815766

research-article2018
TAP0010.1177/0959354318815766Theory & PsychologyAagaard

Article

Theory & Psychology

Multitasking as distraction: A
2019, Vol. 29(1) 87­–99
© The Author(s) 2018
Article reuse guidelines:
conceptual analysis of media sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0959354318815766
https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354318815766
multitasking research journals.sagepub.com/home/tap

Jesper Aagaard 
Aarhus University

Abstract
The word “multitasking” gets thrown around a lot these days. For years it was touted as the
cognitive default for a new generation of digital natives, but psychologists are increasingly warning
us against its harmful effects on many different forms of human activity. What exactly is meant by
the concept of multitasking, however, remains peculiarly taken-for-granted. The purpose of this
article is therefore to analyze, evaluate, and interpret how the word “multitasking” is currently
being used in scientific practice. Taking departure in the domain of media multitasking research,
the article reveals an unacknowledged normativity in the empirical research literature: Multitasking
does not in fact denote a quantitative enumeration of tasks, but a qualitative distinction between
on- and off-task activity. In other words, multitasking is functionally equivalent to distraction. This
article discusses how this insight challenges the scientific rationality of current media multitasking
research and concludes with implications for future research.

Keywords
attention, cognitive psychology, conceptual analysis, distraction, multitasking

At the turn of the millennium, a number of popular-scientific writings began to hail the
birth of a new generation of learners variously designated as the Net Generation (Tapscott,
1998) and digital natives (Prensky, 2001). Born and raised in fully digitized lifeworlds,
technologies were said to have changed the way these young people think. A key tenet in
this techno-optimist literature was that this new generation of learners shared an uncanny
ability to perform several tasks at once, or what is also known as multitasking. As claimed
in the now widely cited anthology Educating the Net Generation: “Net Gen students are

Corresponding author:
Jesper Aagaard, Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Aarhus University, Bartholins Allé 11,
8000 Aarhus C, Denmark.
Email: jaagaard@psy.au.dk
88 Theory & Psychology 29(1)

facile at multitasking and moving back and forth (sometimes rapidly) between real and
virtual spaces” (Brown, 2005, p. 12.3f). As these generational labels grew in popularity
and began to affect educational policy-making, cognitive psychologists became increas-
ingly concerned with the effects of such modern-day multitasking: Was it really true that
young people were superb multitaskers? This scientific interest spawned a field of
research on so-called media multitasking, which investigates the relationship between
human attention and the use of digital devices like computers, laptops, and cell phones.
Fast-forward to today, and a multitude of empirical studies have since shown that media
multitasking is emphatically not the blessing that proponents of the techno-optimist dis-
course envisioned it to be (for a comprehensive review, see van der Schuur, Baumgartner,
Sumter, & Valkenburg, 2015). In fact, it is safe to say that the tide has since turned
against media multitasking. The Wiley Handbook of Psychology, Technology, and
Society, for instance, contains no less than five chapters that address the detrimental
effects of media multitasking (Rosen, Cheever, & Carrier, 2015). Although diametrically
opposed in their assessment of this contemporary phenomenon, techno-optimists and
cognitive psychologists both draw on the concept of “multitasking” when addressing the
attentional dynamics involved in these human–technology relations. In this article, I will
argue that this choice of terminology is misguided.
The purpose of this article is to replace the concept of media multitasking with digital
distraction: media multitasking is not a matter of attention divided, but of attention
diverted. The article begins with a brief review of existing media multitasking research,
which shows that engaging in this activity has significant adverse effects on academic
performance. What exactly these studies mean by “media multitasking,” however, is
unclear. To clarify the meaning of this rather elusive term, the article therefore proceeds
to analyze how cognitive psychologists employ the concept of multitasking in scientific
practice. It is demonstrated that the word does not in fact denote a quantitative enumera-
tion of tasks, but a qualitative distinction between on- and off-task activity. In other
words, multitasking is functionally equivalent to distraction. Finally, the article discusses
how this insight challenges the scientific rationality of current media multitasking
research and concludes with implications for future research.

