
Belgian Askari. We had done no harm and carried our tax
receipts to show (sic) who we were.77
In a number of cases, the beating received by the Northern Rhodesians

were very severe, and some people died.78 To avoid these experiences many
Northern Rhodesians decided to sell their fish to European traders operating on
the Congo side of the border very cheaply-less than one penny per pound
instead of four pence.79
In 1940, the district commissioner for Fort Rosebery noted, after a tour of
Sokontwe area that:
74NAZ/ZA1/9/18/38: Deposition ... 14 September 1930.
75NAZ/ZA1/9/18/38: Deposition ... 12 December 1930.
76NAZ/ZA1/9/18/30: Deposition ... 17 November 1930.
77NAZ/ZA1/9/18/30: PC, Fort Rosebery, to SNA 22 September 1930;Deposition ... 10 October 1930.
78NAZ/1/9/8/30: Deposition ... 16 October 1930.
7T.R. Mvusi, "The Creation of Unemployment in Northern Rhodesia 1899-1936"(Ph.D. thesis,

Northwestern University, 1984), 190.

More complaints were made to me on the trip by the natives

who stated that on entering the Congo, they were liable to
arrest and imprisonment even if they had passes ....signed by
the Native Authority. One man produced a Congo
Government receipt for 42 francs which he said he had paid
as an alternative to imprisonment. He had both a pass and
identity certificate.80
The Northern Rhodesian officials did not know how to solve the problem.
They complained to the Belgian officials from time to time. Except in one case
where two Congolese policemen were jailed for their excesses, they had no
positive results from their complaints.81 The provincial commissioner for Mweru-
Luapula complained that "there was no remedy open ... which would have the
effect of easing the situation with regard to the attitude adopted towards [the
Northern Rhodesian] natives by the Belgian officials."82 In short, the Northern
Rhodesians passing through the Pedicle were at the mercy of the Congolese
soldiers.83
The plight of the Northern Rhodesians transiting the Pedicle was brought
to the attention of the Western Province Regional Council on 17 July 1944 by
Dauti Yamba, representing Luanshya. In the motion he tabled, he informed the
members that he had been
asked by many people on the Copperbelt to bring to the

notice of the council the difficulties Africans were
experiencing by having to pass through Congo territory to and
from their districts in Western Province.... people travelling
between the Copperbelt and these districts (east of the
Luapula) have many troubles crossing Congo territory.... At
present people were being detained by Customs Authorities at
Sakania and having their goods confiscated, being required to
produce evidence that they were examined by a doctor, and
were subjected to much abuse and rough treatment.84
Yamba asked the administration to make representations to the Belgian

government to "allow transit across the Pedicle without let or hindrance." He
suggested that the government explore the possibility of acquiring the Pedicle
from the Congo or to arrange an "exchange" of territory so as to do away with
the awkward "foot" jutting into Northern Rhodesia. The motion was supported by
all the members. The government promised to look into the matter but nothing
80NAZ/SEC 2/872: Tour Report of Sokontwe area 15 March 1940.
81NAZ/ZA1/18/38: SNA to Chief Secretary, 30 May 1931.
82NAZ/ZA1/9/18/38: PC to SNA, 22 December 1930.
83This is gleaned from a statement by one source "Because we had to cross the Pedicle to go to the
Copperbelt or Fort Rosebery, we were at the mercy of Bakaboke" (local name for the Congolese soldiers).
Nsakanya.
84Northern Rhodesia Government, Report of the Second Meeting of the Northern Rhodesia
Western Province Regional Council, July 1944, 18-19, Nsakanya.

happened. A year later, the issue was debated again at the third meeting of the
Council.85 In November 1946, the issue was discussed at the first meeting of the
Northern Rhodesia African Representative Council in a motion tabled by Chief
Kopa. The chief called on the government to "protect Northern Rhodesian
Africans who cross the Belgian Congo." He went on to echo Yamba's earlier
suggestion to consider the possibility of acquiring "the Congo Pedicle." Edward
Sampa, who seconded the motion, was more explicit when he stated that:
It is a sad thing to go through the Congo. When going through

the area we meet with many difficulties. If you go through the
Congo and you happen to meet a policeman of the territory,
the first thing he does is to try and beat you and rob you of
your belongings, even though you have done nothing wrong.86
Again, the members urged the government to act but nothing came out of their
pleas.
The Fort Rosebery-Chembe-Mokambo-Mufulira Road
Although the Northern Rhodesia government continued to use the Fort

