Indian Foreign Policy

Syllabus topic
Indian Foreign Policy : Determinants of foreign policy; the institutions of policy-making;
Continuity and change.
PYQs

1. Identify the elements of change in India's foreign policy.(2013, 150, 10)

2. The social structure of a country influences its foreign policy-making. How does the social
structure of India impact the course and direction of its foreign policy ? (2015,150,10)
3. Which determinant factors play an important role in making India's foreign policy?
Illustrate with examples.(2016,150, 10)
4. Examine the Indian National Movement and geographical location of India as
determinants of India's foreign policy.(2017, 150, 10)
5. "India is often said to have a rich strategic culture. Discuss(2018, 150, 10)
6. "India's current foreign policy marks significant qualitative shifts from that of the previous
regimes." Discuss(2018, 150, 10)

Swami Vivekananda described the world as a gymnasium where nations

come to make themselves strong.

Strategic Culture
'Culture' is the set of behaviour, belief ,values and symbols that have been developed ,retained
and handed over to the next generations in history. Therefore, 'strategic culture' is the set of the
same in the context of the state behaviour in the matters considered as a strategic.
'Strategic culture' is a relatively new concept towards understanding the strategic thinking
of any state. It is an attempt to integrate the influence of countries, culture , cumulative
historical memory and their influences on shaping security and foreign policy .
The concept of strategic culture has been first given by Jack Snyder . Social constructivist lay
special emphasis on strategic culture .
According to KANTI BAJPAI, ' strategic culture' consists of two parts. The first is the 'central
strategic paradigm'( that is the basic assumptions about orderliness in the world) . The second
part is the grand strategy that follow.
The sources of the strategic culture of a nation state are its history,geography, national culture,
politics etc. Therefore, states may have different strategic culture pertaining to the differences in
these factors.
Whether India has a strategic culture?
As regards the debate about the existence of strategic culture in India findings from a study of the
impacts of historical and cultural factor on India's strategic thinking led George Tanham to
conclude that 'Indians lacked formal and systematic strategic planning' and thus,lacks '
strategic culture'. He held that India lacks strategic culture to support its political ambitions
. In his monograph, “Indian Strategic Thought : An interpretative Essay”, he argued that
Indian values , cultural diversity , recent historical legacy and non-alignment as a state policy
stymied the proliferation of strategic thought and could result into sub-optimal responses
to challenges faced on multiple fronts particularly in areas related to national security .

However, the critics of George Tanham's view about India's strategic culture argue that most of
the views about existence of strategic culture in India are often rudimentary and impulsive rather
than based on an objective definition and understanding. This is mainly due to lack of research on
these dimensions.
In reaction to Tanham's findings, many strategic thinkers in India assert that India has a strategic
culture.One of the most earliest evidence of existence of strategic thinking in India can be found
in Kautilya's Arthashastra,an ancient treatise on statecraft, which contains provisions of pro-
active strategic measures to be undertaken by a pragmatic ruler.
Henry Kissinger in his book “World Order”, held that Kautilya with
dispassionate clarity gives the vision of how to protect the interest of the
state while neutralising , subverting and conquering the neighbours . India’s
strategic community has taken Kautilya’s wisdom as a guide on foreign
policy .
Dr. S. Jaishankar in his book , “The
India Way” , in the chapter “Krishna’s
choice : The strategic culture of a rising
power”, talks about the rich strategic culture of India
with reference to Mahabharata. Unlike Arthashatra, which
has a clinical approach to statecraft, he finds
Mahabharat as a vivid distillation of India’s statecraft.
Bhagwat Geeta mentions about the importance of courage in implementing policies .
Mahabharat talks about tactical compromises , Balance of Power , diplomacy , alliances.
Mahabharat is a tale of ethics as well as power.
Therefore, in this way, contrary to what George Tanham concluded as a lack of strategic culture,
India has a long history of strategic planning.A section of critics argue that debates on India's
strategic culture is a futile exercise as it either undercut or inflate India's strategic potential. In
addition, they assert that Tanham's conceptualization of strategic culture predominantly
represents a Western perspective of security . The Western definition not only undermines the
value of military strength, but it also doesn't recognise the importance of diplomatic and peaceful
efforts towards addressing threats to security.

Determinants of foreign policy

Foreign policy ,in concrete terms ,is a combination of principles, interests and objectives
through which a country formulates and conducts its relations in the international affairs.
A country’s foreign policy does not emerge from a vacuum; it is guided and shaped by country’s
history, culture, the political system and various other factors.

The determinant of the evolution of India’s foreign policy(IFP)

Domestic politics as the determinant of Foreign Policy

No country’s foreign policy can be immune from the influence of the dynamics within i.e. the
nature of governing system, the political culture including the policies of political parties, public
opinion, etc. tradition, structure of government and enlightened leadership.
In the modern world, in most political systems, implementation of proposed policies requires a
consensus by the government and not only the leader’s whim. The degree of acceptability
required will depend on the political system where the decision maker is operating. For example,
any foreign policy in a democratic system that does not have consensus is likely not to succeed.
The influence of domestic politics on India’s foreign policy can be discerned from the beginning .
For example – one of the factors for adopting the Non Alignment as a foreign policy was to gain
the domestic consensus as India had both the left and the right .(C Raja Mohan)
The influence of domestic politics can be demonstrated with the example of India and US Civil
Nuclear Treaty , 2005. The 2005 treaty was meant allow India a waiver without signing the NPT,
in exchange of allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct inspections of
its civilian nuclear facilities. Despite it being a win-win situation for India, the Indian government
was reluctant to proceed because of the coalition pressures.

Similarly , there was a role of domestic political factors behind

  India’s decision to vote against Srilanka in UNHRC
 Indian’s decision to impose informal blockade on Nepal .
 India could not enter into Teesta Agreement with Bangladesh .
It is often said that India’s Middle East Policy has been shaped by the domestic determinant.
In this way, it can be argued that foreign policy is made and conducted in a complex domestic and
international environments. Domestic politics influences foreign policy decisions and if a policy is
not accepted at home it unlikely to succeed in the international context. Thus, Foreign Policy
analysis needs to be multilevel and multifaceted in order to understand the complicated
motivational factors and nature of foreign policy. Sometimes, leaders may have to resort to
suboptimal foreign policy due to domestic political demands.

Geographical factors as the determinant of Foreign Policy

India’s size and location have played a vital role in shaping its foreign policy . On its north are
the loftiest of all, Himalayan range (15,000 KM). India’s relations with the two countries in the
north – Pakistan and China – go beyond the bilateral dimension and has implications on wider
regions . India has 7500 KM of coastline touched by waters of Indian ocean on three sides of its
territory . Most of India’s foreign trade is routed through Indian ocean . Indian ocean also
brought colonial rule to India . Thus , the ocean has geo-political and geo-strategic significance
. India’s foreign policy has to ensure not only the protection of its northern borders but also its
territorial waters and EEZ .

India’s geography posses three principle foreign policy challenge

1. Determinable borders as South Asia was a single entity but the partition of the sub
continent and the emergence of nation states have created amorphous unsettled
borders
2. India is boxed in by unfriendly neighbours which limits its reach and influence .
3. Asymmetry in size and power has given rise to huge trust deficit with the neighbours .

Happymon Jacob believes that , New Delhi’s excessive focus on the continental sphere since
Independence has not yielded great returns in terms of secure borders, healthy relations with its
neighbours or deterrence stability vis-à-vis adversaries. It is time for India to change its grand
strategic approach — by shifting its almost exclusive focus from the continental sphere to the
maritime sphere.

Role of Leadership as the determinant of Foreign Policy

National leaders, especially the head of government has to play a two level game between
international and domestic politics. The head of government in any kind of political system is
motivated by two similar goals: retain political power and build and maintain policy coalitions.
The domestic politics can also influence him either because he wants to achieve domestic goals
through foreign policies or he wants his foreign policy decisions to further his domestic
agendas.
Kautilya recognizes the role of leadership(King/ Nabhi) in his Saptang theory. Western scholars
like Alexander George and Julliet George also emphasise on the role of leaders. As evident in
Indian context , PM Nehru was also the first foreign minister and his grand liberal idea is
reflected in India's foreign policy decisions like reaching out to UN on Kashmir issue , leading the
third world countries through NAM, recognizing China as well as supporting its permanent
candidature of UNSC. Similarly, India’s decision to intervene in Bangladesh liberation and
countering Pakistan amidst visible resistance from USA was reflective of Mrs Gandhi’s strong
outlook. On the other hand , Gujral’s doctrine and Manmohan Doctrine project a liberal picture.

Harsh Pant, in his book, "Indian Foreign Policy: The Mode Era" , observes that
PM Modi has himself become India's ambassador selling brand India inviting
investment. He is perceived as a strong leader who would not rethink the
strategy of going beyond the set ‘dogmas’. For the first time, soft power is
being used strategically, focus is on diaspora

Although, the underlying forces shaping Indian foreign Policy has not been
able to alter radically but the political leadership infuses new dynamism to
achieve significant outcomes. Though leadership matters a lot, but institutions should not be
undermined.

History and culture as the determinant of Foreign Policy

Legacy of an ancient civilization & cultural and philosophical tradition has helped the evolution
of India’s world view in the post-independence era, evident from policy concepts like
Panchsheel, kautilya's Mandal siddhanta; vasudhaev kutumbakam , dharmasastra etc.
It is from our history and culture only , that India’s policy makers have borrowed the elements of
tolerance, preference for the middle way (ati sarvatra varjayet), nonviolence and universal
brother & peace. Experts believe that, while Nehru’s foreign policies were inspired by Buddhism
and Ashoka, Modi’s foreign policies are inspired from Kautilya and Chandra Gupta Maurya.

India’s own experience of colonialism and its struggle for independence in modern history has
committed our foreign policy to fight against imperialism, colonialism and racialism. A.
Appadorai talks of a 2-fold impact of Indian National Movement on our foreign policy. First is
the support for the freedom of dependent peoples in other parts of the world and second is
India’s approach against any kind of racial discrimination. Even scholars like Richard M. Fontera
acknowledge the fact ,in his ‘Anti-colonialism as a Basic Indian Foreign Policy’, that India’s
responses to problems of international concerns are often determined by the fact that it divide
the world into pro-colonial and anti-colonial blocs.
Ambassador K.S. Murthy notices that ancient Hindu foreign policy was one of isolationism.
There was a kind of Munroe Doctrine towards states outside India . Hindu thinkers expressly
forbade aggressive wars on other cultures and on states outside India. This is reflected in
contemporary India’s constitutional values wherein Article 51 talks about promotion of
international peace and security. At the same time the Preamble declares India as a ‘Sovereign’
country with right to territorial integrity.

India’s close cultural links with Nepal ,Myanmar, Srilanka and South East Asia is rooted in
traditional and cultural history of India.

Social structure as the determinant of Foreign Policy

India, being a heterogeneous and pluralistic society has taken an inclusive course .Same is seen
in our middle ground approach to international affairs like Non Alignment. Having experienced
and suffered due to class inequalities, India supports development over trade like in Doha
Round. Indian society is still majorly patriarchal, thus the IFP is still not very feminist at its
core,much like other south Asian nations.
 Indian Foreign Policy : Continuity and change.
External Affairs Minister's speech at the 4th Ramnath Goenka Lecture, 2019 sketched out the
evolution and corresponding changes in IFP.

According to Jaishankar, Indian foreign policy has evolved in six broad phases

First phase (1946-62)

It could be characterized as an era of optimistic non-alignment. Its setting was very much of a
bipolar world, with camps led by the United States and the USSR. India’s objectives were to
resist the constraining of its choices and dilution of its sovereignty as it rebuilt its economy
and consolidated its integrity. Its parallel goal, as the first of the decolonized nations, was to
lead Asia and Africa in a quest for a more equitable world order. It also saw energetic Indian
diplomacy from Korea and Vietnam to the Suez and Hungary. However, the 1962 conflict with
China not only brought this period to an end, but in a manner that significantly damaged India’s
standing.

Second phase (1962-71)

It is a decade of realism and recovery. India made pragmatic choices on security and political
challenges despite a paucity of resources. It looked beyond non-alignment in the interest of
national security, concluding a now largely forgotten defence agreement with the U.S. in 1964.
External pressures on Kashmir mounted in this period of vulnerability. The global context
remained bipolar, but it now saw the emergence of limited cooperation between the US and
USSR. South Asia happened to be a particular area of convergence and Indian diplomacy had to
face the superpowers together, as it did in Tashkent in 1965. It was also a period when domestic
challenges were particularly acute, ranging from political turbulence to economic distress. But
for our purposes, what is important is that even though the stress levels were higher, we came
through an anxious period without too much damage.

Third phase (1971 to 1991)

It was one of greater Indian regional assertion. It started with the decisive dismantlement of an
India-Pakistan equivalence through creation of Bangladesh, but ended with the IPKF
misadventure in Sri Lanka. The larger environment by now was dramatically different, with the
Sino-US rapprochement of 1971 upending the strategic landscape. The Indo-Soviet Treaty and
the adoption of more pro-Soviet positions on international issues were India’s response to this
challenge. It was a particularly complex phase as the US-China-Pakistan axis which came into
being at this time seriously threatened India’s prospects. While they had many long-term
consequences, the shift in India’s posture came more from other factors. The collapse of USSR,
its close ally, and the not unconnected economic crisis in 1991 compelled us to look again at the
first principles of both domestic and foreign policy.
Fourth Phase (1991-2001)
The dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of a "unipolar” world characterized the fourth
phase. It encouraged a radical rethink in India on a broad range of issues. And it shifted focus to
safeguarding strategic autonomy. If India opened up economically more to the world, its
reflection was also evident in new diplomatic priorities and approaches. The Look East policy
summarized the changed Indian approach to world affairs, which also saw adjustments in its
position on Israel. This is a period where India reached out to engage the US more intensively,
yet did so while protecting its equities in critical areas. This quest for strategic autonomy was
particularly focused on securing its nuclear weapon option, but also visible in trade negotiations.
By the turn of the century, enough had happened for India to now shift gear again and move to
a higher level. After 1998, it was now a declared nuclear weapon power, had fended off
Pakistan’s military adventurism again in Kargil in 1999, generated enough economic growth to
be of global interest, and managed well a United States that was focusing more on
developments in Asia and the consequences of Islamic fundamentalism.

Fifth phase (2001-2014)

This more competitive environment opened up new windows of opportunity for India, especially
as the United States found it difficult to maintain the same degree of unipolarity. As a
consequence, India discovered the benefits of working with different powers on different issues.
This fifth phase is one where India gradually acquired the attributes of a balancing power. It is
reflected in the India-US nuclear deal as well as a better understanding with the West at large.
At the same time, India could also make common cause with China on climate change and
trade, and consolidate further ties with Russia while helping to fashion BRICS into a major
forum. This was, in some senses, a period of opportunity where India moved the global needle
by taking new positions.

Sixth Phase (2014 onwards)

India chose to turn to more energetic diplomacy. India entered a world of convergences and
issue-based arrangements. This awareness was accompanied by a growing sense of its own
capabilities. India has emerged among the major economies of the world . India shaped key
global negotiations, such as in Paris on climate change. The investment of greater resources in
development partnerships with countries of the South was also noteworthy.

India’s diplomatic agenda has broadened considerably, as indeed have its partners in those
endeavours.Today, India is a nations who have an optimal mix of capabilities, relationships and
positioning who can aspire to occupy the multiple poles of the emerging international order.
And it is the confidence of being able to forge ahead in this looser architecture that can inspire
New Delhi to emerge as a leading power in the future.
Conclusion
The balance sheet for India’s foreign policy after seven decades presents a mixed picture. There
have been times when India punched much above its weight and sometimes it’s performance
has not been upto the mark. However, today India faces an ever dynamic world , wherein each
policy decision that New Delhi makes will have a greater repercussion for its great power
aspirations. But, as Rabindranath Tagore declared, you cannot cross the sea merely by standing
and staring at the water. India will require a beginning, it requires a thinking that keeps up with
times, a clearer definition of interests and a determined pursuit of that.
 Geopolitics of Arctic and Climate change

Global climate change has catapulted the Arctic into the centre of geopolitics, as
melting Arctic ice transforms the region from one of primarily scientific interest into a
maelstrom of competing commercial, national security and environmental concerns,
with profound implications for the international legal and political system.

For the last few years, the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s north coast has seen
significant changes, providing Russia with greater access to its vast Siberian resources
and leading to bold assertions of its sovereignty over vast swathes of the polar sea.
Indeed, the region has already opened to global commerce with the announcement on
21 August 2009 that, for the first time, two German commercial ships unaccompanied
by icebreakers were traversing the Northern Sea Route on a voyage from Vladivostok
to the Netherlands.

The prospect of longer ice-free periods in the Arctic has momentous implica- tions for
the region’s commercial development, which risks further melting of the Arctic ice.

In addition, new technological developments in marine surface and undersea logistics,

as well as deep-water drilling technology, have increased the salience of issues
relating to the extension of coastal states’ respective continental shelves under the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).

Arctic melt does and will continue to pose economic, military and environmental
challenges to governance of the region, and that technological factors will most likely
be a barrier to access in the short term and an enabler in the longer term. Decreased
sea ice gives countries more opportunities to plant infrastructure to enable the
exploitation of hydrocarbons and minerals, and to gain greater access for commercial
shipping and fishing.

Resources and shipping routes

The ice there has locked up vast caches of natural resources, including an estimated
13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of undiscovered natural gas.

While the Arctic may have tremendous potential in the long run its contribution to
energy resources in the short term should not be overestimated, as other areas are
cheaper, less contentious and less technologically challenging to exploit.

The technology required to recover Arctic resources year-round is not readily

available, and will not become so in the short term. Transport difficulties add to the
problems to be overcome. Natural gas requires pipelines or expensive and complex
liquefaction infrastructure. The former is the less likely option, because pipelines
would have to cover very large distances. With technological breakthroughs in the
development of shale oil resources in the lower 48 states over the last several years,
meanwhile, US natural gas reserves have nearly quadrupled.
Technology is a key barrier to Arctic access in other ways. Icebreakers, many nuclear
powered, are necessary for presence and power projection in the region year-round.
The various Arctic nations have widely divergent capabilities. For example, Russia
has 20 icebreakers; Canada has 12, and is working on budgeting for 8 more; the US
has, to all intents and purposes, just one functional icebreaker.

In addition to hydrocarbon resources, new shipping routes opened up as the Arctic ice
vanishes will reduce substantially the maritime distances between Europe and Asia,
while also providing strategic alternatives to other countries such as Japan, which
would have an interest in Arctic access owing to its current depen- dence on shipping
through the Strait of Malacca for most of its energy supplies.

Use of the North-West Passage over North America could shorten shipping routes
between Asia and the US east coast by 5,000 miles. However, even though Canada is
a strong ally of the US, there are disputes between the two countries over the waters
of the Canadian archipelago, which Canada claims are internal waters not subject to
16
the conventions of ‘innocent passage’, while the US regards them as a strait for
international navigation, through which ships should be allowed to pass without
interference by Canadian authorities.

If the waterway does indeed become ever more ice-free in the future, Canada will be
forced formally to resolve its dispute with the United States over the status of the
North West Passage.

The Northern Sea Route over Eurasia is also important since it shortens shipping
routes between northern Europe and north-east Asia by 40 per cent compared with the
18
existing routes through the Suez or Panama canals, and takes thousands of miles off
maritime routes round Africa or Latin America.

Moreover the potential benefits of an ice-free Arctic throughway include the ability to
avoid dangerous chokepoints beset by piracy and lower transportation costs

Finally, the potential for dangerous weather patterns to emerge in warming waters,
combined with difficult-to-navigate broken ice and the lack of adequate maritime
traffic management, make Arctic transit a treacherous under- taking even under the
best of conditions.

Hydrocarbon prices and concerns about energy security are key drivers in accelerating
interest in the Arctic, since high energy prices will generate new techno- logical
developments that are difficult to justify with prices even at current levels.

Governance

The Arctic is geologically complex, largely uncharted, and rife with overlapping
sovereignty claims that will affect all commercial activities involving hydrocarbons
and fisheries and will have a momentous impact on the region’s indigenous
population.
States with territorial borders in the Arctic, as generally defined, are the US, Canada,
Russia, Denmark (via Greenland) and Norway (via Svalbard)—together known as the
‘Arctic Five’. While possessing no direct borders on the Arctic Ocean, Sweden,
Finland and Iceland are also usually considered Arctic states,

Strengthened legal and regulatory frameworks in the Arctic will be necessary to

attract international investment and development. The debate on the future of Arctic
governance centres on whether to create new or use existing multi- national
frameworks. Although the US enforces UNCLOS without having ratified it, it lags
behind the rest of the Arctic states on its Arctic policy and in asserting its presence.

Geopolitical rivalry between USA, Russia & China

The melting Arctic is opening up the once isolated region to more shipping, tourism,
mining, and oil exploration. Climate change is warming the Arctic, which helps
regulate the rest of the earth’s climate, at a faster rate than the rest of the world.
Where scientists warn of crisis from the cascading effects of a thawing Arctic, others
see opportunityIt’s also becoming a battleground once again in the standoff between
Russia and the West.

Russia is dramatically expanding its military footprint in the Arctic as tensions roil
further south, though still not at levels seen during the Cold War. Moscow has
modernized and expanded its Soviet-era Arctic bases, including on the Kola Peninsula
near Scandinavia, where its massive Northern Fleet is based. The expansions include
facilities to house nuclear missiles and long-range cruise missiles pointed at North
America and Europe.

Moscow also has high hopes of turning the opening Arctic into a Russian-dominated
waterway as ice melts, opening new avenues for maritime trade. At an International
Arctic Forum in St. Petersburg in April, Russian President Vladimir Putin outlined
plans to expand commercial shipping across the Arctic Ocean. Without summer ice,
traversing the Arctic could drastically shorten maritime shipping routes between
Europe and Asia, and it could grow to rival other strategic trade corridors including
the Suez Canal and Strait of Malacca. “We need to make the northern sea route safe
and commercially feasible,” Putin said.

China, meanwhile, has planted its own diplomatic flag in the Arctic, declaring itself a
“near-Arctic state” and outlining ambitions to create a “Polar Silk Road” with other
countries to boost trade and commerce through the region. China has shoveled money
into infrastructure projects and building sprees wherever it can find willing partners,
including in Iceland and Greenland. Beijing maintains that they are purely
commercial projects, but Washington and other Western capitals see the moves as a
geopolitical ruse to get its foot in the door on Arctic claims.

Greenland, the self-governed territory in Denmark’s kingdom, has emerged as a

microcosm of the intensifying commercial tussles and a potential crown jewel in
Beijing’s Polar Silk Road. Last year, China developed plans to finance and build three
airports in Greenland, whose cash-strapped government welcomed the prospect of
foreign investment. The plans sparked fears in Washington, particularly at the
Pentagon, that Beijing could take control of the airports and create a beachhead in the
Arctic if Greenland lapsed on loan payments. A last-minute dash by the U.S. and
Danish governments to squeeze China out of the projects averted those plans. But it’s
unclear if Washington can fend off Beijing’s Arctic ambitions at every turn.

Even NATO, which in the past has avoided discussions about the Arctic due to
political sensitivities, is getting into the game. Last year, NATO conducted a massive
military exercise with tens of thousands of troops in Norway aimed at strengthening
its ability to operate in Northern Europe. It included the U.S. aircraft carrier
USS Harry S. Truman sailing into the Arctic Circle to train—the first such move in
decades.

“Russia is increasing its military presence in the Arctic … investing in reopening

Soviet-era military bases,” said Dylan White, NATO’s acting deputy spokesperson.
“NATO is monitoring Russia’s Arctic buildup carefully.”

As Russia, China, and some NATO countries charge ahead, the United States is
struggling to catch up. The U.S. Coast Guard has only two aging icebreakers in its
fleet capable of punching through thick Arctic ice, one of which is normally deployed
to Antarctica, compared to Russia’s 40. Moscow plans to expand its fleet of heavy
icebreakers to 13 by 2035, including nine nuclear-powered icebreakers, compared to
the four it has now.

While U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration appointed high-level envoys to

oversee a new Arctic policy and released a national strategy on the Arctic in 2013, it
devoted few resources to back up its ambitions. Now, under President Donald Trump,
the U.S. government has done little more, some analysts say.

A Pentagon report on China released in May also outlines growing concerns over the
prospect of China’s submarine fleet operating in the Arctic more frequently.

The U.S. Coast Guard, in a new strategy on the Arctic, has called for boosting the
U.S. presence in the region to counterbalance Russia and China. “Over the past 15
years, the Nation’s strategic competitors have invested heavily in Arctic-capable
assets, infrastructure, and relationships, some of which are targeted at eroding the
influence of America and the rule of law,” the document reads. “U.S. investments
over that same period of time have been comparatively modest.”
Determinants of Foreign Policy
 Non-aligned Movement : Aims and achievements.

“The power of nations assembled here is not military power or economic power,
nevertheless it is power. Call it moral force”- Nehru at the first NAM Conference in 1961.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is a forum of 120

developing world states that are not formally aligned
with or against any major power bloc. After the
United Nations, it is the largest grouping of states
worldwide. The countries of the Non-Aligned
Movement represent nearly two-thirds of the United
Nations' members and contain 55% of the world
population.
Drawing on the principles agreed at the Bandung Conference in 1955, the Non-Aligned
Movement was established in 1961 in Belgrade.
The purpose of the organization was enumerated by Fidel Castro in his
Havana Declaration of 1979 as to ensure "the national independence,
sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries"
in their "struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism,
racism, and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination,
interference or hegemony as well as against great power and bloc
politics."
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) provided a platform for newly independent developing
nations to join together to protect this autonomy. It was a disparate group from many
continents, with varying degrees of proximity to, and dependence on, one or the other bloc;
and broadly united around NAM’s flagship campaigns for de-colonisation, universal nuclear
disarmament and against apartheid.
In the years since the Cold War's end, it has focused on developing multilateral ties and
connections as well as unity among the developing nations of the world, especially those
within the Global South.
History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was created and founded during the collapse of the
colonial system and the independence struggles of the peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America
and other regions of the world and at the height of the Cold War. During the early days of
the Movement, its actions were a key factor in the decolonization process, which led later to
the attainment of freedom and independence by many countries and peoples and to the
founding of tens of new sovereign States. Throughout its history, the Movement of Non-
Aligned Countries has played a fundamental role in the preservation of world peace and
security.
While some meetings with a third-world perspective were held before 1955, historians
consider that the Bandung Asian-African Conference is the most immediate antecedent to
the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement. This Conference was held in Bandung on April
18-24, 1955 and gathered 29 Heads of States belonging to the first post-colonial generation
of leaders from the two continents with the aim of identifying and assessing world issues at
the time and pursuing out joint policies in international relations.
The principles that would govern relations among large and small nations, known as the
"Ten Principles of Bandung", were proclaimed at that Conference. Such principles were
adopted later as the main goals and objectives of the policy of non-alignment. The
fulfillment of those principles became the essential criterion for Non-Aligned Movement
membership; it is what was known as the "quintessence of the Movement" until the early
1990s.

The ten principles of Bandung

1. Respect of fundamental human rights and of the objectives and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations.
2. Respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
3. Recognition of the equality among all races and of the equality among all nations,
both large and small.
4. Non-intervention or non-interference into the internal affairs of another -country.
5. Respect of the right of every nation to defend itself, either individually or
collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
6. .
A. Non-use of collective defense pacts to benefit the specific interests of any of
the great powers.
B. Non-use of pressures by any country against other countries.
7. Refraining from carrying out or threatening to carry out aggression, or from using
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.
8. Peaceful solution of all international conflicts in conformity with the Charter of the
United Nations.
9. Promotion of mutual interests and of cooperation.
10. Respect of justice and of international obligations.
A key role was played in this process by the then Heads of State and Government Gamal
Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Ahmed
Sukarno of Indonesia and Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, who later became the founding
fathers of the movement and its emblematic leaders.
Six years after Bandung, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries was founded on a wider
geographical basis at the First Summit Conference of Belgrade, 1961. The Conference was
attended by 25 countries.
The Founders of NAM have preferred to declare it as a movement but not an organization in
order to avoid bureaucratic implications of the latter.
The primary of objectives of the non-aligned countries focused on the support of self-
determination, national independence and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
States; opposition to apartheid; non-adherence to multilateral military pacts and the
independence of non-aligned countries from great power or block influences and rivalries;
the struggle against imperialism in all its forms and manifestations; the struggle against
colonialism, neocolonialism, racism, foreign occupation and domination; disarmament;
non-interference into the internal affairs of States and peaceful coexistence among all
nations; rejection of the use or threat of use of force in international relations; the
strengthening of the United Nations; the democratization of international relations;
socioeconomic development and the restructuring of the international economic system;
as well as international cooperation on an equal footing.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries played a key role in
the struggle for the establishment of a new international economic order that allowed all
the peoples of the world to make use of their wealth and natural resources and provided a
wide platform for a fundamental change in international economic relations and the
economic emancipation of the countries of the South.
The NAM members , in spite of their ideological, political, economic, social and cultural
diversity, have accepted its founding principles and primary objectives and shown their
readiness to realize them.

Achievements of NAM

The most important achievement of NAM movement was that it initiated an active
international struggle for global peace at height of cold war and militarism. It played
significant role in prevention of some of the regional conflicts and also made efforts towards
end of cold war.
Since NAM had greater acceptance among the newly emerging independent nations, it
prevented bipolarisation of world to great extent. It’s clear call to end colonialism and
dismantle the imperialism led people of different colonized countries demand for right of self
determination and end of all kinds of neo-colonialism. It also paced up the decolonization of
the world.
NAM countries made bold calls to end all racial discrimination and apartheid in South Africa
leading ultimately to the triumph of the African National Congress under the leadership of
Nelson Mandela.
One of the most outstanding contributions of the NAM was its consistent support for
strengthening the United Nations Organisation. On the basis of their numerical strength, the
nonaligned countries exercised a considerable influence on the decisions of the General
Assembly. These countries have supported UN in all of its peace-keeping efforts in different
parts of the world.

The countries campaigned for general recognition for a New International Economic Order
{NIEO} based on political and economic equality.

NAM had also successfully ended the monopoly of western agencies

over the news dissemination services. Western control over mass
media led to the projection of a distorted image of non-aligned third
world countries. But with the setting up of a non-aligned Newspool
such distortions have been greatly rectified. This indeed was a great
achievement.
India and NAM
India being a founder and largest member in NAM was an
active participant in NAM meetings till 1970s but India’s
inclination towards erstwhile USSR created confusions in
smaller members. It led to the weakening of NAM and small
nations drifted towards either US or USSR.
Further disintegration of USSR led the unipolar world order
dominated by US. India’s New Economic Policy and inclination towards US raised questions
over India’s seriousness over NAM.
Current Prime Minister of India skipped the 17th and 18th Non Aligned Movement (NAM)
summit held in Venezuela in 2016 and Baku in 2019 respectively.
Moreover, NAM continued losing relevance for India, especially after the founding members
failed to support India during crisis. For instance, during 1962 War with China, Ghana and
Indonesia, adopted explicitly pro-China positions. During 1965 and 1971 wars, Indonesia and
Egypt took an anti India stance and supported Pakistan.

India in particular, but also most other NAM countries, have integrated themselves to
varying degrees within the liberal economic order and have left the call for NIEO . India is a
member of the G20 and has declared itself as a nuclear weapons power and has for all
practical purposes abandoned the call for global nuclear disarmament. Thus , shifting away
from NAM goals and values
India has also engaged itself with new and old global powers. India joining the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue, a coalition seen by many as a counterforce to China’s rise in the Indo-
Pacific showing India’s new approach in dealing with the imperatives of the New World
order.
Recent summit
An online summit titled "United Against Covid-19" conducted on May 4, 2020 for the 2019–
2022 period, addressed mainly the global struggle to fight the Covid-19 pandemics and
supporting NAM to increase its role in dealing with and mitigating the outcomes caused by
this disease in NAM, as well as other countries.
PM Modi and revival of his NAM Policy
PM Modi at the Virtual Summit , 2020: “NAM has often been the world’s moral voice and in
order to retain this role, NAM must remain inclusive.”
PM Modi did skip the two NAM summits during his term in 2016 and 2019, making the 2020
Virtual Summit his first participation in NAM. This raised the serious question about
relevance of NAM and its importance for India. Analysts have called PM Modi’s indifference
with the movement as political and ideological .

Views of Harsh V Pant in his article “Modi’s tryst with NAM”

According to him, calling Modi’s indifference with NAM as political or
ideological constitutes “ serious misreadings” of his foreign policies .
According to him PM Modi has “natural inclination towards pragmatism
when it comes to foreign policy.” The current government has effectively
used all the instruments and platforms to fill the leadership vacuum in the
global order when both China and the US have exposed their
vulnerabilities. This doesn’t mean that non-alignment is back as a foreign policy paradigm.
Given India’s current security predicament, India cannot afford to be non-aligned in the
traditional sense .He has buried NAM for good. Modi has nothing to lose by using it
instrumentally if it serves India’s immediate needs. But to construe this as Modi’s embrace of
a now redundant philosophy of global engagement would be a big fallacy.

Relevance of NAM
“The main concern of NAM is not related to superpower
rivalry , rather it is to give voice and address concerns of third
world countries” P. V. Narsimha Rao

Today the world is no longer bipolar. But there is also no

consensus about the nature of its configuration. Some writers
feel that it is unipolar with the U.S. being the sole Super Power. Other writers argue that it is
multipolar with the European Union, Japan, Russia and China being important centres of
power together with the U.S. Still others have referred to it as "uni-cum-multipolar.
Whatever the terminology, that may be used, there is no doubt that the U.S. and the G-7
powers together are in a position to work in concert and manage the rest of the world. There
has arisen what has been called the new Northern concert of Powers.
Within this global scenario, the practice of nonalignment becomes difficult because there is
no longer the space for manoeuvering nor does there exist the intermediatory role.
Nevertheless, there is a vital need for its practice, precisely because the developing countries
of the South need to assert their independence and act together, if they are not to be totally
overwhelmed by the North.
The imperatives for a revitalized Non-aligned Movement springs from many sources.
For the developing countries this multipolarity presents an uncertain, complex and gloomy
environment in which there may not be many new opportunities, but increased
vulnerability. At present there seems to be no change of the developing countries being able
to exploit the differences that are seen among the major economic powers.
The Third World countries are also being pressurised to agree to all the demand of the
developed world on the question of opening of markets and intellectual property rights,
even though the fact of the matter is that trends towards protectionism are rising in the
developed countries at the time when most of the developing countries are seriously
reforming their economies and providing for market deregulation. So also is the impression
being fostered that the Third World is somehow responsible for environmental pollution
when actually it is west that has been the chief source of environmental degradation.
There is a tendency on the part of the developed countries to impose stringent restrictions
on the transfer of technology to the developing countries. The ever-growing list of items
subjected to the so-called dual use restrictions effectively threatens to deprive the
developing countries of new technological progress .
The world continues to be divided into the nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots'. The nuclear
'haves' seem to be determined to retain their arsenals of the nuclear weapons, albeit on a
reduced scale and to prevent others from acquiring such weapons. The irony is that the
targets of nuclear weapons are now the countries of the Third World as these are being
looked upon as the main threat to the security of the nuclear-weapons powers.Instead of
being discarded after the end of the Cold War, deterrence is being retained and honed for
being used discriminately against the countries of the Third World. The countries of the Third
World are now under tremendous pressure to desist from developing weapons of mass
destruction and to reduce their alleged excessive military expenditure.
Instead of revitalising multilaterialism under the UN , the new alliance headed by the
United States has successfully mounted an all out campaign to destroy the multilateral
character of the world body to alter its agenda and to undermine its functioning to certain
areas. Hard-core economic issues like the removal of poverty, developmental plans, trade,
money, finance and debt have been taken off the agenda of the United Nations and
transferred to the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the General Agreement
on Trade and Tariffs, over which they have greater control and which permit them to use
cross-conditionalities and cross-relation. Organisation forming part of the UN family are
being held in leash through denial of the finances due to them. And in the UN Security
Council, it is the permanent members which, acting in close cooperation, take all the
decisions affecting world peace and security.
There are a number of ad hoc discriminatory regimes aimed at preventing the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These include regimes for chemical weapons
(the 'Australian Club), nuclear weapons "London Supplier Group" (LSG) and Missiles (the
Missile Technology Control Regimes, or MTCR). The lists of dual purpose technologies,
substances and equipment which cannot be exported to the countries of the Third World
under these regimes are so extensive as to have the effect of freezing the technological and
industrial development of the developing countries in those vital areas. It is also very difficult
to judge whether the restrictions applied in any particular case are motivated by the
commercial consideration of preventing the country concerned from developing competitive
capacity or by the consideration of ensuring nonproliferation. These regimes have no
sanction of international law. As they are outside the United Nations and their membership
is restricted, they have the effect of undermining multilateralism.

Many third World countries are facing today the internal strife and threat of disintegration.
The economic and political situation is far from stable. Sovereignty is being subjected to
curtailment and abridgement by some countries in North.

Then, there is a trend at present in the field of trade to resort increasingly to unilateral and
bilateral coercive measures to negotiate reciprocal access to markets and to use cross-
retaliation. Moreover, the attempt by the developed countries to raise new issues not
directly linked to trade, such as labour standards, social conditions and environment clearly
proves that the newly formed world trading system is not likely to serve any better the
interests of the developing countries.
The above analysis shows that with the end of the Cold War, the threat to and pressure on
the independence of the non-aligned countries have assumed new forms. The present
negative trends in the world are contrary to the aims and objectives of the Non-aligned
Movements for a just, equitable and democratic world order. None of the NAM countries or
group of countries, however, big or rich they may be, can face these new realities alone.
Hence, the countries of NAM must continue to stay and act together for reforming and
strengthening the United Nations; encouraging South-South Cooperation; and consolidating
the Movement through necessary reforms.
The realities of current global politics make non-alignment equally relevant today for the
developing'countries of the world as it was during the Cold War period.
However, while Non-alignment continues to be relevant, the role of the Non-aligned
Movement in current global affairs has been somewhat declining. The NAM could not first
prevent the conflict between two of its members-Iraq and Kuwait and neither could it play
an effective role in the subsequent Gulf crises. Nor could it halt the civil war in Yugoslavia,
itself an important member.
One of the reasons for its inefficiency is that today the NAM is faced with serious internal
problems. Some of these include the membership criteria which is too liberal and often
violated, the lack of self discipline amongst its members, the weaknesses in the method of
consensus and the absence of any mechanism for monitoring of global events.

Debate on Relevance of NAM for India

 India’s External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar believes that non-
alignment was a concept of relevance in a specific era and a particular
context, though the independence of action enshrined in it remains a
factor of continuity in India’s foreign policy. However, he also says that
a rejection of non-alignment does not mean a rush to alignment: India
will not join an alliance system. For him ‘alliance’ is as much a Cold
War concept as non-alignment.
According to C. Raja Mohan, NAM is in the state of ' Coma'. It is
passing through the crisis of identity and relevance. For him, NAM was
irrelevant even before end of Cold War. It didn’t have any concrete
achievement as it was extremely idealist to harmonize interest of so many
countries which have collective interest. India's approach to NAM has always
been “`Tabula Rasa” with capacity to accommodate any idea, supported
India's economic pragmatism & muscular geo-politics.
Harsh V Pant believes that NAM was prudent as a policy tool when India wasn’t economic or
military power. Now India need to pursue new goals & policies, and there should be no point
sticking to old shibboleths.
However, according to Prof. Rashid-ud-khan , NAM is a "timeless organization”. He
argues that the complexities of problems in developing countries mandates a platform
like NAM to bring together the developing nations to resolve them.

Shashi Tharoor too,in his article "Is the Non-Aligned Movement relevant
today?", asserts that, although the very name of NAM signifies the negation
of a choice that is no longer on the world's geopolitical table. However NAM
has evolved to widen its objectives to resist the hegemony of the sole
superpower, the US, and in asserting the independence of its members.
According to T.P. Sreenivasan ,NAM stood for freedom of judgement &
action, and hence NAM remains valid whether there are one block or two.
NAM has to adopt and change itself to suit the newly emerging challenges and geopolitics.
World has again moved towards bi-polarity, one led by US and other by China-Russia. The
war torn syria is prime example of this, where both US and Russia is asserting power.
The escalating tension in Indo-pacific region due to China’s assertion and US acting as a
counterweight to check the Chinese expansionist policy.The large scale migration in Europe
and Asia due to the unstable regimes and ethnic conflict in different parts of world.Issue of
global climate change and occurence of catastrophic disasters raising demand to form global
consensus to deal with it. All these global changes requires parallel and proportional
recalibration of NAM agenda and procedures.

Conclusion
In spite of setbacks,the principles and objectives of non-alignment retain their full validity
and force at the present international juncture. The primary condition that led to the
emergence of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, that is, non-alignment from
antagonistic blocks, has not lost its validity with the end of the Cold War. The demise of one
of the blocks has not done away with the pressing problems of the world. On the contrary,
renewed strategic interests bent on domination grow stronger and, even, acquire new and
more dangerous dimensions for underdeveloped countries.
The movement has succeeded to create a strong front on the International level,
representing countries of the third world in the International organizations on top of which
the United Nations.
Even in the third decade of 21st century, the challenges before NAM are enormous. They
include the necessity of protecting the principles of International law, eliminating weapons
of mass destruction , combating terrorism, defending human rights, working toward making
the United Nations more effective in meeting the needs of all its member states in order to
preserve International Peace , Security and Stability, as well as realizing justice in the
international economic system.
The long-standing goals of the Movement remain to be realized. Peace, development,
economic cooperation and the democratization of international relations, to mention just a
few, are old goals of the non-aligned countries.
One can agree to MK Narayanan who says that with non-alignment giving way to
strategic alignment, organisations such as NAM may seem anachronistic, but it should not
be lost sight of that it still resonates with many Third World countries. It also offers an
alternative platform for putting forward a different viewpoint. It would, hence, be premature
to pronounce the death of NAM.
Thus, it would be wrong to question the significance of a long-lasting movement like NAM,
sui generis in its purpose of serving the national interest of member nations and promoting
the cause of humanity. ‘The need of the hour is to call out for NAM’s revitalisation for it to
be able to cater to the 21st Century needs of Third World countries more efficiently,’ as
India’s current Vice President M. Venkaiah Naidu points out.
The NAM countries should come forward with a vision to :
A. Reform and strengthen the United Nations
B. Encourage the South South Cooperation
C. Strive for an equitable world order
D. Consolidate the movement through necessary reforms
E. Adhere to the principles and objectives of the movement by its members and build a
common bargaining platform.
In today’s world order, which former National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon has
described as militarily unipolar, economically multipolar and politically confused. COVID-
19 has deepened the confusion further. India has acquired a larger global profile for two
years as non-permanent member of UN Security Council. NAM is one platform which India
can leverage to further strengthen its global profile.

Some useful Articles:

https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/indias-renewed-embrace-of-the-non-aligned-movement/

https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&view=btop&ver=ops2cvpehp6&search=inbox&th=
%23thread-f%3A1694198545465726621&cvid=1

https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1621065
Syllabus topics:

India and the UN System: Role in UN Peace-keeping; Demand for Permanent Seat in the
Security Council.

India and UN
The Indian approach to the UN, in India’s first PM
Jawaharlal Nehru’s words, is characterized by “whole-
hearted cooperation” through full participation “in its
councils to which her geographical position, and
contribution towards peaceful progress entitle her.”

A brief History of India’s association with the UN

India was among the select members of the United
Nations that signed the Declaration by United Nations
at Washington on 1 January 1942.
India also participated in the historic UN Conference of
International Organization at San Francisco in 1945.
India stood at the forefront during the UN's tumultuous years of struggle against colonialism
and apartheid.
India was the co-sponsor of the landmark 1960 Declaration on UN on Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples which proclaimed the need to
unconditionally end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.
India was also elected the first chair of the Decolonization Committee where its ceaseless
efforts to put an end to colonialism .
India was amongst the most outspoken critics of apartheid and racial discrimination in
South Africa. In fact, India was the first country to raise this issue at the UN (in 1946) and
played a leading role in the formation of a Sub-Committee against Apartheid set up by the
General Assembly. When the Convention on Elimination of all forms of Racial
Discrimination was adopted in 1965, India was among the earliest signatories.
India’s status as a founding member
of the Non-Aligned Movement and
the Group of 77 cemented its position
within the UN system as a leading
advocate of the concerns and
aspirations of developing countries
and the creation of a more equitable
international economic and political
order.
With a view to address global
concerns on the proliferation of WMD
to terrorists, India has been tabling
the consensus resolution on
‘Measures to Prevent Terrorists from Acquiring WMD’. , which has recently been adopted.

India has a long and distinguished history of service in UN peacekeeping, having contributed
more personnel than any other country. To date, more than 244,500 Indians have served in
49 of the 71 UN peacekeeping missions established around the world since 1948. Today,
most significantly, India has almost twice the number of peacekeepers deployed in the
ground as do China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States combined –
also known as the P5

India’s mediatory role in resolving the stalemate over prisoners of war in Korea led to the
signing of the armistice ending the Korean War. India chaired the five-member Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission while the Indian Custodian Force supervised the process
of interviews and repatriation that followed.
The UN entrusted Indian armed forces with subsequent peace missions in the Middle East,
Cyprus, and the Congo .
India also served as chair of the three international commissions for supervision and control
for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos established by the 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina.
India has a long tradition of sending women on UN peacekeeping missions. In 2007, India
became the first country to deploy an all-women contingent to a UN peacekeeping mission
in Liberia.
In addition to their security role, the members of the female Indian Formed Police Unit also
distinguished themselves through humanitarian service, including organizing medical camps
for Liberians, many of whom have limited access to health care services, veterinary support
and engineering services.

The Indian contingent in South Sudan has gone the extra mile by providing vocational
training and life-saving medical assistance, as well as carrying out significant road repair
work. The Indian contingent have received UN medals of honour for their dedication and
service in peacekeeping.
Indian peacekeepers have also brought the ancient Indian practice of yoga to UN missions.
Members of the UN mission in Lebanon, UNIFIL and UNMISS, South Sudan celebrate the
International Yoga Day.
India has also provided 15 Force Commanders to various missions, and was the first country
to contribute to the Trust Fund on sexual exploitation and abuse, which was set up in 2016.
India’s longstanding service has not come without cost. More than 170 peacekeepers have
paid the ultimate price while serving with the United Nations. India has lost more
peacekeepers than any other Member State.

Representation in UN Bodies
India has won several major elections in the last few years including elections to the Human
Right Council (HRC), Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
Significant Achievements
The UNGA Resolution declaring 21 June every year as the International Day of Yoga was
adopted in Dec 2014 with a record number of 177 co-sponsors.
Usage of Hindi in UN public communications (UN news, weekly audio bulletins on UN radio
and UN social media) began in March 2018 following the first MoU signed by the UN with
any country.
The first single-country South-South cooperation initiative at the UN was launched in June
2017 through the “India-UN Development Partnership Fund”, a $100 million fund facility to
undertake projects across the developing world.
In April 2018, a US$50 Million Commonwealth window was created under the Fund to
support SDG related projects in developing countries of the Commonwealth.
Following the efforts made in three previous attempts (2009, 2016 and 2017), the Security
Council finally on 1 May 2019 approved the addition of Masood Azhar to the 1267 Sanctions
of individuals and entities subject to the assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo.
The election of Judge Dalveer Bhandari to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Nov 2017
was a landmark event for India in terms of its unprecedented success in unseating a sitting
judge from UK, a P5 member.
Dr. Neeru Chadha became the first Indian woman to be elected in June 2017 as Judge of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) for the period 2017-2026.
India was elected to the Human Rights Council in Oct 2018 for the period 2019- 2022 with
highest number of votes (188/193).
In Sept 2018, UNEP recognized Prime Minister Modi in the “Policy Leadership” category for
pioneering work in championing the International Solar Alliance and for the pledge to
eliminate single-use plastic in India by 2022.UNEP also selected Cochin International Airport,
which is fully-powered by solar energy, for the Champion for entrepreneurial vision award.

International Solar Alliance (ISA)was registered with the UN as a treaty-based inter-

governmental organization with effect from 9th Feb 2018.

India ratified the Paris Agreement and 'Second commitment period of Kyoto Protocol' in
Climate Change in Aug 2017.

UNGA adopted a Resolution in Dec 2014 on recognizing the Indian festivals of Diwali,
Buddha Purnima and Gurpurab by the UN. The first official celebration of Diwali at UN
Headquarters took place in 2016.

India and UNSC reforms

For India, “no reform of the United Nations (UN) is complete without the composition of the
Security Council changing to reflect contemporary realities of the twenty-first century. This
requires expansion in the membership of the Security Council in both the permanent and non
– permanent categories.”

This Indian quest for the Security Council permanent membership, was defined by former PM
Manmohan Singh as “an essay in persuasion” which lies at the heart of repeated Indian
pleas for reforming the UN.

Teresita C. Schaffer recognises this as India’s multilateral “personality,” .

India’s Security Council Calculus

The origins of the Indian interests in the Security Council can be traced as back to the
founding of the UN itself when Mahatma Gandhi felt that India, then including Pakistan
and Bangladesh, should become a veto-wielding member of the Security Council.
But the leadership precedence for independence and managing the difficult, bloody partition
followed by the India-Pakistan conflict on Kashmir moved their attention and interests away
from the possible opportunity of a seat. (Stephen P Cohen)

Later, India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru shied away from the highly debatable
offer to join the Security Council by both the superpowers, the US and the then Soviet Union
in 1950 and in 1955 respectively, keeping in mind the emerging Cold war calculus and
steadfastly refused to join at the expense of China

Acknowledging India’s rightful claim to a permanent seat, Nehru wrote:

“It would do us little good and it would bring a great deal of trouble in its train….India,
because of many factors is certainly entitled to a permanent seat in the Security Council.
But we are not going in at the cost of China.”
What are the basis of India’s demand for UNSC permanent membership?

The Indian calculus on permanent membership of Security Council flow broadly from a mix of
three streams
1. India’s historic association with the UN system itself since its independence,
2. India’s intrinsic value and place in contemporary international politics and
3. Its ambitions as a traditional great power in Asia and beyond.

India in UN System:
The origins of Indian multilateral engagement dates back to 28 June 1919 when India signed
the Treaty of Versailles that ended the First World War and created the League of Nations,
the precursor of the UN, wherein India, too, was a member.

India, also the original member of the UN that signed the Declaration by the UN at
Washington on 1 January 1942, participated in the historic UN Conference of International
Organization at San Francisco ,1945.

India, since its independence and even before that, has been an active participant in all
initiatives undertaken by the UN and the various UN organs including the various discussions
on the Agenda for Peace and the Agenda for Development, the Millennium Development
Goals, and various UN summits, including most importantly on climate change.

India also contributed most importantly by being instrumental in establishing the G77 of
developing states at the UN, other than supporting the establishment of various bodies like
the UNICEF on a permanent basis, the UNDP, the UNEP, and the restructuring of the
economic and social fields of the UN and the UN Development Fund.

India’s contribution to Peacekeeping operations.

Financial contributions to the UN

India with US$ 20.46 million ranks 23rd in the list of contributors.

On this, India has emphasized way back in 1993 itself: “…not just the financial contribution
in absolute terms, but also in relative terms. For a country with low per capita income,
assessed contribution as per the United Nations scale may entail proportionately higher
sacrifice. The record of timely payment also should be taken into account.” Adding further,
India asserted: “the financial contribution does not remain static forever, and the crucial
issue is the readiness to fulfil the obligations and not the quantum of payment at a
particular point in time.”

Indian strategic interest in the Council seat has also been shaped by its history of interacting
with the Security Council. In the early years of its independence during its armed conflict with
Pakistan on Kashmir, India paid the price for being “idealistic” to take the Kashmir issue to
the UN wherein it had to battle hard realpolitik of Cold war years leading to UN interventions
over the Kashmir dispute. To prevent this negative outcome ever again, the Indian presence
at the Security Council, it is hoped will ensure Indian interests are not sacrificed at the altar
of great power politics. Most importantly, it will stall any possible intervention by China, a
permanent member at the behest of its ally Pakistan.

Indian interests in the Security Council also flow from the larger, many foreign policy debates
in India on whether it will be a status quo power that accepts liberal norms and positions
itself as a “responsible stakeholder’ in the international system or a revisionist power that
seeks to redefine the norms of international engagement. Many pundits agree that India
would be moderately revisionist that seeks to adjust international norms and frameworks
that suits its global vision, without seeking to overthrow the current international system.

India also always seen itself as a champion, a ‘moralistic force’ of the so called Third World,
the developing states. Former Secretary General Kofi Annan has been quoted as saying that
India has been one of the most significant votaries of shaping the UN agenda on behalf of
the developing world.

India’s Intrinsic Value:

By any objective criteria, such as population(Almost one-fifth of humanity), territorial size,

GDP, economic potential, civilizational legacy, cultural diversity, political system and past
and ongoing contributions to the activities of the UN — especially to UN peacekeeping
operations — India is eminently qualified for permanent membership.

India’s rising economic stature globally has added to Indian claims as well. India is now one
of the fastest-growing major economy in the world, and Asia’s third largest. India’s leading
position in software and its IT-enabled services making it a global technology giant adds to
its increasing economic and trade footprint across the world. India is now counted amongst
the most influential players in economic organizations like the WTO, BRICS and the G20.

India’s newly acquired status as a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) in May 1998 also makes
India a natural claimant as a permanent member similar to the existing permanent members
who are all Nuclear Weapon States. Though India has not been accorded a de’ jure
recognition of this by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, India now stands
recognized as a de’ facto NWS due to the nuclear deal signed by India and the United States
in 2005 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver in 2008 to nuclear transfers for India despite
not being a NPT signatory. On the negative side, it is argued by critics that India has still not
signed the NPT, had rejected the CTBT in 1996 and in fact, was the target of unanimous
Security Council Resolution 1172 after it conducted nuclear tests in 1998. But, India’s nuclear
diplomacy after the May 1998 tests successfully turned India from a pariah state to being
increasingly a part of the non-proliferation regime.

India’s Great Power Ambitions:

China’s Middle Kingdome vs Vishwaguru

It would serve as an equalizer to China, its rival and an emerging hegemon in Asia and an
ever increasing strategic and security concern in its immediate neighborhood and beyond.
India has always seen itself as a democratic alternative to the authoritarian China in a
leadership role in Asia. India’s millennia old civilizational existence also demands it to be at
the top of international hierarchy of states

India wishes to shift its international position from a rule taker (a constrained role) to a rule
maker (a system shaping role). The Indian attempts at joining various regimes like the
MTCR and the ongoing, high pitched campaign to join the NSG amply indicate that India is
no more satisfied with being either the target or a mere follower of various international
norms and rules and wants now to shape and align them to suit Indian ideas and interests.

Support from a vast majority of nations - China --only permanent member--ambiguous in its
support for India

Indian perspectives on Council Reforms

The UN Security Council reforms became an international agenda with the UN General
Assembly adopting in 1992 the Resolution 47/62 entitled “The Question of Equitable
Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council.”

In 1993, the Assembly set up an open ended Working Group which discussed on four aspects
for making the Council more representative:
1. the future size of the Council,
2. the categories of membership,
3. the criteria of membership, and
4. the veto power.

The Security Council reformed as back as 1965 when it increased its non-permanent
members from 11 to 15, and increased the necessary votes for the adoption of resolutions
from seven to nine.

The Indian attempts at reforming the Council date as back as 1979, when India’s
ambassador to the UN Brajesh Mishra along with other NAM countries submitted a draft
resolution to the General Assembly calling for an increase in the non-permanent membership
from 10 to 14, arguing an increase in the UN membership as the principal reason.

The 1990s also saw Indian attempts at pressing for UN reforms.

In April 2013 , India called for a conclusion of the IGN process on UNSC reforms by the 70th
anniversary of the UN. India called for a purposeful, result oriented negotiations and
secondly, parity for the unrepresented and the underrepresented.

Five sets of issues have been identified by the General Assembly 62/557 decision on
“question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security
Council and related matters”:
1. categories of membership;
2. question of veto;
3. regional representation;
4. size of an enlarged council and working methods of the Council; and
5. the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly.

Categories of Membership
On the issue of categories of membership, India has supported expansion in both categories
– Permanent and Non-Permanent .
Making a case that there is an imbalance of influence between the permanent and non-
permanent members of the Council, India has called for a “balanced enlargement in both
categories.”
Herein, India has highlighted the need of Africa to be represented in both categories. This
directly challenges the proposed “so called” intermediate models wherein a longer term and
immediate re-election are seen as compensations for a permanent membership.

Question of Veto
On the most important question of veto, Indian position is fully aligned with the G4, L.69 and
Africa who have called for the abolition of veto .
However,India, showing a marked flexibility, has argued that it supports new members with
same responsibilities and obligations as current permanent members as a matter of
principle, it is open to not exercising the veto by new permanent members until a decision is
taken during a review process.

Regional Representation
On the question of regional representation, India has forcefully argued for an equitable
geographical representation and the urgent need for mitigating the non-representation and
under-representation of some regions in both the permanent and the non-permanent
categories. It is “anachronistic” situation that the UN has three of the five permanent
members from one region alone while the regions of Africa, Latin America, three-fourths of
Asia including the Arab states, the entire Central and Eastern Europe, the Caribbean states
and the Small Island developing states remain excluded from the functioning of the Security
Council.

On the role of regional groupings in the selection of new members, India favored the current
practice, viz., each regional grouping would endorse its candidate, to be followed by the
need to contest an election on the floor of the General Assembly for occupying a seat at the
Security Council.
What has been Indian Strategy for reforms?
India has adopted a multi-layered strategy to assume the highly coveted permanent seat in
the Security Council.

According to Stuenkel, the Indian strategy of “revisionist integration” into the Security
Council consists of two components: Maximizing support in the UN General Assembly and
Minimizing resistance in the UN Security Council.
India’s continued leadership of various Global South forums such as G 77 and NAM, it hopes
would garner the much needed numbers in the UNGA.

India has also joined the L-69, the 42 member grouping of developing countries from Asia,
Africa and Latin America. India also, in late 2016, joined as a member the newly founded
group of Friends on UN Security Council Reform created to accelerate the negotiating
process of Council reforms.

However, Mukherjee and Malone highlight at least three challenges in Indian aspirations at
the UNSC:
1. lack of enough Indian government resources for multilateral diplomacy,
2. insufficient engagement with the normative aspects of many UN Security Council
issues, and
3. an over-reliance on entitlement as the bedrock of India’s claims to permanent
membership, at the cost of more hard-nosed realpolitik bargaining in the UN.

Further, with India as part of G4 seems to have limited its options to negotiate a seat for
itself as great power and regional politics would circumscribe the G4 attempts to win
permanent seats for all as a group (Sanjay Baru).

Conclusion

India has to continue seeking its rightful place in any expanded United Nations Security
Council without unnecessarily vesting all its hopes, plans and ambitions in the quest for a
such a status, as the changed world offers examples like Germany, Japan and Israel who
have stitched alternative arrangements that could be multilateral (European Union),
bilateral (US-Israel), regional or creatively/strategically relevant, eg, ‘Quad’.
Will not be counted in your hours

Not a deliverable

Open ended  PSIR/GS2

Exhaustive?

Not minute details  exam relevant

“Our enemies are innovative and resourceful,
and so are we. They never stop thinking about
new ways to harm our country and our people,
and neither do we.” - George W. Bush

“When goods do not cross borders, soldiers

will.”? - Frederic Bastiat
UNSC and India
India and UN
• “whole-hearted cooperation” through full
participation “in its councils to which her
geographical position, and contribution towards
peaceful progress entitle her.”
A brief History of India’s association with the UN

28 June 1919 - Treaty of Versailles LoN

Declaration by the UN at Washington on 1 January 1942

UN Conference of International Organization at San Francisco ,1945.

Responsibilities and powers of the UNSC
Mediation, appointing special envoys,
dispatching a UN Mission or requesting the
UN Secretary-General to settle the dispute.

Ceasefire directives peacekeeping forces

and military observers dispatched.

Sanctions and financial penalties , arms

embargoed, and travel bans
Logic behind limited membership ?
 Issues • Global political imbalance
and
reforms • Regional imbalance Africa or
required? Latin Europe
What reforms are required?
• Structural Reforms  UNGA ‘Perilous interventions:
The Security Council and politics of Chaos’
• Transparency
• Veto Reforms  Korea & Gulf war
• Abolish
• Restrict the use
• Overriding power to UNGA.
• Reform difficult: Articles 108 and 109.
• Membership Reforms in UNSC
 UNGA - 1992 -
Resolution
47/62 entitled
UN- 69th
“The Question
General
of Equitable
Efforts towards Assembly on
1965 : 11  15 Representation In 1993, open ended Working Group :
UNSC reforms September 14,
and Increase in
2015 : IGN 
the
TBN
Membership
of the Security
Council.” .

the categories the criteria of

the future size
of membership, the veto power.
of the Council,
membership, and
Groupings G4 - Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan

Uniting for Consensus - Italy, Spain, Australia, Canada,

South Korea, Argentina and Pakistan

African Union (“Ezulwini Consensus”) 26 2,2.

ACT - Trans-Regional group of 21 states

L.69  developing countries from Africa, Latin America

and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific  42 members.
India’s Security Council Calculus

• Mahatma Gandhi : veto-wielding member

• Partition
• Nehru – 1950,1955 Cold war calculus
• “It would do us little good and it would bring a great
deal of trouble in its train….India, because of many
factors is certainly entitled to a permanent seat in the
Security Council. But we are not going in at the cost of
China.”
 “no reform of the
United Nations (UN)
is complete without
the composition of
the Security Council
changing to reflect
contemporary
realities of the
“an essay in
What India wants? twenty-first century.
persuasion”
This requires
expansion in the
membership of the
Security Council in
both the permanent
and non –
permanent
categories.”
India’s views on UNSC Reforms:
Categories of Membership  “balanced enlargement in both categories.”  Africa

Question of Veto The abolition of veto.

Regional Representation“an equitable geographical representation” “anachronistic” 3/5 from one region
Africa, Latin America, three-fourths of Asia including the Arab states, the entire Central and Eastern Europe, the
Caribbean states and the Small Islands Each regional grouping would endorse its candidate election in UNGA

Size of Council and Its Working Methods ‘we the peoples’ ;1945  2.35 billion 7.3 billion  1945 51  193
Realistic.

Relationship Between Security Council and General Assembly Not competitive or adversarial, but “one of synergy
and complementarity” UN objectives
Why India needs to be in UNSC?
• Kashmir “idealistic”realpolitik of Cold war
• ChinaPakistan
• status quo vs revisionist power moderately
revisionist global vision, without seeking to
overthrow the current international system.
• A ‘moralistic force’ of the so called Third
WorldKofi Annan
What are the basis of India’s demand for UNSC permanent
membership?
 Historic association

Intrinsic value and place in

A mix of three streams contemporary
international politics

Traditional great power in

Asia and beyond.
 India’s Intrinsic Value:
civilizational
legacy,
cultural
diversity,
political
GDP(2.87
Demography Territorial economic system and de’ facto
lakh crores
 one-fifth size, potential, past and NWS
USD (2019))
ongoing
contributions
to the
activities of
the UN
India’s Great Power Ambitions:
democratic
Middle alternative to
equalizer to Rule taker 
Kingdom vs the
China rule maker
Vishwaguru authoritarian
China
 What efforts India has made?
April , 2013 : “revisionist L-69  42
conclusion of integration” member
1979  into the
the IGN grouping of 2016 
Brajesh Security Global South
multi- process on developing Friends on
Mishra + Council forums such
layered 1990s UNSC countries UN Security
NAM  as G 77 and
strategy reforms by • Max UNGA from Asia, Council
UNGA  10 NAM
the 70th • Min UNSC. Africa and Reform
to 14
anniversary Latin
of the UN. America.
Challenges Uniting for Consensus (UFC)/Coffee Club
for India in
getting  1990s  Italy, Spain, Australia,
UNSC seat Canada, South Korea, Argentina and
Pakistan  China(not a member of UFC)

1993 : “…not just the financial contribution in

Financials  US$ absolute terms, but also in relative terms.
Low per capita income (IMF: 145th by GDP
20.46 million (nominal) and 122th by GDP (PPP))
Timely payment
23rd
Not static

readiness to fulfil the obligations and not the

quantum of payment
 Mukherjee and Malone
over-reliance on
Multilateral insufficient entitlement , not
diplomacy engagement realpolitik
bargaining
Sanjay Baru : G4

status quo bias amongst the existing P5

Why India should not pursue UNSC permanent
memebership?
• Psychological sense of ‘arriving’ on the global centre stage
• Veto power
• Israel  powerful, persuasive and progressive power  Around
50 anti-Israel UN resolutions- strengthened  in the
chessboard of realpolitik, power respects power UAE , Bahrain,
etc  Abraham Accords.
• Germany  successful narrative of a more ‘moral’ dimension 
contributes> Great Britain, France or Russia  de facto
• Japan  2nd  GDP (3rd, 4th )
• Creative multilateral options like ‘Quad’
Kishore Mahbubani:Latin America and Africa
Restructuring India’s traditional approach to UN

Delhi must come to terms with a number of propositions

• UNSC reform is unlikely to happen soon 50th ,1995.

• The UN is a lot more than the Security Council  Cold War decolonisation and
disarmament to a new international economic order.
• Priorities national interest over multilateralism territorial integrityinternationalise the
Kashmir  FATF  Article 2
• Look beyond the issues of peace  economic, technological and environmental
disruptions.
• Reshaping the global order  NAM.
• Moving centre of gravity.

Loosening the purse straps 0.7  China, Japan and the US are at 8, 10
and 22 per cent 1%.
 sahayog
(cooperation),

What after getting UNSC Seat?

India’s ‘Five S’ approach to the world: Jaishankar

Conclusions
• A legitimate claim  rightful place in
the comity of nations
• PM Modi “ Institutions that reflect
the imperatives of 20th century won’t
be effective in the 21st.”
• Prof Ramesh Thakur: NC
• A permanent seat in the UNSC is not
the only way to assert its ‘arrival’ on
the global centerstage.
Mock Question

A permanent seat in the United Nations Security

Council (UNSC) is neither necessary nor sufficient .
Discuss. (15 Marks)
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a multilateral development bank that aims to
improve economic and social outcomes in Asia. The bank currently has 103 members as well as 21
prospective members from around the world.

The bank started operation after the agreement entered into force on 25 December 2015, after
ratifications were received from 10 member states holding a total number of 50% of the initial
subscriptions of the Authorized Capital Stock.

The United Nations has addressed the launch of AIIB as having potential for "scaling up financing for
sustainable development" and to improve the global economic governance.

The starting capital of the bank was US$100 billion, equivalent to 2⁄3 of the capital of the Asian
Development Bank and about half that of the World Bank.

The bank was proposed by China in 2013 and the initiative was launched at a ceremony in Beijing in
October 2014. It received the highest credit ratings from the three biggest rating agencies in the
world, and is seen as a potential rival to the World Bank and IMF.

Shareholding structure

The allocated shares are based on the size of each member country's economy (calculated using GDP
Nominal (60%) and GDP PPP (40%)), whether they are an Asian or Non-Asian Member.

Three categories of votes exist: basic votes, share votes and Founding Member votes. The basic
votes are equal for all members and constitute 12% of the total votes, while the share votes are equal
to the number of shares. The Authorized Capital Stock of the bank is 100 billion US Dollars, divided
into 1 million shares of 100 000 dollars each. Each Founding Member furthermore gets 600 votes.

Governance of AIIB

The bank's governance structure is composed of:

The Board of Governors as the top-level and highest decision-making body. It is composed of 1
governor for each member state of the bank and in principle meets once a year.

The board of directors, composed of 12 governors, each representing one or more member is
responsible for daily operations and tasks delegated to it by the board of governors.

India and AIIB

India was among the AIIB’s 57 founding members in 2016. It is also its second-largest shareholder
(with 7.62% voting shares) after China (26.06%).

AIIB has so far invested in 21 projects in India, amounting to almost USD 5.5 billion. Another 20-30
projects are in the pipeline amounting to another USD 5 billion, which will be financed in next two
years.
AIIB has approved financing projects in India in a host of sectors like energy, transport and water
including the Bangalore metro rail project (USD 335 million), Gujarat rural roads project (USD 329
million) and Phase 3 of the Mumbai urban transport project (USD 500 million).

Establishments such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are an example of Chinese
leadership without breaking down existing mechanisms. Much to Washington’s disappointment, the
AIIB presents China as a credible actor in addressing Asia’s economic concerns. The example of AIIB
is also suggestive of what China can accomplish through economic initiatives. Despite strong
opposition from US, traditional American allies such as the UK and Australia signed up for the
initiative. It is also indicative of a changing geo-political trend toward a multipolar world and more
so, a shift from the post Cold War order as far as security and strategic initiatives go.

For the smaller island nations of IOR, Chinese investments mean an alternative to a space
traditionally dominated by one player- India. Where India lacked a vision, China rolled out a
structured framework in achieving its foreign policy goals. New Delhi had little choice but to join the
AIIB, given its economic benefits and India’s own need for capital to boost its infrastructure gap.
 APEC: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

APEC is a regional economic forum established in 1989 to leverage the growing

interdependence of the Asia-Pacific. APEC's 21 members aim to create greater prosperity for
the people of the region by promoting balanced, inclusive, sustainable, innovative and
secure growth and by accelerating regional economic integration.
APEC is working on areas such as trade and investment liberalization, business facilitation,
human security, and economic and technical cooperation, aiming to achieve sustainable
growth and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.
The notion of establishing a forum for promoting sustainable economic growth and regional
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific was first raised by former Australian Prime Minister Bob
Hawke in 1989 in response to the growing interdependence of the region and the advent of
regional trade blocs in other parts of the world.
The first APEC Ministerial Meeting was held later that year in Canberra, Australia, which
marked the official establishment of the mechanism.
In November 1991, the third Ministerial Meeting was held in the South Korean capital of
Seoul with the approval of the Seoul APEC Declaration, which finalized APEC's objectives of
developing and strengthening the open multilateral trading system, and reducing barriers to
trade in goods, services and investment.

In 1994, at the Economic Leaders' Meeting in Bogor, Indonesia, the APEC Economic Leaders'
Declaration of Common Resolve was adopted. The declaration pledged APEC's intent to
achieve free and open trade and investment by 2010 for industrialized economies, and 2020
for developing economies.
APEC's institutional framework includes the Economic Leaders' Meeting, the Ministerial
Meeting, the Senior Officials' Meeting, committees and working groups.

The APEC Secretariat, based in Singapore, was established in 1993 to

provide support and services for the forum's activities at various levels.

APEC currently has 21 members, namely Australia, Brunei, Canada,

Chile, China, China's Hong Kong, Chinese Taipei, Indonesia, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia,
Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the United States and Vietnam.
It has three observers -- the ASEAN Secretariat, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council,
and the Pacific Islands Forum.

Nature of APEC’s regionalism

Three unique features of APEC.
1. Open regionalism – EU is an example of closed regionalism. Closed regionalism
means highly institutionalized framework, tight norms. APEC has a minimum
institutional structure.
2. Soft regionalism – bottom up approach. Countries determine voluntary targets.
3. Massive participation by private sector. Another unique feature is that the members
are known as member economies rather than state parties. China as well as Taiwan
and Hong Kong are member economies in APEC.

Features of APEC
Initially it was just for ease of doing business but now it is taking other objectives also, like
non-conventional security threats.
Bogor Goals : in 1994, member countries commited to create free trade area in Asia Pacific.
Developed countries will reach the target by 2010 and developing countries by 2020. (Huge
significance in case of collapse of WTO).

APEC has three pillars

 1. Trade and investment.
2. Business facilitation.
3. Economic and technical cooperation.
It represents 60% of global GDP and 40% of global population.

Future prospects.
It depends upon US-China relations.
It has been suggested that APEC countries should seriously consider India’s membership in
APEC as a balancer to China and as a countervailing force against China.
Why India has not been included so far?
Members think that India is not enough liberalized. India will have to reform the labour laws.
India has to improve on ease of doing business. India has to improve infrastructure, needs
skill development.
Why India is important for APEC?

In the age of global economic slowdown, India is a sweet spot. India is one of the fastest
growing among emerging economies. India is now emerging as a knowledge based
economy. India has become 4th country in Asia, registering for patents. APEC countries can
take advantage of IT sector. India has started implementing trade facilitation agreement of
WTO. India is cutting red tapism by bringing e-governance. India has introduced GST. India’s
ranking in ease of doing business is improving. At present India has stable govt. which brings
certainty of policy.
What will be advantages for India?

 There is a fear of collapse of WTO.

 India has opted out of RCEP
 So far India has FTA with only ASEAN.
India should actively lobby for its membership in APEC otherwise India will be left out.
What is the biggest advantage in APEC?
APEC model – soft regionalism. It is a low risk venture.

What are the prospects?

Poor prospects. APEC countries will expect India to change.
Why poor prospects?
1. Reluctance in India bureaucracy to change.
2. Divisive politics in India
 3. APEC countries want India to liberalize its agricultural sector. In context of farmers
movements, elections, there is hardly any scope.
4. India is fearful because it already has huge trade deficits.
What India should do?

No point being protectionist. Try to be competitive.

What is the ultimate significance?
Joining APEC is a part of India’s grand initiative of Act-East policy. India will become
significant player in the region.

For further reading:

https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-apec-hanging-between-rhetoric-reality-
50561/#:~:text=India's%20growth%20trajectory%20aligns%20with,in%20the%20last%203
0%20years.
APEC Virtual Meet
Why in News

Recently, a virtual meeting of the 21-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum was
held.

The meeting was hosted by Malaysia. New Zealand will also host next year's APEC
meetings virtually due to the pandemic.

Key Points

With growth in the Asia-Pacific region expected to decline by 2.7% this year, from a 3.6%
growth in 2019, APEC's focus was on accelerating economic recovery and developing an affordable
vaccine.
Focus Areas: Trade and investment, Digital Economy and Technology, Structural Reform,
Economic and Technical Cooperation and Thematic and institutional matters.

APEC leaders adopted the Putrajaya Vision 2040, a new 20-year growth vision to
replace the Bogor Goals named after the Indonesian town where leaders agreed in 1994
to free and open trade and investment.
Recognised the importance of a free, open, fair, non-discriminatory, transparent
and predictable trade and investment environment to drive economic recovery at
such a challenging time (Covid-19).
Discussed the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) agenda and the APEC
Internet and Digital Economy Roadmap (AIDER).
China has become the main driving force behind the grouping after the United States
began withdrawing from multilateral bodies during Trump's presidency.

But Trump made the surprise decision to take part in this year's event, after not
participating at APEC since 2017.
China’s Stand:

It vowed to keep its “super-sized” economy open for business and warned against
protectionism as the world battles the Covid-19 pandemic. It needs to be noted that
Trump’s "America First" policy has alienated trading partners.

After the signing of the world’s largest trade pact ‘Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP)’, China is trying to set the agenda for global
commerce.
Although China is promoting openness in trade, its own actions go against it, for
example:

Australian exports of beef, wine and barley to China, their biggest market,
have been restricted.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

 Established: 1989
Members: 21
India is not a Member.
Member Nations: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore,
Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Vietnam and the United States.
Its 21 member economies are home to around 2.8 billion people and represented approximately
59% of world GDP and 49% of world trade in 2015.

India and APEC

India had requested membership in APEC, and received initial support from the United States,
Japan, Australia and Papua New Guinea. Officials have decided not to allow India to join as
India does not border the Pacific Ocean, which all current members do.
India was invited to be an observer for the first time in November 2011.
Reasons for India to join APEC:

India will be more integrated with the global economy since APEC economies constitute an
important trading bloc in the world.
It will help India bargain and negotiate a better deal with the countries of the Asia-Pacific
region.
Expected Benefits to APEC:

In India, APEC will find an alternate market for labour, consumers and investments, and
an additional counterweight to help check unilateral economic ambitions in the region.
It will also help APEC embrace some notion of ‘Indo-Pacific’ and give it a renewed
purpose in a renewed 21st century.

Source:TH

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 Armenia-Azerbaijan Clashes

PSIR,2014

Expected Question – The crisis unfolding between Armenia and Azerbaijan is a product of geo-politics.

The Caucasus
It is a region between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea and mainly occupied by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
and parts of Southern Russia.

Geographically ,it is home to the Caucasus Mountains, including the Greater Caucasus mountain range, which has
historically been considered a natural barrier between Eastern Europe and Western Asia.

Europe's highest mountain, Mount Elbrus, is in the west part of the Greater Caucasus mountain range. On the
southern side, the Lesser Caucasus includes the Javakheti Plateau and the Armenian highlands.

The Caucasus region is separated into two parts, which fall into two continents
1. the North Caucasus of Russia (Ciscaucasia) in Europe, and
2. the South Caucasus (Transcaucasia) in Asia
Core issue of the conflict

Under international law, Nagorno-Karabakh is recognised as part of Azerbaijan. But the ethnic Armenians who make
up the vast majority (95%) of the population reject Azerbaijani rule. They have been running their own affairs, with
support from Armenia, since Azerbaijan’s forces were pushed out in a war in the 1990s.

Nationalism-Ethnic Nationalism of Armenia against territorial nationalism of Azerbaijan

For some it is a conflict emerging out of geo-economics and geo-politics.

History of the conflict

2
Post First World War, the ottoman empire
withdrew from the South Caucasus. The
British temporarily filled the vacuum but
failed to solve the ethnic tensions, which
led to an open war between Armenia and
Azerbaijan in 1920.

During the war , the Bolshevik

revolutionaries took over Azerbaijan and
Armenia. Nagorno-Karabakh at that time
was 90% Armenian.

What did soviet do with the Nagorno-

karabakh region?
It decided to give Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous province to Azerbaijan,
despite protests from Armenia.

As long as the Soviet Union remained

strong, the region had been relatively
peaceful. But with the Soviet power
receding in the late 1980s, the ethnic frictions started resurfacing.

In 1988, the regional assembly of Nagorno-Karabakh passed a resolution to cancel its autonomous status and join
Armenia. Azerbaijan opposed this move, leading to violent clashes.

When Azerbaijan and Armenia became independent countries, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in 1991,
the tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh led to an open war. The ethnic Armenian rebels of Nagorno-Karabakh, backed
by the Armenian government, fought Azerbaijan for years. A ceasefire was reached in 1994 but Armenia and
Azerbaijan failed to reach a peace agreement.

Why fresh conflict?

The absence of peacekeeping forces in the area has contributed to the regular exchanges of fire that the region has
seen since 1994.

The current clashes were prompted by Azerbaijan in a bid to reclaim some territories that are currently occupied by
separatist Armenians.

Baku wants four UN Security Council resolutions on the Karabakh issue to be implemented . These resolutions call
for ending hostilities and the withdrawal of all occupying forces of Armenia and peaceful resolution to the
conflict.

This is also being seen as an attempt to diverge people’s attention from domestics problems emerging out of falling
oil prices, the COVID-19 pandemic, problems with political prisoners, yet now it unites behind this call.

Turkey, under Erdogan, has been the major force behind adventurism of Baku.

3
 1.Armenia
Stakeholders in the conflict
Azerbaijan

Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region

External players (Regional and non regional)

The Minsk Group - A mediation effort led by the

Economic Significance of the region Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
It is an important transit route for the supply (OSCE), was created in 1994 to address the dispute and is
of oil and natural gas to the European Union co-chaired by the United States, France, and Russia. The
and Central Aisa .Azerbaijan produces about group has successfully negotiated cease-fires, but the
eight hundred thousand barrels of oil per territorial issues remain as intractable .
day. In October 2017, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan
met in Geneva under the auspices of the Minsk Group,
Interests of regional players - Russia , Iran beginning a series of talks on a possible settlement of the
and Turkey – conflict. However, talks have yet to produce concrete
results.
Russia
According to some ,Moscow wants to keep
alive conflicts in the former Soviet Union,
such as those in Moldova, the Crimea in
Ukraine, and Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia. After fomenting such conflicts, Moscow is able to step in as a
“guarantor of peace and stability” and thereby maintain its influence and control.

Also provides market for Russian Weapons .It supplies arms to both countries

However, an alternate opinion also believes that Moscow is interested in the stability in the South Caucasus region
as it is already involved in various conflicts in Syria, Lebanon, and is forced to keep the situation in Belarus under its
control, where protest actions are continuing.

Russia is in a military alliance with Armenia called the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and has two
bases in Armenia.

Turkey
Turkey has as one of its foremost strategic objectives the strengthening of its positions in the Caucasus and Central
Asia by deepening economic, political, and even military relations with the five Turkic-speaking former Soviet
republics: Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan

Turkey – Azerbaijan convergence occurs over

1. Muslim-majority population and shared Turkic culture and language .
2. The primary strategic goal of Azerbaijan is to strengthen its independence by building and exploiting the
oil and gas pipelines that bypass Russia, and to provide economic and military security to its province of
Nakhichevan (a small territory bordered on three sides by Armenia).
4
In 1991, Turkey became the first country to recognise Azerbaijan’s independence and has recently declared its
unconditional support to it.

Azerbaijan and Turkey signed an Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual support in 2010 under which both
agree to support each other "using all possibilities" in the case of military aggression against either.

Russia and Turkey were rivals during the Ottoman Empire and Cold War eras . Both back opposite sides in the civil
wars playing out in Syria and Libya.

Shifting theatre of Islamic war – Turkey is allegedly moving Syrian fighters in this conflict. Armenia on the other
hand is accused of using Kurdish militias from Iraq and syria.

Iran
It shares borders with both and thus want a peaceful solution as early as possible. Tehran is also apprehensive
about any non-resident power intervening in the region . Iran is home to about 30 million ethnic Azerbaijanis – the
largest ethnic group in Iran, and possibly one of the most influential.

Iran was a mediator during 1992 conflict.

Israel
Israel too have close ties with Azerbaijan and sell arms and imports oil and natural gas .

Interests of non-regional powers

France

Amenian diaspora in USA and France has mobilised support for Armenia.

France, which along with the U.S. is a co-chair of the Minsk Group, is currently using a hard-discourse in its foreign
policy, unlike other members of the European Union. French President Emmanuel Macron's administration wants to
play an active role in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya.

Moreover, Paris aims to increase cooperation against Ankara and limit Turkey.

USA
The has urged two countries “to cease hostilities immediately, to use the existing direct communication links
between them to avoid further escalation, and to avoid unhelpful rhetoric and actions.”

Washington's agenda is different from previous years.

According to U.S. President Donald Trump, regional countries should find solutions to regional problems. Trump
believes regional nations should pay the cost of crises in their neighbourhoods.

Trump administration did not want a new problem before the November election. Thus, the White House did nothing
except call for a cease-fire.

5
US’s passive approach on Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict is being seen as its pursuit to international disengagement.
USA does not want to infuriate oil-rich Azerbaijan but at the same time it is unable to put much pressure on Armenia
due to the influence of the lobby in Washington.

EU

There are only two export routes for hydrocarbons. One is northwest through Russia; the other southwest across the
Caucasus. Any widening conflict could endanger both them and Europe's hopes of tapping the Caspian region to
reduce its dependence upon Russian energy sources. Under its Southern Gas Corridor strategy, the EU hopes to add
an additional 10 billion cubic meters of Caspian gas.

Nagorno-Karabakh and India

Visible asymmetry in India’s relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan.

1. Armenia is the only country in the region with which India has a friendship and cooperation Treaty (signed in
1995), which, incidentally, would prohibit India from providing military or any other assistance to Azerbaijan.
2. India has received three heads of states from Armenia, but none from Azerbaijan.
3. Armenia extends its unequivocal support to India on Kashmir issue whereas Azerbaijan not only supports but
also promotes Pakistan’s narrative on this issue.
4. The levels of India’s trade or investment with Armenia are, however, very low. In the case of Azerbaijan,
ONGC/OVL have made small investments in an oilfield project in Azerbaijan and GAIL is exploring the
possibilities of cooperation in LNG.

6
5. Azerbaijan falls on the International North South Transport Corridor route, connecting India with Russia
through Central Asia; it can also connect India with Turkey and beyond through Baku-Tbilisi-Kars passenger and
freight rail link.

On the whole, India’s stakes in the region can be assessed as more or less peripheral.

India’s position on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

India does not have a publicly articulated policy for the South Caucasus. The region has remained on the periphery
of its foreign policy radar.

In the initial stages of the conflict in 1993, India had endorsed the concept of respect for territorial integrity.

For quite some time now, India’s emphasis has been on a peaceful resolution of the conflict through diplomatic
negotiations.

India has every reason not to support Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity as Azerbaijan has shown scant regard for
India’s territorial integrity violated by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir.

Howevern India’s endorsement of Nagorno-Karabakh’s right for self-determination may have repercussions on
Kashmir and may re-ignite secessionist movement in other parts of India.

Thus New Delhi has adopted a balanced and neutral stance , calling for restraint and immediate cessation of
hostilities and resolution of the conflict peacefully through diplomatic negotiations.

India has also expressed its support for the OSCE Minsk Group’s continued efforts towards peaceful resolution,
implying that India is not in favour of involvement of any other entity, including Turkey.

Conclusion

Military victory does not necessarily bring peace; Israel’s victory in the Six Day War in 1967, for example, only led to
a generation of war and resistance.

Both sides must look to the future instead of the past.

The implementation of the four UN Security Council resolutions can be a starter for resolving the dispute.

Only a settlement guaranteeing Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over the region, with de facto Karabakh Armenian
control, has a chance of sustainable solution. . This could perhaps be the beginning of an understanding of new forms
of state sovereignty and self-rule, forms that are more appropriate in a post–nation-state era.

7
Why in News -
Frozen Conflict
erupted in
Autumn 2020
At the heart of the conflict
was the Nagorno-Karabakh
region. It is recognised as
part of Azerbaijan, but it is
controlled by ethnic
Armenians.
The two countries fought a
bloody war over the region
in the late 1980s and early
1990s, and it has been the
trigger for further violence
in the years since.
Caucasus is a strategically important mountainous region in south-
east Europe. For centuries, different powers in the region - both
Christian and Muslim - have vied for control there.

Modern-day Armenia and Azerbaijan became part of the Soviet

Union when it formed in the 1920s. Nagorno-Karabakh was an
ethnic-majority Armenian region, but the Soviets gave control over
the area to Azerbaijani authorities.
Armenia is majority Christian while Azerbaijan
is majority Muslim. Turkey has close ties to
Azerbaijan, while Russia is allied with Armenia -
although it also has good relations with
Azerbaijan.
 Peace
talksmediated by
the OSCE, Minsk
Group  1992 and
chaired by France,
Russia and the
United States.
Latest conflict  27 September till November
A Russian-brokered peace deal
Azerbaijan holds on to several areas that it
gained control of during the conflict and
Armenia will withdraw troops from them.
Almost 2,000 Russian peacekeepers will monitor
the truce.
The peace agreement as a triumph of
Russia

The geopolitical situation shifted in the

South Caucasus Western nations losing
their political influence in the region.

Turkey now seems to be filling the void

left by both the United States and the
European Union.
 The situation
Turkey is
seems complex
Russian attempting to
amid Washington’s
domination in the build its
geopolitical
region is perilous independent
pursuits
to U.S. position as a
throughout the
regional power
South Caucasus.
Tehran shapes its geopolitical ties with the two nations
differently. Christian-majority Armenia enjoys friendly
relations with neighboring Iran that offers a visa-free
regime for its citizens.
There were some skirmishes between Azerbaijan and Iran.

Another impediment to cooperation between these two is

the U.S.-Israel-Azerbaijan military partnership, which is
something Tehran cannot accept.
Georgia is another country being
indirectly entangled in the clash.

As energy commodities are of top

strategic importance, perhaps Baku will
not build new pipelines running
through Armenia, a country hostile to
the strategic interests of Azerbaijan.
 ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional grouping that promotes
economic, political, and security cooperation among its ten members: Brunei, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
ASEAN countries have a total population of 650 million people and a combined gross
domestic product (GDP) of $2.8 trillion. The group has played a central role in Asian
economic integration, spearheading negotiations among Asia-Pacific nations to form one of
the world’s largest free trade blocs and signing six free trade agreements with other regional
economies.

Yet experts say ASEAN’s impact is limited by a lack of strategic vision, diverging priorities
among member states, and weak leadership. The bloc’s biggest challenge, they say, is
developing a unified approach to China, particularly in response to Beijing’s claims in the
South China Sea, which overlap with claims of several ASEAN members.
How ASEAN Works
ASEAN is headed by a chair—a position that rotates annually among member states—and is
assisted by a secretariat based in Jakarta, Indonesia. Important decisions are usually reached
through consultation and consensus guided by the principles of non-interference in internal
affairs and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Some experts see this approach to decision-
making as a chief drawback for the organization. These norms of consensus and non-
interference have increasingly become outdated, and they have hindered ASEAN’s influence
on issues ranging from dealing with China and crises in particular ASEAN states.
ASEAN has contributed to regional stability by developing much-needed norms and fostering
a neutral environment to address shared challenges.

ASEAN’s History

Formed in 1967, ASEAN united Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand,
which sought to create a common front against the spread of communism and promote
political, economic, and social stability amid rising tensions in the Asia-Pacific. In 1976, the
members signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which emphasizes
mutual respect and non-interference in other countries’ affairs.
Membership doubled by the end of the 1990s. The resolution of Cambodia’s civil war in
1991, the end of the Cold War, and the normalization of relations between the United States
and Vietnam in 1995 brought relative peace to mainland Southeast Asia, paving the way for
more states to join ASEAN. With the addition of Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos and
Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999), the group started to launch initiatives to boost
regionalism. The members signed a treaty in 1995, for example, to refrain from developing,
acquiring, or possessing nuclear weapons.

Faced with the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which started in Thailand, ASEAN members
pushed to further integrate their economies. The Chiang Mai Initiative , for instance, was a
currency swap arrangement first initiated in 2000 between ASEAN members, China, Japan,
and South Korea to provide financial support to one another and fight currency speculation.

In 2007, the ten members adopted the ASEAN Charter , a constitutional document that
provided the grouping with legal status and an institutional framework. The charter
enshrines core principles and delineates requirements for membership. (East Timor
submitted an application for membership in 2011 but not all members back its accession.)
The charter laid out a blueprint for a community made up of three branches: the ASEAN
Economic Community (AEC), the ASEAN Political-Security Community, and the ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Community.
Economic Progress
ASEAN has made notable progress toward economic integration and free trade in the region.
In 1992, members created the ASEAN Free Trade Area with the goals of creating a single
market, increasing intra-ASEAN trade and investments, and attracting foreign investment.
Intra-ASEAN trade as a share of the bloc’s overall trade grew from about 19 percent in 1993
to 23 percent in 2017. Across the grouping, more than 90 percent of goods are traded with
no tariffs. The bloc has prioritized eleven sectors for integration, including electronics,
automotives, rubber-based products, textiles and apparels, agro-based products, and
tourism.

Despite the progress, some of the region’s most important industries are not covered by
preferential trade measures, and differences in income among members could make
economic integration challenging. Some experts see the AEC, through which ASEAN defines
its trade goals, as a potential catalyst for further economic integration.

In November 2020, ASEAN members joined Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South
Korea in signing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a free trade
agreement they had been negotiating since 2012. Although the RCEP doesn’t cut tariffs
drastically, it covers more of the world’s population—30 percent—than any other trade bloc.
It will also help boost economic integration between Northeast and Southeast Asia. India,
which was initially involved in negotiations, decided in 2019 that it would not join. ASEAN is
also party to six free trade agreements with countries outside of the grouping.

Regional Security Challenges

Security challenges include maritime disputes, such as in the South China Sea, human
trafficking, narcotics trafficking, refugee flows, natural disasters, food insecurity, and
terrorism and insurgencies. While the vast majority of issues are dealt with outside of
ASEAN, including bilaterally or with outside moderation, there are several ASEAN-led forums
through which regional issues are discussed:

ASEAN Regional Forum. Launched in 1993, the twenty-seven-member multilateral grouping

was developed to facilitate regional confidence-building and preventive diplomacy on
political and security issues. The forum represents a wide array of voices—including ASEAN,
its dialogue partners, North Korea, and Pakistan, among others—yet it is often mired in
geopolitical disputes that limit its effectiveness.
ASEAN Plus Three. The consultative group, which was initiated in 1997, brings together
ASEAN’s ten members, China, Japan, and South Korea.

ASEAN Plus Six. This group consists of ASEAN’s ten members plus Australia, China, India,
Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. It played a central role in pushing forward the RCEP.

East Asia Summit. First held in 2005, the summit seeks to promote security and prosperity
and is often attended by the heads of state of ASEAN members, Australia, China, India,
Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. “The summit remains the
only opportunity for the president of the United States to sit down and collectively engage
his Asia-Pacific counterparts on the main political and security issues of the day,” wrote the
U.S. Institute of Peace’s Vikram Singh and the Brookings Institution’s Lindsey Ford. However,
U.S. President Donald J. Trump has never attended an East Asia Summit.

Amid the coronavirus pandemic and subsequent economic crisis in 2020, ASEAN countries set
up several bodies and mechanisms to procure medical supplies, distribute a COVID-19
vaccine, coordinate economic recovery plans, and facilitate the safe resumption of regional
travel.