Cognitive psychology, attention, and multitasking

The field of media multitasking research is built on the principles of cognitive psychol-
ogy, which argues that the mind is analogous to a computer in the sense that both entities
operate by processing information. Cognitive psychology argues that we can only pro-
cess a small amount of the information available in our environment due to the fixed
amount of energy available to the human brain and the high-energy cost of neuronal
activity involved in information-processing (Carrasco, 2011). Attention has evolved out
of a necessity to focus this limited information-processing capacity on the most vital
environmental information: once a target has been selected, attention modulates how
well the information is processed, how fast and accurate a response is executed, and
whether an event will be remembered later (Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011).
Attention can be focused on one activity or it can be divided between multiple concur-
rent sources of information. The latter process is known as multitasking, the mind’s
Aagaard 89

simultaneous performance of two or more tasks. Media multitasking is a specific subtype

of multitasking that covers (a) using multiple media simultaneously and (b) using media
while engaging in a non-media activity (van der Schuur et al., 2015). Cognitive psy-
chologists have explored how these digital forms of multitasking affect various domains
of youths’ functioning such as cognitive control, academic performance, and socioemo-
tional functioning (van der Schuur et al., 2015). In the domain of academic performance,
empirical inquiries broadly consist of (a) experimental and (b) naturalistic research.
Experimental media multitasking research can be divided into roughly two categories
according to the nature of the study’s primary task: (a) reading texts or (b) watching
lectures. In reading experiments, researchers instruct participants in the media multitask-
ing group to read a passage of text while simultaneously engaging in a secondary task
such as instant messaging (IM), while participants in the control group are instructed to
focus on the text. The two groups are then compared in terms of an outcome variable of
interest such as performance on a reading comprehension test. Fox, Rosen, and Crawford
(2009), for instance, asked two groups of students to read a hardcopy text passage: one
group was instructed to read the text while IMing with a confederate, the other group was
told to focus on the text. Results showed that multitaskers took a significantly longer
time to complete the reading task, but did not score differently on a subsequent compre-
hension test as the additional time use compensated for the IM interruptions. When intro-
ducing time limits to reflect students’ real-life study conditions, however, reading
experiments have shown that media multitasking causes significant performance impair-
ments (Lee, Lin, & Robertson, 2012; Srivastava, 2013). In the second category, lecture-
watching, researchers instruct participants in the multitasking condition to attend to a
lecture while engaging in a secondary task like answering text messages or solving prob-
lems assigned by the researchers, while the control group is instructed to focus on the
lecture. Early studies in this category focused mostly on the use of cell phones and
showed that texting during lectures causes significant impairments in academic perfor-
mance (e.g., Dietz & Henrich, 2014; Ellis, Daniels, & Jauregui, 2010; Rosen, Lim,
Carrier, & Cheever, 2011). Later studies have increasingly focused on the use of comput-
ers and laptops and have demonstrated that students engaging in media multitasking
achieve lower test scores than those who do not (e.g., Downs, Tran, McMenemy, &
Abegaze, 2015; Gupta & Irwin, 2016; Risko, Buchanan, Medimorec, & Kingstone,
2013; Sana, Weston, & Cepeda, 2013; Wood et al., 2012). Furthermore, media multitask-
ers’ laptop use poses a significant distraction to participants sitting in their near vicinity
(Sana et al., 2013).
Naturalistic media multitasking research is a correlational type of research in which
researchers attempt to measure the magnitude and consequences of naturally occurring
media multitasking (i.e., media multitasking that occurs in the course of a “normal”
class). In an influential study in which students were free to use their laptops as they
pleased, students reported spending an average of 17 minutes out of each 75-minute class
period or about 23% of their time using laptops for activities other than taking notes for
class (Fried, 2008). Two years later, Kraushaar and Novak (2010) used spyware to moni-
tor laptop activity in class directly: during an average 75-minute class period, students
spent about 42% of the time involved in educationally unrelated activities. A recent study
using both survey and observational data showed that students were engaged in
90 Theory & Psychology 29(1)

educationally unrelated activities for more than 60% of the time (Ragan, Jennings,
Massey, & Doolittle, 2014). While these numbers reveal the sheer magnitude of naturally
occurring media multitasking, naturalistic studies have also tried to gauge the academic
consequences of such multitasking. In the past 10 years, a multitude of correlational
studies has demonstrated that media multitasking is associated with significant deficits
in several measures of learning, including self-reported understanding of course mate-
rial, overall course performance, and grade point average (GPA; e.g., Bellur, Nowak, &
Hull, 2015; Fried, 2008; Gaudreau, Miranda, & Gareau, 2014; Hembrooke & Gay, 2003;
Junco, 2012; Junco & Cotten, 2012; Kraushaar & Novak, 2010; Ravizza, Hambrick, &
Fenn, 2014).