Rosebery-Kapalala-Sakania-Ndola road, they had a number of misgivings
about it. First was the insecurity posed by the Congolese soldiers. Second, the
road was generally "impassable to motor traffic" during the rainy season, as
bridges on a number of rivers and large sections of the road between Kapalala
and Fort Rosebery were swept away.87 Further, the road was regarded by the
administration and the African population in general as being too "indirect" and
long (as it was about 300km to reach Ndola) for the people living along the
Luapula River and the shores of Lake Mweru where a flourishing fishing
industry existed, exploited mostly by Greek traders to feed the workers in the
Katangan mines and urban centers. As a result of this, many fish traders who
would have wanted to take their fish to the Copperbelt took their fish to
Katanga.88 And third, the administration were of the view that "the customs and
immigration formalities required by the Belgian authorities in connection with
travelling through the Pedicle are both irksome and a cause of unnecessary
85
8Northern Rhodesia Government, Report of the Third Meeting of the Western Province Regional
Council, July 1945, 15, 16.
86Northern Rhodesia Government, Proceedings of the African Representative Council, November

1946, Col. 102; Stewart Gore Browne, "The Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission in 1911-1914," Northern
Rhodesia Journal, 5, 4 (1964), 316.
87Northern Rhodesia Government Notice Number 157 of 1936; NAZ/SEC 2/198: Northern Province
Newsletter, 31 March 1940; Interview Thom Kashimbaya, Mufulira, 17 July 1979.
88NAZ/SEC2/227: Minutes of the First Meeting of the Northern Province (Western Areas), Regional
Council held at Fort Rosebery 23-24 May 1944; Interview, Mwape Songolo, Mansa, 8 September 1985. On the
fishing industry see M. C. Musambachime, "Development and Growth of the Fishing Industry in Mweru-
Luapula 1920-1964" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1981), esp. Chs. 3 and 8.

delays."89 As a result of the desire to cut out these delays and smooth
communication between Fort Rosebery and the Copperbelt, and to capture and
redirect some of the lucrative fish trade to the Copperbelt, the administration
proposed in 1930 the construction of a shorter road between Fort Rosebery and
Mufulira via Mokambo (a distance of about 170km). By 1930, a foot path existed
between Fort Rosebery and Mufulira which was heavily used by workers to and
from the Copperbelt in order to avoid the indirect Ndola-Sakania-Kapalala-
Fort Rosebery route.90 A proposal for the construction of a road linking Fort
Rosebery with Chembe on the Luapula River was discussed and accepted by the
Northern Province Provincial Council in 1938. A sum of £5,000 was also
committed. Construction could not begin, however, because there was "no
definite understanding . .. from the Belgian Government that they would
construct that section of the road lying between Luapula and Mokambo to
complete the through road from Fort Rosebery to the Copperbelt."91 To try and
expedite things, the Northern Rhodesia administration informed the Belgian
administration of Katanga that they were "prepared"to construct the road and
"bear the full cost," which in 1942, rose to 07,000.92The Belgians refused to accept
the offer and instead proposed shelving the project "for the time being."93After
intensive negotiations the project was revived in 1944 and the Northern Rhodesia
government committed 07,600 to the construction of the road and (4,300 (760,000
francs) for the construction of a pontoon.94 The road became operational in July
1947. Within a month, it proved very popular, providing service to 5,135 Africans,
530 bicycles, 131 motor vehicles, and 180,000 pounds of merchandise. Within two
months most of the traffic between the Copperbelt and Fort Rosebery was
directed to this route.95 It also gave a boost to the fishing industry in Lakes
Mweru and Bangweulu, allowing fishermen and traders to move their loads of
fish to the Copperbelt.96
As soon as the road became operational, the same stories of beatings,
robberies, arbitrary arrests, and imprisonment began to be reported. Trivial
offenses committed while at the border post, such as allowing a child to cry,
89NAZ/SEC 3/149:Senior PC, Ndola to Administrative Secretary, Lusaka, 27 August 1947;Kashimbaya,

Interview, Jameson, Mwenso, Mulundu, 18 April 1975.
90NAZ/SEC 3/149: Telegram, Chief Secretary to Chef du Secretariat, Elisabethville, 9 May 1930;
Mwape Songolo; Kashimbaya;Mwanso.
91NAZ/SEC 2/10: Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Provincial Council, Northern Province, 1938, p.
4; Minutes of the Fourth Provincial Council, Northern Province, 1939.
92NAZ/SEC 3/149:Chief Secretary to Chef du Secretariat, 7 November, 1939,see also other letter dated
24 November 1941and 7 July 1942.
93NAZ/SEC 3/149: Director, Public Works Department (PWD), to Chief Secretary, Lusaka, 6 March
1942;Chef du Secretariat Provincial, Elisabethville to Chief Secretary, Lusaka, 26 June 1941.
94NAZ/SEC 3/149: Director, PWD, to Chief Secretary, 9 August 1947.
95At the opening of the road, the PC hoped that the new road would be "of the greatest value in
opening one of the most valuable rural producing areas."
NAZ/SEC 2/198:Northern Province Newsletter, 1 July 1947.
9Mwape Songolo; Interview, S. J. Musango, Twapia, Ndola, 19 July 1979.

