The Nonproliferation Review

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Swarming destruction: drone swarms and

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
weapons

Zachary Kallenborn & Philipp C. Bleek

To cite this article: Zachary Kallenborn & Philipp C. Bleek (2019): Swarming destruction: drone
swarms and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, The Nonproliferation Review,
DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2018.1546902

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1546902

Published online: 02 Jan 2019.

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NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW
https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1546902

Swarming destruction: drone swarms and chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclear weapons
Zachary Kallenborn and Philipp C. Bleek

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Drone swarms—multiple unmanned systems capable of coordinating chemical weapons; biological
their actions to accomplish shared objectives—have major weapons; radiological
implications for the future of warfare. One important set of weapons; nuclear weapons;
implications relates to the ability of drone swarms to complement, weapons of mass destruction;
delivery systems; drones;
challenge, and even substitute for chemical, biological, radiological, unmanned aerial vehicles;
and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. For example, swarming drones might autonomous robots; drone
enable more effective CBRN delivery. Or they might facilitate swarms
standoff detection, search the oceans for nuclear-armed submarines,
or otherwise impede an adversary’s ability to threaten or employ
CBRN weapons. Conventionally armed drone swarms might serve as
strategic deterrents in lieu of CBRN weapons. At the same time,
many CBRN-relevant applications of drone-swarm technology entail
significant technical challenges even for very sophisticated states,
and even more so for non-state actors whose capabilities will be far
more limited, so there is considerable uncertainty around whether,
how much, and when drone-swarm technology will complement,
challenge, or substitute for CBRN weapons.

Once science fiction, drone swarms are exploding into the realm of international security
and their capabilities are growing rapidly. Within only five years, a student drone-swarm
project went from initial presentation to a large working drone swarm capable of being
launched from a fighter jet. In 2011, engineering students at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (MIT) presented the fully autonomous, fixed-wing Perdix drone capable
of between-drone communication at the 2011 Air Vehicle Survivability Workshop.1
Development of this drone transitioned to MIT Lincoln Laboratories and then to the
US Department of Defense’s (DOD) Strategic Capabilities Office. By October 2016, they
had successfully launched a swarm of 103 Perdix drones from three F/A-18 Super
Hornet fighter aircraft.2
Many other states are seriously pursuing drone-swarm technology, including Russia,
South Korea, and China. For example, China successfully tested a swarm of 119
fixed-wing drones and a swarm of 1,000 less sophisticated rotor-wing drones.3 And

CONTACT Zachary Kallenborn zkallenborn@gmail.com

1
MIT Beaver Works, “Project Perdix,” <beaverworks.ll.mit.edu/CMS/bw/projectperdixcapstone>.
2
DOD Strategic Capabilities Office, “Perdix Fact Sheet,” June 1, 2017, <www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/
Perdix%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf>,
3
“China Launched Record-Breaking Swarm of 119 Fixed-Wing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” UASWeekly.com, June 12, 2017,
<uasweekly.com/2017/06/12/china-launched-record-breaking-swarm-119-fixed-wing-unmanned-aerial-vehicles/>;
Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “China Is Making 1,000-UAV Drone Swarms Now,” Popular Science, January 8, 2018, <www.
popsci.com/china-drone-swarms>.
© 2018 Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
2 Z. KALLENBORN AND P.C. BLEEK

China is clearly interested in the military applications, including for targeting US aircraft
carriers.4 Similarly, the South Korean military recently launched a “dronebot” combat unit
and is researching swarming technology.5 Russia is reportedly seeking to develop a heli-
copter capable of controlling a swarm of drones by 2025.6 This implies that all of these
states perceive military value in developing this capability.
However, there has been little study of the broader strategic implications of drone
swarms, including for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.7
A publicly released, abbreviated version of a restricted study by the National Academies
of Science, Engineering, and Medicine on counter-unmanned aerial systems (cUAS)
briefly mentions the threat of drone swarms armed with chemical, biological, or radiologi-
cal weapons for battalion-and-below operations.8 Other studies have focused on the tac-
tical aspects, such as connecting drone swarms to swarm tactics and their efficacy against
traditional maneuver warfare, drone swarms employed to enhance communications in
Marine Aviation ground taskforces, and drone swarms as electronic warfare platforms.9
Some articles examine approaches to countering drone swarms and swarm vs. swarm
combat,10 while others have looked at the history of swarming generally, unrelated to
drones, arguing that the rise of information and communications technology enables
swarming tactics.11 Numerous studies examine technical issues relating to drone
swarms, such as human–drone interaction.12 A small number address, but none focuses
on, topics relevant to CBRN.13 One study examined some theoretical scenarios of

Elsa Kania, “Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power,” Center
4

for a New American Security, November 2017, p. 23, <s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/Battlefield-Singular-

ity-November-2017.pdf?mtime=20171129235804>.
5
Jennie Oh, “South Korean Arm Will Launch ‘Dronebot’ Combat Force Next Year,” UPI, December 5, 2017, <www.upi.com/
South-Korean-army-will-launch-dronebot-combat-force-next-year/2581512469178/>.
6
Marina Lystseva, “Russia to Develop Helicopter Capable of Controlling a Swarm of Drones,” TASS, May 24, 2018,
<tass.com/defense/1006048>.
7
The dearth of analysis on the strategic implications of drone swarms is highlighted explicitly in Robert J. Bunker, Terrorist
and Insurgent Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Use, Potentials, and Military Applications (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute
and US Army War College Press, 2015), p. 54.
8
It is unclear to what extent the restricted version delves more deeply into the topic. National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft (cUAS) Capability for Battalion-and-Below Operations, (Washing-
ton, DC: National Academies Press, 2018), pp. 3–5.
9
Paul Scharre, “Robotics on the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm,” Center for a New American Security, October,
2014, <s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_TheComingSwarm_Scharre.pdf.>; Joseph Foster, “Swarm-
ing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): Extending Marine Aviation Ground Task Force Communications using UAVs,”
Naval Postgraduate School, December 2014; Polat Cevik, Ibrahim Kocaman, Abdullah S. Akgul, and Barbaros Akca,
“The Small and Silent Force Multiplier: A Swarm UAV-Electronic Attack,” Journal of Intelligent and Robotic Systems,
Vol. 70 (April 2013), pp. 595–608, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10846-012-9698-1>.
10
Paul Scharre, “Counter-Swarm: A Guide to Defeating Robotic Swarms,” War on the Rocks, March 31, 2015, <https://
warontherocks.com/2015/03/counter-swarm-a-guide-to-defeating-robotic-swarms/>; Timothy H. Chung, Kevin D.
Jones, Michael A. Day, Marianna Jones, and Michael Clement, “50 vs. 50 by 2015: Swarm vs. Swarm UAV Live-Fly Com-
petition at the Naval Postgraduate School,” NPS Institutional Archive, Calhoun: the NPS Institutional Archive, Monterey,
CA 2013, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36740424.pdf>.
11
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Swarming and the Future of Conflict,” RAND, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/
handle/10945/27341/Swarming_and_the_future_of_conflict.pdf?sequence=1>; Sean J. A. Edwards, “Swarming and
the Future of Warfare,” RAND, 2005, <www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2005/RAND_
RGSD189.pdf>.
12
Amy Hocraffer and Chang S. Nam, “A Meta-analysis of Human–System Interfaces in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
Swarm Management,” Applied Ergonomics, Vol. 58 (2017), pp. 66–80, <www.researchgate.net/profile/Chang_Nam5/pub-
lication/303782432_A_meta-analysis_of_human-system_interfaces_in_unmanned_aerial_vehicle_UAV_swarm_man-
agement/links/5767f71f08ae1658e2f8b435.pdf>, provides a meta-analysis of “27 UAV swarm management papers
focused on the human–system interface and human factors concerns.”
13
Ilker Hazinedar, “Future’s Operation Areas: New Generation Suppression Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) Elements,” in Edward
M. Carapezza, ed., Sensors, and Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Technologies for Homeland
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 3

non-recallable drone swarms being used in a weapon of mass destruction (WMD)-like