Despite these diplomatic forums, disagreements over security issues continue to challenge
ASEAN’s unity. The group’s most glaring issue has been finding a joint response to the rise of
China. China’s re-emergence as the major power in the East Asia region is not only likely to
transform Southeast Asia’s relations with China, but also perhaps the internal relations of
ASEAN itself.
Maritime disputes in the South China Sea have been among the biggest irritants. Brunei,
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam claim features in waters contested with
China. For those countries, China’s moves to reclaim land and build artificial islands are seen
as violations of their national sovereignty. In response, some have invested in modernizing
their militaries. For other ASEAN members, tensions in the South China Sea are
geographically distant and not a priority. A few, such as Cambodia, even tend to support
China’s claims. In 2002, ASEAN and China signed the nonbinding Declaration of Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea. Efforts to make it a legally binding code of conduct have
regained momentum in recent years, with Beijing voicing support for reaching an agreement
by 2022.

The United States, which has a strong interest in preventing China from controlling the South
China Sea, has responded by continuing military cooperation with ASEAN members,
including the Philippines and Vietnam, and increasing its maritime presence to enforce
freedom of navigation in international waters.

ASEAN members have been divided over their ties to China and to the United States. The
region is in need of investment, trade, and infrastructure development, and China has moved
to fill these needs. But ASEAN members are anxious about becoming economically
dependent on China; in turn, these nations look to the United States to hedge.

Way Forward
ASEAN brings together countries with significantly different economies and political systems.
Singapore boasts the highest GDP per capita among the group’s members at more than
$65,000 based on 2019 World Bank figures; Myanmar’s is the lowest at around $1,400. The
members’ political systems include democracies, authoritarian states, and hybrid regimes.
Demographics differ across the region, too, with many religious and ethnic groups
represented. ASEAN’s geography includes archipelagos and continental land masses with
low plains and mountainous terrain.

Given such diversity among its members, the bloc remains divided over how to address many
issues, including China’s claims in the South China Sea, human rights abuses, including ethnic
cleansing against the Rohingya minority in Myanmar, and political repression in member
states such as Cambodia.
Some experts have suggested that ASEAN reimagine its framework and decision-making
practices. It is recommended substantive changes to ASEAN that could help it lead economic
and political integration efforts in Asia. These include strengthening its secretariat and
empowering a high-profile secretary-general to speak on its behalf, abandoning consensus
decision-making, and demonstrating that ASEAN can build its own free trade area. Others,
such as CSIS’s Hiebert, see the organization thriving under a coalition-of-the-willing format,
in which some of the group’s members could decide to act on certain issues, such as joint
maritime patrol initiatives, and others could join later.

Difference in approach of EU and ASEAN

1. EU is intrusive (it imposes lot of conditionalities) on member countries even in
domestic sphere. ASEAN follow ASEAN way. It is based on Panchsheel – Non
interference in domestic affairs and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
2. EU is supranational (having power that transcends national boundaries.), ASEAN is
international.
3. EU has introduced qualified majority whereas ASEAN follows consensus based
approach.
4. Both EU and ASEAN are communities. ASEAN has not gone for single currency
model, they have currency swap arrangement.
5. In one way ASEAN is more advanced than EU. EU still does not have its charter,
ASEAN has its own charter.
6. Both EU and ASEAN have been the stabilizing forces in their regions.

Comparison between ASEAN and SAARC

1. Both are examples of the regional integration in third world.
2. If ASEAN is the most advanced example, SAARC is the worst example of regional
integration. According to former foreign secretary S Jaishankar, SAARC is a
jammed vehicle. According to C Rajamohan, Pakistan is a camel in the carvaan of
SAARC, which slows down the traffic.

India and ASEAN relations

If there is any region where India punches beyond its weight, it is South East Asia. Look East /
Act East proved to be the most successful initiative of South Block. Today India is well placed
in the economic architecture as well as the security architecture in the region. India has been
inducted into East Asia Summit even before US and Russia. A lot of credit goes to ASEAN
countries in giving such centrality to India in Asia Pacific.

What is the significance of ASEAN in Asia Pacific?

ASEAN is called as the nucleus of Asia Pacific. ASEAN is also called as the gateway of India to
the region. We should not ignore the fact that center of gravity of international politics and
economy has shifted in the Asia Pacific region. ASEAN is the biggest ally of India in the
region.
Timeline of India ASEAN relations.
1967 – When ASEAN was formed and India was invited to be a part of the initiative, India
ignored ASEAN
After the end of cold war, as India lost USSR and opened up its economy, there was no
positive environment in immediate neighbourhood, India had to look towards the extended
neighbourhood. If South Asia forms the first mandal, South East Asia and West Asia come in
the second concentric circle.

1992 – India became sectoral dialogue partner. Same year Pakistan also became sectoral
dialogue partner.
1996 – India became full dialogue partner.
2002 – India’s status was elevated and India became summit level partner.
ASEAN invited India to be a part of all of its initiatives like ASEAN regional forum, East Asia
Summit, ADMM+ and RCEP.
2012 – India and ASEAN have become strategic partners. It is to be noted that Pakistan
continues to be sectoral dialogue partner.
2010 – India entered into its first and only regional trading agreement with any block. (AIFTA
– ASEAN India Free Trade Area).
2015 – India ASEAN free trade agreement in services.
Significance. There is huge imbalance in India ASEAN trade, which is tilted towards ASEAN.
Inclusion of services will play in bringing the balance in the trade.
ASEAN is India's fourth largest trading partner with about $86.9 Bn in trade between India
and the ten ASEAN nations
India and ASEAN are also involved in sub regional initiatives like Mekong Ganga
Cooperation. India and Thailand are working together for the advancement of CLMV
countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam), LDCs of the region. (China also has a similar
initiative known as GMR – Greater Mekong Region.)

Mekong Ganga initiative has been India’s strategic initiative to weaken the initiative of
China. It was formed in year 2000. The four pillars of cooperation have been education,
culture, tourism, transport and communication. Like all other Indian initiatives, it has also
been languishing. Thailand became too disappointed and launched its own initiative
(Irrawaddy Chaophraya). Modi govt. has given a new lease of life to the platform. In 2016, a
plan of action was adopted to expand cooperation in infrastructure, IT, pharmaceuticals and
intermediate goods. India has given $2bn LoC to CMLV countries. Mekong and Ganga are
known as civilizational rivers, there is huge influence of India in the region, India should give
strategic view to the region which is a land bridge to connect further with South East Asia.
Connectivity is the thrust area. The two major projects involving India are Kaladan
Multimodal Transit and Transport Project.
India Myanmar Thailand trilateral highway which will start in Moreh (Manipur), Bagan
(Myanmar), Maesot (Thailand).

Kaladan Multimodal Project.

It is a $500mn project, connecting Kolkata to Sittwe port of Myanmar. Then through Kaladan
river to Paletwa in Chin region of Myanmar. Then via road route to Aizawl in Mizoram. It is
expected to operationalized by 2020.
It will reduce distance of 1880 km to mere 900 km to Aizawl from Kolkata.
However the route of the project along Kaladan river and Paletwa port is troubled with Chin
conflict, Rohingya conflict and some militant groups.

The India–Myanmar–Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway (Friendship Highway)

It is a highway under construction that will connect Moreh, India with Mae Sot, Thailand via
Myanmar. The road is expected to boost trade and commerce in the ASEAN–India Free Trade
Area, as well as with the rest of Southeast Asia. India has also proposed extending the
highway to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. The proposed approx 3,200 km (2,000 mi) route
from India to Vietnam is known as the East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC).

The 17th ASEAN- India Summit, 2020

The Summit saw Prime Minister Modi highlighting the Indo-Pacific region. That’s because a
cohesive, responsive and prosperous ASEAN is seen as vital to India's Indo-Pacific Vision and
to Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR). India’s decision to opt out of RCEP,
even when all ASEAN member countries are signatories to that agreement, will mark a shift
in how India enhances bilateral engagements with ASEAN nations with greater strategic
intent.
The ASEAN India Strategic Partnership is an important part of India’s Act East Policy,
especially since India has chosen not to join the recently signed Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP).
The PM Modi gave primacy to the Indo-Pacific region. That’s because a cohesive, responsive
and prosperous ASEAN is seen as vital to India’s Indo-Pacific Vision and to Security And
Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR).

On trade and investment, India emphasised the need for regional value chains (RVCs) – a
factor that influenced India’s withdrawal from RCEP which was finally launched on 15
November 2020. India now needs to push for a suitable review of the India ASEAN FTA and
to secure its vital interests in services using reciprocity appropriately. That may help a more
balanced trade regime and facilitate new cross investments in resilient supply chains. The
cohesive and responsive ASEAN that PM spoke about must also cover trade and investment
issues.

In pursuit of a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific region India looked for an
alignment between the 2019 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific Oceans
Initiative, which the PM announced at the same summit last year. The Indo-Pacific Oceans’
Initiative is based on sustainable development goal 14 (SDG 14) and proposes a safe, secure
and stable maritime domain. India also brought up the fight against terrorism.

India addressed the challenges in the South China Sea directly and asking for a rules-based
order in the region, upholding adherence to international law, especially the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Despite assertions by many that the South
China Sea must be governed by UNCLOS and the freedom of third parties to operate, it is
evident that the draft Code of Conduct (COC) which China is negotiating with ASEAN
excludes these vital elements and seeks ASEAN concurrence to make China the hegemon of
the South China Sea as it has physically become. As ASEAN hedged, it was Chinese PM Li
who pushed for an early conclusion of the COC in an effort to bring forward the 2021
timeline! ASEAN is uncomfortable with the direction that the COC is taking and has used the
COVID-19 pandemic as the reason to avoid discussion virtually.

With respect to the COVID-19 pandemic, PM Modi announced a contribution of $1 million to

the COVID-19 ASEAN Response Fund. Hopefully, this will form the basis of larger exports of
related medicines and medical equipment from India to ASEAN countries.

To support physical and digital connectivity the PM reiterated the offer of a $1 billion line of
credit (LOC) which has not been utilised for several years. There does not appear to be a
cogent policy pursued for this by Indian companies nor do ASEAN members see this as more
attractive than what is offered by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

However, the demands for connectivity are immense and it is best if India uses the
partnership with Japan and Australia to create a suitable project, like a strategic port, in
ASEAN. It must, however, take into consideration the relatively slow implementation of the
U.S.–Japan-–Australia Infrastructural Trilateral initiative in the region which reveals the
difficulties in undertaking coordinated projects in third countries.

While India stays the course and supports ASEAN Centrality, its patience wearing thin due to
lack of appropriate ASEAN responsibility for its own region. ASEAN is struggling to deal with
China as well as the growing interest in the Indo Pacific. The Quad is seen as a challenge to
ASEANs sentiments as it forces ASEAN to consider dealing with Chinese intrusions more
robustly.

Due to COVID-19, countries are redefining their sense of national security. The focus on
strategic autonomy with an emphasis on resilient supply chains could be a robust
movement. India has steadfastly grown its bilateral engagement with select ASEAN
members like Indonesia, Vietnam and most recently Philippines.Cooperation against
terrorism and in defence has been initiated more robustly.

As Asia looks for multipolarity, developing relations with individual ASEAN members with
matching security concerns is bound to acquire importance for India.
 RCEP

RCEP was originally being negotiated between 16 countries — ASEAN members and
countries with which they have free trade agreements (FTAs), namely Australia, China,
Korea, Japan, New Zealand and India.
The purpose of RCEP was to make it easier for products and services of each of these
countries to be available across this region. Negotiations to chart out this deal had been on
since 2013, and India was expected to be a signatory until its decision last November.
Why did India walk out?
India decided to exit discussions over “significant outstanding issues”. According to a
government official, India had been “consistently” raising “fundamental issues” and
concerns throughout the negotiations and was prompted to take this stand as they had not
been resolved by the deadline to commit to signing the deal. Its decision was to safeguard
the interests of industries like agriculture and dairy and to give an advantage to the
country’s services sector. According to officials, the current structure of RCEP still does not
address these issues and concerns.
China factor
Escalating tensions with China are a major reason for India’s decision. While China’s
participation in the deal had already been proving difficult for India due to various economic
threats, the clash at Galwan Valley has soured relations between the two countries. The
various measures India has taken to reduce its exposure to China would have sat
uncomfortably with its commitments under RCEP.

Major issues that were unresolved during RCEP negotiations were related to the exposure
that India would have to China. This included India’s fears that there were “inadequate”
protections against surges in imports. It felt there could also be a possible circumvention of
rules of origin— the criteria used to determine the national source of a product — in the
absence of which some countries could dump their products by routing them through other
countries that enjoyed lower tariffs.
India was unable to ensure countermeasures like an auto-trigger mechanism to raise tariffs
on products when their imports crossed a certain threshold. It also wanted RCEP to exclude
most-favoured nation (MFN) obligations from the investment chapter, as it did not want to
hand out, especially to countries with which it has border disputes, the benefits it was giving
to strategic allies or for geopolitical reasons. India felt the agreement would force it to
extend benefits given to other countries for sensitive sectors like defence to all RCEP
members.
RCEP also lacked clear assurance over market access issues in countries such as China and
non-tariff barriers on Indian companies.

Cost to India
There are concerns that India’s decision would impact its bilateral trade ties with RCEP
member nations, as they may be more inclined to focus on bolstering economic ties within
the bloc. The move could potentially leave India with less scope to tap the large market
that RCEP presents —the size of the deal is mammoth, as the countries involved account for
over 2 billion of the world’s population.
Given attempts by countries like Japan to get India back into the deal, there are also worries
that India’s decision could impact the Australia-India-Japan network in the Indo-Pacific. It
could potentially put a spanner in the works on informal talks to promote a Supply Chain
Resilience Initiative among the three.
However, India’s stance on the deal also comes as a result of learnings from unfavourable
trade balances that it has with several RCEP members, with some of which it even has FTAs.

India has trade deficits with 11 of the 15 RCEP countries, and some experts feel that India
has been unable to leverage its existing bilateral free trade agreements with several RCEP
members to increase exports.

Way forward :
India, as an original negotiating participant of RCEP, has the option of joining the
agreement without having to wait 18 months as stipulated for new members in the terms
of the pact. RCEP signatory states said they plan to commence negotiations with India once
it submits a request of its intention to join the pact “in writing”, and it may participate in
meetings as an observer prior to its accession.

However, the possible alternative that India may be exploring is reviews of its existing
bilateral FTAs with some of these RCEP members as well as newer agreements with other
markets with potential for Indian exports. Over 20 negotiations are underway.

India currently has agreements with members like the ASEAN bloc, South Korea and Japan
and is negotiating agreements with members like Australia and New Zealand. Two reviews
of the India-Singapore CECA have been completed; the India-Bhutan Agreement on Trade
Commerce and Transit was renewed in 2016; and the India-Nepal Treaty of Trade was
extended in 2016. Eight rounds of negotiations have been completed for the review of the
India-Korea CEPA, which began in 2016. India has taken up the review of the India-Japan
CEPA and India-ASEAN FTA with its trading partners.
Look East Policy of India

Initiated in 1991, it marked strategic shift in India’s perspective of world. Under last
government, it was changed from Look East to Act East.

Recently, at the 2018 edition of the Shangri La Dialogue, PM

Narendra Modi in his keynote address emphasized the centrality
of ASEAN to the newly emerging geopolitical construct of the
Indo-Pacific.
He also shared India’s vision of an inclusive, rules-based order taking shape in the region,
which, he concluded, is large enough to amicably accommodate the rise of all the
stakeholders.
1. India’s historical and cultural linkages with region.
2. Hinduism and Buddhism. Non assertive conversion.
3. India helped in decolonization of SEA. But couldn’t do much during Cold War.
4. Several connectivity projects like Kaladan, Friendship Highway etc.
5. Large Indian diaspora in the region.
6. Culture, Commerce, Connectivity : PM Modi. Allocation of $1bn for physical and
digital connectivity.

From Look East to Act East

China’s growing assertiveness in the region undercuts India’s historical tradition of economic
and political non-alignment.
Until the end of the Cold War Indian economic policy was driven by protectionism . India’s
position of economic isolation began to be dismantled following the end of the Cold War,
especially via the 1991 liberalization reforms introduced by then-PM Narsimha Rao and his
Finance Minister Manmohan Singh.
A substantial part of these liberalization programs aimed to integrate India into the
economic markets of Southeast Asia via the ‘Look East Policy’ (LEP) announced by Rao in
1991. ‘Looking East’ towards the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Rao
hoped, would allow India to replicate the “economic miracle” some ASEAN and East Asian
countries had performed in the decades prior. In the pursuit of an economic “miracle”, India
significantly reduced its trade barriers to deregulate its domestic import and export markets,
and ASEAN consequently emerged as one of India’s most important trading markets. Since
then, the politico-economic integration of India and ASEAN has been further
institutionalized: India became ASEAN’s dialogue partner in 1996, a summit level partner in
2002, and a free trade agreement (AIFTA) was signed in 2010 before the relation was
upgraded to a strategic partnership in 2012. India is now also a member of regional forums
such as the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum, reflecting the deepening
political ties between India and ASEAN and India’s growing significance in the regional
economic architecture.

In line with a nationalist discourse, PM Narendra Modi ambitiously announced in 2014 that
India would start to not only ‘look’ East, but also to ‘act’ East. Based on the three C’s
(Culture, Commerce, and Connectivity), India’s ‘Act East Policy’ (AEP) aims to deepen India’s
given connectivity with Southeast Asia and expand India’s economic and political integration
into East Asia and the Pacific as a whole via a set of bilateral and multilateral economic and
political arrangements. Crucially, the AEP also incorporates a variety of security-related
arrangements that deepen India’s security policy cooperation with regional partners and
interlinks the geostrategies of India with that of other regional actors by ‘coupling’ the
geographical sphere of the Indian Ocean with that of the Pacific.
AEP seeks to address the LEP’s shortcomings and diverges from the LEP in its regional scope
and its security-related initiatives vis-à-vis China. As such, the AEP can be conceptualized as
a reconfiguration of India’s geostrategic posture and aims to establish a counterweight to
China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the Asia-Pacific as a whole. The
necessity to counterbalance China in the Indian and Pacific Ocean is particularly apparent in
consideration of the recent border clashes and Beijing’s sustained territorial claims over
Arunachal Pradesh. In practical terms, the AEP positions New Delhi in political opposition to
China and marks the convergence between Indian security interests and those formulated in
the American-Japanese discourse of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), thus potentially
leading to a further strategic convergence between India and other regional security actors.

The LEP and its Economic Impact

The increased market integration of Indian and Southeast Asian economies has played a key
role in India’s economic rise: in 1991, the total trade volume between ASEAN and India
accounted for $2 billion - by 2017/2018, the trade volume had grown to $72 billion.
Cooperation with ASEAN can be discerned as particularly desirable given India’s
geographical proximity with ASEAN, the emergence of ASEAN as a demographically-
economically expanding and increasingly prosperous consumer market, and the partially
comparable stages of economic development that facilitate the processing of integration on
equal politico-economic terms. India furthermore shares religious and cultural affiliations
with many ASEAN States and possesses significant links to large diaspora communities in
countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia, which can aid in facilitating further connectivity.

Although the LEP has contributed to India’s economic development, it has also exhibited
limitations in the extent to which it enables integration. Firstly, the distributional impact of
economic liberalization reforms within India has been highly unequitable. India’s north
east has remained excluded from the economic benefits of this process.
Secondly, the LEP has been successful in enhancing the trade connectivity between ASEAN
and India in terms of imports from ASEAN and, to a lesser extent, improving Indian exports
to ASEAN. Over time, India has grown more dependent on ASEAN markets than vice versa,
which is epitomized by the differing import/export share rates. As a result, India’s trade
balance with ASEAN has developed negatively. Increasing trade deficit marks a worrying
trend for India .

Equally worrying is India’s economic performance in the region relative to its geopolitical
competitor in Beijing. Whilst China’s investment in the region has multiplied , which also
correlates to China’s surging investment in the context of the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI),
India’s has either stagnated or decreased. What is more is that China’s trade footprint in the
region is likely to amplify in the years and decades to come due to the enhanced connectivity
of the BRI, which India has remained opposed to and thus excluded from. To be sure, if
successful, the BRI is likely to produce trade volumes that will significantly exceed India’s
already wavering extent of regional integration and trade.
Factors limiting India’s connectivity:

 Firstly, India has maintained fairly high tariff levels, which has culminated in the
sustenance of trade barriers that hinder further integration and epitomizes the
influence of prior, protection-based policies.
 The lack of physical trade and network infrastructure .
 The connectivity of India’s NER is also detrimentally impacted by domestic political
volatility as the NER has been historically plagued by separatist movements.
 The organised crimes in the region have contributed to a volatile political and
financial environment that undermines safe returns on investments and therefore
constrains the NER’s development.

The LEP was originally designed as a trade policy that furthered India’s integration into
the global and regional economy, and whilst the positive economic impact of the LEP
has been undeniable, it appears to have reached its limits in terms of the extent of
integration it can facilitate.
 Moreover, integration has been predominantly of economical nature, and not of political
nature, and the efficacy of the LEP in enhancing connectivity is limited by a series of
economic, infrastructural, and partially security-related factors, which the Act East Policy
seeks to address.

Act East
The AEP was first announced by Indian PM Modi at a regional summit in Myanmar in 2014,
where he suggested that "A new era of economic development, industrialisation and trade
has begun in India. Externally, India's 'Look East Policy' has become 'Act East Policy’”. Since
then, PM Modi has reiterated India’s intent to ‘act East’ on numerous occasions and has
described ASEAN as the “anchor” of the AEP. Importantly, the AEP is, comparable to the
LEP, not a policy that has been put into legislation, but an overarching strategy that marks
a transformation in how India addresses the shortcomings of the LEP and the geopolitical
challenges of the 21st century, especially in regards to China.
To address the inequitable domestic distributional implications and trade limitations, the
AEP emphasizes the need to link the NER with Southeast Asia as the poor infrastructural
connectivity is a major impediment in how well India connects to its eastern partners. The
India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway seeks to address this issue: the transport
network, agreed on in 2009, will connect the Indian town of Moreh in Manipur to Mandalay
in Myanmar to Western Thailand. Within Thailand, rail networks connect the transport
chains to the East to Bangkok and to the South to Malaysia and Singapore, making Thailand
subsequently operate as a distribution point for further trade networks that connect India to
Southeast Asian markets, thereby reducing India’s reliance on maritime traffic and choke
points such as the Malacca Strait and the Lombok Strait. In the context of enhanced
connectivity, there have also been talks of extending the Trilateral Highway to the bordering
countries of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, and the strategic significance of mainland
Southeast Asia is further embodied by the growing Indian investment in these countries.
In spatial-economic terms, a key difference between the LEP and the AEP is its geographical
scope; Whereas the LEP was focused almost exclusively on Southeast Asia, the AEP extends
this perspective to the economies of East Asia and the Pacific, and Japan and South Korea in
particular have been key for India’s growing regional ambitions.

Japan and India have institutionalized 2+2 Ministerial Dialogues, and a host of bilateral
arrangements regulate New Delhi’s and Tokyo’s coordination in terms of security, defence,
energy, counterterrorism, cyber strategy, and maritime cooperation. India and Japan also
signed a free trade agreement in 2011, despite which the trade volume between both
countries has slightly decreased in volume, yet Japanese FDI into India has almost tripled
between 2014 and 2017, which mirrors India’s general economic trajectory of growing trade
imbalances. Japan has also been important for the AEP and India’s ambitions insofar as it
has openly committed itself to investing into infrastructure projects in the NER.
Relations between Japan and South Korea have undergone a similar trajectory, aligning with
Seoul’s Southern Policy, which seeks to enhance South Korea’s regional economic ties. The
foreign ministers of both countries have been meeting regularly since 1996, and a free trade
agreement was signed in 2009, and although this agreement has not significantly boosted
trade, South Korean FDI into India has steadily increased. Again, the growing trade
imbalances are hereby an issue that Indian policy-makers will need to address in the coming
years.

Australia marks another emerging economic partner for India as India has grown to be
Australia’s fifth-largest export market, and New Delhi derives a significant share of its
enriched uranium from Australia, making cooperation with Canberra key for energy
provisions. Although the connectivity of the Australian and Indian markets has improved and
is likely to further deepen in the future, economic relations are still somewhat novel and
subsequently do not possess the scope and size of other economies ties. Increased Indian
engagement with Australia could be incentivized by facilitating economic exchange as well
as improving the connection between India and the South Asian diaspora communities in
Australia. Whilst the Australian-Indian economic relation is a comparatively new one, it has
emerged as a vital one for both countries.

Ultimately, the expanding geographical scope of the AEP has reformulated India’s emphasis
towards deepening the trade cooperation with traditional and non-traditional partners in
East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. Whilst this has stimulated New Delhi’s regional
trade relations, the extent of this trade remains limited as of now. Similarly, to India’s
engagement in Southeast Asia, relations are characterized by the penetration of Indian
markets through FDI and, as with ASEAN, this is likely to exacerbate India’s trade deficit in
the future.

Strategic dimension
The AEP has also expanded the operational scope of the LEP beyond one that is merely
focused on economics to one that integrates matters of security in the Indo-Pacific region.
This links the AEP as a geostrategy to other regional geostrategies, resulting in a
convergence of security aims and a subsequently emerging security cooperation. A
particularly pertinent framework is that of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), pursued by
Tokyo and Washington, and although most of India’s security collaborations are in their
infancy, they mark significant reconfigurations in the regional security architecture.

Whilst the LEP was effectively an economic strategy, the AEP expands on this by adding a
geostrategic defence component: in 2016, PM Modi argued for the enhancement of the
security cooperation between India and ASEAN given the shared security threats of terrorism
and radicalization, with the cooperation between ASEAN and India thus far mainly taking the
form of bilateral security arrangements with ASEAN member States rather than ASEAN as
such. This can be understood as a result of the partially differing security interests and
strategies within ASEAN, and Indian security cooperation has been particularly expressive
with Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

India entered a strategic partnership with Hanoi in 2007, and Vietnam has become a main
importer of Indian arms owing to a set of bilateral agreements and a $500 million line of
credit that was extended to Vietnam for the purchase of defence equipment. In 2015, the
two countries also announced the ‘Joint Vision Statement 2015-2020’, which initiated joint
military exercises, thus intensifying the security cooperation between India and Vietnam.

Similar bilateral agreements have been struck between New Delhi and the respective
administrations in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. Indonesia and India have conducted joint
naval controls since 2002, and a 2018 announcement of a strategic partnership extended
this cooperation to joint military exercises, the sharing of best practices, and the enhanced
coordination of military research. Similarly, a deepened 2015 integration between India and
Malaysia was to focus on engaging in joint military exercises, cyber and naval security
efforts were to be coordinated, and there has been an increased exchange between top
foreign policy officials.

The geopolitical dimensions of these security arrangements are key for Indian foreign policy:
Indonesia and Malaysia are situated adjacent to the Lombok Strait and the Malacca Strait,
and ensuring access to these waterways is of key significance for India’s economic
endeavours in the region and for the general tradability on international waters. The
Malacca Strait in particular is also vital for China, with 80% of Beijing’s annual energy supply
passing through the strait. Control over these maritime choke points thus provides the
controlling actors with leverage over countries that rely on the free tradability of waterways,
indicating the geostrategic relevance of the region and the geostrategic dimension of
regional security cooperation. Likewise, Vietnam has made territorial claims in the South
China Sea, which is fully claimed by China and henceforth pitches Hanoi against China’s
expansionist territorial ambitions in the region. Beijing is indeed the common denominator in
these countries’ concerns as Chinese assertiveness threatens the legal status quo in the
region, especially in regards to international trade, resulting in the strategic interests of
regional players converging in their suspicion regarding China.

The increased integration of security cooperation and multilateralization of security

arrangements is embodied by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The Quad
subsequently embodies the geostrategic and geo-economic framework of the FOIP, which
can be interpreted as a geopolitical alternative to China’s ambitious BRI.

Participation in the Quad signifies a significant turn in foreign policy conduct for India that is
indicative of an active reformulation of India’s regional security posture.
Conclusion

The AEP has significantly shifted India’s geostrategic posture in the Indo-Pacific and has
reformulated India’s approach to one that is more strategically assertive. In an often realist-
controversial security environment, the AEP can thus be conceptualized as a
counterbalancing effort against Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific .

All things considered, the AEP marks an ambitious reformulation of India’s security policy
abroad, and, if successful, can enhance India’s economic and political role in the regional
security architecture. The path there is uncertain, and may intensify the historical
geopolitical rivalry between China and India. However, one thing is certain; China’s strategic
and aggressive opportunism may result in the new reality that India, formally and openly
entrenches itself in the opposite camp, thereby tilting the balance of power further to
Beijing's disadvantage.
Not a deliverable
Open ended  PSIR/GS2
Exhaustive?
Not minute details  exam relevant
Assam- Long-standing inter-state
Mizoram boundary issues
border Arunachal, Meghalaya,
dispute Mizoram , Nagaland.
Significance
• No Man’s Land
• Economic blockade
• Police conflict not only people
• Inflammatory speeches  BJP/NDA  Immaturity
• FIRs
Genesis of the boundary dispute?
•Complex boundary equations
•Colonial era Mizoram  Lushai Hills
•Notification of 1875  Bengal Eastern Frontier
Regulation (BEFR) Act, 1873 - differentiated the
Lushai Hills from the plains of Cachar
•1933 - demarcates a boundary between the
Lushai Hills and Manipur.
Way SC
forward Union intervention
: Sundarram Commission 1971
Boundary Commission Shashtri Commission 1985
Use in Exam

Federalism : Constitutional provisions; changing nature

of centre-state relations; integrationist tendencies and
regional aspirations; inter-state disputes.
Section 66A of IT Act
Why in NGO People’s Union of Civil
news? Liberties (PUCL)
Section 66A of the Information Technology Act,
2000 ?
• Punishable offence
• Sending 'grossly offensive' or 'menacing' information using a
computer resource or communication device.
• False, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury,
criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will
Issue? vagueness  Bal Thackeray

“offensive” Jadavpur University professor

Ambikesh Mahapatra.
wide Activist Aseem Trivedi
connotation
Mayank Sharma and K V Rao
What
were the
Whimsical interpretations by law
grounds enforcement agencies.
for the
challenge? The terms used in the section had
not been specifically defined
Shreya Singhal Case 2015
• struck down Section 66A of IT Act  “open-
ended and unconstitutionally vague”
• “being violative of Article 19(1)(a) and not saved
under Article 19(2).”
• Read down Section 79
• “advocacy” and “incitement;”
Use in exam :
• Salient Features of the Indian Constitution :
The Preamble, Fundamental Rights and
Duties, Directive Principles; Parliamentary
System and Amendment Procedures; Judicial
Review and Basic Structure doctrine.
WHY BELARUS MATTERS TO INDIA?

CONTEXT:

The EU wants India on its side in isolating and ostracising Belarusian President Alexander
Lukashenko, whom it accuses of having falsified national election results last year. New
Delhi’s stand matters because it is now in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and is
an influential member of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC).

Right from the start, West European governments viewed Lukashenko as a Soviet holdover:
neither a democrat nor a reformer, plus a proxy for Moscow.
RECENT DEVELOPMENT:

In a telephone conversation with Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla, the Secretary
General of the European External Action Service of the EU, Stefano Sannino, went to great
lengths to stress that Europe was facing a grave threat from Lukashenko. Sannino accused
Belarus of cynically trying to flood the EU with vulnerable migrants by pushing them in through
its border with Poland. The West has accused Russia of supporting Belarus in this plot.

Shringla refused to bite the bullet and was non-committal on the phone with Sannino. A Ministry
of External Affairs (MEA) readout of their conversation said between the lines that all the EU
could get out of its telephonic outreach was that “both sides agreed on the need to de-escalate
the situation and arrive at an early resolution”.
India is not about to join any crusade against Lukashenko or encourage any colour revolution
in Minsk of the kind, which the West has orchestrated in many capitals around the world.

On the contrary, the MEA recently approved the opening of a Belarusian Consulate
General in Mumbai.It is expected to open before December 31st.

What does it signify?

India’s permission for a new Belarusian Consulate is evidence that India values its
strategic autonomy.PV Narasimha Rao’s government was one of the first in the world to
recognise Minsk as an independent capital in 1991 as part of his policy of retaining
relations with successor states of the Soviet Union. An Indian diplomatic mission
opened in Minsk a year later.

IMPORTANCE OF BELARUS FOR INDIA:

The diplomatic relations between Belarus and India were established in 1992 – next April,
we will mark the 30th anniversary.

Bilateral relations between India and Belarus are marked by broad understanding on
issues of mutual interest. The two countries enjoy a comprehensive partnership and
have established mechanisms for exchanging views on bilateral, regional and
multilateral issues through Foreign Office Consultations, Intergovernmental Commission
(IGC), and Joint Commission on Military Technical Cooperation.

Belarus supports India on every issue: a permanent seat in a reformed UNSC, the recent
election for a non-permanent seat at the UN high table, membership of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG), of which Belarus is a member. These are issues over which some European
countries have reservations about backing India.Belarus recognizes India as
an emerging global power and seeks to develop a “strategic relationship” with India.
India's supportive stand on various Resolutions in Geneva and New York targeting
Belarus for violation of human rights and restrictions on freedom of expression have
also been appreciated by Belarus.

If the past is any guide, Lukashenko’s next visit to India will only be in 2027. He has visited
India in every tenth year during his long presidency: in 1997, 2007 and 2017.

Two-way bilateral trade in 2020 amounted to US$ 627 million. The trade balance
remains in favour of Belarus primarily on account of imports of Potash.The Republic of
Belarus may become an “entry point” for Indian pharmaceutical companies to the
Eurasian market.

With controversy erupting at the climate talks in Glasgow on whether coal should be
“phased out” or “phased down”, and India’s role in changing the formulation, neither
side would like to highlight imminent collaboration between state-owned mining
companies in Belarus and Coal India Limited. Belarusian oil companies with advanced
technology are helping India to increase output in domestic oil fields.

WAY FORWARD:
Only one Indian head of state has been to Belarus-President Mukherjee and that too
some six years ago.An India-Belarus Foreign Office consultation, planned for
November 1 in Minsk after a hiatus of three years, has not, however, taken place yet.
This should be revived with full potential.There should be frequent diplomatic
consultations at all levels.

Belarus needs several footholds in Asia diversified by geographical subregions.

India could become one of such pillars in South Asia..
 Migration attempts into the European
Union from Belarus have surged in
recent years with Poland witnessing
30,000 illegal attempted border
crossings since August this year (2021).
Despite freezing conditions and lack of
vital supplies, thousands of migrants are
stranded along the Belarusian border as
Poland denies them entry into the
country. Belarus, on the other hand, has
refused to take these migrants back even
as several have died of hypothermia.
The border crisis that started in August has seen
migrants mostly from the Middle East, shepherded by
Belarus, gathering at the borders of Poland, Latvia and
Lithuania.
Migration attempts into the European Union from Belarus have surged in recent
years with Poland witnessing 30,000 illegal attempted border crossings since August
this year.

The recent surge is in response to the sanctions imposed by the EU.

Lukashenka has responded to the sanctions by pushing waves of migrants from the
Middle East to the borders to cross into the EU.

This strategy is a form of hybrid warfare, a tactic first used by Russia against the
Nordic states in 2015.
What is hybrid warfare?

Hybrid warfare is a strategy aimed at destabilising EU borders by stirring up tensions within

member states and allies.

In 2015, when migrants descended over the Greek-Macedonian border, some EU members
offered asylum to refugees. But this time, European officials have agreed to defend their borders
from uncontrolled immigration.

This is because Europeans believe the border crisis is manufactured by Lukashenko.

Moral dilemma

The migrants’ rough stay at the

borders creates a moral dilemma
for Poland, Lithuania and Latvia.

This move has been criticised by

propagandists who have likened this
fence to Donald Trump’s wall.
Is Russia behind the border crisis?

Russia is a key ally of Belarus. Poland and EU have accused Russia of spearheading the
artificial flow of migrants from Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan onto European borders.

However, Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the accusations.

"We are ready to help it by all means if of course, anything would depend on us," Putin
was quoted as saying by Reuters.
The worsening condition

While Poland is concerned about the migrant

situation, the EU is planning to impose additional
sanctions against Belarus to curb the crisis.
Geo-politics :
• Belarus is a defensive buffer.
• US has to prevent the integration of Eurasia
• China – Presently not spoken but does have
ambitions
Conclusion
• The crisis may repercussions that could
be highly consequential for the global
politics for times to come
 India-Bhutan relations: recent advances since the Doklam Standoff of 2017

India’s role in Bhutan’s economy is enormous too. India is Bhutan’s largest trade
partner, accounting for 79 percent of Bhutan’s total imports and 90 percent of its
exports. Bhutan’s hydropower sector, which contributes 14 percent of its GDP and 27
percent of government revenue, is financed largely by India. Besides, India provides
a market for three-fourths of Bhutan’s hydropower production, with the rest being
consumed locally. India is Bhutan’s largest aid donor too and has financed much of its
Five-Year economic plans.

Sudha ramachandran points out that a small but growing number of Bhutanese are
critical of India’s grip over their economy and foreign policy. They describe its role in
Bhutan’s hydropower sector as exploitative. “Not only are the terms on which India is
financing the hydropower projects unfavorable to Bhutan but also, it is getting
electricity from Bhutan at cheap rates,” the Bhutanese official pointed out.
Importantly, Bhutanese are arguing that as a sovereign country, Bhutan should be able
to determine its own foreign policy. Not establishing a normal relationship with China
“at the behest of India” is seen as imperiling Bhutanese sovereignty.

Importantly, Bhutan is increasingly keen to settle its territorial dispute with China.

China lays claim to 764 square kilometers of territory, including 495 sq km in the
Jakurlung and Pasamlung Valleys in north-central Bhutan and another 269 sq km in
western Bhutan, comprising the Doklam Plateau.

Although Bhutan and China do not have official diplomatic relations, they have
engaged in direct bilateral talks since 1984 to settle the border dispute. Twenty-five
rounds of talks have taken place so far. China has reportedly offered Bhutan a
“package deal,” under which it will recognize Bhutanese control over the Jakurlung
and Pasumlung Valleys in return for Thimphu ceding control over Doklam to China.
Additionally, Beijing is reportedly insisting on Bhutan establishing trade and
diplomatic relations as a quid pro quo for a border settlement.

China has intimidated Bhutan repeatedly on the Doklam question. Although the two
countries signed an agreement in 1998, promising to maintain peace and tranquility
along the Sino-Bhutanese border areas, Beijing has carried out several
incursions there. In November 2007, for instance, its soldiers dismantled several
unmanned posts near the Chumbi Valley.

China’s building of roads in Doklam triggered a serious crisis last year at this tri-
junction, resulting in a 73-day standoff.

In August 2017, India and China agreed on an “expeditious disengagement” from the
area. However, satellite images reveal that Chinese troops have not pulled out.
Indeed, Chinese road building and helipad construction continues. Therefore, the
possibility of another India-China face-off here cannot be ruled out.

While Doklam is strategically important to India and China, its value to Bhutan is
more economic than strategic; Doklam’s rich pastoral land supports the livelihoods of
people living in Bhutan’s western border districts.
Ceding it to China would impose economic costs on Bhutan but it would give the
latter settled borders. However, it would draw New Delhi’s ire.

During the Doklam crisis, “Thimphu walked on eggshells, balancing between India’s
stifling embrace and the potential consequences from China,” Indian defense analyst
Ajai Shukla observed. The crisis underscored to the Bhutanese that their unresolved
border dispute with China was leaving them vulnerable to entanglement in big power
rivalries. Understandably, it has injected a sense of urgency in Thimphu to settle the
border dispute with China. Bhutan’s new government is under some pressure from the
Bhutanese people to act on this issue.

In addition, there are economic compulsions that would prompt the government to
reach out to China. Diversifying Bhutan’s hydropower-centric economy was one of
the main election promises of the DNT and the government can be expect to set this
in motion. Bhutan’s hydroelectric sector accounts for almost 80 per cent of the
country’s external debt – to focus on developing industries and other employment
generating sectors such as Tourism.

Such steps to diversify the economy, “will affect relations with India,” S. D. Muni, a
former diplomat and Professor Emeritus at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New
Delhi has said.

Even without official relations, China has a significant presence in the Bhutanese
economy. A third of Bhutan’s consumer imports consist of Chinese goods, which are
making their way into Bhutan through third countries, Muni points out.

This Chinese presence will grow manifold once diplomatic and economic ties are
established. It could enhance Chinese influence over Bhutan, as it has in India’s other
neighbors, such as Sri Lanka. There is concern in India that Bhutan could quickly slip
into a debt trap, forcing Thimphu to hand over strategic assets to the Chinese in
exchange for debt relief, as was Sri Lanka’s experience.

There is concern in New Delhi that such a scenario would compel Bhutan to cede
Doklam to China. India has often been criticized for treating Bhutan as a protectorate.
However, India has sought to meet Bhutanese aspirations in the past. It was India that
sponsored Bhutan’s membership in the United Nations in 1971. Importantly, it
replaced the 1949 Treaty with the Treaty of Friendship in 2007, which brought into
the India-Bhutan relationship “an element of equality.”

Bilateral relations between the two countries completed 50 years last year and a
host of programmes were held to mark the historical moment.
The DNT government in Bhutan came to power on the slogan “Narrowing the
Gap” and has looked at addressing income disparity and growing
unemployment. The government is also looking to diversify Thimphu’s trade,
the latter largely dominated its hydropower exports to India.

Also, Bhutan is all set to graduate from UN’s Least Developed Country
status by 2023 and a robust economy with vibrant private sector is a requisite
for that. Thimphu cannot for long resist foreign direct investment and opening
up its market. It is also eyeing at the membership of the World Trade
Organization.

China’s advances

Bhutan declined an invitation to attend the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
conference held in Beijing in April this year that saw the participation of more
than 40 heads of states. However, if Bhutan’s media is to go by, its civil
society is warming up to China’s advances. The rationale for Bhutan’s civil
society to open up to China is premised on the need for diversifying its foreign
trade that it argues to be heavily leaning in India’s favour.

Though, Chinese offers to further intensify trade have so far been snubbed by
Thimphu, the prowess of the Chinese economy is having a marked influence
upon Bhutan’s urban population with internet available on fingertips. Chinese
exports to Bhutan in terms of value are third, closely reeling behind India and
South Korea, which are first and second largest exporters.

The pressure on the government was palpable when Prime Minister Dr. Lotay
Tshering in January this year had reportedly said that his country is willing
to strengthen pragmatic cooperation with China including tourism and resolve
the border issue at an early date through friendly consultations.
In the backdrop of such developments, it is important for the Indian EAM to
focus on strengthening political relations between the two countries.

Recent advances following the foreign minister S. Jaishankar and PM

Modi’s visit of 2019

The two countries also signed 10 MoUs to infuse new energy in their ties. Both
inaugurated the 720MW Mangdechhu hydroelectric power plant. Mr. Modi also
launched the RuPay Card in Bhutan aimed at boosting tourism from India. Also
an additional $100 million will be available to Bhutan under a standby swap
arrangement to meet the foreign exchange requirement. Also both sides
inaugurated the Ground Earth Station and SATCOM network, developed with
assistance from ISRO for utilization of South Asia Satellite in Bhutan.

India is providing ₹5,000 crore for Bhutan’s 12th five-year plan that began in 2018,
the same as the allocation for the previous plan. Hydro-power, however, will continue
to be an important sector of cooperation between the two neighbours with the two
sides looking to start discussions on the 2,500 MW Sankosh project.
 - 91 -

5. CHINA’S EMERGING POWER AND MILITARY ROLE:

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA

Sujit Dutta

The growth in China's overall national power, including its military capabilities,
and how China's leaders will employ this power will have far reaching implications for
Asia and the world. China is not only the largest state in the world in terms of
population but is many times larger than all other states, excepting India. 1 Rapid and
sustained industrialization and modernization over the next two to three decades is
likely to transform this largely agrarian state into a powerful entity, given sheer
demographic realities. 2 Power in the Chinese case has a strong military component,
since modernization of the armed forces and the military-industrial complex is an
important goal for China. The Chinese leadership's commitment to build comprehensive
national power (CNP)3 is a major factor shaping the stability and security of Asia. In
addition, China's nuclear weapon capability, its permanent status in the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC), the large size of its armed forces and the crucial role the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) in its neo-authoritarian political system and national
security policy-making give it a special place in the Asian security and strategic order.

Numerous Western experts argue that the Chinese armed forces and much of its
weapons inventory suffer from major technological lags, especially when compared
with the United States, Japan, Russia, South Korea, India and some of its other
neighbors.4 A comparative assessment has been made in a 1995 RAND study of China's
air power. 5 This is largely true if only the PLA's conventional capabilities and not its
nuclear forces are taken into account. In additon, two other factors must be mentioned in
assessing Chinese conventional forces. First is the sheer power of numbers. With a
strength of 2.9 million, China has the largest armed forces in the world. It has a
corresponding size in air power and is Asia's leading missile power. What it lacks in
quality it makes up through numbers and its willingness to take heavy casualties in
warfare, as demonstrated in the Korean War against the far superior forces of the United
States, and against Soviet forces in 1969. Second, China is committed to steady
modernization of its conventional forces to match those of the other advanced military
powers.

The rise of China into a military-industrial powerhouse will therefore have a

multi-dimensional impact upon other states of the Asia-Pacific region. This judgment is
now well-recognized by most strategic analysts.6 It will in particular have direct
security consequences for China's neighbors, notably Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Vietnam,
Philippines, Mongolia, other Southeast Asian states, the Central Asian states and Russia,
and the countries of South Asia. Most of these countries will be affected one way or the
other by Beijing's changing economic and military capabilities, its trade and defense
policies, its approach toward resolution of bilateral disputes, and how it will use its
power as it grows stronger. States in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia, which do not
share a border with China, will be affected by its naval build up, its handling of its
territorial claims in the South China Sea, and its strategic and military relationship with
Myanmar and Indochina.

Even the United States recognizes that following Soviet disintegration and with
Japanese power contained within the U.S.-Japan alliance framework China will be its
leading challenger, its key concern, and the alternative center of power and influence in
 - 92 -

the strategically vital Asia Pacific region. According to the 1997 Strategic Assessment
published by the National Defense University:" Dealing with China as a rising power is
the most compelling of all of the many challenges facing the United States and its
regional allies." 7 As its author further asserts:

Within the decade, China could become a power that is a peer to the US. in
the East Asian theater. Moreover, as its comprehensive national strength
continues to develop over the decade, Beijing might play the role of the
theater peer with more assurance than is presently the case. A more capable
and confident China may prove to be more obdurate in its pursuit of issues
that touch upon sovereignty and national reunification, such as Taiwan or
the South China Sea. In these circumstances, a miscalculation by Beijing of
either Taipei's or Washington's intentions could produce a conflict into
which the United States might be drawn. Prudence would dictate that such
an eventuality be considered by US. force planners. 8

The study concludes: “a robust military force and an active dialogue on security issues
and concerns are viewed as key elements in any strategy of dissuasion” in regard to
China.9

Thus, in spite of its techno-economic and military lag in comparison with the
developed states, China has begun to play an international role far larger than its overall
capabilities. Its status as Asia's only permanent member of the UNSC and nuclear
weapon state, its rapidly growing economy and the lure of its large market, its size and
pivotal geopolitical location have given China the strategic weight and influence of a
major power. China's assertive nationalism, a strong sense of self-importance and
independence, a national resolve and strategy geared towards attaining a high level of
power in all its dimensions -- economic, military, technological, and politico-cultural--
are together redefining the Asian strategic environment, often in a destabilizing
manner, given its unfulfilled territorial and unification agenda.

Yet very little incisive discussion has taken place or recognition exists outside
India of the security implications for South Asia of the re-ordering of the balance of
forces underway in Asia resulting from the growth of China's power. South Asia has
not received the attention in this discussion that it warrants even though China and
India constitute the strongest military powers in mainland Asia, and that they are
neighbors whose policies and capabilities directly affect each other.

China, India and most of the states in South Asia are still in the midst of economic
development, industrialization, and modern state formation, and are therefore not yet in
the first rung of the global power structure represented by the triad of North America,
West Europe and Japan. However, according to the projections of the World Bank and
other international agencies, both China and India will emerge among the five largest
economies of the world within the next two decades--the U.S., Japan, and the European
Union being the others.10 This will mean a substantial growth in the national power of
the two countries. China and India straddle a common geopolitical space across the
Himalayas and South, Southwest, and Southeast Asia. This makes for strategic and
geopolitical competition. The growth of these two major power centers adjacent to one
another would increasingly be a major factor shaping Asia's politico-security
environment. Stable relations between these two powers is therefore is not only in the
interest of their peoples, but also in Asian and global interest. Building the basis for a
stable and cooperative relationship is a challenge in itself.
 - 93 -

China's rising military capabilities, especially its nuclear and missile build up, has
direct security implications on its neighbors in Asia with whom it has sovereignty
disputes, ethnic-related insecurities and tensions, and geopolitical rivalries, and some of
whom Beijing sees as potential threats.11 This has forced Asian states to adjust their
post-Cold War strategies, with China now the dominant focus of security concern.12 The
international strategic studies community, however, by focusing on East Asia, has not
recognized the larger dynamics at play in Asia and especially South Asia.13 Indeed,
even the October 1997 U.S.-China agreement under which China committed to curtail
its missile and nuclear relations with Iran in return for U.S. cooperation in the Chinese
nuclear energy sector have been driven by non-proliferation and its own security
concerns in the Gulf rather than a wider view of the strategic and security environment
in Asia and how to ensure long-term stability. 14

CHINA'S SEARCH FOR POWER

Wealth and power have been the principal goals of the Chinese elite for over a
century. They remained the principal goals under Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping,
despite the very different developmental and modernization strategies adopted by the
two principal post-revolutionary leaders of China. Most major states have historically
translated their power into influence and predominance vis-a-vis other states. China has
not been an exception. The post-1949 Chinese leadership has been keenly conscious of
the role of military power and the focus of political and strategic leverage this power
provides in domestic and international politics.

This search for political and military power has been closely tied to China's
perception of its own weakness, its historical memory of 19th and 20th century
humiliation by Western powers, and occupation of large parts of its territory by Japan.
The fact that China was militarily defeated by Britain, France, and Japan respectively
before it was politically and economically subjugated is deeply etched in Chinese
memory--a memory that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has nurtured. A strong
China--that is " a rich country with a strong army" as Japanese reformers had sought to
build in the 19th century--is necessary so that it is never again subjected to humiliation
and hegemony. Indeed, the entire history of struggle for power in 20th century China
underlies this commitment. In the years after the revolution, this belief was
strengthened by its searing experience in the Korean War, the containment policy of the
United States till the 1972 rapprochement, and by U.S. military threats during the
Korean war as well as the Taiwan Straits crises in the 1950s. The military was an
integral element of the post-1949 power structure and it was relatively straightforward
for the Party to see the world through a militarized prism. Its experience, global and
internal realities, and its political-strategic needs made this feasible.

In the period since the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), military
power has been viewed as a guarantor of China's strategic independence, security, and
influence in the world. These remain the key goals that CNP is expected to ensure in
future decades. The Chinese leadership since Mao has repeatedly asserted that it does
not want China to be a superpower. Yet the leadership has also repeatedly stated that
China must become "a first rank power" as early as possible.15 The need to modernize
the PLA and its key strategic role was underlined by Party General Secretary Jiang
Zemin in his July 1991 speech marking the 70th anniversary of the founding of the
CCP.16
 - 94 -

Thus, despite the stress on the economic dimension of modernization, military

reforms have never been neglected by the leadership. The reforms have been geared
towards enhancing the effectiveness and power of the PLA and the Chinese Party-State.
The very fact that military modernization has been placed on the national agenda next to
economic modernization (the aggregate of the three modernizations--industrial,
agricultural, and technological) indicates its high priority. 17

From a national security perspective, China is preparing to meet three key

challenges after the Cold War. In an immediate sense, it must build a military force
structure and capabilities that will enable it to use force if necessary to pursue its
sovereignty and territorial claims on Taiwan, the South China Sea islands, and if
necessary elsewhere-- for example against India, Vietnam, and Japan. Second, its
military power must provide it with adequate deterrence against the United States --the
remaining superpower--and defeat all calls for a neo-containment strategy against
China. Finally, in the longer run its power must ensure that China will be an integral
part of a new security structure in Asia and the Pacific, and that its interests and
concerns not be undermined.

Two factors make this agenda problematic and destabilizing: first, China's
increasingly assertive nationalism18 with the PLA at the core of defining national
identity and security goals, and second, China's deeply rooted realpolitik strategic
culture and its repeated use of force in pursuit of the national interest.19 A heightened
nationalist environment has emerged and been promoted by the Party-State since the
Tiananmen crisis and the collapse of state socialist regimes in the Soviet Union, Eastern
Europe and elsewhere, to meet the challenge of what it calls “peaceful evolution”
supposedly intent on undermining the Communist Party rule in China. Nationalism has
become a necessary defensive mechanism as socialism has declined as the ideological
rationale for the Party's hegemony, and it has gained an assertive character in external
relations. This combination of rising nationalism, its key ideological role in regime
stability, and the realpolitik strategic culture has made China's military power build up
a potent factor of uncertainty, insecurity, and instability in Asia. Indeed, both its
dominant parabellum strategic culture and Maoist thought assume that conflict is a
constant feature in human affairs. As Alastair Johnston notes:

The Chinese leadership believes that conflict is due largely to the

rapacious role of the adversary, and that in this zero-sum context the
application of violence is highly efficacious for dealing with the enemy.
These assumptions generally translate into preference for offensive
strategies followed by progressively less coercive ones, where
accommodation is ranked last.20

This makes conflict over territory and other core interests of the Chinese regime and the
PLA highly likely if the other state refuses to accommodate to Chinese goals.

This combination of the PLA's size, growing strategic and conventional

capabilities, organizational restructuring and adoption of a new strategy of preparing
for "high-tech limited warfare" are factors that its Asian neighbors have to take seriously.
Its already acquired major power status, and the political will to achieve even greater
influence and techno-military power implies that China's expanding role will be a major
feature in the world order in the 21st century. In many ways this is already evident. 21

Moreover, over the past two decades of reform while the PLA's role in elite and
societal politics has seemingly declined it has become increasingly influential in the
 - 95 -

security policy making process.22 Michael Swaine in an important recent study

underlines this point:

Ultimate national strategic and security decision making authority does

not rest with the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) as a body.
Instead, a collective leadership composed of a small subset of senior party
and military leaders determines policy in these areas. The PLA's role in
shaping national strategic objectives and in providing strategic analysis
and intelligence to civilian leaders is particularly significant and
apparently increasing. 23

Since China's relations with its neighbors--including those in South Asia-- has a
substantial national security dimension, and involves disputes over sovereignty, the
military is likely to set much of the tenor of the relationship and the policy line, leaving
less room for flexibility in dealing with issues such as arms transfers, proliferation, and
defense ties. The dominant role of the military in shaping China's national security and
important sectors of the foreign policy agenda is highly destabilizing, since the absence
of democratic or other constraints mean the use of force and application of coercive
strategies would not be politically impeded. Indeed, "by taking tough positions Chinese
leaders demonstrate their nationalist credentials and win vitally important domestic
political support." 24 Asian states therefore have reasons to worry and take precautions.

This is not to argue that China fails to value diplomacy or cooperative ties with
other states at a time when it needs a peaceful security environment and external
support for the success of its modernization program. Indeed, over the past two
decades China has steadily normalized relations with all its neighbors, expanded trade
and investment ties, and signed military confidence building agreements with Russia,
India, and its Central Asian neighbors; opened negotiations with Vietnam and the
ASEAN states to settle territorial disputes; and joined the multilateral ASEAN Regional
Forum. Its economic and political ties throughout Asia are growing and China has a
major stake in preserving them. However, where core issues of sovereignty and
national identity are concerned, the PRC is a prisoner of its strategic culture and
assertive nationalism. For these reasons alone, the accumulation of high military power
by China is destabilizing and a major security challenge.

It is pertinent to note, however, that China's rise as a great power is not a certainty.
China, for example, may ultimately experience the kind of crises that the state socialist
system and the Party-State have faced in other contexts as they have grappled with
marketization, democratization and globalization. Moreover, rapid modernization of
the type that China is experiencing is socially and politically destabilizing as was seen
through the decade of the 1980s leading up to the Tiananmen crisis in 1989. Thus, it is
not inevitable that China's transition from state-socialism to a market based, modern
industrialized, and militarily advanced state will be smooth, crisis free, or painless.
Indeed an examination of the reform era indicates the volatile nature of the process and
the huge hurdles faced by the PRC if it is to attain its national goals in the next two to
three decades.25

There are three possible scenarios regarding China's mid to longer-range future
that deserve attention:

a. In spite of the many internal and external challenges, the PRC will
continue to enhance its national power as a rapidly modernizing neo-
authoritarian state;
 - 96 -

b. It will initiate gradual political reforms and move towards a pluralist and
democratic future, as have Korea and Taiwan;

c. A major breakdown of the state system would occur in China, leading to

renewed civil war that engulfs Hong Kong and Taiwan with unknown
consequences. China's modernization and search for power would be seriously
compromised by such political upheaval. This in turn would have very negative
security and political implications for Asia and the world.

All three scenarios are possible and no theory can accurately forecast the most
likely outcome. However, only the first scenario needs be taken seriously into account
by the region's strategic planners and analysts, because it alone is based on current
realities. The other two are potential scenarios for which alternative planning and
preparations need to be considered, but they cannot serve as the basic framework for a
China policy. An authoritarian, internally uneasy, but increasingly powerful and
assertive China will, therefore, be the reference point of this essay.

CHINA'S MILITARY DOCTRINE AND CAPABILITY

China undertook a major revision of its long-standing military doctrine in 1985

when the Central Military Commission formally announced that "a world war, a major
war, or a nuclear war" were unlikely in the current historical epoch and that the PLA
should prepare itself for fighting "local, border, and limited wars." The new doctrine
was called "People's War Under Modern Conditions" in keeping with the need to
maintain continuity with Mao's strategic thought. The doctrine was given a new,
modernized thrust in 1993 following the PLA's assessment of the American high-tech
campaign in the Gulf War against Iraq.

The PLA has thus been given the task to prepare itself to face two potential
scenarios, one which is possibly unavoidable, and the other unlikely but for which it
nonetheless must prepare if its interests are to be pursued.

a. Border wars, territorial conflicts, and localized partial wars of a limited

character under increasingly high tech conditions. This what the PLA expects to
face and, therefore, such preparations have direct relevance for India, Vietnam,
Taiwan, and other neighbors;

b. A general, modern three-dimensional war, in which the use of nuclear

weapons could be threatened. This is seen as very unlikely but could occur in
case Taiwan declares independence leading to a China-U.S. face off.

However, the PLA's efforts in preparing for frontier and local wars are of greatest
concern to the nations in South Asia. Indeed, ever since the Korean War the PLA has
followed a frontier defense doctrine designed to meet the enemy at or beyond the
border, show resolve, and demonstrate substantial firepower to deter the potential
opponent. As argued by David Shambaugh: "A frontier defense policy has been the
PLA's actual doctrine for four decades despite its professed adherence to a 'people's war'
strategy of luring the enemy in deep to defeat them on their own soil. With the
 - 97 -

detonation of an atomic device in 1964 and the acquisition of intercontinental delivery

systems a decade later, China was able to supplement its conventional doctrine with a
minimum nuclear deterrent."26

China's current conventional power is large but not modern. Beijing is, however,
determined to transform the PLA into a modern force.27 The officially declared defense
budget has been growing at an average rate of 15 percent since 1989--among the fastest
in Asia.28 China's defense expenditure as estimated by international experts is at least
three to four times larger than its officially stated defense budget, and is growing at over
10-20 percent annually.

In assessing China's military capabilities as it affects South Asia, especially India,

the symbiotic relationship between China's strategic forces and conventional forces must
be underlined. While its conventional forces lag behind Western, Japanese, South
Korean, Russian and Indian capabilities, it is not necessarily behind China's neighbors
such as Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, Nepal, the Central Asian states, Mongolia, or the
Philippines -- most of whom are not covered by any alliance. These states are therefore
vulnerable. Moreover, China's nuclear weapons and missiles give it an edge over
virtually all its neighbors, excepting Russia.

Strategic Forces

The key role of Chinese strategic nuclear forces play in creating an advantageous
military climate for the PLA must be also emphasized. China is the only indigenous
Asian power possessing nuclear arms and the triad of delivery systems. China's nuclear
forces create a fundamental asymmetry of power between China and other Asian states.
They ensure that while others would be deterred, China can, if it feels necessary, carry
out punitive attacks, "teach lessons," occupy territory that it unilaterally declares as its
own, and engage in force projection and interventions. Nuclear weapons provide China
with a security shield and the overall cover under which China can use conventional
power against an adversary without fearing large-scale retaliation on its own territory.
China already enjoys a nuclear and missile lead over India and other states in Asia.
These weapons provide it with a sense of power and assurance, allow it to pursue an
assertive nationalist agenda, and furnish it diplomatic leverage.

Army

The large size of the PLA is not very meaningful when it comes to conducting
military operations in South Asia. Because of the forbidding terrain, the PLA faces real
difficulties in sustaining and deploying large number of troops on the high Tibetan
plateau and across the Himalayas, or even across the deserts of Xinjiang. The use of
armor and other heavy equipment is similarly ruled out. Tibet is sparsely inhabited and
has an average height of more than 10,000 feet, and has some of the world's most hostile
terrain, placing strong limitations on weapons and manpower. Only infantry, artillery,
air power and missiles can be used in a military conflict. The absence of a railway
network in Tibet means only roads can be employed by the PLA. The logistical support
for the military in the mountainous terrain is highly constrained, the roads are narrow,
and it is very difficult to sustain a large force. This allows a smaller Indian army to be
highly effective and a modern Indian air force to neutralize the PLA. However, the PLA
is building rapid deployment and mountain warfare special forces and units.
 - 98 -

Air Power

Current Chinese air power can be used against South Asia from air force bases
located in Tibet but would not pose an unmanageable threat to the Indian air force.
Indeed, given the absence of secure and hard shelters for its fighters in Tibet, the PLA
Air Force would face serious problems of surviving a battle against India. However, the
introduction of the Russian Su-27 and the agreement to proceed with serial production
in China, a new generation of fighters such as the F-10, air refueling capabilities,
airborne radar and an improved air defense system will substantially improve China's
capabilities in the coming years. This will require constant Indian efforts to keep its air
power modern and effective in facing the challenge.

Navy

The Chinese Navy is still largely a coastal defense force, though it is being
modernized. The introduction of new generation frigates and destroyers, and the
Russian built Kilo class submarines will gradually improve capabilities. However, the
navy's current concern is concentrated in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the
Pacific. It would take some time before the Chinese Navy can start operating in the
Indian Ocean. Availability of port facilities in Myanmar, Pakistan, and possibly Iran --
three states in the region with which it has naval cooperation--would be of key
importance if it were to play that role. China, according to many Indian security
experts, would attempt to develop in the longer term, a naval presence in the Indian
Ocean.29 When that happens, Chinese nuclear submarines armed with cruise missiles
are likely to be deployed. This will be of direct concern for the Indian and Indonesian
navies, and for the U.S. naval forces based in Diego Garcia. The Indian Ocean is
expected to become an important area for China's naval deployments because of
growing maritime activity, politico-military ties in the region, and possible energy
dependence on the Gulf. This opinion is broadly shared within the Indian strategic
community and the naval establishment. China's growing military role in Myanmar is
especially pertinent in this context. Chinese assistance in establishing signal intelligence
facilities in Great Cocos, modernization of naval facilities and installation of new radar
equipment in Hiangyi islands at the mouth of the Bassein river, and development of
naval infrastructure at Akyab and Mergui in Myanmar are seen as building blocks for
attaining Chinese strategic goals in the region, including the monitoring of India's naval
communications, and possibly India's missile testing in the Bay of Bengal. A long-term
Indian naval development program to safeguard its maritime and strategic interests and
prevent any potential destabilizing impact of the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean-Bay
of Bengal-Arabian Sea area is, therefore, seen as crucial for India's security. 30

China has also found in cash-strapped Russia a major source for weapons and
technology for the modernization of the PLA's arsenal and its sprawling defense
industry.31 Beijing's revival of techno-military cooperation with Moscow has provided
China state of the art technology it could not secure from the West. Besides acquiring
Su-27 fighters with an agreement on co-production, Russian transfers include Il-76
transport aircraft, some of which have been refitted to provide in-flight refueling, Kilo
class submarines, SA-10 surface-to-air missile batteries, and AA-8 Aphid air-to-air
missiles. Russia is also providing assistance for China's anti-ballistic missile defense
programs, nuclear submarine technology, anti-submarine warfighting capability, tanks
and artillery. In addition, a large number of Russian scientists are employed in China's
defense industries, helping its modernization.32
 - 99 -

Access to Russian and Israeli military technology is enabling China to gain

significant capabilities across the board that will transform its sprawling military system
and capabilities in the coming decades. China is developing antisubmarine warfare,
ship-borne air defense, sustained naval operations, and amphibious warfare capabilities.
It is acquiring ground force mobility, logistical support, air defense, all-weather
operations, and command and control capabilities. It is developing strategic airlift,
aerial refueling, ground attack capabilities and adding a new generation of air-
superiority fighters. Most of its 24 Group Armies now have rapid deployment units
comprising some 18 to 20 divisions. It also has created a 5000 strong marine corps.
These units are equipped with the latest in weaponry. 33

CHINA'S REGIONAL POSTURE

South Asia is defined here as the region that stretches from Iran and Afghanistan
in the south-west to Myanmar in south-east and the Indian Ocean, but excluding
Indonesia and other Southeast Asian states neighboring India that are being analyzed
separately in this volume. The principal country in the region is India. India's strategic
reach and geopolitical weight; its pivotal location straddling the busy sea lanes of the
Indian Ocean in the South, East, and West Asia on its two flanks, and China, Central
Asia and Russia on the north; gives meaning and makes sense to South Asia, otherwise a
region with a disparate group of small and medium states. Myanmar, Bangladesh on
one side and Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran on the other, or Nepal and Bhutan in the
north and Sri Lanka or Maldives in the south have very limited strategic linkages.
However, they all become an integral part of South Asia as a region because India binds
and links each of them into a unit. This essay will therefore analyze India's perceptions
of China and its policy options towards China as a central theme. Indeed, with India's
impending emergence as a major power, the nature, content, and direction of
India-China relations, the relations of both countries with the United States, and their
evolving relations with other regional states will determine much of the strategic
landscape and future power configurations in the region.

Following its takeover of Tibet, China became an integral part of the Southern
Asian geopolitical and strategic environment. It shares borders with Afghanistan,
Pakistan (given its occupation of a portion of Jammu and Kashmir), India, Nepal,
Bhutan and Myanmar. As neighboring states, each is affected--some positively and
some negatively--by China's military power, posture, strategic thinking, and evolving
role. China thus shapes in a major way the regional balance of power and security
environment. Only India has common borders with a greater number of states in the
region than China. Beijing has over the years also developed some of its closest external
relationships in the region built on defense and intelligence ties, military transfers, and
political support. Unlike China's ties in East Asia where they are essentially economic,
its South Asian ties are primarily politico-military in content.

While South Asia is not central to China's current priorities, it is a growing area of
interest. The United States, East Asia (including the Koreas, Japan, and the ASEAN
states) and Russia have greater importance for Chinese policy makers preoccupied with
modernization, national security, national unification, military build up, trade, and
investment. Nonetheless, the region has vital security, diplomatic, and economic
interests for China. The South Asian states hold the key to the stability and security of
its two troubled provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang. After Russia, China shares its longest
border with India--a 4000 kilometer stretch that it has failed to settle in spite of waging a
war in 1962. At the same time, Beijing has sought to improve its ties with India since the
 - 100 -

late 1970s as part of its efforts to improve its security environment and raise its profile
with nonaligned nations. Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran are China's most important
Muslim neighbors, its corridor to the Gulf and West Asia, and the key to the security of
its Muslim majority province of Xinjiang. Nearly 90 percent of China's total arms
transfers are targeted at Pakistan, Iran, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Thailand and Sri Lanka,
all neighbors of India.34 China has also developed naval and defense ties with all these
Indian Ocean littoral states--dotting the area between the Gulf and Southeast Asia.

Crucially, since 1965-66, China has constructed long-term security cooperation

with Pakistan that includes transfer of nuclear and missile technology and systems.35
Indeed, Pakistan and North Korea are the only countries that have managed to maintain
stable and long-term cooperative relations with the post-1949 communist regime in
China. Every other relationship--including with the socialist Soviet Union, Vietnam,
Albania, and nonaligned Burma, Indonesia and India--have suffered as a result of
China's exaggerated need to assert itself, wars set off by its territorial claims,
ultra-leftism, and the wild swings in foreign policy.

Following recent improvement in Sino-Indian relations and the signing of the 1993
and 1996 agreements on confidence building measures between the two states, Beijing
has felt the need to moderate its policy towards Pakistan, projecting a more even-
handed diplomatic approach. Thus, it has moved away from its backing for Pakistan's
position on Kashmir and calls for self-determination to a position supporting a bilateral
settlement. Nonetheless, its defense and strategic ties with Islamabad remain an
important element of its strategic posture in the region. The transfer of M-11 missiles in
1991 and nuclear know-how and materials such as ring magnets for uranium
enrichment indicates China's abiding interest in keeping alive the Pakistan card against
India.

From an Indian security perspective, China's post-1988 strategic ties and military
relations with the military-dominated power structure in Myanmar has potential
strategic implications almost as serious as Beijing's ties with Pakistan. It allows China to
have two major allies on the two wings of India while it straddles the northern borders.
China, Pakistan, and Myanmar together cover the bulk of India's land borders, and
Beijing also has forged close naval ties with these states.

The growth of Chinese power has three very different implications for the regional
states and is, therefore, perceived differently by these three separate clusters of states.
The first group comprises the states that have close, friendly ties with China and that
welcome the growth of China's overall power and role: Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh,
Myanmar and Sri Lanka. These countries currently see China as an ally in their effort to
enhance their political space, and to ensure a steady, and more affordable supply of
military weapons and technology not available elsewhere. China to them is a benign
state whose power and independent role enhances their security by balancing other
major states such as India or the United States or Russia that are their principal concern.
They do not have any border disputes with China, nor are they affected adversely by its
military power.

A second group comprises land-locked Nepal and Bhutan which have close
security relations with India but which would be directly affected by a dominant or a
hostile China, by migrations from China as a result of political turmoil in Tibet, and by a
deterioration in Sino-Indian relations. Neither of them are dependent on China for
essential supplies or trade outlets. Their policies, economy, and security revolve around
 - 101 -

India. China has tried to expand its ties with both countries and in the past even sought
to undermine India's special relations with them. Beijing sought to open up arms
exports to Nepal in the late 1980s but retreated in the face of a strong Indian reaction
that involved closing down of all except two of the 17 border posts that give Nepal
virtually free access into India. It was an ill-conceived Chinese move that indicates
immense insensitivity to India's security concerns. Nepal has in recent years been more
conscious of India's concerns and has adopted a neutral posture on Sino-Indian issues.36
The Chinese continue to retain their presence through road building, manufacturing and
other projects, and regular high-level political visits. As far as Bhutan is concerned,
negotiations are continuing to settle the boundary with China. Beijing does not as yet
have an embassy in Thimpu. Bhutan has special foreign policy links with India and has,
therefore, been particularly sensitive to Indian reactions to its China policy. 37

India falls in the third category. The dominant power in the region with an
independent foreign policy, India has had a troubled relationship with China over
territorial and other issues such as Tibet, conflicting world views and strategic postures
during the Cold War, and over Chinese policies considered hostile by New Delhi. Since
the resumption of high-level political exchanges between the two countries in December
1988, regular diplomatic talks to settle outstanding issues, promote military exchanges,
and agreements to prevent conflict, the relationship has improved and stabilized. But
there has been little movement on resolving outstanding disputes, settle the issue of the
presence of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees in India, or removing Indian
insecurities regarding China's strategic postures and defense ties in the region.

With the exception of Pakistan, most regional states have at times had strained
relations with China. China refused to support the Bangladesh freedom movement and
backed the Pakistani military's efforts to forcefully and brutally suppress secessionist
activities in the east. The post-independent government under the leadership of
President Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was perceived as too close to India and the Soviet
Union and incurred Chinese hostility. For some years, Beijing used its veto to prevent
Dhaka from entering the United Nations. It was only following the Sheikh's overthrow
in an army coup d'état in 1975 and recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan that China
finally established diplomatic ties with the state. However, since then the two countries
have gradually established close relations, and China not only supplies naval ships,
artillery and fighters to Dhaka, but also training to the military. 38

Beijing's relations were strained with Myanmar for nearly two decades over
Chinese interference over Burmese internal affairs and support for insurgents.
However, relations began to grow after the military assumed power in 1988. Close
defense ties have been built as Burma's military regime has felt cut off from international
contacts and aid. This dependence on China could have a negative impact on the
traditional neutrality and independence of Myanmar, strengthen the military regime,
and create a destabilizing strategic relationship. Greater cooperation among India,
ASEAN, and Myanmar alone can restore the old balance. A nonaligned Myanmar is
clearly essential for India, China, and Southeast Asian security. India has thus backed
Myanmar's integration within ASEAN and has expanded its own trade and political ties
to restore a balance in Myanmar's external ties.39

China was a major actor in the Afghan civil war and a key supplier of small arms
to the insurgents in the combined effort of United States and Pakistan to force a Soviet
withdrawal from the country. It bears the responsibility along with the Soviet Union,
the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia in destroying the Afghan state, flooding it
with weapons, and then failing to rebuild an alternative state structure and a regime of
 - 102 -

peace. Current Chinese interest in Afghanistan, given its continuing civil war and
virtual statelessness is low, and relations weak. But these would certainly grow should
the situation stabilize.

Iran in the early Khomeni years refused to have regular dealings with China
because of its close ties and support for the Shah's regime. 40 However, since the
mid-1980s, China has developed defense and arms transfer relations with Iran. These
ties evolved during the Gulf War with Iraq as a result of Islamic Iran's problems in
acquiring arms from its traditional Western arms suppliers and the need to develop a
secure supply channel. For a time in the late 1980s, China was the largest arms supplier
to Teheran. These included tanks, fighters, and anti-ship missiles such as the Silkworm.
Indeed, China managed to arm both Iran and Iraq in that war. Since the 1990s, Russia
has emerged as Iran's main arms supplier. China, however, remains a stable supplier of
weapons to Iran. While Beijing will have to restrict the nature of its nuclear and missile
collaboration with Tehran as a result of its commitments to Washington during
President Jiang Zemin's visit in October 1997, its politico-military ties with Tehran will
endure. Beijing has long-term strategic interests in the Gulf and these interests are
growing as it comes to rely on Persian Gulf oil supplies. Post-Cold War Sino-Iranian
relations have grown in the context of Iran's efforts to develop close ties with Russia,
China, and India to overcome the "dual containment" policy of the United States. Long-
term stability in the region requires normalization of U.S.-Iran relations.

China has also been alert in developing ties with the small island states of Sri
Lanka, Maldives, and Mauritius. Though small, these Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean
islands are being given their due importance by China because of its wider pan-Asian
and global strategic perspective. China's trade and economic presence have been
growing in these states, which also have strong ties with India. It has cultivated friendly
ties with Sri Lanka since the 1950s and has been a principal supplier of arms to
Colombo. Sri Lanka, like Bangladesh, has found in China a useful counter-balance to its
large Indian neighbor to its north. 41

The post-Mao Chinese interaction with the states of South Asia have been largely
stable and increasingly relaxed owing to three significant diplomatic steps initiated by
Beijing. These are its decision :

• To discontinue all political and armed support to insurgencies in India

and Myanmar and improve state-to-state ties;

• To adopt a neutral posture on India-Pakistan disputes, abandon its

post-1964 call for self-determination in Jammu and Kashmir, and support a
settlement of the Kashmir issue on the basis of the 1972 Simla Agreement
between India and Pakistan;

• Not to foment regional tensions and contradictions by openly supporting

the cause of the smaller regional states against India and stay out of
intra-regional controversies.

These steps flowed from a fundamental shift in China's domestic and foreign
policies in the post-Mao reform years to improve its ties with its neighbors, lower its
security risks, and promote development. This has led, particularly in the past decade,
to normalization of relations with all South Asian states, resumption of high level
political exchanges, signing of the "Agreement to Maintain Peace and Tranquillity on the
Border" with India in September 1993, and the "Agreement on Confidence Building
 - 103 -

Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Control in the India-China Border
Areas" in 1996. The two major powers of the region have thus established a regime of
confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) and are in the process of
delineating the Line of Actual Control (LOAC).42 All these steps have measurably
benefited regional security.

Given China's current preoccupations with internal stability, security,

modernization and consolidation of territorial limits and strategic space in the Hong
Kong-Taiwan-South China Sea sector, it is keen to maintain stable and good relations
with the South Asian states. There is thus a direct relationship between China's more
assertive posture in East Asia, its recurrent friction in ties with the United States, and its
moderation and spirit of cooperation in South Asia, Central Asia, and Russia.

In spite of the generally relaxed atmosphere, latent sources of political diplomatic

friction must be addressed in the coming years if the relationship between China and
South Asia is to remain stable. These flow from:

• Unsettled border problems with India and Bhutan;

• The continuing political and ethnic tensions in Tibet, China's hostile

relations with the Tibetans in-exile, and the consequent concern that
separatism could lead to future regional tensions with United States, and
India.

• China's military ties and destabilizing arms transfers to Pakistan, Iran,

and military-ruled Myanmar; and possible efforts to secure naval facilities
in the Indian Ocean littoral, and deploy naval power, which would touch off
suspicions and tensions with the U.S., India, and Indonesia.

• China's military build up--especially its naval and air power, and
modernization of its strategic weapons. This could engender growing
concern about the rise of a hegemonic, militarily assertive China. India,
Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines and a post-junta ruled Myanmar would
share such concerns.

INDIA’S RESPONSE TO CHINA'S EMERGING ROLE

There are competitive elements and cooperative possibilities in the India-China

relationship, both with wider political and security consequences. In the short run, both
countries are likely to pursue peaceful ties, as this will enhance their security while they
engage in modernization and grapple with internal security and political challenges.
However, relations in the medium to longer term are uncertain, and could again
become tense. Much will depend on internal developments in China and India, the
growth of their respective military capabilities, and the response of the major powers
towards both states. Sino-Indian relations could become increasingly competitive or
even confrontational if China begins to pursue its major territorial claims against India,
if its commitment towards détente and peaceful resolution of disputes over sovereignty
diminishes; or if its arms transfer policies, defense ties, and arms build-up is viewed as
threatening by India; or if the political situation in Tibet gets out of control. Current
 - 104 -

Indian policies stress increasing cooperation with China and reduced military growth
rates. A policy of engagement, détente, and peaceful resolution of disputes and
enhanced cooperation are seen to be in the country's long-term interest. However, a
strategic posture that only stresses diplomacy and interdependence and downgrades
military capabilities is likely to be inadequate in dealing with the medium to long term
challenges posed by a rising China. A rapidly modernizing, strong and democratic
India that balances China's power in South and Southeast Asia is viewed by most Indian
officials and strategic experts as important for India and for long-term peace and
security in the region.

What does a powerful China imply for India and the region? For those countries
that are close to China and view the steady growth in China's military power
positively--i.e., Pakistan , Iran, Bangladesh, and Myanmar--the current structure of
relations is deemed highly favorable. They have no alliance commitments with China,
do not see its power as a threat to their interests, and see in it a reliable source of military
technology and equipment not available elsewhere. China enhances their options and
independence against the West and India. But for India the growing power and
strategic reach of China has very different implications that it cannot take lightly.

In the medium to longer run, the growth of Chinese power will affect India in two
ways:

• As an increasingly important element of the larger Asian and global

balance of forces;

• As the most powerful state in India's neighborhood, directly affecting its

security, diplomacy, economy, and politics;

To the extent Chinese power helps create a stable and peaceful Asian balance of
power, to the extent its reforms and large market create new opportunities for regional
growth and prosperity; and to the extent the reforms lay the basis for a more cooperative
Chinese policy, India is likely to view China's development in positive terms. This
would lay the basis for cooperation between the two states on critical global issues that
affect the interests of both countries--for example, trade, a future multilateral security
structure in Asia, and the environment.

However, to the extent China poses a security challenge, strengthens India's

adversaries, manipulates neighboring states that are part of the South Asian security
environment, or assumes hegemonic tendencies, it would be a major factor of concern.
In terms of security China will continue to pose problems for India in coming decades,
and the growth of its power could easily affect India's autonomy of action in Asia. The
China factor would have to be taken into account in all its external interactions--
economic, military, and diplomatic. Its military power, arms transfer, and import
policies, directions and dimensions of trade, its policies on the territorial issue, its
military build up, defense ties, and evolving national defense, diplomatic, and economic
strategies all impinge directly upon India.

The longest stretch of India's border is with China. Beijing disputes large portions
of this border. China not only occupies 38,000 sq. km in Ladakh's Aksai Chin plateau
but also claims 90,000 sq. km in Arunachal Pradesh. This claim has not been given up
and could be pursued at a future date if Beijing feels India is posing a challenge or is not
sufficiently friendly. India is officially committed to secure a favorable settlement of the
territorial issue and to prevent any further erosion in bilateral ties. India's military
 - 105 -

power is seen by its strategic community as a defensive instrument to thwart the use of
power as a leverage in diplomacy, to prevent sudden aggression and hostile behavior,
and to enhance its politico-diplomatic influence and leverage.

Militarily, in terms of conventional power, the Indian armed forces and strategic
community do not expect China to be assertive on the Sino-Indian border areas for some
time to come. In terms of intentions, China will be interested in building CBMs,
evolving cooperative ties, working out the LOAC, and pulling back or withdrawing of
forces in certain areas. This has already taken place in Sumdorong Chu. China's
primary interests lie in developing its economy, in modernizing the infrastructure in
Tibet and the interior, improving military capabilities and logistics, and resolving the
political issues in Tibet and Xinjiang. Moreover, China will be deeply involved in
settling its external problems in the east--i.e., Taiwan, stabilizing the situation in the
Korean peninsula, and improving relations with the United States and Japan.

Most Indian military experts believe that in 1962 India was caught unprepared for
war psychologically, politically, and militarily, and such an outcome cannot be repeated.
Indeed, in 1967 at Nathu La in Sikkim and in 1986-87 at the Sumdorong Chu in
Arunachal, the Indian armed forces were able to rebuff and deter the PLA from
encroachments and from employing intimidation tactics. India was militarily superior
and better equipped than the PLA forces, and the army displayed its clear resolve to
safeguard its territory and counter any Chinese moves. The lesson was not lost on
Beijing, and the effect has been to neutralize overt Chinese military belligerence against
India. This has helped move China towards CBMs and has established the basis for
peace and tranquillity in the border regions.

The armed forces feel that if India has to maintain its relative conventional edge
against China it needs to invest significantly in force multipliers, deterrence, and
communications. India's airforce, missile program, radar network, navy, and nuclear
deterrence all need a boost in the coming ten years if it is to face up to the challenge of
China's power even in the context of a generally cooperative and friendly relationship
between the two countries. This is necessary to ensure that an asymmetry of military
power not adversely affect India's security, diplomacy, and economy. The challenge
could turn to a threat if China's overall attitude towards India and the boundary issue
change on account of sudden developments in Tibet and elsewhere in the region.

From the Indian perspective, China's nuclear weapons and missile program pose
the most immediate as well as the most serious long-term security threat. The South
Asian environment has been nuclearized since 1964, and missiles exist in the military
arsenals and many neighboring states. The political uneasiness about nuclear weapons
in India did not allow New Delhi to take appropriate deterrence measures, and the
opposition of the major powers to India's nuclear and missile programs have worsened
this problem. Management of India's complex and difficult security environment under
such conditions has become very challenging. India not only faces the Chinese nuclear
challenge but also the threat of a nuclear Pakistan, and the Sino-Pakistan security nexus
that has included collaboration in the nuclear and missile areas. Current Indian nuclear
and medium range missile capabilities are largely in a non-weaponized, non-deployed
stage. This condition is unlikely to deter China from undertaking military action. The
close ties between China and some of these states operating in an anti-India framework
makes the challenge even greater.43 India does not see any direct gains for its security
from China's joining of arms control mechanisms such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. None of them redress the strategic
imbalance nor do they constrain Chinese capabilities in the nuclear or missile areas. Its
 - 106 -

new nuclear export policies announced in 1997 cannot undo the transfers it made to
Pakistan in the nuclear and missile domain. While Chinese participation in various
arms control regimes is positive from a global perspective, their contribution to Indian
or South Asian security is minimal.

What are India's options in this complex equation? Given their respective internal
challenges, the huge tasks of nation building, the consequent need for internal and
external peace and security, both Beijing and New Delhi have an interest in enhancing
their own security in terms of each other and the region by developing cooperative ties
and confidence building measures. However, many of China's activities push towards
less cooperative ties and undermine confidence. For India, China strategy in the
post-Cold War era calls for a combination of astute diplomacy and rapid development of
national power and prestige. While there is broad consensus on the China policy across
the political spectrum, there are differences within the Indian political and strategic
community, on the relative weight between cooperation and deterrence in dealing with
the challenges posed by China.

The contradictory dynamics of the relationship entail a complex four dimensional

strategy for coping with the China challenge--cooperation and confidence building,
deterrence, support for multilateral security building in Asia, and a stable balance of
power in Asia. India does not expect China to settle the border issue to India's
satisfaction in the near future, nor weaken its defense ties with Pakistan and Myanmar,
nor restrain its military build up. To maintain security and ensure long-term stability in
relations with China and other neighbors, India's politico-military options entail the
following dimensions.

Structural Engagement with China

Both India and China face huge domestic tasks related to modernization as well as
external problems and national consolidation tasks in which other countries are of
greater concern. China considers national consolidation-- the enhancing of its sovereign
control over Taiwan and the South China Sea and overcoming political dissension in
Tibet and Xinjiang--as among its priority tasks. For India, the ending of terrorism and
separatism in Jammu and Kashmir and political consolidation of India's sovereignty
over the state and in the Northeast will remain the immediate tasks. These conditions
create the grounds for confidence building, cooperation, and reconciliation between the
two countries to facilitate these possibilities:

i. Develop a series of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs)

that help maintain long-term peace along the Line of Control. This is currently
underway and was given formal shape by the 1993 India-China agreement, and
plans for a troop pull-back where the troops are in close confrontation;

ii. Keep up an intensive, high level leadership dialogue so as to understand

China's security concerns, strategy, and motives;

iii. Develop all-round relations with China, including border trade, giving it
a stake in India's development and growth and linking its prosperity of China's
southern provinces to India's well-being;
 - 107 -

iv. Make best use of the international balance of forces, improved

diplomatic relations with China, and India's growing strategic importance to
resolve the outstanding boundary problem to mutual satisfaction.

Deterrence and Power

India's military capability, however, remains the key for ensuring security and
stability in relations with China. Defense modernization suffered during the late 1980s
and first half of the 1990s owing to a major restructuring of the economic and financial
system, cutbacks in defense expenditure, and the collapse of the Soviet Union which
supplied the bulk of India's military hardware and technology. Military R&D also
declined. However, India has remained committed to acquire capabilities to deal with a
militarily more robust China. Work on the Agni missile project, the Light Combat
Aircraft project, the main battle tank, and aircraft carrier projects have been sustained,
though they have suffered from financial constraints and political uncertainty at the
center. The signs, are however, pointing towards greater efforts in higher levels of
defense modernization in the coming years.44

The growth in China's power unmatched by commensurate developments by India

is not in global, regional or India's interest. A techno-economic-military asymmetry
between these two Asian states will have a strategic impact on the entire South Asia-
Indian Ocean region. It will affect India's South Asian neighbors as well as the major
powers, who will then approach the two countries differently. A China seen as more
powerful and successful by India's neighboring states would enhance Chinese
diplomatic and military leverage against India. Beijing's growing influence in the
international system would mean that the U.S. and other major powers will adjust to
Chinese interests, sphere of influence, and concerns in Asia. China would also have a
growing say in the reform of the United Nations, and in creating nuclear and missile
regimes that work against states such as India.

India needs to enhance its overall national power and deterrence capability
through its nuclear weapon and missile programs and its naval and air power, while
keeping up the modernization of its conventional forces to ensure its security against an
increasingly robust China. It also needs to find ways to make its nuclear deterrence
credible in the post-CTBT phase. These are substantial challenges that will require both
financial and political commitment, and active international diplomacy to explain its
concerns and security dilemma.

Multilateralism

A third element of India's strategic options is to support and help create

multilateral security structures in Asia that would draw in all countries and create
normative and preventive mechanisms. This would involve:

i. Close multi-layered ties with the United States, Russia, Japan, Europe,
ASEAN, the Gulf states, and the states of South Asia to create balance of forces
favorable to India.

ii. Support for regional CSBMs, peace structures, and peaceful norms for
solving disputes from which all countries could gain.
 - 108 -

iii. Opposition to all regimes that seek to maintain the current global
nuclear and missile asymmetry that are detrimental to India's interests.

Balance of Power

China is expected to become increasingly active and assertive in South, Central,

and West Asia, and in the Indian Ocean regions--areas that are less important to its
preoccupations today. India needs to take necessary steps now to match China in
techno-economic terms, so as to thwart any negative fall-out to its security and
well-being. Close defense ties with the Western powers, Russia, and extensive political,
economic and selective defense ties with the Gulf states and Central Asia, ASEAN
(including Myanmar and Indo-China), Japan, and Korea, will become important in
creating a positive external security environment. Joint military exercises, co-production
and collaboration defense R&D with the advanced industrial world, and selective arms
exports will also be major components of such a strategy. Concerted and coordinated
efforts will also be needed to rapidly enhance the country's overall power and
diplomatic role so as to face challenges posed by the major and even some minor
powers.

The question arises: what if India cannot attain an equal and balanced relationship
with China? In such a case, India would clearly need security partners with which to
balance China-- as it previously did with the Soviet Union. India clearly would have to
closely nurture its ties with the United States, Japan and Europe in order to create
appropriate conditions for future contingencies.

However, most Indian decision makers view the country's interests best served not
in an alliance with a major power, but in enhancing its own power to thwart coercion
and aggression. For India, an equal and balanced relationship with China is essential for
its own security and strategic interests, as well as for regional peace. Therefore, while
India attempts to develop a stable engagement strategy, interdependence, and diverse
cooperative ties with China, it will need to continue to enhance its power and all round
economic, military, political and technological capabilities if its national security and
autonomy are not to be compromised. Should these efforts not succeed, India will either
have to acquiesce to a dominant Chinese role in the region, or build security links with
an external power to balance China which may not be feasible unless India itself is seen
as a more robust, purposeful, and rapidly modernizing state. The United States, Russia,
or Japan would be wary of displeasing China or jeopardizing their respective interests
vis-a-vis Beijing if India is perceived as weak. Thus for India the challenge posed by
China can only be met by sustained levels of economic growth, continued
modernization of its military technological base, and restructuring of its military forces.
These measures will ensure it an independent role in the world, safeguard its security,
and advance its interests. These are also the only options around which a national
consensus can be built. A subordinate role to China or a security alliance with the U.S.
despite the growing congruence in Indo-U.S. interests, both remain politically
unacceptable within India. Nor is it certain that the U.S. desires such a role. However, a
series of strategic relationships tying India with the United States, Japan, Russia, and
Europe that strengthen the forces of democracy and rule of law, help build universal
norms and structures for peaceful resolution of disputes, promote multilateralism, and
create a new Asian balance for peace and security are both possible and desirable.
 - 109 -

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

There has been little understanding in the United States and the West of India's
legitimate security concerns in the nuclear and missile realm, especially vis-a-vis China.
Western policy toward India has been largely driven by the Pakistan factor or by non-
proliferation. To New Delhi, the current non-proliferation and technology control
agenda of the Western powers is irrational and unacceptable, since it undermines both
India's security and a stable and a secure order in Asia. The U.S. policy to buttress a
five-power global nuclear monopoly is not conducive for Asian or global peace and
stability. Such a policy keeps India and others disarmed, while permitting the military
build up of the five majors, including China. A policy that allows China's nuclear
build-up but constrains India's defense program is not only against India's interest but
clearly not in the interest of Asia. Asia requires a balance of forces between its most
important powers, not a pronounced, deliberately fostered asymmetry. Moreover, such
an asymmetry and a vulnerable India that it entails cannot be in America's interest.

This argument has been recognized in a recent report on U.S. policy towards India
by a task force of the Council on Foreign Relations. In the words of its authors:

The entire effort of the United States to establish universal

nonproliferation regimes that indefinitely perpetuate the inequality
between the nuclear weapon states, including China, and non-nuclear
weapon states, including India, is designed to relegate India to second-
class status.45

India also views the U.S. decision to activate its 1985 nuclear agreement with China
despite the latter's track record in proliferation--while refusing to cooperate on similar
terms with India, which has maintained nuclear restraint and refused to export missiles
and nuclear materials--as bizarre and indefensible. This policy can only heighten
pressures in India to go overtly nuclear. India is not against U.S.-China cooperation in
the nuclear energy arena, but wants a similar arrangement with Washington. It also
seeks a new dialogue and agreement with the U.S. on the entire gamut of issues
involving nuclear weapons, proliferation, and missiles and technology controls so as to
enhance its security and economic interests, end the two-tier approach to global security,
and build a new security environment in Asia. India is not covered by an alliance or a
nuclear umbrella. Its security needs must be addressed in a new structure of peace in
Asia.