Experimental methods and conceptual confusion

Casting even a cursory glance on the scientific research on media multitasking reveals
the gross inadequacy of the techno-optimist narrative: media multitasking is consist-
ently and unanimously shown to have significant adverse effects on academic perfor-
mance. An important question arises, however: What exactly does “media multitasking”
mean? Setting aside the question of what counts as media in media multitasking (a
laptop ostensibly does, but what about books or blackboards?), we arrive at the concept
of multitasking: one would be forgiven for thinking that the field of media multitasking
research, built as it is upon this concept, would provide a well-defined, unambiguous,
and highly operationalizable definition of the word. It does not. The vast majority of
studies simply take the term for granted, while the few studies that actually do address
it offer only vague definitions: multitasking is defined as “doing more than one activity
simultaneously” (Wood et al., 2012), “the performance of two or more tasks together”
(Srivastava, 2013), or “simultaneous involvement in two or more tasks without disen-
gagement or a temporary break from either task” (David, Kim, Brickman, Ran, &
Curtis, 2015). None of these scientific definitions takes us beyond the literal meaning
of the word multitasking, which is to perform several (multi-) tasks at once, and it
remains unclear what constitutes a task. As the main semantic constituent of multitask-
ing, this is rather problematic: How can we say that media multitasking is harmful if
we cannot even explain what it means?
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953/2009) once remarked that scientific psychology was
troubled by a combination of “experimental methods and conceptual confusion” (§371).
Wittgenstein’s solution to this problem was not to provide stricter definitions, but to
remind us of how we ordinarily use the concepts in our scientific research programs.
This kind of conceptual analysis can be used to clarify the grammar and meaning of
concepts, to expose conceptual problems in models, to reveal unacknowledged assump-
tions and steps in arguments, and to evaluate the consistency of theoretical accounts
(Machado & Silva, 2007). Racine (2015) offers a helpful guide for doing such
Wittgensteinian conceptual analysis: (a) compare uses of the concept in question to
determine what researchers mean by it, (b) determine whether unusual uses of the con-
cept have important theoretical or practical consequences, and (c) clarify what research-
ers appear to be saying. Or, in short: analyze, evaluate, and interpret. This kind of
conceptual analysis can thus be understood as a hermeneutic quest that lays out and
Aagaard 91

explicates what is currently only tacitly understood in a specific field of research. What
follows is a conceptual analysis of multitasking, which traces the roots of the word, situ-
ates its use in psychological research, and analyzes how it is currently being used in the
empirical research literature. Two caveats apply: first, while multitasking is an influen-
tial concept that figures prominently in many textbooks on cognitive psychology, the
present analysis specifically addresses the term as it is used in media multitasking
research. While many of the arguments here also apply to the broader notion of multi-
tasking (the analysis targets the problem of defining task, which is certainly also relevant
in the case of ordinary multitasking), explicitly making this connection is beyond the
scope of this article. Second, while the concept of media multitasking is still widely used
today (e.g., Lau, 2017; May & Elder, 2018; Waite, Lindberg, Ernst, Bowman, & Levine,
2018), the present analysis mainly targets empirical studies published around 2010–2015
that helped to establish and consolidate the academically negative effects of media mul-
titasking as an empirical fact.

A conceptual analysis of multitasking

The word “multitasking” originally stems from the field of computer science where it
refers to the ability of the computer’s central processing unit (CPU) to process several
computer jobs or “tasks” simultaneously (Xu & Wang, 2017). Cognitive psychologists
eventually appropriated the term and used it to describe situations in which the human
mind divides attention between several tasks at once. As such, multitasking is one of
the few psychological concepts that originated as a technical term before seeping into
our everyday vocabulary, where it currently means something along the lines of jug-
gling several tasks at once (although, paradoxically, few would consider the act of
juggling itself to be an instance of multitasking). As the meaning of multitasking ulti-
mately hinges on the meaning of the word task, we shall try to narrow down the scien-
tific meaning of this concept through a series of successive demarcations. Since
cognitive psychology itself does not provide any starting points, we shall proceed
inductively. An initial suggestion is that a task is anything denoted by a verb, so that
multitasking consists of a constellation of verbs in the form of X’ing while Y’ing (e.g.,
texting while driving). This definition, however, runs into the issue of human learning.
Think about learning to drive. You may recall how hectic it was to make a turn: slow
down, step on the clutch, shift gears, use the turn signal, and so forth. For the novice
driver, performing all these actions at once definitely requires some degree of multi-
tasking. Fortunately, this stressful situation changes as the driver gains experience:
while an experienced driver obviously still brakes and shifts gears, this activity is no
longer experienced as the performance of a series of distinct tasks, but as an integrated
part of the unified activity of driving. What do we make of this experiential change?
Certain strands of cognitive psychology would argue that the driver’s performance of
these tasks has simply become “automated” and should still count as multitasking.
Kirschner and Karpinski (2010), for instance, have argued that multitasking is only
possible when performing such automated tasks: “Actually, we can only multitask that
which is automated (i.e., when schemas have been automated), and where thinking
does not play a role” (p. 1238).
92 Theory & Psychology 29(1)

