G.R. No. 102782. December 11, 1991.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R. CALDERON, and
GRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitioners, vs. THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY
OF MANDALUYONG, respondents.

Administrative Law; Local Government; Delegation of legislative power.—The Court holds that there is a
valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the requisites of
such delegation are present.

These requisites are:

1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and

2) the presence of a sufficient standard.

Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and
provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What
only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to
determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar

Second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard,
the function of which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and thus “prevent the
delegation from running riot.” This requirement has also been met. It is settled that the “convenience
and welfare” of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable
sufficient standard to delimit the delegate’s authority.

Requisites for validity of a municipal ordinance;

Measures under consideration do not conform to existing law.—According to Elliot, a municipal

ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5)
must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. A careful study of
the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion
because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD1605 does not allow
either the removal of the license plates or the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations
committed in Metropolitan Manila.

Same; Same; Same.—The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law
explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of
legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources
of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with
what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government
unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the
enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has
the force and effect of a statute.

CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, PETITIONER, V. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER & LIGHT CO., INC. (CEPALCO),
RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 224825. October 17, 2018

Few things are more established in this jurisdiction than the requisites of a valid ordinance. In order for
an ordinance to be valid in substance, it

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit, but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable

Nonetheless, the presumption, being just that, may be set aside when invalidity or unreasonableness

(1) appears on the face of the ordinance; or

(2) is established by proper evidence

An ordinance carries with it the presumption of validity. The question of reasonableness though is open
to judicial inquiry. Much should be left thus to the discretion of municipal authorities. Courts will go slow
in writing off an ordinance as unreasonable unless the amount is so excessive as to be prohibitive,
arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory.

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, G.R. No. 111097

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the
legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it
may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional
limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great
a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the
corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation
themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.

This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without
meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local
government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions.
The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to
withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct
conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by
mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government
units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.

G.R. NO. 211559 - ERIC F. ACOSTA AND NATHANIEL G. DELA PAZ, PETITIONERS, V. HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA

Not Municipal but PNP. Delegated power

Still, to validly exercise their quasi-legislative powers, administrative agencies must comply with two (2)
tests: (1) the completeness test; and (2) the sufficient standard test.

The completeness test requires that the law to be implemented be "complete [and should set forth]
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate." On the other hand, the
sufficient standard test requires that the law to be implemented contain "adequate guidelines ... to map
out the boundaries of the delegate's authority. "To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of
the delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to
be implemented." Furthermore, the Administrative Code requires that administrative agencies file with
the University of the Philippines Law Center the rules they adopt, which will then be effective 15 days
after filing.

Since Congress expressly granted the Chief of the Philippine National Police the power to issue rules and
regulations to implement Republic Act No. 10591, the fundamental issue to be resolved by this Court is
whether the Chief of Police validly exercised this quasi-legislative power in light of the completeness and
sufficient standard tests.