CONCLUSION

Since the emergence of the independent states in South Asia and Tibet's forcible
incorporation into Beijing's sovereign orbit--China has been a key actor in the politics
and security of the region. Close security and strategic ties bind China to several states
in the area. Its ties with the major South Asian state and Asia's largest democracy,
however, have yet to stabilize. Military relations and strategically guided policies have
dominated China's ties with the region. It is realpolitik guided behavior, patterned on
the interest-driven role of major powers of the 19th and 20th Century, thus diverges
from the needs of cooperation, security and stability.

With China persisting in its military modernization and build-up, India and other
states in the region need to maintain their defense modernization so as not to create any
serious imbalance in conventional power. While China's relations with most states in
 - 110 -

South Asia are currently stable, a shift in China's strategic mission and intentions could
create an entirely new situation.

India sees itself as a stabilizing force in Asia and it is the central power that binds
South Asia as a strategic and geographic unit. Its success as a modern, powerful, secular
and democratic state would strongly constrain the growth of fundamentalism,
militarism, and hegemonism, and promote the formation of a cooperative, peaceful and
law governed order in the region. India has no pan-Asian hegemonic aspiration.
However, it has vital political, economic, and security interests in the region spanning
the Gulf, lower Central Asia, the Indian Ocean, China, and Southeast Asia. India's large
size; its democratic, secular, and federal polity; its growing need for oil, technology,
markets, and capital; its vast market and economic potential; and its technical and
military power make it important for the well-being of the rest of Asia. A powerful and
prosperous India will also serve as the engine of change for the largest population
concentration in the world--in South Asia. A weak India and a strong China may serve
the interests of Pakistan, but not very many other countries. Some of the smaller states
such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka--despite their occasional differences with India--
have too much to gain from India's rapid growth, prosperity, and stability. Nor would
Myanmar and Southeast Asia, Iran and the Central Asian states, or Russia take
satisfaction from the power vacuum that a weak India would create in the region.

What Asia needs is not a containment of China but a realistic engagement strategy
that takes the interests of all countries into account. That would involve enmeshing
China in trade, investment, and multilateral security ties. But it would also entail
creating a new Asian balance and supporting India and other states to secure their
interests.

____________
1
China's 1.2 billion people and India's 900 million are several times larger than the next largest --
the United States.
2
The Chinese Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an average nine per cent annually through
the two decades of its reforms and modernization since 1978-79, according to both Chinese
official and World Bank statistics. It is expected to maintain high rates over the next two decades
barring grave socio-economic dislocation. Such a growth rate over an extended period has
quadrupled its 1980 GDP, and enhanced its industrial, infrastructural, and technological
capabilities several-fold. This was made possible by China's strategic relationship with the
United States and the West developed during the 1970s and has greatly enhanced the scope,
resources, and technological acquisitions of its ambitious military modernization program.
3
CNP is a concept that the Chinese strategic community has used to set its goals since the late
1980s, based in part on the concept of Comprehensive Security developed by the Japanese
government in 1980 and on post-Cold War discussions developed on the contribution of
economic and technological factors to national power and competition among states.
4
See, for example, Michel Oksenberg and Elizabeth Economy: "While China's capabilities have
steadily improved, so have those of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the ASEAN states. Moreover,
although China is spending more on defense compared to Russia and the United States than a
decade ago, Washington and Moscow are in different league in terms of strategic capability. In
short, China is not a military colossus among pygmies." Shaping U.S.-China Relations: A Long-
Term Strategy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), p. 34. The same report also cites
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) figures which show that China in 1993
accounted for 36 per cent of total Asian defense expenditure, ahead of Japan (29%) and Southeast
Asia (10%), and South Asia (7%). South Korea and Taiwan accounted for 8 and 7 per cent
respectively. Such large expenditure differentials between China and South Asian states over an
extended period indicate the emergence of grave military asymmetries, especially when China's
nuclear and missile programs are taken into account.
 - 111 -

5
Kenneth Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, China's Airforce Enters the 21st Century,
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995).
6
See David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's
Responses," International Security, Vol .21, No. 2, Fall 1996, pp.180-209; also Shambaugh, "Growing
Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," Survival, Vol. 36, No .2, Summer 1994, pp. 43-59;
Ross H. Munro, "The Asian Interior: China's Waxing Sphere of Influence," Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 4,
Fall 1994, pp. 585-605; Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs,
November/December 1993. For other perspectives on the regional implications of China's growth
see John Wong, "China in the Dynamic Asia-Pacific Region," The Pacific Review, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1995,
pp. 617-36; Harry Harding, "A Chinese Colossus?," The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 18, No .3,
September 1995, pp. 104-122; Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the `Constrainment' of China,"
International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4, Spring 1996, pp. 107-135; and Segal, China Changes Shape:
Regionalism and Foreign Policy, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Adelphi Paper
No. 287, March 1994; Gerald Segal, "A Riskier East Asia for Lack of a New Security Order,"
International Herald Tribune, 8 July 1994; Bonnie S. Glaser, "China's Security Perceptions: Interests
and Ambitions," Asian Survey, March 1993, pp. 252-271; Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry,"
International Security, Winter 1993/94; Yun-Wing Sung, The China-Hong Kong Connection: The Key
to China's Open Door Policy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Masashi Nishihara,
"Japan Has Cause To Worry About China's Ambition," International Herald Tribune, 12 July 1994.
7
Strategic Assessment 1997: Flashpoints and Force Structure (Washington, DC: Institute for National
Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1997), p. 45.
8
Ibid., p 55.
9
Ibid., p. 56.
10
A British treasury report, among many others, cited by the Financial Times has
predicted that within the next 20 years Britain, France, Canada, and Italy would lose
their Group of Seven status and would be overtaken by China, India, Brazil, and
Indonesia. See Reuters, 7 June 1996. Using a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Exchange
Rate for calculating Gross National Product, China was placed second after the United
States and India fifth in the 1996 World Development Report published by the World Bank.
11
Following the destruction of the Soviet Union, the resolution of most territorial disputes with
Russia, and the construction of a 'strategic partnership' with the successor Russian state, China's
regional security environment has dramatically improved. Its new concerns focus on the prospect
of an independent Japanese power or "militarism" as Beijing calls it, and to a lesser extent India.
Its relations with Vietnam, in spite of recent improvements, remain uneasy because of serious
territorial problems and Hanoi's independent posture. Globally, the United States remains its
principal concern. For a discussion, see David Shambaugh, "The Insecurity of Security: The PLA's
Evolving Doctrines and Threat Perceptions Towards 2000," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies,
Spring 1994, pp. 3-25; Also see Ross H. Munro, "Eavesdropping on the Chinese Military: Where it
Expects War and Where it Doesn't," Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 3, Summer 1994, p. 355.
12
For an alarmist view on the emergence of Chinese `hegemony' in Southeast, South and Central
Asia see Ross H. Munro, "The Asian Interior: China's Waxing Sphere of Influence," Orbis, Vol. 38,
No. 4, Fall 1994, pp. 585-605.
13
Among the few recent works on China's role in South Asia are John Garver, "Sino-
Indian Rapprochement and the Sino-Pakistan Entente," Political Science Quarterly, Vol.
111, No. 2, 1996, pp. 323-347; also Garver "China and South Asia," The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 519 (January 1992); the special issue
of the quarterly journal China Report (New Delhi), devoted to the theme "China and
South Asia," Vol. 30, No. 2, April-June 1994; Gary Klintworth, The Practice of Common
Security: China's Borders with Russia and India (Taipei: Chinese Council of Advanced
Policy Studies (CAPS) Paper No. 4, 1993); Sandy Gordon, "Sino-Indian Relations After
the Cold War" (Canberra: SDSC Newsletter, Australian National University, March
1993); Ramakant (ed.), China and South Asia (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1988).
Among earlier works are: Anwar Hussain Syed, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an
Entente Cordiale (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974); Yaacov Vertzberger,
 - 112 -

The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistan Relations 1960-1980 (New York: Praeger, 1982);
J.P.Jain, China, Pakistan and Bangladesh (New Delhi: Radiant Press, 1974).
14
The Chinese pledge not to export nuclear materials to unsafeguarded nuclear installations was
the key commitment that enabled the United States to provide the necessary Presidential
certification reviving the 1985 Sino-U.S. Agreement on cooperation in nuclear energy. See U.S.
State Department Fact Sheet, 7 November 1997. China, however, offered no pledges regarding
the supply of missiles to Pakistan.
15
Note, among others, this 1987 statement: "China is advancing toward modernization and has
the potentialities to becoming a first class power in the world even though it is now a developing
socialist country." Wan Qizhi, "The Pattern of Today's World", Ban Yue Tan, No. 18, 25 September
1987, cited in FBIS-CHI, 7 October 1987, p. 3. On the question of becoming a superpower, see
Deng Xiaoping's statement: "The more powerful China becomes, the more reliable world peace
will be. After becoming powerful, China will not join the ranks of the superpowers. China has
declared that she will never become a superpower." See "Deng Xiaoping Talks Freely About the
Situation at Home and Abroad," Liaowang, No. 37, 16 September 1985, cited in FBIS-CHI, 30
September 1985, p. K3. See also Jonathan D. Pollack, "China's Potential as a World Power,"
International Journal, Vol. XXXV, No. 3, Summer 1980.
16
"Building Socialism the Chinese Way," Beijing Review, 8-14 July 1991.
17
For a Chinese perspective on the all-around value of military power, see Lu Xiaobing,
"Strengthening National Defense Building Is Important Guarantee for Economic Development,"
in Jiefangjun Bao, 6 February 1991, trans. in FBIS-CHI, 1 March 1991. For an authoritative
statement from the 1980s, see former Defense Minister Zhang Aiping's speech, "Strengthen
Modernization of the Army--In Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the
Chinese People's Liberation Army," Renmin Ribao, 24 July 1987, in FBIS-CHI, 27 July 1987. Also
see Qin Weidong, "Zhang Aiping Talks on Army Modernization in the Course of Reform,"
Liaowang, 27 July 1987, in FBIS-CHI, 10 August 1987, p. K 9.
18
See Allen S. Whiting, "Assertive Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy," Asian Survey, August
1993, pp.913-933; Michel Oksenberg, "China's Confident Nationalism," Foreign Affairs, Vol.65,
Winter 1986-87.
19
This has been a major area of theoretical contribution by Alastair Iain Johnston. In particular,
see "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press,
1996); and his major work, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995). Johnston argues that China's
parabellum traditional strategic culture has been the dominant variable explaining China's
strategic behavior and its high propensity to use force in asserting its claims and in pursuing
strategic and foreign policy objectives.
20
See ibid., p 249.
21
As David Shambaugh argues: "It is important not to exaggerate China's potential threat. The
PLA's weapon inventory and combat capability lags significantly behind the state-of the-art and
there is no evidence that China aspires to conquer others, but the early 1990s are likely to prove
the `take -off' phase in a military build up that early next century will challenge for pre-eminence
in Asia. This development, in turn, could trigger a regional realignment to contain Chinese
power. From China's perspective, its current build up is a legitimate effort to acquire armed
forces commensurate with its rising status as a global economic power and protect its perceived
national interests. But from the perspective of many of China's neighbors an alarming trend has
begun." See Shambaugh, “Growing Strong,” op.cit., pp. 43-44.
22
Shambaugh assesses: "Foreign policy is dominated by a handful of Politburo level officials.
Defense and national security policy is handled entirely by the Central Military Commission
(CMC)." See Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China?", op.cit., p.201. Also see
Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking (Santa Monica,
California: RAND, 1996). While Swaine observes that the military does not "dictate" policy,
"there is increasing evidence to suggest that the military's involvement in the foreign policy
subarena is growing, both formally and informally. Military views are increasingly expressed
and military influence exerted on specific foreign policy issues. In fact, the military's relationship
 - 113 -

to the foreign policy subarena is probably the most dynamically changing dimension of the entire
national security policy arena." Swaine, p. 31.
23
Ibid., pp. 73-74.
24
Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement," p. 190.
25
See the exchange between Jack Goldstone, "The Coming Chinese Collapse," and Huang
Yasheng, "Why China Will Not Collapse," in Foreign Policy, No. 99, Summer 1995, pp. 35-68.
26
Shambaugh, "China's Challenge to Asian Security," op.cit., p. 53.
27
See Yitzhak Shichor, "China's Defense in a Changing World," in Kevin Clements (ed.),
Peace and Security in the Asia Pacific Region: Post Cold War Problems and Prospects (Tokyo:
United Nations University Press, 1992), pp. 183-203.
28
For estimates on China's military expenditure see the discussion in SIPRI Yearbook 1994-95; The
Military Balance 1995-96 (IISS, London) pp. 270-275; and Jasjit Singh, "Trends in Defense
Expenditure," Asian Strategic Review 1995-96 (New Delhi: Institute For Defense Studies and
Analysis, 1996), pp. 23-89.
29
See for example, the strategic assessment of Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, Director, Institute for
Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi.
30
See among others, Rahul Roychoudhury, "The Chinese Navy and the Indian Ocean," Maritime
International, January 1995, pp. 21-22; Roychoudhury, "The Indian Navy: Past, Present and
Future," in Jasjit Singh (ed.), Asian Strategic Review 1996-97, pp. 89-115; and Roychoudhury, Sea
Power and Indian Security (London: Brasseys, 1995).
31
For an analysis of China's weapons and military technology imports that takes a
relaxed view, see Bates Gill, "Determinants and Directions for Chinese Weapons
Imports," The Pacific Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1995, pp. 359-382. Also see David Shambaugh,
"China's Military: Real or Paper Tiger?" Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring 1996,
pp. 19-36.
32
See Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions From Abroad: A Quest For Superb and
Secret Weapons, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)
33
See Strategic Assessment, op.cit., pp. 50-51.
34
For arms transfer data, see SIPRI 1996 Yearbook; also see the United Nations Arms
Register data available since 1992 on seven major categories of weapon systems that
form the bulk of the international trade in arms.
35
Mushahid Hussain, "Pakistan-China Defense Cooperation -- An Enduring Relationship,"
International Defense Review, No.2, 1993, pp. 108-111.
36
For a brief discussion see Rama Kant, "Nepal's China Policy," China Report, 30:2 (1994),
pp. 161-173.
37
For a discussion on the relationship see Surjit Mansingh, "China-Bhutan Relations,"
China Report, 30:2 (1994), pp. 175-186.
38
For a recent analysis see Suchita Ghosh, China-Bangladesh-India Tangle Today: Towards
A Solution? (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1995); Iftekharezzuman, "Changing Global
Scenario: Challenges for Bangladesh," in M. G. Kabir and Shaukat Hassan (eds), Issues
and Challenges Facing Bangladesh Foreign Policy (Dhaka: Bangladesh Society of
International Studies, 1989); Virendra Narain, Foreign Policy of Bangladesh: The Context of
National Liberation Movement (1971-81) (Japiur: Aalekh Publishers, 1987); R Chakrabarti,
"China and Bangladesh," China Report (New Delhi), Vol .30, No .2, April-June 1994, pp.
149-159.
39
See Andrew Selth, "Burma and the Strategic Competition between China and India,"
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 1996; David Steinberg, "Myanmar as
Nexus: Sino-Indian Rivalry on the Frontier," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 16, No.
1, 1993; J Mohan Malik, "Myanmar's Role in Regional Security: Pawn or Pivot?"
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 19, No. 1, June 1997, pp. 52-73; Bertil Lintner, "Burma
and its Neighbors," China Report, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1992, pp. 224-259; P.Stobdan, "China's
Forays into Burma: Implications for India," Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), Vol. 16, No. 1,
 - 114 -

April 1993, pp 21-38; Baladas Ghoshal, "Trends in China-Burma Relations," China Report,
Vol. 30, No. 2, April-June 1994, pp. 187-202;
40
For a recent Iranian analysis of ties with China that reflects the positive official policy,
see Maryam Daftari, "Sino-Iranian Relations and Encounters: Past and Present," The
Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.VII, No.4, Winter 1996, pp. 854-876. For
Chinese arms transfers to Iran see SIPRI Yearbook 1995, op cit., also Chalmers, op cit.
41
V.Suryanarayan, "Sri Lanka's Policy Towards China," China Report, Vol. 30, No. 2
(1994), pp. 203-214; Gamini Navaratne, The China Connection -- A Study of Sri Lanka-China
Relations in the Modern Period (Colombo: Sandasa News Agency Publications, 1976).
42
For a discussion of these issues see Sujit Dutta, "India's Evolving Relations with
China," Strategic Analysis, Vol. XVII, No. 4, July 1995, pp. 477-502; also Rosemary Foot,
"Chinese-Indian Relations and the Process of Building Confidence: Implications for the
Asia-Pacific," The Pacific Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1996, pp. 58-76; For an earlier analysis see
Surjit Mansingh and Steven Levine, "China and India: Moving Beyond Confrontation,"
Problems of Communism, No.38, 1989; For a discussion of the more general Chinese
security perspectives see David Shambaugh, "China's Security Policy in the Post-Cold
War Era," Survival, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 88-106.
43
In particular, see Lin Liang Guang, "India's Role in South Asia: A Chinese
Perspective," in Vernon L. B. Mendis (ed.), India's Role in South Asia (Colombo:
Bandarnaike Institute for International Studies, 1992).
44
For a discussion see Jasjit Singh and Swaran Singh, "Trends in Defense Expenditure," Strategic
Review 1996-97, op. cit.
45
A New U.S. Policy Towards India and Pakistan: Report of an Independent Task Force (New York:
Council on Foreign Relations, 1996).
Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA)
❑Introduction

❑Comecon is the byname of Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA),

also called (from 1991) Organization for International Economic Cooperation

❑It Was established in January 1949.

❑The objective was to facilitate and coordinate the economic development of the
eastern European countries belonging to the Soviet bloc and of other socialist
states elsewhere in the world.

❑Moscow was concerned about the Marshall Plan and wanted to prevent
countries in the Soviet sphere of influence from moving towards that of the
Americans and South-East Asia.

❑Headquarters were established in Moscow.

❑After the democratic revolutions in eastern Europe in 1989, the organization

largely lost its purpose and power, and changes in policies and name in 1990–91
reflected the disintegration.
❑Evolution in Memberships:
❑Original members - Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.

❑Albania joined in February 1949 but ceased taking an active part at the end of 1961.

❑The German Democratic Republic (GDR) became a member in September 1950

❑In the late 1950s, a number of communist-ruled non-member countries – the People's Republic of
China, North Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia – were invited to participate as observers in
Comecon sessions.

❑Later, Mongolia(in 1962) and Vietnam(1978) gained full membership.But China stopped attending
Comecon sessions after 1961.

❑In 1964 an agreement was concluded enabling Yugoslavia to participate on equal terms with
Comecon members in the areas of trade, finance, currency, and industry.

❑Cuba, in 1972, became the 9th full member and Vietnam, in 1978, became the 10th.
❑There were three kinds of relationships – besides the 10 full memberships – with the
Comecon:

❑Associate Member -Yugoslavia was the only country considered to have associate
member status on the basis of the 1964 agreement.

❑Cooperant status - Finland, Iraq, Mexico, and Nicaragua had a cooperant status with
Comecon.They did not take part in Comecon operations and were represented in
Comecon by commissions made up of members of the government and the business
community.

❑Observers - After 1956, Comecon allowed certain countries with communist or pro-
Soviet governments to attend sessions as observers. In November 1986, delegations from
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Laos, and South Yemen attended the 42nd Council Session as
observers.
❑The Structure

❑Although not formally part of the organization's hierarchy, the Conference of First Secretaries
of Communist and Workers' Parties and of the Heads of Government of the Comecon Member
Countries was Comecon's most important organ.

❑The official hierarchy of Comecon consisted of :

❑The Session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance,
❑The Executive Committee of the Council,
❑The Secretariat of the Council,
❑Four council committees,
❑Twenty-four standing commissions,
❑Six interstate conferences,
❑Two scientific institutes, and
❑several associated organizations.
❑The Session

❑The Session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance examined fundamental
problems of economic integration and directed the activities of the Secretariat and other
subordinate organizations.

❑Delegations,usually headed by the Prime ministers met during the second quarter of each
year in a member country's capital.

❑Each country appointed one permanent representative to maintain relations between

members and Comecon between annual meetings.

❑An extraordinary Session, such as the one in December 1985, might be held with the
consent of at least one-third of the members. Such meetings usually took place in Moscow.
❑Executive Committee

❑The highest executive organ in Comecon, the Executive Committee, was entrusted with
elaborating policy recommendations and supervising their implementation between sessions.

❑It supervised work on plan coordination and scientific-technical cooperation.

❑Composed of one representative from each member country

❑The Executive Committee met quarterly, usually in Moscow.

❑In 1971 and 1974, the Executive Committee acquired economic departments which
considerably strengthened the authority and importance of the Executive Committee.
❑Other entities

❑There were four council committees:

❑Council Committee for Cooperation in Planning,
❑Council Committee for Scientific and Technical Cooperation,
❑Council Committee for Cooperation in Material and Technical Supply, and
❑Council Committee for Cooperation in Machine Building.

❑Their mission was "to ensure the comprehensive examination and a multilateral settlement of the
major problems of cooperation among member countries in the economy, science, and
technology."
❑All committees were headquartered in Moscow and usually met there.

❑The International Secretariat

❑Comecon's only permanent body
❑Comecon's primary economic research and administrative organ.

❑In 1956, eight standing commissions were set up to help Comecon make recommendations
pertaining to specific economic sectors.
❑In 1986 there were twenty-four standing commissions, each headquartered in the capital of a
member country and headed by one of that country's leading authorities in the field addressed by the
commission.
❑The standing commissions had authority only to make recommendations, which had then to
be approved by the Executive Committee, presented to the Session, and ratified by the
interested member countries.
❑Commissions usually met twice a year in Moscow.

❑The six interstate conferences on:

❑Water management,
❑Internal trade,
❑Legal matters,
❑Inventions and patents,
❑Pricing, and
❑Labor affairs

❑They were purely consultative and generally acted in an advisory capacity to the Executive
Committee or its specialized committees.

❑The scientific institutes on standardization and on economic problems of the world economic
system concerned themselves with theoretical problems of international cooperation.
❑Origin and Evolution
❑Comecon was formed under the aegis of the Soviet Union in 1949 in response to the formation of
the Committee of European Economic Cooperation in western Europe in 1948.

❑1949 to 1953 - Comecon’s activities were restricted to bilateral trade and credit agreements
among member countries.

❑After 1953 the Soviet Union and Comecon began to promote industrial specialization among the
member countries and thus reduce “parallelism” (redundant industrial production) in the economies
of eastern Europe.

❑In the late 1950s, after the formation of the European Economic Community in western Europe,
Comecon undertook more systematic and intense efforts along these lines, though with only limited
success.

❑The economic integration envisaged by Comecon in the early 1960s met with issues like
Incompatibility of the price systems used in the various member countries

❑Trade was conducted mainly on a barter basis through bilateral agreements between governments.
❑Evolution under different Soviet leadership

❑Stalin Era
❑The primary factors in Comecon's formation appear to have been Joseph Stalin's desire to
cooperate and strengthen the international relationships at an economic level with the smaller
states of Central Europe

❑Initially, planning seemed to be moving along rapidly toward a coordination of national

economic plans

❑But with no coercive authority from Comecon

❑All decisions would require unanimous ratification, and even then governments would
separately translate these into policy.

❑Soviet Union, under Stalin moved domestically toward autarky and internationally toward an
"embassy system of meddling in other countries' affairs directly.

❑Comecon's scope was officially limited in November 1950 to "facilitating trade.“

❑One important legacy of this brief period of activity was the Sofia principle

❑Adopted at the August 1949 Comecon council session in Bulgaria.

❑Weakened intellectual property rights, making each country's technologies available to

the others for a nominal charge

❑This, naturally, benefited the less industrialized Comecon countries, and especially the
technologically lagging Soviet Union, at the expense of East Germany and Czechoslovakia
and, to a lesser extent, Hungary and Poland.

❑This principle weakened only after 1968, as it discouraged new research and by now
the Soviet Union itself began to have more marketable technologies.
Khrushchev era(1953-1963)
❑Comecon again began to strengthen as all Comecon countries started moving away from
autarkic policies towards developing complementary specialties

❑In 1956, ten permanent standing committees were setup.

❑The Soviet Union began to trade oil for Comecon manufactured goods.

❑There was much discussion of coordinating five-year plans.

❑However, the Polish protests and Hungarian uprising led to major social and economic
changes, including the 1957 abandonment of the 1956–60 Soviet five-year plan, as the Comecon
governments struggled to reestablish their legitimacy.

❑The next few years saw a series of small steps toward increased trade and economic
integration, including the introduction of the "convertible rouble ", revised efforts at national
specialization, and a 1959 charter modeled after the 1957 Treaty of Rome.
❑The efforts at transnational central planning failed.

❑In December 1961, a council session approved the Basic Principles of the International Socialist
Division of Labour
❑It meant a closer coordination of plans
❑Concentrating production of similar products in one or several socialist countries.

❑In November 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev followed this up with a call for "a
common single planning organ.“

❑This was resisted by Czechoslovakia, Hungary,Poland and Romania.(Romania strongly

rejected the notion that it should specialize in agriculture.)

❑In Central and Eastern Europe, only Bulgaria happily took on an assigned role of agriculture
which was its strong sector.

❑Despite increased integration ( in petroleum, electricity, and other technical/scientific sectors)

and the 1963 founding of an International Bank for Economic Co-operation, Comecon countries
all increased trade with the West relatively more than with one another.
Brezhnev era(1964-1985)
❑Till 1967, Comecon operated on the basis of unanimous agreements, the results was
usually being a failure.

❑In 1967, Comecon adopted the "interested party principle"

❑Under this any country could opt out of any project they chose, still allowing the
other member states to use Comecon mechanisms to coordinate their activities.
❑In principle, a country could still veto
❑But the ideas was that they would typically choose just to step aside rather than either
veto or be a reluctant participant.

❑In this period, there were some efforts to move away from central planning, by establishing
intermediate industrial associations and combines in various countries.However, these
groupings typically proved "unwieldy, conservative, risk-averse, and bureaucratic,"
reproducing the problems they had been intended to solve.

❑One economic success of the 1970s was the development of Soviet oil fields.Comecon
economies generally showed strong growth in the mid-1970s. They were largely unaffected
by the 1973 oil crisis.
❑Also the détente brought opportunities for investment and technology transfers from the West. This
also led to an importation of Western cultural attitudes, especially in Central Europe.

❑However,capital flows died out as détente faded in the late 1970s

❑From 1979 to 1983, all of Comecon experienced a recession (with the possible exceptions of East
Germany and Bulgaria) .They never recovered in the Communist era. Romania and Poland
experienced major declines in the standard of living.
❑Perestroika(Restructuring)
❑The 1985 Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical Progress and the
rise to power of Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev increased Soviet
influence in Comecon operations and led to attempts to give Comecon some degree
of supranational authority.

❑The Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical Progress was designed to
improve economic cooperation through the development of a more efficient and
interconnected scientific and technical base.

❑This was the last attempt to put the Comecon economies on a sound economic
footing.

❑Gorbachev and his economic mentor Abel Aganbegyan hoped to make

"revolutionary changes" in the economy, foreseeing that "science will increasingly
become a 'direct productive force', as Marx foresaw.

❑The program was not a success. "The Gorbachev regime made too many
commitments on too many fronts, thereby overstretching and overheating the Soviet
economy.

❑The Central and East European members resented contributing even scarce
capital to projects that were chiefly of interest to the Soviet Union.
 ❑Furthermore,two factors that marked the beginning of the end for Comecon were:
❑The liberalization policy, 1988 allowed Comecon countries to negotiate trade treaties
directly with the European Community (renamed EEC)
❑The "Sinatra doctrine" - under which the Soviet Union allowed that change would be the
exclusive affair of each individual country .

❑As a result the March 1990 of Comecon meeting in Prague was just a formality, discussing the
coordination of non-existent five-year plans.

❑From January 1, 1991, the countries shifted their dealings with one another to a hard currency
market basis.

❑The result was a radical decrease in trade with one another.

❑The final Comecon council session took place on June 28, 1991, in Budapest, and led to an
agreement to disband within 90 days.

❑The Soviet Union itself was dismantled on December 26, 1991.

❑Post-Cold War activity after Comecon

❑After the collapse of communist governments across eastern Europe in 1989–90, those countries
began a pronounced shift to private enterprise and market-type systems of pricing.

❑Trade payments in hard, convertible currencies began.

❑Under agreements made early in 1991, Comecon was renamed the Organization for International
Economic Cooperation

❑Each nation was deemed free to seek its own trade outlets and the pledge was weakened .

❑After the fall of the Soviet Union and communist rule in Eastern Europe, East Germany
automatically joined the European Union (then the European Community) in 1990.

❑The Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and
Slovenia joined the EU in 2004

❑Bulgaria and Romania in 2007

❑Croatia in 2013
❑To date, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany (former GDR), Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, and
Slovenia are now members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

❑Russia, along with Ukraine and Belarus founded the Commonwealth of Independent States which
consists of the ex-Soviet republics.

❑Russia also leads the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan and the Eurasian Economic Union with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

❑Vietnam and Laos joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 1995 and 1997 respectively.
❑Uniting factors within the Comecon –
❑Political and ideological factors. All Comecon members were "united by a commonality of
fundamental class interests and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism" and had common
approaches to economic ownership (state versus private) and management (plan versus
market).

❑Cominform - In 1949 the ruling communist parties of the founding states were also linked
internationally through the Cominform . Although the Cominform was disbanded in 1956,
interparty links continued through periodic international conferences of communist parties.

❑The East European members of Comecon were also militarily allied with the Soviet Union in
the Warsaw Pact.
❑Some of Comecon’s successes
❑Organization of eastern Europe’s railroad grid and of its electric-power grid;

❑The creation of the International Bank for Economic Cooperation (1963) to finance
investment projects jointly undertaken by two or more members;

❑The construction of the “Friendship” oil pipeline, which made oil from the Soviet
Union’s Volga region available to the countries of eastern Europe.
❑The Exchange system in Comecon

❑Working with neither meaningful exchange rates nor a market economy, Comecon countries
had to look to world markets as a reference point for prices.

❑But unlike agents acting in a market, prices tended to be stable over a period of years, rather
than constantly fluctuating, which assisted central planning.

❑Also, there was a tendency to underprice raw materials relative to the manufactured goods
produced in many of the Comecon countries.

❑International barter helped preserve the Comecon countries' scarce hard currency reserves.

❑In strict economic terms, barter harmed countries whose goods would have brought higher
prices in the free market or whose imports could have been obtained more cheaply.

❑Still, all of the Comecon countries gained some stability, and the governments gained some
legitimacy
❑Within Comecon, there were occasional struggles over just how this system should work.

❑Early on, Nikolai Voznesensky made afailed attempt for a more "law-governed" and
technocratic price-based approach.

❑Instead, what won out was a "physical planning" approach that strengthened the role of
central governments over technocrats.

❑At the same time, the effort to create a single regime of planning "common economic
organization" failed . Although a protocol to create such a system was signed January 18, 1949, but
never ratified.

❑Reason -
❑It threatened the sovereignty of both smaller states and the Soviet Union
❑Stalin clearly preferred informal means of intervention .

❑This resulted in promotion of autarky in each Comecon country because none fully trusted
the others to deliver goods and services.

❑With few exceptions, foreign trade in the Comecon countries was a state monopoly, and the state
agencies and captive trading companies were often corrupt.
❑Oil transfers

❑From 1970s,Soviet petroleum and natural gas were routinely transferred within Comecon at
below-market rates.

❑Why below market price?-

❑Politically motivated subsidization of shaky economies to defuse discontent and

reward compliance with Soviet wishes.

❑Alternate view

❑The slow adjustment of Comecon prices during a time of rising oil and gas
prices

❑Mineral resources were abundant in the Comecon

Ineffective production

❑As in every planned economy, operations did not reflect state of market, innovations,
availability of items or the specific needs of a country.
❑Comecon vs. the European Economic Community(EEC):

❑Although Comecon was loosely referred to as the "EEC of Central and Eastern Europe," important
contrasts existed between the two .

❑Both organizations administered economic integration; however, their economic structure, size,
balance, and influence differed.

❑EEC

❑In the 1980s, the EEC incorporated the 270 million people in Europe into economic
association through intergovernmental agreements

❑The EEC was a supranational body that could adopt decisions (such as removing tariffs) and
enforce them.

❑Activity by members was based on initiative and enterprise from below

❑It strongly influenced by market forces.

❑Comecon

❑Joined together 450 million people in 10 countries and on 3 continents.

❑The level of industrialization from country to country differed greatly

❑The organization linked two underdeveloped countries – Mongolia, and Vietnam – with some highly
industrialized states.

❑A large national income difference existed between European and non-European members.

❑The physical size, military power, and political and economic resource base of the Soviet Union made
it the dominant member.

❑In trade among Comecon members, the Soviet Union usually provided raw materials, and Central
and East European countries provided finished equipment and machinery.

❑The three underdeveloped Comecon members had a special relationship with the other seven.
❑Comecon accumulated more political than economic gains from its heavy contributions to
these three countries' underdeveloped economies.
❑Economic integration was planned from above.

❑It ignored the influences of market forces or private initiative.

❑Comecon had no supranational authority to make decisions or to implement them.

❑Its recommendations could only be adopted with the full concurrence of interested parties and
(from 1967) did not affect those members who declared themselves disinterested parties.

❑Most Comecon foreign trade was a state monopoly, placing several barriers between a producer
and a foreign customer.

❑Unlike the EEC, where treaties mostly limited government activity and allowed the market to
integrate economies across national lines, Comecon needed to develop agreements that called for
positive government action.

❑Furthermore, while private trade slowly limited or erased national rivalries in the EEC, state-to-
state trade in Comecon reinforced national rivalries and resentments
❑Intra-Comecon Relations:

❑The Soviet Union was a dominant power.

❑Possessed 90 percent of Comecon members' land and energy resources,
❑70 percent of their population,
❑65 percent of their national income

❑The location of many Comecon committee headquarters in Moscow

❑However the "sovereign equality" of members, as described in the Comecon Charter, assured
members that if they did not wish to participate in a Comecon project, they might abstain.

❑Central and East European members frequently invoked this principle

❑Thus, neither Comecon nor the Soviet Union as a major force within Comecon had supranational
authority.Thereby depriving Comecon of necessary power to achieve maximum economic efficiency.
❑Reasons why Comecon did not achieve the desired success :
❑Collectively, the members of the Comecon did not display the necessary prerequisites for
economic integration: their level of industrialization was low and uneven, with a single dominant
member (the Soviet Union) producing 70% of the community national product.

❑In the late 1980s, there were ten full members: the Soviet Union, six East European countries,
and three extra-regional members. Geography, therefore, no longer united Comecon members.

❑Wide variations in economic size and level of economic development also tended to generate
divergent interests among the member countries.
China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a collection of infrastructure projects that are under
construction throughout Pakistan since 2013. Originally valued at $47 Billion, the value of CPEC
projects is worth $62 Billion as of 2020. CPEC is intended to rapidly upgrade Pakistan's required
infrastructure and strengthen its economy by the construction of modern transportation networks,
numerous energy projects, and special economic zones.

On 13 November 2016, CPEC became partly operational when Chinese cargo was transported
overland to Gwadar Port for onward maritime shipment to Africa and West Asia.

CPEC will link seaports in Gwadar and Karachi with northern Pakistan, as well as points further north
in western China and Central Asia. CPEC's potential impact on Pakistan has been compared to that of
the Marshall Plan undertaken by the United States in post-war Europe. Should the initial $46 billion
worth of projects be implemented, the value of those projects would be roughly equivalent to all
foreign direct investment in Pakistan since 1970, and would be equal to 17% of Pakistan's 2015 gross
domestic product.

According to those who consider it as a failed project , CPEC has become a victim of its own hype.
Fanciful figures of $62 billion may never materialise — around one-third of that, estimates suggest,
reflects the current scope of the plan — and as Andrew Small, the author of The China Pakistan Axis
put it, the plan has been “considerably slimmed-down” from the sweeping scope that was first
imagined.

Under the original Long-Term Plan (LTP) for the CPEC (2017-2030) signed off by both governments,
the plan was built around a “1+4” model of the CPEC as the core while prioritising four areas:

1. Gwadar, where China is expanding a port on the Arabian Sea and has ambitious plans for a
Free Trade Zone,
2. Energy,
3. Transport Infrastructure and
4. Industrial Cooperation.
Regardless of the CPEC's limitations, one enduring legacy of the plan that India will have to contend
with is how it has deepened the China-Pakistan ties, adding heavy economic stakes to an already
close military partnership.

India’s position on CPEC

“One China policy” must be congruent to “One India policy”, meaning, the Chinese must be
sensitive to Indian claims. – Sushma Swaraj (Former MoEA, India)

The official position of India on CPEC as stated in Lok Sabha by the Minister Of State In The Ministry
Of External Affairs

“Government’s concerns arise in part from the fact that the inclusion of the so-called illegal ‘China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor’ (CPEC) as a flagship project of ‘OBOR/BRI’, directly impinges on the
issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity of India. This so-called illegal ‘China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor’ (CPEC) passes through parts of the Union Territories of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh which
are under illegal occupation of Pakistan. Government has conveyed its concerns to the Chinese side
about their activities in areas illegally occupied by Pakistan in the Union Territories of Jammu &
Kashmir and Ladakh and has asked them to cease such activities.

Further, the Government is of the firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on
universally recognized international norms. They must follow principles of openness, transparency
and financial responsibility and must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty, equality
and territorial integrity of other nations.

Government’s consistent position in this regard has also been endorsed by other countries. The India-
USA Joint Statement ‘Prosperity through Partnership’ released in June 2017 called upon all nations
to support bolstering regional economic connectivity through transparent development of
infrastructure and the use of responsible debt financing practices, while ensuring respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity, the rule of law and the environment.

The India-Japan ‘Prosperity through Partnership’ released in September 2017 also underlined the
importance of all countries ensuring the development and use of connectivity infrastructure in an
open, transparent and non-exclusive manner based on international standards and responsible debt
financing practices, while ensuring respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the rule of law,
and the environment.

The European Commission issued a Joint Communication in September 2018 titled ‘Connecting
Europe and Asia – Building blocks for an EU Strategy’ in which it has been highlighted that the
European Union promotes an approach to connectivity, which is sustainable, comprehensive and
rules-based. Connectivity has to be economically, fiscally, environmentally and socially sustainable in
the long term.”

S Jaishankar at 2017 Raisina Dialogue : “The economic corridor passes through an illegal territory,
an area that we call Pak-occupied Kashmir. You can imagine India’s reaction at the fact that such a
project has been initiated without consulting us.”
Prime Minister Narendra Modi too asserted that “connectivity in itself cannot override or undermine
the sovereignty of other nations”.

The long-term strategic consequences of OBOR for India could also allow China to consolidate its
presence in the Indian Ocean at India’s expense. China may use its economic power to increase its
geopolitical leverage and, in doing so, intensify security concerns for India. CPEC gives China a
foothold in the western Indian Ocean with the Gwadar port, located near the strategic Strait of
Hormuz, where Chinese warships and a submarine have surfaced. Access here allows China greater
potential to control maritime trade in that part of the world—a vulnerable point for India, which
sources more than 60% of its oil supplies from the Middle East.

If CPEC does resolve China’s “Malacca dilemma”—its over-reliance on the Malacca Straits for the
transport of its energy resources—this would give Asia’s largest economy greater operational space
to pursue unilateral interests in maritime matters to the detriment of freedom of navigation and the
trade-energy security of several states in the Indian Ocean region, including India.
But India needs to do more than just articulate its opposition. It needs to provide a new template for
the world on global connectivity projects. New Delhi has moved in that direction recently with an
articulation of the Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC). The AAGC, structured to connect East Asia,
South-East Asia and South Asia with Africa and Oceania, provides a normative alternative to OBOR
with its promise of being more consultative and inclusive. With the AAGC, India and Japan have
underscored the “importance of all countries ensuring the development and use of connectivity
infrastructure in an open, transparent and non-exclusive manner based on international standards
and responsible debt financing practices, while ensuring respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity, the rule of law, and the environment.”

Given the circumstances. India’s apprehension, shouldn’t be viewed as anti-connectivity corridor but
pro-sovereignty. To sum up, the Indian concern is well articulated by the foreign secretary,
S.Jaishankar’s statement “China should respect India’s territorial sovereignty as Beijing is ‘very
sensitive’ to matters relating to its own sovereignty”. For any transnational economic corridor to
succeed, mutual respect for sovereignty is a must.
EMERGING GEO POLITICAL SCENARIO IN MIDDLE EAST

TURKEY

rakesh sood- turkey wants the world stage, from the Kurds to Kashmir FOR EXPANSION OF FRONTIERS AND
GROWING SIGNIFICANCE IN MIDDLE EAST

INTRODUCTION

A strategy some have cheekily labelled as ‘neo-Ottoman’ or ‘Ottoman 2.0’.

KURDS VS TURKEY

For Turkey, almost the entirety of the Kurdish population in the region is seen from the lens of the PKK, a far-
left militant outfit, designated as a “terror” group by Ankara. The rise of Kurdish nationalism, and the ethnic
group’s aims to set-up a Kurdish sovereign State carved out of the current borders of the Middle East, is an
unacceptable proposition for Turkey.
Prior to Trump’s decision to withdraw from syria and Turkey were already at loggerheads. Ankara had decided to
go ahead and purchase of S-400 missile defence systems from Russia, a cardinal sin for a North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) member.
In response, the Trump administration blocked the deliveries of F-35 fighter jets.

INCREASING SIGNIFICANCE OF TURKEY

Turkey is also home to more than 3 million refugees, which the State uses as bait to gain leverage with both
Europe and the US.
The Erdogan plan, which many see as his vision of a rejuvenated “neo-Ottoman” power, re-imagining the
historical glory of the erstwhile Ottoman Empire, also sees Turkey as the power centre for Sunni Islam. This
vision challenges the centrality of Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, which was visible in the aftermath of the
murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi,

INDIAN RESPONSE

India’s response to Turkey’s stand and Indian interests has been consistent. Prior to UNGA, Prime Minister Narendra
Modi met with leaders of Cyprus and Armenia, two states that have heavy historical contentions with Ankara.
New Delhi also released an uncharacteristically direct statement criticising the military assault in the northern
Syria

Turkey rakes up a new front with France

Erdogan criticised French president Emmanuel Macron for making ‘anti-Islam’ statements and aired a clarion call for
the Muslim world to boycott France, French products and economy
OUTCOME

The divide between not just Ankara and Paris expanded further but Turkey’s fractures with European states itself
visibly expanded within hours
Turkey has managed to rake up strains around most of its geographic borders. In August, as tensions over oil and
gas exploration with Ankara in the eastern Mediterranean reached a critical point with Greece, France
deployed assets from its air force and navy to back up Athens, as both European Union members successfully
worked in unison to ward off Ankara’s exploration ships,
Turkey is also simultaneously, vociferously, involved in creating space for itself in the Middle East by undermining
the power of the Saudi – UAE block.
EXAMPLE- ongoing civil war in Libya, where the government structure in Tripoli is backed by Erdogan while the
challenge to it, via General Khalifa Haftar, is backed by the UAE

TURKEY'S MILLITARY VENTURES

Beyond the immediate Gulf, Turkey has also expanded its military reach, with operations in Syria where it
supported rebels (including factions priorly aligned with Al Qaeda), operations against the PKK in northern Iraq,
military base in Somalia, troops in Afghanistan as part of its commitments to the NATO-led mission in the country
and most recently sending private militias hired from the Syrian war along with air force assets to Azerbaijan,
backing Baku in the its latest skirmish in the Nagorno-Karabkh crisis with Armenia.

GEOPOLITICAL SCENARIO AND GROUND REALITIES

In this ‘neo-Ottoman’esque’ expansionism of hard power by Ankara, it has limited number of allies. In its quest
to name and shame Macron, the only overt support Erdogan has received is from its long-term ally Pakistan, and Iran.
Iran, being the seat of power of Shia Islam, and Erdogan, looking to become a ‘Sunni Ayatollah’, have interests and
geo-political aims in common but not much else.
Uncharacteristically rallying behind Erdogan, Iran’s Ayatollah Khamanei, asked them if “freedom of expression
means insulting, especially a sacred personage?”
While both Turkey and Iran are working to undermine the larger Saudi-UAE led Gulf power block, Islamabad is
looking to join this grouping as it fails to rally the Gulf, and organisations such as the Organisation of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC) behind its narratives on Kashmir.'

USE OF RELIGION TO FURTHER GEO POLITICAL INTERESTS

Lucius Annaeus Seneca; “Religion is regarded by the common people as true, the wise as false, and by the
rulers as useful”.
Erdogan’s overtures as placing himself as the “real” harbinger of Sunni Islam, and beyond that as
representation for all Muslims and their faith in the world, is largely a translation in practice of Seneca’s
philosophy.

Geopolitics of West Asia: Implications for India

INTRODUCTION

West Asia occupies an important position in international relations due to its geographical location and
proximity to continents and countries – South Asia, China, Central Asia, Europe, and Africa
.The region is strategically significant due to its enormous energy resources, trade route links to different parts
of the world and the fact that it is a place of origin for the Abrahamic religions
 All powers seek a stake in the affairs of the region due to the abundance of natural resources. It is also a region
plagued with instability largely due to the involvement of external forces, and sometimes due to internal
conflicts.
The famous Great Game left a devastatingly lasting impact on the states, its’ politics, peoples, environment,
resources, and economies

ISSUES- ll date internal as well as external transformations such as political instability, civil wars, sectarian rivalry,
religious extremism, and secessionist movements are making it volatile and precarious region.Regional
heavyweights like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey are contending each other’s views and divided on the basis of
their deep vested interests

INDIA'S MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS

India’s commercial and cultural relations with the region have ancient roots.An important factor influencing
India’s foreign policy is her socio-cultural affinity of Indian Muslims owing to – Macca and Madina located in this
region.
India has been heavily dependent on energy supplies from the region, while Indian expatriates have constituted
a substantial share of the regional labor market.
During the recent time, the reliance on soft power diplomacy as a foreign policy tool has been incorporated by
Prime Minister Mr. Narendra Modi.
The presence of Indian diaspora has also become an important element of spreading soft power prerogatives. They
are looked upon as an unofficial ambassador to foreign policy and an important bridging link between two
regions.
Till date, India’s main interests in the region are economic in nature and our West Asia Policy is pragmatic,
clear and acceptable.

The evolution of India’s West Asian policy BRIEF OVERVIEW

CHANGE IN INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

IDEOLOGICALLY DRIVEN Non-Aligned Movement to a policy based on greater pragmatism. Today, the
increasing multipolarity of the global order has enabled India to pursue its policy of strategic autonomy with
greater freedom when it comes to international relations and trade.
During the Cold War years of global bipolarity, India’s foreign policy followed the principles of the 1955 Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) which PM Jawaharlal Nehru founded.
In the West Asian context, this was reflected in the Nehru-Nasser alliance, through which India supported the Arabs
against Western interference, particularly in the case of Palestine and the 1956 Suez Crisis.
By 1991, the Cold War formally ended with the dissolution of the USSR.The US-sponsored version of neo-liberalism
emerged as the final evolutionary form of global governance. Such unipolarity presented India with significantly less
flexibility of options in setting its West Asian policy .example- gulf crisis
Iraqi forces on the orders of President Saddam Hussain had invaded Kuwai, an oil-producing country. As the
international community began to rally against Iraqi hostility, New Delhi failed to publicly align itself with either side.
Iraq, a non-aligned secular state in a sea of Gulf monarchies, was India’s natural ally to for ideological reasons. Iraq
was also one of the few Middle Eastern countries that supported India’s claims on Kashmir.
India maintained a ‘non-aligned’ presence in West Asia, balancing between the three poles of power—i.e. Israel,
Iran and Saudi Arabia.

OUTCOME
Foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale earlier this year said that India’s alignment today is issue-based, not ideology-
based, giving it diplomatic flexibility and decisional autonomy.
 Modi visited the capitals of all three power centres of Jews, Shia Muslims and Sunni Muslims alike, and his
government reaped:

terror suspects were deported from Saudi Arabia and the UAE; technological and defence partnerships were
negotiated with Israel; and the Indian government came to the defence of India–Iran oil trade and the Chabahar
investments amidst American pressure against Tehran.

To be sure, the optics tended to score higher than the actual deliverables in many cases.

Still, these engagements have managed to create a strong bedrock for greater cooperation specifically between
India and the Gulf, long seen as a difficult relationship that largely revolves around the issues of oil and Indian
migrant workers.

TRUMP AND MIDDLE EAST

INTRODUCTION

Donald Trump’s term has been hectic and polemical. As a former businessman, Donald Trump hasn’t considered
geopolitics as a holistic and complex environment within which multiple actors interact. Rather, he has
preferred to operate in either a bilateral or even a unilateral fashion to achieve his foreign policy objectives
This strategy has strongly undermined international institutions and thus, hindered advancements on global
governance issues like climate change, advancing free trade, and transnational cooperation on health policies.

TRUMP REACTIVE APPROACH TOWARDS MIDDLE EAST

Applied to the Middle East and the Muslim World at-large, this go-it alone approach has provoked multiple
cataclysms in an already highly complex and unstable zone.
Trump has had a very polarising effect in the region — stirring praise for his pragmatic and aggressive
approach on the one hand, and raising concerns for his impulsive decisions that often caused mayhem
Trump’s campaign IN 2016 often invoked the Middle East as a region, where the US has needlessly squandered
blood and treasure. Furthermore, in September 2015, Trump pledged to deport all Syrian refugees — most of
whom are Muslim — from the United States. He said, “They could be ISIS, I don’t know.
In an age where disruption is the new normal, this one surely gets the cake. The US President Donald Trump,
overturning decades of carefully calibrated American diplomatic posturing over the last seven decades, has
formally declared Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.
the US President said he was casting aside the “failed strategies of the past.”

Trump’s record in the Middle East

Notably, the execution of the leader of Iran’s paramilitary Quds Force — the Islamic Republican Guard Corps
Maj. Gen Qassem Soleimani, brought extreme uncertainty and raised questions over the US’ approach in an
already unstable region
the only way to describe U.S. policy in the region is “strategic incoherence.” Every White House has trouble
being consistent in its foreign policy. The problem with Trump’s approach to the Middle East is not actually
inconsistency but rather the scattershot quality of his encounters with the region.

ABRAHAM ACCORD
 However, the gradual alignment of American foreign policy objectives with Sunni powerhouses in the region
led to a historic deal between the UAE, Bahrain and Israel.(ABRAHAM ACCORD)
Under this, Trump announced that Bahrain and the UAE would establish “full normalization of relations” with
Israel, in exchange of the latter temporarily forgoing its plan to “declare sovereignty” over the West Bank.
deal is set to bring more peace and prosperity in the Middle East, counterintuitive results may manifest.
Furthermore, the deal leaves the Palestinians in an odd status quo. For instance, despite the threat of annexation
being alleviated, Palestinian territories continue to suffer from an acute socio-economic crisis,

The emergent normalisation between Arab states and Israel comes at a time when Iran is seen as a greater
threat, and the Palestinian cause isn’t considered as much of a prerequisite for peace as it was in the past
the Israel – Palestine problem being at the core of regional battles, the plan perhaps has already faltered at
the box office. More than the Palestine issue, the deal of the century was more a play by Trump for his legacy

. Prior to this, the president went out of the way to attempt and address other big American foreign policy
conundrums in North Korea and Iran. ‘I was not elected to solve small problems,’ Trump said.

Does India stand to gain from Israel-UAE agreement – and how?

INTRODUCTION

The wheels of history keep turning inexorably. The Israeli-UAE agreement to normalise relations is a path-
breaking move in West Asia, and an inflexion point in regional and global geopolitics
defining moment for the evolving regional political architecture, that will leave a lasting impact on West Asia. It
envisages “full normalisation” of relations between Israel and UAE.
Brokered by the Trump Administration, it will propel the region into a different geopolitical trajectory.

Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law dubbed ‘Deal of the Century’.

Satirist Karl Sharro, perhaps aptly reviewed the ongoing situation: “Middle East peace plans are my favorite genre of
Western fiction,” he quipped.

Arab-Israeli Conflict: Historical Context ( BRIEF OVERVIEW)

After World War I, the former Ottoman-ruled territories in West Asia came under the occupation of the victorious
Western powers. In 1917, out of gratitude for the help rendered by the Jewish community in UK, British PM Arthur
Balfour pledged to create a homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine which had a small Jewish community, mainly
in Jerusalem, the holy city of the Jewish faith.

The UNSCOP recommended the partition of Palestine into two states – one Jewish and the other Arab. The UN
accepted this partition plan, and announced the creation of the two states, with Jerusalem as an international city.
Jerusalem is a holy city for the three monotheistic faiths: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. India, a member of USCOP,
opposed the partition plan and backed the Arab position for a ‘one state solution’ with safeguards for the Jewish
community. The Arabs had consistently opposed the partition plan, and the Arab world exploded in anger when Israel
announced its independence in May 1948, leading to the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948 and later the 1967 and 1973
wars.

Saudi Arabia’s ‘Role’ In Israeli-UAE Agreement

Saudi Arabia has, so far, not reacted – but its crucial role in the deal is beyond doubt.
Why Israel-UAE Agreement Could Divide The Muslim World Further?

Iran has called the agreement ‘shameful’, and Hamas, backed by Iran, has called it ‘a stab in the back of our
people’
. Turkey has also criticised the deal, blaming UAE for ‘hypocritical behaviour’. Ironically, Turkey has maintained
diplomatic relations and ties with Israel for decades, but is today seeking leadership of the Muslim world.
Drawing attention to the threat of imminent annexation, he added that UAE has tried to “defuse a ticking time bomb
that was threatening the two-state solution.”'

Its recent move to convert the former Hagia Sophia Church and Museum in Istanbul into a mosque, indicates the
path it has chosen.

INDIA 'S REACTION

India welcomed the agreement and the full normalisation of Israel-UAE ties, while endorsing the two-state
solution – its default position – and exhorted the Israel and the Palestinians to work for a comprehensive peace
deal.
, India has been consistently supportive of the Palestinian cause. India has always called for a two-State solution
to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. We reiterate our view that the final status issues should be resolved through direct
negotiations between the two Parties and be acceptable to both.
“India has consistently supported peace, stability and development in West Asia, which is its extended
neighbourhood.
Both nations are key strategic partners of India,
” MEA Spokesperson Anurag Srivastava said that India “continues its traditional support for the Palestinian cause”,
while adding that “We hope to see early resumption of direct negotiations to find an acceptable two-state
solution.”

How Israel-UAE Agreement Could lead to realignment of stategic interests of nations?

Pakistan’s dilemma will increase further as its ties with its patron, Saudi Arabia, is fraying at the edges. Both
Saudi Arabia and UAE have ignored Pakistan’s request to convene meetings of the OIC to discuss the Kashmir issue.
Pakistan has shifted closer to Iran and Turkey, as strategic rivalry between Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey has
led to geopolitical re-alignments.
Saudi Arabia and UAE are far more concerned about Iran’s role in the region and have gravitated towards
their ally US.
This opportunity has been the window utilised by US to bring in its ally Israel into the equation, with the
ultimate aim of putting more pressure on Iran.
it will lead to more instability and volatility in the region affecting india's commercial and strategic interests

Why Saudi Arabia and the UAE aren’t bothered by India’s citizenship amendment act?

introduction-

c rajamohan- diplomacy is a game played in grey areas.

India over the last month has faced protests against the Modi government’s Citizenship Amendment Act
(CAA) and the eventuality of a National Population Register (NPR), which critics have said is discriminatory
against Muslims and is “un-secular” in intent.
 why the Islamic countries in the Middle East have remained quiet about the ongoing upheavals in the world’s
most populous democracy, home to the third-largest Muslim population.?

The answer lies in more than a decade of rapprochement, realignment, and new geopolitical and economic
realities forcing a change of play in the major Arab capitals, along with New Delhi.

REASONS for which india is important for gulf countries

With the UAE well into being a major center for global finance and business, Saudi Arabia’s is determined to
follow the footsteps of Abu Dhabi’s Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ) in making Saudi Arabia’s economic
future less reliant on its current addiction to petro-dollars and more based on business, manufacturing,
services, and so on.
Large market economies looking for investments and offering returns in relatively peaceful political climates
are far and few between, and developing nations such as India (along with China) not only have large appetites
for oil, but also thirst for foreign investments to stimulate growth.
* As India seeks to pursue a multi-dimensional engagement with West Asia, While much focus is often given to
India’s ‘Act East’ policy, India’s ‘Look West’ policy too is evolving rapidly.
* Underlining India’s credentials as a “very respected country in the international arena”, Palestinian President
Mahmoud Abbas had called for a potential Indian role in the West Asian peace process. “We believe in the
importance of a possible Indian role… to reach a final agreement based on international consensus and resolutions,
* Gulf was an “extended part of our (India) neighborhood”. Some people, in fact, even wittily call Dubai India’s
fifth largest (and cleanest) city.
* For Modi, however, the Middle East is not just about business deals and investments, as security also ranks high on
the agenda. India has eyed Israel as a source of sophisticated military technology,

* India is also showing signs of finally overcoming its reluctance to forge security partnerships with the Gulf
states whose security apparatuses had long been closely associated with Pakistan.
EXAMPLE- . In 2018, the UAE extradited three individuals wanted in India on corruption charges, a move that
the Indian ambassador in Abu Dhabi attributed to a “personal touch,” In 2018, India signed a pact with Oman that
allows the Indian Navy to use the strategic port of Duqm overlooking the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean

IMPORTANT TAKEAWAYS

Modi got to inaugurate the first Hindu temple in the UAE in 2018, and was conferred with the highest civilian
honor by both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh.
one of the achievements from India’s perspective has been gaining significant space for messaging against
Pakistan’s access to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC),
allowing India to successfully abrogate Islamabad’s views on Kashmir within the Islamic world.
The fact that former Indian Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj was invited to the OIC to deliver a talk in
March last year despite string opposition by Pakistan, which had thwarted India’s attempt to join the forum in
1969, is particularly notable.
India’s relations with Saudi Arabia moving beyond transactional oil trade and the 3.2 million strong Indian
population living and working in the country is still a design in progress. Major strides have taken place since the
2010 ‘Riyadh Declaration’ signed during former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to the kingdom which
elevated the bilateral relationship into a strategic one, with Saudi Arabia even deporting people wanted by Indian
authorities for years over terror-related activities, a move that would have been unfathomable in the 1990s.

INDIAN APPROACH
 India’s diplomacy in the wider Middle East region is marked by rich diplomatic ties with the three poles of power,
Riyadh, Jerusalem, and Tehran alike, without burning its hands in the region’s internal quagmire. Till now, New
Delhi’s diplomacy with the Gulf has not breached its equally consistent outreach with the others.
Since his election in 2014, Modi has made foreign policy a priority, prompting some observers to claim that a
“Modi doctrine” is now in effect. The Middle East is no exception. Despite the complexity of governing a country
the size of India and navigating its dizzying domestic politics, Modi has visited eight Middle Eastern countries and
territories since 2014, more than his four predecessors combined.
The inaugural Air India flight connecting New Delhi to Tel Aviv in 2018 being allowed to use Saudi airspace
illustrated India’s advertised concept of “strategic-autonomy” at play.

ISSUES IN BALANCING INTERESTS

As a result, the Iranian issue has emerged as one big irritant in an otherwise robust Indian-U.S. partnership. The
Trump administration’s hawkish position on Iran has made things difficult for Indian diplomacy, though there are
signs that Washington is not keen to push the Iran issue beyond a certain point when it comes to Indian-U.S.
engagement.

GEOPOLITICAL SCENARIO IN MIDDLE EAST

EARLIER SCENARIO

the Middle East was a house split down many rooms. The coalition of Saudi Arabia, UAE & Bahrain had
imposed a blockade on Qatar, and severed diplomatic ties, in an effort to bring about regime change in the
small emirate.
The traditional rivalry between Saudi and Iran had touched new heights, with proxy wars in Yemen & Syria &
re-imposing of US sanctions on Iran (Trump had visited Riyadh in 2017, and in the backdrop of a sizeable arms
deal, had articulated an agenda for empowering the Arabian side of the gulf against Iran,
The Saudi-UAE coalition seemed unstoppable in Yemen, while the future looked bleak for Iran and Qatar,
economically and militarily.
“We are a primary target for the Iranian regime,” Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi said in 2017. “We won’t wait
for the battle to be in Saudi Arabia. Instead, we’ll work so that the battle is for them in Iran.”
As a result, India seems to be breaking with its “balancing” approach to the region, often considered a legacy
of its Cold War-era policy of nonalignment.

CURRENT SCENARIO

there seem to be thawing of tenuous relationships in war-ridden Yemen, easing of the blockade by Saudi-UAE
against Qatar and most unbelievably, the semblance of some reconciliation between Saudi and Iran.
And there’s one reason for this extremely inexplicable chain of events – USA’s clear intentions not to soil their
hands in the Middle East anymore.'
That the USA has little interest in partaking in any conflict in the region. US withdrawal from Syria, and their non-
response to the September 14 attacks on Saudi oil facilities by Houthi rebels (Iran was accused of the attacks by
proxy but has denied responsibility), have had a painful awakening to a new reality for Saudi.
the UAE held direct maritime security talks with Iran, and pulled back from the war in Yemen, where it had
allied with the Saudis in a battle against the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels. A larger reconciliation with Saudi here
seems around the corner.
In recent weeks, there were reports of an olive branch from the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, asking
for de-escalation with Iran (The leaders of Iraq and Pakistan had offered to mediate). Iran welcomed the gestures,
 stating publicly that it was open to talks with Riyadh.
Sometimes called as Saudi Arabia’s ‘research lab’, home to metropolis’ such as Dubai and pushing a progressive
and globalist approach, all the things Saudi perhaps aims to replicate, Abu Dhabi and Delhi’s alliance has been
one of Modi’s success stories.
In Modi, the UAE seemingly sees more robust Indian economic growth, and perhaps even political stability,
banking on his previously fractured image being the harbinger of change on how he wants to present himself now in
the international arena, an important optic for the Indian prime minister. Despite all this, economic growth and
stability remains the forefront argument, as US becomes mostly self-sufficient on oil, the Asian economies, led by
India and China, are expected to lead purchases of crude.
Other regional factors also played their part, the convergence of Israel and the Arab world’s backdoor diplomacy
gave New Delhi a lot of breathing space.

Dr Gargash said ‘hegemonistic” Iran is also trying to expand its influence in the region, further destabilising
the region.
IRAN is “spending billions of dollars” in Syria. “Iran’s belligerent behaviour” is a big problem for the stability
and security of the region, he said, pointing out that the solution for Syria is not military but political.

ROLE OF GLOBAL POWERS WITH RESPECT TO MIDDLE EAST

Saying Syria and Yemen are cases of failures of diplomacy, he said the biggest test for Russia now is how to
convert the gains (in Syria) to political solution.
.New powers like China and Russia are making their presence felt in the Middle East as old relationships
undergo transformations and new actors challenge the authority of the established states. Extant powers like
the US are shifting their gaze away from the region. Instead of being dependent on the region’s oil, the US is
now exporting natural gas to the Middle East
Countries like the UAE, Kuwait and Jordan are now buying LNG from the US. Though the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet
still cruises the Persian Gulf ostensibly to protect energy shipments flowing out of the Strait of Hormuz, it is
only a matter of time before its role evolves. In contrast, China and India are today the world’s largest net oil
importers and much of their crude comes from countries in the Middle East. India relies on the region for almost
65 per cent of its crude supplies.
New Delhi has now effectively de-hyphenated Israel from Palestine and is confident of engaging with the two
independent of each other

CHINA'S CONTAINMENT POLICY

Oman has been a long-standing partner of India in West Asia, where Indians constitute the largest expatriate
community. With the Indian Ocean becoming a priority focus area for New Delhi, Oman’s significance is likely to
grow.
China’s expanding footprint in the Indian Ocean Region has alerted India to the possibility of strengthening
security ties with littoral states.

India is likely to step up its military presence in Oman. Naval cooperation has already been gaining
momentum with Muscat giving berthing rights to Indian naval vessels to fight piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Regular
naval exercises have now become the norm.
India and Oman have not only made military cooperation more expansive during the Modi visit but also made an
attempt to take the relationship to other domains: by enhancing cooperation in the field of health, tourism and
peaceful uses of outer space.

Given the nature of West Asian polities, with sultans and monarchs still holding sway, the Prime Minister’s
personal diplomacy has indeed had a significant impact in galvanising bilateral relations. But bureaucratic
inertia in New Delhi continues to hamper India’s outreach.
 India’s engagement with West Asia should now focus on delivering on its commitments and strengthening its
presence as an economic and security partner. This will be crucial as traditional powers such as the U.S. and Russia
are jostling militarily, even as America’s stakes in the region decline by the day. China and India, as two emerging
powers, are yet to articulate a clear road map for the region.

WAY AHEAD

While India is still stuck in the age-old debates of Israel-Arab rivalry, West Asia has moved on.

Growing rivalry between the Sunni Arabs and Shia Iran is reshaping old relationships and India will have to be
more pragmatic in its approach towards the region

Saudi-Iranian rivalry mushrooms to threaten the middle east

* RAKESH SOOD

INTRODUCTION

Islamic heartland is where the winds of change now blow at gale force. Shifts in alliances around the rivalry
between Saudi Arabia and Iran have accelerated change, ensuring the region will witness greater conflict and
uncertainty
On one side is Saudi Arabia, the United States and Israel. On the other is Iran, Russia and Turkey.

OVERVIEW

Two historic events of 1979 continue to impact the region. First, the Islamic Revolution in Iran shifted the one-
time staunch US ally to target of sanctions. Incipient Saudi-Iran rivalry assumed a sectarian edge.
After the 1990s, the US “dual containment” policy also included Iraq, which suited both Saudi Arabia and
Israel.

CURRENT SCENARIO

In Iran,2015 nuclear deal Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which imposes strict constraints on Iran’s nuclear
activities while providing sanctions relief. The deal was universally welcomed. However, Israel and Saudi Arabia
criticized it for ignoring Iran’s missile program and growing regional influence and for marking a break from the
US containment policy.
Trump supported the Saudi war in Yemen, backed the idea of a Saudi-led Sunni military alliance and named
Iran as the destabilizing influence in the region, even as Saudi Arabia signed a clutch of defense deals worth $110
billion.
MBS’s( MOHAMMAD BIN SALMAN) efforts to rally the Gulf Cooperation Council into an anti-Iran posture
have fractured the organization. In June, together with Bahrain, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia
severed diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar, which has traditionally enjoyed closer ties with Iran and
hosts a number of Muslim Brotherhood leaders in exile. Qatar also hosts the largest US military base in the region:
Trump’s decision in October to withhold certification of the Iranian nuclear deal, a demand imposed by the US
Congress, has jeopardized the agreement. Trump’s rationale is not that Iran is violating the JCPOA, but that the
deal needs tightening and should also restrict missile development and Iran’s regional role. European allies,
Russia and China criticized this decision
In November, MBS described Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei as “the new Hitler of the Middle East”
and warned that a lesson from Europe is that appeasement does not work.
 To be fair, MBS also proposes reforms including ending Saudi dependence on oil by 2030 and embracing a
“moderate, balanced Islam that is open to the world and to all religions.”
An Arab Spring in Saudi Arabia would make earlier protests look like a picnic.

ROLE OF OTHER PLAYERS

Russia has reasserted its presence in the region. Its war on the Islamic State and other Syrian rebels ensures
that Assad will stay for the time being.
Turkey is coming around to accepting this, recognizing that Assad’s ouster may create a Kurdish-dominated
Rojava on its southern border. A Russia-Iran-Turkey axis is emerging. The Kurdish referendum in northern Iraq in
September has the potential of undoing the borders created after the fall of the Ottoman Empire.

India’s middle eastern naval diplomacy

INTRODUCTION

political observers say, commercial calculations weigh heavy in India’s political outreach to the Middle East.

CHANGE OF APPROACH

New Delhi is starting to think strategically about the Middle East, deepening security ties with Gulf States —
sharing intelligence, creating security capacities, and fashioning joint strategies to combat littoral threats.
Having assumed the role of a ‘net security provider’ in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), the Indian Navy has
moved to secure the near and extended neighborhood, seeking an active expansion of operational presence in
Arabian Sea.
To a degree, the renewed emphasis on naval visits in the Gulf region stems from India’s need to protect the vital
sea-lanes in the Western Indian Ocean.
Indeed, since 2008, when piracy levels in the Gulf of Aden spiked, the involvement of Indian Naval in anti-
piracy duties, as well as its interaction with regional navies rose significantly.
New Delhi has also been worried about the rise of militant forces in the Middle East, leading to a greater Indian
naval operations in ensuring the security of the regional sea-lanes
. The need to effectively tackle emerging non-traditional challenges, such as armed robbery, drugs / human
trafficking, illegal fishing, and maritime terrorism in the Western Indian Ocean has resulted in greater capacity-
building assistance, allowing regional maritime forces to combat criminal activities in the North Western Arabian
Sea.

India’s Indian Ocean Diplomacy

India’s recent naval diplomatic forays in the Middle East are part of a deliberate strategy to strengthen
maritime cooperation across the Asian littorals.
Since 2007, when it codified the concept of maritime diplomacy EX- SAGAR ,IONS
the Indian Navy (IN) has not only expanded its engagement with Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian navies but has
also built “bridges of friendship” through regular ship visits to countries along the Indian Ocean rim.
Apart from collaborating with regional navies in anti-piracy duties, the Indian navy has played an important role in
supporting and training G.C.C. maritime forces.
The naval engagement with Oman has been most notable. While India and Oman entered into a “strategic
partnership” in 2008, naval cooperation has been on since 1993 in the form of a biennial exercise, Naseem Al-Bahr.[4]
India has provided naval training and hydrographic support to Oman, while Omani ships have been regular visitors at
Indian ports.
More significantly, Oman has played a key role in sustaining India’s security efforts in the Gulf of Aden by offering
berthing and replenishment facilities to naval ships, and hosting a crucial listening post in the Western Indian Ocean
 With a new super-port project at Duqm nearing completion, Oman is poised to transform the maritime
geopolitics of the Arabian Sea.[

During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Saudi Arabia in April 2016, there was an agreement on
strengthening maritime security in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean regions, as also to improve bilateral
collaboration in humanitarian assistance and evacuation in natural disasters and conflict situations.
Meanwhile the Indian navy has moved to expand defense ties with Bahrain and Kuwait, through the signing of
an MoU for deeper defense cooperation.

Indian naval planners recognize the conflicts in which Iran and Middle East monarchies have been involved in
Yemen and other parts of West Asia. With a series of attacks on Gulf naval vessels by Houthi militia supported
by Iran, the situation has indeed turned complex.
India, however, has desisted from taking sides, emphasizing its desire to help regional navies jointly fight
irregular threats in the region.

INTRUSION OF CHINA IN INDIAN OCEAN

New Delhi’s need to preserve its strategic stakes in the Indian Ocean. With China’s continuing efforts to make
strategic inroads in West Asia, India’s geopolitical influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has been slowly
shrinking. Reports of a new Chinese naval base in Djibouti, growing submarine visits, and a spurt in Beijing’s
maritime military activities in the Western Indian Ocean have created concern in India’s security establishment.
CPEC ALONG WITH INCLUSION OF NATIONS IN BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE is also a concern for india.

ROLE OF OTHER PLAYERS

Despite the expanding scope of maritime interaction, there appear to be limits to how far New Delhi can raise its
Middle Eastern security profile.
Many Sunni Gulf states have strong ties with Pakistan, and tend to support Islamabad on matters of security
policy]The Pakistan navy carries our regular exercises with Middle Eastern maritime forces , and retired
Pakistan Army Chief, Raheel Sharif, even leads a joint military alliance waging war with Houthi rebel forces in
Yemen.
Indian policymakers are clear that many Gulf States view the United States to be the indispensable security
provider in the region.
A few do not see the Indian navy as a major security player, in part because of New Delhi’s unwillingness to
intervene militarily in the Gulf region.
Despite much cooperation with the Indian Navy on matters of regional security, capacity building, training and even
joint defense production, Arab navies are happy to limit their naval cooperation with India to matters of
irregular security.

Conclusion

For Indian regional maritime aspirations to be realized, therefore, the Indian navy will need to project a more
resolute intent in the Western Indian Ocean.
The Indian navy’s remains seized of the political role of sea power, as a useful complement to its wartime
uses.
Notwithstanding the utility of maritime “soft power,” INDIA must be prepared to showcase strategic
capability
For their part, India’s political leadership must realize the importance of ‘balance’ in its Middle Eastern relationships.
India’s Arabian Gulf diplomacy, then, has been critical in rebalancing the strategic narrative to favor Indian
interests.
 Nonetheless, India’s current engagement with the Middle East remains inadequate in comparison to the critical
interest it has in the region’s stability, starting with demographics.

Crisis in Middle East result of “failed modernisation”: Historian Prof. Susser

WHY MIDDLE EAST HAS BEEN A HOTSPOT OF EXISTING SECTARIAN AND INTER REGIONAL CONFLICTS?

famed historian Prof. Asher Susser, identified “failed modernisation” as a result of the interaction between the
West and the Middle East as the main reason for the crisis.
According to him, this failure to successfully modernise has been characterised by three main deficits — a
deficit in political freedom, a deficit in first world education and a deficit in gender equality. The first two are
important instruments in evolving an economy and boosting technological innovations — the Arab World is devoid
of both.
Prof. Susser also talked about the high rate of marginalisation of women in education and employment, which
means that only half the population contributes towards economic growth.
Given this context, the Middle East remains the “Arab world” only in a technical sense; there is now an
emergence of the “New Middle East” where powers like Turkey, Iran and Israel are becoming key players of
the region, he said.

Petering out of ‘Arab Spring’

“The Arab Spring reflected a definite yearning for change across the Arab World, it began with Tunisia, then
Egypt, Bahrain, Syria and even Saudi Arabia,” said Ramani. “Over the last decade, it has petered out, and in most
countries, it descended into civil war, the only success has been in Tunisia,” he explained

LIBYA AND SYRIA

Ramani described the current situation in Libya, as “utter chaos and anarchy.” He felt there was still a persisting
power vacuum. “The Libyan state as we know it does not exist. There is no Pan African Pan Arab Libya. The
country remains deeply divided and this is problematic,
Syria continues to be a playground for not only sectarian battles but also geo-political struggles between the
super powers, mainly Russia and the US.

American role

Fracking has led to a substantial increase in the US domestic oil and gas production, and thereby to a
reduction of US dependence on oil import.
Energy independence has impacted on the nation’s ‘Iran Policy’, which under the Trump Administration began
with the US withdrawal of the nuclear deal. “It is unclear what the reasoning behind the US backing out was, other
than that it appeared to be personal,” reflected Ramani.
Mr. Trump had never hidden his dislike for the JCPOA, calling it a “horrible, one-sided deal that should have
never, ever been made”.
He argued that it had “heightened tensions in Iran and strengthened hardliners”.
If Iran choose to be belligerent then its response is likely to include attempts to disrupt shipping in the Persian
Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz is particularly vulnerable

CONCLUSION
 Growing instability in West Asia is entirely unsustainable for India in the long term. “West Asia is a crucial
region for India, not just in terms of the remittances but to secure Indian interests in the long term. India needs
to concerned with the worsening of US-Iran relations. A détente between the US and Iran is in our benefit.”

SUMMING UP

Ramani said, “Parts of West Asia are burning. Syria might see the end of the Civil War but it will take years for
it to recover, Yemen is unresolved. Tensions between Israel and Iran will continue and we are likely to see new
forms of instability extend to West Bank as a result of US role.”

COMPETITION BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA TO SECURE STRATEGIC SPACE IN MIDDLE EAST

INTRODUCTION

The engagement by India and China in the West Asia region is a good example of their metamorphosing approaches

CURRENT SCENARIO

The year 2020 has been a watershed moment for relations between India and China following the most serious
clashes between the two countries in the Galwan region of Ladakh since the 1962 war;
relations between New Delhi and Beijing are at new lows. These events have had a cascading effect on the very
thought process of foreign policy, not just for New Delhi with regard to its neighbourhood

What dictates alignment now

Strategic autonomy is today a term New Delhi’s power corridors are well-acquainted with.
former Foreign Secretary of India, Vijay Gokhale, the ideation of ‘strategic autonomy’ is much different from
the Nehruvian era thinking of ‘non-alignment’. , Mr. Gokhale said: “The alignment is issue based, and not
ideological.”
However, the year 2020 and the tectonic geopolitical shifts it has brought in its wake, from deteriorating U.S.-China
ties, to the COVID-19 pandemic that started in China, followed by the Ladakh crisis, is forcing a drastic change in
the geopolitical playbooks of the two Asian giants, and, by association, global security architectures as well.

AdvantageS of Beijing

Meanwhile, China’s overtures have been steadily more adventurous as it realises two major shifts that have
taken place in West Asia.
First, Beijing has tried to capitalise around the thinking in the Gulf that the American security safety net is not
absolute, and they need to invest more in others. China, being second only to the U.S. in both economic and
military terms today, is the obvious engagement.

Scott J. Harr have pontificated that China is no longer happy with a passive role in West Asia, and through
concepts such as “negative peace” and “peace through development”, in concert with tools such as the Belt
and Road Initiative, Beijing is now ready to offer an alternative model for “investment and influence”.
Over the past month, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during an in-person meet with Iranian Foreign Minister
Mohammad Javad Zarif suggested the development of a “new forum” to address the region’s tensions — an
alternative to the West-led ecosystems that have prevailed for decades.
The theory of interests superseding ideology in foreign policy is fast unravelling practically, both from the
perspectives of India and China.
CONCLUSION

While in the recent past, the Indo-Pacific, with the development of the Quad, has taken centre stage, other
geographies such as West Asia have also started to showcase bolder examples of New Delhi and Beijing’s
metamorphosing approaches towards the international arena.

GROWING MILITARIZATION OF PERSIAN GULF

RAJESWARI PILLAI RAJAGOPALAN

INTRODUCTION

Iran successfully launched a military satellite into space. Though it enhances Iran’s space and rocketry
capabilities, it is also likely to increase competition between Iran and its neighbours, as well as between Iran and
the United States.

OUTCOME

A number of military activities undertaken by Iran in recent days suggest that Tehran is relentless in upping the
ante and creating strategic frictions with the US as well as others in the region.
These developments come against the backdrop of growing tensions between Iran and the United States after
Washington walked out of the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1. As tensions with the US
increase, Iran has been growing closer to China and Russia.
the US criticised Iran for its “provocative maneuvers” in the Persian Gulf.
US Naval Forces Central Command said 11 small vessels of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy engaged in
“dangerous and harassing approaches” on American ships
the commander of US Central Command, stated that “tensions with Tehran have not come down and may be
exacerbated”

All of this makes the situation quite precarious in the Persian Gulf. These kinds of naval incidents could turn
quickly into major mishaps.
Iran’s behaviour also calls into question its adherence to internationally recognised rules of the road in the
naval domain.
Tehran is using the opportunity to send a strategic message to other powers in the region and beyond.
IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami lauded the “new dimensions of the defence power of the
Islamic Republic of Iran,” citing it as a “strategic achievement” for Tehran. stated that “access to the space is
not a choice but an inevitable necessity and we should find our place in the space.”

RAKESH SOOD-- US-Iran brinkmanship threatens regional stability, nuclear order

The Iran nuclear deal, formally called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), appears headed for an
untimely demise as both the U.S. and Iran engage in competing strategies of “maximum pressure” and
“maximum resistance,” respectively.

MESSAGING BY IRAN
Iranian messaging has been at three levels ― to its people that it will resist U.S. pressures, to the Europeans that
they need to make good on their assurances because Iran will not wait indefinitely, and to the U.S. that new
 negotiations will not take place under sanctions pressure.
Iran’s latest warning is a reminder that the nuclear nonproliferation order is shaky, partly because the P-5
have failed to deliver on their promises on nuclear disarmament, partly because the U.S. Russia and China have
ambitious nuclear modernization programs to make them more usable,

CONCLUSION

Trump’s policy of unilaterally discarding internationally negotiated instruments will create a backlash.

The US has maintained its primacy in West Asia for the last several decades and the Carter Doctrine, enunciated by
former US President Jimmy Carter in 1980, explicitly committed Washington to defend the oil fields of the
Persian Gulf against external threats
. Despite signals that Mr Trump might be going back on this decades-old doctrine, he has once again brought
the debate on America’s regional role to centre stage

. with China’s rise in the region, the stage might be set for a regional competition between the two

New energy in India-Saudi Arabia ties

HARSH V. PANT

GENERIC POINTS FOR VALUE ADDITION

MODI -first visit in 2016, King Salman conferred Saudi Arabia’s highest civilian award on him, his second visit saw
him participate in the high-profile Future Investment Initiative Summit, dubbed the ‘Davos in the desert’, an
initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
In Riyadh, Modi made a strong pitch seeking investment in India’s energy sector by underling that India will be
investing around $100 billion in oil and gas infrastructure by 2024 in creating additional oil refining capacity, laying
new pipelines and building gas import terminals to meet energy needs of an economy that is being targeted to nearly
double in five years.
Modi assured investors that “due to political stability, predictable policy, and big diverse market, your
investment in India will be most profitable.”
India’s sustained outreach to Saudi Arabia has paid rich dividends on the political front with Riyadh taking a
positive approach on the Kashmir question since Modi government’s decision to abrogate Article 370 on
August 5. Unlike Turkey and Malaysia, it has cautioned Pakistan against escalating the crisis.
For New Delhi, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states are becoming key interlocutors in the Middle East. For
Riyadh, India is one of the eight major powers with which it wants to forge strategic partnerships as part of its
Vision 2030

Russia’s engagement in the Indian Ocean

INTRODUCTION

Iran, Russia and China HOLDED first joint naval exercise in the Northern Indian Ocean ‘the marine security
belt’
the latest initiative by Iran is a response to the move by the United States to form a naval coalition in the
Persian Gulf.
LATEST EVENTS
 the coalition of Western naval powers purports to protect shipping in the Gulf waters from Iranian attacks. Regional
analysts say there has been a hardening in the international posture towards Iran in recent months after
allegations that Iran seized a British-flagged tanker in the Strait of Hormuz
. Indeed, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands and France have even backed a UK proposal for a European naval
force.
The US accuses Tehran of disrupting the flow of international oil by attacking tankers and Saudi oil facilities,
leading senior Iranian officials to warn Washington that any attempt to form an international coalition in the Gulf will
invite an Iranian response.
From an Indian perspective then, recent developments offer a bittersweet taste of regional geopolitics. Russia’s
engagement in the Indian Ocean has indeed grown but not quite in the way India’s maritime watchers had
imagined
The activities of Russia, China, and Iran on their own terms have also attracted interest. Russia has its own initiative,
the Collective Security in the Persian Gulf, which is also backed by China.
Meanwhile, Iran has plans to pursue a “Hormuz Peace Endeavor” called HOPE, That its own initiative would not
include any foreign powers and that it will be a coalition of regional states (while Iran’s naval prowess thus far
has been limited to its use of fast boats to harass and chase foreign naval vessels, which has been undertaken by the
IRGC and not the actual navy

, the Iranian Navy is gaining teeth with acquisition of new drones and other technologies).
China has been more cautious about formal statements, partly because Chinese security analysts say Beijing
would not want “to be drawn into Middle East conflicts.”
GROWING ASSERTIVENESS OF CHINA

INTRODUCTION -

India, the United States, Japan and Australia (QUAD) agreed to step up coordination in creating a free and open Indo-
Pacific, amid China's growing assertiveness in the strategically vital INDO PACIFIC region.
THEY affirmed strengthening of a free, open and rules-based international order,
The in-person meeting of the foreign ministers of the 'Quad' hosted by Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi
took place in the backdrop of China's aggressive military behaviour in the Indo-Pacific, South China Sea and along the
Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh.
Addressing the 2nd Quad ministerial meeting, Prime Minister Suga said a free and open Indo-Pacific is "widely
recognised by the international community as a vision of peace and prosperity of this region," and that his
government's basic policy is to "further continue advancing our members to this end.

S JAISHANKAR SAID-

"We remain committed to upholding the rules-based international order, underpinned by the rule of law, transparency,
freedom of navigation in the international seas, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty and peaceful resolution of
disputes," he said, amidst growing global concern over China's expansionist behaviour.
ON BORDER CRISIS--"The state of the border cannot be de-linked from the state of the relationship.," Mr
Jaishankar said referring to his newly published book ''The India Way'
Mr. Jaishankar said the challenge for the diplomacy of the two countries would be on how to adjust to each
other’s rise.

HOW CHINA ASSERTIVENESS IS GROWING-

China is engaged in hotly contested territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas. Beijing has also made
substantial progress in militarising its man-made islands in the past few years.
Beijing claims sovereignty over all of the South China Sea. But Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei and Taiwan
have counterclaims. In the East China Sea, China has territorial disputes with Japan. The South China Sea and the East
China Sea are stated to be rich in minerals, oil and other natural resources. They are also vital to global trade.
Meanwhile, Japan has lodged a protest against China's creation of a digital museum laying out its claims to a group of
Japan-controlled islets in the East China Sea, the government's top spokesman said on Monday. "The Senkaku Islands
have been recognised historically and under international law as an inherent part of Japan's territory and we maintain
effective control over them,

DHRUVA JAISHANKAR

China’s ambassador to Sweden, Gui Congyou, has a colorful turn of phrase to describe his country’s approach to foreign
policy: “We treat our friends with fine wine, but for our enemies we have shotguns.”

EXAMPLES OF GROWING ASSERTIVENESS

 The most dramatic developments in China’s hardening attitude have been closest to home. On May 22, the National
People’s Congress approved a national security law for Hong Kong, which came into force on July 1, undermining
Beijing’s treaty commitment to “one country, two systems.”
A major mobilization by the People’s Liberation Army along the disputed border with India in April and May led to
clashes and a prolonged military stand-off. Further violence during a de-escalation process on June 15 resulted in the
deaths of 20 Indian soldiers-GALWAN CLASH
One month later, Chinese officials and media also made claims to a sizeable tract of territory in Bhutan, an area that
had not featured in previous border negotiations.
the Australian government revealed a sustained cyber attack by China against government agencies, infrastructure, and
businesses. This came after Canberra passed laws to increase oversight on foreign lobbying and protect its political
system from external interference (moves driven by specific Chinese activity), and disqualified Chinese telecom
companies from acting as suppliers for 5G contracts. Beijing also imposed trade curbs on Australia as explicit retaliation
for its calls
Other fronts — including the South and East China Seas, and relations with Taiwan — have witnessed continued or
worsening frictions, with the pandemic inducing not even a short period of restraint on China’s part. In mid-April, a
Chinese vessel tagged a Malaysian drill ship in disputed waters off of Borneo, resulting in a standoff that eventually
involved five countries.
After South Korea decided to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in July 2016, China lost
no time in imposing a series of unilateral sanctions targeting South Korean-based companies. It even encouraged a
boycott of South Korean products
Several airspace violations by Chinese aircraft were also reported over Taiwan, and the island experienced sustained
Chinese disinformation campaigns throughout its recent elections. China also named a number of geographic features in
the South China Sea in April and the East China Sea in June, as part of its expansive territorial claims.
The unprecedented scale of China’s open criticism of American domestic affairs and conspiracy-theorizing about U.S.
origins for the virus could be explained away in the context of worsening bilateral tensions.
In Brazil, Chinese diplomats have launched broadsides against elected officials, including the son of President Jair
Bolsonaro. The propaganda, disinformation, and written and verbal attacks from Chinese officials in Europe have led to
the summoning of the Chinese ambassador in France, pushback against China’s “aggressive” diplomacy from the E.U.’s
top foreign policy official, and plummeting views of China among European publics.

GLOBAL RETALIATION AGAINST CHINA ASSERTIVENESS

Recent moves on the part of the United States, such as its revocation of Hong Kong’s special status, sanctions
against Chinese officials responsible for human rights abuses in Xinjiang, and hardened South China Sea policy
have been partly conditioned by Chinese actions and Sino-American dynamics during the pandemic
plans for formats ranging from the D-10 (a proposed group of ten democracies to cooperate on 5G technologies
and other economic security issues) to the new E.U.-U.S. dialogue on dealing with the China challenge.
U.S. trade and technological restrictions, Australia’s criticism of political interference, the United Kingdom’s
involvement in Hong Kong, Japan’s “remilitarization,” India’s border infrastructure development, Southeast
Asia’s resource extraction in the South China Sea, Taiwan’s pro-independence tilt, or Canada’s detention of a
Chinese citizen
United Kingdom (UK) announced its decision to ban all Huawei equipment from the country’s 5G networks by end-2027

Trump lavished praise on Xi and then in his speech targeted China for --“the audacious theft of intellectual property”

REASONS FOR CHINA ASSERTIVENESS

A first explanation could be considered “opportunistic assertiveness.” Simply put, Beijing is taking advantage of
political and economic weaknesses and distractions in the rest of the world, and believes that the U.S.-Chinese
relationship under the Trump administration cannot get much worse anyway.
A second possibility, implying a lasting change rather than a temporary burst of opportunism, might be considered
“imperious assertiveness.They genuinely believe that China now offers a viable alternative to the United States as a
global power and that any criticism is unjustified or hypocritical. The lackluster response by the Western world —
specifically the United States and parts of Europe — to COVID-19 stands in contrast to Asian technocratic superiority
 Some critics in China have gently warned against the adverse consequences of this approach (“destroying yourself
through excessive praise”), particularly when China’s own challenges — from demographics to debt — remain
considerable
A third theory implies “reactive assertiveness,” a term first coined by the International Crisis Group to describe China’s
behavior in the South China Sea. it suggests an escalatory response to the immediate economic, reputational, security,
and political challenges China faces through the pandemic and its aftermath. As went the South China Sea, where China
has sought to “use perceived provocations as a chance to change the status quo in its favor — all the while insisting
the other party started the trouble”
A final possibility — implying concern that China and the Chinese Communist Party are entering an extended period of
vulnerability — is “insecure assertiveness.” China’s actions arise not out of a sense of strength, but of weakness, and a
belief that its threat environment has changed in a more fundamentally dangerous way.
No One Likes Us, We Don’t Care”--It is possible that some combination of the above is at play: China is displaying
imperiousness, opportunism, reactiveness, and insecurity all at once.

WAY FORWARD

China’s successes in combating COVID-19 at home, the aid it rendered to others, greater assertiveness of its foreign policy and
the confrontational policies conducted by the United States have combined to accelerate the emergence of a world where two
power centres — the United States and China — are much stronger than all the others.
The US Pivot and Indian Foreign Policy is based on the premise of the ascendance of Chinese power and relative decline
of the United States
(US) on the world stage causing transition of power in international politics. Considering China’s assertive behaviour, this power
transition
is unlikely to be peaceful inducing uncertainty in the system. By using the term ‘balance of power’ in the title itself, emerging
bipolar world order with the US and China being the two poles in the near future.
Hydro Politics
between
India and
China
Chinese Superdam near Arunachal - Near Great Bend ,
River falls at the height of 2000 m near Yarlung Grand Canyon
Hydrocapacity 3X of Three Gorges Dam , so far the largest in
the world

Objectives -
 Strategic Cooperation Agreement , Oct 16. 2020 with TAR
. National security , Water resources , Domestic security
 Meet Chinese goal of Peak Carbon Emission by 2020 and
Carbon neutrality by 2060.
Institutional Mechanisms : India China
 Flooding

Water scarcity

Weaponising

Choking Indian Economy

India’s
Concerns Unrest in North East

Earthquake

India has its own diversion plans (River linking )

 Government
of India has
conveyed:

India has
established water
rights

MEA’s Any development

Response has to take into
account the
concerns of lower
riparian states

Discussion at
mechanism
established in 2006
 China acts
responsibly :

China’s
Response
Sceintific Contingency
planning managemnt
 China acts responsibly
:

China’s China will factor in the

Response
interest of other
Contingency
Scientific planning coutries before the
management
construction of the
Dam
 • India is considering massive 10 GW Hydro powerplant in
Arunachal

India’s Note :
1. Considering the speed of execution  India will be at
counter- disadvantage
offensives 2. India will alienate Bangladesh whose support it requires

Analysis:
• India working on “Prior appropriation Principle of International
Law”  First user get right to continue using that quantity of
water
Chinese
Geopolitics

Li Ling’s Book “Tibet’s water will save

China ”
Chinese
Geopolitics

 The agreement on Brahmputra with India is sub-optimal

 China agreed to share hydrological data to show itself as a
responsible neighbour
 The discussion on water is overshadowed by territorial
disputes
 Initially China favoured bilateral aargengemnts  now
multilateral . Example – Lancang Mekong cooperation with
5 countries
 China insist to include Bangladesh – India prefers bilateral
 Stressed relations over Teesta
 China’s aim to encircle India working with Dhaka
South Asian
Geopolitics

 Bangladesh , Nepal, Pakistan have criticized India’s

hypocracy  India as a Bully
 China Threat : An Indian Propaganda for its own
administarive lapses
Way Forward for India

 India will need to be more adept in responding to

Brahmaputra river-related issues.
 It needs to clearly envision the desired end goal and
strategic outcomes for dealing with impending water
conflicts.
 Needs to de-emphasise China’s role for the time being and
restrengthen its relationship with Bangladesh.
 Needs to push the impending Teesta river agreement and
restore its image as a responsible upper riparian.
 Needs to mirror its strength and firmness in negotiations with
China on water rights, as it did in the case of the Doklam
stand-off and in opposing the Belt and Road Initiative,
rather than projecting itself as a victim.
 India - European Union(EU) Relations
Timeline

15th Summit between India and EU takes place in virtual format

The leaders decided to strengthen the India-EU Strategic Partnership, based on shared
principles and values of democracy,
freedom, rule of law, and respect for human
rights, aiming at delivering concrete benefits
for the people in India and the EU.