manner, but did not consider theoretical literature on the topic or the full range of
CBRN issues.14 Another touched on the relationship between drone swarms and CBRN
in the context of a broader study of emerging technology impacting WMD writ large.15
No study has considered the full range of extant and potential CBRN implications of
drone swarms.
Emerging drone-swarm technology has significant and broad implications for CBRN
weapons and defenses.
Of these applications, some have the potential to be more significant for national and
global security. For example, swarms have potential to play a role in the identification of dis-
persed mobile missile launchers. To cite another example, the ability of drone swarms to serve
as sophisticated chemical- and biological-weapon (CB) delivery systems could significantly
increase the utility of these weapons. Such developments could undercut perceptions that
chemical and biological weapons have both limited battlefield utility and pose indiscriminate
threats, both of which appear to have been important to the marginalization of these weapons
in international politics and US defense planning.16 Finally, drone swarms may bolster efforts
to suppress enemy air defenses in order to clear a path for an attack.17 This article explores
these and other applications, while being mindful of three important caveats.
First, many applications of swarms discussed here are unlikely to be realized in the
short term. Second, applications may face challenges that limit their value. Third, the
applicability of drone swarms to a dimension of CBRN warfare does not imply that
drone swarms are the best or only approach to that application.
The ability of any actor to successfully employ CBRN weapons depends on the outcome
of the competition between the actor’s offensive capabilities and the target’s defenses.
Offensive capabilities depend on the attributes of the CBRN delivery system and agent/
device as well as supporting infrastructure: the productive capacity to produce the agent
and system in the desired quantities and intelligence operations to identify and evaluate
targets. The target may seek to prevent the attack or mitigate the consequences. The
target may attempt to identify and eliminate the actor’s CBRN capabilities before they
are used, relying on intelligence to identify stored or deployed CBRN delivery systems
or agents. Alternatively, the target may harden facilities through, for example, sophisti-
cated air-filtration systems that can contain or neutralize biological-weapons agents.

Security, Defense, and Law Enforcement, XIV (Bellingham, WA: SPIE Publishers, 2015), includes four sentences on drone
swarms’ potential as air-defense suppression, which could have an effect on air-based CBRN delivery systems. Bryan
Clark, “The Emerging Era in Undersea Warfare,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, January 22, 2015, p. 16,
<csbaonline.org/research/publications/undersea-warfare/publication>, mentions the possibility of using swarms of
unmanned undersea vehicles for coordinated surveillance or attack operations, which could have an impact on submar-
ine-based nuclear weapons.
14
Jeremy Straub, “Analysis of Mutual Assured Destruction-like Scenario with Swarms of Non-recallable Autonomous
Robots,” Proceedings of the International Society for Optics and Photonics, May 23, 2015, <www.spiedigitallibrary.org/
conference-proceedings-of-spie/9456/1/Analysis-of-mutual-assured-destruction-like-scenario-with-swarms-of/10.1117/
12.2177839.short?SSO=1>.
15
Natasha Bajema and Diane DiEuliis, “Peril and Promise: Emerging Technologies and WMD; Emergence and Convergence
Workshop Report, 13–14 October 2016,” National Defense University: Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion, May 2017, pp. 14–21, <https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/Portals/97/Documents/Publications/Articles/2016%
20Workshop%20Report%20FINAL%205-12-17.pdf?ver=2017-05-12-105811-853>.
16
See, for instance, Frank L. Smith III, American Biodefense: How Dangerous Ideas about Biological Weapons Shape National
Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).
17
Mike Pietrucha, “The Need for SEAD Part 1: The Nature of SEAD,” War on the Rocks, May 17, 2016, <https://
warontherocks.com/2016/05/the-need-for-sead-part-i-the-nature-of-sead/>.
4 Z. KALLENBORN AND P.C. BLEEK

Targets might also be “hardened” through better consequence management capabilities—

for example, a capability to rapidly identify a release of Bacillus anthracis (the causative
agent of the disease anthrax) and surge relevant medication to exposed populations
could dramatically reduce the effects of an attack. We will seek to identify applications
for drone swarms across this entire offensive and defensive spectrum.

Defining “drone swarms”

Drone swarms consist of multiple unmanned platforms and/or weapons deployed to accom-
plish a shared objective, the platforms and/or weapons autonomously altering their behavior
based on communication with one another.18 The interconnectivity of drone swarms
enables them to exhibit more complex behaviors than their component drones. For
example, during the 2018 Olympics, 1,000 drones arranged themselves in complex, highly
precise formations to create moving images of the Olympic rings, a flying dove, and a snow-
boarder.19 Autonomy potentially enables highly sophisticated behaviors, such as self-
healing, where a swarm adjusts its behavior in response to the loss of individual units.20
Drone swarms could involve novel platforms capable of launching attacks or existing
weapon systems modified to allow communication and autonomous action. Drones
within the swarm might be in close physical proximity or separated by miles. If the
drones are deployed to accomplish the same objective and autonomously share infor-
mation affecting their actions, they are part of a single swarm.
The number of drones within a swarm and their capacity to execute complex missions
continue to grow.21 Because drones involve proven, albeit evolving, technologies, the
primary limitation on swarm size is the capacity to manage information exchanges
between ever more drones. With computing power projected to continue growing
rapidly over the coming years, there is strong reason to believe that the capacity to
manage that information will continue to grow as well.22 Further, energy-density research
continues to increase the payload capacity and flight endurance of unmanned platforms.23
A drone swarm could consist of many drones of similar or identical size and capability
or a heterogeneous mixture of platforms with different weapons and sensors.24 Current
drone swarms are typically designed as sensor platforms, conducting coordinated area
18
Drone swarms are not necessarily fully autonomous. Humans may still have some level of control such as approving
firing decisions.
19
The drones in the show were preprogrammed to form these shapes and did not communicate with one another. As such,
they are not true drone swarms; however, the example illustrates what drone swarms could do. Brian Barrett, “Inside the
Olympics Opening Ceremony World-Record Drone Show,” WIRED, February 9, 2018, <www.wired.com/story/olympics-
opening-ceremony-drone-show/>.
20
DOD, “Department of Defense Announces Successful Micro-Drone Demonstration,” January 9, 2017, <www.defense.gov/
News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1044811/department-of-defense-announces-successful-micro-drone-
demonstration/>.
21
In general, a larger drone swarm offers more capability than a smaller one; however, the optimal size of the drone swarm
will depend significantly on the mission and the capabilities of component drones.
22
Peter J. Denning and Ted G. Lewis, “Exponential Laws of Computing Growth,” Communications of the ACM, Vol. 60 (2017),
pp. 54–65, <https://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2017/1/211094-exponential-laws-of-computing-growth/fulltext>; Tom
Simonite, “Moore’s Law Is Dead. Now What?” MIT Technology Review, May 13, 2016, <www.technologyreview.com/s/
601441/moores-law-is-dead-now-what/>; Lieven Eeckhout, “Is Moore’s Law Slowing Down? What’s Next?” IEEE Computer
Society, July/August 2017, pp. 4–5, <pdfs.semanticscholar.org/25a9/5e08d0b56fefebed4c5418113146ea99376f.pdf>.
23
There is a tradeoff between payload capacity and flight endurance. On the same platform, increasing the payload
capacity results in a decrease in flight endurance, while increasing flight endurance decreases payload capacity.
24
Among others, see Zachary Kallenborn, “The Era of the Drone Swarm is Coming, and We Need to Be Ready for It,”
Modern War Institute at West Point, October 25, 2018, <https://mwi.usma.edu/era-drone-swarm-coming-need-ready>.
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 5

surveillance.25 These swarms are typically composed of small drones with limited range.
However, as the technology matures, it will become increasingly viable to incorporate
larger, more complex platforms able to carry weapon systems over large distances.26 As
the drone swarms and component drones increase in sophistication (better control algor-
ithms; larger payloads; improved range and persistence), production costs are likely to
increase as well owing to increased system complexity. Higher costs may mitigate some
of the strategic value drone swarms offer.
Role differentiation within heterogeneous swarms offers distinct advantages. Attack
drones carry weapons payloads; sensing drones carry sensors to identify and track poten-
tial targets or threats; communications drones ensure stable communication links within
the swarm and between command system; and dummy drones may absorb incoming
adversary fire, generate false signatures, or simply make the swarm appear larger.
The composition of a heterogeneous swarm could be modified to meet the needs of a
particular mission or operational environment. The capability to swap in new drones has
been demonstrated on a small scale.27 In the future, providing a drone swarm to an oper-
ational commander could be akin to supplying a box of Lego: “Here are your component
parts. Assemble them into what you need.”
Role differentiation may also enable more complex behaviors: sensing drones may be
smaller and lighter than attack drones, enabling them to conduct reconnaissance ahead
of the main swarm. Software architecture has been developed to coordinate teams of
multi-mission unmanned aerial vehicles, including integrated intelligence and strike
functions, weapon selection, and route planning based on identified adversary air defenses
(Figure 1).28
There is a significant distinction between drone swarms and drones en masse. Drones en
masse is the use of multiple drones without autonomous communication between the
drones (see Figure 1). Rather, one or more human decision-makers coordinate all their
actions, either in real time or in advance via preprogrammed behaviors. This distinction
is significant for three reasons. First, the limits of human cognition are likely to limit the
size, complexity, and behaviors of drone swarms generally, and they are exacerbated signifi-
cantly with drones en masse. As Amy Hocraffer and Chang S. Nam note: “[aerial drone]
swarms pose several human factors challenges, such as high cognitive demands, non-intui-
tive behavior, and serious consequences for errors.”29 They also find that the level of auton-
omy of the swarm is the main factor in whether the human controller is a strength or
weakness for management of large drone swarms.30 While drone swarms have at least
limited autonomy to limit the cognitive demands, drones en masse do not necessarily.