spitting of saliva, throwing away a banana skin, or wearing a hat in presence of a

soldier earned the offender a stiff fine or detention or both. The brutality
inflicted on the Northern Rhodesians created fear and uncertainty for those
passing through the Pedicle. They only relaxed after reaching the Northern
Rhodesian side.97
The situation worsened after independence of the Congo in June 1960, and
the secession of Katanga from the rest of the Congo. Travellers were frequently
beaten, robbed, and killed. There were levies for being fat, bald-headed, smart,
wearing a hat when passing through the immigration office (Bureau d'immigration),
having a wrist watch, bicycle, camera, radio, sewing machine, or anything else of
value. There were unnecessary delays to force the victims to part with their
money or valuable items. No receipts were given. Truck and bus drivers as well
as fish traders were made to part with a substantial amount of money to grease
the hands of the soldiers. Those who failed to pay had their vehicles
impounded.98 The situation became progressively worse after Zambia's
independence in 1964. Hardly a month passed without the report of some
misfortune befalling a Zambian traveller or with the border being closed.
Nobody was spared: party and government officials and members of Parliament
suffered the same fate as ordinary passengers. The situation worsened with the
decline in the wages paid to the military personnel in Zaire. As payment of
wages was irregular, many soldiers resorted to using force and violence against
the Zambian passengers passing through the Pedicle.99
Violence against Northern Rhodesians (now Zambians) is a colonial
legacy that was condoned by the Belgian administration. It instilled fear-not
respect-for the Congolese and later Zairean soldier by the Northern Rhodesians.
This was well exploited by the soldiers to get what they wanted from the
travellers. Although these activities were known to the administration they were
not widely reported and neither did the government protest in strong terms to
the Belgian Congo. With the coming of independence, this changed. These
incidents are now given wide coverage and the Zambian government has
protested to the Zairean government from time to time.100 The harassment of
Zambian travellers in the Pedicle has become a thorn in the relations between
Zambia and Zaire.101 Although there have been several meetings of the Zambia-
Zaire Joint Permanent Commission, formed in 1974, little has been achieved.l02
The Pedicle remains an ever-present problem which has chilled relations between
97Kashimbaya,Mwenso.
98Mwenso;Kashimbaya.
9Musango; Kashimbaya;Pardon.
100Kashimbayawas a regular victim.

101Pardon,Nsakanya, Kashimbaya.
102For a detailed discussion see Bartha H. Zimba, "Zambian Policy Towards Zaire 1964-1978"(M.A.
thesis, Carleton University, 1979), 145;Rajah Kunda, "The African Boundary Problem with Special Reference
to the border dispute between Zambia and Zaire (LLB Obligatory Essay, School of Law, University of
Zambia, 1981), 37; R. H. Nketani, "Boundary Problems in International Law with Special Reference to
African Boundary Disputes and their Settlement" (LLB Obligatory Essay, School of Law, 1980); Africa
Contemporary Record, 1973/74, BB334.

Zambia and Zaire. Zambians are now encouraged by the government to use the
newly constructed Samfya-Serenje road which bypasses the Pedicle and ensures
security for the Zambians.103
Conclusion
In 1918, at the signing of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk between Germany and
Soviet Russia, Trotsky is reported to have remarked that "every state [was]
founded on force."104Max Weber argued later that a "state had the monopoly to
claim the legitimate use of force."105 And extending this argument further,
McIver stated that "coercive power is a criterion of the state, but not its essence .
.. It is true that there is no state where there is no overwhelming force.... But
the exercise of force does not make a state."106The task of this paper was to
show how in the Belgian Congo and later in Zaire, force and violence have been
freely used as instruments of authority. The Force Publique were left free to use
force and violence not only against the Congolese but also against Northern
Rhodesians transiting through the Pedicle. The actions of the Force Publique
reflect the observations made by Bertrand de Jouvenel who argued that "a man
feels himself more of a man when he is imposing himself and making others the
instrument of his will," which, he added, "gives him incomparable pleasure."107
Apart from pleasure, there was in the case of the Force Publique and other
violent military forces elsewhere, the element of domination which bred fear
among the victims, in this case, Northern Rhodesians. The cultivation of this fear
created an advantage which was well utilized by the Force Publique in dealing
with their victims who were either beaten, robbed, jailed or even killed. This state
of affairs was partly due to indiscipline and partly to the fact that the soldiers
received poor wages, forcing them to supplement their income by exhortation,
brutality, terror, and violence. Beyond supplementation, a desire to accumulate
became their primary object. Bribery and corruption became an accepted way of
life. Where these could not be employed, violence and force were readily used to
induce submission and reduce the chances of resistance.
103Kunda,"The African Boundary Problem,"37; Africa Contemporary Record, 1974-75,B 333-4.
104Arendt, On Violence, 37.

105MaxWeber, The Theory, 152.
106R.M. McIver, The Modern State (London, 1926), 222.
107Bertrandde Jouvenel, Power: The Natural History of its Growth (London, 1952), 110.


Military Violence Against Civilians The Case of The Congolese and Zairean Military in The Pedicle 1890-1988

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Military Violence Against Civilians The Case of The Congolese and Zairean Military in The Pedicle 1890-1988

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