The problem with this definition is that if the concept of multitasking includes auto-
mated tasks, we literally multitask all the time: right now, you are reading, blinking,
breathing, sitting, and perhaps even drinking coffee. Including the performance of such
automated tasks under the heading of multitasking would severely conflict with our every-
day understanding of the word: reading an article while drinking coffee is not generally
perceived as an instance of multitasking. Worse yet, it would render the scientific con-
cept of multitasking redundant since there would no longer be anything like “unitasking”
against which to compare and contrast the phenomenon. As long as there is no objective
demarcation of the concept of a task, it seems more parsimonious to exclude automated
tasks from the concept of multitasking (i.e., automated tasks cannot be said to exist as
tasks). To be fair, many cognitive psychologists would certainly grant this point. In fact,
Kirschner and Karpinski later came to argue that multitasking “does not include activi-
ties that are fully automated” (Karpinski, Kirschner, Ozer, Mellott, & Ochwo, 2013, p.
1183). With automated tasks thus excluded, multitasking can tentatively be defined as
the performance of two or more tasks that require conscious attention. Now we only
have to figure out what it means for a task to require conscious attention. According to
cognitive psychology, there is a crucial distinction to be made here: automated tasks do
not require conscious attention and therefore do not interfere with other concurrent tasks,
but tasks that do require conscious attention burden our limited attentional capacity and
thereby reduce the cognitive processing power that is available to other tasks: “Automatic
activation processes … are distinguished from operations that are performed by the con-
scious processing system since the latter system is of limited capacity and thus its com-
mitments to any operation reduces its availability to perform any other operation”
(Posner & Snyder, 2004, p. 221). Therefore, if multitasking means performing two or
more tasks that require conscious attention, it invariably comes at a cost: each additional
task detracts from the overall level of attentional resources (i.e., 100%) that could other-
wise be allocated to the primary task.1 According to this definition, we should predict
deficits in primary task performance whenever a person engages in multitasking.
The problem with this definition is that benign multitasking suddenly becomes oxy-
moronic (Aagaard, 2015b). Skeptics might object that this criticism disregards the
empirical possibility that specific subtypes of multitasking might not lead to statistically
significant performance decreases and should therefore be considered harmless. This
objection, however, goes against the empirical research literature in which multitasking
is often identified as a decrease in primary task performance: “Within the extant litera-
ture, multi-tasking is typically indirectly defined via the interference it produces” (Wood
et al., 2012, p. 366). Or, as another article puts it: “In short, multitasking or task switch-
ing can be examined simply as cognitive overload that interferes with a primary task”
(David et al., 2015, p. 1664). Unfortunately, this definition commits the logical fallacy of
begging the question: if something constitutes a secondary task only if it requires atten-
tion, and the only way to check whether it requires attention is if it impairs primary task
performance, we end up presupposing that which has to be proven: multitasking impairs
primary task performance. When cognitive psychologists explain that media multitask-
ing impairs task performance due to “cognitive overload,” we are thus not offered an
actual explanation of the performance decrease, but a mere re-description of the research
findings that begs the question of why a particular constellation of tasks causes cognitive
Aagaard 93

overload: Why can’t students practice media multitasking so that it eventually trans-
forms into benign unitasking like gear-shifting and turn-signaling in driving?

Multitasking as distraction
I want to argue that what cognitive psychologists call media multitasking consistently
results in academic decrements due to the nature of the tasks involved. These tasks can-
not figure as parts of the same overall activity like gear-shifting and turn-signaling do in
driving, because they constitute incompatible activities that pull in different directions.
In other words, as it is currently used in multitasking research, the concept of multitask-
ing does not denote a quantitative enumeration of tasks, but a qualitative distinction
between on- and off-task activity. As an example, when discussing multitasking, Bellur
et al. (2015) argue that, “some texting or use of technology would not be multitasking
[emphasis added], as it would be part of the assignment [emphasis added]” (p. 68). This
conceptual clarification occurs as the authors reflect on the limitations of their empirical
study. They lament the fact that their measures did not properly differentiate between
multitasking on tasks related to class work (e.g., online research) and tasks unrelated to
class work (e.g., social media use). As a remedy, they suggest that future research “should
carefully distinguish between task-relevant use of technology and task-irrelevant multi-
tasking” (p. 68). As evident in this distinction, only activity that pulls attention away
from one’s educational assignments is thought to count as multitasking. As a result, mul-
titasking becomes functionally equivalent to distraction. This conceptual displacement
becomes even more obvious when we move to the Method section of the empirical litera-
ture: experimental set-ups consist of primary, “education-like” tasks like reading texts or
watching lectures, which are then paired with secondary, distracting tasks like viewing
irrelevant videos or IMing about unrelated topics.
Lee et al. (2012), for instance, set out to examine the impact of media multitasking on
learning in order to answer the question: Do we acquire more or less information in a
multitasking learning environment? In itself, this is an interesting and important ques-
tion. The way the researchers set out to answer the question, however, is remarkable. Lee
et al. (2012) conducted an experiment in which they divided 130 college participants into
three groups that were assigned to two out of three conditions: (a) reading in silence, (b)
reading with a background video playing that they could ignore, and (c) reading with a
background video playing that contained testable information. The reading sets con-
tained articles of a scientific, historical, and political nature, while the two videos con-
sisted of a sitcom and a documentary on drunk driving. Afterwards, participants were
given multiple-choice tests about the materials. Participants could score up to 54 points
on the reading sets and an additional 18 points if a video was shown. But here is the
kicker: scores for the video condition were excluded to “prevent score inflation for that
group” (p. 100). In other words, groups were compared on the reading sets only. In this
comparison, it remains unexplained how devoting attention to an irrelevant sitcom or
documentary should (even hypothetically) help participants obtain more information
about the printed articles. The research literature is full of similar examples. Sana et al.
(2013), for instance, asked participants in the media multitasking condition to watch a
45-min PowerPoint lecture on meteorology while answering questions like “What is on
94 Theory & Psychology 29(1)