As the world's two largest democracies,

India and the EU affirmed their
determination to promote effective
multilateralism and a rules-based
multilateral order with the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation at its core.

They will bolster their cooperation in international fora to reinforce international security,
strengthen preparedness and response for global health emergencies, enhance global
economic stability and inclusive growth, implement the Sustainable Development Goals
and protect the climate and the environment. The Joint Statement said, the EU is looking
forward to India’s G20 Presidency in 2022 and its membership in the UN Security Council
in 2021-2022.

As the world is fighting the COVID-19 pandemic, the leaders agreed that global
cooperation and solidarity are essential to protect lives and to mitigate the socio-
economic consequences of the pandemic. The leaders emphasised the importance of
strengthening preparedness and response capacities, of sharing information in a free,
transparent and prompt manner, and of improving international response.

The leaders noted mutual synergies in the field of healthcare through shared capacities,
experiences and strengths in the production of pharmaceuticals and vaccines, healthcare
research and development, diagnostics and treatment.

They discussed prospects for global collaboration and sustained funding for developing
and deploying and accessibility of effective diagnostics, treatments and vaccines to make
them available to all at an affordable price. They called for the future COVID-19 vaccine to
become a global common good.

The leaders agreed to further develop their trade and investment relations to unleash their
full potential particularly in the context of post-COVID-19 economic recovery and support
sustainable growth and jobs on both sides. They reaffirmed their commitment to work
towards balanced, ambitious and mutually-beneficial trade and investment agreements,
opening markets and creating a level playing field on both sides.

They also agreed to establish a regular High Level Dialogue at ministerial level to provide
guidance to the bilateral trade and investment relations and to address multilateral issues
of mutual interest. India and the EU agreed to keep the global trading system open, with
the WTO as the bedrock of the rules-based multilateral trading system.

They welcomed the ongoing activity in India of the European Investment Bank and the
upcoming planned investments of Euros 550 million in the Pune and Bhopal Metro Rail
Projects.

The leaders adopted the "India-EU Strategic

Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025” to guide cooperation
between India and the EU over the next five years. They
welcomed the signing of the India-EURATOM
Agreement on research and development cooperation
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

They also adopted a Joint Declaration on Resource Efficiency and Circular Economy and
welcomed the upcoming renewal of the India-EU Science and Technology Agreement for
another five years.
The EU traces its origins to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the
European Economic Community (EEC), established, respectively, by the 1951 Treaty of Paris
and 1957 Treaty of Rome. EU is the most advanced regional integration model . It has
common currency (19 countries), common market , common foreign and security policy as
well as alignment on justice and home affairs . Schenzen Agreement abolishes passport
control .

The original members of what came to be known as the European Communities were the
Inner Six: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. At
present , the total strength is 27.

Milestones in the evolution of EU

Treaty of Paris, 1951

European Coal and Steel Community formed.

Treaty of Rome , 1957

The EU’s precursor, the European Economic Community (EEC), was established in 1957,
following the Treaty of Rome. Consisting of a homogeneous group of six countries (Belgium,
France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands).

Treaty of Maastricht, 1992

To reflect the post-Cold War Europe's unity with a unified Germany. It helped create the Euro
and, later, also pushed the eastward expansion of the EU.

The Treaty of Lisbon, 2007

It marked another political evolution, giving the EU a stronger legal character by introducing
a permanent President of the European Council and strengthening the position of the High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

EU in current times
Macron: “The bloc needs to assert sovereignty over its political and security
decisions . Europe is on the edge of a precipice ”. He reminds that EU can no
longer be an economic giant and a political dwarf.

Once a gold standard for regional integration , EU is facing the existential crisis
.
o The idea of Europe with a “variable geometry”, proposed during the hasty
expansion during the 1990s to accommodate differences is now a clear sign of
political disunity. As EU expanded , it also started showing faultlines to the extent
it has become difficult to maintain the Unity . EU states may appear as one entity
from outside but today the fault lines are easily visible . EU states are divided on
 multiple lines for example – Old Europe and New Europe ; East and West Europe
; North and South Europe ; Core and Periphery ; Europhobic and Europhilic .
o Since Eurozone crisis ,EU is suffering from economic challenges like
unemployment , recession, debt crisis .
o Since 2011 , as a result of Arab Spring , EU came under the crisis emerging from
migration of refugees .

The economic challenges and the refugee crisis has challenged EU’s core values related to
democracy and human rights. There is a growth of rightist parties along with illiberal
democracies and authoritarian leaders.

EU is also facing challenges from outside  Unilateralism of Trump , a resentful Russia on

its border and a China determined to emerge as the new global power.

The Covid Crisis has also made a significant dent in EU’s image along with Brexit .

Issues of concern related to EU

Brexit

Brexit represent exit of Britain from EU on the basis

of 2016 referendum . Britain had joined EU in 1973.
Britain was considered as Europhobic.

Key Issues :
The “leave campaign” argued (51.9 % in the
referendum ):
1. Take control of sovereignty of Britain back
which was lost in EU’s complicated system.
2. Huge money paid as a subscription.
3. Controlling our economy ourselves .
4. In context of immigration , controlling our borders.
5. EU has a burdensome regulations and prevent progressive reforms.
6. UK to have its own rational immigration system.

Arguments of “Remain campaign ” (48.1 % in the referendum ):

1. UK is stringer , safer and better of in EU.
2. Jobs and trade is closely linked with EU and it adds billions of dollars to British
Economy

On 1st January , Britain left EU.

Present arrangement :

 Freedom to work and live between EU and UK comes to an end .

  UK is free to set its own trade policy and negotiates deals with other countries .
Already doing Australia, New zealand and USA. The three do not have FTA with EU.
 They will continue to buy an sell goods across the borders without paying taxes and
without any limitations on the amount . Yet they will have to do paperwork to agree
to shared rules and standards on workers rights and social and environmental
regulations. Paperwork at the borders causes delay.

Still, issues have not ended – There is no deal on data sharing and financial services
agreement on fishing is only for 5 years . At present , they have agreed to identical rules . But
in future they need not to follow the identical rules which can lead to dispute and Tariffs.

Northern Ireland will continue to follow EU rules to avoid hardening of borders . However,
there will be checks on goods entering Northern Ireland from UK.

Impact of Brexit on India:

It is premature to make assessment . However , India can explore opportunities in service

sector in both the markets. Brexit paves the way for FTA between New Delhi and London but
can take the sheen away from India’s FTA with EU.
India’s professionals may gain because after Brexit deal , UK and EU professionals will have
no longer unrestricted freedom to work , study or start the business.

Indian companies having their headquarters in UK or EU aiming to serve both the markets
may face problems .

Britain may loose attractiveness for Indian investors as Britain use to be a Gateway to
Europe.
Automobile sector may face downturn .

India EU FTA

The deal has been languishing for many years and have gone through numerous rounds of
talks.

The proposed agreement is politically and economically crucial for both sides. In political
terms, from the EU’s perspective the free trade agreement (FTA) with India will support the
EU’s aim of employing FTAs to foster partner countries’ integration into the world economy,
and will strengthen its role in global trade governance.

From India’s perspective, it will boost Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Make in India”
campaign and his ambition to establish India as a regional leader and global manufacturing
centre. Furthermore, the FTA will strengthen India’s attempts to harness its growing
domestic economy and middle class to support its rise as a global economic power.

In economic terms, a well-negotiated agreement will boost trade and investment flows
between the two regions.

The EU is India’s largest trading partner and investor as well as its main source of technology
transfer. The EU- India trade account for €80 billion in goods in 2019 . The EU is the second-
largest destination for Indian exports (over 14% of the total) after the USA.

India is the EU’s 10th largest trading partner, accounting for 1.9% of EU total trade in goods
in 2019. Trade in goods between the EU and India increased by 72% in the last decade.

Trade in services between the EU and India increased rapidly from €22.3 billion in 2015 to
€29.6 billion in 2018.

The EU's share in foreign investment inflows to India more than doubled from 8% to 18% in
the last decade, making the EU the first foreign investor in India.
Some 6,000 European companies are present in India, providing directly 1.7 million jobs and
indirectly 5 million jobs in a broad range of sectors.

There are a host of studies analysing the economic effects of the proposed FTA. The analysis
by the Indian government suggests that India will be a net loser from the FTA in terms of the
trade in goods, primarily as a result of the loss of revenues from lower or zero tariffs,
although gains are expected from liberalisation of the services sector.

A report by Sussex University and an Indian NGO – CUTS International – also indicates that
liberalisation of trade in goods would yield only ambiguous welfare effects.

Areas of disagreement
European and Indian expectations diverge on issues such as tariffs on cars, wines, and dairy
products imported from the EU, and on the liberalisation of the visa regime for Indian
professionals entering the EU.
The EU and India have even had trade disputes at the World Trade Organization (WTO) on
wine and spirits and on pharmaceuticals. When FTA negotiations began, India had high
tariffs in areas of interest to the EU and restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) in
several sectors, including insurance and trade. Rules on FDI in insurance and wholesale trade
and on single-brand retail have since been changed, but tariffs on goods such as wines and
cars remain at between 60 and 100 percent.

Both the EU and India have voiced concerns about restrictive measures that function as a
barrier to their exporters. Recently, for instance, the EU expressed anxiety over the Indian
government’s requirement that 15 categories of IT and consumer electronic products must
be registered in the country. A similar issue is mandatory in-country testing and certification
of telecom network elements. India has also been affected by EU regulations and standards,
especially on agricultural exports. For example, imports of Indian Alphonso mangoes were
banned in May 2014 after “non-European fruit flies” were found in some consignments,
though this was lifted in early 2015.

One of India’s key objectives is to be recognised as a data-secure country. At present, India

is not considered data-secure under EU legislation, despite India amending its Information
Technology Act in 2000 and issuing new Information Technology Rules in 2011, in line with
the “safe harbour” principles adopted by the United States. This hampers the flow of
sensitive data and means that Indian firms are unable to gain market access in the EU,
increasing operating costs.

Another key Indian objective is reform to allow skilled Indian professionals to temporarily
reside and work in EU member states. If rules on movement of professionals were
liberalised, Indian businesses would benefit significantly from increased access to the EU
services market. However, the EU says it is unable to intervene on this issue because work
permits and visas are under the remit of individual member states. A related issue is the
differentiated qualifications and professional standards between EU partners, which
restrict Indian professionals’ access to the EU markets.

For its part, the EU wants India to first liberalise its professional services sector, specifically
accountancy and legal services. However, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India
and the Bar Council of India are vehemently opposed to such liberalisation as they fear
competition from overseas accounting and law firms.

Secondly, the EU has sought massive cuts in India’s tariffs on automobiles and auto
components. Fully assembled cars attract a 60 percent import duty, rising to 75 percent for
cars with free on-board value over $40,000 and engine capacity of 3,000 cc for petrol cars
and 2,500 cc for diesel cars. The EU sees this as protectionism: by contrast, the tariff on
Indian cars imported into the EU is 6.5 percent. However, Indian industry fears that tariff
cuts would flood the domestic market with European cars, which could have an adverse
impact on investment and on the “Make in India” campaign. There are also fears about auto
components being imported into India at concessional rates.

Finally, the EU has sought deep tariff cuts for wines and spirits. India currently levies import
duty of 60–100 percent, plus state taxes. Given that alcohol is a major source of revenue, it is
not likely that Indian states will agree to cut taxes. The EU also seeks to strengthen
intellectual property rights in India. Existing Indian laws do not allow evergreening of
patents (extending patents when they are about to expire by making small changes to the
product) or data exclusivity, preventing various drugs and chemicals from being sold in India.
India argues that if it were to accede to the EU’s demand, the Indian pharmaceutical
industry would not be able to sell cheap generic drugs.

The way forward

These problems notwithstanding, the proposed agreement is critical for both the EU and
India.

The FTA is also important for India from the perspective of investment flows and technical
cooperation. The EU’s assistance would enable European companies to help India in its plan
to develop 100 “smart cities” in the near future, as well as helping other Indian initiatives.

To agree on the FTA despite the differences between the EU’s and India’s negotiating
agendas in a tough economic climate, both partners will need to show determination to
make the partnership strategic.

EU China Investment Deal

China and EU entered into a deal replacing 25 bilateral investment deals entered by
individual countries by China , before 2009. The existing deals reduced the legal uncertainties
for EU investors , but were largely accommodative of China’s discriminatory investment
regime . The new deal makes a step further in broadening the legal framework for EU
investors , but it falls short of genuine level playing field . It is called comprehensive because
earlier deals were only on investment but now gives market access also.
1. The deal eliminates quantitative restrictions , equity caps or joint venture
requirements in number of sectors.
2. China removed joint venture requirement in automotive sector .
3. It will facilitate EU’s market access in research and development, telecom and market
access.

However , it does not include any investor protection mechanism .It does not make any
provision for the forced labour . It benefits China by encouraging EU’s investment; fuels

Chinese economy and technological development . It legitimise its actions in Hong Kong.

The deal strongly favours China . EU failed to leverage its market positions and technological
advancement . EU is caught in asymmetrical game in which China defects and EU cooperates
. The fate of the deal will be similar to British deal with China on Hong Kong.

China’s objective in the deal has been geo-political , whereas EU is caught in “peace lovers
dilemma” .

In economic terms , the primary winners are certain German

and French companies entrenched in the manufacturing and
service sectors . EU leaders think that they will gain vis-à-vis
USA.

The EU has compromised over its values , failed to gain a

level playing field from China in Economic sphere, halt China’s abuse of human rights ; to
discourage China’s assertiveness . EU’s deal is similar to Trump’s mistake of going solo in the
tariff war .
The deal damages EU’s comparative advantage vis-à-vis China , damages the transatlantic
ties and hurt strategic partners like India.
For EU, it was an opportunity to display its “strategic autonomy” vis-à-vis USA. For China , it
was an opportunity to put a wedge between EU and USA.

China has gained the game of realpolitik effectively , whereas Europe weakened its own
hands , gives short shrift to its own values and undermine the position of its friends and
allies.

Message from the deal : China is too big to be ignored, too rich to displease, too big to
punish and too big to fail.
Will not be counted in your hours

Not a deliverable

Open ended  PSIR/GS2

Exhaustive?

Not minute details  exam relevant

“Our enemies are innovative and resourceful,
and so are we. They never stop thinking about
new ways to harm our country and our people,
and neither do we.” - George W. Bush

“When goods do not cross borders, soldiers

will.”? - Frederic Bastiat
UNSC and India
India and UN
• “whole-hearted cooperation” through full
participation “in its councils to which her
geographical position, and contribution towards
peaceful progress entitle her.”
A brief History of India’s association with the UN

28 June 1919 - Treaty of Versailles LoN

Declaration by the UN at Washington on 1 January 1942

UN Conference of International Organization at San Francisco ,1945.

Responsibilities and powers of the UNSC
Mediation, appointing special envoys,
dispatching a UN Mission or requesting the
UN Secretary-General to settle the dispute.

Ceasefire directives peacekeeping forces

and military observers dispatched.

Sanctions and financial penalties , arms

embargoed, and travel bans
Logic behind limited membership ?
 Issues • Global political imbalance
and
reforms • Regional imbalance Africa or
required? Latin Europe
What reforms are required?
• Structural Reforms  UNGA ‘Perilous interventions:
The Security Council and politics of Chaos’
• Transparency
• Veto Reforms  Korea & Gulf war
• Abolish
• Restrict the use
• Overriding power to UNGA.
• Reform difficult: Articles 108 and 109.
• Membership Reforms in UNSC
 UNGA - 1992 -
Resolution
47/62 entitled
UN- 69th
“The Question
General
of Equitable
Efforts towards Assembly on
1965 : 11  15 Representation In 1993, open ended Working Group :
UNSC reforms September 14,
and Increase in
2015 : IGN 
the
TBN
Membership
of the Security
Council.” .

the categories the criteria of

the future size
of membership, the veto power.
of the Council,
membership, and
Groupings G4 - Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan

Uniting for Consensus - Italy, Spain, Australia, Canada,

South Korea, Argentina and Pakistan

African Union (“Ezulwini Consensus”) 26 2,2.

ACT - Trans-Regional group of 21 states

L.69  developing countries from Africa, Latin America

and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific  42 members.
India’s Security Council Calculus

• Mahatma Gandhi : veto-wielding member

• Partition
• Nehru – 1950,1955 Cold war calculus
• “It would do us little good and it would bring a great
deal of trouble in its train….India, because of many
factors is certainly entitled to a permanent seat in the
Security Council. But we are not going in at the cost of
China.”
 “no reform of the
United Nations (UN)
is complete without
the composition of
the Security Council
changing to reflect
contemporary
realities of the
“an essay in
What India wants? twenty-first century.
persuasion”
This requires
expansion in the
membership of the
Security Council in
both the permanent
and non –
permanent
categories.”
India’s views on UNSC Reforms:
Categories of Membership  “balanced enlargement in both categories.”  Africa

Question of Veto The abolition of veto.

Regional Representation“an equitable geographical representation” “anachronistic” 3/5 from one region
Africa, Latin America, three-fourths of Asia including the Arab states, the entire Central and Eastern Europe, the
Caribbean states and the Small Islands Each regional grouping would endorse its candidate election in UNGA

Size of Council and Its Working Methods ‘we the peoples’ ;1945  2.35 billion 7.3 billion  1945 51  193
Realistic.

Relationship Between Security Council and General Assembly Not competitive or adversarial, but “one of synergy
and complementarity” UN objectives
Why India needs to be in UNSC?
• Kashmir “idealistic”realpolitik of Cold war
• ChinaPakistan
• status quo vs revisionist power moderately
revisionist global vision, without seeking to
overthrow the current international system.
• A ‘moralistic force’ of the so called Third
WorldKofi Annan
What are the basis of India’s demand for UNSC permanent
membership?
 Historic association

Intrinsic value and place in

A mix of three streams contemporary
international politics

Traditional great power in

Asia and beyond.
 India’s Intrinsic Value:
civilizational
legacy,
cultural
diversity,
political
GDP(2.87
Demography Territorial economic system and de’ facto
lakh crores
 one-fifth size, potential, past and NWS
USD (2019))
ongoing
contributions
to the
activities of
the UN
India’s Great Power Ambitions:
democratic
Middle alternative to
equalizer to Rule taker 
Kingdom vs the
China rule maker
Vishwaguru authoritarian
China
 What efforts India has made?
April , 2013 : “revisionist L-69  42
conclusion of integration” member
1979  into the
the IGN grouping of 2016 
Brajesh Security Global South
multi- process on developing Friends on
Mishra + Council forums such
layered 1990s UNSC countries UN Security
NAM  as G 77 and
strategy reforms by • Max UNGA from Asia, Council
UNGA  10 NAM
the 70th • Min UNSC. Africa and Reform
to 14
anniversary Latin
of the UN. America.
Challenges Uniting for Consensus (UFC)/Coffee Club
for India in
getting  1990s  Italy, Spain, Australia,
UNSC seat Canada, South Korea, Argentina and
Pakistan  China(not a member of UFC)

1993 : “…not just the financial contribution in

Financials  US$ absolute terms, but also in relative terms.
Low per capita income (IMF: 145th by GDP
20.46 million (nominal) and 122th by GDP (PPP))
Timely payment
23rd
Not static

readiness to fulfil the obligations and not the

quantum of payment
 Mukherjee and Malone
over-reliance on
Multilateral insufficient entitlement , not
diplomacy engagement realpolitik
bargaining
Sanjay Baru : G4

status quo bias amongst the existing P5

Why India should not pursue UNSC permanent
memebership?
• Psychological sense of ‘arriving’ on the global centre stage
• Veto power
• Israel  powerful, persuasive and progressive power  Around
50 anti-Israel UN resolutions- strengthened  in the
chessboard of realpolitik, power respects power UAE , Bahrain,
etc  Abraham Accords.
• Germany  successful narrative of a more ‘moral’ dimension 
contributes> Great Britain, France or Russia  de facto
• Japan  2nd  GDP (3rd, 4th )
• Creative multilateral options like ‘Quad’
Kishore Mahbubani:Latin America and Africa
Restructuring India’s traditional approach to UN

Delhi must come to terms with a number of propositions

• UNSC reform is unlikely to happen soon 50th ,1995.

• The UN is a lot more than the Security Council  Cold War decolonisation and
disarmament to a new international economic order.
• Priorities national interest over multilateralism territorial integrityinternationalise the
Kashmir  FATF  Article 2
• Look beyond the issues of peace  economic, technological and environmental
disruptions.
• Reshaping the global order  NAM.
• Moving centre of gravity.

Loosening the purse straps 0.7  China, Japan and the US are at 8, 10
and 22 per cent 1%.
 sahayog
(cooperation),

What after getting UNSC Seat?

India’s ‘Five S’ approach to the world: Jaishankar

Conclusions
• A legitimate claim  rightful place in
the comity of nations
• PM Modi “ Institutions that reflect
the imperatives of 20th century won’t
be effective in the 21st.”
• Prof Ramesh Thakur: NC
• A permanent seat in the UNSC is not
the only way to assert its ‘arrival’ on
the global centerstage.
Mock Question

A permanent seat in the United Nations Security

Council (UNSC) is neither necessary nor sufficient .
Discuss. (15 Marks)
 India – West Asia Relations

Overall analysis of India’s policy

West Asia is most sensitive region of International politics. According to the former vice
president Hamid Ansari (TRAVELLING THROUGH THE CONFLICT) , strategic importance of
West Asia lies in its geography, in its essential resources. He also points that West Asia
suffers from the curse of centrality.
Importance for India
C Rajamohan explains India’s foreign policy strategy in form of 3 concentric circles/Mandals
1. Immediate neighbourhood.
2. Extended neighbourhood
3. The outside world
West Asia is in the second concentric circle.
West Asia is not just a gas station for India, it has huge strategic importance (Rakesh Sood)
Views of Alfred T Mahan.
He advised British India to focus on West Asia to maintain the hegemony
of British empire. India’s security is linked to peace and stability in West
Asia.

What has been India’s policy in West Asia?

One of the earliest decisions on foreign policy matters taken by independent India was
related to West Asia on the creation of Israel. Indian leaders opposed the creation because
of Pakistan factor. India was against making religion , the basis of statehood. India took pro-
Palestinian approach. It is generally believed that there is a domestic determinant of India’s
stand on palestinian issue i.e. The sentiments of Muslim minorities in India.

Views of Ishrat Aziz

The foreign policy of any country including India is based on national interest. It was purely
secular consideration. India knew that creation of Israel will destabilize the entire middle
east. Instability will create security threat for India. It is a wrong assumption that the
sentiments of Muslims shaped India’s west Asia policy. It is to be noted that unlike USA
where there are different lobbies, there is no Muslim lobby in India, directing India’s foreign
policy. India’s foreign policy so far has been conducted in the framework of non-alignment.
West Asia is the best place where India could successfully pursue non-alignment. India could
maintain good relations with Iran, Israel as well as Gulf countries. This shows that even for
West Asian countries, religion is not a consideration.

At present, Gulf countries are strengthening their relations with India even at the cost of
Pakistan.They are looking at India as an opportunity. e.g. Saudi Arabia wants to diversify its
economy rather than just relying on oil exports. Gulf countries are looking at India as a net
security provider. India is also a source of cheap labour. India has huge cultural capital,
diaspora in the region. 30% of UAE population is Indian. (3.5 million).
Former Ambassador Ranjit Gupta described India’s policy as ‘non interventionist, non
judgemental, non prescriptive and non alignment’. India has stayed away from taking sides
in Local conflicts.
What should be India’s policy in West Asia?
West Asia is a highly challenging area because of numerous fault lines. It is not easy to
navigate through ‘the choppy waters’ of the politics in West Asia. So far India has done well.
India could protect its interests, even none of the non state actors in West Asia have directly
targeted India.

There are two schools of thought in India when it comes to policy on West Asia
1. Continue the traditional policy. Maintain low profile.
Prof. Girijesh Pant – West Asia is not a place for display of India’s power. It is a place
for augmentation of India’s power.
Former Ambassador Ranjit Gupta – Our policy should be based on the mature
recognition of the limits of our capabilities. India’s passivity is fine in unpredictable
and volatile environment. If speech is silver, silence is golden.
2. India should play more proactive role.
MEA S Jaishankar : India’s foreign policy should
change in accordance to its changed status. India
should be a leading power and not just a balancing
power. India’s ‘think west’ shall match India’s ‘act
east’. According to him, up till now our foreign
policy towards West Asia was free from ‘strategic
calculations’ driven by market than by strategic interest. However now we are
consolidating the partnership.

C Rajamohan – After many false starts, India is emerging as the swing state. India
has potential to shape the outcomes on many critical issues.
Chinmaya Gharekhan – India should leave the passive approach and should raise its
‘diplomatic profile’.

India adopted the “Look West policy” in 2005. While announcing the new policy, Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh said that “the Gulf region, like South-East and South Asia, is
part of our natural economic hinterland. We must pursue closer economic relations with
all our neighbours in our wider Asian neighbourhood. India has successfully pursued a
‘Look East’ policy to come closer to the countries of South-East Asia. We must come
closer to our western neighbours in the Gulf.”

S Jaishankar as the foreign Secretary in 2016 held that , while Act East Policy is under
consolidation , it is also perhaps time to think West . In the coming days , it may be
expected that Gulf will be the focus of India’s foreign policy .(Speech at Net Growth Annual
Summit)

Nicolas Blarel – ‘RECALIBRATING INDIA’S MIDDLE EAST POLICY’

India is a linked to the region through culture, commerce and colonialism. India needs
multiple engagements. Under Modi govt. India is able to overcome its attitude of looking at
West Asia through the prism of Pakistan.
Achievement in ‘look west’

Though there is a impression that Look East is the most successful initiative but actually from
the very beginning, Look West has been successful. Still India’s trade with South East Asia is
much less than the bilateral trade India has with Gulf Countries ($ 200 bn).

Gulf countries – up till now India has neglected Saudi Arabia, UAE but we have entered into
the strategic partnership. Even India does have good relations with Qatar.
Iran – PM tried to consolidate relations with Iran also. However India Iran relations have
never reached to its optimal potential. The reason is Iran’s aspiration to become the leader
in the Muslim world compels Iran to take pro-Pakistan approach in Kashmir. Iran is also
fearful of Saudi Arabia loosing Pakistan to create instability. India’s compulsions to have
closer relations with USA make it difficult for India to maintain equity in the relations.
According to Iranian diplomat’s New Delhi’s Qiblah is Washington. According to PM Modi,
there is a huge potential. Once we make up our mind, distance is just half a step.
Israel – India always had close relations with Israel. However the relationship has not been
open. Nehru’s policy towards Israel was ‘recognition without relations’. Nehru took
extremely pro-palestinian stand. It used to be said that Nehru tried to look more Arab than
the Arabs themselves. Much before India, Egypt, Jordan recognized Israel. Israel has always
provided critical help in India’s war against Pakistan. Israel’s help was critical in Kargil war. It
was during the time of Narsimha Rao in 1992 that we established full diplomatic relations.
Now across the party consensus is to maintain close relations with Israel.

The basic difference in Congress and BJP’s approach is, Congress’s approach was to keep the
relations in closet , while BJP’s approach is to bring the relationship in lime light .
According to C Rajamohan, Modi’s approach is transparent and more confident.
Turkey – India never had good relations with Turkey. Turkey showered all of her love for
Pakistan because of Turkey’s aspiration to be a leader in Muslim world.
 India-Iran Relations

Iran, one of the richest countries in hydrocarbon and India. Nevertheless, Iran’s strategic
significance to India is crucial, compelling India to remain tied to Iran in face of
insurmountable difficulties. Under the current scenario, had relations been solely based on
energy it would have been easy for india to drift away. However, Iran’s geographical position
is paramount to India’s geopolitical outreach, especially to Central Asia, a rich reservoir of
natural resources. Similarly, Iran is vital for India’s access to Afghanistan in which India has
immense strategic and security interests.
The benefits of India-Iran ties are mutual. An important element in the India-Iran
relationship is India’s status as a huge market for Iranian products. India’s choice of Iran as a
gateway to Central Asia and Afghanistan also has positive repercussions on Iran’s
aspirations of becoming a regional hub for trade and transit. Finally, under the backdrop of
Iran’s nuclear controversy and US efforts to isolate Iran, the continued relationship of the
Islamic Republic of Iran with the world’s largest democracy has immense ideational value.
Such an understanding of reciprocally advantageous consequences motivated India and Iran
to formally sign two consecutive comprehensive joint documents reflecting their vision of
strategic partnership. The first is the ‘Tehran Declaration’ signed in April 2001, and the
second is the ‘New Delhi Declaration’ signed in January 2003. While these documents serve
as a template for greater regional and global cooperation, they also highlight the realisation
of the scope of such a partnership. Notwithstanding these efforts, the cloud of the Iranian
nuclear controversy and India’s need for closeness to the United States had implications on
India-Iran relations. Still, the issues surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme, its regional
role, and resultant antagonism with other countries have its share of pressure on the
potentially deep and broad bilateral ties between India and Iran. Since the onset of this
controversy, India has indulged in a balancing act between its relationship with Iran, on one
hand, and with the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, on the other. The US effort to impose
“maximum pressure” on Iran to ensure its seclusion has its toll on the India-Iran relationship.
Amongst the visible effects of the Iran-US enmity is Iran’s increased ties with China, an
adversary of India. 25-years of strategic partnership between Iran and China is likely to have
further implications on the dynamics of the India-Iran relationship.
The Current Scenario
In order to understand the current depth and anticipate
the future course of India-Iran relations, three core issues
could be underlined, which serve as a pointer to this
trajectory.
The first is Iran’s Farzad-B Gas Field in which an Indian
state-owned company, ONGC, was involved at the
discovery stage. After the detection of gas, a protracted negotiation between the two sides
failed to result in India obtaining the rights to its development, translating into Iran deciding
to independently develop this field.
The second prominent issue that has become a marker of the evolving India-Iran relationship
is the proposed railway line connecting Chabahar to Zahedan, the capital of Iran’s Sistan and
Baluchestan Province. This project was conceived to link the Chabahar Port to Afghanistan,
which is of sizeable strategic interest to India. Recently, the media reported that Iran had
withdrawn its proposal from India. However, India has denied this, officially maintaining that
the two countries are currently in talks to fructify this venture.
The third important issue is the Chabahar Port project. In this
realm, India has achieved considerable success, specifically in
terms of starting the operation of this project after the initial
investment for its development. India’s initial commitment
was in 2003, and the port was finally operationalized in 2016.
Despite the impediments created by US sanctions, the two
countries made significant progress on this front and since
2018, an Indian company has been operating the port.. The
two countries are further exploring ways to boost traffic
towards making the port more economically viable and
increasing its usage for Afghanistan as well as Central Asia.
Notably, in the Indian strategic discourses, Chabahar has often
been portrayed as a strategic gain for India, especially given China’s participation in the
development of Pakistan’s Gwadar Port. However, Iran has avoided linking any strategy
dimension to the Chabahar Port and has articulated its willingness to open the door of its
further development to other countries, including China. The future developments in the
arena of the Chabahar Port and the depth of India’s participation, as well as China’s
presence or absence, will have ramifications on the evolving strategic partnership between
India and Iran.

Analysis
A comprehensive review of the depth, nature, and trajectory of India-Iran relations is also
indicative of the nature of India’s broader approach to the Middle East. The recent
developments where a war-weary United States is increasingly perceived as returning to its
traditional role of an offshore balancer in the Middle East has created avenues for other
powers such as Russia, China, Turkey, and India to make inroads in the region.

India has joined the club of Russian S400 missile defence system, which China, Turkey, and
Iran also belong, reflecting a unique commonality between these five countries. The fact that
the transfer of Russia’s S400 missile defence system is antithetical to US strategic interest,
India’s enlistment in this club may provide some hint to India’s eventual leaning in the
balance of power between the two camps respectively led by the US and Russia in the Middle
East, a region where Iran is a key actor. This, however, is a long-term scenario.
In the foreseeable future, India’s strategic and economic standing is likely to provide it a
limited role in the Middle East; directly impacting its ties with Iran. As India’s strength grows
and it is more capable of projecting power away from its borders, its foreign policy might
witness according changes. Still, India’s offshore manoeuvrability might be constricted by its
position as a state sandwiched by two antagonistic nuclear powers, viz., China and Pakistan,
claiming a large chunk of its strategic resources. Another limitation is that unlike China, India
does not enjoy permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council; an apparent
factor in Iran’s calculations while choosing between India and China.
Despite India’s energy dependence on the Middle East, its economic structure ties it more to
the West. A prodigious portion of India’s GDP constitutes the service sector whose
destination is primarily the West, including the US; a component in India’s risk assessments
in forging ties with Iran. This often causes a mismatch between India’s aspirations and
deliveries, creating a scenario in which its policy towards Iran either looks as ambivalent or
succumbing to US pressure. The truth is that India’s relationship with Iran is as much
predicated on its national interests as its relations with any other country.
Unlike India, China has a rapidly developing manufacturing industry for which it needs raw
material as well as expanding markets and this is a potent aspect in its analysis of
determining the risks of US sanctions while forming ties with Iran. Consequently, the two
countries are establishing a long-term relationship that is likely to prove as a game-changer
in the Middle East and have further negative repercussions on India-Iran relations.

The Abraham Accords, which further consolidates the front against Iran and is potentially
isolating it more, is still another development that may further impede the growth of India-
Iran relations.

For India, Iran proved to be a territory to extend its influence offshore, both economic and
strategic. However, Iran has traditionally tied itself to the Pakistan and is recently drawing
nearer to China in a fashion that may put its relations with India on uncomfortable ground.
Such realisation by India, especially through the painful ways of delayed or failed
negotiations, appears to be instilling a sentiment of fatigue in the Indian attempt of
nurturing closer ties with Iran. These are some indicators that may compel us to believe that
the pace of India-Iran relations may further slow down until a long-term solution to the Iran-
US standoff is found.

India–Iran relations : Timeline

Independent India and Iran established diplomatic relations on 15 March 1950. During much
of the Cold War period, relations between the Republic of India and the erstwhile Imperial
State of Iran suffered due to their different political interests—non-aligned India fostered
strong military links with the Soviet Union, while Iran enjoyed close ties with the United
States.
Following the 1979 revolution, relations between Iran and India strengthened momentarily.
However, Iran's continued support for Pakistan and India's close relations with Iraq during
the Iran–Iraq War impeded further development of Indo–Iranian ties.
In the 1990s, India and Iran supported the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan against the
Taliban regime.. The two countries signed a defence cooperation agreement in December
2002
In 2011, the US$12 billion annual oil trade between India and Iran was halted due to
extensive economic sanctions against Iran.

From the geopolitical perspective, even though the two countries share some common
strategic interests, India and Iran differ significantly on key foreign policy issues.

India has expressed opposition to Iran's nuclear programme and whilst India is against
reconciliation with taliban, Iran favours reconciliation with Taliban, India supports the
presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan unlike Iran.

On 22 May 2016, Prime minister Narendra Modi paid an official visit to Iran. The visit
focused on bilateral connectivity and infrastructure, an energy partnership, and trade.

Just before Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Israel in July 2017, Iran's Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei, urged Muslims in Kashmir to 'repudiate oppressors'.

Issues in India Iran Relations

Iran's Nuclear Interests
India, despite close relations and convergence of interests with Iran, voted against Iran in the
International Atomic Energy Agency in 2005, which took Iran by surprise. Indo-US nuclear
deal was conditional to India supporting the US on the Iran issue.
Infrastructure
A highway between Zaranj and Delaram (Zaranj-Delaram Highway) is being built with
financial support from India. The Chabahar port has also been jointly financed by Iran and
India. India alone plans to invest 20 Billion US dollars towards development of Chabahar
port. India is helping develop the Chabahar Port, which will give it access to the oil and gas
resources in Iran and the Central Asian states. By so doing, India hopes to compete with the
Chinese, who are building Gwadar Port, in Pakistan's Balochistan. Iran plans to use Chabahar
for trans-shipment to Afghanistan and Central Asia, while keeping the port of Bandar Abbas
as a major hub mainly for trade with Russia and Europe. India, Iran and Afghanistan have
signed an agreement to give Indian goods, heading for Central Asia and Afghanistan,
preferential treatment and tariff reductions at Chabahar.
Work on the Chabahar-Milak-Zaranj-Delaram route from Iran to Afghanistan is in progress.
Iran is, with Indian aid, upgrading the Chabahar-Milak road and constructing a bridge on the
route to Zaranj. India's BRO is laying the 213 km Zaranj-Delaram road. It is a part of India's
US$750 million aid package to Afghanistan. The Chabahar port project is Iran's chance to
end its US-sponsored economic isolation and benefit from the resurgent Indian economy.
Along with Bandar Abbas, Chabahar is the Iranian entry point on the north–south corridor.

North-South Transport Corridor

North South Transport Corridor route via India, Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia
The North–South Transport Corridor is the ship, rail, and road route for moving freight
between India, Russia, Iran, Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The route primarily
involves moving freight from India, Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia via ship, rail and road.The
objective of the corridor is to increase trade connectivity between major cities such as
Mumbai, Moscow, Tehran, Baku, Bandar Abbas, Astrakhan, Bandar Anzali, etc.It is expected
that the transport costs will be reduced by "$2,500 per 15 tons of cargo".
Iran China Strategic Partnership

China signed 25-year deal with Iran in challenge to the US

Beijing plans to invest in Iran while buying oil from the Islamic Republic, further straining its
relationship with the US

Iran’s closer integration with China may help shore up its economy against the impact of the
US sanctions, while sending a clear signal to the White House of Tehran’s intentions

China and Iran signed an overarching deal aimed at charting the course of their economic,
political and trade relations over the next 25 years.
Beijing plans to invest in Iran while buying oil from the Islamic Republic, further straining its
relationship with the US which has already been frayed by China’s imports of covertly-
shipped Iranian crude.

The “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" agreement, signed in Tehran in march 2021by

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, has
been in the works since 2016, when President Xi Jinping became the first Chinese leader to
visit the Iranian capital in over a decade.
The latest alliance between Beijing and Tehran is a challenge to US President Joe Biden’s
administration as it sets about trying to rally allies against China, which Secretary of State
Antony Blinken has said is the world’s “greatest geopolitical test."
“The document can elevate bilateral ties to a new strategic level," Foreign Ministry
spokesman of Iran held. The deal focuses on boosting private-sector collaboration and Iran’s
role in Xi’s flagship infrastructure and investment program, the Belt and Road Initiative, he
said.
There is a plan for long-term supply of Iranian crude to China as well as investment in oil,
gas, petrochemical, renewables and nuclear energy infrastructure.
Lured by the prospect of cheaper prices, China has already increased its imports of Iranian oil
to around 1 million barrels a day, eroding US leverage as it prepares to enter stalled talks
with Tehran to revive a nuclear deal.
The Biden administration has indicated that it’s open to reengaging with Iran after then-
President Donald Trump abandoned the accord nearly three years ago and reimposed
economic sanctions, but the two sides have yet to even agree to meet. Iran exported around
2.5 million barrels of oil a day before American penalties resumed.
Iran’s closer integration with China may help shore up its economy against the impact of the
US sanctions, while sending a clear signal to the White House of Tehran’s intentions.
Challenges in the relations :
Iranian experts feel Chabahar, much touted example of New Delhi-Tehran . Geo economic
cooperation, is over hyped and India cooperates with Iran only to balance its equations with
China and Pakistan.
The various shortcomings that are preventing it from achieving its stated objectives and the
overall trajectory of Indo-Iranian partnership.

Post Islamic Revolution, Indo-American relationship has defined Indo-Iran relations

Iran-India relations have always been influenced by international actors. The impact of
regional and trans-regional variables is more serious in Chabahar and it forces Iran and India
to make strategic choices against each other. In recent years, India has moved closer to the
United States and the West and reduced cooperation with Iran and China. India has also
participated in the US super-maximum economic pressure campaign against the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Due to that, it has reduced its commercial relations with Tehran to the
lowest level in recent years.
 India-Israel Relations

Warming Indo-Israeli relations first occurred between an earlier Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee (in office for a full term between 1999 and 2004), and
Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s long-time leader, whose Likud Party was, and remains,
ideologically similar to the BJP. Their “warmth” was reignited when Prime Minister Narendra
Modi was elected in 2014.

While India formally recognised Israel in 1950, bilateral engagement, or “normalisation”

only began formally in 1992. Indian National Congress Party governments, however, did not
have open relations with Israel, believing that visible ties with it would damage India’s
relations with surrounding Islamic states including Palestine, which had India’s “principled
support”, and its own Muslim population. These fears remain unproven.

Zionist Israel, perceiving threats to its security from its Muslim-majority neighbours,
primarily Iran-influenced Hezbollah in Lebanon and now the Palestinian Authority, and Modi,
whose lifelong membership of the right-wing Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sang (RSS), is moving
legislatively towards a Hindu India, share, as said, right-wing values.

India’s relations with Israel have two major policy planks: military-security supply – India has
become the largest market for Israel’s military exports – and a land-based agenda drawing
on Israel’s expertise in fields including agriculture, dairy farming and water management,
boosted by “value-adding” such as training and technology transfers. They also share a fear
of terrorism from Islamic states, Iran in the case of Israel, and for India, from Pakistan, and it
is arguably the greatest area of co-operation between them, involving the exchange of
information on terrorist groups and their activities including recruitment practices, border
security and comparisons of operational experiences.

While the Indo-Israeli relationship, at least under the current leaders, is well cemented,
India’s support for Palestine has shifted. The first line of the Indian Ministry of External
Affairs’ “Updated Note on India-Palestine Relations” states that ‘India’s support for the
Palestinian cause is an integral part of the nation’s foreign policy’, but in his first year in
office (2014) Modi chose to follow a “de-hyphenation” policy in order to deal with both
independently, despite the long-running conflict over delineating the Palestinian state.
Hosting or visiting both leaders as he did in 2017, Modi has again demonstrated his
diplomatic – or fence-sitting – skills.
Timeline of India Israel Relations
1949 – India voted against creation of Israel .
1950 – Official recognition to Israel
1992 – Full diplomatic relations with Embassy in Tel Aviv.
1997 – Ezer Weizman , became first Israeli president to visit India .
2000 – Advani and Jaswant Singh became first minsters to visit Israel and cooperation in anti
terrorism begins .
2017 – Modi becomes the first PM to visit Israel . It was a standalone visit .

2018 – Netanyahu visited India to commemorate 25 years of the relations.

Areas of cooperation
Defence - Israel is becoming Leading supplier . India took UAVs , Falcon AWACs systems,
Barak I surface to air missiles .
Intelligence sharing – Between RAW and Mossad .
Bilateral Trade – 200 million USD in 1992 to 5 billion USD in 2014. Negotiating FTA.

Collaboration in space , Science and technology , agriculture

 India-UAE Relations

The number of Indian nationals residing in the United Arab

Emirates (UAE) has been estimated as over three million,
approximately 27.1% of the country’s population.
While initially engaged in the petroleum industry, Indians are now
spread across the UAE’s economy, in professional services,
manufacturing, transport and construction. The two countries
have agreed to partner to undertake development projects in the region, and India and the
UAE are committed to ‘work together in select countries of sub-Saharan Africa in areas of
priority to them’.
UAE is India’s largest trading partner in the region, the second largest export destination and
fourth largest source of India’s imports. In parallel, India is the UAE’s second largest trading
partner, and a vast source of its imports. The UAE is also India’s “re-export hub” for the
Middle East and North Africa.
Under Modi government , India UAE partnership has become strategic in true sense . UAE is
important for a backchannel diplomacy between India and Pakistan . India UAE have
deepened their defence partnership .
UAE has deported more than 100 fugitives back. As reported in media, UAE has played an
important role in the recent ceasefire agreement .

India and the UAE's bilateral ties have gained momentum amid mutual cooperation in trade,
commerce, culture, heritage healthcare etc; since Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi
came to power in May 2014.
As Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in his speech to the nation on the occasion of
Independence Day on August 15, 2020, India’s neighbours are not the only ones with whom
India shares geographical boundaries, but also those with whom India has close and
harmonious relations. He referred to India’s strong relationship with the countries in West
Asia, particularly the UAE, which further strengthened in the last few years. He personally
thanked the leadership of these countries for their help to the Indian community during the
Covid-19 crisis.”

He added: “Our relationship with the UAE is a multi-faceted one with deep engagements in
trade and investment, tourism, food security, culture, science and technology, defence and
space. Our focus will continue to be on further strengthening our comprehensive strategic
partnership and exploring new areas of cooperation. Food and healthcare have emerged as
important sectors of growth during the pandemic, showing how our strategic ties can adapt
to the changing requirements. Energy will remain an important area of cooperation.
However, we’re not only investing in each other’s energy sector but also working together
for a more sustainable and climate-friendly future. We’re expanding capacities in the field of
renewable energy, particularly in the field of solar energy, including through the
International Solar Alliance. We're committed to working closely with the International
Renewable Energy Agency (Irena) and will also explore possible cooperation in newer areas
like the ‘hydrogen economy’. "

Factors that have contributed to the changing dynamics of the relationship:

1. Diversification of UAE economy: Foreign trade and the oil and gas sectors were the
fulcrum of bilateral relations in the decades preceding the end of the oil era boom. But
since then, the UAE has pursued an aggressive strategy of diversifying its economy, and its
relations with India have benefited as a result.

The focus of bilateral relations have now diversified to include many new sectors after the
official visits of Shaikh Mohammad Bin Zayed and Modi — such as IT, space tech, tourism,
defence manufacturing and renewable energy.

2. Evolving country profile and priorities: The recent upsurge in relations is a reminder
that both the UAE and India have leapfrogged in terms of global reputation and foreign
policy since 1981. India now is not only a growing economic power, but also an
aspirational power. In the 1980s, India was seen as aligned with the Soviet Union — now
we have multidimensional relations with almost all countries. That certainly helps
recalibrate our relations with the UAE. The recent high-level visits of UAE and Indian
leaders also demonstrate the proactive nature of decision-making between the two
countries. The era of passive bilateral relations is over — both nations have demonstrated
that with the same resources as before, there is so much more that can be achieved.

3. Key partners in combating extremism: The UAE and India share a deeply common goal
— fighting terrorism, combating extremism and ideologies of hatred. We cooperate very
closely with Indian authorities in fighting extremists and terrorists — both individuals and
organisations.Both India and the UAE are two moderate nations which have been victims
of terror.

4. Common economic goals: The growing opportunities for jobs in India, along with the
appreciating rupee, booming stock market, structural reforms such as GST, ease of doing
business have all helped prepare a solid foundation for its growth. There are massive
possibilities from the $75-billion fund announced by Modi and Shaikh Mohammad Bin
Zayed.

5. Rigorous follow up to strategic partnership: Another reason for the greater depth in
relations is the rigorous structure of various committees that have been set up following
the high-level visits. Following the elevation of the UAE and India’s relation to a
comprehensive strategic partnership, there are several high-level committees which are
working in parallel to advance the bilateral agenda. A committee on strategic dialogue
committee has been set up which meets twice a year and looks into all matters relating to
bilateral trade. There are also a greater number of highly active fora and advocacy
platforms which have been set up in the past three years, such as the UAE-India Economic
Forum, while the frequency and depth of interaction with existing trade and business
associations have intensified.

6. Greater mobility of people: With a 3.3-million-strong population, the Indian diaspora in

the UAE is the largest in the world, and growing. The UAE has significantly eased visit visa
norms for Indians. The result is greater people-to-people interaction between the two
countries — whether it is Indian tourists seeking a glimpse of the sea, sands and Burj
Khalifa in the UAE, or Emiratis travelling to India for education, investments, medical
treatment or simply on a vacation.
India Saudi Arabia Relations

For long India Saudi relations were affected by Pakistan factor . However, since 90s the
relations have started improving . In 2006, King Abdullah made a special visit which resulted
into Delhi Declaration , the beginning of strategic partnership . It was consolidated in 2010
with Manmohan Singh’s visit which resulted into Riyadh declaration . PM Modi visited Saudi
Arabia in 2016 and was conferred highest civilian award .
Saudi Crown prince Mohammed Bin Salman visited India in 2019.

Saudi Arabia has become the leading supplier of oil , plans to make an investment of 100
Billion USD in next few years.
 India – Afghanistan

Introduction
Place for ‘Great Games’  Graveyard of Empires

Why Great Games?

1. Strategic Locations
2. Mineral resources
Importance for India
1. Second front against Pakistan
2. Access to Central and West Asia
3. Terrorism and Kashmir connection

India Afghanistan Relations

Till the end of cold war – Since Afghanistan was under the
Soviet’s influence , India had good relations with Afghanistan .
In 1950, a five year treaty of friendship was signed affirming
everlasting peace and friendship.

Since the end of cold war – Afghanistan is going through the civil war , which is also the
product of another round of Great Games among the major powers .
What is the current strategic scenario in Afghanistan ?
After almost twenty years of war started by USA, and witnessing the huge loss of men and
material, the efforts are still going on for reconciliation among the warring parties .
What is the status of the talks ?

The talks are in two interrelated formats

1. February, 2020 – USA Taliban Agreement on Foreign troops withdrawal and Taliban
counter-terrorism assurances .
2. Intra Afghan Negotiations , which began in Doha in September 2020 for the political
settlement of the conflict.

Evolution of USA’s Policy towards Afghanistan

1. George Bush : Global war on terrorism
2. Obama : Surge and Exit Policy
3. Trump :
a. South Asia Policy  Confrontationist approach: A three-
pronged objective in South Asia.
i. First, honing an expansive conception of US interests in
Afghanistan to also involve military action against the Taliban
— and not just the Al Qaeda.
ii. Second, prioritising cooperation with the Pakistani security
apparatus in-line with US tactical and political objectives
towards denying a safe haven to terror organisations in the region.
iii. Third, seeking India’s integration into the United States’ regional
security calculus in order to cultivate a “natural
balancer” to China.
b. 2018 – Zalmay Khalilzad appointed as the special US Envoy to
resume the talks

US Taliban Deal

The four-page pact was signed between Zalmay

Khalilzad, US Special Representative for
Afghanistan Reconciliation, and Mullah Abdul
Ghani Baradar, political head of the Taliban on
February 29, 2020.
 Important elements of the deal
The withdrawal of US troops along with bringing down NATO
or coalition troop numbers within 14 months from when the
deal was signed. The main counter-terrorism commitment by
the Taliban is that “Taliban will not allow any of its members,
other individuals or groups, including al-Qaeda, to use the
soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United
States and its allies”.
The agreement said “ permanent and comprehensive ceasefire will be an item on the
agenda of the intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations. The participants of intra-
Afghan negotiations will discuss the date and modalities of a permanent and
comprehensive ceasefire, including joint implementation mechanisms, which will be
announced along with the completion and agreement over the future political ”.

Separately, a three-page joint declaration between the Afghan government (Islamic

Republic of Afghanistan) and the US was issued in Kabul at the time.

Other elements include removal of sanctions on Taliban leaders, releasing prisoners

held by both sides and ceasefire.

4. Joe Biden’s Approach – Biden Administration has said that it will review US-Taliban
deal reached by Trump administration in February, 2020 meant for bringing peace to
Afghanistan enabling the withdrawal of US and NATO forces.

The Joe Biden administration has proposed a new peace plan to the Afghan
government and the Taliban, seeking to bring violence to a halt and form an interim
government. Secretary of State Antony Blinken wrote a letter to
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, which Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S.’s
special envoy for Afghanistan, delivered to the Afghan leader in
Kabul , detailing the proposal.

a. First, Blinken has proposed a UN-led conference of

representatives of Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran, India and the U.S. “to discuss
a unified approach to support peace in Afghanistan”.
b. Second, It urges both sides to reach a consensus on
Afghanistan’s future constitutional and governing
arrangements; find a road map to a new “inclusive
government”; and agree on the terms of a “permanent and
comprehensive ceasefire”.
 c. Blinken has also proposed a senior level meeting of the Afghan government
and the Taliban in Turkey to discuss power sharing, reduction of violence and
other specific goals.

The Biden administration’s assessment is that the Taliban are on the ascent. It hopes
that the best way to prevent a complete Taliban takeover is a regional peace process
and an interim unity government. The Taliban are yet to respond to America’s
proposal.
Biden Administration has reemphasised the need for responsible withdrawal .

Biden is giving confusing signals :

a. Troop withdrawal by 1st May deadline will be tough.
b. US forces will not stay in the country longer.

Biden’s Dilemma
a. He cannot commit the troops endlessly as USA is not winning .
b. If he pulls back without peace agreement Civil war will intensify and Taliban will
make rapid gains .
c. If US troops do not leave , it will trigger a tough response from Taliban .

Why Biden has given a new proposal ?

a. Afghanistan conflict is multi faceted . He cannot ignore India, Russia, China , Iran .
Hence , he wants UB to takeover the process . Thus involving other regional
stakeholders.
b. He wants to buy time .

Who are the parties in the ‘Game ’?

a. Afghan Government – . Andullah is chairing HCNR (High
Council for National Reconciliation) . Mohammad Masoom
Stanekzai is the chief negotiator from the side if Afghan
Government.
b. Taliban, led by Haibatullah Akhunzdzada. Other leaders are
Abdul Ghani Baradar . Their negotiator is Abdul Hakim
Haqqani.
c. US – Zalmay Khalilzad is the special envoy.
d. Russia – Helping Taliban .
 e. China – Helping Taliban
f. Iran – Helping Taliban
g. Pakistan – Helping Taliban
h. Turkey – Helping Taliban
i. India – Helping Afghan Government .

The Peace Deal and India

India has been out of the game . Recently Russia conducted a meeting inviting US, China ,
Pakistan but ignoring India. Its good Biden brough India back.
Recent developments

Afghanistan Foreign Minister Hanif Atmar visited India in March , 2021 , reflecting India’s
significance in the talks. India in past year saw several high level visits from Afghanistan
including from Abdul Rashid Dostam , former Vice-President ; Abdullah Abdullah , Ata
Mohammad Nuur .

India’s participation is essential for the balanced outcome in Afghanistan in the interest of
long term peace . It is good that at Moscow , all parties emphasised that they do not support
restoration of Islamic Emirates run by Taliban and that it should reduce violence
significantly.

India’s Afghanistan Policy

Afghanistan is critical to India’s security ,

however in the past we have seen that
India has limited its role to soft power ,
outsourcing its security to US. In the event
of US withdrawal , strategists suggest that
India should go for military footprints .
However, there are many geographical
impediments in India’s military
engagement in Afghanistan.
What should be India’s role ?
a. Work with the regional players
 b. Utilise the platform of SCO
c. Speed up its connect central Asia Policy .
d. Continue to display its soft power .

What is the biggest obstacle for India’s participation ?

Pakistan’ security dilemma and its attempt to gain strategic depth .

Indian initiatives in Afghanistan(More than 3 Billion USD)

a. Parliament Building
b. Habiba High School
c. Salma Dam/ India Afghanistan Friendship Dam.
d. Electricity Transmission line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul.
e. Indira Gandhi Children Hospital.
f. Agricultural University in Kandahar.
g. Chimtala Power station in Kabul
h. Cricket Stadium in Kandahar.
i. 285 military vehicles for Aghan Army
j. 20 Mi-35/Mi-25 chopper for air force .
k. In November 2020, in a global conference on Afghanistan , S Jaishankar announced
over 100 high impact community project worth 80 Million USD
 India – Afghanistan

Introduction
Place for ‘Great Games’  Graveyard of Empires

Why Great Games?

1. Strategic Locations
2. Mineral resources
Importance for India
1. Second front against Pakistan
2. Access to Central and West Asia
3. Terrorism and Kashmir connection

India Afghanistan Relations

Till the end of cold war – Since Afghanistan was under the
Soviet’s influence , India had good relations with Afghanistan .
In 1950, a five year treaty of friendship was signed affirming
everlasting peace and friendship.

Since the end of cold war – Afghanistan is going through the civil war , which is also the
product of another round of Great Games among the major powers .
What is the current strategic scenario in Afghanistan ?
After almost twenty years of war started by USA, and witnessing the huge loss of men and
material, the efforts are still going on for reconciliation among the warring parties .
What is the status of the talks ?

The talks are in two interrelated formats

1. February, 2020 – USA Taliban Agreement on Foreign troops withdrawal and Taliban
counter-terrorism assurances .
2. Intra Afghan Negotiations , which began in Doha in September 2020 for the political
settlement of the conflict.

Evolution of USA’s Policy towards Afghanistan

1. George Bush : Global war on terrorism
2. Obama : Surge and Exit Policy
3. Trump :
a. South Asia Policy  Confrontationist approach: A three-
pronged objective in South Asia.
i. First, honing an expansive conception of US interests in
Afghanistan to also involve military action against the Taliban
— and not just the Al Qaeda.
ii. Second, prioritising cooperation with the Pakistani security
apparatus in-line with US tactical and political objectives
towards denying a safe haven to terror organisations in the region.
iii. Third, seeking India’s integration into the United States’ regional
security calculus in order to cultivate a “natural
balancer” to China.
b. 2018 – Zalmay Khalilzad appointed as the special US Envoy to
resume the talks

US Taliban Deal

The four-page pact was signed between Zalmay

Khalilzad, US Special Representative for
Afghanistan Reconciliation, and Mullah Abdul
Ghani Baradar, political head of the Taliban on
February 29, 2020.
 Important elements of the deal
The withdrawal of US troops along with bringing down NATO
or coalition troop numbers within 14 months from when the
deal was signed. The main counter-terrorism commitment by
the Taliban is that “Taliban will not allow any of its members,
other individuals or groups, including al-Qaeda, to use the
soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United
States and its allies”.
The agreement said “ permanent and comprehensive ceasefire will be an item on the
agenda of the intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations. The participants of intra-
Afghan negotiations will discuss the date and modalities of a permanent and
comprehensive ceasefire, including joint implementation mechanisms, which will be
announced along with the completion and agreement over the future political ”.

Separately, a three-page joint declaration between the Afghan government (Islamic

Republic of Afghanistan) and the US was issued in Kabul at the time.

Other elements include removal of sanctions on Taliban leaders, releasing prisoners

held by both sides and ceasefire.

4. Joe Biden’s Approach – Biden Administration has said that it will review US-Taliban
deal reached by Trump administration in February, 2020 meant for bringing peace to
Afghanistan enabling the withdrawal of US and NATO forces.

The Joe Biden administration has proposed a new peace plan to the Afghan
government and the Taliban, seeking to bring violence to a halt and form an interim
government. Secretary of State Antony Blinken wrote a letter to
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, which Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S.’s
special envoy for Afghanistan, delivered to the Afghan leader in
Kabul , detailing the proposal.

a. First, Blinken has proposed a UN-led conference of

representatives of Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran, India and the U.S. “to discuss
a unified approach to support peace in Afghanistan”.
b. Second, It urges both sides to reach a consensus on
Afghanistan’s future constitutional and governing
arrangements; find a road map to a new “inclusive
government”; and agree on the terms of a “permanent and
comprehensive ceasefire”.
 c. Blinken has also proposed a senior level meeting of the Afghan government
and the Taliban in Turkey to discuss power sharing, reduction of violence and
other specific goals.

The Biden administration’s assessment is that the Taliban are on the ascent. It hopes
that the best way to prevent a complete Taliban takeover is a regional peace process
and an interim unity government. The Taliban are yet to respond to America’s
proposal.
Biden Administration has reemphasised the need for responsible withdrawal .

Biden is giving confusing signals :

a. Troop withdrawal by 1st May deadline will be tough.
b. US forces will not stay in the country longer.

Biden’s Dilemma
a. He cannot commit the troops endlessly as USA is not winning .
b. If he pulls back without peace agreement Civil war will intensify and Taliban will
make rapid gains .
c. If US troops do not leave , it will trigger a tough response from Taliban .

Why Biden has given a new proposal ?

a. Afghanistan conflict is multi faceted . He cannot ignore India, Russia, China , Iran .
Hence , he wants UB to takeover the process . Thus involving other regional
stakeholders.
b. He wants to buy time .

Who are the parties in the ‘Game ’?

a. Afghan Government – . Andullah is chairing HCNR (High
Council for National Reconciliation) . Mohammad Masoom
Stanekzai is the chief negotiator from the side if Afghan
Government.
b. Taliban, led by Haibatullah Akhunzdzada. Other leaders are
Abdul Ghani Baradar . Their negotiator is Abdul Hakim
Haqqani.
c. US – Zalmay Khalilzad is the special envoy.
d. Russia – Helping Taliban .
 e. China – Helping Taliban
f. Iran – Helping Taliban
g. Pakistan – Helping Taliban
h. Turkey – Helping Taliban
i. India – Helping Afghan Government .

The Peace Deal and India

India has been out of the game . Recently Russia conducted a meeting inviting US, China ,
Pakistan but ignoring India. Its good Biden brough India back.
Recent developments

Afghanistan Foreign Minister Hanif Atmar visited India in March , 2021 , reflecting India’s
significance in the talks. India in past year saw several high level visits from Afghanistan
including from Abdul Rashid Dostam , former Vice-President ; Abdullah Abdullah , Ata
Mohammad Nuur .

India’s participation is essential for the balanced outcome in Afghanistan in the interest of
long term peace . It is good that at Moscow , all parties emphasised that they do not support
restoration of Islamic Emirates run by Taliban and that it should reduce violence
significantly.

India’s Afghanistan Policy

Afghanistan is critical to India’s security ,

however in the past we have seen that
India has limited its role to soft power ,
outsourcing its security to US. In the event
of US withdrawal , strategists suggest that
India should go for military footprints .
However, there are many geographical
impediments in India’s military
engagement in Afghanistan.
What should be India’s role ?
a. Work with the regional players
 b. Utilise the platform of SCO
c. Speed up its connect central Asia Policy .
d. Continue to display its soft power .

What is the biggest obstacle for India’s participation ?

Pakistan’ security dilemma and its attempt to gain strategic depth .

Indian initiatives in Afghanistan(More than 3 Billion USD)

a. Parliament Building
b. Habiba High School
c. Salma Dam/ India Afghanistan Friendship Dam.
d. Electricity Transmission line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul.
e. Indira Gandhi Children Hospital.
f. Agricultural University in Kandahar.
g. Chimtala Power station in Kabul
h. Cricket Stadium in Kandahar.
i. 285 military vehicles for Aghan Army
j. 20 Mi-35/Mi-25 chopper for air force .
k. In November 2020, in a global conference on Afghanistan , S Jaishankar announced
over 100 high impact community project worth 80 Million USD
 India and the Nuclear Question

Syllabus Topic:
India and the Nuclear Question : Changing perceptions and policy.

Introduction
India embarked on the path of nuclear weapons development after its face-off with China in
the 1962 war, followed by China carrying out nuclear tests in 1964 and in the subsequent
years. In 1974, under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India conducted its first nuclear tests,
Pokhran-I, dubbed as a “peaceful nuclear explosion”. Despite more than two decades of
international pressure that followed to make India abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons,
India again carried out a test in May 1998, Pokhran-II, involving a fission device, a low-yield
device, and a thermonuclear device. Its successful execution meant that India had the ability
to introduce nuclear warheads into its fast-developing missile programme. A fortnight after
the Pokhran-II tests, Pakistan also carried out similar tests, confirming progress with its
nuclear weapons programme; since that time its nuclear arsenal has expanded rapidly.

India’s Nuclear Capabilities

India possesses both nuclear weapons and extensive nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. India
tested its first nuclear device in May 1974 and Second in May, 1998.

According to the 2019 SIPRI Yearbook, the Indian arsenal includes 130 to 140 warheads.
India's stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium is estimated at 0.58 ± 0.15 tons. India has
also stockpiled roughly 4.0 ± 1.4 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU).

India and Nuclear control regimes

India remains outside both the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

What is Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ?

NPT is legal instrument treated as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation
regime. The treaty institutionalised the non-proliferation norm by de-legitimising
‘proliferation’ (production and transfer) of nuclear weapons, fissile materials and related
technology by the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) while the recognised five nuclear-
weapon states (NWS) — namely the US, Russia, the UK, France and China, can continue to
possess nuclear weapons.
The Treaty can be described to have three objectives of :
1. non-proliferation,
2. disarmament and
3. peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
However, NNWS criticised this treaty of having structural flaws and viewed it as an
imbalanced instrument.
Nevertheless, the treaty has attained a near-universal status with just four hold-outs —
India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea and it is widely acknowledged that having a treaty
to halt the spread of nuclear weapons was better than having none at all.

Issues Pertaining to NPT

 Failure of Disarmament Process - The NPT is largely seen as a Cold War era
instrument that has failed to fulfil the objective of creating a pathway towards a
credible disarmament process. Treaty proposes no tangible disarmament roadmap,
no reference to test ban or to the freezing of production of either fissile materials or
nuclear weapons, and omitted provisions for reductions and elimination. It instead
allowed sustenance and expansion of arsenals by stipulating January 1, 1967 as the
cut-off date to determine the NWS.
 System of Nuclear ‘Haves’ and ‘Have-Nots’ - NNWS criticizes the treaty to be
discriminatory as it focuses on preventing only horizontal proliferation while there
is no limit for vertical proliferation . In this context, NNWS groupings demand that
the NWS should renounce their arsenals and further production in return for
commitment of NNWS not to produce them.
 Vertical Proliferation vs Horizontal Proliferation
Vertical proliferation can be defined as the advancement or modernization of a
nation-state's nuclear arsenal, whereas horizontal proliferation is the direct or
indirect transfer of technologies from one nation-state to another, which
ultimately leads to the more advanced development and proliferation of nuclear
weapons.

 Other issues –
o NNWS held that Articles I & II of the treaty (prohibition of possessing nuclear
weapons) did not prohibit nuclear weapons on allied territory of NWS. For
example, NATO countries for the US.
o NNWS also feels that the restrictions on Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE)
technology are one-sided.
o Under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) protocols of nuclear safety,
the NWS allowed to maintain ‘voluntary’ safeguards while the rest were
subjected to comprehensive safeguards, which seemed intrusive and
discriminatory to the NNWS.
Due to this tussle, most of the quadrennial Review Conferences (RevCon), the forum that
reviews the health and functioning of the treaty, has remained largely inconclusive since
1995.

As there is no explicit obligation on part of NWS to reduce their arsenal, NWS have continued
to expand their respective arsenals without any constraints.
Post-Cold War Challenges for NPT
The treaty’s existential challenges began in the post-Cold War setting when the attempts by
a few State Parties to break-out or gain nuclear latency led to numerous instances of non-
compliance, violations and defiance.
The NPT’s indefinite extension in 1995, while invoking its irreplaceability, also underlined the
inability of states to formulate a stand-alone instrument towards the objective of
disarmament, as enshrined in the NPT.
The emergence of non-state actors with declared intent to access weapons of mass
destruction and the detection of a global nuclear black-market, has raised concerns on the
limitations of the treaty to address the challenges thrown up by the new strategic milieu.

India’s Stand on NPT

 India is one of the only five countries that either did not sign
the NPT or signed but withdrew, thus becoming part of a list
that includes Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and South
Sudan. India always considered the NPT as discriminatory
and had refused to sign it.

India has opposed the international treaties aimed at non-

proliferation since they were selectively applicable to the non-nuclear powers and
legitimised the monopoly of the five nuclear weapons powers.

However, India has a facility-specific safeguards agreement in place with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
allowing it to participate in global civilian nuclear technology commerce.

Recent Developments and Current Status

India was recently accepted as a member of three of the four major export control regimes.
1. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 2016,
2. Wassenaar Arrangement in 2017
3. Australia Group in 2018.

Arguments for India’s NSG Membership

India has been actively pursuing membership into the NSG and has received explicit
support as well for its membership from many current NSG members including the United
States, Russia, Switzerland and Japan.
In arguing for NSG membership, India has portrayed itself as a responsible nuclear power,
pointing to its positive record on nonproliferation and consistent support for complete
nuclear disarmament. .However, China does not support an explicit membership in the
NSG for India but instead proposes a two-step approach:
1. First would be to reach consensus on a non-discriminatory resolution that would
apply to all non-NPT countries alike
2. Then discuss individual membership applications by non-NPT countries.

India argues that its membership should be considered under current rules because NSG is
an export-control mechanism and not a non-proliferation one, so question of linking NSG
membership to the NPT membership does not arise.

Furthermore, India argues that there is a precedent for non-signatories of NPT joining
the NSG when France became a founding member of the NSG in 1974 but did not accede
to the NPT until 1992.
 India’s declared nuclear posture is of credible minimum deterrence and has successfully
developed a strategic triad of nuclear delivery systems. India has not signed the CTBT,
but maintains a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and supports negotiations for
a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) that is "universal, non-discriminatory, and
internationally verifiable." The Indian mission to the United Nations has also submitted
several draft recommendations on “reducing nuclear danger,” which include “steps to
reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons, including through
de-alerting and de-targeting nuclear weapons.”

India has argued that “nuclear weapons are an integral part of our national security and
will remain so pending the global elimination of all nuclear weapons.” India maintains its
official commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons.
 Evolution of India’s Nuclear Programme
Developing a Peaceful Nuclear Program: 1947 to 1974
India's nuclear program was mainly conceived by Homi Bhabha, who persuaded political
leaders to invest resources in the nuclear sector. The first Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal
Nehru, launched an ambitious nuclear program to boost the country’s prestige and self-
reliance in energy with primary focus on producing inexpensive electricity. However, the
decision to develop the complete nuclear fuel cycle also gave India the technical capability to
pursue nuclear weapons.

The internal debate over whether India should develop a nuclear explosive device continued
in the backdrop of security developments in China and elsewhere as necessitating a
nuclear deterrent.

Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri authorized theoretical work on the Subterranean Nuclear
Explosion for Peaceful Purposes (SNEPP) project in November 1964. On 18 May 1974, under
orders from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India tested a fission device which it described as
a “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE).

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) are nuclear explosions conducted for non-military
purposes.The US proposed to prohibit PNE rights and instead offered to provide the
technology on a commercial basis. The Indian representatives consistently termed the
offer as 'atomic apartheid' and 'commercial super-monopoly,' and insisted that PNE rights
need to be integral to all peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
The Slow Path Toward Weaponization: 1974 to 1998
India’s 1974 nuclear test was condemned by many countries as a
violation of the peaceful-use agreements underlying U.S. and
Canadian-supplied nuclear technology and material transfers, and
was a major contributing factor to the formation of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG). Thus, India did not follow the 1974 test
with subsequent tests, nor did it immediately weaponize the
device design that it had tested. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi authorized weaponization of
India's nuclear capability in late 1980s. At the same time, India continued to support efforts
for nuclear disarmament. In 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi submitted an Action Plan for
a Nuclear-Weapons-Free and Non-Violent World Order to the United Nations General
Assembly.

https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/opinion/rajiv-gandhi-plan-on-nuclear-
disarmament-is-more-relevant-even-after-30-years

As negotiations on the CTBT rapidly progressed in the early 1990s, India came to regard the
CTBT as an instrument of non-proliferation that sought to freeze countries’ nuclear
capabilities. This, along with the indefinite extension of the NPT, reignited domestic political
pressure to conduct further tests. In 1995, the Narasimha Rao government considered an
accelerated program of nuclear tests but test preparations were detected by U.S. intelligence
and thus were postponed.

In 1998, Vajpayee government authorized two rounds of nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May
1998, after which India formally declared itself to be a nuclear-weapon state.
India as an Emerging Nuclear Power: 1998 to 2009
In January 2003, a Ministry of External Affairs press released the Nuclear doctrine of India.
A turning point in U.S.-India relations occurred when plans for negotiating a U.S.-India
nuclear cooperation agreement were unveiled in July 2005 under the George W. Bush
administration. This agreement, and the subsequent endorsement of India's case by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), enabled India to engage in international nuclear trade. In
return, India agreed to allow safeguards on a select number of its nuclear facilities that
are classified as "civilian" in purpose. The remaining "military" facilities remained off-limits
to international inspectors. The U.S. Congress passed the Hyde Act in January 2006 to
exempt nuclear cooperation with India from provisions of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act,
allowing for the adoption of a bilateral 123 nuclear cooperation agreement in August 2007.
In September 2008, the NSG approved an exemption allowing the members of this export
control regime to conduct nuclear trade with India.

India as an Established Nuclear Power: 2009 to Present

Inspite of the US India Civil Nuclear Deal, the nuclear power industry did not grow as
expected because India's liability laws regulating civilian nuclear power plants far
exceeded the international standards for nuclear liability and held suppliers legally liable
for any damages resulting from accidents. To address these concerns and give impetus to
nuclear power industry, India ratified the IAEA Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Damage in 2016.
By 2019, India had put total of 26 reactors under IAEA safeguards. Enabled by the NSG
waiver granted to it in 2008, India has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with Russia,
United States, France, United Kingdom, South Korea, Canada, Argentina, Kazakhstan,
Mongolia, Australia, Sri Lanka, Japan, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Czech Republic and Namibia.
India continues to participate in international nuclear trade and has signed agreements with
Canada, Kazakhstan and Australia to supply uranium to fuel its civilian nuclear reactors.
 INDIA’S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
India’s Nuclear Doctrine can be stated as :
1. Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent;
 A posture of "No First Use" nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a
nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere;
 Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict
unacceptable damage.
 Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership
through the Nuclear Command Authority.
 Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states;
 However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by
biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear
weapons;
 A continuance of strict controls on export of nuclear and missile related materials and
technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations, and
continued observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests.
 Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, through global,
verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.

2. The Nuclear Command Authority comprises a Political Council and an Executive

Council. The Political Council is chaired by the Prime Minister. It is the sole body
which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons.
3. The Executive Council is chaired by the National Security Advisor. It provides inputs
for decision making by the Nuclear Command Authority and executes the directives
given to it by the Political Council.

No First Use(NFU) component of India’s Nuclear Doctrine

Logic behind NFU

According to Rajesh Rajagopalan, the logic of NFU is counterintuitive: a country that faces
no existential threats (in addition to being the strongest and most powerful one in its
neighbourhood) has little need to use nuclear weapons first. This was a conclusion that
many Indian civilian strategists reached, both because they understood how India’s
circumstances dictated the country’s choices and they learned the right lessons from the
useless and wasteful Cold War nuclear arms race.
Retreating from NFU will prove to be of little benefit to India and could make managing
and controlling the country’s nuclear arsenal much more difficult. India simply does not
have the kind of nuclear superiority that would permit such a counterforce first-strike
doctrine.For a country facing two nuclear-armed adversaries—China and Pakistan, both of
which have territorial aims against India and maintain a strategic alliance by targeting it—
India’s nuclear arsenal remains relatively modest. Thus ,no-first-use policy is the best
response to the situation India faces.
However, there is no guarantee that India will not abandon NFU at some point in the future;
such a decision does not require India to do much. Especially in the case of the current BJP
government, this is more likely to be an ideologically driven change .
Harsh V Pant in his article “Is India overturning decades of nuclear
doctrine?” says that the country has good reason to want first-strike
capabilities. But the actual state of its arsenal suggests that it won’t get
them.
Choosing NFU policy was a good military and diplomatic sense. The
relatively small size of India’s arsenal ruled out a first strike anyway, and
the country’s commitment to restraint, meanwhile, built its image as a
responsible nuclear stakeholder and helped ease New Delhi’s accommodation in the
international nuclear order.

Why the question on revising NFU?

Firstly, there is a growing consensus in the Western non-proliferation community that, in
practice, New Delhi has already nearly relinquished the policy. In fact, experts believe that
should India and Pakistan go to war, India would ready its nuclear force for pre-emptive
strikes. And it has acquired the capability—nuclear arsenal, delivery systems, and ISR
(intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems—to do so. Moreover, having already
been granted recognition of its right to a nuclear program through the 2005 Indo-U.S.
nuclear deal, New Delhi has less incentive for caution.

Second, given the disparity between New Delhi’s conventional military power and Beijing’s,
publicly adopting a first-use doctrine would communicate both power and resolve on India’s
part.

Experts believe that the no-first-use doctrine may simply be a public lie to hide private
intentions. However, backing away from the principle would also signal strength and
perhaps make it less likely that India would need to use its new military capabilities to begin
with.
Adding conventional deterrence will put enormous strain on India’s underequipped and
overstretched Military. Diplomatically, too, building up conventional deterrence has been
costly. Measures such as inviting Australia to joint naval exercises in Malabar and initiating
official trade talks with Taiwan rattle Beijing, but not much more. While signalling a change
in nuclear posture may be an easy way to improve the deterrence.
The problem of proportionality persists as well. Decision-makers in Beijing are convinced of
New Delhi not using a tactical nuclear weapons to deter salami-slicing of small portions of its
territory.
Thus, it can be concluded that India’s nuclear weapons have and will continue to remain
weapons of last resort, meant to fulfil only one objective: deterring its adversaries from
using nuclear weapons first.

What events have started the debate over abandoning of NFU?

In a speech in 2010, the then national security adviser, Shivshankar
Menon, stated that India’s doctrine is “no first use against non-nuclear
weapon states,” implying that NFU does not apply to nuclear-armed
powers.
In March 2012, a nonofficial task force of strategic analysts, put together
by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi, also produced an alternate
nuclear doctrine for India
In 2013, Shyam Saran, convener of the National Security Advisory
Board, said: “India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons,
but if it is attacked with such weapons, it would engage in nuclear
retaliation which will be massive and designed to inflict
unacceptable damage on its adversary. The label on a nuclear
weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant from the Indian
perspective.”
In 2014, BJP’s election manifesto, it promised to “revise and update” India’s nuclear
doctrine to “make it relevant to challenges of current time.” This led to some speculation
that a key element of India’s nuclear doctrine, India’s no-first-use commitment (NFU) for
nuclear weapons, might be altered.
Former defence minister Manohar Parrikar expressed his personal distaste towards NFU by
saying, “Why should I bind myself? I should say I am a responsible nuclear power and I will
not use it irresponsibly.”
Defence minister Rajnath Singh in August 2019 tweeted that while India is firmly committed
to its NFU doctrine, the future of the policy all depends on the circumstances.

Conclusion

The dominant opinion on NFU is that India should maintain it. Even the Ministry of External
Affairs, in response to a question in the Lok Sabha, provided a clarification, stating that no
change had been made to the NFU policy.

However, there is a near consensus in the Indian strategic community that India’s nuclear
doctrine needs to be periodically re-examined. There is also a consensus that the Indian
government needs to release more information about its nuclear doctrine and policy, both
in order to deter adversaries and so that Indian public debate is better informed.
 India and the Nuclear Question

Syllabus Topic:
India and the Nuclear Question : Changing perceptions and policy.

Introduction
India embarked on the path of nuclear weapons development after its face-off with China in
the 1962 war, followed by China carrying out nuclear tests in 1964 and in the subsequent
years. In 1974, under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India conducted its first nuclear tests,
Pokhran-I, dubbed as a “peaceful nuclear explosion”. Despite more than two decades of
international pressure that followed to make India abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons,
India again carried out a test in May 1998, Pokhran-II, involving a fission device, a low-yield
device, and a thermonuclear device. Its successful execution meant that India had the ability
to introduce nuclear warheads into its fast-developing missile programme. A fortnight after
the Pokhran-II tests, Pakistan also carried out similar tests, confirming progress with its
nuclear weapons programme; since that time its nuclear arsenal has expanded rapidly.

India’s Nuclear Capabilities

India possesses both nuclear weapons and extensive nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. India
tested its first nuclear device in May 1974 and Second in May, 1998.

According to the 2019 SIPRI Yearbook, the Indian arsenal includes 130 to 140 warheads.
India's stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium is estimated at 0.58 ± 0.15 tons. India has
also stockpiled roughly 4.0 ± 1.4 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU).

India and Nuclear control regimes

India remains outside both the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

What is Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ?

NPT is legal instrument treated as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation
regime. The treaty institutionalised the non-proliferation norm by de-legitimising
‘proliferation’ (production and transfer) of nuclear weapons, fissile materials and related
technology by the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) while the recognised five nuclear-
weapon states (NWS) — namely the US, Russia, the UK, France and China, can continue to
possess nuclear weapons.
The Treaty can be described to have three objectives of :
1. non-proliferation,
2. disarmament and
3. peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
However, NNWS criticised this treaty of having structural flaws and viewed it as an
imbalanced instrument.
Nevertheless, the treaty has attained a near-universal status with just four hold-outs —
India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea and it is widely acknowledged that having a treaty
to halt the spread of nuclear weapons was better than having none at all.

Issues Pertaining to NPT

 Failure of Disarmament Process - The NPT is largely seen as a Cold War era
instrument that has failed to fulfil the objective of creating a pathway towards a
credible disarmament process. Treaty proposes no tangible disarmament roadmap,
no reference to test ban or to the freezing of production of either fissile materials or
nuclear weapons, and omitted provisions for reductions and elimination. It instead
allowed sustenance and expansion of arsenals by stipulating January 1, 1967 as the
cut-off date to determine the NWS.
 System of Nuclear ‘Haves’ and ‘Have-Nots’ - NNWS criticizes the treaty to be
discriminatory as it focuses on preventing only horizontal proliferation while there
is no limit for vertical proliferation . In this context, NNWS groupings demand that
the NWS should renounce their arsenals and further production in return for
commitment of NNWS not to produce them.
 Vertical Proliferation vs Horizontal Proliferation
Vertical proliferation can be defined as the advancement or modernization of a
nation-state's nuclear arsenal, whereas horizontal proliferation is the direct or
indirect transfer of technologies from one nation-state to another, which
ultimately leads to the more advanced development and proliferation of nuclear
weapons.

 Other issues –
o NNWS held that Articles I & II of the treaty (prohibition of possessing nuclear
weapons) did not prohibit nuclear weapons on allied territory of NWS. For
example, NATO countries for the US.
o NNWS also feels that the restrictions on Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE)
technology are one-sided.
o Under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) protocols of nuclear safety,
the NWS allowed to maintain ‘voluntary’ safeguards while the rest were
subjected to comprehensive safeguards, which seemed intrusive and
discriminatory to the NNWS.
Due to this tussle, most of the quadrennial Review Conferences (RevCon), the forum that
reviews the health and functioning of the treaty, has remained largely inconclusive since
1995.

As there is no explicit obligation on part of NWS to reduce their arsenal, NWS have continued
to expand their respective arsenals without any constraints.
Post-Cold War Challenges for NPT
The treaty’s existential challenges began in the post-Cold War setting when the attempts by
a few State Parties to break-out or gain nuclear latency led to numerous instances of non-
compliance, violations and defiance.
The NPT’s indefinite extension in 1995, while invoking its irreplaceability, also underlined the
inability of states to formulate a stand-alone instrument towards the objective of
disarmament, as enshrined in the NPT.
The emergence of non-state actors with declared intent to access weapons of mass
destruction and the detection of a global nuclear black-market, has raised concerns on the
limitations of the treaty to address the challenges thrown up by the new strategic milieu.

India’s Stand on NPT

 India is one of the only five countries that either did not sign
the NPT or signed but withdrew, thus becoming part of a list
that includes Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and South
Sudan. India always considered the NPT as discriminatory
and had refused to sign it.

India has opposed the international treaties aimed at non-

proliferation since they were selectively applicable to the non-nuclear powers and
legitimised the monopoly of the five nuclear weapons powers.

However, India has a facility-specific safeguards agreement in place with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
allowing it to participate in global civilian nuclear technology commerce.

Recent Developments and Current Status

India was recently accepted as a member of three of the four major export control regimes.
1. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 2016,
2. Wassenaar Arrangement in 2017
3. Australia Group in 2018.

Arguments for India’s NSG Membership

India has been actively pursuing membership into the NSG and has received explicit
support as well for its membership from many current NSG members including the United
States, Russia, Switzerland and Japan.
In arguing for NSG membership, India has portrayed itself as a responsible nuclear power,
pointing to its positive record on nonproliferation and consistent support for complete
nuclear disarmament. .However, China does not support an explicit membership in the
NSG for India but instead proposes a two-step approach:
1. First would be to reach consensus on a non-discriminatory resolution that would
apply to all non-NPT countries alike
2. Then discuss individual membership applications by non-NPT countries.

India argues that its membership should be considered under current rules because NSG is
an export-control mechanism and not a non-proliferation one, so question of linking NSG
membership to the NPT membership does not arise.

Furthermore, India argues that there is a precedent for non-signatories of NPT joining
the NSG when France became a founding member of the NSG in 1974 but did not accede
to the NPT until 1992.
 India’s declared nuclear posture is of credible minimum deterrence and has successfully
developed a strategic triad of nuclear delivery systems. India has not signed the CTBT,
but maintains a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and supports negotiations for
a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) that is "universal, non-discriminatory, and
internationally verifiable." The Indian mission to the United Nations has also submitted
several draft recommendations on “reducing nuclear danger,” which include “steps to
reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons, including through
de-alerting and de-targeting nuclear weapons.”

India has argued that “nuclear weapons are an integral part of our national security and
will remain so pending the global elimination of all nuclear weapons.” India maintains its
official commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons.
 Evolution of India’s Nuclear Programme
Developing a Peaceful Nuclear Program: 1947 to 1974
India's nuclear program was mainly conceived by Homi Bhabha, who persuaded political
leaders to invest resources in the nuclear sector. The first Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal
Nehru, launched an ambitious nuclear program to boost the country’s prestige and self-
reliance in energy with primary focus on producing inexpensive electricity. However, the
decision to develop the complete nuclear fuel cycle also gave India the technical capability to
pursue nuclear weapons.

The internal debate over whether India should develop a nuclear explosive device continued
in the backdrop of security developments in China and elsewhere as necessitating a
nuclear deterrent.

Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri authorized theoretical work on the Subterranean Nuclear
Explosion for Peaceful Purposes (SNEPP) project in November 1964. On 18 May 1974, under
orders from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India tested a fission device which it described as
a “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE).

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) are nuclear explosions conducted for non-military
purposes.The US proposed to prohibit PNE rights and instead offered to provide the
technology on a commercial basis. The Indian representatives consistently termed the
offer as 'atomic apartheid' and 'commercial super-monopoly,' and insisted that PNE rights
need to be integral to all peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
The Slow Path Toward Weaponization: 1974 to 1998
India’s 1974 nuclear test was condemned by many countries as a
violation of the peaceful-use agreements underlying U.S. and
Canadian-supplied nuclear technology and material transfers, and
was a major contributing factor to the formation of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG). Thus, India did not follow the 1974 test
with subsequent tests, nor did it immediately weaponize the
device design that it had tested. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi authorized weaponization of
India's nuclear capability in late 1980s. At the same time, India continued to support efforts
for nuclear disarmament. In 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi submitted an Action Plan for
a Nuclear-Weapons-Free and Non-Violent World Order to the United Nations General
Assembly.

https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/opinion/rajiv-gandhi-plan-on-nuclear-
disarmament-is-more-relevant-even-after-30-years

As negotiations on the CTBT rapidly progressed in the early 1990s, India came to regard the
CTBT as an instrument of non-proliferation that sought to freeze countries’ nuclear
capabilities. This, along with the indefinite extension of the NPT, reignited domestic political
pressure to conduct further tests. In 1995, the Narasimha Rao government considered an
accelerated program of nuclear tests but test preparations were detected by U.S. intelligence
and thus were postponed.

In 1998, Vajpayee government authorized two rounds of nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May
1998, after which India formally declared itself to be a nuclear-weapon state.
India as an Emerging Nuclear Power: 1998 to 2009
In January 2003, a Ministry of External Affairs press released the Nuclear doctrine of India.
A turning point in U.S.-India relations occurred when plans for negotiating a U.S.-India
nuclear cooperation agreement were unveiled in July 2005 under the George W. Bush
administration. This agreement, and the subsequent endorsement of India's case by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), enabled India to engage in international nuclear trade. In
return, India agreed to allow safeguards on a select number of its nuclear facilities that
are classified as "civilian" in purpose. The remaining "military" facilities remained off-limits
to international inspectors. The U.S. Congress passed the Hyde Act in January 2006 to
exempt nuclear cooperation with India from provisions of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act,
allowing for the adoption of a bilateral 123 nuclear cooperation agreement in August 2007.
In September 2008, the NSG approved an exemption allowing the members of this export
control regime to conduct nuclear trade with India.

India as an Established Nuclear Power: 2009 to Present

Inspite of the US India Civil Nuclear Deal, the nuclear power industry did not grow as
expected because India's liability laws regulating civilian nuclear power plants far
exceeded the international standards for nuclear liability and held suppliers legally liable
for any damages resulting from accidents. To address these concerns and give impetus to
nuclear power industry, India ratified the IAEA Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Damage in 2016.
By 2019, India had put total of 26 reactors under IAEA safeguards. Enabled by the NSG
waiver granted to it in 2008, India has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with Russia,
United States, France, United Kingdom, South Korea, Canada, Argentina, Kazakhstan,
Mongolia, Australia, Sri Lanka, Japan, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Czech Republic and Namibia.
India continues to participate in international nuclear trade and has signed agreements with
Canada, Kazakhstan and Australia to supply uranium to fuel its civilian nuclear reactors.
 INDIA’S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
India’s Nuclear Doctrine can be stated as :
1. Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent;
 A posture of "No First Use" nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a
nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere;
 Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict
unacceptable damage.
 Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership
through the Nuclear Command Authority.
 Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states;
 However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by
biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear
weapons;
 A continuance of strict controls on export of nuclear and missile related materials and
technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations, and
continued observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests.
 Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, through global,
verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.

2. The Nuclear Command Authority comprises a Political Council and an Executive

Council. The Political Council is chaired by the Prime Minister. It is the sole body
which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons.
3. The Executive Council is chaired by the National Security Advisor. It provides inputs
for decision making by the Nuclear Command Authority and executes the directives
given to it by the Political Council.

No First Use(NFU) component of India’s Nuclear Doctrine

Logic behind NFU

According to Rajesh Rajagopalan, the logic of NFU is counterintuitive: a country that faces
no existential threats (in addition to being the strongest and most powerful one in its
neighbourhood) has little need to use nuclear weapons first. This was a conclusion that
many Indian civilian strategists reached, both because they understood how India’s
circumstances dictated the country’s choices and they learned the right lessons from the
useless and wasteful Cold War nuclear arms race.
Retreating from NFU will prove to be of little benefit to India and could make managing
and controlling the country’s nuclear arsenal much more difficult. India simply does not
have the kind of nuclear superiority that would permit such a counterforce first-strike
doctrine.For a country facing two nuclear-armed adversaries—China and Pakistan, both of
which have territorial aims against India and maintain a strategic alliance by targeting it—
India’s nuclear arsenal remains relatively modest. Thus ,no-first-use policy is the best
response to the situation India faces.
However, there is no guarantee that India will not abandon NFU at some point in the future;
such a decision does not require India to do much. Especially in the case of the current BJP
government, this is more likely to be an ideologically driven change .
Harsh V Pant in his article “Is India overturning decades of nuclear
doctrine?” says that the country has good reason to want first-strike
capabilities. But the actual state of its arsenal suggests that it won’t get
them.
Choosing NFU policy was a good military and diplomatic sense. The
relatively small size of India’s arsenal ruled out a first strike anyway, and
the country’s commitment to restraint, meanwhile, built its image as a
responsible nuclear stakeholder and helped ease New Delhi’s accommodation in the
international nuclear order.

Why the question on revising NFU?

Firstly, there is a growing consensus in the Western non-proliferation community that, in
practice, New Delhi has already nearly relinquished the policy. In fact, experts believe that
should India and Pakistan go to war, India would ready its nuclear force for pre-emptive
strikes. And it has acquired the capability—nuclear arsenal, delivery systems, and ISR
(intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems—to do so. Moreover, having already
been granted recognition of its right to a nuclear program through the 2005 Indo-U.S.
nuclear deal, New Delhi has less incentive for caution.

Second, given the disparity between New Delhi’s conventional military power and Beijing’s,
publicly adopting a first-use doctrine would communicate both power and resolve on India’s
part.

Experts believe that the no-first-use doctrine may simply be a public lie to hide private
intentions. However, backing away from the principle would also signal strength and
perhaps make it less likely that India would need to use its new military capabilities to begin
with.
Adding conventional deterrence will put enormous strain on India’s underequipped and
overstretched Military. Diplomatically, too, building up conventional deterrence has been
costly. Measures such as inviting Australia to joint naval exercises in Malabar and initiating
official trade talks with Taiwan rattle Beijing, but not much more. While signalling a change
in nuclear posture may be an easy way to improve the deterrence.
The problem of proportionality persists as well. Decision-makers in Beijing are convinced of
New Delhi not using a tactical nuclear weapons to deter salami-slicing of small portions of its
territory.
Thus, it can be concluded that India’s nuclear weapons have and will continue to remain
weapons of last resort, meant to fulfil only one objective: deterring its adversaries from
using nuclear weapons first.

What events have started the debate over abandoning of NFU?

In a speech in 2010, the then national security adviser, Shivshankar
Menon, stated that India’s doctrine is “no first use against non-nuclear
weapon states,” implying that NFU does not apply to nuclear-armed
powers.
In March 2012, a nonofficial task force of strategic analysts, put together
by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi, also produced an alternate
nuclear doctrine for India
In 2013, Shyam Saran, convener of the National Security Advisory
Board, said: “India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons,
but if it is attacked with such weapons, it would engage in nuclear
retaliation which will be massive and designed to inflict
unacceptable damage on its adversary. The label on a nuclear
weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant from the Indian
perspective.”
In 2014, BJP’s election manifesto, it promised to “revise and update” India’s nuclear
doctrine to “make it relevant to challenges of current time.” This led to some speculation
that a key element of India’s nuclear doctrine, India’s no-first-use commitment (NFU) for
nuclear weapons, might be altered.
Former defence minister Manohar Parrikar expressed his personal distaste towards NFU by
saying, “Why should I bind myself? I should say I am a responsible nuclear power and I will
not use it irresponsibly.”
Defence minister Rajnath Singh in August 2019 tweeted that while India is firmly committed
to its NFU doctrine, the future of the policy all depends on the circumstances.