25
Axel Bürkle, Florian Segor, and Matthias Kollman, “Towards Autonomous Micro UAV Swarms,” Fraunhofer-Institut für
Optronik, Systemtechnik und Bildauswertung, Vol. 61, Nos. 1–4, (2011), pp. 339–53, <http://akme-a2.iosb.fraunhofer.
de/EatThisGoogleScholar/d/2011_Towards%20autonomous%20micro%20UAV%20swarms.pdf>.
26
The US Navy recently tested a swarm of four drone boats: Jeremy Hsu, “US Navy’s Drone Boat Swarm Practices Harbor
Defense,” IEEE Spectrum, December 19, 2016, <https://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/military-robots/navy-
drone-boat-swarm-practices-harbor-defense>.
27
Nithin Mathews, Anders Lyhne Christensen, Rehan O’Grady, Francesco Mondada, and Marco Dorigo, “Mergeable Nervous
System for Robots,” Nature Communications, Vol. 8 (2017), <www.nature.com/articles/s41467-017-00109-2>.
28
Milton B. Adams, Janet A. Lepanto, and Mark L. Hanson, “Mixed Initiative Command and Control of Autonomous Air
Vehicles,” Journal of Aerospace Computing, Information, and Communication, Vol. 2, No. 2 (February 2005), <https://
arc.aiaa.org/doi/10.2514/1.12963>.
29
Hocraffer and Nam, “A Meta-analysis of Human–System Interfaces in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Swarm Manage-
ment,” p. 66.
30
Ibid., p. 77
6 Z. KALLENBORN AND P.C. BLEEK

Figure 1. Information flows in different drone types.

Second, drones en masse, unlike drone swarms, will not be vulnerable to countermeasures
that seek to disrupt inter-drone communication or exploit weaknesses in control algorithms.
Drones en masse will still be vulnerable to disrupting connections between the drones and
the operator, though this communication may use different frequencies or different types of
communication methods than inter-swarm communication. Although a central hub to
collect and disperse data could limit this risk, the use of a central hub would likely
impose range and responsiveness costs and create a vulnerable target to disrupt the drone
swarm. Third, drone swarms will incorporate additional technological complexity over
drones en masse. While commercial-off-the-shelf or do-it-yourself drones can easily be
used en masse, enabling them to communicate and alter behavior autonomously is a signifi-
cant technical challenge. This challenge is likely to be particularly acute for non-state actors,
who are likely to have more limited capabilities.
Drone swarms are also distinct from swarming as a tactic. John Arquilla and David
Ronfeldt define tactical swarming as “seemingly amorphous, but it is a deliberately struc-
tured, coordinated, strategic way to strike from all directions at a particular point or
points, by means of a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire, close-in as well as from
standoff positions.”31 Given the rich history and apparent importance of swarming as a
tactic, it is striking that the literature on it appears to be rather limited. Swarming has
been employed as a tactic throughout history, long before contemporary development
of unmanned systems. For example, the twelfth- and thirteenth-century Mongols “com-
bined the mobility of the horse with the rapid, long-range fire of their horn bows to
create an imposing ability to swarm either fire or forces.”32
Drone swarms are highly suited to employing swarming tactics, but do not necessarily
need to do so. Members of a drone swarm rapidly share information and coordinate
their actions, enabling them to attack from all directions. The ability of drones within

31
Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “Swarming and the Future of Conflict,” p. vii
32
Ibid, p. 29
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 7

a swarm to act either individually or collectively also enables drones to concentrate or

disperse as needed.

CBRN-related roles
Next, we examine the applications of drone swarms to CBRN weapons and defenses,
addressing three categories of applications:

1. Complement: Employing drone swarms to improve the ability of CBRN weapons,

including their associated delivery systems, to achieve desired effects.
2. Challenge: Using drone swarms to mitigate CBRN threats.
3. Substitute: Pursuing drone swarms as alternatives to CBRN weapons.

Complementing CBRN weapons

Drone-swarm technology has the potential to improve existing delivery systems or to
provide novel delivery systems. The technology is likely to improve targeting, improve sur-
vivability against traditional defenses, enable the development of new tactics, and ease
mission planning and intelligence requirements. However, drone-swarm delivery
systems also introduce new vulnerabilities into cyber and electronic warfare. For the fore-
seeable future, drone-swarm-based delivery systems are likely to be useful adjuncts to tra-
ditional delivery systems but are unlikely to wholly replace them.
Traditional nuclear delivery systems consist of land- and sea-based airplanes equipped
with nuclear gravity bombs or air-launched cruise missiles, submarines and surface ships
with nuclear ballistic and cruise missiles, and fixed and mobile land-based ballistic and
cruise missiles.33 Each delivery system offers advantages and disadvantages. While submar-
ines are capable of significantly greater stealth than bombers or missiles, submarine-
launched missiles have historically been less accurate and communication links are less
reliable and slower, increasing response time in a nuclear crisis. While land-based missiles
offer significant range, even mobile versions are significantly less mobile than submarines
and airplanes, making them generally more vulnerable to attack in many circumstances.
And while airplanes have significant range and mobility, they are also more readily defea-
table through robust air defenses or while on the ground. The development of multiple
systems offers states the ability to select the best option based on operational need, decreases
the likelihood of a successful first strike eliminating all nuclear-weapons capability—thereby
reducing crisis or conflict “use it or lose it” pressure on policy makers to strike first—and
forces an adversary to expend resources to defend against different methods of attack.
CB-weapons delivery systems include artillery shells, ballistic missiles, aerial bombs,
and aerial sprayers.34 Traditional CB delivery systems disseminate their agent through
either area or point attacks. Area attack methods such as spray tanks mounted on aircraft
release large amounts of agent, relying on the wind to drift the agent into a targeted area.
Alternatively, point attacks via artillery, missiles, or aircraft deliver the agent directly on
the target.
33
Various other delivery systems have also been pursued, including various “tactical” systems.
34
Office of Technology Assessment, “Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks,” OTA-ISC-559,
August 1993, p. 50, <www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ota/9341.pdf>.
8 Z. KALLENBORN AND P.C. BLEEK