Channel 3 tonight at 10 pm?” (p. 26). Other questions posed by media multitasking
researchers include “What do you like to do in your spare time?” (Bowman, Levine,
Waite, & Gendron, 2010), “What is your favorite place to eat and what is your favorite
dish there?” (Downs et al., 2015), and “If you won $100,000 in the lottery, what would
you do with the money?” (Rosen et al., 2011). It goes without saying that these questions
are unrelated to the experimentally selected primary tasks. In fact, these questions seem
specifically designed to pull attention away from these tasks.
When cognitive psychologists claim to be exploring media multitasking, they are thus
investigating the distractive use of digital technologies: multitasking is not a matter of
attention divided, but of attention diverted. Now, the traditional view of psychological
research has long asserted that rigorous quantitative studies need clear and operational
definitions of their key concepts. Such studies are only as good as their operationaliza-
tions and if these operationalizations are inexact, the resulting significance levels and
effect sizes are irrelevant. “Garbage in, garbage out,” as they say. But it is important to
acknowledge that behind even good operationalizations lie certain understandings of the
objects of inquiry. In the case of media multitasking, cognitive psychologists do not use
the term multitasking as a neutral descriptor that signifies the brute number of tasks
undertaken (n ⩾ 2), but as a normative term that signifies the distractive nature of one of
these tasks. To be fair, some multitasking researchers are candid and open about this
interest in off-task multitasking (Wood et al., 2012), computer mediated non-lecture
related activities (Risko et al., 2013), and non-academic internet use (Ravizza et al.,
2014). Somewhat surprisingly, however, these researchers also proceed to investigate
these concepts as if they were neutral descriptors rather than normative terms. Perhaps
less surprisingly, they invariably find that engaging in such distraction leads to signifi-
cant drops in academic performance. We thereby learn that having one’s attention drawn
away from a primary task is distracting. But we already knew that: etymologically speak-
ing, being distracted literally means having one’s attention drawn-away (dis-tracted)
from something.
These numerous attempts to demonstrate empirical relationships between variables
that are logically related make the field of media multitasking research dangerously pseu-
doempirical (Smedslund, 1998). A good way to test whether a study is pseudoempirical is
to consider whether a negation of its hypotheses is possible. If such a negation is unac-
ceptable (i.e., absurd or senseless), the hypothesis is pseudoempirical since it expresses a
logical necessity that could have been stated in advance of the study (Smedslund, 2016).
Let us be very clear about what such a negation means in the case of multitasking: Is it
possible that multitasking taken in a broad sense can be educationally helpful? Yes, this is
presumably why students take notes during lectures. But is it conceivable that multitask-
ing understood as distraction might improve academic performance? No, that is simply
impossible. Regrettably, such pseudoempirical research is epidemic within scientific psy-
chology, which tends to value experimentation and quantification over conceptual analy-
sis (Banicki, 2012).2 As Valsiner and van der Veer (2000) argue:

A scientist can agree that a given project—involving a large number of subjects—is

pseudoempirical. Yet he or she may do the study anyway, citing the need to communicate to his
or her peers that the work done is “trustworthy,” rather than “mere speculation.” (p. 17)
Aagaard 95

This idea of trustworthy knowledge, however, does offer a second, more charitable read-
ing of current media multitasking research: cognitive psychologists have convincingly
demonstrated that students’ frequent off-task use of educational technology is distract-
ing. In a society steeped in techno-optimism, this empirical evidence constitutes an
important answer to a real problem.