Conclusion

The dominant opinion on NFU is that India should maintain it. Even the Ministry of External
Affairs, in response to a question in the Lok Sabha, provided a clarification, stating that no
change had been made to the NFU policy.

However, there is a near consensus in the Indian strategic community that India’s nuclear
doctrine needs to be periodically re-examined. There is also a consensus that the Indian
government needs to release more information about its nuclear doctrine and policy, both
in order to deter adversaries and so that Indian public debate is better informed.
VIETNAM:

India and Vietnam will define the future of

Asia
-Ho Chin Minh, a former President of Vietnam had even gone on to describe the relations
between India and Vietnam as flourishing under a“cloudless sky”.

-Overtime, the two countries have developed strong relations with strategic engagements
through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-led multilateral mechanisms such
as the East Asia Summit, ASEAN regional forum, ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus as
well as the India led Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MCG).

-Indo-Vietnam comprehensive strategic partnership can contribute to promoting regional stability

as both nations share a similar vision of an open, inclusive, peaceful and rules-based Indian
Ocean region.-P.M. MODI
GEOSTRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE:

-India-Vietnam relations are one of the most crucial bilateral relations that India has in Southeast
Asia. It has both economic and strategic angles. India’s about 55% trade passes through the
South China Sea (SCS), which has of late become a victim of the Chinese aggressiveness.
China is illegally claiming 90% of the SCS through its cartographic aggression, which includes
Vietnamese EEZ as also of others. However, it is only Vietnam that is strongly opposing China
and favours implementation of the Ruling of Permanent Court of Arbitration of 2016. The
Philippines, which had filed the case, soon after the verdict decided not to pursue the judgement
in view of the huge financial assistance promised by China. It is only recently the Philippines
has realised that its sovereignty is under jeopardy.
-Vietnam, along with other Asian nation, Philippines have territorial disputes with China over the
Spratly Islands. This, apart from the bilateral dispute the country has over the Paracel Islands
with the world’s most populous nation.

-Against this backdrop of territorial and maritime disputes with China, both India and Vietnam
are mindful of their respective concerns and limitations. Being responsible stakeholders that
believe in a rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific region, both nations have striven to avoid a
direct confrontation with China. Both countries have also been relentless in pitching for a
peaceful ASEAN-led solution to the South China Sea dispute while supporting the US idea of
Freedom of Navigation Operations. The US intervention in the SCS brings with it a whole new
range of complications accelerating the pace to achieve superpower status.

-Both the countries are in the UNSC and are working jointly for the realisation of common goals.
Coordination between the two is critical to raise issues of security in South China Sea and
implications of dams on Mekong and Brahmaputra by China. In addition, both have to press for
the implementation of the PCA Ruling, which China has rejected reflecting its scant regard for
international laws and bodies. Now both have to give greater push to involve other nations for
the maintenance of peace, stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region.

-Relations received a greater push in 2014 when India launched ‘Act East Policy’ that gave
greater focus to the South East Asian countries. Since then, India and Vietnam have taken
several steps to upgrade their ties.India’s Act East policy (AEP) was formulated (2014) to focus
on creating an “extended neighbourhood in the Asia Pacific Region”.
TRADE:
-Over the past two decades, bilateral trade between Vietnam and India has steadily grown from
US$200 million in 2000 to US$12.3 billion in the financial year 2019-2020.Vietnam’s bilateral
trade figures with India accounted for only US$11.1 billion in the 2020–21 financial year — 12
times smaller than that with China. India’s imports from Vietnam increased from US$2.5 billion
in 2015–16 to US$6.1 billion in 2020–21.Conversely, Indian exports to Vietnam have not shown
consistent growth in the last five years, reaching only US$5 billion in 2020–21.

-The rising importance of Vietnam in global supply chains has the potential to strengthen
India-Vietnam ties further. India is estimated to have invested nearly US$2 billion in Vietnam
including funds channeled via other countries. Over 200 Indian investment projects in Vietnam
are primarily focused on sectors including energy, mineral exploration, agrochemicals, sugar,
tea, coffee manufacturing, IT, and auto components.

-SMEs play a large role in both India’s and Vietnam’s economies. Most recently, India and
Vietnam held a promotion conference titled ‘Boosting trade-investment cooperation
opportunities between Vietnamese and Indian SMEs.

DEFENCE:

-India and Vietnam had upgraded their ties to the level of Comprehensive Strategic
partnership in 2016.

-India has also offered Vietnam a line of credit worth $500 million to develop its defence
industry.

-On 21st December, 2020, the Indian PM Modi and the then Vietnamese PM Nguyen Xuan
Phuc co-chaired a virtual summit and issued the India-Vietnam Joint Vision for Peace,
Prosperity and People containing the guidelines for future development of India –
Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The significance of this document lay in the
fact that it would serve as the cornerstone for a new era of India – Vietnam Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership. Seven agreements inked included one on implementing arrangements on
defence industry cooperation and another on nuclear cooperation between India’s Atomic
Energy Regulatory Board and Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. The summit
provided an opportunity to hand over one high speed guard boat to Vietnam, launch of two other
vessels manufactured in India, and keel-laying of seven vessels being manufactured in Vietnam
under the $100 million defence Line of Credit extended by India to that country.
-In December 2020, the Indian Navy took part in the “passage exercise” with the Vietnamese
Navy in the SCS as part of efforts to boost maritime cooperation between the two countries.

-In more recent times, the Defence Secretary Dr Ajay Kumar, co-chaired (Jan,12 2021) the 13th
India-Vietnam Defence Security Dialogue along with his Vietnamese co-chair Sr Lt Gen Nguyen
Chi Vinh, the Deputy Defence Minister, Vietnam. During their virtual interaction, the Defence
Secretary and the Deputy Defence Minister expressed their satisfaction at the ongoing defence
cooperation between the two countries in spite of the limitations imposed by COVID 19.

-Recently at ASEAN summit two sides put special emphasis on areas such as civil nuclear
energy, space, marine sciences, and emerging technologies. India and Vietnam also agreed to
strengthen their strategic partnership “in line with India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI)
and the ASEAN’s Outlook on Indo-Pacific to achieve shared security, prosperity and growth
for all in the region.” IPOI is an initiative launched by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the East
Asia Summit in Thailand in November 2019. The initiative is centered around seven pillars
including maritime security; maritime ecology; maritime resources; capacity building and
resource sharing; disaster risk reduction and management; science, technology, and academic
cooperation; and trade connectivity and maritime transport. India has called on Vietnam to
partner on one of the seven pillars of the IPOI.

-Hanoi is interested in India’s Akash surface-to-air systems and Dhruv advanced light
helicopters. Defense analysts argue that especially in the wake of the Galwan clash, India must
proceed with both the Brahmos and the Akash missile systems and not continue being coy on
account of China’s reactions. Discussions on the possible sale of Brahmos have been going on
for a few years now. Reportedly, disagreements with Russia (the missile was jointly developed
with Russia) on the sale have been resolved.

OTHER AREAS OF COOPERATION:

-Vietnam is also keen for India to expand its presence in oil and gas exploration in the South
China Sea and has firmly maintained that the areas fall well within Vietnam’s economic zone.
India has on many occasions explained that it will continue to maintain its oil and gas
exploration tie-ups with Vietnam in Vietnamese waters.

-India also reiterated its development and capacity assistance for Vietnam through quick
impact projects (QIP), Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) and e-ITEC
initiatives, Ph.D. fellowships and proposals in the area of water resource management in
Vietnam’s Mekong Delta region, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and digital
connectivity. India has already approved 12 QIPs for implementation in Vietnam: seven in water
resource management in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta Region and five linked to construction of
educational infrastructure in Vietnam.
-There are a number of platforms and venues that have been created at track 1 and 1.5 levels in
recent years to create and sustain linkages between India and ASEAN countries on the
Indo-Pacific theme.

-As part of reaching out to Southeast Asia, through Mission SAGAR, Indian Naval Ship INS
Kiltan delivered 15 tons of flood relief material containing 3,000 flood relief kits for Vietnam’s
Steering Committee for NDPC (National Disaster Prevention and Control) in December 2020.
This reiterates India’s position as a dependable partner and the Indian Navy as the preferred
security partner and first responder

Vietnam Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh to undertake maiden visit to India in
--

December

In his first visit to India since taking charge, Vietnam PM is expected to discuss
advancing the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries with PM
Narendra Modi.

CONCLUSION:

Aswani, R.S.

India plays a leading role in the IOR, while Vietnam holds an important geopolitical position in
the Pacific region. They are facing similar opportunities and challenges. Both are located in
strongly developing regions, and they need to make use of this opportunity by enhancing
cooperation and mutual support to grow more rapidly and sustainably.

Vietnam and India’s relations should not be looked at only from the prism of “Vietnam is for
India, what Pakistan is for China”. There is considerable cooperation in multidimensional sectors
for both countries to mutually nourish and contribute to regional peace and prosperity in
Indo-Pacific.

But there is a lag in economic cooperation.

Kannan Reghunathan Nair: Since the upgrade of bilateral relations to a ‘Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership’ in 2016, India–Vietnam strategic coordination has continued to deepen —
as reflected through increased defence and maritime security cooperation. But New Delhi and
Hanoi’s economic ties are lagging behind, limiting their ability to address shared security and
strategic concerns raised by China’s economic rise in India’s backyard and maritime
assertiveness in the South China Sea.
Vietnam is not only a close strategic partner of India but also a proactive middle-sized state in
ASEAN. Vietnam plays a critical role in facilitating mainland Southeast Asia’s socio-economic
progress through ASEAN platforms and the Cambodia–Laos–Vietnam Developmental Triangle
Area. Hanoi is also keen on enmeshing extra-regional players in the Mekong region to foster
regional growth and economic diversification. For these reasons, Vietnam can act as an
important bridge-builder between India and CLMV countries in the area of connectivity and
economic cooperation.
 India – China Relations

1949 – India became the first non-communist country to recognise

1950 – India did not support US led
resolution blaming China as aggressor in Korean Crisis.

1954 – Panchsheel Agreement.

The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, known as the Panchsheel Treaty.

Their first formal codification in treaty form was in an agreement between China and India in
1954 — the "Agreement (with exchange of notes) on trade and intercourse between Tibet
Region of China and India", which was signed at Peking on 28 April 1954.

The Five Principles, as stated in the Sino–Indian Agreement 1954, are listed as:

 mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,

 mutual non-aggression,
 mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
 equality and mutual benefit, and
 peaceful co-existing.

1959 – Dalai Lama escaped to India

1957 – Karakoram Highway across Aksai Chin.

Aksai Chin
Aksai Chin is almost the size of Bhutan and little
smaller than Switzerland. Most of it is in
occupation of China, which captured the region
during 1950s and consolidated its military grip over
the area during the 1962 India-China war, rejecting
all Indian attempts to settle border disputes
peacefully.
A major Sino-Indian bilateral negotiation for a friendly and permanent settlement of all
outstanding issues, including the border dispute, was initiated in Delhi in December 1953.
It is argued that "Aksai Chin is like a Damocles sword hanging over India's head" in addition
to being a gateway to Central Asia and an easy route to "easily run over New Delhi, the
Indian capital city. This explains why China was expressly keen in seizing Aksai Chin

Tibet :The Core Issue In China-India Relations

Following a brief military conflict between

China and Tibet at the start of the 20th
century, Tibet declared itself as an
independent nation in 1912. It functioned as
an autonomous region until 1950. In 1949,
the Communists under Mao Zedong’s
leadership gained power and in 1950 seized
control of Tibet. In 1951, the Dalai Lama’s
representatives signed a seventeen-point
agreement that granted China sovereignty over Tibet for the first time. The Chinese
claim that this document is proof of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet while Tibet says
that it was coerced into signing this document.
 The current Dalai Lama claims that he wants only autonomy for Tibet, because it
would ensure the preservation of Tibet’s unique culture, language and customs. The
Dalai Lama in 1959 fled Tibet to India after a failed uprising. The Chinese have little
trust in the Dalai Lama and claim that his intentions are not sincere. Further China
claims that Tibet has been an inalienable part of China since the thirteenth century
under the Yuan Dynasty.
 The Chinese blame the British for causing confusion in Tibet refusing to be bound by
any treaties signed between Tibet and Britain during the early 20th century. This
includes the 1914 Shimla convention where the British recognized Tibet as an
autonomous area under the suzerainty of China. There is also differing contentions
about what includes political Tibet in modern times. For the Chinese, this includes the
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), which are the western and central areas. This was
directly ruled by Tibet when the Chinese invaded Tibet in 1950.
 Following the Cultural Revolution, Mao sent the Chinese army to Tibet after they
refused to accept the conditions which the Chinese authorities wanted to impose..
Mao’s Cultural Revolution in Tibet continued until 1976. After Deng Xiaoping took
over in 1978, he reached out to the Dalai Lama in a quest to foster a reconciliatory
economic and cultural policy towards Tibet.
 Pro-independence protests in Tibet started in 1987 and this led to a clampdown by
the Chinese authorities on religious and cultural freedom in Tibet. Simultaneously, a
 rapid economic development programme was formulated leading to large
immigration of Hans Chinese into Tibet. The Dalai Lama’s exile in Dharamsala in
Northern India in 1959 put India squarely at the centre of this China-Tibet dispute.
India is currently home to around 120,000 Tibetan
Some Chinese officials claim they are just waiting for the Dalai Lama’s expiry for the Tibetan
movement’s intensity to subside.'

1961 – Aggressive border patrolling by China ; Nehru’s Forward Policy

1962 – Massive attack on Eastern and Western Front, Unilateral ceasefire

Why India and China went to war in 1962 ?

56 years ago, China attacked India over multiple points across the border, leading to a
month-long standoff between 10,000 to 20,000 Indian soldiers and 80,000 Chinese troops.
Unprepared for the offensive, India lost nearly 4,000 soldiers in the war and suffered its most
humiliating defeat.

The causes of war

The leading cause for the 1962 war was China’s perception that India was meddling in its
internal affairs in Tibet. After Independence, India largely maintained cordial relations with
China. It did, briefly, protest Chinese occupation in Tibet. However, in March 1959, when the
Dalai Lama fled Tibet and found asylum in India, People’s Republic of China leader Mao
Zedong did not take it lightly. He claimed that the Lhasa rebellion in Tibet was fuelled by
India. China felt that the political asylum to the Dalai Lama amounted to interference by
India in China’s internal affairs.

Invasion

 Smaller conflicts between the two countries increased in 1962. On 10 July, over 350
Chinese troops surrounded an Indian post at Chushul, Leh. Using loudspeakers, they
told the Gurkha regiment to not fight for India.
 And on 20 October the People’s Liberation Army invaded India in Ladakh, northern
Uttarakhand and across the McMahon Line in the then North-East Frontier Agency
(now Arunachal Pradesh), catching India completely off guard. The attack began
simultaneously in all sectors of the border at the same time — 5 am — synchronised
as per Beijing time. Convinced that there would not be a war, India didn’t deploy
enough soldiers, while China launched a full frontal attack.
 A panicked India reportedly sought US assistance to control the Chinese aggression.
Nehru wrote to then US President John F. Kennedy to provide “air transport and jet
fighters” to India. But US largely stayed away.
 Meanwhile, China proposed that Ayub Khan, then Pakistan President, should attack
India. Pakistan chose not to. Because the Soviets were engaged in their own high-
stakes gamble in Cuba, Moscow did not discourage the Chinese, despite Khrushchev’s
close relationship with Nehru, “At the same time defeating India would answer the
question Kennedy had raised in his 1959 speech in the Senate about which country,
democratic India or communist China, was poised to win the race for great power
status in Asia. For Mao, the conflict with India provided a surrogate for his rivalry
with Moscow and with Washington,”

The lessons

 The war officially ended on 20 November, 1962, after China finally announced a
ceasefire along the entire Sino-Indian border, even as some minor conflicts continued
in NEFA and Aksai Chin.
 The Sino-Indian War put the spotlight on India’s unpreparedness in a war situation
and underlined the need to modernise its armed forces.
  It also highlighted the crucial strategic mistakes India committed, including not using
the Indian Air Force.
 On the 50th anniversary of the war, former Indian ambassador to Iraq R.S. Kalha
wrote that then Chinese President Liu Shaoqi told the Sri Lankan leader Felix
Bandaranaike after the war that the conflict was “to demolish India’s arrogance and
illusions of grandeur”.The main objective of Mao Zedong, founding father of the
People’s Republic of China, to attack India in 1962 was to “humiliate” Nehru who was
emerging as a leader of the third world,
 India’s defence experts and historians should revise their view of 1962 seen as a
‘humiliating defeat’. Instead it should be seen as a victory of Nehru’s policy of non-
alignment which, with massive military and economic aid from both the American
and (then) Soviet blocs, had India’s defence forces fully prepared by 1965. It was a
blessing in disguise.

1979 – Vajpayee visited Beijing as Foreign Minster

1987 – China Condemned the establishment of

Arunachal Pradesh as a state; standoff in Sum do rong
chhu valley .
1988 – Rajiv Gandhi’s visit Joint Working Group on
Boundary Issue .

Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988 broke the ice

The relations between India and China - deep-frozen for the last 26
years - finally seemed to thaw with the formation of a joint task
force to solve the thorny border issue. Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi's visit to China marked a new beginning in bilateral
relations.
The two sides issued a joint communiqué that stressed the need to
restore friendly relations on the basis of the Panchsheel. India and
the People's Republic of China agreed to achieve a "fair and reasonable settlement while
seeking a mutually acceptable solution" to the border dispute. The communiqué also
expressed China's concern about agitation by Tibetan separatists in India and reiterated that
anti-China political activities by expatriate Tibetans would not be tolerated. Rajiv Gandhi
signed bilateral agreements on science and technology co-operation, establish direct air
links, and on cultural exchanges. The two sides also agreed to hold annual diplomatic
consultations between foreign ministers, set up a joint committee on economic and scientific
co-operation, and a joint working group on the boundary issue. The latter group was to be
led by the Indian foreign secretary and the Chinese vice minister of foreign affair.
1993 – Peace and Tranquillity agreement on Border

The 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and

Tranquility contains the following key provisions

 The two countries will resolve the border issue through peaceful and friendly
consultations. The two sides will ‘‘strictly respect and observe’’ the LAC, pending an
ultimate solution.
 The two sides agree to reduce their military forces along the LAC in conformity with
the agreed requirements of the principle of mutual and equal security ceilings.
 The two sides will work out effective confidence-building measures (CBM) along the
LAC.
 The high point of this period of relative Sino-Indian rapprochement was the historic
visit by Chinese President Jiang Zemin to New Delhi in late 1996. The two sides signed
the Agreement on CBM in the Military Field along the LAC, according to which their
governments pledged:
 To limit the number of field-army troops, border-defense forces, paramilitary forces,
and major categories of armaments along the LAC;
 To avoid holding large-scale military exercises near the LAC and to notify the other
side of exercises involving one brigade group (that is, 5,000 troops);
 Not to discharge firearms, cause biodegradation, use hazardous chemicals, set off
explosives, or hunt with firearms within two kilometers of the LAC;
 To maintain and expand telecommunications links between border meeting points at
designated places along the LAC.
 To maintain and expand telecommunications links between border meeting points at
designated places along the LAC.

1998 – India points at China for operation Shakti

Sino-Indian relations hit a low point in 1998 following India's nuclear tests.
Before conducting its first nuclear test in 1974, India’s nuclear policy was directed toward
the perceived threat from China
sisted in identifying China as India’s most formidable threat.27 ‘‘China is potential threat
number one,’’ George Fernandes, defense minister, said in May 1998: ‘‘The potential threat
from China is greater than that from Pakistan and any person who is concerned about
India’s security must agree with that.’’

2003 – Vajpayee’s visit Strategic Partnership. China

recognises Sikkim as India’s territory .

China officially recognised Indian sovereignty over Sikkim 2003

An agreement on the boundary with China could set the tone for a final settlement of the
Kashmir question with Pakistan. GOOD FENCES make good neighbours. The absence of a
settled boundary with China, let alone fences, has been at the heart of New Delhi's troubled
relationship with Beijing for more than four decades. The biggest political outcome from the
Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to China has been the decision by the two sides to
explore a final settlement of the boundary dispute.

Nathu La pass reopens for trade after 44 years

Marking a historic occasion, Nathu La, the famous Himalayan
pass at 14,500 feet on the Sino-India border here reopened after
44 years. Once part of the historic 'Silk Route', Nathu La became
India's third point after Shipkila in Himachal and Lipulekh in
Uttaranchal for border trade with China.

The reopening of the pass came a little over a year after China
accepted Sikkim as an integral part of India. The route had been
closed since the Indo-China war of 1962.

2004 – Special Representative Mechanism : Guiding Principles and Political parameters

The resolution and
final solution of the
boundary question
will promote positive
relations between
India and China, "in
accordance with the
Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence"
and "principle of
mutual and equal security".
In attainment of the solution the two sides will consider "historical evidence, national
sentiments, practical difficulties and reasonable concerns and sensitivities of both sides, and
the actual state of border areas"; the boundary should be along "well-defined geographical
features"; interests of "settled populations in the border areas" to be considered; and
"delineation of the boundary to be done through modern and joint means.
Pending final solution, all dispute resolution mechanism bodies will continue to function as
per their objectives.
2005 - SAARC Summit in 2005, China was granted an observer status
China has an observer status in SAARC, .It was in the 18th summit, which was held in
Kathmandu in November 2014, that Beijing expressed its interest in joining the organisation.
However, this was not endorsed by India for geopolitical reasons. The Charter of SAARC
requires consensus among all members for admitting a new member. If China is to be
admitted it must get the support of all the members.
Three realities exist as far as China’s admission as a full member of SAARC is concerned.

 Firstly, the perception that China is not a South Asian country as it doesn’t share a
history and culture with the people of South Asia. China has borders with five of the
eight South Asian countries and is located in the proximity of Bangladesh, yet, China
is not a mainstream South Asian country
 Secondly, China in view of its wide-ranging trade, economic and commercial relations
with almost all the South Asian countries and geographical contiguity with South Asia
is qualified to be a full member of SAARC.
 Thirdly, almost half of SAARC members support China’s admission to the organisation
as a full member. Indeed, it is not only Pakistan which vehemently supports China’s
full admission but also members like Sri Lanka,
For India, China’s admission as a full member may lead to an anti-Indian Sino-Pakistani
alliance which other smaller members of SAARC may also join. It is the fear of China
neutralizing India’s domination in South Asia which has led to New Delhi’s constant
opposition to China’s membership. In order to pre-empt China’s admission India has tried to
use its influence with Afghanistan, Bhutan and Bangladesh.
Chinese President Xi Jinping in his official visit to India urged the Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi to change his country’s policy on opposing China’s membership in the
SAARC. He also stated that China would support India’s full membership in the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) and he requested that the Indian Prime Minister should
reciprocate this gesture by backing China’s SAARC ambitions.

2009 – BRIC
2013 – BDCA
2013 Depsang standoff

On April 15, an Indian patrol found that a

Chinese platoon had established a camp in
what was clearly the Indian side of the Line of
Actual Control. On the evening of May 5, after
weeks of consultations and flag meetings, the
Chinese and Indian sides agreed to restore
status quo ante in the area, which essentially
meant that the Chinese removed the five tents they had set up on April 15.
The fact that their move was clearly non-threatening, yet high visibility, suggests that Beijing
was sending some kind of a signal.

Signalling what ?
The Chinese action can be seen at two levels- one as a straightforward land grab, and two
instances of signalling. The first is an established pattern where the PLA keeps nibbling at
Indian territory to create new "facts on the ground" or a "new normal" in relation to their
claimed LAC. They do this, as they have done in the past– occupy an area, then assert that it
has always been part of their territory and offer to negotiate. In this very sector, Chinese
claim lines have been varying since 1956. At that time, for example, the entire Chip Chap and
Galwan river valleys were accepted by China as being Indian territory. But in 1960 China
insisted that these areas were within their claim line and they occupied them following the
1962 war.
The fact that the border is neither demarcated
nor inhabited, and there is no agreement on
the alignment of the LAC in many areas, aids
this process, China could be signalling its
unhappiness over the Indian military build up
on the Sino-Indian border. In the last five years,
India has activated forward airfields in the
Ladakh sector, completed important road
building projects in the Chumar sector, begun
work on the road to link DBO with Leh, and
moved high-performance fighter aircraft to bases proximate to Tibet.
2017 – India in SCO

2017 Doklam
Doklam Conflict

Doklam, or Donglang in Chinese, is an area

spread over less than a 100 sq km comprising a
plateau and a valley at the trijunction between
India, Bhutan and China. It is surrounded by the
Chumbi Valley of Tibet, Bhutan’s Ha Valley and
Sikkim.
Despite several rounds of engagement between
China and Bhutan, the dispute between the two
over Doklam has not been resolved. It flared up in 2017 when the Chinese were trying to
construct a road in the area, and Indian troops, in aid of their Bhutanese counterparts,
objected to it, resulting in the stand-off. Doklam is strategically located close to the Siliguri
Corridor, which connects mainland India with its north-eastern region. The corridor, also
called Chicken’s Neck, is a vulnerable point for India.
Why does it matter?
While India-Tibet trade flourished along the Siliguri corridor and Chumbi Valley, Doklam had
very little significance. Even during British rule, Doklam did not command much attention. In
recent years however, China has been beefing up its military presence in the Chumbi Valley,
where the Chinese are at a great disadvantage militarily. Both Indian and Bhutanese troops
are on a higher ground around the Valley.
This is also the reason, the Indian security establishment suspect, why the Chinese have a
deep interest in Doklam, which would give them a commanding view of and an easy access
to both the Chumbi Valley and the Siliguri Corridor.
The Bhutanese government told China that “the construction of the road inside Bhutanese
territory is a direct violation of the agreements and affects the process of demarcating the
boundary between our two countries.”The Ministry of External Affairs said: “Such
construction would represent a significant change of status quo with serious security
implications for India.” The Chinese government released a map to accuse India of
trespassing into its territory, and in a detailed statement in the first week of August, it said
“India has no right to interfere in or impede the boundary talks between China and Bhutan.”

What were India’s concerns?

India’s concerns emanated from Chinese action to change the status quo on the ground by
building a road in violation of China’s existing understanding with both India and Bhutan.

What arguments did India put forth in these negotiations?

One, India contested the Chinese claims of sovereignty over this region as it is part of
Bhutan.
Two, India argued that the Chinese attempt to alter the status quo amounted to a unilateral
determination of the tri-junction of the three countries.
Three, China was violating the 2012 written common understanding between the two
countries that the tri-junction would be finalised in consultation with all concerned countries.
Continuation of the faceoff was not in the mutual interest of India and China and prolonging
it would only give others an opportunity to take advantage. Finally, India reminded the
Chinese side of the Astana Consensus wherein both sides had agreed that differences should
not become disputes.

What led to a breakthrough?

Both sides were conscious of the importance of ending the face-off before the BRICS Summit
in Xiamen, scheduled that September. India also said that on its part, as a gesture of
goodwill, it was willing to take the first step to break the impasse.
After six weeks of diplomatic persuasion, India got the Chinese side to reach an agreement
to resolve the situation with the disengagement of border personnel at the site on August
28, 2017. The Chinese removed troops, equipment and tents by 150 m from the site, while
Indian troops returned to their original positions. This addressed the challenge of the Chinese
building a road and concerns about them pushing the tri-junction point southwards. But it
did not bring the Chinese troops back to the status quo as before June 16, 2017 as they
remained deployed in northern Doklam where they were earlier absent.

2018 – Wuhan Informal Talks

2019 – Mamallapuram Talks

2020 – Galwan clashes  Disengagement

India-China Galwan faceoff

This is the first time after the 1962 War that soldiers have died in clashes on the India-
China border in Ladakh. Even otherwise, the last deaths on the Line of Actual Control (LAC)
were an ambush of an Assam Rifles patrol in Arunachal Pradesh by the Chinese in 1975. But
the last real military engagement between the two armies was at Nathu La in Sikkim in
1967, in which 88 Indian soldiers lost their lives, and more than 300 Chinese soldiers were
killed.

But all these incidents were prior to the two countries signing, starting from 1993, various
agreements for maintaining peace and tranquility on the border.
Moreover, at least 20 soldiers including a Commanding Officer lost their lives on a single day
in Galwan
What exactly happened in the Galwan Valley ?
Tensions had been running high in the area for the past few weeks, with a large number of
soldiers and military equipment deployed along the LAC by both sides. Even though the LAC
in Galwan Valley was never disputed by the two sides, the Chinese had moved into the Indian
side of the LAC. After the meeting at the level of Corps Commanders on June 6, negotiations
had been conducted between local military commanders of both the armies for a mutually
agreed disengagement process.
As part of that process, a buffer zone had been agreed to be created between the LAC and
the junction of the Shyok and Galwan rivers to avoid any faceoff between the two armies.
The two armies were to move back by a kilometre each in that area as a first step.
When Colonel B Santosh Babu, who was monitoring this process, noticed that a Chinese
camp was still existing in the area, he went to get it removed. This soon led to fisticuffs and
blows being exchanged, resulting in deaths and injuries.
Were the Indian soldiers not carrying weapons?
No, this is as per the drill followed by both sides in the border areas to avoid inadvertent
escalation by opening fire.
This is in tune with the 1996 agreement between the two countries on Confidence Building
Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border
Areas, which imposed a lot of restrictions on military equipment, exercises, blasts, and
aircraft in the vicinity of the LAC.
China's intentions
The deaths of 20 soldiers in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh, where Indian and Chinese forces
are facing off, is the first such incident in 45 years. According to Adhir Ranjan Chowdhury,
Congress leader in Lok Sabha, this escalation “underlines the scale of the problem and the
challenge ahead” for New Delhi in its dealings with Beijing. Chowdhury argues in The Indian
Express that “China has clearly twisted the crisis into a strategic opportunity by taking
advantage of the geo-political distraction”.
That China is becoming more belligerent across strategic theatres, challenging the status
quo, is supported by multiple examples from the South China Sea. For the Government of
India, this is a moment to guard against complacency, fostered by decades of nimble
diplomacy that led to equilibrium, however precarious, on the border issue with China. It was
complacency, fostered by the 1999 bus ride to Lahore, that perhaps led to the Kargil conflict.

More worryingly, Beijing may have concluded that heightened aggression along the LAC
will invariably bring India to the negotiating table—that India will grant China greater
political concessions, market access or economic bargains as the price for “peace and
tranquillity” .China is also using this moment to send a message to its other neighbours in
the East and South China Sea.
China is demonstrating to the world the limitations of decaying American power without
having to actually confront it.
EXAMPLE - sum total of Beijing’s behaviour during the ‘Made in China’ pandemic: The
acceleration of territorial revisionism in the South China Sea; the subjugation of Hong Kong
through the stoutly contested national security law; repeated violations of Taiwanese
airspace; heightened naval aggression around Japan’s Senkaku Islands; and its most recent
encroachment in Nepal.
China’s dilemma with India originates from asymmetry between China and India in their
security priorities. India sees China as its primary threat, while China sees India as a
secondary challenge as its national security
priorities unequivocally lie in the western Pacific. Because India is not China’s primary threat
and South Asia is not China’s primary theater, China would prefer to save on costs and
minimize military and strategic resources on India.
The essence of strategy lies in China’s confidence that it has the financial resources, military
capacity and domestic political consensus to sustain and prevail in a protracted standoff (or
war) of attrition
vis-à-vis India. China’s 1962 war with India and the 1979 war with Vietnam both
demonstrates the central position and essence of “self-defense war” concept in China’s
playbook.
In a long-term and strategic perspective, China’s most desired option to settle the disputes
and relations with India is winning without fighting.
The logic of this option lies in the belief that the power gap between China and India will only
grow with China’s rise, and there will be a day that the power imbalance becomes so large
that India will recognize the
impracticality and impossibility of its desired endgame This diplomacy-based approach put a
Band-Aid on the most dividing and disturbing issue between two great powers in the region.
And its utility and effectiveness have come under more and more questioning as both sides
try to defend their military positions on the frontline.

GALWAN CLASH REASONS

China remains a significantly more powerful entity and its infrastructure is still in much
better shape. But Indian infrastructure development has reached a critical point, Chinese
opposition to the 255 km-long strategic Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie road has been so
vehement.
Connecting Leh to the
Karakoram Pass, this
all-weather road is
India’s frontal challenge
to China’s expansionist
designs in the region.
Despite Chinese
objections, India has
continued to pursue this
project given its
strategic importance.
China raising the
temperature on the
border is a preemptive
move to dissuade India from moving ahead.

China’s recent behaviour cannot be delinked from the global situation where Beijing has
come under pressure and is facing a global backlash for its aggression.
M Taylor Fravel - the Sino-Indian border constituted a “secondary strategic direction” for
China. Its principal interest lay in the direction of Taiwan and the western Pacific.
The domestic motivations of Beijing’s LAC aggression Covid-19 has generated a backlash
against the Chinese regime led by Xi. This has rendered his hold on power under stress,
Having secured an indefinite extension of his reign following the 19th Party Congress by
effectively shelving the term limits set by Deng Xiaoping, the denouement induced by the
pandemic has in all likelihood compelled him to keep select internal constituencies
sufficiently placated and mollified. Beijing’s outrage or pique over New Delhi assigning two
Members of Parliament (MPs) to attend Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s virtual
swearing-in ceremony any appearance of weakness in Xi at home in the face of what China
perceives to be a regional and global multi-directional assault on both its ambitions and rise
as a great power could imperil his domestic grip on authority.
In the ongoing round of tensions between New Delhi and Beijing, the latter has pretty much
followed the Pakistani playbook— level a baseless charge against India, that it is trying to
make territorial gains, in order to justify its own aggression. Finally, the source of this
Chinese aggression, can be attributed to nationalism. China is picking fights with multiple
actors simultaneously amid an ongoing health pandemic precisely because of what it sees as
a nationalist imperative.
How the Galwan tragedy has clarified India’s vision?
Tragedies often lead to a clarity of vision, a vision that was clouded by the misplaced sense
of our ability to manage China. New Delhi should also lose its innocence when it comes to
China. Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi has underlined that India wants peace but “will
give a befitting reply” if provoked the first Indian casualties on the disputed India-China
boundary since 1975 should be occasion to reconsider several long-held beliefs and methods
of dealing with the relationship that successive governments in New Delhi have adopted over
the years. Foreign policymaking in India cannot be an open, public or democratic exercise
and that ‘quiet diplomacy’ is the way to go in dealing with China. In its attempt to
unilaterally define the Line of Actual Control (LAC), Beijing has disregarded the central tenets
of all pacts it has signed with India since 1993 to keep the border peaceful.

EARLIER New Delhi was the first country to warn the world of the dangers of BRI at a time
when almost every other country was willing to buy into Beijing’s narrative. Today, India’s
framing of the BRI problems is widely accepted by most major global powers. India has also
managed to shape the global discourse on the Indo-Pacific and is now working closely with
likeminded regional players into giving it operational heft. Despite China’s continued
objections to the term, IndoPacific maritime geography is now widely accepted.
And so in its wisdom, China decided to wield the blunt instrumentality of force, hoping that
this would “teach India a lesson”. The reality is Chinese actions will produce exactly the
opposite effect of what they probably intended to do. Indian public opinion, which was
already negative about China, will now become even more strongly anti-Chinese.
The challenge in Sino-Indian ties is fundamentally structural. China is interested in shaping
an alternative global order commensurate to its growing economic and military power. And
India is a nation on China’s periphery whose rise it seeks to scuttle to secure its interests. In
New Delhi, there is now a more realistic appraisal of China. Indian foreign policy has evolved
in directions that demands reciprocity from Beijing.

China is both India’s most important neighbour, and its most significant foreign policy
challenge. India cannot ignore China, and it needs to be cognisant of the growing power
differential between the two.

The events of June 15 should set alarm bells ringing in New Delhi. India’s approach, since the
1962 War, of hedging and buck- passing can be ill afforded against Xi Jinping’s China and its
“wolf-warrior diplomacy”.
India must “punish” rather than “deny” Chinese adventurism—a significant revision of the
rules of engagement .

WHY China is foolish to make an enemy of India?

With a spiral of escalation building, a conflict so far limited to the Line of Actual Control with
China could see other theatres open up, including one in the Indian Ocean.
Unlike on the land border, where China has a relative advantage of terrain, military
infrastructure and troop strength, India is better placed at sea. In the Eastern Indian Ocean
through which most of China’s cargo and energy shipments pass, the Indian Navy is the
dominant force.
From India’s point of view, China has been nothing but trouble. It remains the main
international backer of the Pakistani military establishment, a perpetual threat to regional
stability.
Years of such behavior have worn down India’s cherished commitment to non-alignment —
or “strategic autonomy,” as we are supposed to call it in the post-Cold War era.
One would think the Chinese leadership, which has made such a fetish of their nation’s
supposed “century of humiliation,” China’s leaders may feel that that the U.S. has
mismanaged their nation’s emergence on the global
stage. But they have no one else to blame for their inept handling of India’s rise.

Strengths of India and its preparedness

Since the mid 2000s, for instance ,India has added to its Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) for
rapid counter offensive operations in Tibet (“Him Vijay” exercises are already being held by
them in Arunachal Pradesh—the Western sector of the LAC), improved its roads and
logistical infrastructure, augmented its firepower with the acquisition of the 145 M-777
ultra-light Howitzers from the US in 2016, deployed the Brahmos cruise missile system .
India can also exploit China’s frailties in the Indian Ocean Region and seek to interdict vital
Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), particularly those passing through the strait of Malacca.
To bolster its counter-offensive capacity, the Indian Navy has already taken on lease a
nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) from Russia— the INS Chakra and recruited the
aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya in 2012.
India must take a more vocal stand on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea to
ensure that China’s military resources are over-extended, and cannot be concentrated in its
Western theatre.
India’s commitment to the Quad and a deepening of its strategic partnership with the US,
should either be leveraged to exact concessions on the border, or used to rapidly upgrade
domestic military capacity.
Tsinghua University professor Xu Zhangrun laments the consequences of Beijing’s global
assertiveness: “Instead of embracing a [global] community,” he writes, “China is increasingly
isolating itself from it.
What is the new disengagement agreement in eastern Ladakh?
In the first major breakthrough in talks to resolve the nine-month military standoff along the
Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh, China’s Defence Ministry announced Wednesday that
Chinese and Indian troops on the southern and northern shores of Pangong Tso began
“synchronized and organized disengagement” in line with the consensus reached between
Corps Commanders when they last met on January 24.

What does this disengagement process entail?

According to the statement made by Rajnath Singh in Rajya Sabha, “both sides will remove
the forward deployment in a phased, coordinated and verified manner”.
“China will pull its troops on the north bank towards the east of Finger 8. Similarly, India will
also position its forces at its permanent base at the Dhan Singh Thapa post near Finger 3.
Similar action will be taken by both the parties in the south bank area as well.”
Both sides have also agreed that the area between Finger 3 and Finger 8 will become a no-
patrolling zone temporarily, till both sides reach an agreement through military and
diplomatic discussions to restore patrolling.
Further, all the construction done by both sides on the north and south banks of the lake
since April 2020 will be removed.

Why is this area important?

The north and south banks of Pangong Tso are two of the most significant and sensitive
regions when it comes to the current standoff that began in May 2020. What makes the
areas around the shores of the lake so sensitive and important is that clashes here marked
the beginning of the standoff; it is one of the areas where the Chinese troops had come
around 8 km deep west of India’s perception of the Line of Actual Control.

China had positioned its troops on the ridgeline connecting Fingers 3 and 4, while according
to India the LAC passes through Finger 8.
Why has this taken so long?
Since September, China has insisted that India first pull its troops back from the south bank
of Pangong Tso, and the Chushul sub- sector. However, India has been demanding that any
disengagement process should include the entire region, and troops should go back to their
April 2020 positions.
However, it seems that for now both sides have agreed to first disengage from the Pangong
Tso area only.
Singh mentioned on Thursday that in the military and diplomatic discussions with China since
last year, “we have told China that we want a solution to the issue on the basis of three
principles:
1. LAC should be accepted and respected by both the parties.
2. Neither party should attempt to change the status quo unilaterally.
3. All agreements should be fully adhered to by both parties.
Also, for disengagement in the friction areas, he said, “India is of the view that the forward
deployments of 2020 which are very close to each other should be pulled back and both the
armies should return to their permanent and recognised posts”
Does this mean that the standoff is resolved?
That’s a clear no. Even Singh said in his statement that “there are still some outstanding
issues that remain regarding deployment and patrolling on LAC” and mentioned that “our
attention will be on these in further discussions”.
What are the hurdles?
Two of the main stumbling blocks in finding a permanent resolution are lack of trust and no
clarity on intent.

Any permanent resolution will include first, disengagement of troops from the frontlines
from all friction points, then de-escalation that will entail sending the troops from the depth
areas to their original bases. Both sides have around 50,000 troops in the region, along with
additional tanks, artillery and air defence assets.
As the standoff progressed in the months of May, June and July, there was a mirrored
military build-up from both sides. A resolution has to include sending these troops and
military equipment where they came from on both sides.
But neither side had been willing to take the first step to reduce their troop or military
strength, as it does not trust the other side. Sources in the military establishment have
reiterated multiple times that what was China’s intent for diverting its troops last May from
their traditional exercise in the region to the LAC, which led to the standoff is not known.
Further, this is not the first disengagement attempt even for this standoff.
Analysis
India must be pleased. This outcome means that it was able to force Chinese troops out of
what New Delhi believes is its side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that divides the two
countries. India, in short, has repeated the military success it achieved during the Doklam
crisis in 2017, when the two faced off over China’s attempt to build a road and both sides
eventually withdrew their troops. The latest showdown originated in May 2020, when the
Chinese army prevented Indian soldiers from patrolling up to their claim lines and
established permanent structures on its own side. Both in terms of geography and numbers,
China’s intrusion was neither local nor limited.
If China had aimed to coerce India into accepting its territorial claims along the LAC, the
massacre at Galwan Valley emboldened New Delhi’s resolve to fight back. What followed
was a concerted effort to use all of the economic, diplomatic, and military power at India’s
disposal to push China to return to the status quo—what it called a “strategy of hurt.” This
strategy communicated a simple dictum to Beijing: China should remove its soldiers and its
bases, or India would inflict economic, diplomatic, and military costs.
India’s opening gambit was economic sanctions against Chinese firms operating in the
country. India may be dependent on trade with China for the import of raw materials and
finished goods, but China also has large stakes in Indian markets—especially when it comes
to technology. So it made sense that, as the border crisis with China escalated, India moved
to ban Chinese apps and disallowed Chinese state-owned companies from investing in
infrastructure projects. The threat of economic decoupling, including a prospective ban on
Huawei from India’s 5G infrastructure, followed.

Diplomatically, too, India embraced the West more firmly, signing an agreement that
furthers military cooperation between the United States and India and inviting Australia to
participate in joint naval exercises. It also sent an Indian destroyer to the South China Sea to
signal its decision to side with the West on disputes there.
Militarily, India built up a local preponderance of forces and materiel to deter any further
Chinese activities. The effort marked the biggest mobilization of the Indian Armed Forces in
recent decades.
Military deterrence and economic and diplomatic maneuvering could not have altered
China’s cost-benefit calculus on their own. After all, even with its show of strength, India’s
military is still leagues behind China’s in terms of size and equipment, and China’s vastly
larger economy could absorb any economic costs from India’s disengagement

So why did Beijing ultimately agree to a reinstatement of the status quo?

To alter Beijing’s cost-benefit matrix, India needed not military deterrence but to change the
tactical military reality on the border. Its increased military presence provided options for
employing limited but innovative force to buy leverage at the negotiating table. In the
mountains, that meant occupying the higher ground. For example, in a late August
preemptive move, the Indian Army captured the dominant features of the Kailash mountain
range overseeing China’s positions in both the north and the south bank of the Pangong Tso
lake.
Indian forces also captured the dominant heights on the north bank of the lake. This tactical
maneuver surprised the Chinese troops that remained ensconced on the lower ridges. India’s
military actions had increased the costs for China to hold on to the territory it had grabbed.
That gave India the tactical advantage so long as the conflict remained limited to the LAC.
The limited disengagement in the Pangong Tso lake region should not, however, distract
from the systemic obstacles in Sino-Indian relations. China’s growing power and its
constant use of the border dispute to coerce India will remain New Delhi’s primary strategic
challenge. India is now facing a hostile great power that not only eyes its territory but also
detests its rise in the global order.

The first concerns India’s military reorientation toward its northern borders. After almost
half a century of a Pakistan-centric military posture, the Indian military—on land, air, and
sea—will now be oriented toward China. Major reconfiguration in force positioning of the
Indian Army, Air Force, and Navy is already underway.
Second, the process of India’s economic decoupling with China—which started with New
Delhi’s decision to stay out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a free
trade agreement that includes China—will continue apace. India may relent on a few
matters, but the larger trajectory of Sino-Indian economic relations is now set. Members of
the Quad—Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—are increasingly realizing that
Chinese power depends on the country’s economic interdependence with the liberal
economies. Constraining China militarily will necessitate its economic isolation. India and the
other Quad countries will feel the hurt in the near to midterm, but in the long term,
marginalizing China will hurt Beijing more.

Finally, New Delhi will not stray from its increasing alignment with the West. If earlier India
was band wagoning with the United States for material and status gain, today its
requirement now is more existential: It needs the United States and the Quad members to
provide the country with technology, money, and arms to internally balance China.
Disengagement from Pangong Tso is just the beginning of the Sino-Indian military de-
escalation. However, it will not resolve the fundamental problems of their bilateral relations.
China’s military rise and its penchant for territorial aggrandizement will continue to push
Sino-Indian relations through cycles of violence.
ISSUES IN INDIA CHINA RELATIONS
Border Issues:

 Dispute is in three sectors:

 Eastern sector - 91,000 square miles – Dispute on McMohan line .
 Middle Sector- Least disputed
 Western Sector – 38,000 square miles under Chinese occupation Johnson line and
McDonald line.
India China Boundary Dispute

The border between India and China is not clearly demarcated.

The boundary dispute is divided into three sectors, viz. Western, Middle and Eastern.

 The boundary dispute in the Western Sector (Ladakh) pertains to the Johnson Line
proposed by the British in the 1860s that extended up to the Kunlun Mountains and
put Aksai Chin in the then princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.
 India used the Johnson Line and claimed Aksai Chin as its own. China, however, do
not recognise it and instead accepts McDonald Line which puts Aksai Chin under its
control.
 In the Middle Sector (Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand), the dispute is a minor
one.
 Here border is the least controversial except for the precise alignment to be followed
in the Barahoti plains. India and China have exchanged maps on which they broadly
agree.
  The disputed boundary in the Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim) is over
the McMahon Line (in Arunachal Pradesh) decided in 1914 in a meeting of
Representatives of China, India, and Tibet in Shimla.
 Though the Chinese representatives at the meeting initiated the agreement, they
subsequently refused to accept it .The Tawang tract claimed by China was taken over
by India in 1951.
Understanding Sino-Indian border issues
The border between India and China is not clearly demarcated throughout. India, following
Independence, believed it had inherited firm boundaries from the British, but this was
contrary to China’s view. China felt the British had left behind a disputed legacy on the
boundary between the two newly formed republics.
Nearly six decades have passed since then, but the border issue remains unresolved. It has
turned into one of the most protracted border disputes in the world. Since 1981, when the
first round of border talks was held, officials from India and China have met a number of
times to find a solution to the issue. The two countries are also engaged in Confidence
Building Measures (CBMs) on the border with bilateral agreements signed in 1993,
1996,2003, 2005, 2012 and 2013. By the beginning of the 21st century, the two sides had
agreed not to let the border dispute affect bilateral engagements. During Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003, the two sides agreed on the appointment of
special representatives for consultations aimed at arriving at a framework for a boundary
settlement that would provide the basis for the delineation and demarcation of the border.
This has resulted into Political parameters and guiding principles for resolution of dispute.

Despite two decades of CBMs and the thaw in bilateral relations, incidents on the border,
known as “incursions”, “intrusions” or “violations” continue to be reported in the Indian
media .
The Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) signed by the two countries in 2013
was aimed at preventing incidents involving tailing of patrols, and generally streamlining
channels of communication in case of a faceoff. A five-layer mechanism for communication
between the two sides was agreed upon: first, flag meetings between border personnel on
the LAC; second, meetings between senior officers of China’s Military Regions and India’s
Army Commands; third, periodic meetings at the ministry level; fourth, meetings of the
Working Mechanism (set up in 2013); and fifth, the apex India-China Annual Defence
Dialogue.
Conclusion

Given China’s push for the Belt and Road Initiative, and given that its China Pakistan
Economic Corridor project has already affected India’s sovereignty claims in certain parts of
Kashmir, it is incumbent upon India to bring the settlement of the India- China border issue
to the forefront of its relationship with China.

 High Trade Deficit

India's trade deficit with China is $45.91 billion.
Indian economy is deeply intertwined with Chinese exports

China’s share in Indian imports for intermediate goods, capital goods, and final consumer
goods is 12%, 30%, and 26% respectively. India depends on China in many key industries
from electrical machinery and appliances to pharmaceutical drug API. In recent years, there
have been certain mobile companies shifting their assembly lines to India, which is a step in
the right direction but still, all the key high-end manufacturing components like the display,
chipset, and memory are being imported from China.
Cost is a vital reason why Chinese products dominate markets across sectors. Products such
as fertilisers are 76% cheaper, electronic circuits 23%, and data processing units around 10%
cheaper if made in China. It will be hard to substitute or compete with those prices. Since the
pandemic, there are calls to diversify the supply chain. The Indo-American Chamber of
Commerce said that around 1,000 firms were planning to leave China but only 300 of them
were serious about investing in India.

The current trade scenario suggests that the nationalistic notions of bringing China to its
knees by boycotting Chinese goods has been a flop. The simple example that even a good as
small as LEDs are still cheaper than Indian alternatives by almost 50% despite a 40% hike in
prices of the Chinese goods is indicative of that. This indicates that India needs to undertake
a series of reforms like land and labour reforms to foster growth and investment. India also
needs to scale up domestic production in key sectors including electrical machinery and
pharmaceuticals to replace those imports. Without any of these key reforms, the Prime
Minister’s call for ‘Aatma Nirbhar Bharat’ will remain a mere slogan as it currently appears
to be now and that is why we see a booming trade relationship between India and China
after the Galwan Valley incident and will continue to see a significant dependence on China
for the foreseeable future.
India-China economic ties: Impact of Galwan

In recent years, the India-China bilateral relationship has been characterised by historical
animosities and border disputes. Nevertheless, the economic ties have grown since the early
2000s and have been at the forefront of this relationship. Trade and investment have
provided a cushion to this otherwise tricky relationship.

The bilateral trade that stood at US$ 3 billion in the year 2000 grew to US$ 92.68 billion in
2019. China was India’s second-largest trading partner in 2019 and emerged as the largest
trading partner in the first half of FY 20-21. The bilateral trade declined by only 15%
compared to a 32.46% decline in overall trade in 2020-21. China accounted for 5% of India’s
exports and 14 % of India’s imports in 2019. This had led to a very high trade deficit of US$
56.77 billion in 2019. Attempts have been made to reduce the India-China trade deficit
through bilateral talks. The issue, for instance, was raised at the bilateral informal summit in
Mahabalipuram, and both sides agreed to set up a new high level economic and trade
dialogue mechanism to address this issue.
China forms an integral part of the global supply chain, and India too is heavily dependent
on Chinese imports, ranging from a variety of raw materials to critical components.
According to data from 2019, a staggering 70% of electronic components, 45% of consumer
durables, 70% of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs), and 40% of leather goods come
from China. According to a response to a query in Rajya Sabha, India has the world’s third-
largest pharmaceutical industry for which 2/3rds of its key ingredients come from China.
Meanwhile, the Galwan Valley incident in mid-June led to calls for boycotting of Chinese
goods. According to a survey conducted by Local Circles, 87% of Indian consumers were
willing to boycott Chinese goods. One of the prime campaigns was to boycott Chinese goods
for Diwali and it was seen that even in the Prime Minister’s home state of Gujarat in
Ahmedabad, 80% of the decorative lights and LEDs sold in shops were still ‘Made in China.’

Effect of the Galwan Valley incident

There has also been an effort to reduce India’s dependence on Chinese goods.

The Indian Railways, for instance, cancelled an INR 471 Crore deal with a Chinese firm.
Similarly, state-owned telecom firm BSNL was instructed not to use gear from Chinese firm
Huawei for a network upgrade.
The government has mandated all products to have the Country of Origin tag for products on
the Government e-Marketplace in an effort to identify Chinese-origin goods. In early July
2020, the Ministry of Power restricted power supply systems and networks import from
China citing cyber and security threats, which constitute about 30% of the total imports from
China. In the last 10 years, 12,540 MW out of 22,420 MW of the supercritical power plants
were built using Chinese equipment. India also extended safeguard taxes on imports of solar
cells and modules as well as imposed anti-dumping duty on several goods.
In July, India placed colour television sets imports under the restricted category, thus
requiring a licence to import; and air conditioners under the prohibited category.

Water issues
 China plans to build a major dam on Brahmaputra,a run-of-the-
river dams on Yarlung Zangbo.
The Tibetan plateau is often called the “Third Pole”, owing to its
glacial expanses and vast reserves of freshwater. It is a source of
seven of the South Asia’s largest rivers- the Indus, Ganges,
Brahmaputra, Irrawaddy, Salween, Yangtze and Mekong.
Current status of India-China water relationship
Trans-border rivers flowing from China to India fall into two main
groups

• The Brahmaputra River System on the Eastern side consisting river Siang
(mainstream of river Brahmaputra) and its tributaries i.e., Subansiri and Lohit

• The Indus River System on the Western side consists of river Indus and the river Sutlej.
There is no institutionalized mechanism on water
cooperation between India and China, both countries
have signed only .
MoU for Hydrological Information of the River
Brahmaputra in 2002.
2010 MoU on Hydrological Data Sharing on River Sutlej /
Langqen Zangbo (renewed in 2015)
ELM (Expert Level Mechanism) to cooperate in emergency management (e.g., flood), trans-
border Rivers issues etc. in 2006.
Besides these continuous diplomatic engagement plays a key role in sustained
communication for data sharing and other developments in the river systems.
Concerns that India has regarding the recent developments on Brahmaputra?
Volume and quality of water: Experts have highlighted that even Run-of-the-river projects
will significantly reduce the availability of water in the North-Eastern region.
Creation of hydroelectric projects would alter the flow of water and potentially increase the
siltation levels, thus affecting the quality of water in the lower riparian states.
Absence of transparency in developments: Chinese infrastructural developments in the
Tibetan region have not been transparent. E.g.- Road developments near the India-Tibet
border etc.
Lack of trust on China: China’s past record of strong-arming Southeast Asian countries in
Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) framework
Potential use as political leverage in border disputes: For example, China stopped sharing
of hydrological data on Brahmaputra during the Doklam standoff. (But it was sharing the
same with Bangladesh.)

National Security implication: Availability of water can directly affects the existence of a
large section of people.Poor water availability in the Eastern region can trigger a fresh influx
of refugees from Bangladesh
Environmental Impact: Increased pollution (Siang- Brahmaputra’s main artery recently
turned blackish grey as it entered India), potential impact on climate change, threat to
biodiversity in the region and altering the monsoonal patterns of the region.
Increased disaster vulnerability: Artificially controlling and consequent sudden releases of
the flow of water increases the probability of floods especially in lower riparian . Also, China
plans to build this infrastructure by using small nuclear explosions, this will not only impact
the seismic balance of the region but also will have a radioactive fallout (affecting
agriculture and water quality).
Course of action for India?
Experts have suggested to go beyond monitoring to secure its interests. Following steps can
be taken by India
Strengthening its hydrological capacity: Increase the monitoring capacity. + satellite-based
monitoring for activity and infrastructural developments
Building international consensus against Chinese activities: Persuade other lower riparian
states like Bangladesh, ASEAN countries
Efforts can also be made to draw out a consensus of a collective of democracies in pursuance
of International law of ‘Prior Appropriation’. In accordance with the law, India being the first
user has rights to use same quantity of water for hydropower projects on Brahmaputra
against China.
Drawing clear red lines and communicate the same to China.
Geographically, India and China share a water system and that fact will not change in the
foreseeable future. As a result, pressure and counter pressure tactics can only be a solution
in the short-term. In the long-term, strained water relations between countries will hinder
the development on both sides. In the light of this, India could make an effort to further
strengthen cooperation through diplomatic channels available like the Expert Level
Mechanism and using other diplomatic means like the Himalayan Charter and Himalayan
Council for the future of the Himalayas among others.
Why India is opposed to joining Belt and Road Initiative?
China’s Belt and Road Forum, hosted with great
fanfare, signals the priority of this flagship connectivity
initiative while also underlining its credentials as the
new “shaper” of global trends and norms. Exhorting all
countries to participate, Chinese President Xi Jinping
suggested that “what we hope to create is a big family
of harmonious co-existence.”

The policy initiative aims to enhance China’s centrality in the global economic unilateral
approach in how the project is conceived and implemented so far belies the rhetoric of
multilateralism emanating from Beijing.
Taking inspiration from the ancient Silk Road trading route, China’s One Belt One Road
initiative, or OBOR, hopes to link more than 65 countries, encompassing up to 40 percent of
global GDP. Xi’s signature foreign paradigm – linking China to Asia, Europe and Africa via an
ambitious network of ports, roads, rail and other infrastructure projects. Beginning in China’s
Fujian province, the projected Maritime Silk Route passes through the Malacca Strait to the
Indian Ocean, moving along the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, ending in Venice.
The scale and scope of OBOR is huge, with at least $1 trillion in investments. China,
desperate to deflect criticism that OBOR is primarily an instrument for Chinese expansionism,
managed to convince heads of 29 states and governments to participate in the summit.
The West views this as a Chinese bilateral project being touted a multilateral venture. The
outgoing president of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China complains that the OBOR has
“been hijacked by Chinese companies, which have used it as an excuse to evade capital
controls, smuggling money out of the country by disguising it as international investments
and partnerships.”
The rest of the world is more receptive. Lavishing praise on China for the OBOR initiative
while targeting the US, Putin warned at the summit that “protectionism is becoming the new
normal,” adding that the “ideas of openness and free trade are increasingly often being
rejected (even) by those who until very recently expounded them.”
India refused to participate, maintaining opposition to China’s investment in the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor, or CPEC, which passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
India, boycotting the event, announced in an official statement: “No country can accept a
project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Indian Foreign
Secretary S Jaishankar articulated this position at the 2017 Raisina Dialogue: “China is very
sensitive about its sovereignty. The economic corridor passes through an illegal territory, an
area that we call Pak-occupied Kashmir. You can imagine India’s reaction at the fact that
such a project has been initiated without consulting us.” Prime Minister Narendra Modi
reinforced this point, asserting that “connectivity in itself cannot override or undermine the
sovereignty of other nations.”
The advantages for India of joining China’s multibillion dollar OBOR initiative are apparent,
and the economic logic is compelling. With bilateral trade of $70.08 billion in 2016, China
remains India’s largest trading partner. Last year also saw record Chinese investments into
India reaching close to $1 billion. Compared to this, China’s economic ties with Pakistan
remain underwhelming with bilateral trade volume reaching $13.77 last year.
Yet against the backdrop of deteriorating Sino-Indian ties, India cannot feasibly join the
OBOR project without challenging the very foundations of its foreign policy. The $55 billion
CPEC would link China’s Muslim-dominated Xinjiang Province to the Gwadar deep-sea port in
Pakistan. Despite the rhetoric, Beijing’s priority in pumping huge sums into a highly volatile
Pakistani territory is not to provide economic relief for Pakistan’s struggling economy or to
promote regional economic cooperation.
The long-term strategic consequences of OBOR for India could also allow China to
consolidate its presence in the Indian Ocean at India’s expense. Indian critics contend that
China may use its economic power to increase its geopolitical leverage and, in doing so,
intensify security concerns for India. CPEC gives China a foothold in the western Indian Ocean
with the Gwadar port, located near the strategic Strait of Hormuz, where Chinese warships
and a submarine have surfaced. Access here allows China greater potential to control
maritime trade in that part of the world – a vulnerable point for India, which sources more
than 60 percent of its oil supplies from the Middle East. What’s more, if CPEC does resolve
China’s “Malacca dilemma” – its over-reliance on the Malacca Straits for the transport of its
energy resources – this gives Asia’s largest economy greater operational space to pursue
unilateral interests in maritime matters to the detriment of freedom of navigation and trade-
energy security of several states in the Indian Ocean region, including India.
More generally, the Maritime Silk Road reinforces New Delhi’s concerns about encirclement.
Beijing’s port development projects in the Indian Ocean open the possibility of dual-use
facilities, complicating India’s security calculus. The Belt and Road Initiative is a highly
ambitious undertaking in line with China’s aspirations to emerge as the central economic
power at a time when the United States makes plans to step back from global affairs.
Why India is opposed to CPEC Project ?
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is
China’s ambitious project for
increasing connectivity and economic
cooperation within Eurasia. Since its
announcement in 2013, the BRI has
been positively received by many
countries covered within its ambit.
New Delhi sent a clear message to
Beijing that it doesn’t support CPEC.
India registered its protest by
boycotting the high-profile Belt and
Road Forum organised by China. Its
principal objection was that CPEC
passed through Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir (PoK).
The Ministry’s statement read: “Our
position on OBOR/BRI is clear and
there is no change. The so-called ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ violates India’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity. No country can accept a project that ignores its core
concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
India’s position will undoubtedly have a larger impact on China-India relations. PoK is
considered a contested territory by the international community. Nevertheless, for India, PoK
remains an emotional and sensitive issue. It is little wonder that China’s insistence on
establishing the CPEC project through PoK is seen by India as a deliberate disregard of its
territorial claims.
At a broader level, if China invests heavily in the region, it risks becoming party to what has
been a troubling bilateral dispute between nuclear-armed rivals. If CPEC gets operationalised
and fortifies the emergence of a fully functional China-Pakistan axis, this would hamper
India’s larger interests in the South Asian region and force astrategic rethink in South Block.
The incentives for this would be even stronger if CPEC’s potential success renders PoK more
industrially developed, thus granting Pakistan greater legitimacy over the region Whether
India has any road map to take the conversation on PoK forward is a different debate but no
nation can be expected to wilfully forsake its territorial claims. Had India not registered its
protest, that would have been perceived as a weakness, and would have been a setback for
India’s emerging power status in the international system.

China's reaction to India's concerns

India’s concerns over sovereignty relating to the USD 46-billion China Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) is “unwarranted,”asking New Delhi to take an “objective and more
pragmatic” view of China’s ambitious Silk Road project.
India’s concerns were “unwarranted.” “China respects India’s sovereignty concerns. Taking a
strong stand on territorial issues is important, but it’s hoped India could adopt an objective
and more pragmatic attitude towards the One Belt, One Road proposal.”
New Delhi fears that the CPEC, passing through the Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, would
serve the purpose of granting legitimacy to Pakistan’s control over the region, and by
promoting the construction of the corridor, China intends to meddle in the Kashmir dispute.
These concerns are unwarranted.”
“China has no intention of interfering in the territorial dispute between India and Pakistan.
China has long believed that the two neighbours should solve their dispute through dialogue
and consultations, and it has repeatedly emphasised that the construction of the CPEC would
not affect its stance on the issue,”. India’s official position : minister of external afaairs in
rajya sabha

“Government’s concerns arise in part from the fact that the inclusion of the so-called illegal
‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ (CPEC) as a flagship project of ‘OBOR/BRI’, directly
impinges on the issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity of India. This so-called illegal
‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ (CPEC) passes through parts of the Union Territories of
Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh which are under illegal occupation of Pakistan. Government
has conveyed its concerns to the Chinese side about their activities in areas illegally occupied
by Pakistan in the Union Territories of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh and has asked them to
cease such activities.
Further, the Government is of the firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on
universally recognized international norms. They must follow principles of openness,
transparency and financial responsibility and must be pursued in a manner that respects
sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of other nations.

S Jaishankar at 2017 Raisina Dialogue : “The economic corridor passes through an illegal
territory, an area that we call Pak-occupied Kashmir. You can imagine India’s reaction at the
fact that such a project has been initiated without consulting us.”

Prime Minister Narendra Modi too asserted that “connectivity in itself cannot override or
undermine the sovereignty of other nations”.

China & Kashmir

Article 370 abrogation
On 5 August 2019, the Government of India (GoI) announced the abrogation of Article 370 of
the Constitution and the bifurcation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) into two union
territories. This triggered an unprecedented international response.
Soon after the announcement, India embarked on a massive diplomatic outreach to assuage
the concerns of the global community.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
While India struggled with Pakistan over Kashmir, it was also engaged in a dispute with
Beijing over Aksai Chin—an isolated, inhospitable plain, west of the Karakoram range. In the
1950s, China began the construction of a road in this region, to connect Xinjiang with Tibet,
both of which it had recently annexed then. The road ran through Aksai Chin, with China
taking effective control over the area. After the 1962 Sino-India war, China retained control
of a large part of the territory, despite India’s rightful claim over it being a part of Ladakh.
During this time, China and Pakistan’s friendship deepened, and Pakistan gifted a part of
Kashmir called “Shaksgam Valley” to China in 1963. An article of the Sino-Pakistan Border
Agreement, which ceded the land, states, “[T]he two Parties have agreed that after the
settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority
concerned will re-open negotiations with the Government of China … so as to sign a
Boundary Treaty to replace the present agreement.”[8] This effectively made China’s claim
over the Shaksgam Valley contingent on the settlement of the Kashmir issue between India
and Pakistan.
While it was favourably received by both India and Pakistan, the agreement was ignored in
most other countries.
China' response
China’s response to the changes in Kashmir focused on its concern over Ladakh becoming a
Union Territory. It called the move “unacceptable,” claiming that it would directly “impede
China’s sovereignty. China’s statements suggest that its opposition to the removal of Article
370 is driven by a fear that it would further complicate its boundary issue with India, in light
of the 740-km LoC in J&K.
However, China soon revised its statement, stating that the Kashmir issue should be resolved
bilaterally in a peaceful manner and that both sides must avoid any action that could
escalate tensions in the region. During a China–Pakistan meeting in Beijing, the Chinese
foreign minister said the solution should be in accordance with the UN Charter and relevant
UNSC resolutions. On Pakistan’s insistence, China called for a private meeting to discuss
Kashmir at the UNSC.

Over the last few decades, China’s policy on J&K has vacillated, with Beijing choosing to call
it a solely India–Pakistan issue whenever it suited its interests. ern borders.
Over the years, China has come to refer to J&K as a “disputed territory” or as “India-
controlled Kashmir,” lending further legitimacy to Pakistan’s cause. In 2010, China started
issuing stapled visas to the residents of J&K, manifesting its desire to cement its pro-Pakistan
stance.
Beijing’s interests in Jammu and Kashmir are both strategic and economic. The crown head
of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) runs
through parts of POK. The sovereignty of this part is disputed, as India has repeatedly
claimed the territory as its own. Recent statements from top ministers of the GoI have made
it clear that the government will make efforts take control of POK, which directly impinges
upon China’s interests in the region. The latter’s US$19- billion investment in CPEC is directly
linked to the Indo-Pak territorial dispute over J&K, which will be affected by the balance of
power shifting towards India.
China’s desire to undermine India’s legitimate claim over J&K is fuelled by its hegemonic
ambitions in the subcontinent. In 2010, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh warned that
“Beijing could be tempted to use India’s ‘soft underbelly’, J&K, and Pakistan ‘to keep India in
low-level equilibrium’. Thus, China’s economic and military support for Pakistan is designed
in a manner that does not necessarily strengthen Islamabad but hopes to offset the growing
power differential it has with New Delhi. The CPEC allows Beijing quicker access to the
Arabian Sea, and a network of transportation infrastructure allows for the encirclement of
India.

For now, China seems to have taken a restrained position on the J&K matter. This is partly
because the August 2019 decision does not change the status quo along the Line of Actual
Control (LAC).
Alliances will form a key area in the US strategic competition with China. The Biden team will
have to work hard to convince them that the US is willing to play a leadership role once
again, whether it is in Europe in relation to Russia or in the western Pacific with China. The
Trump administration’s handling of alliances has left a trail of suspicion that the US is
unwilling or unable to play a significant role outside its own immediate region. Its shambolic
handling of the Covid pandemic has only deepened this worry.
The administration has been particularly careful to identify the Indo-Pacific as a priority
region. The Indo-Pacific team under Kurt Campbell is the largest regional team in the
National Security Council which has a generous quota of Indian Americans at the leadership
levels.
Biden himself underscored the importance he attaches to Quad in his telephone conversation
with PM Modi last week. The American readout noted that the two leaders agreed to
‘continuing close cooperation to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific’ as well as for a
‘stronger regional architecture through the Quad.’
Revival of the Middle Kingdom-A post-pandemic world order
Since World War II, however, it has incorporated
several strains of ideological and enduring
civilisational beliefs.
Take the case of China, for example, which is
attempting to upstage, or at least match, the U.S.
as the principal global hegemon. Realising that
mere ideology was not enough to propel it to that
position, Mao Zedong’s successors have drawn on two civilisational markers from Chinese
history that have troubled the Chinese people for centuries: the ‘Middle Kingdom’ syndrome
and ‘the Century of Humiliation’. While the first marker builds on the glory of the Ming
Dynasty (late 14th century to mid-17th century) and the centrality of the Han people in a
world order that saw China as the most prosperous nation in the world, it also reminds the
Chinese people of the dangers that lurk around its periphery. Chinese leaders often draw
attention to the Mongol rule (late 13th century to mid-14th century) and over two centuries
of misrule by the Manchus and the Qing Dynasty (mid-17th century to early 20th century) as
examples of this.
The second marker draws on the stripping of China of its honour and resources by multiple
colonial powers during the ‘Century of Humiliation’ from the mid-19th century to the time of
the emergence of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. These markers from Chinese history
have gradually become dogma and seen as a blot on Chinese history that need resolution.
Realising in the 1980s that Maoist ideology no longer
appealed to the Chinese people, Deng reintroduced
Confucianism as a much-needed intellectual and ethical prop
to China’s push for ‘great power’ status. Sun Tzu re-emerged
as China’s answer to Clausewitz and for a few decades it
appeared that these would soften traditional Chinese
dogma. It also raised hopes that China would largely play by
the existing rules and bide its time.
Xi Jinping, however, has been a leader in a hurry. In the process, he has perpetuated the
deepened hurt of the Chinese people to an extent that it has become embedded dogma. He
has abandoned Confucianism and the ethical pursuit of power, and fallen back on hard-core
communist ideology. Hard power and muscular nationalism coupled with a neo-colonial and
mercantilist attitude towards vulnerable nations seems to be the new strategy to compete
with the U.S. While this strategy seemed to be working at a time when the U.S. appeared to
be looking inwards and showing signs of strategic fatigue, President Xi’s ambitious Belt and
Road Initiative demonstrated an overreach that had the potential to backfire as it created a
sense of fear of, rather than respect for China.
Demonstration of flexibility
India is neither afflicted by unreasonable expectations of power, ideological dogma, or
haunted by accentuated perceptions of historical hurt. Despite its own centuries of conquest
and exploitation by invaders and colonial powers, it has demonstrated resilience, learnt to
let go and embraced the good that emerged from the centuries of darkness.
South China Sea – should India worry?
Importance of South China Sea
The SCS is an important junction for navigation between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It
connects with the Indian Ocean through the Malacca Strait to the southwest, and commands
access to the East China Sea to the northeast. The sea lane running between the Paracel and
Spratly Islands is used by oil tankers moving from the Persian Gulf to Japan as well as by
warships en route from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. Security in the SCS is a concern both
for regional countries such as China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, as well as the extra-
regional countries, including India, due to their strategic and economic interests in this
region. Any conflict in the SCS will pose a threat to regional and international security.

Territorial sovereignty, contention on energy, significance of the geographic location, threat

to maritime security and overlapping maritime claims are at the core of the SCS dispute The
SCS, an integrated ecosystem, is one of the richest seas in the world in terms of marine flora
and fauna, coral reefs, mangroves, seagrass beds, fish and plants. The sea accounts for
approximately 10 per cent of the annual global fisheries catchment, making it extremely
viable for the fishing industries of nearby countries.
Furthermore, value-added production (canning, filleting, fresh, frozen and chilled processing)
has translated into valuable foreign exchange earnings and job opportunities for countries in
the region. However, China has been imposing fishing rules to operate in the disputed
waters, resulting in serious maritime security concerns and objections from other claimant
states. Recently, China’s new fishing rules which came into effect on January 1, 2014 raised
questions about its efforts to exercise jurisdiction over all fishing activities in the disputed
waters.

Furthermore, the region richly laden in both oil and natural gas has led to speculation that
the disputed territories could hold potentially significant energy resources. According to the
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates, the SCS contains 11 billion barrels of
oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proved and probable reserves.

Most notably, the SCS occupies a significant geostrategic position in terms of international
shipping as a majority of energy shipments and raw materials have to pass through it.

Undoubtedly, the SCS is a critical corridor between the Pacific and Indian Ocean for
commercial and naval shipping China’s ordered an administrative reorganisation of its
South China Sea territories, injecting new discord in an already tense region. Beijing
instituted two new municipal districts, carving up the governance of the Paracel and Spratly
island groups, earlier managed by the local administration of Sansha — China’s
southernmost city of Hainan province – between two sub-authorities. Xisha and Nansha
(Chinese names for the Paracel and Spratly Islands) will now function as separate
administrative units with jurisdiction over their respective island chains.
China’s neighbours may well have anticipated the gambit. Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia
have in recent months sought to offer pushback to Chinese aggression in their near-seas,
employing administrative, legal and operational means. In December last year, Malaysia
approached the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf claiming waters
beyond the 200-kilometre limit of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the northern part of
the South China Sea – a move prompted by China’s extended presence in and around the
Luconia Shoals. Weeks later, Indonesia deployed warships and a submarine in the waters off
the Natuna Islands after an encroachment by Chinese fishing boats and coastguard ships.
Earlier this month, Vietnam sent a diplomatic note to the United Nations protesting the
PRC’s sweeping assertions in the South China Sea, after a Chinese ship rammed and sunk a
Vietnamese fishing boat.
An irked China has doubled down on its territorial claims, sending in more militia and coast
guard vessels into disputed regions. The Chinese vessel and its coast guard escorts have been
accused of harassing an exploration vessel operated by

Malaysia’s state oil company. The United States has rushed to respond, ordering the USS
America – an amphibious assault ship – and guided missile warships USS Bunker Hill and USS
Barry in the region.

Three aspects of the drama unfolding in the South China Sea are relevant for India.
First, Chinese militia operations
have focused on the region’s
Western end close to the Indian
Ocean Region, targeting
countries that India has a close
political and military
relationship with.
Second, the developments in
the South China Sea coincide
with a rise in Chinese activity in
the Eastern Indian Ocean,
particularly Chinese research
and survey vessel presence to
add to India’s discomfort,
China’s mining operations in
the Southern Indian Ocean
have expanded considerably, as also the presence of Chinese fishing boats areas close to
India’s territorial waters.
A third factor for Indian analysts to consider has been the growing instances of Chinese
intelligence ship sightings in the IOR. Chinese Dongdiao class intelligence-gathering ships –
known earlier to stalk US, Australian and Japanese warships in the Western Pacific – now
operate in the waters of the Eastern Indian Ocean, keeping an eye on the Indian naval
movements. One such Chinese spy ship was spotted close to the eastern sea border near the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands late last year causing some disquiet in India’s security
establishment. Regional observers are troubled by Beijing’s attempts to take advantage of a
fluid geopolitical situation following COVID-19. With many Southeast Asia leaders sick or in
self-imposed quarantine and Washington distracted by the pandemic at home, Chinese
militias have upped the tempo of operations in critical regional hotspots.
How the South China Sea situation plays out will be critical for India 's security and well-
being?
In the first place, the South China Sea is not China’s sea but a global common.

Second, it has been an important sea-lane of communication since the very beginning, and
passage has been unimpeded over the centuries.

Third, Indians have sailed these waters for well over 1,500 years — there is ample historical
and archaeological proof of a continuous Indian trading presence from Kedah in Malaysia to
Quanzhou in China.

Fourth, nearly $200 billion of our trade passes through the South China Sea and thousands of
our citizens study, work and invest in ASEAN, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

Fifth, we have stakes in the peace and security of this region in common with others who
reside there, and freedom of navigation, as well as other normal activities with friendly
countries, are essential for our economic well being.

In short, the South China Sea is our business. We have historical rights established by
practice and tradition to traverse the South China Sea without impediment.

In return, we too have to be responsive to ASEAN’s expectations. While strategic

partnerships and high-level engagements are important, ASEAN expects longer-lasting buy-
ins by India in their future. They have taken the initiative time and again to involve India in
Indo-Pacific affairs.
India’s position on the South China Sea disputes has so far been neutral. A tendency to
view the region through a prism of geopolitics and “balance of power” makes Indian
decision makers wary of taking a stand on China’s aggressive posturing. Yet the costs of
saying and doing nothing are rising. To many in New Delhi, it is clear that China’s firming
grip over disputed territories in the South China Sea portends greater power projection in
the Eastern Indian Ocean.
Even so, New Delhi has not abandoned its policy of non intervention in the security affairs of
Southeast Asia. India’s policy elite believe that their country is not party to the maritime
territorial disputes in the region and must refrain from meddling in a matter that does not
directly concern it. Indian decision-makers also know that Beijing operates from a position of
strength in the South China Sea, where it has physical control over critical islands. Possession
of these features gives Beijing the ability to exert strategic authority over the disputed
territory, regardless of the rights and interests of other regional states.

It continues to hope that Beijing will respect India’s sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean in
the same way that New Delhi respects China’s in Southeast Asia. Even if Beijing has not
acted in good faith recently, the Indian government is unwilling to violate their goodwill
pact.

New Delhi is not impervious either to the threat China poses to trade flows in the region or to
its significant challenges to Indian energy and strategic interests. Access to the major
waterways in Southeast Asia is an important consideration for Indian policymakers, as is the
need to build capacity in member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). Both are central to New Delhi’s Indo-Pacific vision. Yet, when it comes to security
issues in the South China Sea, India is wary of provoking China. Notwithstanding the security
establishment’s deep misgivings about Chinese expansionism in littoral Asia—including in
the eastern Indian Ocean—Indian diplomats and spokespeople almost never make public
their reservations about China’s maritime assertiveness.
By contrast, India is relatively open about its disagreements with the United States in the
interpretation of maritime law and the freedoms enjoyed by foreign warships in a coastal
state’s EEZ. Indian officials do not concur with U.S. claims that warships have a right to
uninterrupted passage in coastal zones without prior notification and approval of the coastal
state.
Events of past weeks have shown that the imperative for India is to display solidarity with
partners in Southeast Asia. It must do so by publicly stating its discomfiture with Chinese
assertiveness and by strengthening its strategic partnerships with the United States, Japan,
and Australia in the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, Indian officials must initiate a
dialogue with China and ASEAN on a rules-based order in Asia, setting the terms of
engagement between maritime forces
The imperative for India then is to come out on the side of maritime principle in the South
China Sea. New Delhi must display solidarity with Southeast Asia partners by publically
stating Indian discomfiture with Chinese assertiveness.
India’s maritime gateway to the Pacific is South China Sea
Being one of the most important seas of the world, geopolitically, economically and
strategically, the South China Sea (SCS) attracts considerable attention in the strategic
community in India. It continues to be seen as one of the most difficult regional conflicts in
the Asia-Pacific and an “arena of escalating contention.” India has vital maritime interests in
the SCS. Around 55 per cent of India’s trade in the Asia-Pacific transits through the SCS
region. In fact, in recent times, New Delhi has become more active in expressing its interest
in the freedom of navigation in the SCS and the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes
between Beijing and its maritime neighbours.

China warns India on South China Sea exploration projects

China on indicated it was opposed to India engaging in oil and gas exploration projects in
the disputed South China Sea, and warned Indian companies against entering into any
agreements with Vietnam "Our consistent position is that we are opposed to any country
engaging in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters under China's
jurisdiction," as China enjoyed "indisputable sovereignty" over the South China Sea and its
islands.

Role played by Asian Nations

Malaysia approached the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf claiming
waters beyond the 200-kilometer limit of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the northern
part of the South China Sea—a move prompted by China’s extended presence in and around
the Luconia Shoals. Weeks later, Indonesia deployed warships and a submarine in the waters
off the Natuna Islands after an encroachment by Chinese fishing boats and coast guard
ships. In April, Vietnam sent a diplomatic note to the United Nations protesting Beijing’s
expanding assertions in the South China Sea following an incident in which a Chinese ship
rammed and sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat. Unfortunately, these actions have not helped
moderate Chinese behavior. With Covid-19 sweeping through Southeast Asia, civilian and
military leaders have been preoccupied with fighting the pandemic. Regional states,
moreover, are increasingly dependent on Chinese investment and medical aid, and many are
reluctant to openly criticize China’s assertive actions in their near seas. As some see it,
China’s recent moves are part of a long-standing “salami-slicing” strategy at sea: the slow
accumulation of small and stealthy actions, none of which justify a major tactical escalation
by other countries but that over time add up to a major strategic shift. China, however, has
been astute in denying neighbors the space to mount an effective response in the littoral.
Southeast Asian leaders said a 1982 UN oceans treaty should be the basis of sovereign rights
and entitlements in the South China Sea, in one of their strongest remarks opposing China’s
claim to virtually the entire disputed waters on historical grounds.
The leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations took the position in a statement
issued by Vietnam on Saturday on behalf of the 10-nation bloc.
“We reaffirmed that the 1982 UNCLOS is the basis for determining maritime entitlements,
sovereign rights, jurisdiction and legitimate interests over maritime zones,” the ASEAN
statement said.
The leaders were referring to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a 1982
international agreement that defines the rights of nations to the world’s oceans.
Three Southeast Asian diplomats told that it marked a significant strengthening of the
regional bloc’s assertion of the rule of law in a disputed region that has long been regarded
as an Asian flashpoint. While it has criticised aggressive behaviour in the disputed waters,
ASEAN has never castigated China by name in its post-summit communiques.
The Philippines invoked the dispute settlement mechanism of the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 2013 to test the legality of China’s ‘nine-dash line’ regarding the
disputed Spratlys. In response, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague
decreed in its July 12, 2016 judgment that the line had “no legal basis.” China dismissed the
judgment as “null and void.”

The PCA award undermined the Chinese claim. It held that none of the features of the
Spratlys qualified them as islands, and there was no legal basis for China to claim historic
rights and to the resources within the ‘nine-dash line’. The UNCLOS provides that islands
must sustain habitation and the capacity for non-extractive economic activity. Reefs and
shoals that are unable to do so are considered low-tide elevations.
The award implied that China violated the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). It
noted that China had aggravated the situation by undertaking land reclamation and
construction, and had harmed the environment and violated its obligation to preserve the
ecosystem. China dismissed the award as “a political farce under the pretext of law.”
U.S. rejects China's claims in South China Sea
The United States on rejected China's disputed claims to offshore resources in most of the
South China Sea, China has offered no coherent legal basis for its ambitions in the South
China Sea and for years has been using intimidation against other Southeast Asian coastal
states, “We are making clear: Beijings claims to offshore resources across most of the South
China Sea are completely unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them,” said
Pompeo. The U.S. has long opposed China's expansive territorial claims on the South China
Sea, sending warships regularly through the strategic waterway to demonstrate freedom of
navigation there. Monday's comments reflect a harsher tone. “The world will not allow
Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire,

Regional analysts said it would be vital to see whether other nations adopt the U.S. stance
and what, if anything, Washington might do to reinforce its position and prevent Beijing
from creating “facts on the water” to buttress its claims.
The relationship between the United States and China has grown increasingly tense over the
past six months over Beijing's handling of the coronavirus pandemic, its tightened grip on
Hong Kong and its crackdown on China's Uighur Muslim community. China claims 90% of the
potentially energy-rich South China Sea, but Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and
Vietnam also lay claim to parts of it, through which about $3 trillion of trade passes each
year. Beijing has built bases atop atolls in the region but says its intentions are peaceful.
Beijing routinely outlines the scope of its claims with reference to the so-called nine-dashed
line that encompasses about nine- tenths of the 3.5-million-square-kilometer South China
Sea on Chinese maps.

China’s growing threat via debt trap diplomacy

China has been using the financial tool of debt to gain influence across the world and grab
considerable power in India’s neighbouring countries, thereby increasing the amount of
political and security threats the nation is exposed to. Mint takes a deep dive.
How does China’s debt trap diplomacy work?

In a push to gain rapid political and economic ascendency across the globe, China is
dispensing billions of dollars in the form of concessional loans to developing countries,
mostly for their large-scale infrastructure projects. Often, developing nations are lured by
China’s offer of cheap loans for transformative infra projects, which involve a substantial
investment. These developing nations, which are primarily low- or middle-income countries,
are unable to keep up with the repayments, and Beijing
then gets a chance to demand concessions or
advantages in exchange for debt relief.
India’s former biggest trading partner, Bangladesh, has
found a new global partner in China. In the most recent
exchange between Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and
Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, it was
established that the economic development of
Bangladesh will be bolstered through BRI funding. They
share the opinion that the BRI establishes a model of
international cooperation for all the participants and proffers new opportunities for regional
connectivity. Beijing may seek to leverage BRI development of Payra, a power hub, to obtain
port access in the future. Bhutan is looking at potentially partnering with China to diversify
their economy. However, reports suggest that they are likely to skip out the upcoming BRI
forum as they did in 2017, despite Chinese attempts to press for their attendance.
China’s soft power investments have attained success extending beyond BRI measures. For
instance, Sri Lanka requires technical assistance to contain the spread of the coronavirus and
a model to follow; China seems to offer both. A concessionary loan of $500 million to propel
its efforts to combat the pandemic in Sri Lanka has been granted. Ambassador Hu Wei
earlier presented Sri Lankan Minister of Health Pavithra Wanniarachchi a document that
details lessons learned in China’s handling of Covid-19. In early April, the Chinese
government and companies that are involved in major projects in Sri Lanka donated several
masks, PPE, and test kits. America’s absence and India’s inaction here have magnified
China’s goodwill.

China’s strategic commitments include the

CPEC with Islamabad to leverage Chinese
capital, production capacity, and build a
“mechanism for sustainable economic
growth.” In return, Beijing gains a
connection to the Arabian Sea, a trade route
to the vital Malacca Strait. Plans with
Bangladesh to construct a parallel pipeline
connecting Kunming and Chittagong are underway. This is also a strategic backup point in
the event of the US and India acting as adversaries of China and blocking the choke-points of
Malacca and the Indian Ocean region.
Despite the infrastructural void that Chinese investments fill, western analysts deem the
practice a version of debt-diplomacy — hence when the indebted economies fail to service
their loans, they are said to be pressured to support China’s geostrategic interests. Most of
South Asia either did not take serious note of this earlier and are already in too deep now, or
believe that they are gaining greater advantages imbibing this bilateral diplomacy. Soft
power in South Asia has ushered a fear of retaliation; negative impacts such as debt traps
appear less threatening to these countries than turning into China’s enemy.
What concessions are demanded by China?
There are several advantages or concessions that China asks for in exchange for debt relief.
Sri Lanka, for instance, was forced to hand over control of the Hambantota port project to
China for 99 years, after it found itself under massive debt owed to Beijing. This allowed
China control over a key port positioned at the doorstep of its regional rival India, and a
strategic foothold along a key commercial and military waterway. Similarly, in exchange for
relief, China constructed its first military base in Djibouti.
Whereas Angola is replaying multibillion-dollar debt to China with crude oil, creating major
problems for its economy. What are these concessional loans granted by China?
These are loans extended to low- and middle-income countries on terms that are
significantly more generous than market loans. The ‘concessionality’ factor is achieved either
by offering interest rates that are below the market rates or leniency in the grace period, and
often with a combination of both. These loans generally have long grace periods.

Has India taken any loans from China?

India has not entered into any loan agreement directly with China. However, it has been the
top borrower of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a multilateral bank wherein
China is the largest shareholder (26.6% voting rights) and India the second (7.6% voting
rights) among other countries. China’s vote share allows it veto power over decisions
requiring super-majority. Loans provided to India could also pave the way for Chinese firms
to enter and gain experience in the promising Indian infra market.

How is the debt trap affecting India, then?

Most of India’s neighbours have fallen prey to China’s debt trap, and ceded to China’s $8 tn
project – One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) which seeks to improve connectivity among
countries in Asia, Africa and Europe. The initiative requires India to accept that the Kashmir-
controlled Pakistan region, is Pakistan, because that’s where some of the projects are. China
through OBOR can hence increase India’s political cost of dealing with its neighbours.

Covid19: Made in China pandemic

The outbreak of the novel coronavirus in Wuhan and China’s domestic and international
response to this pandemic has forced the world to confront the grim realities of Chinese
leadership.
Research indicates that had China taken proactive measures to contain and suppress the
pandemic earlier in December 2019, the number of #Covid19 cases could have been
mitigated by up to 95 per cent. We now know that the opposite happened: local authorities
in China suppressed information about the outbreak, even destroying proof of the virus
sometime in December. Official censors scrubbed social media posts from medical
professionals warning of a new “SARS-like” disease. And as late as mid-January, Chinese
authorities denied evidence of any community transmission, allowing the lunar new year
celebrations to proceed despite having known about it for at least a month.

 China delayed notifying the WHO and in permitting it to inspect the situation in
Wuhan; released vital genetic information to the international community a full week
after it was isolated; and allowed millions of individuals from Wuhan to leave the city
unscreened, many of whom then travelled the world
 On cue, China’s international response changed gears. The prevailing theme that now
dominates Beijing’s state-controlled media is one of China “buying time” for the
international community to react—a claim that attempts to deflect attention from
the CPC’s and the Chinese State’s failings. Laughably, Chinese officials now appear to
be engaged in an authorized and concerted misinformation campaign, with several
diplomats and even the MFA spokesperson ludicrously claiming that the US Army was
responsible for smuggling the ‘Virus’ into Wuhan.
 Beijing’s industrial prowess and control over critical supply chains, including medical
supplies, have also added a geo- economic element to the pandemic. It has raced to
be seen as providing public goods when other powers are faltering. the international
community is now confronted by a prolonged public health emergency whose
contours and impact are not even vaguely known at the moment. An equally
paralysing and fearful consequence is the global economic slowdown as a direct
result of China’s irresponsible domestic and international behaviour. A less than
inspiring response to the outbreak in the US and much of Europe will likely whitewash
China’s offences against the international community in the short term, but the long
term implications will last.

WHY WUHAN?
The industrial and transportation hub on the Yangtze River is the first place the coronavirus
surfaced in the world. It’s possible that the virus came to Wuhan undetected from elsewhere,
but the city of 11 million is a logical place for the mission to start.
People began falling ill in December 2019, many with links to a sprawling food market that
dealt in live animals. The growing number of patients triggered alarms that prompted
China’s Center for Disease Control and Prevention to send a team to investigate.

WHY THE SECRECY?

China has firmly rejected calls for an independent outside investigation. The head of the
WHO recently expressed impatience with how long China took to make necessary
arrangements for the expert team’s visit.
The ruling Communist Party keeps a tight hold on information and is particularly concerned
about possible revelations about its handling of the virus that could open it up to
international criticism and financial demands.
China stifled independent reports about the outbreak and has published little information on
its search for the origins of the virus.

China’s wolf warrior diplomacy

There was a time when China banked on diplomacy of deceit with its leaders saying one
thing and the government doing something different. This is how China got India's Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru confused about Chinese intentions before the 1962 war. Now,
China has adopted a "wolf warrior" diplomacy. China is confrontational and conspiratorial
with anybody or any country that attempts to call the Chinese bluff in post-Covid-19 world.
This is a new form of warfare fought by China on social media, particularly Twitter, a social
media platform that is banned within China.
A recent social media post by one of its "wolf warrior" diplomats, Zhao Lijian to target
Australia is a leaf out of China's book of new diplomacy theory. Zhao Lijian earlier this week
posted a digitally manipulated image on Twitter apparently showing an Australian soldier
threatening to slit the throat of a girl. The caption of the image read: "Shocked by the
murder of Afghan civilians & prisoners by Australian soldiers."
This came against the backdrop of a report indicting Australian soldiers -- part of the
international force in Afghanistan -- for the killing of 39 Afghan civilians and prisoners. When
Australia objected to the Twitter "slur" by the official handle of the Chinese foreign ministry
spokesperson Zhao Lijian, China rebuffed the objection. Australian Prime Minister Scott
Morrison called it "outrageous", "unjustified" and sought an apology from China. The
Chinese foreign ministry refused to take down the post and called the Australian anger as
"over-reaction".
HOW DID IT BEGIN?
The term "wolf warrior diplomacy" came into vogue during the Covid-19 pandemic. The term
drew from a jingoistic Chinese film franchise, "Wolf Warrior". The second film of the series
came in 2017 with a tagline, "Though far away, anyone who affronts China will pay".
This is exactly what China has been trying to do during the Covid-19 pandemic to a range of
countries -- Australia, the US, Europe, Taiwan or India -- on social media and in bilateral
relations.
However, the "wolf warrior" diplomacy has its roots in the "strategy of nationalism" that
China adopted in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989.
China launched the Patriotic Education Campaign and manufactured a narrative of "Century
of Humiliation" aimed at a makeover of the Communist Party of China (CPC) from a
revolutionary force to a nationalist expression.
The nationalism campaign adopted an aggressive outlook under Xi Jinping. The Chinese state
became more and more assertive as Xi Jinping strengthened his position in China through
elimination of his rivals in the name of fighting corruption. The first sign of wolf warrior
diplomacy emerged in 2017 -- the year of the release of Wolf Warrior-2 -- when Europe
found Chinese diplomats trying to bully it.