Drone-swarm technology is likely to improve delivery-system targeting. Sensor drones

within the swarm can collect live or at least timelier intelligence on more precise target
locations and feed that information to attack drones to improve the likelihood of a success-
ful strike. Timely information could identify, for example, a previously unknown protec-
tive measure or a previously unidentified vulnerability. Alternatively, traditional delivery
systems could share information about their progress and adjust their trajectory if a
weapon misses its target. However, false negatives could also create problems if a
system redirects based on incorrect information about another system’s miss. Improved
targeting is likely to be especially significant for CB weapons.
Environmental conditions can significantly complicate the effective delivery of CB
weapons (nuclear weapons are more forgiving of environmental conditions). As the
DOD notes: “efficiency of dissemination is the most important factor in the effectiveness
of chemical weapons.”35 Similarly, as the former Office of Technology Assessment notes:
“in principle, biological weapons efficiently delivered under the right conditions against
unprotected populations would, pound for pound of weapon, exceed the killing power
of nuclear weapons.”36 Wind conditions can prevent agents from reaching their targets,
while temperature and moisture can weaken the agent’s lethality. While point attacks
can reduce the challenges posed by wind conditions, they generally require a larger
payload and/or affect more limited areas.37
Drone swarms equipped with CB weapons could offer extensive military utility beyond
traditional delivery systems. CB weapons are generally considered not to provide effective
strategic deterrents, in part because of these environmental concerns. Environmental con-
ditions prevent the weapons from being used reliably, making threats of their use less cred-
ible. However, integrated environmental sensors could improve their reliability, thereby
improving their ability to function as strategic deterrents.
Dispersed sensor drones could identify potential targets and weather conditions favor-
able to a successful attack. Attack drones may only release the weapon agent when a target
is identified and in such a position that a release is likely to be effective, decreasing
unnecessary agent use and the risk of inadvertent casualties.
Of course, there will still be challenges. Although highly effective autonomous control
systems could mitigate risks to civilians, poorly developed ones would increase the risk of
mistakes. A poorly designed system is more likely to make a targeting error, if autono-
mously targeting, or to accidentally crash and release the agent over friendly or civilian
areas. Such concerns also suggest that states may be hesitant to allow complete drone
autonomy over targeting decisions.38 Further, the payload and range are both likely to
be limited in the short run, as current swarming-capable drones are quite small—limiting
the amount of agent able to be delivered—and with small battery capacity.39 For small
drones, strong weather conditions can still cause problems, such as blowing the drone

35
DOD, “The Military Critical Technologies List Part II: Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies (ADA 330102), ‘Chemical
Weapons Technology’,” February 1998, p. II-4-22, <http://fas.org/irp/threat/mctl98-2/mctl98-2.pdf>.
36
Office of Technology Assessment, “Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” p. 52
37
Office of Technology Assessment, “Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction,” OTA-BP-ISC-115, December
1993, p. 98, <www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ota/9344.pdf>.
38
States are likely to differ over the degree of concern, especially as the impacts could be limited. For example, auton-
omous targeting could only be allowed in pre-designated areas where risk of inadvertent harm is minimal.
39
With highly robust targeting algorithms able to alter their dispersion based on local geography, limited payload may not
be a significant concern. Better targeting means less required agent.
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 9

off course.40 So, while drone swarms could mitigate some problems, drone swarms are
unlikely to completely mitigate these weaknesses. Similarly, Gregory Koblentz of
George Mason University notes that biological weapons are highly ineffective strategic
deterrents because of uncertain effects, a need for surprise, and the broad availability of
defensive measures.41 Drone swarms would not mitigate these challenges.
Individual drones could also achieve at least some of these benefits. The same environ-
mental sensors could be mounted on a single CB-equipped drone. Individual drones could
also achieve some of the wide-area advantages of drone swarms if drones were launched en
masse. Individual drones are also likely to be cheaper than swarms because they could be
purchased off the shelf without needing the software or hardware to manage the swarming
behavior. These benefits are already being realized with drone-based crop-sprayers to help
farmers in California.42 But drone swarms enable the use of various new tactics and strat-
egies in employing CBRN weapons.
Drone swarms equipped with CB weapons could be pre-positioned within friendly
cities to attack hostile forces. Members of a drone swarm positioned on rooftops could
be activated when invaders arrive, swooping in from all directions to target enemy person-
nel. Such a rapid, unexpected attack would leave little time for adversary forces to don pro-
tective gear to minimize CB-weapon effects. By the time adversaries are prepared, the
drone swarm may have already dispersed.
Drone-swarm delivery systems could enable mixed tactics, incorporating CB weapons
alongside conventional weapons. In a scenario where a drone swarm attacks a massed
group of adversary troops, a few lead drones may attack with a chemical agent. Soldiers
don appropriate protective gear and prepare themselves to respond to a chemical
attack. However, the remaining drones may be equipped with conventional munitions,
striking the soldiers unexpectedly. Such an attack would likely be more effective than a
conventional attack alone, because chemical protective gear inhibits soldiers’ dexterity,
vision, and communication.43 Similarly, a drone-swarm attack equipped with conven-
tional weapons could include a small number of drones equipped with biological
weapons. Those drones might go unrecognized in the confusion of the attack, leaving sol-
diers unaware of their exposure.
The improved targeting, live information, and intra-swarm communication may also
decrease mission-planning and intelligence requirements.44 For example, in certain situ-
ations, it may make sense to allow the drones themselves to select their targets and rely
on automation to prevent confliction and appropriately distribute attacks.45 Mission com-
manders would not need to take significant efforts to plan the exact sequence and pro-
gression of attacks. Further, they might also be able to expend less time and fewer
resources on intelligence collection and analysis prior to an operation because the

40
Perry Hardin and Ryan Jensen, “Small-Scale Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Environmental Remote Sensing: Challenges and
Opportunities,” GIScience & Remote Sensing, Vol. 48, (2011), pp. 99–111.
41
Gregory D. Koblentz, Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2009), p. 39.
42
“Unmanned Drones Used for Spraying to Better Assist Crop Growth,” CBS Sacramento, June 9, 2013, <https://
sacramento.cbslocal.com/2013/06/09/unmanned-drones-used-for-spraying-to-better-assist-crop-growth/>.
43
Bernard J. Fine, “Human Performance of Military Tasks while Wearing Chemical Protective Clothing,” GlobalSecurity.org,
September 23, 2002, <www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2002/mopp-human-performance.htm>.
44
David Frelinger, Joel Kvitky, and William Stanley, “Proliferation Autonomous Weapons: An Example of Cooperative
Behavior,” RAND, 1998, p. 19, <www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB239.html>.
45
Ibid.
10 Z. KALLENBORN AND P.C. BLEEK

drones could collect some information in situ. Of course, this is unlikely to apply to
nuclear-armed drones because nuclear weapons are unlikely to ever be deployed
without considerable pre-operation planning or removing meaningful human control.
Finally, drone-swarm delivery systems could better survive traditional CBRN delivery
defenses. The CBRN-equipped drone swarm could, for instance, incorporate conven-
tional drones designed to attack adversary defenses: information sharing within the
drone swarm would allow the drones to coordinate these actions so that the convention-
ally armed drones focus on the defensive systems that pose the greatest threat to the
CBRN-armed drone. Similarly, the CBRN-equipped drone swarm could also include
decoy drones designed to absorb attacks from defensive systems. As the number of
drones increases, the likelihood of an adversary successfully defeating the CBRN-
equipped drone would decrease. However, drone-swarm delivery systems may also
create new vulnerabilities.
Drone swarms are more likely than traditional CBRN delivery systems to be more vul-
nerable to cyber- and electronic-warfare attacks because drone swarms significantly
depend on those capabilities to function. Adversaries may also seek to exploit the auton-
omous control of more advanced drone swarms to manipulate their actions.46 In an
extreme scenario, an adversary could manipulate the drone swarm into using CBRN
weapons against a friendly or neutral population. Although these vulnerabilities could
be mitigated, they do mean that drone swarms may have significant reliability concerns.
A reliable delivery system is critical for CBRN weapons to function as strategic deter-
rents. If a target of a CBRN attack is not confident that the threatening state can reliably
carry out the threat, they are unlikely to be deterred. This concern, in part, drove the
United States to develop its nuclear triad—nuclear-armed submarines, nuclear gravity
bombs, and land-based missiles—to ensure it can reliably carry out a nuclear threat
even in the event of an adversary first strike. But specific cyber vulnerabilities, for
example, may not be discovered until the drone swarm is used in a nuclear attack (a
so-called “zero-day” vulnerability that is unknown to cyber defenders prior to an
attack). Thus, even if drone swarms offer significant benefits for CBRN delivery, the
decreased reliability may outweigh the benefits in their use as a strategic deterrent
against a technologically sophisticated adversary.47
But reliability concerns are likely to be less significant against adversaries that lack
sophisticated electronic- or cyber-warfare capabilities. Less militarily capable states, dom-
estic populations, and terrorist organizations may lack the capabilities to effectively exploit
these vulnerabilities. Instead, these actors must rely on traditional CBRN defenses.
Further, states may differ in how concerned they are about decreased reliability, either
believing their cyber- and electronic-warfare defenses are capable enough to minimize
the concern or only using drones in ways where reliability concerns are few. Russia, for
example, is developing an underwater drone that is armed with nuclear weapons.48