The myth of multitasking

So far, we have demonstrated that multitasking means distraction. However, it is impor-
tant to distinguish this conceptual analysis from cognitive psychology’s own critique of
multitasking as a “myth” (see e.g., Kirschner & De Bruyckere, 2017). This critique is
based on a theoretical distinction between parallel and serial information-processing,
where parallel processing refers to attention paid to several tasks simultaneously, while
serial processing refers to attention paid to one task at a time in rapid succession, or what
is also known as task-switching (Fischer & Plessow, 2015). The first part of this critique
argues that human beings are physically incapable of parallel processing due to limita-
tions in our cognitive architecture, so whenever we think we are multitasking, we are in
fact only task-switching:

Thus, what people really mean when they say that a person is able to or are even good at
multitasking is that this person, be it children, adolescents or young adults have, through
practice, developed the ability to quickly switch between carrying out different tasks or using
different media. (Kirschner & De Bruyckere, 2017, p. 139)

Having established that multitasking is a myth, the second part of the critique goes on to
argue that efficient “multitasking” (i.e., efficient task-switching) is also a myth, which is
evidenced by the deleterious effects described in the multitasking literature. Rapid task-
switching can never be efficient, it is argued, because it involves a Psychological
Refractory Period (PRP), which is “the period of time during which the response to a
second stimulus is significantly slowed because a first stimulus is still being processed”
(Kirschner & Bruyckere, 2017, p. 138). Basically, this critique argues that multitasking
means task-switching, and that since rapid task-switching involves processing lags, it
invariably comes at a cost.
On the face of it, this cognitive critique seems to mirror our conceptual analysis in
that both approaches argue something to the extent of “multitasking is distracting.”
Upon closer examination, however, it turns out that these two approaches are radically
different: The cognitive critique subscribes to two conjoint hypotheses, namely that (a)
multitasking means task-switching and that (b) task-switching leads to distraction.
Although the second part of this argument replaces the notion of cognitive overload
with a new explanatory entity, the PRP, the argument is still causal in nature: task-
switching contains a lag that causes distraction. What we have argued, however, is that
what happens in scientific inquiries on media multitasking does not somehow cause
distraction, it quite simply is distraction. The relationship between research partici-
pants’ activity and their distraction is not causal and measurable, but normative and
conceptual, and this holds true regardless of whether we call this activity multitasking
96 Theory & Psychology 29(1)

or task-switching. This clarification is vital, because it closes off an easy escape route
for current media multitasking research, namely, replacing the concept of multitasking
with task-switching. While the concept of task-switching may entail certain advan-
tages compared to multitasking (e.g., it may more aptly describe what is at stake in
certain situations), the concept still takes the notion of task for granted and the criti-
cisms that have been leveled against multitasking in this article therefore apply equally
to task-switching.

Implications for future research

The present article explored the concept of multitasking. Since there are currently no
accepted definitions of what constitutes a task, it seems impossible to define multitasking
objectively. This saddles empirical researchers with a conceptual dilemma: either they
have to use an empty definition of multitasking that poses no restrictions as to what
counts as a task, or they have to use a substantial definition that inevitably entails perfor-
mance impairments. In the first case, researchers face the problem of redundancy, which
can only be escaped by explaining exactly what they mean by task, which tasks are
thought to occur in their situation of inquiry, which of these tasks are explored, which are
left unexplored, and, most importantly, what separates these two kinds of task. Providing
such an exhaustive and non-question-begging account seems difficult if not downright
impossible. In the second case, multitasking always comes at a cost and we simply do not
need empirical studies to show us that it is harmful. Instead of attempting to solve this
conceptual conundrum, however, we dissolved it by looking at the tasks that are cur-
rently included in media multitasking research: it turns out that such research examines
a very specific use of educational technology, namely the distractive use of these devices.
We therefore replaced the descriptive concept of multitasking with the normative con-
cept of distraction. Importantly, however, our argument against media multitasking
research is not an argument for young people’s ability to multitask (i.e., the techno-
optimist narrative), it is an argument that what is at stake is not a brute cognitive over-
load, but attention directed towards educationally irrelevant activity. In other words, our
conceptual analysis does not change the fact that students do engage in distraction or that
such distraction does have negative effects (i.e., that distraction is distracting).
Nevertheless, acknowledging the inherent normativity of this technologically mediated
activity does affect our approach to the subject: ideally, the concept of multitasking
should gradually be phased out and replaced by distraction. Furthermore, having estab-
lished that multitasking really means distraction, it is less interesting to ask whether this
activity impairs learning than asking when it happens, how it is experienced, and why it
occurs so frequently. Future research on the rapidly proliferating phenomenon of digital
distraction should focus on such issues (for tentative answers to some of these questions,
see Aagaard, 2015a).