DURING COVID-19
China was never more cornered internationally than when it found itself cornered over
mismanagement of Covid-19 and the subsequent attempt to cover it up. China has been in a
tight spot diplomatically since January this year. Incidentally, its diplomatic Twitter presence
has phenomenally increased during this period.
China's diplomatic adoption of Twitter is surprising because it does not allow its citizens to
use Twitter, whose Chinese version Weibo is a big hit in the country. But since the world
listens to this microblogging platform, China converted it into a weapon for "wolf warrior"
diplomats, whose tweets are popularised using an army of bots.
Chinese diplomats have used "provocation" as a tool to get international attention on
Twitter.
The Chinese attempt has since been to blame any other country but itself for Covid-19. China
has been trying to build a narrative that it was an "efficient" and "vigilant" China that
discovered a pandemic and warned the world of the underlying dangers. In its latest
attempt, China has tried to pin the blame on India for the Covid-19 outbreak.
The World Health Organisation (WHO) only recently said it would be "highly speculative" to
say that coronavirus outbreak did not take place in China.
WHAT SUSTAINS "WOLF WARRIOR" DIPLOMACY?
That "wolf warrior" diplomacy is part of China's state policy is confirmed from reports that Xi
Jinping administration has more than doubled the budget for diplomacy and that the
performance appraisals of the foreign office staffers are linked to "public relations"
activities. The second is a big incentive for the government employees.
The fiercer they prove themselves as "wolf warrior" diplomat, the bigger would be their
appraisal and higher the career growth. Zhao Lijian saw his career take a flight after he took
on the American government over human rights abuse issue in 2019 -- from a counsellor in
the Chinese embassy in Pakistan, where for about two years he prefixed "Muhammad" to his
name to becoming one of the three formidable spokespersons in the Chinese foreign
ministry.
China has adopted a ‘wolf-warrior’ mentality because an increasing sense of insecurity and
defensiveness is causing it to become aggressive,
China has been creating trouble in Hong Kong, Taiwan, India and other neighbouring
countries like Vietnam and Indonesia.
At a press conference in Beijing last Sunday, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had said that
China’s new policy is to push back against “deliberate insults”.

“We never pick a fight or bully others. But we have principles and guts. We will push back
against any deliberate insult, resolutely defend our national honour and dignity, and we will
refute all groundless slander with facts, India, NSG, and the Chinese roadblock Diplomats
invested in on-going consultations at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on India’s
membership application have suggested that more member-countries now support India’s
inclusion in the Group that lays out guidelines for exports of nuclear and related sensitive
items. Yet, China’s apparent unwavered opposition to India’s entry to the NSG, that runs on
consensus, continues to hurt New Delhi’s prospects.
Why does India want to join the NSG?
New Delhi submitted its membership application to the NSG in May 2016, a month before
the Seoul plenary of the Group. This membership application follows over a decade of
cooperation between India and the NSG. New Delhi seeks to join the Group under its larger
goal of integrating completely into the global non-proliferation architecture. The first stage
of this integration was completed in 2008 when it received the waiver from the NSG to the
condition of implementing full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in order to engage in global nuclear commerce for peaceful purposes – a condition
applicable on all non-nuclear weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
nuclear weapons (NPT).
What stands between India and the NSG?
India’s membership application to the NSG, however, hit a road-block when China expressed
its strong opposition to India’s inclusion, citing implications on NPT as the reason since India
has not signed the Treaty. Non-proliferation experts have raised concerns that inclusion of
India into the NSG would affirm its status as a nuclear weapon state and since NPT, the
framework that holds the nuclear non-proliferation architecture, allows only five nuclear
weapon states, India’s admission in the NSG would undermine the NPT. Though Beijing has
used this argument to substantiate its position, its push for India’s admission to be linked
with Pakistan’s entry to the Group showcases how its political imperatives have a larger role
to play in its opposition. While a majority of the 48 NSG members share the understanding
that India’s entry to the Group will be beneficial, there remain a few, along with China, that
have not yet joined the consensus.
However, China – and some other nations – did not budge. Their objections revolved under
questions of having a process – that rather than taking up applications one by one, a set of
‘criteria’ should be drawn up for non-NPT members. Since decision in the NSG taken on the
basis of consensus, objection raised by even one country acts as a veto.
A criteria-based approach would effectively put New Delhi on the same platform as
Islamabad. This would be galling for India as it considers itself to be a “responsible” nuclear
power, as opposed to the proliferation record of Pakistan, with its chronicled links to nuclear
programs of China, North Korea, Iran and Libya.
Beijing’s unusually public opposition to India’s NSG membership drive had been among the
reasons that led to a widening strain in relations with New Delhi.
“China’s position on NSG expansion is consistent and clear. We believe all countries need to
follow NSG rules, uphold the authority and solemnity of the NPT and seek a non-
discriminatory solution acceptable to all based on full consultation,” said spokesperson Lu
Kang at the daily briefing in Beijing on Friday.
Lu noted that a “non-discriminatory” plan had to be acceptable to “all the NPT-non parties”,
that is, both India and Pakistan. Denying that China was thwarting India, he argued that the
plenary meeting would not be discussing the entry of any specific “NPT non-party” applicant,
before reaching a “non-discriminatory plan”. “So, there is no blocking of India,” he asserted.

Do NSG members share a common vision on the Group’s future?

The lack of consensus within the NSG brings to fore questions regarding whether or not the
current members share a common vision and understanding on the objectives of the NSG
and on the path the Group would take in fulfilling them. In assessing various objectives of
the Group, two feature prominently. First is that the Group should include all states that
could supply nuclear and related items, controlling exports of which fall under the mandate
of the NSG. This will allow the NSG to spread and universalise norms of export control and
nuclear non-proliferation, thus enhancing its credibility. Second, given the fact that NSG
functions on consensus, the Group must only include those countries that are seriously
committed to the goal of nuclear non- proliferation, barring which NSG could become
defunct.

Would NSG gain a “like-minded” partner in India?

In including nuclear exporters, NSG also needs to ensure that it takes in only those states
that are equally committed to non- proliferation of nuclear weapons. The challenge for NSG
members is in assessing “like-mindedness” of a membership applicant. Being a signatory to
the NPT has been referred to as the litmus test, but does it really capture a country’s
commitment to nuclear non-proliferation? Cases of Iraq, Iran and North Korea present a
different picture. While these countries have been at times referred to as rogue states by the
nuclear order, how would one weigh the violation of NSG guidelines by China, a de jure
nuclear weapon state under the NPT, in supplying additional reactors to Pakistan, plans of
which were not disclosed by China at the time of joining the NSG even though that was a
requirement

Can China really encircle India with its String of Pearls? The great game of Asia ?
Those having slightest of interest in India-China relationship are familiar with the String of
Pearls theory. The phrase seems to have been in use even before but publication of Energy
Futures in Asia: Final Report in 2004 made it popular.
The report said that China was working on a strategy to expand its influence in the Indian
Ocean to extract maximum benefit from it and contain Indian hold in the region. China was
expected to raise civilian and military infrastructure at chosen points on the islands or ports -
metaphorically called pearls - surrounding India.
String of pearl, in geostrategic parlance, refers to the Strait of Malacca, Sri Lanka, Pakistan,
the Maldives, the Strait of Hormuz and Somalia. It also includes Bangladesh and Myanmar in
Chinese strategy

STRAIT OF MALACCA
The Strait of Malacca connects Indian Ocean with Pacific Ocean with Malaysia and
Singapore on one side while Indonesia on the other side. It is not very far from the Nicobar
Islands.
The Strait of Malacca is key for China's energy requirements. About 80 per cent of its fuel
from the Middle East passes through this. Wary of India's stronghold in the Indian Ocean,
China has been consistently working to develop friendly and cooperative relations with the
countries in the region.
In 1971, when China gave feelers about aligning with Pakistan during the Liberation War for
Bangladesh, India had threatened to block the Strait of Malacca. Later in 1999 during Kargil
war, India choked supply to Pakistan - practically blocking Karachi port - using its dominance
in the Indian Ocean. China is on a mission to turn the tide against India.

MYANMAR AND BANGLADESH

China has developed assets in Myanmar. It has built a gas pipeline of about 2,400 km from
Myanmar to China. It is also reported to have a military base in Coco Island of Myanmar.
China is said to have developed a naval base near Strait of Malacca on Cocos Keeling Island,
which is a distant part of Australia. Further north in the Bay of Bengal, China developed the
port of Chittagong in Bangladesh. It has given China a foothold and stake in the Bay of
Bengal. Significant part of Chinese trade passes through this port.
China had been pushing Bangladesh to allow it to develop a small naval base near
Chittagong. SRI LANKA
Sri Lanka has been a trusted friend of India for decades but the years between 2012 and
2014 saw increased Chinese presence in the island country.
China developed a port at Hambantola on the southeastern part of Sri Lanka. A Chinese
company built the port and gained control to manage it.
China was in the process of developing it into a naval base, when in January 2015, the
Rajapakshe government was voted out in Sri Lanka

PAKISTAN
China has Gwadar port and the CPEC to protect in Pakistan. The Gwadar port has gained
further significance as China joined what was originally conceived as the Iran-Pakistan-India
gas pipeline.

India withdrew from the project as it was not assured of the security of the pipeline in
certain stretches in Pakistan. The project is now called Iran-Pakistan-China pipeline. It
touches Gwadar on its route to China.

The CPEC is developing into a vital geo-strategic and trade asset of China. At present, it
carries only two per cent of its trade with Pakistan. But, China expects the volume to
increase as it plans to route much of its trade with the Middle East and Africa through
Gwadar port and the CPEC.
China's String of Pearls vs India's Iron Curtain

Naval analyst Zhang Ming recently proclaimed that the Islands of India’s Andaman and
Nicobar Archipelago could be used as a ‘metal chain’ to block Chinese access to the Straits of
Malacca. China has gone further to claim that India is building an ‘Iron Curtain’ in the Indian
Ocean, which is debatable.
In recent years, a number of analysts have drawn attention to the similarities of nationalism,
between the rise of modern China and the rise of Wilhelmine Germany. Newsweek’s Fareed
Zakaria, says that “like Germany in the late 19th century, China is growing rapidly but
uncertainly, into a global system (including the Indian Ocean) in which it feels it deserves
more attention and honor.

The 19th century strategic thinker Mahan had prophesised that the future of the world in the
21st century would be decided on the waters of the Indian Ocean and in this, India’s
expansion of its maritime power and Navy, and inroads in to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)
is very much on China’s radar, which deserves introspection.
It is less publicised or talked about, but in the last two decades India has stealthily straddled
its interests in the Indian Ocean Rim, which includes the islan ..

India’s maritime military strategy and the Navy’s 2004 maritime doctrine, both issued by the
Indian Navy are very clear that it is the Indian Navy’s responsibility to ensure stability in the
IOR, which irks the Chinese as they view the Indian Ocean as their life line for trade and
energy. Chi Haotin had said, ‘It is Indian Ocean not India’s Ocean
India has developed a special relationship with Mauritius, which is a fulcrum island state
because of its strong Indian diaspora. India has instituted a favourable taxation treaty that
makes it India’s largest offshore investor

When it comes to the Indian Ocean, New Delhi is hedging its bets against an assertive China.
India and France recently signed a strategic pact opening up their naval bases to each
other’s warships across the Indian Ocean. This comes two years after a similar deal with the
United States and signifies a web of strategic trust to thwart Beijing’s expansion into India’s
traditional area of influence.In recent years, Beijing’s push to contain India has become more
frenetic, including signing agreements with Myanmar, Sri Lanka , the Maldives and Pakistan
.

India’s deal with France is therefore an escalation of New Delhi’s capacity to project power.
It grants the Indian navy access to strategically important French ports – including one in
Djibouti , home to China’s single overseas military base and a focal point of strategic
competition for the Indian Ocean. The installation can host over 10,000 troops and serves as
a springboard for Chinese navy operations across the Indian Ocean.

China’s Djibouti military base: ‘logistics facility’, or platform for geopolitical ambitions
overseas

Indian PM Narendra Modi signed the India-Singapore Bilateral Agreement for Navy
Cooperation in 2018 which allows Indian Navy ships logistical support, including refuelling at
Singapore’s Changi naval base located near the disputed South China Sea. Changi Naval
Base forms a strategic point in the ‘Necklace of Diamonds’ that India is creating to counter
China’s ‘String of Pearls’ strategy.The ‘Necklace of Diamonds’ comprises Changi Naval Base
in Singapore, Chabahar Port in Iran, the Assumption Islands in Seychelles, and Duqm Port in
Oman. In addition to this, India is creating strong naval ties with Vietnam, Japan, France,
Australia and the United States.
However, China’s investment in its ‘String of Pearls’ is greater than India in its ‘Necklace of
Diamonds’. China has invested US$60 billion in Africa under its String of Pearls strategy,
whereas India’s largest investment for its Necklace of Diamonds amounts to $8 billion, in
Chabahar Port in Iran.
India opposes re-joining RCEP over China concerns
15 countries solidified their participation in the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP). Even as India opted to stay out after walking out of discussions last year,
the new trading bloc has made it clear that the door will remain open for India to return to
the negotiating table.
What is RCEP?
Described as the “largest” regional trading agreement to this day, RCEP was originally being
negotiated between 16 countries — ASEAN members and countries with which they have
free trade agreements (FTAs), namely Australia, China, Korea, Japan, New Zealand and
India.
The purpose of RCEP was to make it easier for products and services of each of these
countries to be available across this region. Negotiations to chart out this deal had been on
since 2013, and India was expected to be a signatory until its decision last November.
Why did India walk out?
On November 4, 2019,
India decided to exit
discussions over
“significant outstanding
issues”. According to a
government official, India
had been “consistently”
raising “fundamental
issues” and concerns
throughout the
negotiations and was prompted to take
this stand as they had not been resolved
by the deadline to commit to signing the
deal. Its decision was to safeguard the
interests of industries like agriculture
and dairy and to give an advantage to
the country’s services sector. According
to officials, the current structure of
RCEP still does not address these issues and concerns.
How far is China’s presence a factor?
 Escalating tensions with China are a major
reason for India’s decision. While China’s
participation in the deal had already been
proving difficult for India due to various
economic threats, the clash at Galwan Valley
has soured relations between the two countries.
The various measures India has taken to reduce
its exposure to China would have sat
uncomfortably with its commitments under
RCEP.
Major issues that were unresolved during RCEP
negotiations were related to the exposure that
India would have to China. This included India’s
fears that there were “inadequate” protections
against surges in imports. It felt there could also be a possible circumvention of rules of
origin— the criteria used to determine the national source of a product — in the absence of
which some countries could dump their products by routing them through other countries
that enjoyed lower tariffs.
India was unable to ensure countermeasures like an auto-trigger mechanism to raise tariffs
on products when their imports crossed a certain threshold. It also wanted RCEP to exclude
most-favoured nation (MFN) obligations from the investment chapter, as it did not want to
hand out, especially to countries with which it has border disputes, the benefits it was giving
to strategic allies or for geopolitical reasons. India felt the agreement would force it to
extend benefits given to other countries for sensitive sectors like defence to all RCEP
members.
India has trade deficits with 11 of the 15 RCEP countries, and some experts feel that India
has been unable to leverage its existing bilateral free trade agreements with several RCEP
members to increase exports.

India must guard against Chinese tech intrusion

The recent border standoff between China and India at Ladakh confirms two political
realities that must not be ignored. First, India must not allow the intrusion of Chinese firms
into its telecommunications network. If societies will be digital, China should not be
permitted to encode India’s public sphere. New Delhi must not license Huawei or ZTE to
provide equipment for its 5G rollout. And second, India must not allow any Chinese-origin
firm into its critical infrastructure in much the same manner that it was kept away from
certain industrial projects in the past.
An authoritarian regime that has given Xi Jinping absolute power has now become predatory
in its external engagements and is a caricature of an insecure bully. The courtesies of
diplomatic speak have been dispensed with as it referred to Australia as a “giant kangaroo
that serves as a dog of the US”. The middle kingdom now has a medieval mindset that only
seeks territory and markets for its benefit. That it continues on this course during the
COVID19 pandemic reveals much about its naked ambitions.
This is China’s approach to India and each nation must make its own choice. For India’s
national interest, the choice is clear. There is no more room to accommodate China’s
economic affections while being scorched by the Dragon’s fire.The criticality of 5G
technology is based not only on its speed but also on its all pervasiveness. The real power of
5G lies in its ability to be a network of networks — to simultaneously serve several verticals
including governance, business, smart cities, education, mobility, and in the post-COVID19
world, healthcare through telemedicine along with most other human interactions.
This makes the way we negotiate 5G technology a vital matter for national security.
Allowing Huawei or ZTE to be a 5G equipment provider to Indian telecommunications firms
will be like asking the Chinese Communist Party to run our general elections. As we repulse
China at the borders, we must ensure that we do not surrender our cities, homes and minds
to that ideology. In fact, one major lapse on the part of India has been that it has allowed
the creeping acquisition of India Tech by the Digital BRI, even as the country has opposed the
Belt and Road in its physical manifestation.

The risk China Tech poses to Indian interests is real. Considering they are backed by an
authoritarian regime that’s weaponising everything in its armoury, from trade and
technology to medical equipment and humanitarian aid, the provisions by state- controlled
Chinese firms are a global concern. Australia and the US have discovered it, Europe is in the
process of finding out, and smaller nations will awaken to the consequences too late.
As a $3 trillion economy that has set its eyes on becoming a $10 trillion one in the 2030s,
India cannot ignore the perils of the noxious interplay of Chinese Communist Party objectives
and the capitalist façade represented by Huawei.
National security is not a choice. It is a primary assumption and the first responsibility of
statecraft. A country that uses its military power to threaten other nations and its economic
power to pervert free trade and steal technologies, will not think twice before using its
technological influence to advance its strategic ambitions and lust for territory. These
networks are India’s lifelines of growth and highways of aspirations. These will support
economic growth, governance, innovations, and be the critical infrastructure that can cart
India towards a $10,000 per capita income future. These must not be implicated by an
erroneous choice in partners.
For India to allow Huawei even in its 5G trials displays an act that’s not very different from
India rooting for China as a member of the United Nations Security Council against its own
interests in 1950. Seven decades later, allowing Huawei into India mirrors the same
sentiment — it is a signal that India is giving in to China’s bullying.
China & South Asia

In his 19th Party Congress speech in October 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that
“China will deepen relations with its neighbors in accordance with the principle of amity,
sincerity, mutual benefits, and inclusiveness, and the policy of forging friendship and
partnership with its neighbors.”] As neighbours of China, South Asian countries—including
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—have
increasingly come into contact with Beijing in the diplomatic, economic, and security
domains. These interactions demonstrate that China is not simply appealing to the better
angels of South Asian neighbours. Rather, Beijing has crafted a geostrategic approach to the
region that assiduously seeks to secure its own national interests.

Pakistan
Pakistan rarely criticises China’s harsh treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang. Beijing reciprocates
by protecting Islamabad in international organisations. For instance, Beijing has wielded its
veto power at the UN Security Council multiple times to prevent the sanctioning of Masood
Azhar, the leader of a Pakistan-based militant group called Jaish-e-Mohammed, until finally
relenting last year. As the rotational president of the Financial Action Task Force, Beijing also
likely played a key role in 2019 in helping Pakistan avoid sanctions for terrorism financing.
China also holds up its partnership with Pakistan as an important demonstration of benign
intentions to develop the rest of the world through BRI. Indeed, BRI’s flagship project, CPEC,
runs through territory under de facto Pakistani control, but disputed by India. Following Xi
and Khan’s last meeting, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to CPEC, stating their
“determination to speedily execute CPEC so that its growth potential can be fully realized
making it a high-quality demonstration project of BRI.”
On Afghanistan, Chinese leaders believe that Pakistan serves as a useful partner to achieve
security in order to eventually benefit from economic development there. The joint
statement following the Xi-Khan meeting in September indicates that “the Chinese side
appreciated Pakistan’s efforts in promoting peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan.
Both sides maintained that an inclusive, and Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process
would be key to bringing peace and stability in the country.
China almost certainly assesses Pakistan to be a valuable asset toward better understanding
the situation in Afghanistan and in communicating with different actors in the country, to
include the Taliban, who China believes must be a part of any future government.
Afghanistan

China seeks Afghan reconciliation, to include Taliban integration, in a future government.

Most recently in September, Beijing noted that Afghanistan “should have broad
representation and inclusiveness in order to make all factions and ethnic groups equally
involve[d] in the political life so as to build a united political foundation.”
As noted earlier, Beijing further seeks to incorporate Afghanistan into BRI. According to a
readout of Xi’s meeting with Afghan President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani in June 2019,
Beijing seeks to “steadily promote practical cooperation in economy and trade [via BRI]. In
April, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reaffirmed Beijing’s interest in helping Afghanistan
through BRI, stating “China is willing to work with Afghanistan to deepen joint construction
of the Belt and Road and advance bilateral cooperation in various fields in order to jointly
benefit the two countries and peoples.
China looks to Afghanistan to support counter-terrorism operations to prevent instability
from spilling over into bordering Xinjiang province. Xi has pledged to “continue to help
Afghanistan build its capacity in fighting terrorism and maintaining stability.” Xi further
“called on the Afghan side to continue to firmly support China in its fight against the terrorist
force of East Turkistan Islamic Movement.
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka

In July, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang met with Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and
the two leaders focused much of their discussion on the need for the economic development
of Bangladesh via BRI funding

China and Bangladesh pledged to deepen defense cooperation, especially in the areas of
“defense industry and trade, training, equipment and technology, mutual visits of navy ships,
and the UN peacekeeping operations.” The Chinese navy in 2016 made its first port visit (and
again in 2017) to Chittagong, perhaps signaling Beijing’s belief that the largest port in
Bangladesh holds geostrategic value.
China is also the largest arms supplier of the Bangladeshi military, providing 71.8 percent of
weapons from 2008 to 2018, suggesting that Beijing seeks to further ingratiate itself with
Dhaka through these sales.
Bhutan does not have diplomatic relations with China, and so there is much less interaction
than with other South Asian countries. However, in the last meeting held in February 2019
between visiting Chinese ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui, and Bhutanese Prime Minister
Lotay Tshering, Beijing emphasised the need to continue working together with Bhutan on
resolving the border issue. This is likely in reference to the Doklam region in which a China-
India dispute occurred in 2017. Either way, the last round of China-Bhutan border talks were
held in 2016.
China’s relationship with the Maldives is near-exclusively focused on leveraging BRI to
develop Maldives as well as to raise Chinese influence there to counter India. Beijing’s
preferred Maldivian President, Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom, was defeated in elections in
2018, and the current leader, Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, is more amenable to India’s wishes.
Bilateral ties, however, remain positive, with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang as recently as
July 2019 noting his appreciation for continued Maldivian support of BRI. Beijing has touted
the completion of the “China-Maldives Friendship Bridge” as a tangible example of what
positive bilateral relations can create to benefit average Maldivians
Chinese President Xi went directly to Nepal in what was the first visit by a Chinese head of
state in 23 years. While on the ground, Xi signed 20 agreements through BRI to better enable
China to develop and connect with Nepal. The two sides “will accelerate the building of the
Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network through connectivity projects
including ports, highways, railways, aviation, and communications, and have announced the
launch of a feasibility study of the China-Nepal cross-border railway. Beijing was further
pleased to see Kathmandu acknowledge that “Tibet affairs are China’s internal affairs, and
the determination [of Nepal] on not allowing any anti-China activities on its soil.
Finally, on Sri Lanka, the Chinese focus is mainly on developing the island and likely currying
influence there for future geostrategic aspirations. During a meeting between Chinese
Premier Li and Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena in May 2019, the two leaders
expressed an interest in progressing with BRI projects, consistent with the last joint
statement issued in 2016.
In exchange for paying down Colombo’s BRI debt, the Chinese got Sri Lanka in December
2017 to hand over Hambantota port on a 99-year lease; Hambantota is geostrategically
located on the Indian Ocean, potentially bolstering Beijing’s String of Pearls.

Conclusion
As detailed in this brief, Chinese interests in South Asia stretch far beyond simply maintaining
amicable relations in the region. Rather, China is dissatisfied at the LAC with India and is
trying to improve the situation to its liking. Beijing is also frustrated with New Delhi’s
persistent support of the Dalai Lama and rejection of BRI. As a result, China seeks to
undermine India by aligning closely with archrival Pakistan.
Chinese warfare strategy

Trusions and coercion around its borders through military means. These include but are not
restricted to Bhutan, Japan, nations in the South China Sea and India.

Second, psychological intrusions through information warfare in democracies, using the

tools that serve communications, transparency and accountability in democracies. Their
public sphere and institutions are seen
as handy sharp instruments serving China’s designs Third, technological
intrusion through its corporate arms such as Huawei and ZTE, which by
the virtue of being incorporated, designed and operating under the
National Intelligence Law collect intelligence and information for the
benefit of the Communist Party of China from the countries in which they
operate And fourth, controlling multilateral arenas through capture of
international institutions such as WHO as the Made in China pandemic so clearly brought
out.
After successfully weaponising trade in WTO, health in WHO, investments along the Belt and
Road Initiative, debt through its debt trap diplomacy, narratives through information
intrusions, China is now on way towards weaponising data, using companies like Huawei
and ZTE as the tip of its digital spear.
Chinese apps banned by India

When the Narendra Modi government’s Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology
banned 59 Chinese apps, including TikTok, WeChat, and UC Browser, it did so through the
powers of one law. The government said that these apps were banned under Section 69A of
the Information Technology Act, 2000 because “they are engaged in activities which are
prejudicial to sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of state and public
order.”

Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, was introduced by an amendment to
the Act in 2008. It gives the Central government the power to block public access to any
information online — whether on websites or mobile apps.

Under Section 69A, if a website threatens India’s defence, its sovereignty and integrity,
friendly relations with foreign countries and public order, the government can ban it, after
following due procedure.

A feature of Section 69A is that it includes terms such as “security of the state, emergency
nature, sovereignty and integrity of India and public order”, which are common for national
security determinations across Indian laws. The Section mandates strict confidentiality about
complaints and action taken. Due to the presence of this clause, Right to Information (RTI)
queries are not applicable to the law. Moreover, the committees to examine requests and
review appeals comprise entirely members from the executive.
India rolls the dice on Hong Kong

Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a controversial national security law that gave Beijing
unprecedented powers to shape the future of Hong Kong.
It dramatically reduced Hong Kong’s autonomy and gives Beijing the ability to crackdown
against dissent under the garb of tackling crimes of secession, subversion, terrorism and
collusion with foreign forces.
ISSUE
For most Hong Kongers, it is clear that it cuts at the very heart
of their freedom of expression and organisation, effectively
repudiating the so-called “one country, two systems” principle
on which the relationship between
Hong Kong and mainland China has been premised since 1997.
Hong Kong has been rocked by anti-Beijing protests since June
2019 and the new law is effectively Xi Jinping’s revenge on Hong Kongers for making him
withdraw the controversial extradition bill of last year. Since then a
broader anti-China and pro-democracy movement has been gathering momentum in Hong
Kong which Beijing is now determined to demolish with this new law.

INDIA'S APPROACH

New Delhi chose the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva to react where it argued
last week that India has been keeping “a close watch on recent developments” in Hong Kong
given the presence of a large Indian community there.
New Delhi had in the past been reluctant to talk about the Hong Kong issue but recent
violent clashes in the Galwan Valley of Ladakh last month, perhaps, made it imperative for
India to change its approach
In the past India has been reluctant to even give visas to pro-democracy activists of Hong
Kong and along with Indonesia was the only other member state of the G-20 last year which
refused to even meet pro-democracy activists. India also maintained a studied silence over
China’s ill-treatment of its Muslim minority in Xinjiang. The border crisis this year has
challenged the very foundations of India’s China policy and all aspects are being recalibrated
by New Delhi – from trade and technological engagement to China’s domestic political
imperatives. Major powers like the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and Japan have all spoken
out against the new Chinese law.
Hong Kong is also important for India for economic reasons. For global investors, it has
always
been an attractive destination, leading to its emergence as one of Asia’s most powerful
financial centres.
WAY AHEAD
As a mature democracy, we should be able to articulate and defend our positions to our
global stakeholders. It is what makes India different from China and a more reassuring
global presence
China has never hesitated to meddle in Indian domestic matters in the past. India’s past
diffidence in challenging China on its ‘internal’ matters has not really paid New Delhi any
significant dividends.

India’s Hong Kong move has been noticed the world over

Calls for India to play the Taiwan card grow louder

•Possible asymmetric diplomatic strategies to challenge

China, such as altering India’s “one China policy” to enhance
India’s relations with Taiwan. Indian Express, wrote in May
that India should be pragmatic in considering the question of
Taiwan’s observer status in the World Health Assembly: The
decision “should not be made either out of peevishness or
fear.” The editorial argued that New Delhi should judge the
issue on “apolitical appreciation of the specific technical
issues involved.
 •The Times of India, asked the government to “not shy away
from supporting Taiwan.” that this should remain an important
aspect of the reform of the World Health Organization (WHO). It
also argued that India should stop being “overly deferential to
Beijing” when China has routinely worked against Indian interests
in the UN and other multilateral organizations. India should step
up its cooperation with Taiwan. it was strange that India has
shied away from cooperating with Taiwan, whereas Taipei and
Beijing had active trade and investment ties despite their political disagreements.

•Namrata Hasija, a research associate at the Delhi-based Centre for China Analysis and
Strategy, asserts that India must stop seeing Taiwan through the China lens that gets
activated every time there is tension in Sino Indian ties.
•Highlighting that Taiwan was one of the first countries to send medical equipment to India,
former diplomat G. Parthasarathy also made the case for India to strengthen its relations
with Taiwan. He added that Taiwan offers opportunities for cooperation in several key
sectors, especially in India’s semiconductor industry, which could also possibly reduce India’s
reliance on China in the electronics and communication industries
•Taipei Times called on Taiwan to “deepen ties with India, in particular economic, military
and intelligence ties, to contain Chinese expansionism and put Xi back into his box.” This also
fits well with President Tsai Ing-wen’s New Southbound policy which has a particular focus
on India.
 India – China Relations

1949 – India became the first non-communist country to recognise

1950 – India did not support US led
resolution blaming China as aggressor in Korean Crisis.

1954 – Panchsheel Agreement.

The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, known as the Panchsheel Treaty.

Their first formal codification in treaty form was in an agreement between China and India in
1954 — the "Agreement (with exchange of notes) on trade and intercourse between Tibet
Region of China and India", which was signed at Peking on 28 April 1954.

The Five Principles, as stated in the Sino–Indian Agreement 1954, are listed as:

 mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,

 mutual non-aggression,
 mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
 equality and mutual benefit, and
 peaceful co-existing.

1959 – Dalai Lama escaped to India

1957 – Karakoram Highway across Aksai Chin.

Aksai Chin
Aksai Chin is almost the size of Bhutan and little
smaller than Switzerland. Most of it is in
occupation of China, which captured the region
during 1950s and consolidated its military grip over
the area during the 1962 India-China war, rejecting
all Indian attempts to settle border disputes
peacefully.
A major Sino-Indian bilateral negotiation for a friendly and permanent settlement of all
outstanding issues, including the border dispute, was initiated in Delhi in December 1953.
It is argued that "Aksai Chin is like a Damocles sword hanging over India's head" in addition
to being a gateway to Central Asia and an easy route to "easily run over New Delhi, the
Indian capital city. This explains why China was expressly keen in seizing Aksai Chin

Tibet :The Core Issue In China-India Relations

Following a brief military conflict between

China and Tibet at the start of the 20th
century, Tibet declared itself as an
independent nation in 1912. It functioned as
an autonomous region until 1950. In 1949,
the Communists under Mao Zedong’s
leadership gained power and in 1950 seized
control of Tibet. In 1951, the Dalai Lama’s
representatives signed a seventeen-point
agreement that granted China sovereignty over Tibet for the first time. The Chinese
claim that this document is proof of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet while Tibet says
that it was coerced into signing this document.
 The current Dalai Lama claims that he wants only autonomy for Tibet, because it
would ensure the preservation of Tibet’s unique culture, language and customs. The
Dalai Lama in 1959 fled Tibet to India after a failed uprising. The Chinese have little
trust in the Dalai Lama and claim that his intentions are not sincere. Further China
claims that Tibet has been an inalienable part of China since the thirteenth century
under the Yuan Dynasty.
 The Chinese blame the British for causing confusion in Tibet refusing to be bound by
any treaties signed between Tibet and Britain during the early 20th century. This
includes the 1914 Shimla convention where the British recognized Tibet as an
autonomous area under the suzerainty of China. There is also differing contentions
about what includes political Tibet in modern times. For the Chinese, this includes the
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), which are the western and central areas. This was
directly ruled by Tibet when the Chinese invaded Tibet in 1950.
 Following the Cultural Revolution, Mao sent the Chinese army to Tibet after they
refused to accept the conditions which the Chinese authorities wanted to impose..
Mao’s Cultural Revolution in Tibet continued until 1976. After Deng Xiaoping took
over in 1978, he reached out to the Dalai Lama in a quest to foster a reconciliatory
economic and cultural policy towards Tibet.
 Pro-independence protests in Tibet started in 1987 and this led to a clampdown by
the Chinese authorities on religious and cultural freedom in Tibet. Simultaneously, a
 rapid economic development programme was formulated leading to large
immigration of Hans Chinese into Tibet. The Dalai Lama’s exile in Dharamsala in
Northern India in 1959 put India squarely at the centre of this China-Tibet dispute.
India is currently home to around 120,000 Tibetan
Some Chinese officials claim they are just waiting for the Dalai Lama’s expiry for the Tibetan
movement’s intensity to subside.'

1961 – Aggressive border patrolling by China ; Nehru’s Forward Policy

1962 – Massive attack on Eastern and Western Front, Unilateral ceasefire

Why India and China went to war in 1962 ?

56 years ago, China attacked India over multiple points across the border, leading to a
month-long standoff between 10,000 to 20,000 Indian soldiers and 80,000 Chinese troops.
Unprepared for the offensive, India lost nearly 4,000 soldiers in the war and suffered its most
humiliating defeat.

The causes of war

The leading cause for the 1962 war was China’s perception that India was meddling in its
internal affairs in Tibet. After Independence, India largely maintained cordial relations with
China. It did, briefly, protest Chinese occupation in Tibet. However, in March 1959, when the
Dalai Lama fled Tibet and found asylum in India, People’s Republic of China leader Mao
Zedong did not take it lightly. He claimed that the Lhasa rebellion in Tibet was fuelled by
India. China felt that the political asylum to the Dalai Lama amounted to interference by
India in China’s internal affairs.

Invasion

 Smaller conflicts between the two countries increased in 1962. On 10 July, over 350
Chinese troops surrounded an Indian post at Chushul, Leh. Using loudspeakers, they
told the Gurkha regiment to not fight for India.
 And on 20 October the People’s Liberation Army invaded India in Ladakh, northern
Uttarakhand and across the McMahon Line in the then North-East Frontier Agency
(now Arunachal Pradesh), catching India completely off guard. The attack began
simultaneously in all sectors of the border at the same time — 5 am — synchronised
as per Beijing time. Convinced that there would not be a war, India didn’t deploy
enough soldiers, while China launched a full frontal attack.
 A panicked India reportedly sought US assistance to control the Chinese aggression.
Nehru wrote to then US President John F. Kennedy to provide “air transport and jet
fighters” to India. But US largely stayed away.
 Meanwhile, China proposed that Ayub Khan, then Pakistan President, should attack
India. Pakistan chose not to. Because the Soviets were engaged in their own high-
stakes gamble in Cuba, Moscow did not discourage the Chinese, despite Khrushchev’s
close relationship with Nehru, “At the same time defeating India would answer the
question Kennedy had raised in his 1959 speech in the Senate about which country,
democratic India or communist China, was poised to win the race for great power
status in Asia. For Mao, the conflict with India provided a surrogate for his rivalry
with Moscow and with Washington,”

The lessons

 The war officially ended on 20 November, 1962, after China finally announced a
ceasefire along the entire Sino-Indian border, even as some minor conflicts continued
in NEFA and Aksai Chin.
 The Sino-Indian War put the spotlight on India’s unpreparedness in a war situation
and underlined the need to modernise its armed forces.
  It also highlighted the crucial strategic mistakes India committed, including not using
the Indian Air Force.
 On the 50th anniversary of the war, former Indian ambassador to Iraq R.S. Kalha
wrote that then Chinese President Liu Shaoqi told the Sri Lankan leader Felix
Bandaranaike after the war that the conflict was “to demolish India’s arrogance and
illusions of grandeur”.The main objective of Mao Zedong, founding father of the
People’s Republic of China, to attack India in 1962 was to “humiliate” Nehru who was
emerging as a leader of the third world,
 India’s defence experts and historians should revise their view of 1962 seen as a
‘humiliating defeat’. Instead it should be seen as a victory of Nehru’s policy of non-
alignment which, with massive military and economic aid from both the American
and (then) Soviet blocs, had India’s defence forces fully prepared by 1965. It was a
blessing in disguise.

1979 – Vajpayee visited Beijing as Foreign Minster

1987 – China Condemned the establishment of

Arunachal Pradesh as a state; standoff in Sum do rong
chhu valley .
1988 – Rajiv Gandhi’s visit Joint Working Group on
Boundary Issue .

Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988 broke the ice

The relations between India and China - deep-frozen for the last 26
years - finally seemed to thaw with the formation of a joint task
force to solve the thorny border issue. Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi's visit to China marked a new beginning in bilateral
relations.
The two sides issued a joint communiqué that stressed the need to
restore friendly relations on the basis of the Panchsheel. India and
the People's Republic of China agreed to achieve a "fair and reasonable settlement while
seeking a mutually acceptable solution" to the border dispute. The communiqué also
expressed China's concern about agitation by Tibetan separatists in India and reiterated that
anti-China political activities by expatriate Tibetans would not be tolerated. Rajiv Gandhi
signed bilateral agreements on science and technology co-operation, establish direct air
links, and on cultural exchanges. The two sides also agreed to hold annual diplomatic
consultations between foreign ministers, set up a joint committee on economic and scientific
co-operation, and a joint working group on the boundary issue. The latter group was to be
led by the Indian foreign secretary and the Chinese vice minister of foreign affair.
1993 – Peace and Tranquillity agreement on Border

The 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and

Tranquility contains the following key provisions

 The two countries will resolve the border issue through peaceful and friendly
consultations. The two sides will ‘‘strictly respect and observe’’ the LAC, pending an
ultimate solution.
 The two sides agree to reduce their military forces along the LAC in conformity with
the agreed requirements of the principle of mutual and equal security ceilings.
 The two sides will work out effective confidence-building measures (CBM) along the
LAC.
 The high point of this period of relative Sino-Indian rapprochement was the historic
visit by Chinese President Jiang Zemin to New Delhi in late 1996. The two sides signed
the Agreement on CBM in the Military Field along the LAC, according to which their
governments pledged:
 To limit the number of field-army troops, border-defense forces, paramilitary forces,
and major categories of armaments along the LAC;
 To avoid holding large-scale military exercises near the LAC and to notify the other
side of exercises involving one brigade group (that is, 5,000 troops);
 Not to discharge firearms, cause biodegradation, use hazardous chemicals, set off
explosives, or hunt with firearms within two kilometers of the LAC;
 To maintain and expand telecommunications links between border meeting points at
designated places along the LAC.
 To maintain and expand telecommunications links between border meeting points at
designated places along the LAC.

1998 – India points at China for operation Shakti

Sino-Indian relations hit a low point in 1998 following India's nuclear tests.
Before conducting its first nuclear test in 1974, India’s nuclear policy was directed toward
the perceived threat from China
sisted in identifying China as India’s most formidable threat.27 ‘‘China is potential threat
number one,’’ George Fernandes, defense minister, said in May 1998: ‘‘The potential threat
from China is greater than that from Pakistan and any person who is concerned about
India’s security must agree with that.’’

2003 – Vajpayee’s visit Strategic Partnership. China

recognises Sikkim as India’s territory .

China officially recognised Indian sovereignty over Sikkim 2003

An agreement on the boundary with China could set the tone for a final settlement of the
Kashmir question with Pakistan. GOOD FENCES make good neighbours. The absence of a
settled boundary with China, let alone fences, has been at the heart of New Delhi's troubled
relationship with Beijing for more than four decades. The biggest political outcome from the
Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to China has been the decision by the two sides to
explore a final settlement of the boundary dispute.

Nathu La pass reopens for trade after 44 years

Marking a historic occasion, Nathu La, the famous Himalayan
pass at 14,500 feet on the Sino-India border here reopened after
44 years. Once part of the historic 'Silk Route', Nathu La became
India's third point after Shipkila in Himachal and Lipulekh in
Uttaranchal for border trade with China.

The reopening of the pass came a little over a year after China
accepted Sikkim as an integral part of India. The route had been
closed since the Indo-China war of 1962.

2004 – Special Representative Mechanism : Guiding Principles and Political parameters

The resolution and
final solution of the
boundary question
will promote positive
relations between
India and China, "in
accordance with the
Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence"
and "principle of
mutual and equal security".
In attainment of the solution the two sides will consider "historical evidence, national
sentiments, practical difficulties and reasonable concerns and sensitivities of both sides, and
the actual state of border areas"; the boundary should be along "well-defined geographical
features"; interests of "settled populations in the border areas" to be considered; and
"delineation of the boundary to be done through modern and joint means.
Pending final solution, all dispute resolution mechanism bodies will continue to function as
per their objectives.
2005 - SAARC Summit in 2005, China was granted an observer status
China has an observer status in SAARC, .It was in the 18th summit, which was held in
Kathmandu in November 2014, that Beijing expressed its interest in joining the organisation.
However, this was not endorsed by India for geopolitical reasons. The Charter of SAARC
requires consensus among all members for admitting a new member. If China is to be
admitted it must get the support of all the members.
Three realities exist as far as China’s admission as a full member of SAARC is concerned.

 Firstly, the perception that China is not a South Asian country as it doesn’t share a
history and culture with the people of South Asia. China has borders with five of the
eight South Asian countries and is located in the proximity of Bangladesh, yet, China
is not a mainstream South Asian country
 Secondly, China in view of its wide-ranging trade, economic and commercial relations
with almost all the South Asian countries and geographical contiguity with South Asia
is qualified to be a full member of SAARC.
 Thirdly, almost half of SAARC members support China’s admission to the organisation
as a full member. Indeed, it is not only Pakistan which vehemently supports China’s
full admission but also members like Sri Lanka,
For India, China’s admission as a full member may lead to an anti-Indian Sino-Pakistani
alliance which other smaller members of SAARC may also join. It is the fear of China
neutralizing India’s domination in South Asia which has led to New Delhi’s constant
opposition to China’s membership. In order to pre-empt China’s admission India has tried to
use its influence with Afghanistan, Bhutan and Bangladesh.
Chinese President Xi Jinping in his official visit to India urged the Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi to change his country’s policy on opposing China’s membership in the
SAARC. He also stated that China would support India’s full membership in the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) and he requested that the Indian Prime Minister should
reciprocate this gesture by backing China’s SAARC ambitions.

2009 – BRIC
2013 – BDCA
2013 Depsang standoff

On April 15, an Indian patrol found that a

Chinese platoon had established a camp in
what was clearly the Indian side of the Line of
Actual Control. On the evening of May 5, after
weeks of consultations and flag meetings, the
Chinese and Indian sides agreed to restore
status quo ante in the area, which essentially
meant that the Chinese removed the five tents they had set up on April 15.
The fact that their move was clearly non-threatening, yet high visibility, suggests that Beijing
was sending some kind of a signal.

Signalling what ?
The Chinese action can be seen at two levels- one as a straightforward land grab, and two
instances of signalling. The first is an established pattern where the PLA keeps nibbling at
Indian territory to create new "facts on the ground" or a "new normal" in relation to their
claimed LAC. They do this, as they have done in the past– occupy an area, then assert that it
has always been part of their territory and offer to negotiate. In this very sector, Chinese
claim lines have been varying since 1956. At that time, for example, the entire Chip Chap and
Galwan river valleys were accepted by China as being Indian territory. But in 1960 China
insisted that these areas were within their claim line and they occupied them following the
1962 war.
The fact that the border is neither demarcated
nor inhabited, and there is no agreement on
the alignment of the LAC in many areas, aids
this process, China could be signalling its
unhappiness over the Indian military build up
on the Sino-Indian border. In the last five years,
India has activated forward airfields in the
Ladakh sector, completed important road
building projects in the Chumar sector, begun
work on the road to link DBO with Leh, and
moved high-performance fighter aircraft to bases proximate to Tibet.
2017 – India in SCO

2017 Doklam
Doklam Conflict

Doklam, or Donglang in Chinese, is an area

spread over less than a 100 sq km comprising a
plateau and a valley at the trijunction between
India, Bhutan and China. It is surrounded by the
Chumbi Valley of Tibet, Bhutan’s Ha Valley and
Sikkim.
Despite several rounds of engagement between
China and Bhutan, the dispute between the two
over Doklam has not been resolved. It flared up in 2017 when the Chinese were trying to
construct a road in the area, and Indian troops, in aid of their Bhutanese counterparts,
objected to it, resulting in the stand-off. Doklam is strategically located close to the Siliguri
Corridor, which connects mainland India with its north-eastern region. The corridor, also
called Chicken’s Neck, is a vulnerable point for India.
Why does it matter?
While India-Tibet trade flourished along the Siliguri corridor and Chumbi Valley, Doklam had
very little significance. Even during British rule, Doklam did not command much attention. In
recent years however, China has been beefing up its military presence in the Chumbi Valley,
where the Chinese are at a great disadvantage militarily. Both Indian and Bhutanese troops
are on a higher ground around the Valley.
This is also the reason, the Indian security establishment suspect, why the Chinese have a
deep interest in Doklam, which would give them a commanding view of and an easy access
to both the Chumbi Valley and the Siliguri Corridor.
The Bhutanese government told China that “the construction of the road inside Bhutanese
territory is a direct violation of the agreements and affects the process of demarcating the
boundary between our two countries.”The Ministry of External Affairs said: “Such
construction would represent a significant change of status quo with serious security
implications for India.” The Chinese government released a map to accuse India of
trespassing into its territory, and in a detailed statement in the first week of August, it said
“India has no right to interfere in or impede the boundary talks between China and Bhutan.”

What were India’s concerns?

India’s concerns emanated from Chinese action to change the status quo on the ground by
building a road in violation of China’s existing understanding with both India and Bhutan.

What arguments did India put forth in these negotiations?

One, India contested the Chinese claims of sovereignty over this region as it is part of
Bhutan.
Two, India argued that the Chinese attempt to alter the status quo amounted to a unilateral
determination of the tri-junction of the three countries.
Three, China was violating the 2012 written common understanding between the two
countries that the tri-junction would be finalised in consultation with all concerned countries.
Continuation of the faceoff was not in the mutual interest of India and China and prolonging
it would only give others an opportunity to take advantage. Finally, India reminded the
Chinese side of the Astana Consensus wherein both sides had agreed that differences should
not become disputes.

What led to a breakthrough?

Both sides were conscious of the importance of ending the face-off before the BRICS Summit
in Xiamen, scheduled that September. India also said that on its part, as a gesture of
goodwill, it was willing to take the first step to break the impasse.
After six weeks of diplomatic persuasion, India got the Chinese side to reach an agreement
to resolve the situation with the disengagement of border personnel at the site on August
28, 2017. The Chinese removed troops, equipment and tents by 150 m from the site, while
Indian troops returned to their original positions. This addressed the challenge of the Chinese
building a road and concerns about them pushing the tri-junction point southwards. But it
did not bring the Chinese troops back to the status quo as before June 16, 2017 as they
remained deployed in northern Doklam where they were earlier absent.

2018 – Wuhan Informal Talks

2019 – Mamallapuram Talks

2020 – Galwan clashes  Disengagement

India-China Galwan faceoff

This is the first time after the 1962 War that soldiers have died in clashes on the India-
China border in Ladakh. Even otherwise, the last deaths on the Line of Actual Control (LAC)
were an ambush of an Assam Rifles patrol in Arunachal Pradesh by the Chinese in 1975. But
the last real military engagement between the two armies was at Nathu La in Sikkim in
1967, in which 88 Indian soldiers lost their lives, and more than 300 Chinese soldiers were
killed.

But all these incidents were prior to the two countries signing, starting from 1993, various
agreements for maintaining peace and tranquility on the border.
Moreover, at least 20 soldiers including a Commanding Officer lost their lives on a single day
in Galwan
What exactly happened in the Galwan Valley ?
Tensions had been running high in the area for the past few weeks, with a large number of
soldiers and military equipment deployed along the LAC by both sides. Even though the LAC
in Galwan Valley was never disputed by the two sides, the Chinese had moved into the Indian
side of the LAC. After the meeting at the level of Corps Commanders on June 6, negotiations
had been conducted between local military commanders of both the armies for a mutually
agreed disengagement process.
As part of that process, a buffer zone had been agreed to be created between the LAC and
the junction of the Shyok and Galwan rivers to avoid any faceoff between the two armies.
The two armies were to move back by a kilometre each in that area as a first step.
When Colonel B Santosh Babu, who was monitoring this process, noticed that a Chinese
camp was still existing in the area, he went to get it removed. This soon led to fisticuffs and
blows being exchanged, resulting in deaths and injuries.
Were the Indian soldiers not carrying weapons?
No, this is as per the drill followed by both sides in the border areas to avoid inadvertent
escalation by opening fire.
This is in tune with the 1996 agreement between the two countries on Confidence Building
Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border
Areas, which imposed a lot of restrictions on military equipment, exercises, blasts, and
aircraft in the vicinity of the LAC.
China's intentions
The deaths of 20 soldiers in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh, where Indian and Chinese forces
are facing off, is the first such incident in 45 years. According to Adhir Ranjan Chowdhury,
Congress leader in Lok Sabha, this escalation “underlines the scale of the problem and the
challenge ahead” for New Delhi in its dealings with Beijing. Chowdhury argues in The Indian
Express that “China has clearly twisted the crisis into a strategic opportunity by taking
advantage of the geo-political distraction”.
That China is becoming more belligerent across strategic theatres, challenging the status
quo, is supported by multiple examples from the South China Sea. For the Government of
India, this is a moment to guard against complacency, fostered by decades of nimble
diplomacy that led to equilibrium, however precarious, on the border issue with China. It was
complacency, fostered by the 1999 bus ride to Lahore, that perhaps led to the Kargil conflict.

More worryingly, Beijing may have concluded that heightened aggression along the LAC
will invariably bring India to the negotiating table—that India will grant China greater
political concessions, market access or economic bargains as the price for “peace and
tranquillity” .China is also using this moment to send a message to its other neighbours in
the East and South China Sea.
China is demonstrating to the world the limitations of decaying American power without
having to actually confront it.
EXAMPLE - sum total of Beijing’s behaviour during the ‘Made in China’ pandemic: The
acceleration of territorial revisionism in the South China Sea; the subjugation of Hong Kong
through the stoutly contested national security law; repeated violations of Taiwanese
airspace; heightened naval aggression around Japan’s Senkaku Islands; and its most recent
encroachment in Nepal.
China’s dilemma with India originates from asymmetry between China and India in their
security priorities. India sees China as its primary threat, while China sees India as a
secondary challenge as its national security
priorities unequivocally lie in the western Pacific. Because India is not China’s primary threat
and South Asia is not China’s primary theater, China would prefer to save on costs and
minimize military and strategic resources on India.
The essence of strategy lies in China’s confidence that it has the financial resources, military
capacity and domestic political consensus to sustain and prevail in a protracted standoff (or
war) of attrition
vis-à-vis India. China’s 1962 war with India and the 1979 war with Vietnam both
demonstrates the central position and essence of “self-defense war” concept in China’s
playbook.
In a long-term and strategic perspective, China’s most desired option to settle the disputes
and relations with India is winning without fighting.
The logic of this option lies in the belief that the power gap between China and India will only
grow with China’s rise, and there will be a day that the power imbalance becomes so large
that India will recognize the
impracticality and impossibility of its desired endgame This diplomacy-based approach put a
Band-Aid on the most dividing and disturbing issue between two great powers in the region.
And its utility and effectiveness have come under more and more questioning as both sides
try to defend their military positions on the frontline.

GALWAN CLASH REASONS

China remains a significantly more powerful entity and its infrastructure is still in much
better shape. But Indian infrastructure development has reached a critical point, Chinese
opposition to the 255 km-long strategic Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie road has been so
vehement.
Connecting Leh to the
Karakoram Pass, this
all-weather road is
India’s frontal challenge
to China’s expansionist
designs in the region.
Despite Chinese
objections, India has
continued to pursue this
project given its
strategic importance.
China raising the
temperature on the
border is a preemptive
move to dissuade India from moving ahead.

China’s recent behaviour cannot be delinked from the global situation where Beijing has
come under pressure and is facing a global backlash for its aggression.
M Taylor Fravel - the Sino-Indian border constituted a “secondary strategic direction” for
China. Its principal interest lay in the direction of Taiwan and the western Pacific.
The domestic motivations of Beijing’s LAC aggression Covid-19 has generated a backlash
against the Chinese regime led by Xi. This has rendered his hold on power under stress,
Having secured an indefinite extension of his reign following the 19th Party Congress by
effectively shelving the term limits set by Deng Xiaoping, the denouement induced by the
pandemic has in all likelihood compelled him to keep select internal constituencies
sufficiently placated and mollified. Beijing’s outrage or pique over New Delhi assigning two
Members of Parliament (MPs) to attend Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s virtual
swearing-in ceremony any appearance of weakness in Xi at home in the face of what China
perceives to be a regional and global multi-directional assault on both its ambitions and rise
as a great power could imperil his domestic grip on authority.
In the ongoing round of tensions between New Delhi and Beijing, the latter has pretty much
followed the Pakistani playbook— level a baseless charge against India, that it is trying to
make territorial gains, in order to justify its own aggression. Finally, the source of this
Chinese aggression, can be attributed to nationalism. China is picking fights with multiple
actors simultaneously amid an ongoing health pandemic precisely because of what it sees as
a nationalist imperative.
How the Galwan tragedy has clarified India’s vision?
Tragedies often lead to a clarity of vision, a vision that was clouded by the misplaced sense
of our ability to manage China. New Delhi should also lose its innocence when it comes to
China. Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi has underlined that India wants peace but “will
give a befitting reply” if provoked the first Indian casualties on the disputed India-China
boundary since 1975 should be occasion to reconsider several long-held beliefs and methods
of dealing with the relationship that successive governments in New Delhi have adopted over
the years. Foreign policymaking in India cannot be an open, public or democratic exercise
and that ‘quiet diplomacy’ is the way to go in dealing with China. In its attempt to
unilaterally define the Line of Actual Control (LAC), Beijing has disregarded the central tenets
of all pacts it has signed with India since 1993 to keep the border peaceful.

EARLIER New Delhi was the first country to warn the world of the dangers of BRI at a time
when almost every other country was willing to buy into Beijing’s narrative. Today, India’s
framing of the BRI problems is widely accepted by most major global powers. India has also
managed to shape the global discourse on the Indo-Pacific and is now working closely with
likeminded regional players into giving it operational heft. Despite China’s continued
objections to the term, IndoPacific maritime geography is now widely accepted.
And so in its wisdom, China decided to wield the blunt instrumentality of force, hoping that
this would “teach India a lesson”. The reality is Chinese actions will produce exactly the
opposite effect of what they probably intended to do. Indian public opinion, which was
already negative about China, will now become even more strongly anti-Chinese.
The challenge in Sino-Indian ties is fundamentally structural. China is interested in shaping
an alternative global order commensurate to its growing economic and military power. And
India is a nation on China’s periphery whose rise it seeks to scuttle to secure its interests. In
New Delhi, there is now a more realistic appraisal of China. Indian foreign policy has evolved
in directions that demands reciprocity from Beijing.

China is both India’s most important neighbour, and its most significant foreign policy
challenge. India cannot ignore China, and it needs to be cognisant of the growing power
differential between the two.

The events of June 15 should set alarm bells ringing in New Delhi. India’s approach, since the
1962 War, of hedging and buck- passing can be ill afforded against Xi Jinping’s China and its
“wolf-warrior diplomacy”.
India must “punish” rather than “deny” Chinese adventurism—a significant revision of the
rules of engagement .

WHY China is foolish to make an enemy of India?

With a spiral of escalation building, a conflict so far limited to the Line of Actual Control with
China could see other theatres open up, including one in the Indian Ocean.
Unlike on the land border, where China has a relative advantage of terrain, military
infrastructure and troop strength, India is better placed at sea. In the Eastern Indian Ocean
through which most of China’s cargo and energy shipments pass, the Indian Navy is the
dominant force.
From India’s point of view, China has been nothing but trouble. It remains the main
international backer of the Pakistani military establishment, a perpetual threat to regional
stability.
Years of such behavior have worn down India’s cherished commitment to non-alignment —
or “strategic autonomy,” as we are supposed to call it in the post-Cold War era.
One would think the Chinese leadership, which has made such a fetish of their nation’s
supposed “century of humiliation,” China’s leaders may feel that that the U.S. has
mismanaged their nation’s emergence on the global
stage. But they have no one else to blame for their inept handling of India’s rise.

Strengths of India and its preparedness

Since the mid 2000s, for instance ,India has added to its Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) for
rapid counter offensive operations in Tibet (“Him Vijay” exercises are already being held by
them in Arunachal Pradesh—the Western sector of the LAC), improved its roads and
logistical infrastructure, augmented its firepower with the acquisition of the 145 M-777
ultra-light Howitzers from the US in 2016, deployed the Brahmos cruise missile system .
India can also exploit China’s frailties in the Indian Ocean Region and seek to interdict vital
Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), particularly those passing through the strait of Malacca.
To bolster its counter-offensive capacity, the Indian Navy has already taken on lease a
nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) from Russia— the INS Chakra and recruited the
aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya in 2012.
India must take a more vocal stand on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea to
ensure that China’s military resources are over-extended, and cannot be concentrated in its
Western theatre.
India’s commitment to the Quad and a deepening of its strategic partnership with the US,
should either be leveraged to exact concessions on the border, or used to rapidly upgrade
domestic military capacity.
Tsinghua University professor Xu Zhangrun laments the consequences of Beijing’s global
assertiveness: “Instead of embracing a [global] community,” he writes, “China is increasingly
isolating itself from it.
What is the new disengagement agreement in eastern Ladakh?
In the first major breakthrough in talks to resolve the nine-month military standoff along the
Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh, China’s Defence Ministry announced Wednesday that
Chinese and Indian troops on the southern and northern shores of Pangong Tso began
“synchronized and organized disengagement” in line with the consensus reached between
Corps Commanders when they last met on January 24.

What does this disengagement process entail?

According to the statement made by Rajnath Singh in Rajya Sabha, “both sides will remove
the forward deployment in a phased, coordinated and verified manner”.
“China will pull its troops on the north bank towards the east of Finger 8. Similarly, India will
also position its forces at its permanent base at the Dhan Singh Thapa post near Finger 3.
Similar action will be taken by both the parties in the south bank area as well.”
Both sides have also agreed that the area between Finger 3 and Finger 8 will become a no-
patrolling zone temporarily, till both sides reach an agreement through military and
diplomatic discussions to restore patrolling.
Further, all the construction done by both sides on the north and south banks of the lake
since April 2020 will be removed.

Why is this area important?

The north and south banks of Pangong Tso are two of the most significant and sensitive
regions when it comes to the current standoff that began in May 2020. What makes the
areas around the shores of the lake so sensitive and important is that clashes here marked
the beginning of the standoff; it is one of the areas where the Chinese troops had come
around 8 km deep west of India’s perception of the Line of Actual Control.

China had positioned its troops on the ridgeline connecting Fingers 3 and 4, while according
to India the LAC passes through Finger 8.
Why has this taken so long?
Since September, China has insisted that India first pull its troops back from the south bank
of Pangong Tso, and the Chushul sub- sector. However, India has been demanding that any
disengagement process should include the entire region, and troops should go back to their
April 2020 positions.
However, it seems that for now both sides have agreed to first disengage from the Pangong
Tso area only.
Singh mentioned on Thursday that in the military and diplomatic discussions with China since
last year, “we have told China that we want a solution to the issue on the basis of three
principles:
1. LAC should be accepted and respected by both the parties.
2. Neither party should attempt to change the status quo unilaterally.
3. All agreements should be fully adhered to by both parties.
Also, for disengagement in the friction areas, he said, “India is of the view that the forward
deployments of 2020 which are very close to each other should be pulled back and both the
armies should return to their permanent and recognised posts”
Does this mean that the standoff is resolved?
That’s a clear no. Even Singh said in his statement that “there are still some outstanding
issues that remain regarding deployment and patrolling on LAC” and mentioned that “our
attention will be on these in further discussions”.
What are the hurdles?
Two of the main stumbling blocks in finding a permanent resolution are lack of trust and no
clarity on intent.

Any permanent resolution will include first, disengagement of troops from the frontlines
from all friction points, then de-escalation that will entail sending the troops from the depth
areas to their original bases. Both sides have around 50,000 troops in the region, along with
additional tanks, artillery and air defence assets.
As the standoff progressed in the months of May, June and July, there was a mirrored
military build-up from both sides. A resolution has to include sending these troops and
military equipment where they came from on both sides.
But neither side had been willing to take the first step to reduce their troop or military
strength, as it does not trust the other side. Sources in the military establishment have
reiterated multiple times that what was China’s intent for diverting its troops last May from
their traditional exercise in the region to the LAC, which led to the standoff is not known.
Further, this is not the first disengagement attempt even for this standoff.
Analysis
India must be pleased. This outcome means that it was able to force Chinese troops out of
what New Delhi believes is its side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that divides the two
countries. India, in short, has repeated the military success it achieved during the Doklam
crisis in 2017, when the two faced off over China’s attempt to build a road and both sides
eventually withdrew their troops. The latest showdown originated in May 2020, when the
Chinese army prevented Indian soldiers from patrolling up to their claim lines and
established permanent structures on its own side. Both in terms of geography and numbers,
China’s intrusion was neither local nor limited.
If China had aimed to coerce India into accepting its territorial claims along the LAC, the
massacre at Galwan Valley emboldened New Delhi’s resolve to fight back. What followed
was a concerted effort to use all of the economic, diplomatic, and military power at India’s
disposal to push China to return to the status quo—what it called a “strategy of hurt.” This
strategy communicated a simple dictum to Beijing: China should remove its soldiers and its
bases, or India would inflict economic, diplomatic, and military costs.
India’s opening gambit was economic sanctions against Chinese firms operating in the
country. India may be dependent on trade with China for the import of raw materials and
finished goods, but China also has large stakes in Indian markets—especially when it comes
to technology. So it made sense that, as the border crisis with China escalated, India moved
to ban Chinese apps and disallowed Chinese state-owned companies from investing in
infrastructure projects. The threat of economic decoupling, including a prospective ban on
Huawei from India’s 5G infrastructure, followed.

Diplomatically, too, India embraced the West more firmly, signing an agreement that
furthers military cooperation between the United States and India and inviting Australia to
participate in joint naval exercises. It also sent an Indian destroyer to the South China Sea to
signal its decision to side with the West on disputes there.
Militarily, India built up a local preponderance of forces and materiel to deter any further
Chinese activities. The effort marked the biggest mobilization of the Indian Armed Forces in
recent decades.
Military deterrence and economic and diplomatic maneuvering could not have altered
China’s cost-benefit calculus on their own. After all, even with its show of strength, India’s
military is still leagues behind China’s in terms of size and equipment, and China’s vastly
larger economy could absorb any economic costs from India’s disengagement

So why did Beijing ultimately agree to a reinstatement of the status quo?

To alter Beijing’s cost-benefit matrix, India needed not military deterrence but to change the
tactical military reality on the border. Its increased military presence provided options for
employing limited but innovative force to buy leverage at the negotiating table. In the
mountains, that meant occupying the higher ground. For example, in a late August
preemptive move, the Indian Army captured the dominant features of the Kailash mountain
range overseeing China’s positions in both the north and the south bank of the Pangong Tso
lake.
Indian forces also captured the dominant heights on the north bank of the lake. This tactical
maneuver surprised the Chinese troops that remained ensconced on the lower ridges. India’s
military actions had increased the costs for China to hold on to the territory it had grabbed.
That gave India the tactical advantage so long as the conflict remained limited to the LAC.
The limited disengagement in the Pangong Tso lake region should not, however, distract
from the systemic obstacles in Sino-Indian relations. China’s growing power and its
constant use of the border dispute to coerce India will remain New Delhi’s primary strategic
challenge. India is now facing a hostile great power that not only eyes its territory but also
detests its rise in the global order.

The first concerns India’s military reorientation toward its northern borders. After almost
half a century of a Pakistan-centric military posture, the Indian military—on land, air, and
sea—will now be oriented toward China. Major reconfiguration in force positioning of the
Indian Army, Air Force, and Navy is already underway.
Second, the process of India’s economic decoupling with China—which started with New
Delhi’s decision to stay out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a free
trade agreement that includes China—will continue apace. India may relent on a few
matters, but the larger trajectory of Sino-Indian economic relations is now set. Members of
the Quad—Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—are increasingly realizing that
Chinese power depends on the country’s economic interdependence with the liberal
economies. Constraining China militarily will necessitate its economic isolation. India and the
other Quad countries will feel the hurt in the near to midterm, but in the long term,
marginalizing China will hurt Beijing more.

Finally, New Delhi will not stray from its increasing alignment with the West. If earlier India
was band wagoning with the United States for material and status gain, today its
requirement now is more existential: It needs the United States and the Quad members to
provide the country with technology, money, and arms to internally balance China.
Disengagement from Pangong Tso is just the beginning of the Sino-Indian military de-
escalation. However, it will not resolve the fundamental problems of their bilateral relations.
China’s military rise and its penchant for territorial aggrandizement will continue to push
Sino-Indian relations through cycles of violence.
ISSUES IN INDIA CHINA RELATIONS
Border Issues:

 Dispute is in three sectors:

 Eastern sector - 91,000 square miles – Dispute on McMohan line .
 Middle Sector- Least disputed
 Western Sector – 38,000 square miles under Chinese occupation Johnson line and
McDonald line.
India China Boundary Dispute

The border between India and China is not clearly demarcated.

The boundary dispute is divided into three sectors, viz. Western, Middle and Eastern.

 The boundary dispute in the Western Sector (Ladakh) pertains to the Johnson Line
proposed by the British in the 1860s that extended up to the Kunlun Mountains and
put Aksai Chin in the then princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.
 India used the Johnson Line and claimed Aksai Chin as its own. China, however, do
not recognise it and instead accepts McDonald Line which puts Aksai Chin under its
control.
 In the Middle Sector (Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand), the dispute is a minor
one.
 Here border is the least controversial except for the precise alignment to be followed
in the Barahoti plains. India and China have exchanged maps on which they broadly
agree.
  The disputed boundary in the Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim) is over
the McMahon Line (in Arunachal Pradesh) decided in 1914 in a meeting of
Representatives of China, India, and Tibet in Shimla.
 Though the Chinese representatives at the meeting initiated the agreement, they
subsequently refused to accept it .The Tawang tract claimed by China was taken over
by India in 1951.
Understanding Sino-Indian border issues
The border between India and China is not clearly demarcated throughout. India, following
Independence, believed it had inherited firm boundaries from the British, but this was
contrary to China’s view. China felt the British had left behind a disputed legacy on the
boundary between the two newly formed republics.
Nearly six decades have passed since then, but the border issue remains unresolved. It has
turned into one of the most protracted border disputes in the world. Since 1981, when the
first round of border talks was held, officials from India and China have met a number of
times to find a solution to the issue. The two countries are also engaged in Confidence
Building Measures (CBMs) on the border with bilateral agreements signed in 1993,
1996,2003, 2005, 2012 and 2013. By the beginning of the 21st century, the two sides had
agreed not to let the border dispute affect bilateral engagements. During Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003, the two sides agreed on the appointment of
special representatives for consultations aimed at arriving at a framework for a boundary
settlement that would provide the basis for the delineation and demarcation of the border.
This has resulted into Political parameters and guiding principles for resolution of dispute.

Despite two decades of CBMs and the thaw in bilateral relations, incidents on the border,
known as “incursions”, “intrusions” or “violations” continue to be reported in the Indian
media .
The Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) signed by the two countries in 2013
was aimed at preventing incidents involving tailing of patrols, and generally streamlining
channels of communication in case of a faceoff. A five-layer mechanism for communication
between the two sides was agreed upon: first, flag meetings between border personnel on
the LAC; second, meetings between senior officers of China’s Military Regions and India’s
Army Commands; third, periodic meetings at the ministry level; fourth, meetings of the
Working Mechanism (set up in 2013); and fifth, the apex India-China Annual Defence
Dialogue.
Conclusion

Given China’s push for the Belt and Road Initiative, and given that its China Pakistan
Economic Corridor project has already affected India’s sovereignty claims in certain parts of
Kashmir, it is incumbent upon India to bring the settlement of the India- China border issue
to the forefront of its relationship with China.

 High Trade Deficit

India's trade deficit with China is $45.91 billion.
Indian economy is deeply intertwined with Chinese exports

China’s share in Indian imports for intermediate goods, capital goods, and final consumer
goods is 12%, 30%, and 26% respectively. India depends on China in many key industries
from electrical machinery and appliances to pharmaceutical drug API. In recent years, there
have been certain mobile companies shifting their assembly lines to India, which is a step in
the right direction but still, all the key high-end manufacturing components like the display,
chipset, and memory are being imported from China.
Cost is a vital reason why Chinese products dominate markets across sectors. Products such
as fertilisers are 76% cheaper, electronic circuits 23%, and data processing units around 10%
cheaper if made in China. It will be hard to substitute or compete with those prices. Since the
pandemic, there are calls to diversify the supply chain. The Indo-American Chamber of
Commerce said that around 1,000 firms were planning to leave China but only 300 of them
were serious about investing in India.

The current trade scenario suggests that the nationalistic notions of bringing China to its
knees by boycotting Chinese goods has been a flop. The simple example that even a good as
small as LEDs are still cheaper than Indian alternatives by almost 50% despite a 40% hike in
prices of the Chinese goods is indicative of that. This indicates that India needs to undertake
a series of reforms like land and labour reforms to foster growth and investment. India also
needs to scale up domestic production in key sectors including electrical machinery and
pharmaceuticals to replace those imports. Without any of these key reforms, the Prime
Minister’s call for ‘Aatma Nirbhar Bharat’ will remain a mere slogan as it currently appears
to be now and that is why we see a booming trade relationship between India and China
after the Galwan Valley incident and will continue to see a significant dependence on China
for the foreseeable future.
India-China economic ties: Impact of Galwan

In recent years, the India-China bilateral relationship has been characterised by historical
animosities and border disputes. Nevertheless, the economic ties have grown since the early
2000s and have been at the forefront of this relationship. Trade and investment have
provided a cushion to this otherwise tricky relationship.

The bilateral trade that stood at US$ 3 billion in the year 2000 grew to US$ 92.68 billion in
2019. China was India’s second-largest trading partner in 2019 and emerged as the largest
trading partner in the first half of FY 20-21. The bilateral trade declined by only 15%
compared to a 32.46% decline in overall trade in 2020-21. China accounted for 5% of India’s
exports and 14 % of India’s imports in 2019. This had led to a very high trade deficit of US$
56.77 billion in 2019. Attempts have been made to reduce the India-China trade deficit
through bilateral talks. The issue, for instance, was raised at the bilateral informal summit in
Mahabalipuram, and both sides agreed to set up a new high level economic and trade
dialogue mechanism to address this issue.
China forms an integral part of the global supply chain, and India too is heavily dependent
on Chinese imports, ranging from a variety of raw materials to critical components.
According to data from 2019, a staggering 70% of electronic components, 45% of consumer
durables, 70% of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs), and 40% of leather goods come
from China. According to a response to a query in Rajya Sabha, India has the world’s third-
largest pharmaceutical industry for which 2/3rds of its key ingredients come from China.
Meanwhile, the Galwan Valley incident in mid-June led to calls for boycotting of Chinese
goods. According to a survey conducted by Local Circles, 87% of Indian consumers were
willing to boycott Chinese goods. One of the prime campaigns was to boycott Chinese goods
for Diwali and it was seen that even in the Prime Minister’s home state of Gujarat in
Ahmedabad, 80% of the decorative lights and LEDs sold in shops were still ‘Made in China.’

Effect of the Galwan Valley incident

There has also been an effort to reduce India’s dependence on Chinese goods.

The Indian Railways, for instance, cancelled an INR 471 Crore deal with a Chinese firm.
Similarly, state-owned telecom firm BSNL was instructed not to use gear from Chinese firm
Huawei for a network upgrade.
The government has mandated all products to have the Country of Origin tag for products on
the Government e-Marketplace in an effort to identify Chinese-origin goods. In early July
2020, the Ministry of Power restricted power supply systems and networks import from
China citing cyber and security threats, which constitute about 30% of the total imports from
China. In the last 10 years, 12,540 MW out of 22,420 MW of the supercritical power plants
were built using Chinese equipment. India also extended safeguard taxes on imports of solar
cells and modules as well as imposed anti-dumping duty on several goods.
In July, India placed colour television sets imports under the restricted category, thus
requiring a licence to import; and air conditioners under the prohibited category.

Water issues
 China plans to build a major dam on Brahmaputra,a run-of-the-
river dams on Yarlung Zangbo.
The Tibetan plateau is often called the “Third Pole”, owing to its
glacial expanses and vast reserves of freshwater. It is a source of
seven of the South Asia’s largest rivers- the Indus, Ganges,
Brahmaputra, Irrawaddy, Salween, Yangtze and Mekong.
Current status of India-China water relationship
Trans-border rivers flowing from China to India fall into two main
groups

• The Brahmaputra River System on the Eastern side consisting river Siang
(mainstream of river Brahmaputra) and its tributaries i.e., Subansiri and Lohit

• The Indus River System on the Western side consists of river Indus and the river Sutlej.
There is no institutionalized mechanism on water
cooperation between India and China, both countries
have signed only .
MoU for Hydrological Information of the River
Brahmaputra in 2002.
2010 MoU on Hydrological Data Sharing on River Sutlej /
Langqen Zangbo (renewed in 2015)
ELM (Expert Level Mechanism) to cooperate in emergency management (e.g., flood), trans-
border Rivers issues etc. in 2006.
Besides these continuous diplomatic engagement plays a key role in sustained
communication for data sharing and other developments in the river systems.
Concerns that India has regarding the recent developments on Brahmaputra?
Volume and quality of water: Experts have highlighted that even Run-of-the-river projects
will significantly reduce the availability of water in the North-Eastern region.
Creation of hydroelectric projects would alter the flow of water and potentially increase the
siltation levels, thus affecting the quality of water in the lower riparian states.
Absence of transparency in developments: Chinese infrastructural developments in the
Tibetan region have not been transparent. E.g.- Road developments near the India-Tibet
border etc.
Lack of trust on China: China’s past record of strong-arming Southeast Asian countries in
Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) framework
Potential use as political leverage in border disputes: For example, China stopped sharing
of hydrological data on Brahmaputra during the Doklam standoff. (But it was sharing the
same with Bangladesh.)

National Security implication: Availability of water can directly affects the existence of a
large section of people.Poor water availability in the Eastern region can trigger a fresh influx
of refugees from Bangladesh
Environmental Impact: Increased pollution (Siang- Brahmaputra’s main artery recently
turned blackish grey as it entered India), potential impact on climate change, threat to
biodiversity in the region and altering the monsoonal patterns of the region.
Increased disaster vulnerability: Artificially controlling and consequent sudden releases of
the flow of water increases the probability of floods especially in lower riparian . Also, China
plans to build this infrastructure by using small nuclear explosions, this will not only impact
the seismic balance of the region but also will have a radioactive fallout (affecting
agriculture and water quality).
Course of action for India?
Experts have suggested to go beyond monitoring to secure its interests. Following steps can
be taken by India
Strengthening its hydrological capacity: Increase the monitoring capacity. + satellite-based
monitoring for activity and infrastructural developments
Building international consensus against Chinese activities: Persuade other lower riparian
states like Bangladesh, ASEAN countries
Efforts can also be made to draw out a consensus of a collective of democracies in pursuance
of International law of ‘Prior Appropriation’. In accordance with the law, India being the first
user has rights to use same quantity of water for hydropower projects on Brahmaputra
against China.
Drawing clear red lines and communicate the same to China.
Geographically, India and China share a water system and that fact will not change in the
foreseeable future. As a result, pressure and counter pressure tactics can only be a solution
in the short-term. In the long-term, strained water relations between countries will hinder
the development on both sides. In the light of this, India could make an effort to further
strengthen cooperation through diplomatic channels available like the Expert Level
Mechanism and using other diplomatic means like the Himalayan Charter and Himalayan
Council for the future of the Himalayas among others.
Why India is opposed to joining Belt and Road Initiative?
China’s Belt and Road Forum, hosted with great
fanfare, signals the priority of this flagship connectivity
initiative while also underlining its credentials as the
new “shaper” of global trends and norms. Exhorting all
countries to participate, Chinese President Xi Jinping
suggested that “what we hope to create is a big family
of harmonious co-existence.”

The policy initiative aims to enhance China’s centrality in the global economic unilateral
approach in how the project is conceived and implemented so far belies the rhetoric of
multilateralism emanating from Beijing.
Taking inspiration from the ancient Silk Road trading route, China’s One Belt One Road
initiative, or OBOR, hopes to link more than 65 countries, encompassing up to 40 percent of
global GDP. Xi’s signature foreign paradigm – linking China to Asia, Europe and Africa via an
ambitious network of ports, roads, rail and other infrastructure projects. Beginning in China’s
Fujian province, the projected Maritime Silk Route passes through the Malacca Strait to the
Indian Ocean, moving along the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, ending in Venice.
The scale and scope of OBOR is huge, with at least $1 trillion in investments. China,
desperate to deflect criticism that OBOR is primarily an instrument for Chinese expansionism,
managed to convince heads of 29 states and governments to participate in the summit.
The West views this as a Chinese bilateral project being touted a multilateral venture. The
outgoing president of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China complains that the OBOR has
“been hijacked by Chinese companies, which have used it as an excuse to evade capital
controls, smuggling money out of the country by disguising it as international investments
and partnerships.”
The rest of the world is more receptive. Lavishing praise on China for the OBOR initiative
while targeting the US, Putin warned at the summit that “protectionism is becoming the new
normal,” adding that the “ideas of openness and free trade are increasingly often being
rejected (even) by those who until very recently expounded them.”
India refused to participate, maintaining opposition to China’s investment in the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor, or CPEC, which passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
India, boycotting the event, announced in an official statement: “No country can accept a
project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Indian Foreign
Secretary S Jaishankar articulated this position at the 2017 Raisina Dialogue: “China is very
sensitive about its sovereignty. The economic corridor passes through an illegal territory, an
area that we call Pak-occupied Kashmir. You can imagine India’s reaction at the fact that
such a project has been initiated without consulting us.” Prime Minister Narendra Modi
reinforced this point, asserting that “connectivity in itself cannot override or undermine the
sovereignty of other nations.”
The advantages for India of joining China’s multibillion dollar OBOR initiative are apparent,
and the economic logic is compelling. With bilateral trade of $70.08 billion in 2016, China
remains India’s largest trading partner. Last year also saw record Chinese investments into
India reaching close to $1 billion. Compared to this, China’s economic ties with Pakistan
remain underwhelming with bilateral trade volume reaching $13.77 last year.
Yet against the backdrop of deteriorating Sino-Indian ties, India cannot feasibly join the
OBOR project without challenging the very foundations of its foreign policy. The $55 billion
CPEC would link China’s Muslim-dominated Xinjiang Province to the Gwadar deep-sea port in
Pakistan. Despite the rhetoric, Beijing’s priority in pumping huge sums into a highly volatile
Pakistani territory is not to provide economic relief for Pakistan’s struggling economy or to
promote regional economic cooperation.
The long-term strategic consequences of OBOR for India could also allow China to
consolidate its presence in the Indian Ocean at India’s expense. Indian critics contend that
China may use its economic power to increase its geopolitical leverage and, in doing so,
intensify security concerns for India. CPEC gives China a foothold in the western Indian Ocean
with the Gwadar port, located near the strategic Strait of Hormuz, where Chinese warships
and a submarine have surfaced. Access here allows China greater potential to control
maritime trade in that part of the world – a vulnerable point for India, which sources more
than 60 percent of its oil supplies from the Middle East. What’s more, if CPEC does resolve
China’s “Malacca dilemma” – its over-reliance on the Malacca Straits for the transport of its
energy resources – this gives Asia’s largest economy greater operational space to pursue
unilateral interests in maritime matters to the detriment of freedom of navigation and trade-
energy security of several states in the Indian Ocean region, including India.
More generally, the Maritime Silk Road reinforces New Delhi’s concerns about encirclement.
Beijing’s port development projects in the Indian Ocean open the possibility of dual-use
facilities, complicating India’s security calculus. The Belt and Road Initiative is a highly
ambitious undertaking in line with China’s aspirations to emerge as the central economic
power at a time when the United States makes plans to step back from global affairs.
Why India is opposed to CPEC Project ?
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is
China’s ambitious project for
increasing connectivity and economic
cooperation within Eurasia. Since its
announcement in 2013, the BRI has
been positively received by many
countries covered within its ambit.
New Delhi sent a clear message to
Beijing that it doesn’t support CPEC.
India registered its protest by
boycotting the high-profile Belt and
Road Forum organised by China. Its
principal objection was that CPEC
passed through Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir (PoK).
The Ministry’s statement read: “Our
position on OBOR/BRI is clear and
there is no change. The so-called ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ violates India’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity. No country can accept a project that ignores its core
concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
India’s position will undoubtedly have a larger impact on China-India relations. PoK is
considered a contested territory by the international community. Nevertheless, for India, PoK
remains an emotional and sensitive issue. It is little wonder that China’s insistence on
establishing the CPEC project through PoK is seen by India as a deliberate disregard of its
territorial claims.
At a broader level, if China invests heavily in the region, it risks becoming party to what has
been a troubling bilateral dispute between nuclear-armed rivals. If CPEC gets operationalised
and fortifies the emergence of a fully functional China-Pakistan axis, this would hamper
India’s larger interests in the South Asian region and force astrategic rethink in South Block.
The incentives for this would be even stronger if CPEC’s potential success renders PoK more
industrially developed, thus granting Pakistan greater legitimacy over the region Whether
India has any road map to take the conversation on PoK forward is a different debate but no
nation can be expected to wilfully forsake its territorial claims. Had India not registered its
protest, that would have been perceived as a weakness, and would have been a setback for
India’s emerging power status in the international system.

China's reaction to India's concerns

India’s concerns over sovereignty relating to the USD 46-billion China Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) is “unwarranted,”asking New Delhi to take an “objective and more
pragmatic” view of China’s ambitious Silk Road project.
India’s concerns were “unwarranted.” “China respects India’s sovereignty concerns. Taking a
strong stand on territorial issues is important, but it’s hoped India could adopt an objective
and more pragmatic attitude towards the One Belt, One Road proposal.”
New Delhi fears that the CPEC, passing through the Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, would
serve the purpose of granting legitimacy to Pakistan’s control over the region, and by
promoting the construction of the corridor, China intends to meddle in the Kashmir dispute.
These concerns are unwarranted.”
“China has no intention of interfering in the territorial dispute between India and Pakistan.
China has long believed that the two neighbours should solve their dispute through dialogue
and consultations, and it has repeatedly emphasised that the construction of the CPEC would
not affect its stance on the issue,”. India’s official position : minister of external afaairs in
rajya sabha

“Government’s concerns arise in part from the fact that the inclusion of the so-called illegal
‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ (CPEC) as a flagship project of ‘OBOR/BRI’, directly
impinges on the issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity of India. This so-called illegal
‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ (CPEC) passes through parts of the Union Territories of
Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh which are under illegal occupation of Pakistan. Government
has conveyed its concerns to the Chinese side about their activities in areas illegally occupied
by Pakistan in the Union Territories of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh and has asked them to
cease such activities.
Further, the Government is of the firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on
universally recognized international norms. They must follow principles of openness,
transparency and financial responsibility and must be pursued in a manner that respects
sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of other nations.

S Jaishankar at 2017 Raisina Dialogue : “The economic corridor passes through an illegal
territory, an area that we call Pak-occupied Kashmir. You can imagine India’s reaction at the
fact that such a project has been initiated without consulting us.”

Prime Minister Narendra Modi too asserted that “connectivity in itself cannot override or
undermine the sovereignty of other nations”.

China & Kashmir

Article 370 abrogation
On 5 August 2019, the Government of India (GoI) announced the abrogation of Article 370 of
the Constitution and the bifurcation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) into two union
territories. This triggered an unprecedented international response.
Soon after the announcement, India embarked on a massive diplomatic outreach to assuage
the concerns of the global community.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
While India struggled with Pakistan over Kashmir, it was also engaged in a dispute with
Beijing over Aksai Chin—an isolated, inhospitable plain, west of the Karakoram range. In the
1950s, China began the construction of a road in this region, to connect Xinjiang with Tibet,
both of which it had recently annexed then. The road ran through Aksai Chin, with China
taking effective control over the area. After the 1962 Sino-India war, China retained control
of a large part of the territory, despite India’s rightful claim over it being a part of Ladakh.
During this time, China and Pakistan’s friendship deepened, and Pakistan gifted a part of
Kashmir called “Shaksgam Valley” to China in 1963. An article of the Sino-Pakistan Border
Agreement, which ceded the land, states, “[T]he two Parties have agreed that after the
settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority
concerned will re-open negotiations with the Government of China … so as to sign a
Boundary Treaty to replace the present agreement.”[8] This effectively made China’s claim
over the Shaksgam Valley contingent on the settlement of the Kashmir issue between India
and Pakistan.
While it was favourably received by both India and Pakistan, the agreement was ignored in
most other countries.
China' response
China’s response to the changes in Kashmir focused on its concern over Ladakh becoming a
Union Territory. It called the move “unacceptable,” claiming that it would directly “impede
China’s sovereignty. China’s statements suggest that its opposition to the removal of Article
370 is driven by a fear that it would further complicate its boundary issue with India, in light
of the 740-km LoC in J&K.
However, China soon revised its statement, stating that the Kashmir issue should be resolved
bilaterally in a peaceful manner and that both sides must avoid any action that could
escalate tensions in the region. During a China–Pakistan meeting in Beijing, the Chinese
foreign minister said the solution should be in accordance with the UN Charter and relevant
UNSC resolutions. On Pakistan’s insistence, China called for a private meeting to discuss
Kashmir at the UNSC.

Over the last few decades, China’s policy on J&K has vacillated, with Beijing choosing to call
it a solely India–Pakistan issue whenever it suited its interests. ern borders.
Over the years, China has come to refer to J&K as a “disputed territory” or as “India-
controlled Kashmir,” lending further legitimacy to Pakistan’s cause. In 2010, China started
issuing stapled visas to the residents of J&K, manifesting its desire to cement its pro-Pakistan
stance.
Beijing’s interests in Jammu and Kashmir are both strategic and economic. The crown head
of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) runs
through parts of POK. The sovereignty of this part is disputed, as India has repeatedly
claimed the territory as its own. Recent statements from top ministers of the GoI have made
it clear that the government will make efforts take control of POK, which directly impinges
upon China’s interests in the region. The latter’s US$19- billion investment in CPEC is directly
linked to the Indo-Pak territorial dispute over J&K, which will be affected by the balance of
power shifting towards India.
China’s desire to undermine India’s legitimate claim over J&K is fuelled by its hegemonic
ambitions in the subcontinent. In 2010, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh warned that
“Beijing could be tempted to use India’s ‘soft underbelly’, J&K, and Pakistan ‘to keep India in
low-level equilibrium’. Thus, China’s economic and military support for Pakistan is designed
in a manner that does not necessarily strengthen Islamabad but hopes to offset the growing
power differential it has with New Delhi. The CPEC allows Beijing quicker access to the
Arabian Sea, and a network of transportation infrastructure allows for the encirclement of
India.

For now, China seems to have taken a restrained position on the J&K matter. This is partly
because the August 2019 decision does not change the status quo along the Line of Actual
Control (LAC).
Alliances will form a key area in the US strategic competition with China. The Biden team will
have to work hard to convince them that the US is willing to play a leadership role once
again, whether it is in Europe in relation to Russia or in the western Pacific with China. The
Trump administration’s handling of alliances has left a trail of suspicion that the US is
unwilling or unable to play a significant role outside its own immediate region. Its shambolic
handling of the Covid pandemic has only deepened this worry.
The administration has been particularly careful to identify the Indo-Pacific as a priority
region. The Indo-Pacific team under Kurt Campbell is the largest regional team in the
National Security Council which has a generous quota of Indian Americans at the leadership
levels.
Biden himself underscored the importance he attaches to Quad in his telephone conversation
with PM Modi last week. The American readout noted that the two leaders agreed to
‘continuing close cooperation to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific’ as well as for a
‘stronger regional architecture through the Quad.’
Revival of the Middle Kingdom-A post-pandemic world order
Since World War II, however, it has incorporated
several strains of ideological and enduring
civilisational beliefs.
Take the case of China, for example, which is
attempting to upstage, or at least match, the U.S.
as the principal global hegemon. Realising that
mere ideology was not enough to propel it to that
position, Mao Zedong’s successors have drawn on two civilisational markers from Chinese
history that have troubled the Chinese people for centuries: the ‘Middle Kingdom’ syndrome
and ‘the Century of Humiliation’. While the first marker builds on the glory of the Ming
Dynasty (late 14th century to mid-17th century) and the centrality of the Han people in a
world order that saw China as the most prosperous nation in the world, it also reminds the
Chinese people of the dangers that lurk around its periphery. Chinese leaders often draw
attention to the Mongol rule (late 13th century to mid-14th century) and over two centuries
of misrule by the Manchus and the Qing Dynasty (mid-17th century to early 20th century) as
examples of this.
The second marker draws on the stripping of China of its honour and resources by multiple
colonial powers during the ‘Century of Humiliation’ from the mid-19th century to the time of
the emergence of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. These markers from Chinese history
have gradually become dogma and seen as a blot on Chinese history that need resolution.
Realising in the 1980s that Maoist ideology no longer
appealed to the Chinese people, Deng reintroduced
Confucianism as a much-needed intellectual and ethical prop
to China’s push for ‘great power’ status. Sun Tzu re-emerged
as China’s answer to Clausewitz and for a few decades it
appeared that these would soften traditional Chinese
dogma. It also raised hopes that China would largely play by
the existing rules and bide its time.
Xi Jinping, however, has been a leader in a hurry. In the process, he has perpetuated the
deepened hurt of the Chinese people to an extent that it has become embedded dogma. He
has abandoned Confucianism and the ethical pursuit of power, and fallen back on hard-core
communist ideology. Hard power and muscular nationalism coupled with a neo-colonial and
mercantilist attitude towards vulnerable nations seems to be the new strategy to compete
with the U.S. While this strategy seemed to be working at a time when the U.S. appeared to
be looking inwards and showing signs of strategic fatigue, President Xi’s ambitious Belt and
Road Initiative demonstrated an overreach that had the potential to backfire as it created a
sense of fear of, rather than respect for China.
Demonstration of flexibility
India is neither afflicted by unreasonable expectations of power, ideological dogma, or
haunted by accentuated perceptions of historical hurt. Despite its own centuries of conquest
and exploitation by invaders and colonial powers, it has demonstrated resilience, learnt to
let go and embraced the good that emerged from the centuries of darkness.
South China Sea – should India worry?
Importance of South China Sea
The SCS is an important junction for navigation between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It
connects with the Indian Ocean through the Malacca Strait to the southwest, and commands
access to the East China Sea to the northeast. The sea lane running between the Paracel and
Spratly Islands is used by oil tankers moving from the Persian Gulf to Japan as well as by
warships en route from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. Security in the SCS is a concern both
for regional countries such as China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, as well as the extra-
regional countries, including India, due to their strategic and economic interests in this
region. Any conflict in the SCS will pose a threat to regional and international security.

Territorial sovereignty, contention on energy, significance of the geographic location, threat

to maritime security and overlapping maritime claims are at the core of the SCS dispute The
SCS, an integrated ecosystem, is one of the richest seas in the world in terms of marine flora
and fauna, coral reefs, mangroves, seagrass beds, fish and plants. The sea accounts for
approximately 10 per cent of the annual global fisheries catchment, making it extremely
viable for the fishing industries of nearby countries.
Furthermore, value-added production (canning, filleting, fresh, frozen and chilled processing)
has translated into valuable foreign exchange earnings and job opportunities for countries in
the region. However, China has been imposing fishing rules to operate in the disputed
waters, resulting in serious maritime security concerns and objections from other claimant
states. Recently, China’s new fishing rules which came into effect on January 1, 2014 raised
questions about its efforts to exercise jurisdiction over all fishing activities in the disputed
waters.

Furthermore, the region richly laden in both oil and natural gas has led to speculation that
the disputed territories could hold potentially significant energy resources. According to the
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates, the SCS contains 11 billion barrels of
oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proved and probable reserves.