46
Paul Scharre, “Counter-Swarm: A Guide to Defeating Robotic Swarms,” War on the Rocks, March 31, 2015, <http://
warontherocks.com/2015/03/counter-swarm-a-guide-to-defeating-robotic-swarms/>.
47
These concerns may also apply to other advanced weapon systems that are susceptible to being hacked; however, drone
swarms inherently require a high degree of autonomy that is likely to make them more susceptible. Intra-swarm com-
munication is also likely to be a vulnerability unique to drone swarms.
48
Valerie Insinna, “Russia’s Nuclear Underwater Drone Is Real and in the Nuclear Posture Review,” Defense News, January
12, 2018, <www.defensenews.com/space/2018/01/12/russias-nuclear-underwater-drone-is-real-and-in-the-nuclear-
posture-review/>.
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 11

Defeat defenses
Drone swarms have potential applicability in suppressing or defeating air defenses, missile
defenses, and antisubmarine measures.
Targets may try to defend against CBRN attacks using either active defenses to destroy
or disable the delivery system or passive defenses to limit the damage from successful
usage. The type of defense depends significantly on the CBRN delivery system.
Air defenses such as surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft artillery, and interceptor air-
craft seek to deny CBRN-equipped aerial delivery systems access to airspace. A successful
air-defense system requires a defender to locate the incoming plane, provide that infor-
mation to the weapon system, and launch a successful attack. Different types of air
defenses may be integrated to increase the likelihood of success.49
Missile defenses seek to prevent missiles from successfully reaching their targets. In
addition to traditional ballistic-missile defenses systems—composed of radar and inter-
ceptor missiles—there are several other missile-defense systems, as discussed in Ashton
Carter’s definitive 1984 summary, including those that: spread projectiles into the path
of the missile just prior to arrival at a target, rely on buried nuclear bombs that launch
clouds of dust into the air when detonated, fly small rockets through space (exoatmo-
spheric or “overlay” midcourse systems), or use advanced weapons such as lasers or par-
ticle beams to strike the missile in its boost phase.50 Several of these concepts have had
significant difficulty translating to operational reality, such as space-based rockets or
laser-based missile defenses. Nonetheless, development appears to be continuing.51
Missile defenses may be either static—typically guarding large areas—or mobile, with typi-
cally shorter range to defend particular targets.
Antisubmarine measures include aerial, surface, and undersea assets designed to locate
and/or strike adversary submarines equipped with nuclear ballistic or cruise missiles. Sub-
marine warfare, in general, is a “hider–finder” competition in which submarines hide
from antisubmarine forces in the vastness of the ocean.52 Attack submarines are particularly
effective in striking adversary submarines, though are less effective at searching for them.53
Helicopters, aerial drones, and land- or carrier-based fixed-wing aircraft are able to survey
far greater areas far more quickly but cannot strike as effectively.54 Surface ships may serve as
platforms for antisubmarine helicopters, drones, and sensors.55 An effective overall capa-
bility is achieved by integrating all of these systems together.
Drone swarms could be used to strike or disable defensive detection, communication,
and weapon systems. Drones within the swarm could be equipped with electronic- or
cyber-warfare payloads to degrade adversary detection systems. In these roles, as others
have argued, drone swarms offer significant operational advantages including: low

49
James Brungess, Setting the Context: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses and Joint War Fighting in an Uncertain World
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1994), <www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a421980.pdf>.
50
Ashton B. Carter, “Introduction,” in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds., Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, 1984), p. 9.
51
Thomas G. Roberts, “Why a Space-Based Missile Interceptor System Is Not Viable,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 74,
No. 4 (2018), <https://thebulletin.org/2018/06/why-a-space-based-missile-interceptor-system-is-not-viable/>; Jeff
Hecht, “Laser Weapons Not Ready for Missile Defense,” IEEE Spectrum, September 27, 2017, <https://spectrum.ieee.
org/tech-talk/aerospace/military/no-quick-laser-missile-defense>.
52
Clark, “The Emerging Era in Undersea Warfare,” p. 2.
53
Timothy Ketter, “Anti-submarine Warfare in the 21st Century,” Naval War College, May 20, 2004, p. 9.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid.
12 Z. KALLENBORN AND P.C. BLEEK

power requirements, low observability, reduced mission risk, high operational flexibility,
mission sustainability, cost effectiveness, and psychological effectiveness.56 The cost effec-
tiveness of drone swarms is likely to be a significant advantage in suppressing enemy air
defenses, capabilities that the United States has generally neglected since the 1991 Gulf
War.57 However, some technological challenges first need to be mastered, including
effective geolocation, synchronizing antennae, and managing the airspace.58 In addition
to or in lieu of jamming defensive systems, drones could be equipped with antiradiation,
antiship, or regular missiles to strike defensive systems. Swarms of drones could coordi-
nate their fire, striking multiple targets at once. Drone swarms could be particularly
effective in targeting mobile defensive systems because dispersed sensor drones could
search for those systems. This is significant because mobile air defenses tend to be
more difficult to counter than static ones.59 Similarly, as John Benedict argues, “without
reliable, timely, and accurate surveillance cues and reliable weapons, [antisubmarine
warfare] becomes a very hard, inefficient, and asset-intensive game.”60 Defense suppres-
sion swarms could also incorporate decoy drones to draw the attention and/or fire of
defender detector and weapon systems.61
Drone swarms may serve as decoys to create false signatures of a CBRN delivery
system’s presence.62 During Israel’s Bekaa Valley campaign against Syria, the Israeli
military equipped reflectors to individual decoy drones to emulate the radar signatures
of Israeli attack aircraft.63 The Syrian military wasted large numbers of surface-to-air
missiles against the drones, providing the Israelis with an opportunity to attack while
the Syrians reloaded.64 Used in this manner, drone swarms could offer additional capa-
bility. The decoy drones could use time delays to trick defender radar systems into
believing an aircraft was at a range beyond the swarm itself.65 Further, drone swarms
could fly in complex formations, more akin to traditional aircraft. Increased autonomy
may also enable a drone swarm to travel alongside a CBRN delivery system, decreasing
the likelihood of a defender successfully downing the CBRN-equipped system and/or
providing real-time defense.

Challenge CBRN weapons

Drone swarms can also be used to counter CBRN weapons to prevent or inhibit their suc-
cessful usage. Drone swarms could be used as platforms for standoff detection, searching
for CBRN signatures from a distance. Alternatively, they could be used to destroy or
inhibit CBRN delivery systems. In the event of a successful attack, networked drones
could help manage the consequences and fallout of CBRN use.
56
Cevik et al., “The Small and Silent Force Multiplier: A Swarm UAV-Electronic Attack.”
57
Pietrucha, “The Need for SEAD Part 1.”
58
Ibid.
59
Elliot M. Bucki, “Flexible, Smart, and Lethal: Adapting US SEAD Doctrine to Changing Threats,” Air & Space Power Journal,
Vol. 30, No. 2 (2016), pp. 65–78, <www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-30_Issue-2/F-Bucki.pdf>.
60
John R Benedict, “The Unraveling and Revitalization of US Antisubmarine Warfare,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 58
(Spring 2005), p. 94.
61
Mark J. Mears, “Cooperative Electronic Attack Using Unmanned Air Vehicles,” Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 2016, p. 7,
<www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a444985.pdf>.
62
Scharre, “Robotics on the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm,” p. 32.
63
Brungess, “Setting the Context,” p. 21.
64
Ibid.
65
Mears, “Cooperative Electronic Attack using Unmanned Air Vehicles,” p. 7.
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 13

In CBRN competition, these applications favor the defender by lowering the likelihood
of successful attack. Both standoff detection and defeating CBRN delivery systems make it
more difficult to successfully employ CBRN weapons.