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.
Aagaard 97

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.

Notes
1. Furthermore, if multitasking means performing two or more tasks that require conscious
attention, we once again run into the issue of human learning. Phenomenologists have shown
that task-performances may start out as “conscious” but become “automated” when we gain
experience (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). Accordingly, if the concept of multitasking only
includes tasks that require conscious attention, it only deals with tasks in which participants
are inexperienced. This does not seem to be the case with media multitasking.
2. Consistent with this valorization of empirical studies over conceptual analyses, the present article
was rejected by journals publishing media multitasking research for being “purely conceptual.”

ORCID iD
Jesper Aagaard https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3260-7005

References
Aagaard, J. (2015a). Drawn to distraction: A qualitative study of off-task use of educational tech-
nology. Computers & Education, 87, 90–97.
Aagaard, J. (2015b). Media multitasking, attention, and distraction: A critical discussion.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 14(4), 885–896.
Banicki, K. (2012). Connective conceptual analysis and psychology. Theory & Psychology, 22,
310–323. doi: 10.1177/0959354310383077
Bellur, S., Nowak, K., & Hull, K. (2015). Make it our time: In class multitaskers have lower aca-
demic performance. Computers in Human Behavior, 53, 63–70.
Bowman, L., Levine, L., Waite, B., & Gendron, M. (2010). Can students really multitask?
An experimental study of instant messaging while reading. Computers & Education, 54(4),
927–931.
Brown, M. (2005). Learning spaces. In D. Oblinger & J. Oblinger (Eds.), Educating the net gen-
eration (pp. 12.1–12.22). Boulder, CO: EDUCAUSE.
Carrasco, M. (2011). Visual attention: The past 25 years. Vision Research, 51(13), 1484–1525.
Chun, M., Golomb, J., & Turk-Browne, N. (2011). A taxonomy of external and internal attention.
Annual Review of Psychology, 62, 73–101.
David, P., Kim, J. H., Brickman, J., Ran, W., & Curtis, C. (2015). Mobile phone distraction while
studying. New Media & Society, 17(10), 1661–1679.
Dietz, S., & Henrich, C. (2014). Texting as distraction to learning in college students. Computers
in Human Behavior, 36, 163–167.
Downs, E., Tran, A., McMenemy, R., & Abegaze, N. (2015). Exam performance and attitudes
toward multitasking in six, multimedia-multitasking classroom environments. Computers &
Education, 86, 250–259.
Dreyfus, H., & Dreyfus, S. (1986). Mind over machine: The power of human intuition and exper-
tise in the era of the computer. New York, NY: Free Press.
Ellis, Y., Daniels, B., & Jauregui, A. (2010). The effect of multitasking on the grade performances
of business students. Research in Higher Education Journal, 8, 1–10.
Fischer, R., & Plessow, F. (2015). Efficient multitasking: Parallel versus serial processing of mul-
tiple tasks. Frontiers in Psychology, 6(1366), 1–11.
98 Theory & Psychology 29(1)