Most notably, the SCS occupies a significant geostrategic position in terms of international
shipping as a majority of energy shipments and raw materials have to pass through it.

Undoubtedly, the SCS is a critical corridor between the Pacific and Indian Ocean for
commercial and naval shipping China’s ordered an administrative reorganisation of its
South China Sea territories, injecting new discord in an already tense region. Beijing
instituted two new municipal districts, carving up the governance of the Paracel and Spratly
island groups, earlier managed by the local administration of Sansha — China’s
southernmost city of Hainan province – between two sub-authorities. Xisha and Nansha
(Chinese names for the Paracel and Spratly Islands) will now function as separate
administrative units with jurisdiction over their respective island chains.
China’s neighbours may well have anticipated the gambit. Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia
have in recent months sought to offer pushback to Chinese aggression in their near-seas,
employing administrative, legal and operational means. In December last year, Malaysia
approached the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf claiming waters
beyond the 200-kilometre limit of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the northern part of
the South China Sea – a move prompted by China’s extended presence in and around the
Luconia Shoals. Weeks later, Indonesia deployed warships and a submarine in the waters off
the Natuna Islands after an encroachment by Chinese fishing boats and coastguard ships.
Earlier this month, Vietnam sent a diplomatic note to the United Nations protesting the
PRC’s sweeping assertions in the South China Sea, after a Chinese ship rammed and sunk a
Vietnamese fishing boat.
An irked China has doubled down on its territorial claims, sending in more militia and coast
guard vessels into disputed regions. The Chinese vessel and its coast guard escorts have been
accused of harassing an exploration vessel operated by

Malaysia’s state oil company. The United States has rushed to respond, ordering the USS
America – an amphibious assault ship – and guided missile warships USS Bunker Hill and USS
Barry in the region.

Three aspects of the drama unfolding in the South China Sea are relevant for India.
First, Chinese militia operations
have focused on the region’s
Western end close to the Indian
Ocean Region, targeting
countries that India has a close
political and military
relationship with.
Second, the developments in
the South China Sea coincide
with a rise in Chinese activity in
the Eastern Indian Ocean,
particularly Chinese research
and survey vessel presence to
add to India’s discomfort,
China’s mining operations in
the Southern Indian Ocean
have expanded considerably, as also the presence of Chinese fishing boats areas close to
India’s territorial waters.
A third factor for Indian analysts to consider has been the growing instances of Chinese
intelligence ship sightings in the IOR. Chinese Dongdiao class intelligence-gathering ships –
known earlier to stalk US, Australian and Japanese warships in the Western Pacific – now
operate in the waters of the Eastern Indian Ocean, keeping an eye on the Indian naval
movements. One such Chinese spy ship was spotted close to the eastern sea border near the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands late last year causing some disquiet in India’s security
establishment. Regional observers are troubled by Beijing’s attempts to take advantage of a
fluid geopolitical situation following COVID-19. With many Southeast Asia leaders sick or in
self-imposed quarantine and Washington distracted by the pandemic at home, Chinese
militias have upped the tempo of operations in critical regional hotspots.
How the South China Sea situation plays out will be critical for India 's security and well-
being?
In the first place, the South China Sea is not China’s sea but a global common.

Second, it has been an important sea-lane of communication since the very beginning, and
passage has been unimpeded over the centuries.

Third, Indians have sailed these waters for well over 1,500 years — there is ample historical
and archaeological proof of a continuous Indian trading presence from Kedah in Malaysia to
Quanzhou in China.

Fourth, nearly $200 billion of our trade passes through the South China Sea and thousands of
our citizens study, work and invest in ASEAN, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

Fifth, we have stakes in the peace and security of this region in common with others who
reside there, and freedom of navigation, as well as other normal activities with friendly
countries, are essential for our economic well being.

In short, the South China Sea is our business. We have historical rights established by
practice and tradition to traverse the South China Sea without impediment.

In return, we too have to be responsive to ASEAN’s expectations. While strategic

partnerships and high-level engagements are important, ASEAN expects longer-lasting buy-
ins by India in their future. They have taken the initiative time and again to involve India in
Indo-Pacific affairs.
India’s position on the South China Sea disputes has so far been neutral. A tendency to
view the region through a prism of geopolitics and “balance of power” makes Indian
decision makers wary of taking a stand on China’s aggressive posturing. Yet the costs of
saying and doing nothing are rising. To many in New Delhi, it is clear that China’s firming
grip over disputed territories in the South China Sea portends greater power projection in
the Eastern Indian Ocean.
Even so, New Delhi has not abandoned its policy of non intervention in the security affairs of
Southeast Asia. India’s policy elite believe that their country is not party to the maritime
territorial disputes in the region and must refrain from meddling in a matter that does not
directly concern it. Indian decision-makers also know that Beijing operates from a position of
strength in the South China Sea, where it has physical control over critical islands. Possession
of these features gives Beijing the ability to exert strategic authority over the disputed
territory, regardless of the rights and interests of other regional states.

It continues to hope that Beijing will respect India’s sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean in
the same way that New Delhi respects China’s in Southeast Asia. Even if Beijing has not
acted in good faith recently, the Indian government is unwilling to violate their goodwill
pact.

New Delhi is not impervious either to the threat China poses to trade flows in the region or to
its significant challenges to Indian energy and strategic interests. Access to the major
waterways in Southeast Asia is an important consideration for Indian policymakers, as is the
need to build capacity in member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). Both are central to New Delhi’s Indo-Pacific vision. Yet, when it comes to security
issues in the South China Sea, India is wary of provoking China. Notwithstanding the security
establishment’s deep misgivings about Chinese expansionism in littoral Asia—including in
the eastern Indian Ocean—Indian diplomats and spokespeople almost never make public
their reservations about China’s maritime assertiveness.
By contrast, India is relatively open about its disagreements with the United States in the
interpretation of maritime law and the freedoms enjoyed by foreign warships in a coastal
state’s EEZ. Indian officials do not concur with U.S. claims that warships have a right to
uninterrupted passage in coastal zones without prior notification and approval of the coastal
state.
Events of past weeks have shown that the imperative for India is to display solidarity with
partners in Southeast Asia. It must do so by publicly stating its discomfiture with Chinese
assertiveness and by strengthening its strategic partnerships with the United States, Japan,
and Australia in the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, Indian officials must initiate a
dialogue with China and ASEAN on a rules-based order in Asia, setting the terms of
engagement between maritime forces
The imperative for India then is to come out on the side of maritime principle in the South
China Sea. New Delhi must display solidarity with Southeast Asia partners by publically
stating Indian discomfiture with Chinese assertiveness.
India’s maritime gateway to the Pacific is South China Sea
Being one of the most important seas of the world, geopolitically, economically and
strategically, the South China Sea (SCS) attracts considerable attention in the strategic
community in India. It continues to be seen as one of the most difficult regional conflicts in
the Asia-Pacific and an “arena of escalating contention.” India has vital maritime interests in
the SCS. Around 55 per cent of India’s trade in the Asia-Pacific transits through the SCS
region. In fact, in recent times, New Delhi has become more active in expressing its interest
in the freedom of navigation in the SCS and the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes
between Beijing and its maritime neighbours.

China warns India on South China Sea exploration projects

China on indicated it was opposed to India engaging in oil and gas exploration projects in
the disputed South China Sea, and warned Indian companies against entering into any
agreements with Vietnam "Our consistent position is that we are opposed to any country
engaging in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters under China's
jurisdiction," as China enjoyed "indisputable sovereignty" over the South China Sea and its
islands.

Role played by Asian Nations

Malaysia approached the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf claiming
waters beyond the 200-kilometer limit of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the northern
part of the South China Sea—a move prompted by China’s extended presence in and around
the Luconia Shoals. Weeks later, Indonesia deployed warships and a submarine in the waters
off the Natuna Islands after an encroachment by Chinese fishing boats and coast guard
ships. In April, Vietnam sent a diplomatic note to the United Nations protesting Beijing’s
expanding assertions in the South China Sea following an incident in which a Chinese ship
rammed and sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat. Unfortunately, these actions have not helped
moderate Chinese behavior. With Covid-19 sweeping through Southeast Asia, civilian and
military leaders have been preoccupied with fighting the pandemic. Regional states,
moreover, are increasingly dependent on Chinese investment and medical aid, and many are
reluctant to openly criticize China’s assertive actions in their near seas. As some see it,
China’s recent moves are part of a long-standing “salami-slicing” strategy at sea: the slow
accumulation of small and stealthy actions, none of which justify a major tactical escalation
by other countries but that over time add up to a major strategic shift. China, however, has
been astute in denying neighbors the space to mount an effective response in the littoral.
Southeast Asian leaders said a 1982 UN oceans treaty should be the basis of sovereign rights
and entitlements in the South China Sea, in one of their strongest remarks opposing China’s
claim to virtually the entire disputed waters on historical grounds.
The leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations took the position in a statement
issued by Vietnam on Saturday on behalf of the 10-nation bloc.
“We reaffirmed that the 1982 UNCLOS is the basis for determining maritime entitlements,
sovereign rights, jurisdiction and legitimate interests over maritime zones,” the ASEAN
statement said.
The leaders were referring to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a 1982
international agreement that defines the rights of nations to the world’s oceans.
Three Southeast Asian diplomats told that it marked a significant strengthening of the
regional bloc’s assertion of the rule of law in a disputed region that has long been regarded
as an Asian flashpoint. While it has criticised aggressive behaviour in the disputed waters,
ASEAN has never castigated China by name in its post-summit communiques.
The Philippines invoked the dispute settlement mechanism of the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 2013 to test the legality of China’s ‘nine-dash line’ regarding the
disputed Spratlys. In response, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague
decreed in its July 12, 2016 judgment that the line had “no legal basis.” China dismissed the
judgment as “null and void.”

The PCA award undermined the Chinese claim. It held that none of the features of the
Spratlys qualified them as islands, and there was no legal basis for China to claim historic
rights and to the resources within the ‘nine-dash line’. The UNCLOS provides that islands
must sustain habitation and the capacity for non-extractive economic activity. Reefs and
shoals that are unable to do so are considered low-tide elevations.
The award implied that China violated the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). It
noted that China had aggravated the situation by undertaking land reclamation and
construction, and had harmed the environment and violated its obligation to preserve the
ecosystem. China dismissed the award as “a political farce under the pretext of law.”
U.S. rejects China's claims in South China Sea
The United States on rejected China's disputed claims to offshore resources in most of the
South China Sea, China has offered no coherent legal basis for its ambitions in the South
China Sea and for years has been using intimidation against other Southeast Asian coastal
states, “We are making clear: Beijings claims to offshore resources across most of the South
China Sea are completely unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them,” said
Pompeo. The U.S. has long opposed China's expansive territorial claims on the South China
Sea, sending warships regularly through the strategic waterway to demonstrate freedom of
navigation there. Monday's comments reflect a harsher tone. “The world will not allow
Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire,

Regional analysts said it would be vital to see whether other nations adopt the U.S. stance
and what, if anything, Washington might do to reinforce its position and prevent Beijing
from creating “facts on the water” to buttress its claims.
The relationship between the United States and China has grown increasingly tense over the
past six months over Beijing's handling of the coronavirus pandemic, its tightened grip on
Hong Kong and its crackdown on China's Uighur Muslim community. China claims 90% of the
potentially energy-rich South China Sea, but Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and
Vietnam also lay claim to parts of it, through which about $3 trillion of trade passes each
year. Beijing has built bases atop atolls in the region but says its intentions are peaceful.
Beijing routinely outlines the scope of its claims with reference to the so-called nine-dashed
line that encompasses about nine- tenths of the 3.5-million-square-kilometer South China
Sea on Chinese maps.

China’s growing threat via debt trap diplomacy

China has been using the financial tool of debt to gain influence across the world and grab
considerable power in India’s neighbouring countries, thereby increasing the amount of
political and security threats the nation is exposed to. Mint takes a deep dive.
How does China’s debt trap diplomacy work?

In a push to gain rapid political and economic ascendency across the globe, China is
dispensing billions of dollars in the form of concessional loans to developing countries,
mostly for their large-scale infrastructure projects. Often, developing nations are lured by
China’s offer of cheap loans for transformative infra projects, which involve a substantial
investment. These developing nations, which are primarily low- or middle-income countries,
are unable to keep up with the repayments, and Beijing
then gets a chance to demand concessions or
advantages in exchange for debt relief.
India’s former biggest trading partner, Bangladesh, has
found a new global partner in China. In the most recent
exchange between Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and
Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, it was
established that the economic development of
Bangladesh will be bolstered through BRI funding. They
share the opinion that the BRI establishes a model of
international cooperation for all the participants and proffers new opportunities for regional
connectivity. Beijing may seek to leverage BRI development of Payra, a power hub, to obtain
port access in the future. Bhutan is looking at potentially partnering with China to diversify
their economy. However, reports suggest that they are likely to skip out the upcoming BRI
forum as they did in 2017, despite Chinese attempts to press for their attendance.
China’s soft power investments have attained success extending beyond BRI measures. For
instance, Sri Lanka requires technical assistance to contain the spread of the coronavirus and
a model to follow; China seems to offer both. A concessionary loan of $500 million to propel
its efforts to combat the pandemic in Sri Lanka has been granted. Ambassador Hu Wei
earlier presented Sri Lankan Minister of Health Pavithra Wanniarachchi a document that
details lessons learned in China’s handling of Covid-19. In early April, the Chinese
government and companies that are involved in major projects in Sri Lanka donated several
masks, PPE, and test kits. America’s absence and India’s inaction here have magnified
China’s goodwill.

China’s strategic commitments include the

CPEC with Islamabad to leverage Chinese
capital, production capacity, and build a
“mechanism for sustainable economic
growth.” In return, Beijing gains a
connection to the Arabian Sea, a trade route
to the vital Malacca Strait. Plans with
Bangladesh to construct a parallel pipeline
connecting Kunming and Chittagong are underway. This is also a strategic backup point in
the event of the US and India acting as adversaries of China and blocking the choke-points of
Malacca and the Indian Ocean region.
Despite the infrastructural void that Chinese investments fill, western analysts deem the
practice a version of debt-diplomacy — hence when the indebted economies fail to service
their loans, they are said to be pressured to support China’s geostrategic interests. Most of
South Asia either did not take serious note of this earlier and are already in too deep now, or
believe that they are gaining greater advantages imbibing this bilateral diplomacy. Soft
power in South Asia has ushered a fear of retaliation; negative impacts such as debt traps
appear less threatening to these countries than turning into China’s enemy.
What concessions are demanded by China?
There are several advantages or concessions that China asks for in exchange for debt relief.
Sri Lanka, for instance, was forced to hand over control of the Hambantota port project to
China for 99 years, after it found itself under massive debt owed to Beijing. This allowed
China control over a key port positioned at the doorstep of its regional rival India, and a
strategic foothold along a key commercial and military waterway. Similarly, in exchange for
relief, China constructed its first military base in Djibouti.
Whereas Angola is replaying multibillion-dollar debt to China with crude oil, creating major
problems for its economy. What are these concessional loans granted by China?
These are loans extended to low- and middle-income countries on terms that are
significantly more generous than market loans. The ‘concessionality’ factor is achieved either
by offering interest rates that are below the market rates or leniency in the grace period, and
often with a combination of both. These loans generally have long grace periods.

Has India taken any loans from China?

India has not entered into any loan agreement directly with China. However, it has been the
top borrower of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a multilateral bank wherein
China is the largest shareholder (26.6% voting rights) and India the second (7.6% voting
rights) among other countries. China’s vote share allows it veto power over decisions
requiring super-majority. Loans provided to India could also pave the way for Chinese firms
to enter and gain experience in the promising Indian infra market.

How is the debt trap affecting India, then?

Most of India’s neighbours have fallen prey to China’s debt trap, and ceded to China’s $8 tn
project – One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) which seeks to improve connectivity among
countries in Asia, Africa and Europe. The initiative requires India to accept that the Kashmir-
controlled Pakistan region, is Pakistan, because that’s where some of the projects are. China
through OBOR can hence increase India’s political cost of dealing with its neighbours.

Covid19: Made in China pandemic

The outbreak of the novel coronavirus in Wuhan and China’s domestic and international
response to this pandemic has forced the world to confront the grim realities of Chinese
leadership.
Research indicates that had China taken proactive measures to contain and suppress the
pandemic earlier in December 2019, the number of #Covid19 cases could have been
mitigated by up to 95 per cent. We now know that the opposite happened: local authorities
in China suppressed information about the outbreak, even destroying proof of the virus
sometime in December. Official censors scrubbed social media posts from medical
professionals warning of a new “SARS-like” disease. And as late as mid-January, Chinese
authorities denied evidence of any community transmission, allowing the lunar new year
celebrations to proceed despite having known about it for at least a month.

 China delayed notifying the WHO and in permitting it to inspect the situation in
Wuhan; released vital genetic information to the international community a full week
after it was isolated; and allowed millions of individuals from Wuhan to leave the city
unscreened, many of whom then travelled the world
 On cue, China’s international response changed gears. The prevailing theme that now
dominates Beijing’s state-controlled media is one of China “buying time” for the
international community to react—a claim that attempts to deflect attention from
the CPC’s and the Chinese State’s failings. Laughably, Chinese officials now appear to
be engaged in an authorized and concerted misinformation campaign, with several
diplomats and even the MFA spokesperson ludicrously claiming that the US Army was
responsible for smuggling the ‘Virus’ into Wuhan.
 Beijing’s industrial prowess and control over critical supply chains, including medical
supplies, have also added a geo- economic element to the pandemic. It has raced to
be seen as providing public goods when other powers are faltering. the international
community is now confronted by a prolonged public health emergency whose
contours and impact are not even vaguely known at the moment. An equally
paralysing and fearful consequence is the global economic slowdown as a direct
result of China’s irresponsible domestic and international behaviour. A less than
inspiring response to the outbreak in the US and much of Europe will likely whitewash
China’s offences against the international community in the short term, but the long
term implications will last.

WHY WUHAN?
The industrial and transportation hub on the Yangtze River is the first place the coronavirus
surfaced in the world. It’s possible that the virus came to Wuhan undetected from elsewhere,
but the city of 11 million is a logical place for the mission to start.
People began falling ill in December 2019, many with links to a sprawling food market that
dealt in live animals. The growing number of patients triggered alarms that prompted
China’s Center for Disease Control and Prevention to send a team to investigate.

WHY THE SECRECY?

China has firmly rejected calls for an independent outside investigation. The head of the
WHO recently expressed impatience with how long China took to make necessary
arrangements for the expert team’s visit.
The ruling Communist Party keeps a tight hold on information and is particularly concerned
about possible revelations about its handling of the virus that could open it up to
international criticism and financial demands.
China stifled independent reports about the outbreak and has published little information on
its search for the origins of the virus.

China’s wolf warrior diplomacy

There was a time when China banked on diplomacy of deceit with its leaders saying one
thing and the government doing something different. This is how China got India's Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru confused about Chinese intentions before the 1962 war. Now,
China has adopted a "wolf warrior" diplomacy. China is confrontational and conspiratorial
with anybody or any country that attempts to call the Chinese bluff in post-Covid-19 world.
This is a new form of warfare fought by China on social media, particularly Twitter, a social
media platform that is banned within China.
A recent social media post by one of its "wolf warrior" diplomats, Zhao Lijian to target
Australia is a leaf out of China's book of new diplomacy theory. Zhao Lijian earlier this week
posted a digitally manipulated image on Twitter apparently showing an Australian soldier
threatening to slit the throat of a girl. The caption of the image read: "Shocked by the
murder of Afghan civilians & prisoners by Australian soldiers."
This came against the backdrop of a report indicting Australian soldiers -- part of the
international force in Afghanistan -- for the killing of 39 Afghan civilians and prisoners. When
Australia objected to the Twitter "slur" by the official handle of the Chinese foreign ministry
spokesperson Zhao Lijian, China rebuffed the objection. Australian Prime Minister Scott
Morrison called it "outrageous", "unjustified" and sought an apology from China. The
Chinese foreign ministry refused to take down the post and called the Australian anger as
"over-reaction".
HOW DID IT BEGIN?
The term "wolf warrior diplomacy" came into vogue during the Covid-19 pandemic. The term
drew from a jingoistic Chinese film franchise, "Wolf Warrior". The second film of the series
came in 2017 with a tagline, "Though far away, anyone who affronts China will pay".
This is exactly what China has been trying to do during the Covid-19 pandemic to a range of
countries -- Australia, the US, Europe, Taiwan or India -- on social media and in bilateral
relations.
However, the "wolf warrior" diplomacy has its roots in the "strategy of nationalism" that
China adopted in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989.
China launched the Patriotic Education Campaign and manufactured a narrative of "Century
of Humiliation" aimed at a makeover of the Communist Party of China (CPC) from a
revolutionary force to a nationalist expression.
The nationalism campaign adopted an aggressive outlook under Xi Jinping. The Chinese state
became more and more assertive as Xi Jinping strengthened his position in China through
elimination of his rivals in the name of fighting corruption. The first sign of wolf warrior
diplomacy emerged in 2017 -- the year of the release of Wolf Warrior-2 -- when Europe
found Chinese diplomats trying to bully it.

DURING COVID-19
China was never more cornered internationally than when it found itself cornered over
mismanagement of Covid-19 and the subsequent attempt to cover it up. China has been in a
tight spot diplomatically since January this year. Incidentally, its diplomatic Twitter presence
has phenomenally increased during this period.
China's diplomatic adoption of Twitter is surprising because it does not allow its citizens to
use Twitter, whose Chinese version Weibo is a big hit in the country. But since the world
listens to this microblogging platform, China converted it into a weapon for "wolf warrior"
diplomats, whose tweets are popularised using an army of bots.
Chinese diplomats have used "provocation" as a tool to get international attention on
Twitter.
The Chinese attempt has since been to blame any other country but itself for Covid-19. China
has been trying to build a narrative that it was an "efficient" and "vigilant" China that
discovered a pandemic and warned the world of the underlying dangers. In its latest
attempt, China has tried to pin the blame on India for the Covid-19 outbreak.
The World Health Organisation (WHO) only recently said it would be "highly speculative" to
say that coronavirus outbreak did not take place in China.
WHAT SUSTAINS "WOLF WARRIOR" DIPLOMACY?
That "wolf warrior" diplomacy is part of China's state policy is confirmed from reports that Xi
Jinping administration has more than doubled the budget for diplomacy and that the
performance appraisals of the foreign office staffers are linked to "public relations"
activities. The second is a big incentive for the government employees.
The fiercer they prove themselves as "wolf warrior" diplomat, the bigger would be their
appraisal and higher the career growth. Zhao Lijian saw his career take a flight after he took
on the American government over human rights abuse issue in 2019 -- from a counsellor in
the Chinese embassy in Pakistan, where for about two years he prefixed "Muhammad" to his
name to becoming one of the three formidable spokespersons in the Chinese foreign
ministry.
China has adopted a ‘wolf-warrior’ mentality because an increasing sense of insecurity and
defensiveness is causing it to become aggressive,
China has been creating trouble in Hong Kong, Taiwan, India and other neighbouring
countries like Vietnam and Indonesia.
At a press conference in Beijing last Sunday, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had said that
China’s new policy is to push back against “deliberate insults”.

“We never pick a fight or bully others. But we have principles and guts. We will push back
against any deliberate insult, resolutely defend our national honour and dignity, and we will
refute all groundless slander with facts, India, NSG, and the Chinese roadblock Diplomats
invested in on-going consultations at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on India’s
membership application have suggested that more member-countries now support India’s
inclusion in the Group that lays out guidelines for exports of nuclear and related sensitive
items. Yet, China’s apparent unwavered opposition to India’s entry to the NSG, that runs on
consensus, continues to hurt New Delhi’s prospects.
Why does India want to join the NSG?
New Delhi submitted its membership application to the NSG in May 2016, a month before
the Seoul plenary of the Group. This membership application follows over a decade of
cooperation between India and the NSG. New Delhi seeks to join the Group under its larger
goal of integrating completely into the global non-proliferation architecture. The first stage
of this integration was completed in 2008 when it received the waiver from the NSG to the
condition of implementing full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in order to engage in global nuclear commerce for peaceful purposes – a condition
applicable on all non-nuclear weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
nuclear weapons (NPT).
What stands between India and the NSG?
India’s membership application to the NSG, however, hit a road-block when China expressed
its strong opposition to India’s inclusion, citing implications on NPT as the reason since India
has not signed the Treaty. Non-proliferation experts have raised concerns that inclusion of
India into the NSG would affirm its status as a nuclear weapon state and since NPT, the
framework that holds the nuclear non-proliferation architecture, allows only five nuclear
weapon states, India’s admission in the NSG would undermine the NPT. Though Beijing has
used this argument to substantiate its position, its push for India’s admission to be linked
with Pakistan’s entry to the Group showcases how its political imperatives have a larger role
to play in its opposition. While a majority of the 48 NSG members share the understanding
that India’s entry to the Group will be beneficial, there remain a few, along with China, that
have not yet joined the consensus.
However, China – and some other nations – did not budge. Their objections revolved under
questions of having a process – that rather than taking up applications one by one, a set of
‘criteria’ should be drawn up for non-NPT members. Since decision in the NSG taken on the
basis of consensus, objection raised by even one country acts as a veto.
A criteria-based approach would effectively put New Delhi on the same platform as
Islamabad. This would be galling for India as it considers itself to be a “responsible” nuclear
power, as opposed to the proliferation record of Pakistan, with its chronicled links to nuclear
programs of China, North Korea, Iran and Libya.
Beijing’s unusually public opposition to India’s NSG membership drive had been among the
reasons that led to a widening strain in relations with New Delhi.
“China’s position on NSG expansion is consistent and clear. We believe all countries need to
follow NSG rules, uphold the authority and solemnity of the NPT and seek a non-
discriminatory solution acceptable to all based on full consultation,” said spokesperson Lu
Kang at the daily briefing in Beijing on Friday.
Lu noted that a “non-discriminatory” plan had to be acceptable to “all the NPT-non parties”,
that is, both India and Pakistan. Denying that China was thwarting India, he argued that the
plenary meeting would not be discussing the entry of any specific “NPT non-party” applicant,
before reaching a “non-discriminatory plan”. “So, there is no blocking of India,” he asserted.

Do NSG members share a common vision on the Group’s future?

The lack of consensus within the NSG brings to fore questions regarding whether or not the
current members share a common vision and understanding on the objectives of the NSG
and on the path the Group would take in fulfilling them. In assessing various objectives of
the Group, two feature prominently. First is that the Group should include all states that
could supply nuclear and related items, controlling exports of which fall under the mandate
of the NSG. This will allow the NSG to spread and universalise norms of export control and
nuclear non-proliferation, thus enhancing its credibility. Second, given the fact that NSG
functions on consensus, the Group must only include those countries that are seriously
committed to the goal of nuclear non- proliferation, barring which NSG could become
defunct.

Would NSG gain a “like-minded” partner in India?

In including nuclear exporters, NSG also needs to ensure that it takes in only those states
that are equally committed to non- proliferation of nuclear weapons. The challenge for NSG
members is in assessing “like-mindedness” of a membership applicant. Being a signatory to
the NPT has been referred to as the litmus test, but does it really capture a country’s
commitment to nuclear non-proliferation? Cases of Iraq, Iran and North Korea present a
different picture. While these countries have been at times referred to as rogue states by the
nuclear order, how would one weigh the violation of NSG guidelines by China, a de jure
nuclear weapon state under the NPT, in supplying additional reactors to Pakistan, plans of
which were not disclosed by China at the time of joining the NSG even though that was a
requirement

Can China really encircle India with its String of Pearls? The great game of Asia ?
Those having slightest of interest in India-China relationship are familiar with the String of
Pearls theory. The phrase seems to have been in use even before but publication of Energy
Futures in Asia: Final Report in 2004 made it popular.
The report said that China was working on a strategy to expand its influence in the Indian
Ocean to extract maximum benefit from it and contain Indian hold in the region. China was
expected to raise civilian and military infrastructure at chosen points on the islands or ports -
metaphorically called pearls - surrounding India.
String of pearl, in geostrategic parlance, refers to the Strait of Malacca, Sri Lanka, Pakistan,
the Maldives, the Strait of Hormuz and Somalia. It also includes Bangladesh and Myanmar in
Chinese strategy

STRAIT OF MALACCA
The Strait of Malacca connects Indian Ocean with Pacific Ocean with Malaysia and
Singapore on one side while Indonesia on the other side. It is not very far from the Nicobar
Islands.
The Strait of Malacca is key for China's energy requirements. About 80 per cent of its fuel
from the Middle East passes through this. Wary of India's stronghold in the Indian Ocean,
China has been consistently working to develop friendly and cooperative relations with the
countries in the region.
In 1971, when China gave feelers about aligning with Pakistan during the Liberation War for
Bangladesh, India had threatened to block the Strait of Malacca. Later in 1999 during Kargil
war, India choked supply to Pakistan - practically blocking Karachi port - using its dominance
in the Indian Ocean. China is on a mission to turn the tide against India.

MYANMAR AND BANGLADESH

China has developed assets in Myanmar. It has built a gas pipeline of about 2,400 km from
Myanmar to China. It is also reported to have a military base in Coco Island of Myanmar.
China is said to have developed a naval base near Strait of Malacca on Cocos Keeling Island,
which is a distant part of Australia. Further north in the Bay of Bengal, China developed the
port of Chittagong in Bangladesh. It has given China a foothold and stake in the Bay of
Bengal. Significant part of Chinese trade passes through this port.
China had been pushing Bangladesh to allow it to develop a small naval base near
Chittagong. SRI LANKA
Sri Lanka has been a trusted friend of India for decades but the years between 2012 and
2014 saw increased Chinese presence in the island country.
China developed a port at Hambantola on the southeastern part of Sri Lanka. A Chinese
company built the port and gained control to manage it.
China was in the process of developing it into a naval base, when in January 2015, the
Rajapakshe government was voted out in Sri Lanka

PAKISTAN
China has Gwadar port and the CPEC to protect in Pakistan. The Gwadar port has gained
further significance as China joined what was originally conceived as the Iran-Pakistan-India
gas pipeline.

India withdrew from the project as it was not assured of the security of the pipeline in
certain stretches in Pakistan. The project is now called Iran-Pakistan-China pipeline. It
touches Gwadar on its route to China.

The CPEC is developing into a vital geo-strategic and trade asset of China. At present, it
carries only two per cent of its trade with Pakistan. But, China expects the volume to
increase as it plans to route much of its trade with the Middle East and Africa through
Gwadar port and the CPEC.
China's String of Pearls vs India's Iron Curtain

Naval analyst Zhang Ming recently proclaimed that the Islands of India’s Andaman and
Nicobar Archipelago could be used as a ‘metal chain’ to block Chinese access to the Straits of
Malacca. China has gone further to claim that India is building an ‘Iron Curtain’ in the Indian
Ocean, which is debatable.
In recent years, a number of analysts have drawn attention to the similarities of nationalism,
between the rise of modern China and the rise of Wilhelmine Germany. Newsweek’s Fareed
Zakaria, says that “like Germany in the late 19th century, China is growing rapidly but
uncertainly, into a global system (including the Indian Ocean) in which it feels it deserves
more attention and honor.

The 19th century strategic thinker Mahan had prophesised that the future of the world in the
21st century would be decided on the waters of the Indian Ocean and in this, India’s
expansion of its maritime power and Navy, and inroads in to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)
is very much on China’s radar, which deserves introspection.
It is less publicised or talked about, but in the last two decades India has stealthily straddled
its interests in the Indian Ocean Rim, which includes the islan ..

India’s maritime military strategy and the Navy’s 2004 maritime doctrine, both issued by the
Indian Navy are very clear that it is the Indian Navy’s responsibility to ensure stability in the
IOR, which irks the Chinese as they view the Indian Ocean as their life line for trade and
energy. Chi Haotin had said, ‘It is Indian Ocean not India’s Ocean
India has developed a special relationship with Mauritius, which is a fulcrum island state
because of its strong Indian diaspora. India has instituted a favourable taxation treaty that
makes it India’s largest offshore investor

When it comes to the Indian Ocean, New Delhi is hedging its bets against an assertive China.
India and France recently signed a strategic pact opening up their naval bases to each
other’s warships across the Indian Ocean. This comes two years after a similar deal with the
United States and signifies a web of strategic trust to thwart Beijing’s expansion into India’s
traditional area of influence.In recent years, Beijing’s push to contain India has become more
frenetic, including signing agreements with Myanmar, Sri Lanka , the Maldives and Pakistan
.

India’s deal with France is therefore an escalation of New Delhi’s capacity to project power.
It grants the Indian navy access to strategically important French ports – including one in
Djibouti , home to China’s single overseas military base and a focal point of strategic
competition for the Indian Ocean. The installation can host over 10,000 troops and serves as
a springboard for Chinese navy operations across the Indian Ocean.

China’s Djibouti military base: ‘logistics facility’, or platform for geopolitical ambitions
overseas

Indian PM Narendra Modi signed the India-Singapore Bilateral Agreement for Navy
Cooperation in 2018 which allows Indian Navy ships logistical support, including refuelling at
Singapore’s Changi naval base located near the disputed South China Sea. Changi Naval
Base forms a strategic point in the ‘Necklace of Diamonds’ that India is creating to counter
China’s ‘String of Pearls’ strategy.The ‘Necklace of Diamonds’ comprises Changi Naval Base
in Singapore, Chabahar Port in Iran, the Assumption Islands in Seychelles, and Duqm Port in
Oman. In addition to this, India is creating strong naval ties with Vietnam, Japan, France,
Australia and the United States.
However, China’s investment in its ‘String of Pearls’ is greater than India in its ‘Necklace of
Diamonds’. China has invested US$60 billion in Africa under its String of Pearls strategy,
whereas India’s largest investment for its Necklace of Diamonds amounts to $8 billion, in
Chabahar Port in Iran.
India opposes re-joining RCEP over China concerns
15 countries solidified their participation in the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP). Even as India opted to stay out after walking out of discussions last year,
the new trading bloc has made it clear that the door will remain open for India to return to
the negotiating table.
What is RCEP?
Described as the “largest” regional trading agreement to this day, RCEP was originally being
negotiated between 16 countries — ASEAN members and countries with which they have
free trade agreements (FTAs), namely Australia, China, Korea, Japan, New Zealand and
India.
The purpose of RCEP was to make it easier for products and services of each of these
countries to be available across this region. Negotiations to chart out this deal had been on
since 2013, and India was expected to be a signatory until its decision last November.
Why did India walk out?
On November 4, 2019,
India decided to exit
discussions over
“significant outstanding
issues”. According to a
government official, India
had been “consistently”
raising “fundamental
issues” and concerns
throughout the
negotiations and was prompted to take
this stand as they had not been resolved
by the deadline to commit to signing the
deal. Its decision was to safeguard the
interests of industries like agriculture
and dairy and to give an advantage to
the country’s services sector. According
to officials, the current structure of
RCEP still does not address these issues and concerns.
How far is China’s presence a factor?
 Escalating tensions with China are a major
reason for India’s decision. While China’s
participation in the deal had already been
proving difficult for India due to various
economic threats, the clash at Galwan Valley
has soured relations between the two countries.
The various measures India has taken to reduce
its exposure to China would have sat
uncomfortably with its commitments under
RCEP.
Major issues that were unresolved during RCEP
negotiations were related to the exposure that
India would have to China. This included India’s
fears that there were “inadequate” protections
against surges in imports. It felt there could also be a possible circumvention of rules of
origin— the criteria used to determine the national source of a product — in the absence of
which some countries could dump their products by routing them through other countries
that enjoyed lower tariffs.
India was unable to ensure countermeasures like an auto-trigger mechanism to raise tariffs
on products when their imports crossed a certain threshold. It also wanted RCEP to exclude
most-favoured nation (MFN) obligations from the investment chapter, as it did not want to
hand out, especially to countries with which it has border disputes, the benefits it was giving
to strategic allies or for geopolitical reasons. India felt the agreement would force it to
extend benefits given to other countries for sensitive sectors like defence to all RCEP
members.
India has trade deficits with 11 of the 15 RCEP countries, and some experts feel that India
has been unable to leverage its existing bilateral free trade agreements with several RCEP
members to increase exports.

India must guard against Chinese tech intrusion

The recent border standoff between China and India at Ladakh confirms two political
realities that must not be ignored. First, India must not allow the intrusion of Chinese firms
into its telecommunications network. If societies will be digital, China should not be
permitted to encode India’s public sphere. New Delhi must not license Huawei or ZTE to
provide equipment for its 5G rollout. And second, India must not allow any Chinese-origin
firm into its critical infrastructure in much the same manner that it was kept away from
certain industrial projects in the past.
An authoritarian regime that has given Xi Jinping absolute power has now become predatory
in its external engagements and is a caricature of an insecure bully. The courtesies of
diplomatic speak have been dispensed with as it referred to Australia as a “giant kangaroo
that serves as a dog of the US”. The middle kingdom now has a medieval mindset that only
seeks territory and markets for its benefit. That it continues on this course during the
COVID19 pandemic reveals much about its naked ambitions.
This is China’s approach to India and each nation must make its own choice. For India’s
national interest, the choice is clear. There is no more room to accommodate China’s
economic affections while being scorched by the Dragon’s fire.The criticality of 5G
technology is based not only on its speed but also on its all pervasiveness. The real power of
5G lies in its ability to be a network of networks — to simultaneously serve several verticals
including governance, business, smart cities, education, mobility, and in the post-COVID19
world, healthcare through telemedicine along with most other human interactions.
This makes the way we negotiate 5G technology a vital matter for national security.
Allowing Huawei or ZTE to be a 5G equipment provider to Indian telecommunications firms
will be like asking the Chinese Communist Party to run our general elections. As we repulse
China at the borders, we must ensure that we do not surrender our cities, homes and minds
to that ideology. In fact, one major lapse on the part of India has been that it has allowed
the creeping acquisition of India Tech by the Digital BRI, even as the country has opposed the
Belt and Road in its physical manifestation.

The risk China Tech poses to Indian interests is real. Considering they are backed by an
authoritarian regime that’s weaponising everything in its armoury, from trade and
technology to medical equipment and humanitarian aid, the provisions by state- controlled
Chinese firms are a global concern. Australia and the US have discovered it, Europe is in the
process of finding out, and smaller nations will awaken to the consequences too late.
As a $3 trillion economy that has set its eyes on becoming a $10 trillion one in the 2030s,
India cannot ignore the perils of the noxious interplay of Chinese Communist Party objectives
and the capitalist façade represented by Huawei.
National security is not a choice. It is a primary assumption and the first responsibility of
statecraft. A country that uses its military power to threaten other nations and its economic
power to pervert free trade and steal technologies, will not think twice before using its
technological influence to advance its strategic ambitions and lust for territory. These
networks are India’s lifelines of growth and highways of aspirations. These will support
economic growth, governance, innovations, and be the critical infrastructure that can cart
India towards a $10,000 per capita income future. These must not be implicated by an
erroneous choice in partners.
For India to allow Huawei even in its 5G trials displays an act that’s not very different from
India rooting for China as a member of the United Nations Security Council against its own
interests in 1950. Seven decades later, allowing Huawei into India mirrors the same
sentiment — it is a signal that India is giving in to China’s bullying.
China & South Asia

In his 19th Party Congress speech in October 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that
“China will deepen relations with its neighbors in accordance with the principle of amity,
sincerity, mutual benefits, and inclusiveness, and the policy of forging friendship and
partnership with its neighbors.”] As neighbours of China, South Asian countries—including
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—have
increasingly come into contact with Beijing in the diplomatic, economic, and security
domains. These interactions demonstrate that China is not simply appealing to the better
angels of South Asian neighbours. Rather, Beijing has crafted a geostrategic approach to the
region that assiduously seeks to secure its own national interests.

Pakistan
Pakistan rarely criticises China’s harsh treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang. Beijing reciprocates
by protecting Islamabad in international organisations. For instance, Beijing has wielded its
veto power at the UN Security Council multiple times to prevent the sanctioning of Masood
Azhar, the leader of a Pakistan-based militant group called Jaish-e-Mohammed, until finally
relenting last year. As the rotational president of the Financial Action Task Force, Beijing also
likely played a key role in 2019 in helping Pakistan avoid sanctions for terrorism financing.
China also holds up its partnership with Pakistan as an important demonstration of benign
intentions to develop the rest of the world through BRI. Indeed, BRI’s flagship project, CPEC,
runs through territory under de facto Pakistani control, but disputed by India. Following Xi
and Khan’s last meeting, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to CPEC, stating their
“determination to speedily execute CPEC so that its growth potential can be fully realized
making it a high-quality demonstration project of BRI.”
On Afghanistan, Chinese leaders believe that Pakistan serves as a useful partner to achieve
security in order to eventually benefit from economic development there. The joint
statement following the Xi-Khan meeting in September indicates that “the Chinese side
appreciated Pakistan’s efforts in promoting peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan.
Both sides maintained that an inclusive, and Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process
would be key to bringing peace and stability in the country.
China almost certainly assesses Pakistan to be a valuable asset toward better understanding
the situation in Afghanistan and in communicating with different actors in the country, to
include the Taliban, who China believes must be a part of any future government.
Afghanistan

China seeks Afghan reconciliation, to include Taliban integration, in a future government.

Most recently in September, Beijing noted that Afghanistan “should have broad
representation and inclusiveness in order to make all factions and ethnic groups equally
involve[d] in the political life so as to build a united political foundation.”
As noted earlier, Beijing further seeks to incorporate Afghanistan into BRI. According to a
readout of Xi’s meeting with Afghan President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani in June 2019,
Beijing seeks to “steadily promote practical cooperation in economy and trade [via BRI]. In
April, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reaffirmed Beijing’s interest in helping Afghanistan
through BRI, stating “China is willing to work with Afghanistan to deepen joint construction
of the Belt and Road and advance bilateral cooperation in various fields in order to jointly
benefit the two countries and peoples.
China looks to Afghanistan to support counter-terrorism operations to prevent instability
from spilling over into bordering Xinjiang province. Xi has pledged to “continue to help
Afghanistan build its capacity in fighting terrorism and maintaining stability.” Xi further
“called on the Afghan side to continue to firmly support China in its fight against the terrorist
force of East Turkistan Islamic Movement.
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka

In July, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang met with Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and
the two leaders focused much of their discussion on the need for the economic development
of Bangladesh via BRI funding

China and Bangladesh pledged to deepen defense cooperation, especially in the areas of
“defense industry and trade, training, equipment and technology, mutual visits of navy ships,
and the UN peacekeeping operations.” The Chinese navy in 2016 made its first port visit (and
again in 2017) to Chittagong, perhaps signaling Beijing’s belief that the largest port in
Bangladesh holds geostrategic value.
China is also the largest arms supplier of the Bangladeshi military, providing 71.8 percent of
weapons from 2008 to 2018, suggesting that Beijing seeks to further ingratiate itself with
Dhaka through these sales.
Bhutan does not have diplomatic relations with China, and so there is much less interaction
than with other South Asian countries. However, in the last meeting held in February 2019
between visiting Chinese ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui, and Bhutanese Prime Minister
Lotay Tshering, Beijing emphasised the need to continue working together with Bhutan on
resolving the border issue. This is likely in reference to the Doklam region in which a China-
India dispute occurred in 2017. Either way, the last round of China-Bhutan border talks were
held in 2016.
China’s relationship with the Maldives is near-exclusively focused on leveraging BRI to
develop Maldives as well as to raise Chinese influence there to counter India. Beijing’s
preferred Maldivian President, Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom, was defeated in elections in
2018, and the current leader, Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, is more amenable to India’s wishes.
Bilateral ties, however, remain positive, with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang as recently as
July 2019 noting his appreciation for continued Maldivian support of BRI. Beijing has touted
the completion of the “China-Maldives Friendship Bridge” as a tangible example of what
positive bilateral relations can create to benefit average Maldivians
Chinese President Xi went directly to Nepal in what was the first visit by a Chinese head of
state in 23 years. While on the ground, Xi signed 20 agreements through BRI to better enable
China to develop and connect with Nepal. The two sides “will accelerate the building of the
Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network through connectivity projects
including ports, highways, railways, aviation, and communications, and have announced the
launch of a feasibility study of the China-Nepal cross-border railway. Beijing was further
pleased to see Kathmandu acknowledge that “Tibet affairs are China’s internal affairs, and
the determination [of Nepal] on not allowing any anti-China activities on its soil.
Finally, on Sri Lanka, the Chinese focus is mainly on developing the island and likely currying
influence there for future geostrategic aspirations. During a meeting between Chinese
Premier Li and Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena in May 2019, the two leaders
expressed an interest in progressing with BRI projects, consistent with the last joint
statement issued in 2016.
In exchange for paying down Colombo’s BRI debt, the Chinese got Sri Lanka in December
2017 to hand over Hambantota port on a 99-year lease; Hambantota is geostrategically
located on the Indian Ocean, potentially bolstering Beijing’s String of Pearls.

Conclusion
As detailed in this brief, Chinese interests in South Asia stretch far beyond simply maintaining
amicable relations in the region. Rather, China is dissatisfied at the LAC with India and is
trying to improve the situation to its liking. Beijing is also frustrated with New Delhi’s
persistent support of the Dalai Lama and rejection of BRI. As a result, China seeks to
undermine India by aligning closely with archrival Pakistan.
Chinese warfare strategy

Trusions and coercion around its borders through military means. These include but are not
restricted to Bhutan, Japan, nations in the South China Sea and India.

Second, psychological intrusions through information warfare in democracies, using the

tools that serve communications, transparency and accountability in democracies. Their
public sphere and institutions are seen
as handy sharp instruments serving China’s designs Third, technological
intrusion through its corporate arms such as Huawei and ZTE, which by
the virtue of being incorporated, designed and operating under the
National Intelligence Law collect intelligence and information for the
benefit of the Communist Party of China from the countries in which they
operate And fourth, controlling multilateral arenas through capture of
international institutions such as WHO as the Made in China pandemic so clearly brought
out.
After successfully weaponising trade in WTO, health in WHO, investments along the Belt and
Road Initiative, debt through its debt trap diplomacy, narratives through information
intrusions, China is now on way towards weaponising data, using companies like Huawei
and ZTE as the tip of its digital spear.
Chinese apps banned by India

When the Narendra Modi government’s Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology
banned 59 Chinese apps, including TikTok, WeChat, and UC Browser, it did so through the
powers of one law. The government said that these apps were banned under Section 69A of
the Information Technology Act, 2000 because “they are engaged in activities which are
prejudicial to sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of state and public
order.”

Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, was introduced by an amendment to
the Act in 2008. It gives the Central government the power to block public access to any
information online — whether on websites or mobile apps.

Under Section 69A, if a website threatens India’s defence, its sovereignty and integrity,
friendly relations with foreign countries and public order, the government can ban it, after
following due procedure.

A feature of Section 69A is that it includes terms such as “security of the state, emergency
nature, sovereignty and integrity of India and public order”, which are common for national
security determinations across Indian laws. The Section mandates strict confidentiality about
complaints and action taken. Due to the presence of this clause, Right to Information (RTI)
queries are not applicable to the law. Moreover, the committees to examine requests and
review appeals comprise entirely members from the executive.
India rolls the dice on Hong Kong

Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a controversial national security law that gave Beijing
unprecedented powers to shape the future of Hong Kong.
It dramatically reduced Hong Kong’s autonomy and gives Beijing the ability to crackdown
against dissent under the garb of tackling crimes of secession, subversion, terrorism and
collusion with foreign forces.
ISSUE
For most Hong Kongers, it is clear that it cuts at the very heart
of their freedom of expression and organisation, effectively
repudiating the so-called “one country, two systems” principle
on which the relationship between
Hong Kong and mainland China has been premised since 1997.
Hong Kong has been rocked by anti-Beijing protests since June
2019 and the new law is effectively Xi Jinping’s revenge on Hong Kongers for making him
withdraw the controversial extradition bill of last year. Since then a
broader anti-China and pro-democracy movement has been gathering momentum in Hong
Kong which Beijing is now determined to demolish with this new law.

INDIA'S APPROACH

New Delhi chose the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva to react where it argued
last week that India has been keeping “a close watch on recent developments” in Hong Kong
given the presence of a large Indian community there.
New Delhi had in the past been reluctant to talk about the Hong Kong issue but recent
violent clashes in the Galwan Valley of Ladakh last month, perhaps, made it imperative for
India to change its approach
In the past India has been reluctant to even give visas to pro-democracy activists of Hong
Kong and along with Indonesia was the only other member state of the G-20 last year which
refused to even meet pro-democracy activists. India also maintained a studied silence over
China’s ill-treatment of its Muslim minority in Xinjiang. The border crisis this year has
challenged the very foundations of India’s China policy and all aspects are being recalibrated
by New Delhi – from trade and technological engagement to China’s domestic political
imperatives. Major powers like the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and Japan have all spoken
out against the new Chinese law.
Hong Kong is also important for India for economic reasons. For global investors, it has
always
been an attractive destination, leading to its emergence as one of Asia’s most powerful
financial centres.
WAY AHEAD
As a mature democracy, we should be able to articulate and defend our positions to our
global stakeholders. It is what makes India different from China and a more reassuring
global presence
China has never hesitated to meddle in Indian domestic matters in the past. India’s past
diffidence in challenging China on its ‘internal’ matters has not really paid New Delhi any
significant dividends.

India’s Hong Kong move has been noticed the world over

Calls for India to play the Taiwan card grow louder

•Possible asymmetric diplomatic strategies to challenge

China, such as altering India’s “one China policy” to enhance
India’s relations with Taiwan. Indian Express, wrote in May
that India should be pragmatic in considering the question of
Taiwan’s observer status in the World Health Assembly: The
decision “should not be made either out of peevishness or
fear.” The editorial argued that New Delhi should judge the
issue on “apolitical appreciation of the specific technical
issues involved.
 •The Times of India, asked the government to “not shy away
from supporting Taiwan.” that this should remain an important
aspect of the reform of the World Health Organization (WHO). It
also argued that India should stop being “overly deferential to
Beijing” when China has routinely worked against Indian interests
in the UN and other multilateral organizations. India should step
up its cooperation with Taiwan. it was strange that India has
shied away from cooperating with Taiwan, whereas Taipei and
Beijing had active trade and investment ties despite their political disagreements.

•Namrata Hasija, a research associate at the Delhi-based Centre for China Analysis and
Strategy, asserts that India must stop seeing Taiwan through the China lens that gets
activated every time there is tension in Sino Indian ties.
•Highlighting that Taiwan was one of the first countries to send medical equipment to India,
former diplomat G. Parthasarathy also made the case for India to strengthen its relations
with Taiwan. He added that Taiwan offers opportunities for cooperation in several key
sectors, especially in India’s semiconductor industry, which could also possibly reduce India’s
reliance on China in the electronics and communication industries
•Taipei Times called on Taiwan to “deepen ties with India, in particular economic, military
and intelligence ties, to contain Chinese expansionism and put Xi back into his box.” This also
fits well with President Tsai Ing-wen’s New Southbound policy which has a particular focus
on India.
India – China Relations

1949 – India became the first non-communist country to recognise

1950 – India did not support US led

resolution blaming China as aggressor in Korean Crisis.

1954 – Panchsheel Agreement.

The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, known as the Panchsheel Treaty.

Their first formal codification in treaty form was in an agreement between China and India in 1954
— the "Agreement (with exchange of notes) on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China
and India", which was signed at Peking on 28 April 1954.

The Five Principles, as stated in the Sino–Indian Agreement 1954, are listed as:

• mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,

• mutual non-aggression,
• mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
• equality and mutual benefit, and
• peaceful co-existing.

1959 – Dalai Lama escaped to India

1957 – Karakoram Highway across Aksai Chin.

Aksai Chin
Aksai Chin is almost the size of Bhutan and little smaller than Switzerland. Most of it is in occupation
of China, which captured the region during 1950s and consolidated its military grip over the area
during the 1962 India-China war, rejecting all Indian attempts to settle border disputes peacefully.

A major Sino-Indian bilateral negotiation for a friendly and permanent settlement of all outstanding
issues, including the border dispute, was initiated in Delhi in December 1953.

It is argued that "Aksai Chin is like a Damocles sword hanging over India's head" in addition to being
a gateway to Central Asia and an easy route to "easily run over New Delhi, the Indian capital city.
This explains why China was expressly keen in seizing Aksai Chin

Tibet :The Core Issue In China-India Relations

• Following a brief military conflict between China and Tibet at the start of the 20th century,
Tibet declared itself as an independent nation in 1912. It functioned as an autonomous
region until 1950. In 1949, the Communists under Mao Zedong’s leadership gained power
and in 1950 seized control of Tibet. In 1951, the Dalai Lama’s representatives signed a
seventeen-point agreement that granted China sovereignty over Tibet for the first time. The
Chinese claim that this document is proof of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet while Tibet says
that it was coerced into signing this document.
• The current Dalai Lama claims that he wants only autonomy for Tibet, because it would
ensure the preservation of Tibet’s unique culture, language and customs. The Dalai Lama in
1959 fled Tibet to India after a failed uprising. The Chinese have little trust in the Dalai Lama
and claim that his intentions are not sincere. Further China claims that Tibet has been an
inalienable part of China since the thirteenth century under the Yuan Dynasty.
• The Chinese blame the British for causing confusion in Tibet refusing to be bound by any
treaties signed between Tibet and Britain during the early 20th century. This includes the
1914 Shimla convention where the British recognized Tibet as an autonomous area under
the suzerainty of China. There is also differing contentions about what includes political
Tibet in modern times. For the Chinese, this includes the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR),
which are the western and central areas. This was directly ruled by Tibet when the Chinese
invaded Tibet in 1950.
• Following the Cultural Revolution, Mao sent the Chinese army to Tibet after they refused to
accept the conditions which the Chinese authorities wanted to impose.. Mao’s Cultural
Revolution in Tibet continued until 1976. After Deng Xiaoping took over in 1978, he reached
out to the Dalai Lama in a quest to foster a reconciliatory economic and cultural policy
towards Tibet.
 • Pro-independence protests in Tibet started in 1987 and this led to a clampdown by the
Chinese authorities on religious and cultural freedom in Tibet. Simultaneously, a rapid
economic development programme was formulated leading to large immigration of Hans
Chinese into Tibet. The Dalai Lama’s exile in Dharamsala in Northern India in 1959 put India
squarely at the centre of this China-Tibet dispute. India is currently home to around 120,000
Tibetan

Some Chinese officials claim they are just waiting for the Dalai Lama’s expiry for the Tibetan
movement’s intensity to subside.'

1961 – Aggressive border patrolling by China ; Nehru’s Forward Policy

1962 – Massive attack on Eastern and Western Front, Unilateral ceasefire

Why India and China went to war in 1962 ?

56 years ago, China attacked India over multiple points across

the border, leading to a month-long standoff between 10,000
to 20,000 Indian soldiers and 80,000 Chinese troops.

Unprepared for the offensive, India lost nearly 4,000 soldiers

in the war and suffered its most humiliating defeat.

The causes of war

The leading cause for the 1962 war was China’s perception that India was meddling in its internal
affairs in Tibet. After Independence, India largely maintained cordial relations with China. It did,
briefly, protest Chinese occupation in Tibet. However, in March 1959, when the Dalai Lama fled Tibet
and found asylum in India, People’s Republic of China leader Mao Zedong did not take it lightly. He
claimed that the Lhasa rebellion in Tibet was fuelled by India. China felt that the political asylum to
the Dalai Lama amounted to interference by India in China’s internal affairs.

Invasion
 • Smaller conflicts between the two countries increased in 1962. On 10 July, over 350 Chinese
troops surrounded an Indian post at Chushul, Leh. Using loudspeakers, they told the Gurkha
regiment to not fight for India.
• And on 20 October the People’s Liberation Army invaded India in Ladakh, northern
Uttarakhand and across the McMahon Line in the then North-East Frontier Agency (now
Arunachal Pradesh), catching India completely off guard. The attack began simultaneously in
all sectors of the border at the same time — 5 am — synchronised as per Beijing time.
Convinced that there would not be a war, India didn’t deploy enough soldiers, while China
launched a full frontal attack.
• A panicked India reportedly sought US assistance to control the Chinese aggression. Nehru
wrote to then US President John F. Kennedy to provide “air transport and jet fighters” to
India. But US largely stayed away.
• Meanwhile, China proposed that Ayub Khan, then Pakistan President, should attack India.
Pakistan chose not to. Because the Soviets were engaged in their own high-stakes gamble in
Cuba, Moscow did not discourage the Chinese, despite Khrushchev’s close relationship with
Nehru, “At the same time defeating India would answer the question Kennedy had raised in
his 1959 speech in the Senate about which country, democratic India or communist China,
was poised to win the race for great power status in Asia. For Mao, the conflict with India
provided a surrogate for his rivalry with Moscow and with Washington,”

The lessons

• The war officially ended on 20 November, 1962, after China finally announced a ceasefire
along the entire Sino-Indian border, even as some minor conflicts continued in NEFA and
Aksai Chin.
• The Sino-Indian War put the spotlight on India’s unpreparedness in a war situation and
underlined the need to modernise its armed forces.
• It also highlighted the crucial strategic mistakes India committed, including not using the
Indian Air Force.
• On the 50th anniversary of the war, former Indian ambassador to Iraq R.S. Kalha wrote that
then Chinese President Liu Shaoqi told the Sri Lankan leader Felix Bandaranaike after the
war that the conflict was “to demolish India’s arrogance and illusions of grandeur”.The main
objective of Mao Zedong, founding father of the People’s Republic of China, to attack India
in 1962 was to “humiliate” Nehru who was emerging as a leader of the third world,
• India’s defence experts and historians should revise their view of 1962 seen as a ‘humiliating
defeat’. Instead it should be seen as a victory of Nehru’s policy of non-alignment which, with
massive military and economic aid from both the American and (then) Soviet blocs, had
India’s defence forces fully prepared by 1965. It was a blessing in disguise.
1979 – Vajpayee visited Beijing as Foreign Minster

1987 – China Condemned the establishment of Arunachal Pradesh as a state; standoff in Sum do
rong chhu valley .

1988 – Rajiv Gandhi’s visit Joint Working Group on Boundary Issue .

Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988 broke the ice

The relations between India and China - deep-frozen for the last 26 years
- finally seemed to thaw with the formation of a joint task force to solve
the thorny border issue. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China
marked a new beginning in bilateral relations.

The two sides issued a joint communiqué that stressed the need to
restore friendly relations on the basis of the Panchsheel. India and the
People's Republic of China agreed to achieve a "fair and reasonable
settlement while seeking a mutually acceptable solution" to the border
dispute. The communiqué also expressed China's concern about agitation by Tibetan separatists in
India and reiterated that anti-China political activities by expatriate Tibetans would not be tolerated.
Rajiv Gandhi signed bilateral agreements on science and technology co-operation, establish direct air
links, and on cultural exchanges. The two sides also agreed to hold annual diplomatic consultations
between foreign ministers, set up a joint committee on economic and scientific co-operation, and a
joint working group on the boundary issue. The latter group was to be led by the Indian foreign
secretary and the Chinese vice minister of foreign affair.

1993 – Peace and Tranquillity agreement on Border

The 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and

Tranquility contains the following key provisions

• The two countries will resolve the border issue through peaceful and friendly consultations.
The two sides will ‘‘strictly respect and observe’’ the LAC, pending an ultimate solution.
• The two sides agree to reduce their military forces along the LAC in conformity with the
agreed requirements of the principle of mutual and equal security ceilings.
• The two sides will work out effective confidence-building measures (CBM) along the LAC.
• The high point of this period of relative Sino-Indian rapprochement was the historic visit by
Chinese President Jiang Zemin to New Delhi in late 1996. The two sides signed the
 Agreement on CBM in the Military Field along the LAC, according to which their
governments pledged:
• To limit the number of field-army troops, border-defense forces, paramilitary forces, and
major categories of armaments along the LAC;
• To avoid holding large-scale military exercises near the LAC and to notify the other side of
exercises involving one brigade group (that is, 5,000 troops);
• Not to discharge firearms, cause biodegradation, use hazardous chemicals, set off
explosives, or hunt with firearms within two kilometers of the LAC;
• To maintain and expand telecommunications links between border meeting points at
designated places along the LAC.
• To maintain and expand telecommunications links between border meeting points at
designated places along the LAC.

1998 – India points at China for operation Shakti

Sino-Indian relations hit a low point in 1998 following India's nuclear tests.

Before conducting its first nuclear test in 1974, India’s nuclear policy was directed toward the
perceived threat from China

sisted in identifying China as India’s most formidable threat.27 ‘‘China is potential threat number
one,’’ George Fernandes, defense minister, said in May 1998: ‘‘The potential threat from China is
greater than that from Pakistan and any person who is concerned about India’s security must agree
with that.’’

2003 – Vajpayee’s visit Strategic Partnership. China

recognises Sikkim as India’s territory .

China officially recognised Indian sovereignty over Sikkim 2003

An agreement on the boundary with China could set the tone for a final settlement of the Kashmir
question with Pakistan. GOOD FENCES make good neighbours. The absence of a settled boundary
with China, let alone fences, has been at the heart of New Delhi's troubled relationship with Beijing
for more than four decades. The biggest political outcome from the Prime Minister, Atal Bihari
Vajpayee's visit to China has been the decision by the two sides to explore a final settlement of the
boundary dispute.

Nathu La pass reopens for trade after 44 years

Marking a historic occasion, Nathu La, the famous Himalayan pass at

14,500 feet on the Sino-India border here reopened after 44 years.
Once part of the historic 'Silk Route', Nathu La became India's third
point after Shipkila in Himachal and Lipulekh in Uttaranchal for border
trade with China.

The reopening of the pass came a little over a year after China
accepted Sikkim as an integral part of India. The route had been closed
since the Indo-China war of 1962.

2004 – Special Representative Mechanism : Guiding Principles and Political parameters

The resolution and final solution of the boundary question will

promote positive relations between India and China, "in
accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" and
"principle of mutual and equal security".

In attainment of the
solution the two
sides will consider "historical evidence, national
sentiments, practical difficulties and reasonable
concerns and sensitivities of both sides, and the actual
state of border areas"; the boundary should be along
"well-defined geographical features"; interests of
"settled populations in the border areas" to be considered; and "delineation of the boundary to be
done through modern and joint means.

Pending final solution, all dispute resolution mechanism bodies will continue to function as per their
objectives.

2005 - SAARC) Summit in 2005, China was granted an observer status

China has an observer status in SAARC, .It was in the 18th summit, which was held in Kathmandu in
November 2014, that Beijing expressed its interest in joining the organisation. However, this was not
endorsed by India for geopolitical reasons. The Charter of SAARC requires consensus among all
members for admitting a new member. If China is to be admitted it must get the support of all the
members.

Three realities exist as far as China’s admission as a full member of SAARC is concerned.
 • Firstly, the perception that China is not a South Asian country as it doesn’t share a history
and culture with the people of South Asia. China has borders with five of the eight South
Asian countries and is located in the proximity of Bangladesh, yet, China is not a mainstream
South Asian country
• Secondly, China in view of its wide-ranging trade, economic and commercial relations with
almost all the South Asian countries and geographical contiguity with South Asia is qualified
to be a full member of SAARC.
• Thirdly, almost half of SAARC members support China’s admission to the organisation as a
full member. Indeed, it is not only Pakistan which vehemently supports China’s full
admission but also members like Sri Lanka,
• For India, China’s admission as a full member may lead to an anti-Indian Sino-Pakistani
alliance which other smaller members of SAARC may also join. It is the fear of China
neutralizing India’s domination in South Asia which has led to New Delhi’s constant
opposition to China’s membership. In order to pre-empt China’s admission India has tried to
use its influence with Afghanistan, Bhutan and Bangladesh.

Chinese President Xi Jinping in his official visit to India urged the Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi to change his country’s policy on opposing China’s membership in the SAARC. He also
stated that China would support India’s full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) and he requested that the Indian Prime Minister should reciprocate this
gesture by backing China’s SAARC ambitions.

2009 – BRICS

2013 – BDCA

2013 Depsang standoff

On April 15, an Indian patrol found that a Chinese platoon had
established a camp in what was clearly the Indian side of the
Line of Actual Control. On the evening of May 5, after weeks
of consultations and flag meetings, the Chinese and Indian
sides agreed to restore status quo ante in the area, which
essentially meant that the Chinese removed the five tents
they had set up on April 15.

The fact that their move was clearly non-threatening, yet high visibility, suggests that Beijing was
sending some kind of a signal.

Signalling what ?

The Chinese action can be seen at two levels- one as a straightforward land grab, and two instances
of signalling. The first is an established pattern where the PLA keeps nibbling at Indian territory to
create new "facts on the ground" or a "new normal" in relation to their claimed LAC. They do this, as
they have done in the past– occupy an area, then assert that it has always been part of their
territory and offer to negotiate. In this very sector, Chinese claim lines have been varying since 1956.
At that time, for example, the entire Chip Chap and Galwan river valleys were accepted by China as
being Indian territory. But in 1960 China insisted that these areas were within their claim line and
they occupied them following the 1962 war.

The fact that the border is neither demarcated nor

inhabited, and there is no agreement on the alignment of
the LAC in many areas, aids this process, China could be
signalling its unhappiness over the Indian military build up
on the Sino-Indian border. In the last five years, India has
activated forward airfields in the Ladakh sector, completed
important road building projects in the Chumar sector,
begun work on the road to link DBO with Leh, and moved
high-performance fighter aircraft to bases proximate to
Tibet.

2017 – India in SCO

2017 Doklam

Doklam Conflict
Doklam, or Donglang in Chinese, is an area spread over less than
a 100 sq km comprising a plateau and a valley at the trijunction
between India, Bhutan and China. It is surrounded by the
Chumbi Valley of Tibet, Bhutan’s Ha Valley and Sikkim.

Despite several rounds of engagement between China and

Bhutan, the dispute between the two over Doklam has not been
resolved. It flared up in 2017 when the Chinese were trying to
construct a road in the area, and Indian troops, in aid of their
Bhutanese counterparts, objected to it, resulting in the stand-
off. Doklam is strategically located close to the Siliguri Corridor, which connects mainland India with
its north-eastern region. The corridor, also called Chicken’s Neck, is a vulnerable point for India.

Why does it matter?

While India-Tibet trade flourished along the Siliguri corridor and Chumbi Valley, Doklam had very
little significance. Even during British rule, Doklam did not command much attention. In recent years
however, China has been beefing up its military presence in the Chumbi Valley, where the Chinese
are at a great disadvantage militarily. Both Indian and Bhutanese troops are on a higher ground
around the Valley.

This is also the reason, the Indian security establishment suspect, why the Chinese have a deep
interest in Doklam, which would give them a commanding view of and an easy access to both the
Chumbi Valley and the Siliguri Corridor.

The Bhutanese government told China that “the construction of the road inside Bhutanese territory
is a direct violation of the agreements and affects the process of demarcating the boundary between
our two countries.”The Ministry of External Affairs said: “Such construction would represent a
significant change of status quo with serious security implications for India.” The Chinese
government released a map to accuse India of trespassing into its territory, and in a detailed
statement in the first week of August, it said “India has no right to interfere in or impede the
boundary talks between China and Bhutan.”

What were India’s concerns?

India’s concerns emanated from Chinese action to change the status quo on the ground by building a
road in violation of China’s existing understanding with both India and Bhutan.

What arguments did India put forth in these negotiations?

One, India contested the Chinese claims of sovereignty over this region as it is part of Bhutan.

Two, India argued that the Chinese attempt to alter the status quo amounted to a unilateral
determination of the tri-junction of the three countries.

Three, China was violating the 2012 written common understanding between the two countries that
the tri-junction would be finalised in consultation with all concerned countries.
Continuation of the faceoff was not in the mutual interest of India and China and prolonging it would
only give others an opportunity to take advantage. Finally, India reminded the Chinese side of the
Astana Consensus wherein both sides had agreed that differences should not become disputes.

What led to a breakthrough?

Both sides were conscious of the importance of ending the face-off before the BRICS Summit in
Xiamen, scheduled that September. India also said that on its part, as a gesture of goodwill, it was
willing to take the first step to break the impasse.

After six weeks of diplomatic persuasion, India got the Chinese side to reach an agreement to
resolve the situation with the disengagement of border personnel at the site on August 28, 2017.
The Chinese removed troops, equipment and tents by 150 m from the site, while Indian troops
returned to their original positions. This addressed the challenge of the Chinese building a road and
concerns about them pushing the tri-junction point southwards. But it did not bring the Chinese
troops back to the status quo as before June 16, 2017 as they remained deployed in northern
Doklam where they were earlier absent.

2018 – Wuhan Informal Talks

2019 – Mamallapuram Talks

2020 – Galwan clashes à Disengagement

India-China Galwan faceoff

This is the first time after the 1962 War that soldiers have died in clashes on the India-China
border in Ladakh. Even otherwise, the last deaths on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) were an
ambush of an Assam Rifles patrol in Arunachal Pradesh by the Chinese in 1975. But the last real
military engagement between the two armies was at Nathu La in Sikkim in 1967, in which 88 Indian
soldiers lost their lives, and more than 300 Chinese soldiers were killed.

But all these incidents were prior to the two countries signing, starting from 1993, various
agreements for maintaining peace and tranquility on the border.
Moreover, at least 20 soldiers including a Commanding Officer lost their lives on a single day in
Galwan

What exactly happened in the Galwan Valley ?

Tensions had been running high in the area for the past few weeks, with a large number of soldiers
and military equipment deployed along the LAC by both sides. Even though the LAC in Galwan Valley
was never disputed by the two sides, the Chinese had moved into the Indian side of the LAC. After
the meeting at the level of Corps Commanders on June 6, negotiations had been conducted between
local military commanders of both the armies for a mutually agreed disengagement process.

As part of that process, a buffer zone had been agreed to be created between the LAC and the
junction of the Shyok and Galwan rivers to avoid any faceoff between the two armies. The two
armies were to move back by a kilometre each in that area as a first step.

When Colonel B Santosh Babu, who was monitoring this process, noticed that a Chinese camp was
still existing in the area, he went to get it removed. This soon led to fisticuffs and blows being
exchanged, resulting in deaths and injuries.

Were the Indian soldiers not carrying weapons?

No, this is as per the drill followed by both sides in the border areas to avoid inadvertent escalation
by opening fire.

This is in tune with the 1996 agreement between the two countries on Confidence Building
Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas,
which imposed a lot of restrictions on military equipment, exercises, blasts, and aircraft in the
vicinity of the LAC.

China's intentions

The deaths of 20 soldiers in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh, where Indian and Chinese forces are facing
off, is the first such incident in 45 years. According to Adhir Ranjan Chowdhury, Congress leader in
Lok Sabha, this escalation “underlines the scale of the problem and the challenge ahead” for New
Delhi in its dealings with Beijing. Chowdhury argues in The Indian Express that “China has clearly
twisted the crisis into a strategic opportunity by taking advantage of the geo-political distraction”.

That China is becoming more belligerent across strategic theatres, challenging the status quo, is
supported by multiple examples from the South China Sea. For the Government of India, this is a
moment to guard against complacency, fostered by decades of nimble diplomacy that led to
equilibrium, however precarious, on the border issue with China. It was complacency, fostered by
the 1999 bus ride to Lahore, that perhaps led to the Kargil conflict.

More worryingly, Beijing may have concluded that heightened aggression along the LAC will
invariably bring India to the negotiating table—that India will grant China greater political
concessions, market access or economic bargains as the price for “peace and tranquillity” .China is
also using this moment to send a message to its other neighbours in the East and South China Sea.

China is demonstrating to the world the limitations of decaying American power without having to
actually confront it.
EXAMPLE - sum total of Beijing’s behaviour during the ‘Made in China’ pandemic: The acceleration of
territorial revisionism in the South China Sea; the subjugation of Hong Kong through the stoutly
contested national security law; repeated violations of Taiwanese airspace; heightened naval
aggression around Japan’s Senkaku Islands; and its most recent encroachment in Nepal.

China’s dilemma with India originates from asymmetry between China and India in their security
priorities. India sees China as its primary threat, while China sees India as a secondary challenge as
its national security

priorities unequivocally lie in the western Pacific. Because India is not China’s primary threat and
South Asia is not China’s primary theater, China would prefer to save on costs and minimize military
and strategic resources on India.

The essence of strategy lies in China’s confidence that it has the financial resources, military
capacity and domestic political consensus to sustain and prevail in a protracted standoff (or war) of
attrition

vis-à-vis India. China’s 1962 war with India and the 1979 war with Vietnam both demonstrates the
central position and essence of “self-defense war” concept in China’s playbook.

In a long-term and strategic perspective, China’s most desired option to settle the disputes and
relations with India is winning without fighting.

The logic of this option lies in the belief that the power gap between China and India will only grow
with China’s rise, and there will be a day that the power imbalance becomes so large that India will
recognize the

impracticality and impossibility of its desired endgame This diplomacy-based approach put a Band-
Aid on the most dividing and disturbing issue between two great powers in the region. And its utility
and effectiveness have come under more and more questioning as both sides try to defend their
military positions on the frontline.

GALWAN CLASH REASONS

China remains a significantly more powerful entity and its

infrastructure is still in much better shape. But Indian infrastructure
development has reached a critical point, Chinese opposition to the
255 km-long strategic Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie road has been
so vehement.

Connecting Leh to the Karakoram Pass, this all-weather road

is India’s frontal challenge to China’s expansionist designs in
the region. Despite Chinese objections, India has continued
to pursue this project given its

strategic importance. China raising the temperature on the

border is a preemptive move to dissuade India from moving
ahead.
China’s recent behaviour cannot be delinked from the global situation where Beijing has come under
pressure and is facing a global backlash for its aggression.

M Taylor Fravel - the Sino-Indian border constituted a “secondary strategic direction” for China. Its
principal interest lay in the direction of Taiwan and the western Pacific.

The domestic motivations of Beijing’s LAC aggression Covid-19 has generated a backlash against the
Chinese regime led by Xi. This has rendered his hold on power under stress, Having secured an
indefinite extension of his reign following the 19th Party Congress by effectively shelving the term
limits set by Deng Xiaoping, the denouement induced by the pandemic has in all likelihood
compelled him to keep select internal constituencies sufficiently placated and mollified. Beijing’s
outrage or pique over New Delhi assigning two Members of Parliament (MPs) to attend Taiwanese
President Tsai Ing-wen’s virtual swearing-in ceremony any appearance of weakness in Xi at home in
the face of what China perceives to be a regional and global multi-directional assault on both its
ambitions and rise as a great power could imperil his domestic grip on authority.

In the ongoing round of tensions between New Delhi and Beijing, the latter has pretty much
followed the Pakistani playbook— level a baseless charge against India, that it is trying to make
territorial gains, in order to justify its own aggression. Finally, the source of this Chinese aggression,
can be attributed to nationalism. China is picking fights with multiple actors simultaneously amid an
ongoing health pandemic precisely because of what it sees as a nationalist imperative.

How the Galwan tragedy has clarified India’s vision?

Tragedies often lead to a clarity of vision, a vision that was clouded by the misplaced sense of our
ability to manage China. New Delhi should also lose its innocence when it comes to China. Prime
Minister (PM) Narendra Modi has underlined that India wants peace but “will give a befitting reply”
if provoked the first Indian casualties on the disputed India-China boundary since 1975 should be
occasion to reconsider several long-held beliefs and methods of dealing with the relationship that
successive governments in New Delhi have adopted over the years. Foreign policymaking in India
cannot be an open, public or democratic exercise and that ‘quiet diplomacy’ is the way to go in
dealing with China. In its attempt to unilaterally define the Line of Actual Control (LAC), Beijing has
disregarded the central tenets of all pacts it has signed with India since 1993 to keep the border
peaceful.

EARLIER New Delhi was the first country to warn the world of the dangers of BRI at a time when
almost every other country was willing to buy into Beijing’s narrative. Today, India’s framing of the
BRI problems is widely accepted by most major global powers. India has also managed to shape the
global discourse on the Indo-Pacific and is now working closely with likeminded regional players into
giving it operational heft. Despite China’s continued objections to the term, IndoPacific maritime
geography is now widely accepted.

And so in its wisdom, China decided to wield the blunt instrumentality of force, hoping that this
would “teach India a lesson”. The reality is Chinese actions will produce exactly the opposite effect
of what they probably intended to do. Indian public opinion, which was already negative about
China, will now become even more strongly anti-Chinese.
The challenge in Sino-Indian ties is fundamentally structural. China is interested in shaping an
alternative global order commensurate to its growing economic and military power. And India is a
nation on China’s periphery whose rise it seeks to scuttle to secure its interests. In New Delhi, there
is now a more realistic appraisal of China. Indian foreign policy has evolved in directions that
demands reciprocity from Beijing.

China is both India’s most important neighbour, and its most significant foreign policy challenge.
India cannot ignore China, and it needs to be cognisant of the growing power differential between
the two.

The events of June 15 should set alarm bells ringing in New Delhi. India’s approach, since the 1962
War, of hedging and buck- passing can be ill afforded against Xi Jinping’s China and its “wolf-warrior
diplomacy”.

India must “punish” rather than “deny” Chinese adventurism—a significant revision of the rules of
engagement .

WHY China is foolish to make an enemy of India?

With a spiral of escalation building, a conflict so far limited to the Line of Actual Control with China
could see other theatres open up, including one in the Indian Ocean.

Unlike on the land border, where China has a relative advantage of terrain, military infrastructure
and troop strength, India is better placed at sea. In the Eastern Indian Ocean through which most of
China’s cargo and energy shipments pass, the Indian Navy is the dominant force.

From India’s point of view, China has been nothing but trouble. It remains the main international
backer of the Pakistani military establishment, a perpetual threat to regional stability.

Years of such behavior have worn down India’s cherished commitment to non-alignment — or
“strategic autonomy,” as we are supposed to call it in the post-Cold War era.

One would think the Chinese leadership, which has made such a fetish of their nation’s supposed
“century of humiliation,” China’s leaders may feel that that the U.S. has mismanaged their nation’s
emergence on the global

stage. But they have no one else to blame for their inept handling of India’s rise.

Strengths of India and its preparedness

Since the mid 2000s, for instance ,India has added to its Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) for rapid
counter offensive operations in Tibet (“Him Vijay” exercises are already being held by them in
Arunachal Pradesh—the Western sector of the LAC), improved its roads and logistical infrastructure,
augmented its firepower with the acquisition of the 145 M-777 ultra-light Howitzers from the US in
2016, deployed the Brahmos cruise missile system .

India can also exploit China’s frailties in the Indian Ocean Region and seek to interdict vital Sea Lines
of Communication (SLOC), particularly those passing through the strait of Malacca. To bolster its
counter-offensive capacity, the Indian Navy has already taken on lease a nuclear-powered attack
submarine (SSN) from Russia— the INS Chakra and recruited the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya in
2012.

India must take a more vocal stand on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea to ensure that
China’s military resources are over-extended, and cannot be concentrated in its Western theatre.

India’s commitment to the Quad and a deepening of its strategic partnership with the US, should
either be leveraged to exact concessions on the border, or used to rapidly upgrade domestic military
capacity.

Tsinghua University professor Xu Zhangrun laments the consequences of Beijing’s global

assertiveness: “Instead of embracing a [global] community,” he writes, “China is increasingly
isolating itself from it.

What is the new disengagement agreement in eastern Ladakh?

In the first major breakthrough in talks to resolve the nine-month military standoff along the Line of
Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh, China’s Defence Ministry announced Wednesday that Chinese and
Indian troops on the southern and northern shores of Pangong Tso began “synchronized and
organized disengagement” in line with the consensus reached between Corps Commanders when
they last met on January 24.

What does this disengagement process entail?

According to the statement made by Rajnath Singh in Rajya Sabha, “both sides will remove the
forward deployment in a phased, coordinated and verified manner”.

“China will pull its troops on the north bank towards the east of Finger 8. Similarly, India will also
position its forces at its permanent base at the Dhan Singh Thapa post near Finger 3. Similar action
will be taken by both the parties in the south bank area as well.”

Both sides have also agreed that the area between Finger 3 and Finger 8 will become a no-patrolling
zone temporarily, till both sides reach an agreement through military and diplomatic discussions to
restore patrolling.

Further, all the construction done by both sides on the north and south banks of the lake since April
2020 will be removed.

Why is this area important?

The north and south banks of Pangong Tso are two of the most significant and sensitive regions
when it comes to the current standoff that began in May 2020. What makes the areas around the
shores of the lake so sensitive and important is that clashes here marked the beginning of the
standoff; it is one of the areas where the Chinese troops had come around 8 km deep west of India’s
perception of the Line of Actual Control.

China had positioned its troops on the ridgeline connecting Fingers 3 and 4, while according to India
the LAC passes through Finger 8.
Why has this taken so long?

Since September, China has insisted that India first pull its troops back from the south bank of
Pangong Tso, and the Chushul sub- sector. However, India has been demanding that any
disengagement process should include the entire region, and troops should go back to their April
2020 positions.

However, it seems that for now both sides have agreed to first disengage from the Pangong Tso area
only.

Singh mentioned on Thursday that in the military and diplomatic discussions with China since last
year, “we have told China that we want a solution to the issue on the basis of three principles:

(i) LAC should be accepted and respected by both the parties.

(ii) Neither party should attempt to change the status quo unilaterally.

(iii) All agreements should be fully adhered to by both parties.

Also, for disengagement in the friction areas, he said, “India is of the view that the forward
deployments of 2020 which are very close to each other should be pulled back and both the armies
should return to their permanent and recognised posts”

Does this mean that the standoff is resolved?

That’s a clear no. Even Singh said in his statement that “there are still some outstanding issues that
remain regarding deployment and patrolling on LAC” and mentioned that “our attention will be on
these in further discussions”.

What are the hurdles?

Two of the main stumbling blocks in finding a permanent resolution are lack of trust and no clarity
on intent.

Any permanent resolution will include first, disengagement of troops from the frontlines from all
friction points, then de-escalation that will entail sending the troops from the depth areas to their
original bases. Both sides have around 50,000 troops in the region, along with additional tanks,
artillery and air defence assets.

As the standoff progressed in the months of May, June and July, there was a mirrored military build-
up from both sides. A resolution has to include sending these troops and military equipment where
they came from on both sides.

But neither side had been willing to take the first step to reduce their troop or military strength, as it
does not trust the other side. Sources in the military establishment have reiterated multiple times
that what was China’s intent for diverting its troops last May from their traditional exercise in the
region to the LAC, which led to the standoff is not known.

Further, this is not the first disengagement attempt even for this standoff.

Analysis
India must be pleased. This outcome means that it was able to force Chinese troops out of what New
Delhi believes is its side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that divides the two countries. India, in
short, has repeated the military success it achieved during the Doklam crisis in 2017, when the two
faced off over China’s attempt to build a road and both sides eventually withdrew their troops. The
latest showdown originated in May 2020, when the Chinese army prevented Indian soldiers from
patrolling up to their claim lines and established permanent structures on its own side. Both in terms
of geography and numbers, China’s intrusion was neither local nor limited.

If China had aimed to coerce India into accepting its territorial claims along the LAC, the massacre at
Galwan Valley emboldened New Delhi’s resolve to fight back. What followed was a concerted effort
to use all of the economic, diplomatic, and military power at India’s disposal to push China to return
to the status quo—what it called a “strategy of hurt.” This strategy communicated a simple dictum
to Beijing: China should remove its soldiers and its bases, or India would inflict economic, diplomatic,
and military costs.

India’s opening gambit was economic sanctions against Chinese firms operating in the country. India
may be dependent on trade with China for the import of raw materials and finished goods, but China
also has large stakes in Indian markets—especially when it comes to technology. So it made sense
that, as the border crisis with China escalated, India moved to ban Chinese apps and disallowed
Chinese state-owned companies from investing in infrastructure projects. The threat of economic
decoupling, including a prospective ban on Huawei from India’s 5G infrastructure, followed.

Diplomatically, too, India embraced the West more firmly, signing an agreement that furthers
military cooperation between the United States and India and inviting Australia to participate in joint
naval exercises. It also sent an Indian destroyer to the South China Sea to signal its decision to side
with the West on disputes there.

Militarily, India built up a local preponderance of forces and materiel to deter any further Chinese
activities. The effort marked the biggest mobilization of the Indian Armed Forces in recent decades.

Military deterrence and economic and diplomatic maneuvering could not have altered China’s cost-
benefit calculus on their own. After all, even with its show of strength, India’s military is still leagues
behind China’s in terms of size and equipment, and China’s vastly larger economy could absorb any
economic costs from India’s disengagement

So why did Beijing ultimately agree to a reinstatement of the status quo?

To alter Beijing’s cost-benefit matrix, India needed not military deterrence but to change the tactical
military reality on the border. Its increased military presence provided options for employing limited
but innovative force to buy leverage at the negotiating table. In the mountains, that meant
occupying the higher ground. For example, in a late August preemptive move, the Indian Army
captured the dominant features of the Kailash mountain range overseeing China’s positions in both
the north and the south bank of the Pangong Tso lake.

Indian forces also captured the dominant heights on the north bank of the lake. This tactical
maneuver surprised the Chinese troops that remained ensconced on the lower ridges. India’s
military actions had increased the costs for China to hold on to the territory it had grabbed. That
gave India the tactical advantage so long as the conflict remained limited to the LAC.
The limited disengagement in the Pangong Tso lake region should not, however, distract from the
systemic obstacles in Sino-Indian relations. China’s growing power and its constant use of the
border dispute to coerce India will remain New Delhi’s primary strategic challenge. India is now
facing a hostile great power that not only eyes its territory but also detests its rise in the global
order.

The first concerns India’s military reorientation toward its northern borders. After almost half a
century of a Pakistan-centric military posture, the Indian military—on land, air, and sea—will now be
oriented toward China. Major reconfiguration in force positioning of the Indian Army, Air Force, and
Navy is already underway.

Second, the process of India’s economic decoupling with China—which started with New Delhi’s
decision to stay out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a free trade agreement
that includes China—will continue apace. India may relent on a few matters, but the larger trajectory
of Sino-Indian economic relations is now set. Members of the Quad—Australia, India, Japan, and the
United States—are increasingly realizing that Chinese power depends on the country’s economic
interdependence with the liberal economies. Constraining China militarily will necessitate its
economic isolation. India and the other Quad countries will feel the hurt in the near to midterm, but
in the long term, marginalizing China will hurt Beijing more.

Finally, New Delhi will not stray from its increasing alignment with the West. If earlier India was band
wagoning with the United States for material and status gain, today its requirement now is more
existential: It needs the United States and the Quad members to provide the country with
technology, money, and arms to internally balance China.

Disengagement from Pangong Tso is just the beginning of the Sino-Indian military de-escalation.
However, it will not resolve the fundamental problems of their bilateral relations. China’s military
rise and its penchant for territorial aggrandizement will continue to push Sino-Indian relations
through cycles of violence.

ISSUES IN INDIA CHINA RELATIONS

Border Issues:

• Dispute is in three sectors:

v Eastern sector - 91,000 square miles – Dispute on McMohan line .
v Middle Sector- Least disputed
v Western Sector – 38,000 square miles under Chinese occupation Johnson line and
McDonald line.

India China Boundary Dispute

• The border between India and China is not clearly

demarcated.

The boundary dispute is divided into three sectors, viz. Western, Middle and Eastern.
 • The boundary dispute in the Western Sector (Ladakh) pertains to the Johnson Line proposed
by the British in the 1860s that extended up to the Kunlun Mountains and put Aksai Chin in
the then princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.
• India used the Johnson Line and claimed Aksai Chin as its own. China, however, do not
recognise it and instead accepts McDonald Line which puts Aksai Chin under its control.
• In the Middle Sector (Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand), the dispute is a minor one.
• Here border is the least controversial except for the precise alignment to be followed in the
Barahoti plains. India and China have exchanged maps on which they broadly agree.
• The disputed boundary in the Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim) is over the
McMahon Line (in Arunachal Pradesh) decided in 1914 in a meeting of Representatives of
China, India, and Tibet in Shimla.
• Though the Chinese representatives at the meeting initiated the agreement, they
subsequently refused to accept it .The Tawang tract claimed by China was taken over by
India in 1951.

Understanding Sino-Indian border issues

The border between India and China is not clearly demarcated throughout. India, following
Independence, believed it had inherited firm boundaries from the British, but this was contrary to
China’s view. China felt the British had left behind a disputed legacy on the boundary between the
two newly formed republics.

Nearly six decades have passed since then, but the border issue remains unresolved. It has turned
into one of the most protracted border disputes in the world. Since 1981, when the first round of
border talks was held, officials from India and China have met a number of times to find a solution to
the issue. The two countries are also engaged in Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) on the
border with bilateral agreements signed in 1993, 1996,2003, 2005, 2012 and 2013. By the beginning
of the 21st century, the two sides had agreed not to let the border dispute affect bilateral
engagements. During Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003, the two sides
agreed on the appointment of special representatives for consultations aimed at arriving at a
framework for a boundary settlement that would provide the basis for the delineation and
demarcation of the border. This has resulted into Political parameters and guiding principles for
resolution of dispute.

Despite two decades of CBMs and the thaw in bilateral relations, incidents on the border, known as
“incursions”, “intrusions” or “violations” continue to be reported in the Indian media .

The Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) signed by the two countries in 2013 was
aimed at preventing incidents involving tailing of patrols, and generally streamlining channels of
communication in case of a faceoff. A five-layer mechanism for communication between the two
sides was agreed upon: first, flag meetings between border personnel on the LAC; second, meetings
between senior officers of China’s Military Regions and India’s Army Commands; third, periodic
meetings at the ministry level; fourth, meetings of the Working Mechanism (set up in 2013); and
fifth, the apex India-China Annual Defence Dialogue.

Conclusion
Given China’s push for the Belt and Road Initiative, and given that its China Pakistan Economic
Corridor project has already affected India’s sovereignty claims in certain parts of Kashmir, it is
incumbent upon India to bring the settlement of the India- China border issue to the forefront of its
relationship with China.

• High Trade Deficit

India's trade deficit with China is $45.91 billion.

Indian economy is deeply intertwined with Chinese exports

China’s share in Indian imports for intermediate goods, capital goods, and final consumer goods is
12%, 30%, and 26% respectively. India depends on China in many key industries from electrical
machinery and appliances to pharmaceutical drug API. In recent years, there have been certain
mobile companies shifting their assembly lines to India, which is a step in the right direction but still,
all the key high-end manufacturing components like the display, chipset, and memory are being
imported from China.

Cost is a vital reason why Chinese products dominate markets across sectors. Products such as
fertilisers are 76% cheaper, electronic circuits 23%, and data processing units around 10% cheaper if
made in China. It will be hard to substitute or compete with those prices. Since the pandemic, there
are calls to diversify the supply chain. The Indo-American Chamber of Commerce said that around
1,000 firms were planning to leave China but only 300 of them were serious about investing in India.

The current trade scenario suggests that the nationalistic notions of bringing China to its knees by
boycotting Chinese goods has been a flop. The simple example that even a good as small as LEDs are
still cheaper than Indian alternatives by almost 50% despite a 40% hike in prices of the Chinese
goods is indicative of that. This indicates that India needs to undertake a series of reforms like land
and labour reforms to foster growth and investment. India also needs to scale up domestic
production in key sectors including electrical machinery and pharmaceuticals to replace those
imports. Without any of these key reforms, the Prime Minister’s call for ‘Aatma Nirbhar Bharat’ will
remain a mere slogan as it currently appears to be now and that is why we see a booming trade
relationship between India and China after the Galwan Valley incident and will continue to see a
significant dependence on China for the foreseeable future.

India-China economic ties: Impact of Galwan

In recent years, the India-China bilateral relationship has been characterised by historical animosities
and border disputes. Nevertheless, the economic ties have grown since the early 2000s and have
been at the forefront of this relationship. Trade and investment have provided a cushion to this
otherwise tricky relationship.

The bilateral trade that stood at US$ 3 billion in the year 2000 grew to US$ 92.68 billion in 2019.
China was India’s second-largest trading partner in 2019 and emerged as the largest trading partner
in the first half of FY 20-21. The bilateral trade declined by only 15% compared to a 32.46% decline in
overall trade in 2020-21. China accounted for 5% of India’s exports and 14 % of India’s imports in
2019. This had led to a very high trade deficit of US$ 56.77 billion in 2019. Attempts have been made
to reduce the India-China trade deficit through bilateral talks. The issue, for instance, was raised at
the bilateral informal summit in Mahabalipuram, and both sides agreed to set up a new high level
economic and trade dialogue mechanism to address this issue.
China forms an integral part of the global supply chain, and India too is heavily dependent on
Chinese imports, ranging from a variety of raw materials to critical components. According to data
from 2019, a staggering 70% of electronic components, 45% of consumer durables, 70% of Active
Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs), and 40% of leather goods come from China. According to a
response to a query in Rajya Sabha, India has the world’s third-largest pharmaceutical industry for
which 2/3rds of its key ingredients come from China.

Meanwhile, the Galwan Valley incident in mid-June led to calls for boycotting of Chinese goods.
According to a survey conducted by Local Circles, 87% of Indian consumers were willing to boycott
Chinese goods. One of the prime campaigns was to boycott Chinese goods for Diwali and it was seen
that even in the Prime Minister’s home state of Gujarat in Ahmedabad, 80% of the decorative lights
and LEDs sold in shops were still ‘Made in China.’

Effect of the Galwan Valley incident

There has also been an effort to reduce India’s dependence on Chinese goods.