Interfering with CBRN usage

Drone swarms could be used to prevent CBRN-armed planes from taking off; interfere
with missile launches; search for and potentially follow submarines; or target CBRN
command-and-control systems.
Drone swarms could be used to attack CBRN-armed bombers. Drone swarms could
attack the plane either as it takes off or while still grounded or simply fly above an
airfield to create risks of collision.66 States could position drone swarms close to
airfields to use them to prevent the launch of nuclear forces more quickly than it would
otherwise take with conventional bombs or deploying special operations forces.
However, the swarm would need to be camouflaged or disguised in some form to
prevent premature discovery.
Similarly, drone swarms could interfere with the successful delivery of CBRN-armed
missiles. Given enough warning, large numbers of drones could place themselves in the
potential path of an incoming missile. The missile would strike the drones instead of
the target, mitigating or eliminating the harm from a strike.67 Such an approach would
be similar to traditional missile defenses that spray particles into the air, except that a
drone swarm could readily move into the path of an incoming missile or organize them-
selves into layers to protect against follow-up strikes.68 As the drones create a physical
barrier against an incoming missile, they could plausibly be effective against even hyper-
sonic missiles. Alternatively, and far more difficult, drone swarms could be pre-positioned
near missile silos to strike rapidly. Swarms could fly above silos to slam into or detonate
explosives near the missiles at their boost phase to incapacitate or throw them off course.
Even if the damage is readily repairable, it may serve to delay a retaliatory attack, offering
time to deploy or use forces. Alternatively, swarms could serve as platforms for advanced
missile defenses. For example, the Missile Defense Agency requested tens of millions of
dollars into a drone-mounted laser program.69
Drone swarms could aid in countering mobile transporter-erector launchers (TELs),
mobile vehicles that transport and can launch missiles. The mobility of TELs allows them
to move from previously identified positions, requiring significant time and resources to
track and counter them.70 As William F. Bell notes: “Extensive denial and deception planning
seems a fundamental part of all doctrines of threat missile forces. … Our adversaries have seen
the publicly reported difficulty the United States has encountered in finding and killing mobile
66
Scharre, “Robotics on the Battlefield Part II,” p. 15.
67
A significant question is whether few enough drones could be used in this way for the concept to be cost effective. A
swarm of 100,000 large drones surrounding an aircraft carrier would certainly intercept any incoming missile; however,
so many drones are also likely to be highly costly and to threaten friendly aircraft.
68
See also: August Cole and Amir Husain, “Putin Says Russia’s New Weapons Can’t be Beat. with AI and Robotics, They Can,”
Defense One, March 13, 2018, <www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/03/putin-says-russias-new-weapons-cant-be-beat-ai-
and-robotics-they-can/146631/>.
69
Patrick Tucker, “Pentagon Requesting $66M for Laser Drones to Shoot Down North Korean Missiles,” Defense One, Feb-
ruary 12, 2018, <www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/02/pentagon-requesting-66-million-laser-drones-shoot-down-
north-korean-missiles/145939/>.
70
Mark Kipphut, “Theater Missile Defense: Reflections for the Future,” Airpower Journal, Winter 1996, pp. 35–52.
14 Z. KALLENBORN AND P.C. BLEEK

targets in its recent wars; thus, missile mobility is of key importance.”71 The wide-area search
ability and relatively low cost of drone swarms could be particularly effective in searching for
TELs, especially because the cost of losing some drones within the swarm is small compared
with the loss of a manned aircraft. Further, the unique shape of TELs may make them particu-
larly suited to automated image recognition because false positives will be less likely. Once a
TEL is identified, swarms could either send the information about the TEL location back to
other strike forces or incorporate attack drones to eliminate the TEL.
Mixed swarms of undersea, surface, and aerial drones could be used as advanced anti-
submarine platforms to identify and/or eliminate nuclear-armed ballistic or cruise-
missile-carrying submarines. Already, the US military is pursuing autonomous antisub-
marine capabilities. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is cur-
rently developing an Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vehicle for
tracking diesel-electric submarines from the surface.72 Autonomous communication
between unmanned surface, undersea, and aerial vehicles would enable much wider net-
works, increasing the coverage of surveillance and relaying information for attack.73 The
sensors within that network could be a combination of mobile (equipped to the drone) or
static (distributed by the drone) sensors.74
Drone swarms could also mount attacks on submarine bases. Such an attack may seek
to destroy a nuclear-weapon-armed submarine while it is in port or disable port oper-
ations to inhibit resupply or maintenance. This would be particularly significant for
states with a limited number of submarine bases. The United Kingdom, for example,
has only a single nuclear submarine base: Her Majesty’s Naval Base, Clyde. A massive
drone-swarm attack on the base could significantly weaken—even suspend the operation
of—the UK sea-based deterrent.
Drone swarms could also be used to counter other drone swarms armed with CBRN
weapons. In some respects, drone swarms are effective counters to drone swarms
because they are low cost and effective at striking many targets at once. To that end,
DARPA and the US Naval Postgraduate School are exploring swarm vs. swarm combat
to develop new concepts of operations and tactics.75
In addition to targeting delivery systems, drone swarms could target CBRN command-
and-control systems through direct strike on facilities and personnel, or electronic- or
cyber-warfare attacks on facility communication and computer systems. Drone swarms
could be used to strike fixed CBRN command-and-control systems or mobile platforms
such as the United States’s E-6B Mercury. Or drone swarms could be used in targeted
strikes on the personnel involved with CBRN systems, including those in a state’s
nuclear command authority. Drone swarms may also serve as platforms for cyber- or elec-
tronic-warfare payloads to prevent CBRN launch orders from being delivered. Such a

71
William F. Bell, “Have Adversary Missiles Become a Revolution in Military Affairs?” Air & Space Power Journal, Vol. 28, No. 5
(2014), p. 53.
72
Alexander M. G. Walan, “Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail Unmanned Vehicle (ACTUV),” DARPA, <www.
darpa.mil/program/anti-submarine-warfare-continuous-trail-unmanned-vessel>.
73
Clark, “The Emerging Era in Undersea Warfare,” p. 16.
74
Kathleen Hicks, Andrew Metrick, Lisa Sawyer Samp, and Kathleen Weinberger, “Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe,”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2016, pp. 36–37, <http://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/
publication/160721_Hicks_UnderseaWarfare_Web.pdf>.
75
Chung et. al., “50 vs. 50 by 2015.” “Service Academies Swarm Challenge Pushes the Boundaries of Autonomous Swarm
Capabilities,” DARPA, May 11, 2017, <www.darpa.mil/news-events/2017-05-11>.
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 15

drone swarm would also need to ensure that its offensive activities do not inhibit the
swarm itself. For all these applications, the primary advantage of drone swarms is in
their broad area coverage: jammer-equipped swarms could spread broadly over a
command-and-control facility; armed swarms could strike multiple targets at once, satur-
ating a base’s defenses; and drones could spread out to search for possible personnel
targets, while sensing drones monitor for possible threats to the swarm.

CBRN standoff detection

Drones generally offer advantages for detecting CBRN, and swarming drones significantly
enhance that capability even further.
CBRN standoff detectors identify signatures of CBRN material at a distance. Early
detection of CBRN material may interdict the general transfer of CBRN material,
prevent an imminent CBRN attack from occurring, enable faster medical response to miti-
gate damage, or help identify the source and reduce the impact of an attack.76 CBRN
detectors may be deployed at points of entry to identify material or weapons crossing
over national borders. Alternatively, they may be deployed inside or outside of cities to
identify possible CBRN usage. The US BioWatch program, for example, deployed biologi-
cal agent detectors to over thirty-one cities.77
CBRN detection techniques depend on the class of weapon. Nuclear and radioactive
detectors can be active or passive. Passive detectors pick up spontaneously emitted radi-
ation signatures such as neutrons or, more commonly, gamma rays at counts higher
than observed background radiation produced by a potential nuclear material.78 By con-
trast, active detectors bombard a possible source of nuclear/radioactive material with
gamma rays or neutrons to stimulate a detectable response.79 Chemical detectors utilize
a variety of techniques, including mass spectroscopy, infrared spectroscopy, and gas
chromatography.80 These techniques determine the nature of a sample based on how it
reacts to different stimuli such as a beam of electrons (mass spectroscopy) or infrared radi-
ation (infrared spectroscopy).81 The US BioWatch program collects biological material in
air samples that are then analyzed in a lab using a polymerase chain reaction (PCR). PCR
amplifies specific areas of a biological sample’s genome and compares it against microor-
ganisms of concern.82 Environmental factors, detector positioning and spacing, and prop-
erties of the pathogen all affect the likelihood of successful and false detection.83 Some