Fox, A., Rosen, J., & Crawford, M. (2009). Distractions, distractions: Does instant messag-
ing affect college students’ performance on a concurrent reading comprehension task?
CyberPsychology and Behavior, 12(1), 51–53.
Fried, C. (2008). In-class laptop use and its effects on student learning. Computers & Education,
50(3), 906–914.
Gaudreau, P., Miranda, D., & Gareau, A. (2014). Canadian university students in wireless class-
rooms: What do they do on their laptops and does it really matter? Computers & Education,
70, 245–255.
Gupta, N., & Irwin, J. (2016). In-class distractions: The role of Facebook and the primary learning
task. Computers in Human Behavior, 55, 1165–1178.
Hembrooke, H., & Gay, G. (2003). The laptop and the lecture: The effects of multitasking in learn-
ing environments. Journal of Computing in Higher Education, 15(1), 46–64.
Junco, R. (2012). In-class multitasking and academic performance. Computers in Human Behavior,
28(6), 2236–2243.
Junco, R., & Cotten, S. (2012). No A 4 U: The relationship between multitasking and academic
performance. Computers & Education, 59(2), 505–514.
Karpinski, A., Kirschner, P., Ozer, I., Mellott, J., & Ochwo, P. (2013). An exploration of social
networking site use, multitasking, and academic performance among United States and
European university students. Computers in Human Behavior, 29(3), 1182–1192.
Kirschner, P., & De Bruyckere, P. (2017). The myths of the digital native and the multitasker.
Teaching and Teacher Education, 67, 135–142.
Kirschner, P., & Karpinski, A. (2010). Facebook® and academic performance. Computers in
Human Behavior, 26(6), 1237–1245.
Kraushaar, J., & Novak, D. (2010). Examining the effects of student multitasking with laptops dur-
ing the lecture. Journal of Information Systems Education, 21(2), 241–251.
Lau, W. (2017). Effects of social media usage and social media multitasking on the academic per-
formance of university students. Computers in Human Behavior, 68, 286–291.
Lee, J., Lin, L., & Robertson, T. (2012). The impact of media multitasking on learning. Learning,
Media and Technology, 37(1), 94–104.
Machado, A., & Silva, F. (2007). Toward a richer view of the scientific method: The role of con-
ceptual analysis. The American Psychologist, 62(7), 671–681.
May, K., & Elder, A. (2018). Efficient, helpful, or distracting? A literature review of media multi-
tasking in relation to academic performance. International Journal of Educational Technology
in Higher Education, 15(13), 1–17.
Posner, M. L., & Snyder, C. R. R. (2004). Attention and cognitive control. In D. A. Balota &
E. J. Marsh (Eds.), Cognitive psychology: Key readings (pp. 205–223). New York, NY:
Psychology Press.
Prensky, M. (2001). Digital natives, digital immigrants: Part I. On the Horizon, 9(5), 2–6.
Racine, T. (2015). Conceptual analysis. In J. Martin, J. Sugarman, & K. Slaney (Eds.), Theoretical
and philosophical psychology: Methods, approaches, and new directions for social sciences
(pp. 39–52). Chichester, UK: Wiley Blackwell.
Ragan, E., Jennings, S., Massey, J., & Doolittle, P. (2014). Unregulated use of laptops over time in
large lecture classes. Computers & Education, 78, 78–86.
Ravizza, S., Hambrick, D., & Fenn, K. (2014). Non-academic internet use in the classroom is
negatively related to classroom learning regardless of intellectual ability. Computers &
Education, 78, 109–114.
Risko, E., Buchanan, D., Medimorec, S., & Kingstone, A. (2013). Everyday attention: Mind wan-
dering and computer use during lectures. Computers & Education, 68, 275–283.
Aagaard 99

Rosen, L., Cheever, N., & Carrier, L. M. (2015). The Wiley handbook of psychology, technology,
and society. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.
Rosen, L., Lim, A., Carrier, L. M., & Cheever, N. (2011). An empirical examination of the educa-
tional impact of text message-induced task switching in the classroom: Educational implica-
tions and strategies to enhance learning. Psicologia Educativa, 17(2), 163–177.
Sana, F., Weston, T., & Cepeda, N. (2013). Laptop multitasking hinders classroom learning for
both users and nearby peers. Computers & Education, 62, 24–31.
Smedslund, J. (1998). The pseudoempirical in psychology and the case for psychologic. Psycho-
logical Inquiry, 2(4), 325–338.
Smedslund, J. (2016). Why psychology cannot be an empirical science. Integrative Psychology
and Behavioral Science, 50(2), 185–195.
Srivastava, J. (2013). Media multitasking performance: Role of message relevance and formatting
cues in online environments. Computers in Human Behavior, 29(3), 888–895.
Tapscott, D. (1998). Growing up digital: The rise of the net generation. New York, NY: McGraw-
Hill.
Valsiner, J., & van der Veer, R. (2000). The social mind: Construction of the idea. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
van der Schuur, W., Baumgartner, S., Sumter, S., & Valkenburg, P. (2015). The consequences of
media multitasking for youth: A review. Computers in Human Behavior, 53, 204–215.
Waite, B., Lindberg, R., Ernst, B., Bowman, L., & Levine, L. (2018). Off-task multitasking,
note-taking and lower- and higher-order classroom learning. Computers & Education, 120,
98–111.
Wittgenstein, L. (2009). Philosophical investigations (G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, & J.
Schulte, Trans.). Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. (Original work published 1953)
Wood, E., Zivcakova, L., Gentile, P., Archer, K., De Pasquale, D., & Nosko, A. (2012). Examining
the impact of off-task multi-tasking with technology on real-time classroom learning.
Computers & Education, 58(1), 365–374.
Xu, S., & Wang, Z. (2017). Media multitasking. In P. Rössler (Ed.), The international encyclope-
dia of media effects. San Francisco, CA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Author biography
Jesper Aagaard is an assistant professor of psychology at Aarhus University, Denmark. His
research interests include qualitative methods, postphenomenology, and the use of media
technologies. In addition to articles on these subjects, he has recently coedited the book
Postphenomenological Methodologies: New Ways in Mediating Techno-Human Relationships
(2018, Lexington Books).