76
Gary W. Phillips, David J. Nagel, and Timothy Coffey, “A Primer on the Detection of Nuclear and Radiological Weapons,”
National Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy, July 2005, <large.stanford.edu/courses/
2011/ph241/keller1/docs/phillips.pdf>.
77
Dana A. Shea and Sarah A. Lister, “The BioWatch Program: Detection of Bioterrorism,” Congressional Research Service,
November 19, 2003.
78
Richard T. Kouzes, Edward R. Siciliano, James H. Ely, Paul E. Keller, and Ronald J. McConn, “Passive Neutron Detection for
Interdiction of Nuclear Materials at Borders,” Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research A, Vol. 584, Nos. 2–3
(2008), pp. 383–400.
79
Ibid.
80
Committee on R&D Needs for Improving Civilian Medical Response to Chemical and Biological Terrorism Incidents,
Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Research and Development to Improve Civilian Medical Response (Washington, DC:
National Academies Press, 1999).
81
Ibid.
82
Committee on PCR Standards for the BioWatch Program, BioWatch PCR Assays: Building Confidence, Ensuring Reliability:
Abbreviated Version (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2015), p. 25.
83
Ibid.
16 Z. KALLENBORN AND P.C. BLEEK

CBRN detection techniques are not well suited for mobile detectors because of their size
and human requirements.
Air- or ground-based drones could serve as platforms for mobile detectors. Because
detector drones would likely operate primarily in urban or otherwise crowded environ-
ments, drones would need to be small, thereby also limiting detector size. Some already
developed detectors could conceivably be used for these purposes and the US Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) is reportedly testing small drones equipped with sensors for
detecting chemical or radical incidents.84 Ground-based drones are unlikely to have sig-
nificant payload concerns; however, they may be less readily deployable due to inaccessible
terrain. Ground-based drones could also serve as carriers for air-based detection drones,
providing transportation, limited hazard detection (e.g. checking for open space), and
recharging capabilities. The exact operation of the detector drones and feasibility of
different approaches depend significantly on the type of CBRN material searched for
owing to differences in how the detectors operate.
Intra-swarm communication enables sophisticated search patterns. Control algorithms
could prioritize flights over specific areas during high-traffic periods. For example, drones
could be programmed to overfly Washington, DC’s Key Bridge during the evening
commute, a notably congested roadway, which non-state actors could perceive as a desir-
able CBRN target.85 Similarly, swarms could be programmed to frequently change their
routes to mitigate the risk of adversaries anticipating and defeating detection.
Further, intra-swarm communication could help mitigate false positives. If a drone
detects a possible CBRN agent, it could relay a request for a secondary inspection.
Another drone in the swarm may reroute to the area or back-up drones could be activated
and deployed. If the second drone fails to confirm the positive detection, the drones may
return to their previous routing. If the second drone confirms the positive detection, it may
relay the detection to human emergency responders to deploy to the scene.
In cities, CBRN-sensing drones could be incorporated into broader “security swarms”
that provide multi-threat defenses. For example, in addition to CBRN detection, a security
swarm could incorporate drones dedicated to counter-drone operations; drones dedicated
to identifying and neutralizing drones used by hostile actors. A security swarm could also
include facial recognition to identify wanted individuals or general plume-detection capa-
bilities to identify burning buildings.
However, city-based swarms would likely entail significant public concerns. The public
may be unsettled by regularly seeing drones flying above them, especially as current drones
often have a unique buzzing sound. Similarly, the public may raise privacy concerns over
potential recording equipment on the platform.86 Some people may be concerned about
government surveillance, while others may be concerned about nefarious actors acquiring
access to video feeds.
Any such system would need effective cyber security measures to ensure actors are
unable to exploit security swarms for negative ends. They may seek to access data
84
BioPrepWatch Reports, “DHS Testing Drone Sensors with CBRN-Detection Capability,” BioPrepWatch, March 11, 2013,
<https://bioprepwatch.com/stories/510510077-dhs-testing-drone-sensors-with-cbrn-detection-capabilitya>.
85
Jack Moore, “When and Where You’ll Find the Worst Traffic Congestion in DC,” WTOP, February 13, 2017, <https://wtop.
com/dc-transit/2017/02/dc-traffic-congestion-worst/>
86
Heather Roff, “Banning and Regulating Autonomous Weapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 24, 2015,
<http://thebulletin.org/autonomous-weapons-civilian-safety-and-regulation-versus-prohibition/banning-and-
regulating-autonomous-weapons>.
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 17

streams to identify possible targets, take control of the system to destroy it, use it as a
weapon (e.g. flying the drone into a building or person), or inhibit effective incident
response. While certain methods of deployment and usage may mitigate some risk (e.g.
only deploying a detection swarm during an incident), cyber security is still likely to be
a significant concern.
While drones may have minimal up-time owing to limited battery life, platform main-
tenance, and harsh environmental conditions, advances in drone, battery, and automation
technology may allay these problems. For example, a recent study demonstrated drones
are capable of charging on power-lines and via an inductive charging pad.87 Autonomous
drones could also be programmed to return to designated maintenance areas after a given
time period or after an internal self-check has identified a problem. Similarly, drones could
be programmed to return to protected areas in the event of hazardous weather.
Aerial drone swarms will also likely have the added challenge of avoiding potential
hazards from every direction, especially in a city. Depending on drone routing, a detection
drone would need to avoid birds, open windows and doors, stoplights, streetlights, falling
objects, trees, and other hazards. Some success has already been demonstrated in fully
autonomous flight, such as the US Marine Corps’ successful recent tests of a fully auton-
omous helicopter.88 These same technologies could also be quite useful in cleaning up after
a successful CBRN attack.

CBRN response and cleanup

The immediate and longer-term responses to a CBRN attack significantly affect the
attack’s impact. This is most dramatically the case for biological weapons, where timely
awareness of an attack enables rapid deployment of medical countermeasures that can
blunt or even wholly negate the attack’s effects. Consequence management also plays
important roles in mitigating chemical, radiological, and nuclear effects.
A successful CBRN attack can leave significant hazardous material that can persist for
days to years, depending on the type and purity of the agent and the environment in which
it is used. For example, an experimental study of VX persistency found the chemical had
an effective half-life89 of seventy-two hours when applied to grass foliage.90 Similarly,
radiological agents of concern such as cobalt-60 and strontium-90 have radioactive
half-lives of 5.3 years and twenty-nine years, respectively.91 Weapons using these agents
continually risk harm to individuals, preventing or inhibiting access or the use of
affected equipment. And, of course, attempting to remove the material may cause signifi-
cant harm to responders. The effectiveness of decontamination methods will affect the
87
“Flying Drones Could Soon Re-charge while Airborne with New Technology,” Science Daily, October 20, 2016, <www.
sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/10/161020092110.htm>.
88
Sierra Jones, “Autonomous Helicopter Technology Wins Another Major Award,” DOD, May 18, 2018, <www.defense.gov/
News/Article/Article/1525665/autonomous-helicopter-technology-wins-another-major-award/>.
89
“Effective half-life” refers to the time it takes for the amount of VX to be reduced by one half, owing to evaporation and
other factors.
90
Ronald T. Checkai, Mark V. Haley, Michael Simini, Richard J. Lawrence, Roman G. Kuperman, William T. Muse, Ronald
A. Evans, and Michael W. Busch, “Persistence and Effective Half-Life of Chemical Warfare Agent VX on Grass Foliage,”
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, August 2017, <www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038552.pdf>.
91
Charles Ferguson and Michelle M. Smith, “Assessing Radiological Weapons: Attack Methods and Estimated Effects,”
Defense Against Terrorism Review, Vol. 2, (Fall 2009), pp. 15–34, <https://wiki.bnl.gov/nuclearpediaNNSS/images/3/39/
Radiological_Terrorism.pdf>.
18 Z. KALLENBORN AND P.C. BLEEK

overall impact of successful CBRN usage on the defender, especially for radiological
weapons that rely on long-term damage to inflict harm.
Single drones, drones en masse, and drone swarms could all be highly useful in decon-
taminating after a CBRN attack, drone swarms providing the most capability. As
Matthew Jonkey argues: drones could limit risks to human exposure, provide better
information on injured people, assess the “parameters of the incident” (identify
source, incident size, and plume activity), deploy quickly, and be relatively inexpen-
sive.92 In general, drones can be used to clean up the material or support decontamina-
tion through improved situational awareness.
Drones can be tasked directly to clean CBRN-contaminated material. Robots with
CBRN decontamination capabilities could readily spread over areas broadly impacted
by CBRN weapons. Drones, unlike humans, would likely not risk harm from the CBRN
material itself and so would not need sophisticated protective equipment that also inhibits
mobility. That may be especially advantageous in wartime conditions because friendly sol-
diers would not be put in an exposed position.
Drones and drone swarms are also likely to be useful in a support capacity to assess
the spread of material. Drones equipped with cameras and other sensors can provide
real-time video and thermal imaging to help responders deploy resources, identify
risks, and build common situational understanding.93 In a CBRN disaster or successful
usage on the battlefield, this information would be particularly useful in, among other
things, determining the need for CBRN medical countermeasures based on improved
assessments of the number of harmed people and the degree of restrictions on friendly
military mobility.
Initial mathematical modeling has demonstrated significant monitoring potential for
drones en masse in detecting the perimeter of oil spills, a similar type of problem.94
However, as the authors note, the drones “must be able to detect and follow pollutants
that can change and move in time mainly by the action of advection and diffusion.”95
The dynamics of detecting and following CBRN pollutants, as opposed to spilled oil,
are different and will depend significantly on the type of CBRN agent and where and
how the agent is released.
While single drones can accomplish many of these functions as well as drone swarms,
drone swarms would offer additional capability. In large-scale or catastrophic CBRN
usage, the affected area is likely to evolve and expand rapidly. Drone swarms are likely
better equipped to handle the situation because they will be able to respond more auton-
omously and rapidly. Further, a significant CBRN event is also likely to seriously challenge
existing resources, including the availability of drone pilots and support personnel. The
ability of drone swarms to coordinate their actions would decrease personnel requirements
both for drone operation and for planning and coordination.

92
Matthew J. Jonkey, “Seeing Eye Drones: How the DOD Can Transform CBRN and Disaster Response in the Homeland,”
Naval Postgraduate School, December 2016, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/51728>.
93
“Resource Typing Definition for Response Situational Assessment: Unmanned Aircraft System Team,” Federal
Emergency Management Agency, September 2017, <www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1516899610187-b1d4c358ca571
fb6f2efa9c4d67811a5/NIMS_509_2_TechnicalSpecialist(UAS).pdf>.
94
The authors of the study refer to their system as a “drone swarm,” but their description makes clear the drones do not
exchange information. F. Azner, M. Sempere, M. Pujol, R. Rizo, and M.J. Pujol “Modeling Oil-Spill Detection with Swarm
Drones,” Abstract and Applied Analysis, Vol. 2014, (2014), <www.hindawi.com/journals/aaa/2014/949407>.
95
Ibid, p. 3.
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 19

The rarity of CBRN events is likely to create development challenges for any auton-
omous drone system tasked with CBRN response. The rarity of events means little past
data will be available to train algorithms to recognize CBRN activity. This challenge
could be mitigated through experimentation and the use of CBRN agent simulants, but
this may be insufficient, because actual CBRN usage may occur in environments with
unforeseen complications.

Substitute for CBRN weapons

Finally, drone swarms armed with conventional weapons could serve as alternatives to
CBRN weapons in ways that existing conventional weapons do not. This would avoid
many of the dynamics of CBRN competition entirely. Attackers would not need to
worry as much about some defenses against CBRN weapons, such as missile defenses,
owing to differences in altitude. And actors without CBRN agents or delivery systems
could achieve the effects of CBRN weapons without acquiring them. Actors also may be
more willing to use drone swarms offensively, because the normative and legal prohibi-
tions in CBRN competition would not apply.96 Historically, state and non-state actors
have pursued CBRN weapons for mass casualty (against either military or civilian
targets) and assassination purposes. Drone swarms could serve in both roles. States
have also pursued CBRN weapons as strategic deterrents, either for counterforce or coun-
tervalue targeting, and drone swarms could plausibly fill in that role as well.

Conclusions and implications

Drone swarms are an emerging technology whose future implications are still poorly
understood. But drone swarms appear to have significant potential application to
CBRN competition, for both CBRN defenders and attackers. Drone swarms could serve
as CBRN delivery systems. They also could be used to strike or otherwise defeat adversary
defenses to increase the likelihood of successful CBRN usage. Alternatively, drone swarms
could be used to search for CBRN weapons or serve as sophisticated defenses against
CBRN delivery systems. Finally, the ability of drone swarms to inflict harm means
swarms could serve as replacements for CBRN weapons in some situations.
This analysis has relevance for a variety of international government agencies and
current international treaties.

. Export-control agencies should consider how and whether to limit the export of drone
swarms and control technology. Because drone swarms have potential non-military
applications such as environmental monitoring, there is a need to identify factors
that separate military vs. non-military swarms.
. Defense ministries should continue to expand their ongoing research on developing
swarms. This work should especially focus on (1) incorporating swarming behavior
into existing unmanned systems, (2) the development of multi-domain and
96
Of course, new norms and treaties against drone swarms and autonomous weapons could be developed in the future.
The nascent Campaign to Stop Killer Robots seeks to pre-emptively outlaw autonomous weapons, which would include
fully autonomous drone swarms.
20 Z. KALLENBORN AND P.C. BLEEK

heterogeneous swarms, and (3) the development of methods and techniques for creat-
ing interoperable drones that can be readily swapped into or out of a drone swarm. The
US DOD specifically should also include drone-swarm-control technology as a signifi-
cant line of effort for its new Joint Artificial Intelligence Office.97 Defense ministries
should also explore and evaluate methods of defending against mixed conventional
and CBRN swarm threats. Nuclear-armed states should evaluate the risks of drone-
swarm attacks at scale on missile silos and explore and evaluate potential methods
for defending them. Air forces should consider investing in drone swarms to
enhance their capability to suppress enemy air defenses, supporting both nuclear and
conventional aircraft. And navies should explore and evaluate potential drone-swarm
threats to critical naval ports. Missile-defense agencies should investigate the feasibility
of using drone swarms to protect against incoming missiles, how large such drones
would need to be, and how few drones are needed to make a missile-defense swarm
cost efficient.
. Domestic security agencies and departments should explore the potential avenues for
state or non-state actors to exploit drone swarm technology to attack critical infrastruc-
ture. Domestic security agencies should especially explore to what extent airports,
chemical facilities, and nuclear facilities are equipped to address aerial drone threats
generally, especially large numbers of drones, and how current defenses can be
improved. The US DHS should also invest in drone-swarm technology that could be
used for standoff CBRN detection through the National Nuclear Security Adminis-
tration, the Robotic Aircraft Safety Program, and other programs. In addition to
funding platform creation, this research should especially focus on the development
of effective miniaturized CBRN sensors that can be mounted on a small drone. Dom-
estic security agencies should develop and evaluate security swarms that combine a
variety of sensors and capabilities relevant to public security, including but not
limited to: counter-drone capabilities, fire identification, facial recognition, and
CBRN standoff detection. Emergency response agencies should also develop and evalu-
ate drone swarms for CBRN response and cleanup.
. Law enforcement agencies should explore and evaluate the potential for terrorist and
other nefarious actors to acquire and use drone swarm technology. Although this analy-
sis should include the use of drone swarms in a CBRN attack, it should focus on con-
ventionally armed drone swarms because those are likely to be comparatively easy for
non-state actors to acquire. They should also explore the feasibility and potential
methods of back-tracing downed drones to the original swarm.
. Foreign ministries should work with international partners to evaluate the merits and
potential methods of limiting the proliferation of CBRN-relevant drone swarms. This
should include both modifying current international treaties and the potential for
new ones.
. Parties to international treaties that cover delivery systems for CBRN weapons should
discuss how and whether those treaties could or should incorporate drone-swarm tech-
nology. Although a treaty may restrict drones generally, it may not account for the
implications of swarming. For example, the Missile Technology Control Regime

97
Billy Mitchell, “Pentagon Launching Joint Office Focused on Artificial Intelligence,” FedScoop, April 13, 2018, <www.
fedscoop.com/pentagon-launching-joint-office-focused-artificial-intelligence/>.
 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 21

restricts the export of aerial drones that both have a range above 300 kilometers and
carry at least a 500-kilogram payload but does not appear to restrict long-range
swarms of drones functioning as a single unit that achieve a greater-than-500-kilogram
payload in aggregate.

The timeline and feasibility of these drone-swarm applications may vary, but the swarms
are coming. Are we ready?

ORCID
Zachary Kallenborn http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4642-1658
Philipp C. Bleek http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2877-6225

Acknowledgments and disclaimer

The authors are grateful to Natasha Bajema, Andy Ross, and Paul Scharre for providing invaluable
feedback. They also appreciate members of the War on the Rocks forum, “the War Hall,” for pro-
viding valuable insights and sources incorporated into this report. Any errors are the authors’ own.
This article also represents the personal views of the authors and does not represent the policies or
positions of any of their current or past employers or funders.