The Indian Railways, for instance, cancelled an INR 471 Crore deal with a Chinese firm. Similarly,
state-owned telecom firm BSNL was instructed not to use gear from Chinese firm Huawei for a
network upgrade.

The government has mandated all products to have the Country of Origin tag for products on the
Government e-Marketplace in an effort to identify Chinese-origin goods. In early July 2020, the
Ministry of Power restricted power supply systems and networks import from China citing cyber and
security threats, which constitute about 30% of the total imports from China. In the last 10 years,
12,540 MW out of 22,420 MW of the supercritical power plants were built using Chinese equipment.
India also extended safeguard taxes on imports of solar cells and modules as well as imposed anti-
dumping duty on several goods.

In July, India placed colour television sets imports under the restricted category, thus requiring a
licence to import; and air conditioners under the prohibited category.

Water issues

China plans to build a major dam on Brahmaputra,a run-of-the-river

dams on Yarlung Zangbo.

The Tibetan plateau is often called the “Third Pole”, owing to its glacial
expanses and vast reserves of freshwater. It is a source of seven of the
South Asia’s largest rivers- the Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, Irrawaddy,
Salween, Yangtze and Mekong.

Current status of India-China water relationship

Trans-border rivers flowing from China to India fall into two main
groups
• The Brahmaputra River System on the Eastern side consisting river Siang (mainstream of
river Brahmaputra) and its tributaries i.e., Subansiri and Lohit

• The Indus River System on the Western side consists of river Indus and the river Sutlej.

There is no institutionalized mechanism on water cooperation

between India and China, both countries have signed only .

MoU for Hydrological Information of the River Brahmaputra in

2002.

2010 MoU on Hydrological Data Sharing on River Sutlej /

Langqen Zangbo (renewed in 2015)

ELM (Expert Level Mechanism) to cooperate in emergency

management (e.g., flood), trans- border Rivers issues etc. in
2006.

Besides these continuous diplomatic engagement plays a key role in sustained communication for
data sharing and other developments in the river systems.

Concerns that India has regarding the recent developments on Brahmaputra?

Volume and quality of water: Experts have highlighted that even Run-of-the-river projects will
significantly reduce the availability of water in the North-Eastern region.

Creation of hydroelectric projects would alter the flow of water and potentially increase the siltation
levels, thus affecting the quality of water in the lower riparian states.

Absence of transparency in developments: Chinese infrastructural developments in the Tibetan

region have not been transparent. E.g.- Road developments near the India-Tibet border etc.

Lack of trust on China: China’s past record of strong-arming Southeast Asian countries in Lancang-
Mekong Cooperation (LMC) framework

Potential use as political leverage in border disputes: For example, China stopped sharing of
hydrological data on Brahmaputra during the Doklam standoff. (But it was sharing the same with
Bangladesh.)

National Security implication: Availability of water can directly affects the existence of a large
section of people.Poor water availability in the Eastern region can trigger a fresh influx of refugees
from Bangladesh

Environmental Impact: Increased pollution (Siang- Brahmaputra’s main artery recently turned
blackish grey as it entered India), potential impact on climate change, threat to biodiversity in the
region and altering the monsoonal patterns of the region.

Increased disaster vulnerability: Artificially controlling and consequent sudden releases of the flow
of water increases the probability of floods especially in lower riparian . Also, China plans to build
this infrastructure by using small nuclear explosions, this will not only impact the seismic balance of
the region but also will have a radioactive fallout (affecting agriculture and water quality).
Course of action for India?

Experts have suggested to go beyond monitoring to secure its interests. Following steps can be taken
by India

Strengthening its hydrological capacity: Increase the monitoring capacity. + satellite-based

monitoring for activity and infrastructural developments

Building international consensus against Chinese activities: Persuade other lower riparian states
like Bangladesh, ASEAN countries

Efforts can also be made to draw out a consensus of a collective of democracies in pursuance of
International law of ‘Prior Appropriation’. In accordance with the law, India being the first user has
rights to use same quantity of water for hydropower projects on Brahmaputra against China.

Drawing clear red lines and communicate the same to China.

Geographically, India and China share a water system and that fact will not change in the
foreseeable future. As a result, pressure and counter pressure tactics can only be a solution in the
short-term. In the long-term, strained water relations between countries will hinder the
development on both sides. In the light of this, India could make an effort to further strengthen
cooperation through diplomatic channels available like the Expert Level Mechanism and using other
diplomatic means like the Himalayan Charter and Himalayan Council for the future of the Himalayas
among others.

Why India is opposed to joining Belt and Road Initiative?

China’s Belt and Road Forum, hosted with great fanfare,

signals the priority of this flagship connectivity initiative
while also underlining its credentials as the new “shaper” of
global trends and norms. Exhorting all countries to
participate, Chinese President Xi Jinping suggested that
“what we hope to create is a big family of harmonious co-
existence.”

The policy initiative aims to enhance China’s centrality in the global economic unilateral approach in
how the project is conceived and implemented so far belies the rhetoric of multilateralism
emanating from Beijing.

Taking inspiration from the ancient Silk Road trading route, China’s One Belt One Road initiative, or
OBOR, hopes to link more than 65 countries, encompassing up to 40 percent of global GDP. Xi’s
signature foreign paradigm – linking China to Asia, Europe and Africa via an ambitious network of
ports, roads, rail and other infrastructure projects. Beginning in China’s Fujian province, the
projected Maritime Silk Route passes through the Malacca Strait to the Indian Ocean, moving along
the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, ending in Venice.

The scale and scope of OBOR is huge, with at least $1 trillion in investments. China, desperate to
deflect criticism that OBOR is primarily an instrument for Chinese expansionism, managed to
convince heads of 29 states and governments to participate in the summit.

The West views this as a Chinese bilateral project being touted a multilateral venture. The outgoing
president of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China complains that the OBOR has “been hijacked by
Chinese companies, which have used it as an excuse to evade capital controls, smuggling money out
of the country by disguising it as international investments and partnerships.”

The rest of the world is more receptive. Lavishing praise on China for the OBOR initiative while
targeting the US, Putin warned at the summit that “protectionism is becoming the new normal,”
adding that the “ideas of openness and free trade are increasingly often being rejected (even) by
those who until very recently expounded them.”

India refused to participate, maintaining opposition to China’s investment in the China-Pakistan

Economic Corridor, or CPEC, which passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. India, boycotting the
event, announced in an official statement: “No country can accept a project that ignores its core
concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Indian Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar articulated
this position at the 2017 Raisina Dialogue: “China is very sensitive about its sovereignty. The
economic corridor passes through an illegal territory, an area that we call Pak-occupied Kashmir. You
can imagine India’s reaction at the fact that such a project has been initiated without consulting us.”
Prime Minister Narendra Modi reinforced this point, asserting that “connectivity in itself cannot
override or undermine the sovereignty of other nations.”

The advantages for India of joining China’s multibillion dollar OBOR initiative are apparent, and the
economic logic is compelling. With bilateral trade of $70.08 billion in 2016, China remains India’s
largest trading partner. Last year also saw record Chinese investments into India reaching close to $1
billion. Compared to this, China’s economic ties with Pakistan remain underwhelming with bilateral
trade volume reaching $13.77 last year.

Yet against the backdrop of deteriorating Sino-Indian ties, India cannot feasibly join the OBOR
project without challenging the very foundations of its foreign policy. The $55 billion CPEC would link
China’s Muslim-dominated Xinjiang Province to the Gwadar deep-sea port in Pakistan. Despite the
rhetoric, Beijing’s priority in pumping huge sums into a highly volatile Pakistani territory is not to
provide economic relief for Pakistan’s struggling economy or to promote regional economic
cooperation.

The long-term strategic consequences of OBOR for India could also allow China to consolidate its
presence in the Indian Ocean at India’s expense. Indian critics contend that China may use its
economic power to increase its geopolitical leverage and, in doing so, intensify security concerns for
India. CPEC gives China a foothold in the western Indian Ocean with the Gwadar port, located near
the strategic Strait of Hormuz, where Chinese warships and a submarine have surfaced. Access here
allows China greater potential to control maritime trade in that part of the world – a vulnerable
point for India, which sources more than 60 percent of its oil supplies from the Middle East. What’s
more, if CPEC does resolve China’s “Malacca dilemma” – its over-reliance on the Malacca Straits for
the transport of its energy resources – this gives Asia’s largest economy greater operational space to
pursue unilateral interests in maritime matters to the detriment of freedom of navigation and trade-
energy security of several states in the Indian Ocean region, including India.

More generally, the Maritime Silk Road reinforces New Delhi’s concerns about encirclement.
Beijing’s port development projects in the Indian Ocean open the possibility of dual-use facilities,
complicating India’s security calculus. The Belt and Road Initiative is a highly ambitious undertaking
in line with China’s aspirations to emerge as the central economic power at a time when the United
States makes plans to step back from global affairs.
Why India is opposed to CPEC Project ?

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is China’s ambitious project

for increasing connectivity and economic cooperation within
Eurasia. Since its announcement in 2013, the BRI has been
positively received by many countries covered within its
ambit. New Delhi sent a clear message to Beijing that it
doesn’t support CPEC. India registered its protest by
boycotting the high-profile Belt and Road Forum organised
by China. Its principal objection was that CPEC passed
through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).

The Ministry’s statement read: “Our position on OBOR/BRI is

clear and there is no change. The so-called ‘China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor’ violates India’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity. No country can accept a project that ignores its
core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

India’s position will undoubtedly have a larger impact on China-India relations. PoK is considered a
contested territory by the international community. Nevertheless, for India, PoK remains an
emotional and sensitive issue. It is little wonder that China’s insistence on establishing the CPEC
project through PoK is seen by India as a deliberate disregard of its territorial claims.

At a broader level, if China invests heavily in the region, it risks becoming party to what has been a
troubling bilateral dispute between nuclear-armed rivals. If CPEC gets operationalised and fortifies
the emergence of a fully functional China-Pakistan axis, this would hamper India’s larger interests in
the South Asian region and force astrategic rethink in South Block. The incentives for this would be
even stronger if CPEC’s potential success renders PoK more industrially developed, thus granting
Pakistan greater legitimacy over the region Whether India has any road map to take the
conversation on PoK forward is a different debate but no nation can be expected to wilfully forsake
its territorial claims. Had India not registered its protest, that would have been perceived as a
weakness, and would have been a setback for India’s emerging power status in the international
system.

China's reaction to India's concerns

India’s concerns over sovereignty relating to the USD 46-billion China Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC) is “unwarranted,”asking New Delhi to take an “objective and more pragmatic” view of China’s
ambitious Silk Road project.

India’s concerns were “unwarranted.” “China respects India’s sovereignty concerns. Taking a strong
stand on territorial issues is important, but it’s hoped India could adopt an objective and more
pragmatic attitude towards the One Belt, One Road proposal.”

New Delhi fears that the CPEC, passing through the Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, would serve the
purpose of granting legitimacy to Pakistan’s control over the region, and by promoting the
construction of the corridor, China intends to meddle in the Kashmir dispute. These concerns are
unwarranted.”
“China has no intention of interfering in the territorial dispute between India and Pakistan. China has
long believed that the two neighbours should solve their dispute through dialogue and
consultations, and it has repeatedly emphasised that the construction of the CPEC would not affect
its stance on the issue,”. India’s official position : minister of external afaairs in rajya sabha

“Government’s concerns arise in part from the fact that the inclusion of the so-called illegal ‘China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor’ (CPEC) as a flagship project of ‘OBOR/BRI’, directly impinges on the
issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity of India. This so-called illegal ‘China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor’ (CPEC) passes through parts of the Union Territories of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh
which are under illegal occupation of Pakistan. Government has conveyed its concerns to the
Chinese side about their activities in areas illegally occupied by Pakistan in the Union Territories of
Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh and has asked them to cease such activities.

Further, the Government is of the firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on
universally recognized international norms. They must follow principles of openness, transparency
and financial responsibility and must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty, equality
and territorial integrity of other nations.

S Jaishankar at 2017 Raisina Dialogue : “The economic corridor passes through an illegal territory,
an area that we call Pak-occupied Kashmir. You can imagine India’s reaction at the fact that such a
project has been initiated without consulting us.”

Prime Minister Narendra Modi too asserted that “connectivity in itself cannot override or
undermine the sovereignty of other nations”.

China & Kashmir

Article 370 abrogation

On 5 August 2019, the Government of India (GoI) announced the abrogation of Article 370 of the
Constitution and the bifurcation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) into two union territories.
This triggered an unprecedented international response.

Soon after the announcement, India embarked on a massive diplomatic outreach to assuage the
concerns of the global community.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

While India struggled with Pakistan over Kashmir, it was also engaged in a dispute with Beijing over
Aksai Chin—an isolated, inhospitable plain, west of the Karakoram range. In the 1950s, China began
the construction of a road in this region, to connect Xinjiang with Tibet, both of which it had recently
annexed then. The road ran through Aksai Chin, with China taking effective control over the area.
After the 1962 Sino-India war, China retained control of a large part of the territory, despite India’s
rightful claim over it being a part of Ladakh.

During this time, China and Pakistan’s friendship deepened, and Pakistan gifted a part of Kashmir
called “Shaksgam Valley” to China in 1963. An article of the Sino-Pakistan Border Agreement, which
ceded the land, states, “[T]he two Parties have agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir
dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned will re-open negotiations
with the Government of China … so as to sign a Boundary Treaty to replace the present
agreement.”[8] This effectively made China’s claim over the Shaksgam Valley contingent on the
settlement of the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan.

While it was favourably received by both India and Pakistan, the agreement was ignored in most
other countries.

China' response

China’s response to the changes in Kashmir focused on its concern over Ladakh becoming a Union
Territory. It called the move “unacceptable,” claiming that it would directly “impede China’s
sovereignty. China’s statements suggest that its opposition to the removal of Article 370 is driven by
a fear that it would further complicate its boundary issue with India, in light of the 740-km LoC in
J&K.

However, China soon revised its statement, stating that the Kashmir issue should be resolved
bilaterally in a peaceful manner and that both sides must avoid any action that could escalate
tensions in the region. During a China–Pakistan meeting in Beijing, the Chinese foreign minister said
the solution should be in accordance with the UN Charter and relevant UNSC resolutions. On
Pakistan’s insistence, China called for a private meeting to discuss Kashmir at the UNSC.

Over the last few decades, China’s policy on J&K has vacillated, with Beijing choosing to call it a
solely India–Pakistan issue whenever it suited its interests. ern borders.

Over the years, China has come to refer to J&K as a “disputed territory” or as “India-controlled
Kashmir,” lending further legitimacy to Pakistan’s cause. In 2010, China started issuing stapled visas
to the residents of J&K, manifesting its desire to cement its pro-Pakistan stance.

Beijing’s interests in Jammu and Kashmir are both strategic and economic. The crown head of the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) runs through parts of
POK. The sovereignty of this part is disputed, as India has repeatedly claimed the territory as its own.
Recent statements from top ministers of the GoI have made it clear that the government will make
efforts take control of POK, which directly impinges upon China’s interests in the region. The latter’s
US$19- billion investment in CPEC is directly linked to the Indo-Pak territorial dispute over J&K,
which will be affected by the balance of power shifting towards India.

China’s desire to undermine India’s legitimate claim over J&K is fuelled by its hegemonic ambitions
in the subcontinent. In 2010, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh warned that “Beijing could be
tempted to use India’s ‘soft underbelly’, J&K, and Pakistan ‘to keep India in low-level equilibrium’.
Thus, China’s economic and military support for Pakistan is designed in a manner that does not
necessarily strengthen Islamabad but hopes to offset the growing power differential it has with New
Delhi. The CPEC allows Beijing quicker access to the Arabian Sea, and a network of transportation
infrastructure allows for the encirclement of India.

For now, China seems to have taken a restrained position on the J&K matter. This is partly because
the August 2019 decision does not change the status quo along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Alliances will form a key area in the US strategic competition with China. The Biden team will have to
work hard to convince them that the US is willing to play a leadership role once again, whether it is
in Europe in relation to Russia or in the western Pacific with China. The Trump administration’s
handling of alliances has left a trail of suspicion that the US is unwilling or unable to play a significant
role outside its own immediate region. Its shambolic handling of the Covid pandemic has only
deepened this worry.
The administration has been particularly careful to identify the Indo-Pacific as a priority region. The
Indo-Pacific team under Kurt Campbell is the largest regional team in the National Security Council
which has a generous quota of Indian Americans at the leadership levels.

Biden himself underscored the importance he attaches to Quad in his telephone conversation with
PM Modi last week. The American readout noted that the two leaders agreed to ‘continuing close
cooperation to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific’ as well as for a ‘stronger regional architecture
through the Quad.’

Revival of the Middle Kingdom-A post-pandemic world order

Since World War II, however, it has incorporated

several strains of ideological and enduring civilisational
beliefs.

Take the case of China, for example, which is

attempting to upstage, or at least match, the U.S. as
the principal global hegemon. Realising that mere
ideology was not enough to propel it to that position,
Mao Zedong’s successors have drawn on two
civilisational markers from Chinese history that have troubled the Chinese people for centuries: the
‘Middle Kingdom’ syndrome and ‘the Century of Humiliation’. While the first marker builds on the
glory of the Ming Dynasty (late 14th century to mid-17th century) and the centrality of the Han
people in a world order that saw China as the most prosperous nation in the world, it also reminds
the Chinese people of the dangers that lurk around its periphery. Chinese leaders often draw
attention to the Mongol rule (late 13th century to mid-14th century) and over two centuries of
misrule by the Manchus and the Qing Dynasty (mid-17th century to early 20th century) as examples
of this.

The second marker draws on the stripping of China of its honour and resources by multiple colonial
powers during the ‘Century of Humiliation’ from the mid-19th century to the time of the emergence
of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. These markers from Chinese history have gradually
become dogma and seen as a blot on Chinese history that need resolution.

Realising in the 1980s that Maoist ideology no longer appealed to

the Chinese people, Deng reintroduced Confucianism as a much-
needed intellectual and ethical prop to China’s push for ‘great
power’ status. Sun Tzu re-emerged as China’s answer to
Clausewitz and for a few decades it appeared that these would
soften traditional Chinese dogma. It also raised hopes that China
would largely play by the existing rules and bide its time.

Xi Jinping, however, has been a leader in a hurry. In the process, he has perpetuated the deepened
hurt of the Chinese people to an extent that it has become embedded dogma. He has abandoned
Confucianism and the ethical pursuit of power, and fallen back on hard-core communist ideology.
Hard power and muscular nationalism coupled with a neo-colonial and mercantilist attitude towards
vulnerable nations seems to be the new strategy to compete with the U.S. While this strategy
seemed to be working at a time when the U.S. appeared to be looking inwards and showing signs of
strategic fatigue, President Xi’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative demonstrated an overreach that
had the potential to backfire as it created a sense of fear of, rather than respect for China.

Demonstration of flexibility

India is neither afflicted by unreasonable expectations of power, ideological dogma, or haunted by

accentuated perceptions of historical hurt. Despite its own centuries of conquest and exploitation by
invaders and colonial powers, it has demonstrated resilience, learnt to let go and embraced the
good that emerged from the centuries of darkness.

South China Sea – should India worry?

Importance of South China Sea

The SCS is an important junction for navigation between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It connects
with the Indian Ocean through the Malacca Strait to the southwest, and commands access to the
East China Sea to the northeast. The sea lane running between the Paracel and Spratly Islands is
used by oil tankers moving from the Persian Gulf to Japan as well as by warships en route from the
Indian Ocean to the Pacific. Security in the SCS is a concern both for regional countries such as China,
Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, as well as the extra-regional countries, including India, due to their
strategic and economic interests in this region. Any conflict in the SCS will pose a threat to regional
and international security.

Territorial sovereignty, contention on energy, significance of the geographic location, threat to

maritime security and overlapping maritime claims are at the core of the SCS dispute The SCS, an
integrated ecosystem, is one of the richest seas in the world in terms of marine flora and fauna,
coral reefs, mangroves, seagrass beds, fish and plants. The sea accounts for approximately 10 per
cent of the annual global fisheries catchment, making it extremely viable for the fishing industries of
nearby countries.

Furthermore, value-added production (canning, filleting, fresh, frozen and chilled processing) has
translated into valuable foreign exchange earnings and job opportunities for countries in the region.
However, China has been imposing fishing rules to operate in the disputed waters, resulting in
serious maritime security concerns and objections from other claimant states. Recently, China’s new
fishing rules which came into effect on January 1, 2014 raised questions about its efforts to exercise
jurisdiction over all fishing activities in the disputed waters.

Furthermore, the region richly laden in both oil and natural gas has led to speculation that the
disputed territories could hold potentially significant energy resources. According to the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA) estimates, the SCS contains 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas in proved and probable reserves.

Most notably, the SCS occupies a significant geostrategic position in terms of international shipping
as a majority of energy shipments and raw materials have to pass through it.

Undoubtedly, the SCS is a critical corridor between the Pacific and Indian Ocean for commercial and
naval shipping China’s ordered an administrative reorganisation of its South China Sea territories,
injecting new discord in an already tense region. Beijing instituted two new municipal districts,
carving up the governance of the Paracel and Spratly island groups, earlier managed by the local
administration of Sansha — China’s southernmost city of Hainan province – between two sub-
authorities. Xisha and Nansha (Chinese names for the Paracel and Spratly Islands) will now function
as separate administrative units with jurisdiction over their respective island chains.

China’s neighbours may well have anticipated the gambit. Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia have in
recent months sought to offer pushback to Chinese aggression in their near-seas, employing
administrative, legal and operational means. In December last year, Malaysia approached the UN
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf claiming waters beyond the 200-kilometre limit of
its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the northern part of the South China Sea – a move prompted by
China’s extended presence in and around the Luconia Shoals. Weeks later, Indonesia deployed
warships and a submarine in the waters off the Natuna Islands after an encroachment by Chinese
fishing boats and coastguard ships. Earlier this month, Vietnam sent a diplomatic note to the United
Nations protesting the PRC’s sweeping assertions in the South China Sea, after a Chinese ship
rammed and sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat.

An irked China has doubled down on its territorial claims, sending in more militia and coast guard
vessels into disputed regions. The Chinese vessel and its coast guard escorts have been accused of
harassing an exploration vessel operated by

Malaysia’s state oil company. The United States has rushed to respond, ordering the USS America –
an amphibious assault ship – and guided missile warships USS Bunker Hill and USS Barry in the
region.

Three aspects of the drama unfolding in the South China Sea are relevant for India.

First, Chinese militia operations have focused on the region’s

Western end close to the Indian Ocean Region, targeting
countries that India has a close political and military relationship
with.

Second, the developments in the South China Sea coincide with

a rise in Chinese activity in the Eastern Indian Ocean, particularly
Chinese research and survey vessel presence to add to India’s
discomfort, China’s mining operations in the Southern Indian
Ocean have expanded considerably, as also the presence of
Chinese fishing boats areas close to India’s territorial waters.

A third factor for Indian analysts to consider has been the growing instances of Chinese intelligence
ship sightings in the IOR. Chinese Dongdiao class intelligence-gathering ships – known earlier to stalk
US, Australian and Japanese warships in the Western Pacific – now operate in the waters of the
Eastern Indian Ocean, keeping an eye on the Indian naval movements. One such Chinese spy ship
was spotted close to the eastern sea border near the Andaman and Nicobar Islands late last year
causing some disquiet in India’s security establishment. Regional observers are troubled by Beijing’s
attempts to take advantage of a fluid geopolitical situation following COVID-19. With many
Southeast Asia leaders sick or in self-imposed quarantine and Washington distracted by the
pandemic at home, Chinese militias have upped the tempo of operations in critical regional
hotspots.

How the South China Sea situation plays out will be critical for India 's security and well-being?

In the first place, the South China Sea is not China’s sea but a global common.
Second, it has been an important sea-lane of communication since the very beginning, and passage
has been unimpeded over the centuries.

Third, Indians have sailed these waters for well over 1,500 years — there is ample historical and
archaeological proof of a continuous Indian trading presence from Kedah in Malaysia to Quanzhou in
China.

Fourth, nearly $200 billion of our trade passes through the South China Sea and thousands of our
citizens study, work and invest in ASEAN, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

Fifth, we have stakes in the peace and security of this region in common with others who reside
there, and freedom of navigation, as well as other normal activities with friendly countries, are
essential for our economic well being.

In short, the South China Sea is our business. We have historical rights established by practice and
tradition to traverse the South China Sea without impediment.

In return, we too have to be responsive to ASEAN’s expectations. While strategic partnerships and
high-level engagements are important, ASEAN expects longer-lasting buy-ins by India in their future.
They have taken the initiative time and again to involve India in Indo-Pacific affairs.

India’s position on the South China Sea disputes has so far been neutral. A tendency to view the
region through a prism of geopolitics and “balance of power” makes Indian decision makers wary
of taking a stand on China’s aggressive posturing. Yet the costs of saying and doing nothing are
rising. To many in New Delhi, it is clear that China’s firming grip over disputed territories in the
South China Sea portends greater power projection in the Eastern Indian Ocean.

Even so, New Delhi has not abandoned its policy of non intervention in the security affairs of
Southeast Asia. India’s policy elite believe that their country is not party to the maritime territorial
disputes in the region and must refrain from meddling in a matter that does not directly concern it.
Indian decision-makers also know that Beijing operates from a position of strength in the South
China Sea, where it has physical control over critical islands. Possession of these features gives
Beijing the ability to exert strategic authority over the disputed territory, regardless of the rights and
interests of other regional states.

It continues to hope that Beijing will respect India’s sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean in the
same way that New Delhi respects China’s in Southeast Asia. Even if Beijing has not acted in good
faith recently, the Indian government is unwilling to violate their goodwill pact.

New Delhi is not impervious either to the threat China poses to trade flows in the region or to its
significant challenges to Indian energy and strategic interests. Access to the major waterways in
Southeast Asia is an important consideration for Indian policymakers, as is the need to build capacity
in member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Both are central to New
Delhi’s Indo-Pacific vision. Yet, when it comes to security issues in the South China Sea, India is wary
of provoking China. Notwithstanding the security establishment’s deep misgivings about Chinese
expansionism in littoral Asia—including in the eastern Indian Ocean—Indian diplomats and
spokespeople almost never make public their reservations about China’s maritime assertiveness.

By contrast, India is relatively open about its disagreements with the United States in the
interpretation of maritime law and the freedoms enjoyed by foreign warships in a coastal state’s
EEZ. Indian officials do not concur with U.S. claims that warships have a right to uninterrupted
passage in coastal zones without prior notification and approval of the coastal state.

Events of past weeks have shown that the imperative for India is to display solidarity with partners in
Southeast Asia. It must do so by publicly stating its discomfiture with Chinese assertiveness and by
strengthening its strategic partnerships with the United States, Japan, and Australia in the Indo-
Pacific region. At the same time, Indian officials must initiate a dialogue with China and ASEAN on a
rules-based order in Asia, setting the terms of engagement between maritime forces

The imperative for India then is to come out on the side of maritime principle in the South China Sea.
New Delhi must display solidarity with Southeast Asia partners by publically stating Indian
discomfiture with Chinese assertiveness.

India’s maritime gateway to the Pacific is South China Sea

Being one of the most important seas of the world, geopolitically, economically and strategically, the
South China Sea (SCS) attracts considerable attention in the strategic community in India. It
continues to be seen as one of the most difficult regional conflicts in the Asia-Pacific and an “arena
of escalating contention.” India has vital maritime interests in the SCS. Around 55 per cent of India’s
trade in the Asia-Pacific transits through the SCS region. In fact, in recent times, New Delhi has
become more active in expressing its interest in the freedom of navigation in the SCS and the
peaceful resolution of territorial disputes between Beijing and its maritime neighbours.

China warns India on South China Sea exploration projects

China on indicated it was opposed to India engaging in oil and gas exploration projects in the
disputed South China Sea, and warned Indian companies against entering into any agreements with
Vietnam "Our consistent position is that we are opposed to any country engaging in oil and gas
exploration and development activities in waters under China's jurisdiction," as China enjoyed
"indisputable sovereignty" over the South China Sea and its islands.

Role played by Asian Nations

Malaysia approached the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf claiming waters
beyond the 200-kilometer limit of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the northern part of the South
China Sea—a move prompted by China’s extended presence in and around the Luconia Shoals.
Weeks later, Indonesia deployed warships and a submarine in the waters off the Natuna Islands
after an encroachment by Chinese fishing boats and coast guard ships. In April, Vietnam sent a
diplomatic note to the United Nations protesting Beijing’s expanding assertions in the South China
Sea following an incident in which a Chinese ship rammed and sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat.
Unfortunately, these actions have not helped moderate Chinese behavior. With Covid-19 sweeping
through Southeast Asia, civilian and military leaders have been preoccupied with fighting the
pandemic. Regional states, moreover, are increasingly dependent on Chinese investment and
medical aid, and many are reluctant to openly criticize China’s assertive actions in their near seas. As
some see it, China’s recent moves are part of a long-standing “salami-slicing” strategy at sea: the
slow accumulation of small and stealthy actions, none of which justify a major tactical escalation by
other countries but that over time add up to a major strategic shift. China, however, has been astute
in denying neighbors the space to mount an effective response in the littoral.

Southeast Asian leaders said a 1982 UN oceans treaty should be the basis of sovereign rights and
entitlements in the South China Sea, in one of their strongest remarks opposing China’s claim to
virtually the entire disputed waters on historical grounds.
The leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations took the position in a statement issued by
Vietnam on Saturday on behalf of the 10-nation bloc.

“We reaffirmed that the 1982 UNCLOS is the basis for determining maritime entitlements, sovereign
rights, jurisdiction and legitimate interests over maritime zones,” the ASEAN statement said.

The leaders were referring to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a 1982
international agreement that defines the rights of nations to the world’s oceans.

Three Southeast Asian diplomats told that it marked a significant strengthening of the regional bloc’s
assertion of the rule of law in a disputed region that has long been regarded as an Asian flashpoint.
While it has criticised aggressive behaviour in the disputed waters, ASEAN has never castigated
China by name in its post-summit communiques.

The Philippines invoked the dispute settlement mechanism of the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) in 2013 to test the legality of China’s ‘nine-dash line’ regarding the disputed Spratlys.
In response, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague decreed in its July 12, 2016
judgment that the line had “no legal basis.” China dismissed the judgment as “null and void.”

The PCA award undermined the Chinese claim. It held that none of the features of the Spratlys
qualified them as islands, and there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights and to the
resources within the ‘nine-dash line’. The UNCLOS provides that islands must sustain habitation and
the capacity for non-extractive economic activity. Reefs and shoals that are unable to do so are
considered low-tide elevations.

The award implied that China violated the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). It noted that
China had aggravated the situation by undertaking land reclamation and construction, and had
harmed the environment and violated its obligation to preserve the ecosystem. China dismissed the
award as “a political farce under the pretext of law.”

U.S. rejects China's claims in South China Sea

The United States on rejected China's disputed claims to offshore resources in most of the South
China Sea, China has offered no coherent legal basis for its ambitions in the South China Sea and for
years has been using intimidation against other Southeast Asian coastal states, “We are making
clear: Beijings claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are completely
unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them,” said Pompeo. The U.S. has long opposed
China's expansive territorial claims on the South China Sea, sending warships regularly through the
strategic waterway to demonstrate freedom of navigation there. Monday's comments reflect a
harsher tone. “The world will not allow Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire,

Regional analysts said it would be vital to see whether other nations adopt the U.S. stance and what,
if anything, Washington might do to reinforce its position and prevent Beijing from creating “facts on
the water” to buttress its claims.

The relationship between the United States and China has grown increasingly tense over the past six
months over Beijing's handling of the coronavirus pandemic, its tightened grip on Hong Kong and its
crackdown on China's Uighur Muslim community. China claims 90% of the potentially energy-rich
South China Sea, but Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam also lay claim to parts of
it, through which about $3 trillion of trade passes each year. Beijing has built bases atop atolls in the
region but says its intentions are peaceful.
Beijing routinely outlines the scope of its claims with reference to the so-called nine-dashed line that
encompasses about nine- tenths of the 3.5-million-square-kilometer South China Sea on Chinese
maps.

China’s growing threat via debt trap diplomacy

China has been using the financial tool of debt to gain influence across the world and grab
considerable power in India’s neighbouring countries, thereby increasing the amount of political and
security threats the nation is exposed to. Mint takes a deep dive.

How does China’s debt trap diplomacy work?

In a push to gain rapid political and economic

ascendency across the globe, China is dispensing
billions of dollars in the form of concessional loans
to developing countries, mostly for their large-scale
infrastructure projects. Often, developing nations
are lured by China’s offer of cheap loans for
transformative infra projects, which involve a
substantial investment. These developing nations,
which are primarily low- or middle-income
countries, are unable to keep up with the
repayments, and Beijing then gets a chance to
demand concessions or advantages in exchange for
debt relief.

India’s former biggest trading partner, Bangladesh, has found a

new global partner in China. In the most recent exchange
between Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Bangladeshi Prime
Minister Sheikh Hasina, it was established that the economic
development of Bangladesh will be bolstered through BRI funding.
They share the opinion that the BRI establishes a model of
international cooperation for all the participants and proffers new
opportunities for regional connectivity. Beijing may seek to
leverage BRI development of Payra, a power hub, to obtain port
access in the future. Bhutan is looking at potentially partnering
with China to diversify their economy. However, reports suggest that they are likely to skip out the
upcoming BRI forum as they did in 2017, despite Chinese attempts to press for their attendance.

China’s soft power investments have attained success extending beyond BRI measures. For instance,
Sri Lanka requires technical assistance to contain the spread of the coronavirus and a model to
follow; China seems to offer both. A concessionary loan of $500 million to propel its efforts to
combat the pandemic in Sri Lanka has been granted. Ambassador Hu Wei earlier presented Sri
Lankan Minister of Health Pavithra Wanniarachchi a document that details lessons learned in China’s
handling of Covid-19. In early April, the Chinese government and companies that are involved in
major projects in Sri Lanka donated several masks, PPE, and test kits. America’s absence and India’s
inaction here have magnified China’s goodwill.
 China’s strategic commitments include the CPEC with
Islamabad to leverage Chinese capital, production
capacity, and build a “mechanism for sustainable
economic growth.” In return, Beijing gains a connection
to the Arabian Sea, a trade route to the vital Malacca
Strait. Plans with Bangladesh to construct a parallel
pipeline connecting Kunming and Chittagong are
underway. This is also a strategic backup point in the event of the US and India acting as adversaries
of China and blocking the choke-points of Malacca and the Indian Ocean region.

Despite the infrastructural void that Chinese investments fill, western analysts deem the practice a
version of debt-diplomacy — hence when the indebted economies fail to service their loans, they
are said to be pressured to support China’s geostrategic interests. Most of South Asia either did not
take serious note of this earlier and are already in too deep now, or believe that they are gaining
greater advantages imbibing this bilateral diplomacy. Soft power in South Asia has ushered a fear of
retaliation; negative impacts such as debt traps appear less threatening to these countries than
turning into China’s enemy.

What concessions are demanded by China?

There are several advantages or concessions that China asks for in exchange for debt relief. Sri
Lanka, for instance, was forced to hand over control of the Hambantota port project to China for 99
years, after it found itself under massive debt owed to Beijing. This allowed China control over a key
port positioned at the doorstep of its regional rival India, and a strategic foothold along a key
commercial and military waterway. Similarly, in exchange for relief, China constructed its first
military base in Djibouti.

Whereas Angola is replaying multibillion-dollar debt to China with crude oil, creating major problems
for its economy. What are these concessional loans granted by China?

These are loans extended to low- and middle-income countries on terms that are significantly more
generous than market loans. The ‘concessionality’ factor is achieved either by offering interest rates
that are below the market rates or leniency in the grace period, and often with a combination of
both. These loans generally have long grace periods.

Has India taken any loans from China?

India has not entered into any loan agreement directly with China. However, it has been the top
borrower of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a multilateral bank wherein China is the
largest shareholder (26.6% voting rights) and India the second (7.6% voting rights) among other
countries. China’s vote share allows it veto power over decisions requiring super-majority. Loans
provided to India could also pave the way for Chinese firms to enter and gain experience in the
promising Indian infra market.

How is the debt trap affecting India, then?

Most of India’s neighbours have fallen prey to China’s debt trap, and ceded to China’s $8 tn project –
One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) which seeks to improve connectivity among countries in Asia,
Africa and Europe. The initiative requires India to accept that the Kashmir-controlled Pakistan region,
is Pakistan, because that’s where some of the projects are. China through OBOR can hence increase
India’s political cost of dealing with its neighbours.

Covid19: Made in China pandemic

The outbreak of the novel coronavirus in Wuhan

and China’s domestic and international response to
this pandemic has forced the world to confront the
grim realities of Chinsese leadership.

Research indicates that had China taken proactive

measures to contain and suppress the pandemic
earlier in December 2019, the number of #Covid19
cases could have been mitigated by up to 95 per
cent. We now know that the opposite happened:
local authorities in China suppressed information about the outbreak, even destroying proof of the
virus sometime in December. Official censors scrubbed social media posts from medical
professionals warning of a new “SARS-like” disease. And as late as mid-January, Chinese authorities
denied evidence of any community transmission, allowing the lunar new year celebrations to
proceed despite having known about it for at least a month.

• China delayed notifying the WHO and in permitting it to inspect the situation in Wuhan;
released vital genetic information to the international community a full week after it was
isolated; and allowed millions of individuals from Wuhan to leave the city unscreened, many
of whom then travelled the world
• On cue, China’s international response changed gears. The prevailing theme that now
dominates Beijing’s state-controlled media is one of China “buying time” for the
international community to react—a claim that attempts to deflect attention from the CPC’s
and the Chinese State’s failings. Laughably, Chinese officials now appear to be engaged in an
authorized and concerted misinformation campaign, with several diplomats and even the
MFA spokesperson ludicrously claiming that the US Army was responsible for smuggling the
‘Virus’ into Wuhan.
• Beijing’s industrial prowess and control over critical supply chains, including medical
supplies, have also added a geo- economic element to the pandemic. It has raced to be seen
as providing public goods when other powers are faltering. the international community is
now confronted by a prolonged public health emergency whose contours and impact are not
even vaguely known at the moment. An equally paralysing and fearful consequence is the
global economic slowdown as a direct result of China’s irresponsible domestic and
international behaviour. A less than inspiring response to the outbreak in the US and much
of Europe will likely whitewash China’s offences against the international community in the
short term, but the long term implications will last.
WHY WUHAN?

The industrial and transportation hub on the Yangtze River is the first place the coronavirus surfaced
in the world. It’s possible that the virus came to Wuhan undetected from elsewhere, but the city of
11 million is a logical place for the mission to start.

People began falling ill in December 2019, many with links to a sprawling food market that dealt in
live animals. The growing number of patients triggered alarms that prompted China’s Center for
Disease Control and Prevention to send a team to investigate.

WHY THE SECRECY?

China has firmly rejected calls for an independent outside investigation. The head of the WHO
recently expressed impatience with how long China took to make necessary arrangements for the
expert team’s visit.

The ruling Communist Party keeps a tight hold on information and is particularly concerned about
possible revelations about its handling of the virus that could open it up to international criticism
and financial demands.

China stifled independent reports about the outbreak and has published little information on its
search for the origins of the virus.

China’s wolf warrior diplomacy

There was a time when China banked on diplomacy of deceit

with its leaders saying one thing and the government doing
something different. This is how China got India's Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru confused about Chinese
intentions before the 1962 war. Now, China has adopted a
"wolf warrior" diplomacy. China is confrontational and
conspiratorial with anybody or any country that attempts to
call the Chinese bluff in post-Covid-19 world.

This is a new form of warfare fought by China on social media, particularly Twitter, a social media
platform that is banned within China.

A recent social media post by one of its "wolf warrior" diplomats, Zhao Lijian to target Australia is a
leaf out of China's book of new diplomacy theory. Zhao Lijian earlier this week posted a digitally
manipulated image on Twitter apparently showing an Australian soldier threatening to slit the throat
of a girl. The caption of the image read: "Shocked by the murder of Afghan civilians & prisoners by
Australian soldiers."

This came against the backdrop of a report indicting Australian soldiers -- part of the international
force in Afghanistan -- for the killing of 39 Afghan civilians and prisoners. When Australia objected to
the Twitter "slur" by the official handle of the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian,
China rebuffed the objection. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison called it "outrageous",
"unjustified" and sought an apology from China. The Chinese foreign ministry refused to take down
the post and called the Australian anger as "over-reaction".

HOW DID IT BEGIN?

The term "wolf warrior diplomacy" came into vogue during the Covid-19 pandemic. The term drew
from a jingoistic Chinese film franchise, "Wolf Warrior". The second film of the series came in 2017
with a tagline, "Though far away, anyone who affronts China will pay".

This is exactly what China has been trying to do during the Covid-19 pandemic to a range of
countries -- Australia, the US, Europe, Taiwan or India -- on social media and in bilateral relations.

However, the "wolf warrior" diplomacy has its roots in the "strategy of nationalism" that China
adopted in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989.

China launched the Patriotic Education Campaign and manufactured a narrative of "Century of
Humiliation" aimed at a makeover of the Communist Party of China (CPC) from a revolutionary force
to a nationalist expression.

The nationalism campaign adopted an aggressive outlook under Xi Jinping. The Chinese state
became more and more assertive as Xi Jinping strengthened his position in China through
elimination of his rivals in the name of fighting corruption. The first sign of wolf warrior diplomacy
emerged in 2017 -- the year of the release of Wolf Warrior-2 -- when Europe found Chinese
diplomats trying to bully it.

DURING COVID-19

China was never more cornered internationally than when it found itself cornered over
mismanagement of Covid-19 and the subsequent attempt to cover it up. China has been in a tight
spot diplomatically since January this year. Incidentally, its diplomatic Twitter presence has
phenomenally increased during this period.

China's diplomatic adoption of Twitter is surprising because it does not allow its citizens to use
Twitter, whose Chinese version Weibo is a big hit in the country. But since the world listens to this
microblogging platform, China converted it into a weapon for "wolf warrior" diplomats, whose
tweets are popularised using an army of bots.

Chinese diplomats have used "provocation" as a tool to get international attention on Twitter.

The Chinese attempt has since been to blame any other country but itself for Covid-19. China has
been trying to build a narrative that it was an "efficient" and "vigilant" China that discovered a
pandemic and warned the world of the underlying dangers. In its latest attempt, China has tried to
pin the blame on India for the Covid-19 outbreak.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) only recently said it would be "highly speculative" to say that
coronavirus outbreak did not take place in China.
WHAT SUSTAINS "WOLF WARRIOR" DIPLOMACY?

That "wolf warrior" diplomacy is part of China's state policy is confirmed from reports that Xi Jinping
administration has more than doubled the budget for diplomacy and that the performance
appraisals of the foreign office staffers are linked to "public relations" activities. The second is a big
incentive for the government employees.

The fiercer they prove themselves as "wolf warrior" diplomat, the bigger would be their appraisal
and higher the career growth. Zhao Lijian saw his career take a flight after he took on the American
government over human rights abuse issue in 2019 -- from a counsellor in the Chinese embassy in
Pakistan, where for about two years he prefixed "Muhammad" to his name to becoming one of the
three formidable spokespersons in the Chinese foreign ministry.

China has adopted a ‘wolf-warrior’ mentality because an increasing sense of insecurity and
defensiveness is causing it to become aggressive,

China has been creating trouble in Hong Kong, Taiwan, India and other neighbouring countries like
Vietnam and Indonesia.

At a press conference in Beijing last Sunday, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had said that China’s
new policy is to push back against “deliberate insults”.

“We never pick a fight or bully others. But we have principles and guts. We will push back against
any deliberate insult, resolutely defend our national honour and dignity, and we will refute all
groundless slander with facts, India, NSG, and the Chinese roadblock Diplomats invested in on-going
consultations at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on India’s membership application have
suggested that more member-countries now support India’s inclusion in the Group that lays out
guidelines for exports of nuclear and related sensitive items. Yet, China’s apparent unwavered
opposition to India’s entry to the NSG, that runs on consensus, continues to hurt New Delhi’s
prospects.

Why does India want to join the NSG?

New Delhi submitted its membership application to the NSG in May 2016, a month before the Seoul
plenary of the Group. This membership application follows over a decade of cooperation between
India and the NSG. New Delhi seeks to join the Group under its larger goal of integrating completely
into the global non-proliferation architecture. The first stage of this integration was completed in
2008 when it received the waiver from the NSG to the condition of implementing full-scope
safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to engage in global nuclear
commerce for peaceful purposes – a condition applicable on all non-nuclear weapon states under
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT).

What stands between India and the NSG?

India’s membership application to the NSG, however, hit a road-block when China expressed its
strong opposition to India’s inclusion, citing implications on NPT as the reason since India has not
signed the Treaty. Non-proliferation experts have raised concerns that inclusion of India into the
NSG would affirm its status as a nuclear weapon state and since NPT, the framework that holds the
nuclear non-proliferation architecture, allows only five nuclear weapon states, India’s admission in
the NSG would undermine the NPT. Though Beijing has used this argument to substantiate its
position, its push for India’s admission to be linked with Pakistan’s entry to the Group showcases
how its political imperatives have a larger role to play in its opposition. While a majority of the 48
NSG members share the understanding that India’s entry to the Group will be beneficial, there
remain a few, along with China, that have not yet joined the consensus.

However, China – and some other nations – did not budge. Their objections revolved under
questions of having a process – that rather than taking up applications one by one, a set of ‘criteria’
should be drawn up for non-NPT members. Since decision in the NSG taken on the basis of
consensus, objection raised by even one country acts as a veto.

A criteria-based approach would effectively put New Delhi on the same platform as Islamabad. This
would be galling for India as it considers itself to be a “responsible” nuclear power, as opposed to
the proliferation record of Pakistan, with its chronicled links to nuclear programs of China, North
Korea, Iran and Libya.

Beijing’s unusually public opposition to India’s NSG membership drive had been among the reasons
that led to a widening strain in relations with New Delhi.

“China’s position on NSG expansion is consistent and clear. We believe all countries need to follow
NSG rules, uphold the authority and solemnity of the NPT and seek a non-discriminatory solution
acceptable to all based on full consultation,” said spokesperson Lu Kang at the daily briefing in
Beijing on Friday.

Lu noted that a “non-discriminatory” plan had to be acceptable to “all the NPT-non parties”, that is,
both India and Pakistan. Denying that China was thwarting India, he argued that the plenary meeting
would not be discussing the entry of any specific “NPT non-party” applicant, before reaching a “non-
discriminatory plan”. “So, there is no blocking of India,” he asserted.

Do NSG members share a common vision on the Group’s future?

The lack of consensus within the NSG brings to fore questions regarding whether or not the current
members share a common vision and understanding on the objectives of the NSG and on the path
the Group would take in fulfilling them. In assessing various objectives of the Group, two feature
prominently. First is that the Group should include all states that could supply nuclear and related
items, controlling exports of which fall under the mandate of the NSG. This will allow the NSG to
spread and universalise norms of export control and nuclear non-proliferation, thus enhancing its
credibility. Second, given the fact that NSG functions on consensus, the Group must only include
those countries that are seriously committed to the goal of nuclear non- proliferation, barring which
NSG could become defunct.

Would NSG gain a “like-minded” partner in India?

In including nuclear exporters, NSG also needs to ensure that it takes in only those states that are
equally committed to non- proliferation of nuclear weapons. The challenge for NSG members is in
assessing “like-mindedness” of a membership applicant. Being a signatory to the NPT has been
referred to as the litmus test, but does it really capture a country’s commitment to nuclear non-
proliferation? Cases of Iraq, Iran and North Korea present a different picture. While these countries
have been at times referred to as rogue states by the nuclear order, how would one weigh the
violation of NSG guidelines by China, a de jure nuclear weapon state under the NPT, in supplying
additional reactors to Pakistan, plans of which were not disclosed by China at the time of joining the
NSG even though that was a requirement

Can China really encircle India with its String of Pearls? The great game of Asia ?
Those having slightest of interest in India-China relationship are familiar with the String of Pearls
theory. The phrase seems to have been in use even before but publication of Energy Futures in Asia:
Final Report in 2004 made it popular.

The report said that China was working on a strategy to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean to
extract maximum benefit from it and contain Indian hold in the region. China was expected to raise
civilian and military infrastructure at chosen points on the islands or ports - metaphorically called
pearls - surrounding India.

String of pearl, in geostrategic parlance, refers to the Strait of Malacca, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, the
Maldives, the Strait of Hormuz and Somalia. It also includes Bangladesh and Myanmar in Chinese
strategy

STRAIT OF MALACCA

The Strait of Malacca connects Indian Ocean with Pacific Ocean with Malaysia and Singapore on one
side while Indonesia on the other side. It is not very far from the Nicobar Islands.

The Strait of Malacca is key for China's energy requirements. About 80 per cent of its fuel from the
Middle East passes through this. Wary of India's stronghold in the Indian Ocean, China has been
consistently working to develop friendly and cooperative relations with the countries in the region.

In 1971, when China gave feelers about aligning with Pakistan during the Liberation War for
Bangladesh, India had threatened to block the Strait of Malacca. Later in 1999 during Kargil war,
India choked supply to Pakistan - practically blocking Karachi port - using its dominance in the Indian
Ocean. China is on a mission to turn the tide against India.

MYANMAR AND BANGLADESH

China has developed assets in Myanmar. It has built a gas pipeline of about 2,400 km from Myanmar
to China. It is also reported to have a military base in Coco Island of Myanmar.

China is said to have developed a naval base near Strait of Malacca on Cocos Keeling Island, which is
a distant part of Australia. Further north in the Bay of Bengal, China developed the port of
Chittagong in Bangladesh. It has given China a foothold and stake in the Bay of Bengal. Significant
part of Chinese trade passes through this port.

China had been pushing Bangladesh to allow it to develop a small naval base near Chittagong. SRI
LANKA

Sri Lanka has been a trusted friend of India for decades but the years between 2012 and 2014 saw
increased Chinese presence in the island country.

China developed a port at Hambantola on the southeastern part of Sri Lanka. A Chinese company
built the port and gained control to manage it.

China was in the process of developing it into a naval base, when in January 2015, the Rajapakshe
government was voted out in Sri Lanka

PAKISTAN

China has Gwadar port and the CPEC to protect in Pakistan. The Gwadar port has gained further
significance as China joined what was originally conceived as the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.
India withdrew from the project as it was not assured of the security of the pipeline in certain
stretches in Pakistan. The project is now called Iran-Pakistan-China pipeline. It touches Gwadar on its
route to China.

The CPEC is developing into a vital geo-strategic and trade asset of China. At present, it carries only
two per cent of its trade with Pakistan. But, China expects the volume to increase as it plans to route
much of its trade with the Middle East and Africa through Gwadar port and the CPEC.

China's String of Pearls vs India's Iron Curtain

Naval analyst Zhang Ming recently proclaimed that the Islands

of India’s Andaman and Nicobar Archipelago could be used as
a ‘metal chain’ to block Chinese access to the Straits of
Malacca. China has gone further to claim that India is building
an ‘Iron Curtain’ in the Indian Ocean, which is debatable.

In recent years, a number of analysts have drawn attention to

the similarities of nationalism, between the rise of modern
China and the rise of Wilhelmine Germany. Newsweek’s Fareed Zakaria, says that “like Germany in
the late 19th century, China is growing rapidly but uncertainly, into a global system (including the
Indian Ocean) in which it feels it deserves more attention and honor.

The 19th century strategic thinker Mahan had prophesised that the future of the world in the 21st
century would be decided on the waters of the Indian Ocean and in this, India’s expansion of its
maritime power and Navy, and inroads in to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is very much on China’s
radar, which deserves introspection.

It is less publicised or talked about, but in the last two decades India has stealthily straddled its
interests in the Indian Ocean Rim, which includes the islan ..

India’s maritime military strategy and the Navy’s 2004 maritime doctrine, both issued by the Indian
Navy are very clear that it is the Indian Navy’s responsibility to ensure stability in the IOR, which irks
the Chinese as they view the Indian Ocean as their life line for trade and energy. Chi Haotin had said,
‘It is Indian Ocean not India’s Ocean

India has developed a special relationship with Mauritius, which is a fulcrum island state because of
its strong Indian diaspora. India has instituted a favourable taxation treaty that makes it India’s
largest offshore investor

When it comes to the Indian Ocean, New Delhi is hedging its bets against an assertive China. India
and France recently signed a strategic pact opening up their naval bases to each other’s warships
across the Indian Ocean. This comes two years after a similar deal with the United States and
signifies a web of strategic trust to thwart Beijing’s expansion into India’s traditional area of
influence.In recent years, Beijing’s push to contain India has become more frenetic, including signing
agreements with Myanmar, Sri Lanka , the Maldives and Pakistan .
India’s deal with France is therefore an escalation of New Delhi’s capacity to project power. It grants
the Indian navy access to strategically important French ports – including one in Djibouti , home to
China’s single overseas military base and a focal point of strategic competition for the Indian Ocean.
The installation can host over 10,000 troops and serves as a springboard for Chinese navy operations
across the Indian Ocean.

China’s Djibouti military base: ‘logistics facility’, or platform for geopolitical ambitions overseas

Indian PM Narendra Modi signed the India-Singapore Bilateral Agreement for Navy Cooperation in
2018 which allows Indian Navy ships logistical support, including refuelling at Singapore’s Changi
naval base located near the disputed South China Sea. Changi Naval Base forms a strategic point in
the ‘Necklace of Diamonds’ that India is creating to counter China’s ‘String of Pearls’ strategy.The
‘Necklace of Diamonds’ comprises Changi Naval Base in Singapore, Chabahar Port in Iran, the
Assumption Islands in Seychelles, and Duqm Port in Oman. In addition to this, India is creating strong
naval ties with Vietnam, Japan, France, Australia and the United States.

However, China’s investment in its ‘String of Pearls’ is greater than India in its ‘Necklace of
Diamonds’. China has invested US$60 billion in Africa under its String of Pearls strategy, whereas
India’s largest investment for its Necklace of Diamonds amounts to $8 billion, in Chabahar Port in
Iran.

India opposes re-joining RCEP over China concerns

15 countries solidified their participation in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

(RCEP). Even as India opted to stay out after walking out of discussions last year, the new trading
bloc has made it clear that the door will remain open for India to return to the negotiating table.

What is RCEP?

Described as the “largest” regional trading agreement to this day, RCEP was originally being
negotiated between 16 countries — ASEAN members and countries with which they have free trade
agreements (FTAs), namely Australia, China, Korea, Japan, New Zealand and India.

The purpose of RCEP was to make it easier for products and services of each of these countries to be
available across this region. Negotiations to chart out this deal had been on since 2013, and India
was expected to be a signatory until its decision last November.

Why did India walk out?

On November 4, 2019, India decided to exit discussions over “significant outstanding issues”.
According to a government official, India had been “consistently” raising “fundamental issues” and
concerns throughout the negotiations and was prompted to take this stand as they had not been
resolved by the deadline to commit to signing the deal. Its decision was to safeguard the interests of
industries like agriculture and dairy and to give an advantage to the country’s services sector.
According to officials, the current structure of RCEP still does not address these issues and concerns.

How far is China’s presence a factor?

Escalating tensions with China are a major reason for

India’s decision. While China’s participation in the
deal had already been proving difficult for India due
to various economic threats, the clash at Galwan
Valley has soured relations between the two
countries. The various measures India has taken to
reduce its exposure to China would have sat
uncomfortably with its commitments under RCEP.

Major issues that were unresolved during RCEP

negotiations were related to the exposure that India
would have to China. This included India’s fears that
there were “inadequate” protections against surges
in imports. It felt there could also be a possible
circumvention of rules of origin— the criteria used
to determine the national source of a product — in
the absence of which some countries could dump their products by routing them through other
countries that enjoyed lower tariffs.

India was unable to ensure countermeasures like an auto-trigger mechanism to raise tariffs on
products when their imports crossed a certain threshold. It also wanted RCEP to exclude most-
favoured nation (MFN) obligations from the investment chapter, as it did not want to hand out,
especially to countries with which it has border disputes, the benefits it was giving to strategic allies
or for geopolitical reasons. India felt the agreement would force it to extend benefits given to other
countries for sensitive sectors like defence to all RCEP members.

India has trade deficits with 11 of the 15 RCEP countries, and some experts feel that India has been
unable to leverage its existing bilateral free trade agreements with several RCEP members to
increase exports.

India must guard against Chinese tech intrusion

The recent border standoff between China and India at Ladakh confirms two political realities that
must not be ignored. First, India must not allow the intrusion of Chinese firms into its
telecommunications network. If societies will be digital, China should not be permitted to encode
India’s public sphere. New Delhi must not license Huawei or ZTE to provide equipment for its 5G
rollout. And second, India must not allow any Chinese-origin firm into its critical infrastructure in
much the same manner that it was kept away from certain industrial projects in the past.

An authoritarian regime that has given Xi Jinping absolute power has now become predatory in its
external engagements and is a caricature of an insecure bully. The courtesies of diplomatic speak
have been dispensed with as it referred to Australia as a “giant kangaroo that serves as a dog of the
US”. The middle kingdom now has a medieval mindset that only seeks territory and markets for its
benefit. That it continues on this course during the COVID19 pandemic reveals much about its naked
ambitions.

This is China’s approach to India and each nation must make its own choice. For India’s national
interest, the choice is clear. There is no more room to accommodate China’s economic affections
while being scorched by the Dragon’s fire.The criticality of 5G technology is based not only on its
speed but also on its all pervasiveness. The real power of 5G lies in its ability to be a network of
networks — to simultaneously serve several verticals including governance, business, smart cities,
education, mobility, and in the post-COVID19 world, healthcare through telemedicine along with
most other human interactions.

This makes the way we negotiate 5G technology a vital matter for national security. Allowing Huawei
or ZTE to be a 5G equipment provider to Indian telecommunications firms will be like asking the
Chinese Communist Party to run our general elections. As we repulse China at the borders, we must
ensure that we do not surrender our cities, homes and minds to that ideology. In fact, one major
lapse on the part of India has been that it has allowed the creeping acquisition of India Tech by the
Digital BRI, even as the country has opposed the Belt and Road in its physical manifestation.

The risk China Tech poses to Indian interests is real. Considering they are backed by an authoritarian
regime that’s weaponising everything in its armoury, from trade and technology to medical
equipment and humanitarian aid, the provisions by state- controlled Chinese firms are a global
concern. Australia and the US have discovered it, Europe is in the process of finding out, and smaller
nations will awaken to the consequences too late.

As a $3 trillion economy that has set its eyes on becoming a $10 trillion one in the 2030s, India
cannot ignore the perils of the noxious interplay of Chinese Communist Party objectives and the
capitalist façade represented by Huawei.

National security is not a choice. It is a primary assumption and the first responsibility of statecraft. A
country that uses its military power to threaten other nations and its economic power to pervert
free trade and steal technologies, will not think twice before using its technological influence to
advance its strategic ambitions and lust for territory. These networks are India’s lifelines of growth
and highways of aspirations. These will support economic growth, governance, innovations, and be
the critical infrastructure that can cart India towards a $10,000 per capita income future. These must
not be implicated by an erroneous choice in partners.

For India to allow Huawei even in its 5G trials displays an act that’s not very different from India
rooting for China as a member of the United Nations Security Council against its own interests in
1950. Seven decades later, allowing Huawei into India mirrors the same sentiment — it is a signal
that India is giving in to China’s bullying.

China & South Asia

In his 19th Party Congress speech in October 2017,

Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that “China will
deepen relations with its neighbors in accordance with
the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefits, and
inclusiveness, and the policy of forging friendship and
partnership with its neighbors.”] As neighbours of
China, South Asian countries—including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—have increasingly come into contact with Beijing in the diplomatic,
economic, and security domains. These interactions demonstrate that China is not simply appealing
to the better angels of South Asian neighbours. Rather, Beijing has crafted a geostrategic approach
to the region that assiduously seeks to secure its own national interests.

Pakistan

Pakistan rarely criticises China’s harsh treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang. Beijing reciprocates by
protecting Islamabad in international organisations. For instance, Beijing has wielded its veto power
at the UN Security Council multiple times to prevent the sanctioning of Masood Azhar, the leader of
a Pakistan-based militant group called Jaish-e-Mohammed, until finally relenting last year. As the
rotational president of the Financial Action Task Force, Beijing also likely played a key role in 2019 in
helping Pakistan avoid sanctions for terrorism financing.

China also holds up its partnership with Pakistan as an important demonstration of benign intentions
to develop the rest of the world through BRI. Indeed, BRI’s flagship project, CPEC, runs through
territory under de facto Pakistani control, but disputed by India. Following Xi and Khan’s last
meeting, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to CPEC, stating their “determination to
speedily execute CPEC so that its growth potential can be fully realized making it a high-quality
demonstration project of BRI.”

On Afghanistan, Chinese leaders believe that Pakistan serves as a useful partner to achieve security
in order to eventually benefit from economic development there. The joint statement following the
Xi-Khan meeting in September indicates that “the Chinese side appreciated Pakistan’s efforts in
promoting peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan. Both sides maintained that an inclusive,
and Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process would be key to bringing peace and stability in the
country.

China almost certainly assesses Pakistan to be a valuable asset toward better understanding the
situation in Afghanistan and in communicating with different actors in the country, to include the
Taliban, who China believes must be a part of any future government.

Afghanistan

China seeks Afghan reconciliation, to include Taliban integration, in a future government. Most
recently in September, Beijing noted that Afghanistan “should have broad representation and
inclusiveness in order to make all factions and ethnic groups equally involve[d] in the political life so
as to build a united political foundation.”

As noted earlier, Beijing further seeks to incorporate Afghanistan into BRI. According to a readout of
Xi’s meeting with Afghan President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani in June 2019, Beijing seeks to “steadily
promote practical cooperation in economy and trade [via BRI]. In April, Chinese Foreign Minister
Wang Yi reaffirmed Beijing’s interest in helping Afghanistan through BRI, stating “China is willing to
work with Afghanistan to deepen joint construction of the Belt and Road and advance bilateral
cooperation in various fields in order to jointly benefit the two countries and peoples.

China looks to Afghanistan to support counter-terrorism operations to prevent instability from

spilling over into bordering Xinjiang province. Xi has pledged to “continue to help Afghanistan build
its capacity in fighting terrorism and maintaining stability.” Xi further “called on the Afghan side to
continue to firmly support China in its fight against the terrorist force of East Turkistan Islamic
Movement.

Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka

In July, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang met with Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and the two
leaders focused much of their discussion on the need for the economic development of Bangladesh
via BRI funding

China and Bangladesh pledged to deepen defense cooperation, especially in the areas of “defense
industry and trade, training, equipment and technology, mutual visits of navy ships, and the UN
peacekeeping operations.” The Chinese navy in 2016 made its first port visit (and again in 2017) to
Chittagong, perhaps signaling Beijing’s belief that the largest port in Bangladesh holds geostrategic
value.

China is also the largest arms supplier of the Bangladeshi military, providing 71.8 percent of weapons
from 2008 to 2018, suggesting that Beijing seeks to further ingratiate itself with Dhaka through these
sales.

Bhutan does not have diplomatic relations with China, and so there is much less interaction than
with other South Asian countries. However, in the last meeting held in February 2019 between
visiting Chinese ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui, and Bhutanese Prime Minister Lotay Tshering,
Beijing emphasised the need to continue working together with Bhutan on resolving the border
issue. This is likely in reference to the Doklam region in which a China-India dispute occurred in
2017. Either way, the last round of China-Bhutan border talks were held in 2016.

China’s relationship with the Maldives is near-exclusively focused on leveraging BRI to develop
Maldives as well as to raise Chinese influence there to counter India. Beijing’s preferred Maldivian
President, Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom, was defeated in elections in 2018, and the current
leader, Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, is more amenable to India’s wishes. Bilateral ties, however, remain
positive, with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang as recently as July 2019 noting his appreciation for
continued Maldivian support of BRI. Beijing has touted the completion of the “China-Maldives
Friendship Bridge” as a tangible example of what positive bilateral relations can create to benefit
average Maldivians

Chinese President Xi went directly to Nepal in what was the first visit by a Chinese head of state in 23
years. While on the ground, Xi signed 20 agreements through BRI to better enable China to develop
and connect with Nepal. The two sides “will accelerate the building of the Trans-Himalayan Multi-
Dimensional Connectivity Network through connectivity projects including ports, highways, railways,
aviation, and communications, and have announced the launch of a feasibility study of the China-
Nepal cross-border railway. Beijing was further pleased to see Kathmandu acknowledge that “Tibet
affairs are China’s internal affairs, and the determination [of Nepal] on not allowing any anti-China
activities on its soil.

Finally, on Sri Lanka, the Chinese focus is mainly on developing the island and likely currying
influence there for future geostrategic aspirations. During a meeting between Chinese Premier Li
and Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena in May 2019, the two leaders expressed an interest in
progressing with BRI projects, consistent with the last joint statement issued in 2016.

In exchange for paying down Colombo’s BRI debt, the Chinese got Sri Lanka in December 2017 to
hand over Hambantota port on a 99-year lease; Hambantota is geostrategically located on the Indian
Ocean, potentially bolstering Beijing’s String of Pearls.
Conclusion

As detailed in this brief, Chinese interests in South Asia stretch far beyond simply maintaining
amicable relations in the region. Rather, China is dissatisfied at the LAC with India and is trying to
improve the situation to its liking. Beijing is also frustrated with New Delhi’s persistent support of
the Dalai Lama and rejection of BRI. As a result, China seeks to undermine India by aligning closely
with archrival Pakistan.

Chinese warfare strategy

Trusions and coercion around its borders through military means. These
include but are not restricted to Bhutan, Japan, nations in the South China
Sea and India.

Second, psychological intrusions through information warfare in

democracies, using the tools that serve communications, transparency and
accountability in democracies. Their public sphere and institutions are seen

as handy sharp instruments serving China’s designs Third, technological

intrusion through its corporate arms such as Huawei and ZTE, which by the
virtue of being incorporated, designed and operating under the National
Intelligence Law collect intelligence and information for the benefit of the
Communist Party of China from the countries in which they operate And fourth,
controlling multilateral arenas through capture of international institutions such
as WHO as the Made in China pandemic so clearly brought out.

After successfully weaponising trade in WTO, health in WHO, investments along the Belt and Road
Initiative, debt through its debt trap diplomacy, narratives through information intrusions, China is
now on way towards weaponising data, using companies like Huawei and ZTE as the tip of its digital
spear.

Chinese apps banned by India

When the Narendra Modi government’s Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology banned
59 Chinese apps, including TikTok, WeChat, and UC Browser, it did so through the powers of one
law. The government said that these apps were banned under Section 69A of the Information
Technology Act, 2000 because “they are engaged in activities which are prejudicial to sovereignty
and integrity of India, defence of India, security of state and public order.”
Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, was introduced by an amendment to the Act
in 2008. It gives the Central government the power to block public access to any information online
— whether on websites or mobile apps.

Under Section 69A, if a website threatens India’s defence, its sovereignty and integrity, friendly
relations with foreign countries and public order, the government can ban it, after following due
procedure.

A feature of Section 69A is that it includes terms such as “security of the state, emergency nature,
sovereignty and integrity of India and public order”, which are common for national security
determinations across Indian laws. The Section mandates strict confidentiality about complaints and
action taken. Due to the presence of this clause, Right to Information (RTI) queries are not applicable
to the law. Moreover, the committees to examine requests and review appeals comprise entirely
members from the executive.

India rolls the dice on Hong Kong

Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a controversial national security law that gave Beijing
unprecedented powers to shape the future of Hong Kong.

It dramatically reduced Hong Kong’s autonomy and gives Beijing the ability to crackdown against
dissent under the garb of tackling crimes of secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with
foreign forces.

ISSUE

For most Hong Kongers, it is clear that it cuts at the very heart of
their freedom of expression and organisation, effectively
repudiating the so-called “one country, two systems” principle on
which the relationship between

Hong Kong and mainland China has been premised since 1997.

Hong Kong has been rocked by anti-Beijing protests since June 2019
and the new law is effectively Xi Jinping’s revenge on Hong Kongers
for making him withdraw the controversial extradition bill of last year. Since then a

broader anti-China and pro-democracy movement has been gathering momentum in Hong Kong
which Beijing is now determined to demolish with this new law.

INDIA'S APPROACH
New Delhi chose the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva to react where it argued last
week that India has been keeping “a close watch on recent developments” in Hong Kong given the
presence of a large Indian community there.

New Delhi had in the past been reluctant to talk about the Hong Kong issue but recent violent
clashes in the Galwan Valley of Ladakh last month, perhaps, made it imperative for India to change
its approach

In the past India has been reluctant to even give visas to pro-democracy activists of Hong Kong and
along with Indonesia was the only other member state of the G-20 last year which refused to even
meet pro-democracy activists. India also maintained a studied silence over China’s ill-treatment of its
Muslim minority in Xinjiang. The border crisis this year has challenged the very foundations of India’s
China policy and all aspects are being recalibrated by New Delhi – from trade and technological
engagement to China’s domestic political

imperatives. Major powers like the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and Japan have all spoken out
against the new Chinese law.

Hong Kong is also important for India for economic reasons. For global investors, it has always

been an attractive destination, leading to its emergence as one of Asia’s most powerful financial
centres.

WAY AHEAD

As a mature democracy, we should be able to articulate and defend our positions to our global
stakeholders. It is what makes India different from China and a more reassuring global presence

China has never hesitated to meddle in Indian domestic matters in the past. India’s past diffidence in
challenging China on its ‘internal’ matters has not really paid New Delhi any significant dividends.

India’s Hong Kong move has been noticed the world over

Calls for India to play the Taiwan card grow louder

•Possible asymmetric diplomatic strategies to challenge China, such as

altering India’s “one China policy” to enhance India’s relations with Taiwan.
Indian Express, wrote in May that India should be pragmatic in considering
the question of Taiwan’s observer status in the World Health Assembly:
The decision “should not be made either out of peevishness or fear.” The
editorial argued that New Delhi should judge the issue on “apolitical
appreciation of the specific technical issues involved.

•The Times of India, asked the government to “not shy away from supporting Taiwan.” that this
should remain an important aspect of the reform of the World Health Organization (WHO). It also
argued that India should stop being “overly deferential to Beijing” when China has routinely worked
against Indian interests in the UN and other multilateral organizations. India should step up its
cooperation with Taiwan. it was strange that India has shied away from cooperating with Taiwan,
whereas Taipei and Beijing had active trade and investment ties
despite their political disagreements.

•Namrata Hasija, a research associate at the Delhi-based Centre for

China Analysis and Strategy, asserts that India must stop seeing Taiwan
through the China lens that gets activated every time there is tension
in Sino Indian ties.

•Highlighting that Taiwan was one of the first countries to send medical equipment to India, former
diplomat G. Parthasarathy also made the case for India to strengthen its relations with Taiwan. He
added that Taiwan offers opportunities for cooperation in several key sectors, especially in India’s
semiconductor industry, which could also possibly reduce India’s reliance on China in the electronics
and communication industries

•Taipei Times called on Taiwan to “deepen ties with India, in particular economic, military and
intelligence ties, to contain Chinese expansionism and put Xi back into his box.” This also fits well
with President Tsai Ing-wen’s New Southbound policy which has a particular focus on India.
 India - European Union(EU) Relations
Timeline

15th Summit between India and EU takes place in virtual format

The leaders decided to strengthen the India-EU Strategic Partnership, based on shared
principles and values of democracy,
freedom, rule of law, and respect for human
rights, aiming at delivering concrete benefits
for the people in India and the EU.

As the world's two largest democracies,

India and the EU affirmed their
determination to promote effective
multilateralism and a rules-based
multilateral order with the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation at its core.

They will bolster their cooperation in international fora to reinforce international security,
strengthen preparedness and response for global health emergencies, enhance global
economic stability and inclusive growth, implement the Sustainable Development Goals
and protect the climate and the environment. The Joint Statement said, the EU is looking
forward to India’s G20 Presidency in 2022 and its membership in the UN Security Council
in 2021-2022.

As the world is fighting the COVID-19 pandemic, the leaders agreed that global
cooperation and solidarity are essential to protect lives and to mitigate the socio-
economic consequences of the pandemic. The leaders emphasised the importance of
strengthening preparedness and response capacities, of sharing information in a free,
transparent and prompt manner, and of improving international response.

The leaders noted mutual synergies in the field of healthcare through shared capacities,
experiences and strengths in the production of pharmaceuticals and vaccines, healthcare
research and development, diagnostics and treatment.

They discussed prospects for global collaboration and sustained funding for developing
and deploying and accessibility of effective diagnostics, treatments and vaccines to make
them available to all at an affordable price. They called for the future COVID-19 vaccine to
become a global common good.

The leaders agreed to further develop their trade and investment relations to unleash their
full potential particularly in the context of post-COVID-19 economic recovery and support
sustainable growth and jobs on both sides. They reaffirmed their commitment to work
towards balanced, ambitious and mutually-beneficial trade and investment agreements,
opening markets and creating a level playing field on both sides.

They also agreed to establish a regular High Level Dialogue at ministerial level to provide
guidance to the bilateral trade and investment relations and to address multilateral issues
of mutual interest. India and the EU agreed to keep the global trading system open, with
the WTO as the bedrock of the rules-based multilateral trading system.

They welcomed the ongoing activity in India of the European Investment Bank and the
upcoming planned investments of Euros 550 million in the Pune and Bhopal Metro Rail
Projects.

The leaders adopted the "India-EU Strategic

Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025” to guide cooperation
between India and the EU over the next five years. They
welcomed the signing of the India-EURATOM
Agreement on research and development cooperation
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

They also adopted a Joint Declaration on Resource Efficiency and Circular Economy and
welcomed the upcoming renewal of the India-EU Science and Technology Agreement for
another five years.
The EU traces its origins to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the
European Economic Community (EEC), established, respectively, by the 1951 Treaty of Paris
and 1957 Treaty of Rome. EU is the most advanced regional integration model . It has
common currency (19 countries), common market , common foreign and security policy as
well as alignment on justice and home affairs . Schenzen Agreement abolishes passport
control .

The original members of what came to be known as the European Communities were the
Inner Six: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. At
present , the total strength is 27.

Milestones in the evolution of EU

Treaty of Paris, 1951

European Coal and Steel Community formed.

Treaty of Rome , 1957

The EU’s precursor, the European Economic Community (EEC), was established in 1957,
following the Treaty of Rome. Consisting of a homogeneous group of six countries (Belgium,
France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands).

Treaty of Maastricht, 1992

To reflect the post-Cold War Europe's unity with a unified Germany. It helped create the Euro
and, later, also pushed the eastward expansion of the EU.

The Treaty of Lisbon, 2007

It marked another political evolution, giving the EU a stronger legal character by introducing
a permanent President of the European Council and strengthening the position of the High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

EU in current times
Macron: “The bloc needs to assert sovereignty over its political and security
decisions . Europe is on the edge of a precipice ”. He reminds that EU can no
longer be an economic giant and a political dwarf.

Once a gold standard for regional integration , EU is facing the existential crisis
.
o The idea of Europe with a “variable geometry”, proposed during the hasty
expansion during the 1990s to accommodate differences is now a clear sign of
political disunity. As EU expanded , it also started showing faultlines to the extent
it has become difficult to maintain the Unity . EU states may appear as one entity
from outside but today the fault lines are easily visible . EU states are divided on
 multiple lines for example – Old Europe and New Europe ; East and West Europe
; North and South Europe ; Core and Periphery ; Europhobic and Europhilic .
o Since Eurozone crisis ,EU is suffering from economic challenges like
unemployment , recession, debt crisis .
o Since 2011 , as a result of Arab Spring , EU came under the crisis emerging from
migration of refugees .

The economic challenges and the refugee crisis has challenged EU’s core values related to
democracy and human rights. There is a growth of rightist parties along with illiberal
democracies and authoritarian leaders.

EU is also facing challenges from outside  Unilateralism of Trump , a resentful Russia on

its border and a China determined to emerge as the new global power.

The Covid Crisis has also made a significant dent in EU’s image along with Brexit .

Issues of concern related to EU

Brexit

Brexit represent exit of Britain from EU on the basis

of 2016 referendum . Britain had joined EU in 1973.
Britain was considered as Europhobic.

Key Issues :
The “leave campaign” argued (51.9 % in the
referendum ):
1. Take control of sovereignty of Britain back
which was lost in EU’s complicated system.
2. Huge money paid as a subscription.
3. Controlling our economy ourselves .
4. In context of immigration , controlling our borders.
5. EU has a burdensome regulations and prevent progressive reforms.
6. UK to have its own rational immigration system.

Arguments of “Remain campaign ” (48.1 % in the referendum ):

1. UK is stringer , safer and better of in EU.
2. Jobs and trade is closely linked with EU and it adds billions of dollars to British
Economy

On 1st January , Britain left EU.

Present arrangement :

 Freedom to work and live between EU and UK comes to an end .

  UK is free to set its own trade policy and negotiates deals with other countries .
Already doing Australia, New zealand and USA. The three do not have FTA with EU.
 They will continue to buy an sell goods across the borders without paying taxes and
without any limitations on the amount . Yet they will have to do paperwork to agree
to shared rules and standards on workers rights and social and environmental
regulations. Paperwork at the borders causes delay.

Still, issues have not ended – There is no deal on data sharing and financial services
agreement on fishing is only for 5 years . At present , they have agreed to identical rules . But
in future they need not to follow the identical rules which can lead to dispute and Tariffs.

Northern Ireland will continue to follow EU rules to avoid hardening of borders . However,
there will be checks on goods entering Northern Ireland from UK.

Impact of Brexit on India:

It is premature to make assessment . However , India can explore opportunities in service

sector in both the markets. Brexit paves the way for FTA between New Delhi and London but
can take the sheen away from India’s FTA with EU.
India’s professionals may gain because after Brexit deal , UK and EU professionals will have
no longer unrestricted freedom to work , study or start the business.

Indian companies having their headquarters in UK or EU aiming to serve both the markets
may face problems .

Britain may loose attractiveness for Indian investors as Britain use to be a Gateway to
Europe.
Automobile sector may face downturn .

India EU FTA

The deal has been languishing for many years and have gone through numerous rounds of
talks.

The proposed agreement is politically and economically crucial for both sides. In political
terms, from the EU’s perspective the free trade agreement (FTA) with India will support the
EU’s aim of employing FTAs to foster partner countries’ integration into the world economy,
and will strengthen its role in global trade governance.

From India’s perspective, it will boost Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Make in India”
campaign and his ambition to establish India as a regional leader and global manufacturing
centre. Furthermore, the FTA will strengthen India’s attempts to harness its growing
domestic economy and middle class to support its rise as a global economic power.

In economic terms, a well-negotiated agreement will boost trade and investment flows
between the two regions.

The EU is India’s largest trading partner and investor as well as its main source of technology
transfer. The EU- India trade account for €80 billion in goods in 2019 . The EU is the second-
largest destination for Indian exports (over 14% of the total) after the USA.

India is the EU’s 10th largest trading partner, accounting for 1.9% of EU total trade in goods
in 2019. Trade in goods between the EU and India increased by 72% in the last decade.

Trade in services between the EU and India increased rapidly from €22.3 billion in 2015 to
€29.6 billion in 2018.

The EU's share in foreign investment inflows to India more than doubled from 8% to 18% in
the last decade, making the EU the first foreign investor in India.
Some 6,000 European companies are present in India, providing directly 1.7 million jobs and
indirectly 5 million jobs in a broad range of sectors.

There are a host of studies analysing the economic effects of the proposed FTA. The analysis
by the Indian government suggests that India will be a net loser from the FTA in terms of the
trade in goods, primarily as a result of the loss of revenues from lower or zero tariffs,
although gains are expected from liberalisation of the services sector.

A report by Sussex University and an Indian NGO – CUTS International – also indicates that
liberalisation of trade in goods would yield only ambiguous welfare effects.

Areas of disagreement
European and Indian expectations diverge on issues such as tariffs on cars, wines, and dairy
products imported from the EU, and on the liberalisation of the visa regime for Indian
professionals entering the EU.
The EU and India have even had trade disputes at the World Trade Organization (WTO) on
wine and spirits and on pharmaceuticals. When FTA negotiations began, India had high
tariffs in areas of interest to the EU and restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) in
several sectors, including insurance and trade. Rules on FDI in insurance and wholesale trade
and on single-brand retail have since been changed, but tariffs on goods such as wines and
cars remain at between 60 and 100 percent.

Both the EU and India have voiced concerns about restrictive measures that function as a
barrier to their exporters. Recently, for instance, the EU expressed anxiety over the Indian
government’s requirement that 15 categories of IT and consumer electronic products must
be registered in the country. A similar issue is mandatory in-country testing and certification
of telecom network elements. India has also been affected by EU regulations and standards,
especially on agricultural exports. For example, imports of Indian Alphonso mangoes were
banned in May 2014 after “non-European fruit flies” were found in some consignments,
though this was lifted in early 2015.

One of India’s key objectives is to be recognised as a data-secure country. At present, India

is not considered data-secure under EU legislation, despite India amending its Information
Technology Act in 2000 and issuing new Information Technology Rules in 2011, in line with
the “safe harbour” principles adopted by the United States. This hampers the flow of
sensitive data and means that Indian firms are unable to gain market access in the EU,
increasing operating costs.

Another key Indian objective is reform to allow skilled Indian professionals to temporarily
reside and work in EU member states. If rules on movement of professionals were
liberalised, Indian businesses would benefit significantly from increased access to the EU
services market. However, the EU says it is unable to intervene on this issue because work
permits and visas are under the remit of individual member states. A related issue is the
differentiated qualifications and professional standards between EU partners, which
restrict Indian professionals’ access to the EU markets.

For its part, the EU wants India to first liberalise its professional services sector, specifically
accountancy and legal services. However, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India
and the Bar Council of India are vehemently opposed to such liberalisation as they fear
competition from overseas accounting and law firms.

Secondly, the EU has sought massive cuts in India’s tariffs on automobiles and auto
components. Fully assembled cars attract a 60 percent import duty, rising to 75 percent for
cars with free on-board value over $40,000 and engine capacity of 3,000 cc for petrol cars
and 2,500 cc for diesel cars. The EU sees this as protectionism: by contrast, the tariff on
Indian cars imported into the EU is 6.5 percent. However, Indian industry fears that tariff
cuts would flood the domestic market with European cars, which could have an adverse
impact on investment and on the “Make in India” campaign. There are also fears about auto
components being imported into India at concessional rates.

Finally, the EU has sought deep tariff cuts for wines and spirits. India currently levies import
duty of 60–100 percent, plus state taxes. Given that alcohol is a major source of revenue, it is
not likely that Indian states will agree to cut taxes. The EU also seeks to strengthen
intellectual property rights in India. Existing Indian laws do not allow evergreening of
patents (extending patents when they are about to expire by making small changes to the
product) or data exclusivity, preventing various drugs and chemicals from being sold in India.
India argues that if it were to accede to the EU’s demand, the Indian pharmaceutical
industry would not be able to sell cheap generic drugs.

The way forward

These problems notwithstanding, the proposed agreement is critical for both the EU and
India.

The FTA is also important for India from the perspective of investment flows and technical
cooperation. The EU’s assistance would enable European companies to help India in its plan
to develop 100 “smart cities” in the near future, as well as helping other Indian initiatives.

To agree on the FTA despite the differences between the EU’s and India’s negotiating
agendas in a tough economic climate, both partners will need to show determination to
make the partnership strategic.

EU China Investment Deal

China and EU entered into a deal replacing 25 bilateral investment deals entered by
individual countries by China , before 2009. The existing deals reduced the legal uncertainties
for EU investors , but were largely accommodative of China’s discriminatory investment
regime . The new deal makes a step further in broadening the legal framework for EU
investors , but it falls short of genuine level playing field . It is called comprehensive because
earlier deals were only on investment but now gives market access also.
1. The deal eliminates quantitative restrictions , equity caps or joint venture
requirements in number of sectors.
2. China removed joint venture requirement in automotive sector .
3. It will facilitate EU’s market access in research and development, telecom and market
access.

However , it does not include any investor protection mechanism .It does not make any
provision for the forced labour . It benefits China by encouraging EU’s investment; fuels

Chinese economy and technological development . It legitimise its actions in Hong Kong.

The deal strongly favours China . EU failed to leverage its market positions and technological
advancement . EU is caught in asymmetrical game in which China defects and EU cooperates
. The fate of the deal will be similar to British deal with China on Hong Kong.

China’s objective in the deal has been geo-political , whereas EU is caught in “peace lovers
dilemma” .

In economic terms , the primary winners are certain German

and French companies entrenched in the manufacturing and
service sectors . EU leaders think that they will gain vis-à-vis
USA.

The EU has compromised over its values , failed to gain a

level playing field from China in Economic sphere, halt China’s abuse of human rights ; to
discourage China’s assertiveness . EU’s deal is similar to Trump’s mistake of going solo in the
tariff war .
The deal damages EU’s comparative advantage vis-à-vis China , damages the transatlantic
ties and hurt strategic partners like India.
For EU, it was an opportunity to display its “strategic autonomy” vis-à-vis USA. For China , it
was an opportunity to put a wedge between EU and USA.

China has gained the game of realpolitik effectively , whereas Europe weakened its own
hands , gives short shrift to its own values and undermine the position of its friends and
allies.

Message from the deal : China is too big to be ignored, too rich to displease, too big to
punish and too big to fail.
 India Israel Relations

Syllabus

Recent developments in Indian Foreign Policy : India’s position on the recent crises in
Afghanistan, Iraq and West Asia, growing relations with US and Israel ; Vision of a new world
order.

PYQs
1. Can Israel be termed a 'natural ally' of India? (20 Marks/200 words/ 2010)
2. In the history of foreign policy, seldom have relations between any two nations
blossomed as fast as they have in the case of India& Israel. Discuss.(15 marks/ 200
words/ 2014)
3. Discuss the realistic foreign policy initiatives taken by India to balance its relations
between Israel and the Arab world.(15 marks/200 words/2015)
4. Has the recent Indo-Israeli relationships given a new dynamics to India's stand on
Palestinian statehood?(10 marks/ 150 words/ 2017)
5. "The growing closeness between India and Israel will strengthen the cause of
Palestine. Comment.(10 Marks/150 words/ 2019)

Evolution of the relations

Experts identify 3 phases in India-Israel relations:

1. 1947 to 1992 : Based on Gandhian and Nehruvian principles; sympathy towards the
Palestinian Arabs.
2. 1992 to 2014 :Post-cold war and Post Gulf war reorientation and commencement of
official diplomatic links.
3. 2014 to present : A more "close r and constructive engagement" with Israel under
Prime Minister Modi.

From Nehru to Rao (1947 to 1992)

In 1948, India was the only non-Arab-state among 13 countries

that voted against the UN partition plan of Palestine in the
General Assembly that led to the creation of Israel.
PM Jawaharlal Nehru’s reasoning for the decision to recognise
Israel was that it was “an established fact”, and that not doing
so would create rancour between two UN members. A consulate in Mumbai was established
in 1953 .
At the 53rd UN session, India co-sponsored the draft resolution on the right of the
Palestinians to self-determination.
In the 1967 and 1973 wars, India lashed out at Israel as the aggressor.
In the 1970s, India rallied behind the PLO and its leader Yasser Arafat as the sole and
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
In 1975, India became the first non-Arab country to recognise the PLO as the sole
representative of the Palestinian people.
In 1988, when the PLO declared an independent state of Palestine with its capital in East
Jerusalem, India granted recognition immediately. Arafat was received as head of state
whenever he visited India.

Gandhi on the Israel-Palestine Conflict

Gandhi’s way of looking at the Palestine issue had the

imprint of both ideological as well as political
considerations. As per Simone Panter-Brick’s book, Gandhi
and the Middle East (2008), Gandhi admitted that he was
sympathetic to their “age-long persecution” of the Jews.
But, he proceeded to see it in the light of the valid claims of
the other side. For him , Palestine belongs to the Arab in the same sense that England
belongs to the English or France to the French.”
He urged Jews to seek settlement in Palestine only by the goodwill of the Arabs, and by
attempting a change of Arab heart.

From Rao to Modi (1992 to 2014)

By the early 1990s, India’s quest for recognising Israel
was further catalysed by major changes in world
politics brought by the end of the Cold War and the
disintegration of the Soviet Union.The remarkable
rise of Israel as a leading defense technology and arms
supplier was another attraction that India couldn’t
overlook for long.
The opening of an Indian embassy in Tel Aviv in January 1992 marked an end to four decades
of giving Israel the cold shoulder, as India’s recognition of Israel in 1950 had been minus full
diplomatic ties.
These factors nudged the PV Narasimha Rao-led government to finally take the decision of
establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992. In many ways, there was an element
of inevitability to this decision and it had become a matter of time.
During the UPA’s 10 years in office, the balancing act
intensified, and Mahmoud Abbas, head of the Palestinian
Authority that administers the West Bank, visited in 2005, 2008,
2010 and 2012.

From Modi to present (After 2014)

Israel is Hindutva’s ideal of a “strong state” that deals “firmly” with “terrorists”. Even back in
the 1970s, the BJP’s forerunner Jana Sangh had made the case for ties with Israel. In 2000, L
K Advani became the first Indian minister to visit Israel, and in the same year Jaswant Singh
visited as Foreign Minister.
Modi took full ownership of the relationship with Israel. The first
indication of the new phase came with an abstention by India at
the UN Human Rights Council on a resolution welcoming a report
by the HRC High Commissioner. The abstention was conspicuous
because in 2014, India had voted for the resolution through
which the UNHRC inquiry was set up. In 2016, India abstained
again at on a UNHRC resolution against Israel.
In February 2018, Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel. His itinerary did
not include Ramallah. The word then was that India had “de-hyphenated” the Israel-
Palestine relationship, and would deal with each separately.
Dimensions of India-Israel relations
Political Relations
India announced its recognition of Israel on September 17, 1950. Soon thereafter, the Jewish
Agency established an immigration office in Bombay. This was later converted into a Trade
Office and subsequently a Consulate. Embassies were opened in 1992 when full diplomatic
relations were established.
Since the upgradation of relations in 1992, defense and agriculture formed the two main
pillars of the bilateral engagement. In recent years, relations have seen rapid growth across
a broad spectrum of areas - R&D innovation, water, agriculture and space. Agreements on
cyber security, oil & gas cooperation, film co-production and air transport have also been
signed .

Economic and Commercial Relations

From US$ 200 million in 1992 (comprising primarily trade in diamonds), bilateral
merchandise trade stood at US$ 5.65 billion (excluding defense) in 2018-19, with the balance
of trade being in India’s favour by US$ 1.8 billion.
Trade in diamonds constitutes close to 40% of bilateral trade. India is Israel's third largest
trade partner in Asia and seventh largest globally. In recent years, the bilateral trade has
diversified into several sectors such as pharmaceuticals, agriculture, IT and telecom, and
homeland security. Major exports from India to Israel include precious stones and metals,
chemical products, textiles and textile articles, etc. Major imports by India from Israel
include precious stones and metals, chemicals and mineral products, base metals and
machinery and transport equipment.

Indian software companies, notably TCS, Infosys, Tech Mahindra and Wipro, are beginning
to expand their presence in the Israeli market.

Investment
Indian investments in Israel (April 2000-June 2017) totaled USD 122.4 million . Indian
companies are marking their presence in Israel through mergers and acquisitions .
TCS started operations in Israel in 2005; State Bank of India opened a branch in Tel Aviv in
2007; Jain Irrigation fully acquired NaanDan, an Israeli irrigation equipment manufacturing
company, in 2012 and Sun Pharma has a 66.7% stake in Israel’s Taro Pharmaceutical
Industries.

Agriculture
Under a comprehensive Work Plan for cooperation in agriculture signed on 10 May 2006,
bilateral projects are implemented through MASHAV (Center for International Cooperation
of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and CINADCO (Centre for International Agricultural
Development Cooperation of Israel’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development).
India has benefited from Israeli expertise and technologies in horticulture mechanization,
protected cultivation, nursery management, micro- irrigation and post-harvest
management.

Defense & Security

Israel is master in finer aspects of security. India is Israel's largest buyer of arms . The two
countries have elevated their ties to a strategic partnership; a pillar of this relationship is
defense.
India imports critical defense technologies from Israel. There are regular exchanges between
the armed forces. There is cooperation on security issues, including a Joint Working Group
on Counter-Terrorism. In February 2014, India and Israel signed three important agreements
on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Cooperation in Homeland Security, and
Protection of Classified Material. Since 2015, IPS officer trainees have been visiting the Israel
National Police Academy every year for a one-week long foreign exposure training at the
end of their training in the National Police Academy, Hyderabad.
What India Buys?

• Drones
• LRSAM,MRSAM
• Phalcom AEW
• Torpedoes
• Comp Integrated border Management Systems
• Sniffer dogs

Cooperation in S&T and Space

India-Israel cooperation in S&T is overseen by the Joint Committe on S&T, established under
the S&T Cooperation Agreement signed in 1993. During the visit of PM Modi in July 2017, an
MoU for establishing India-Israel Industrial R&D and Innovation Fund (I4F) was signed. In
July 2017, space agencies-ISRO & Israel Space Agency- signed three agreements on space
cooperation.

Culture and Education

In popular Israeli perception, India is an attractive, alternative tourist destination. Israeli

youth are particularly attracted to India. Air India started direct flights between New Delhi
and Tel Aviv in March 2018. Israeli carrier, El Al, operates direct flights between Mumbai and
Tel Aviv. Several courses related to India are taught at Tel Aviv University, Hebrew University
and Haifa University. Since 2012, Israel has been offering post-doctoral
scholarship to students from India in all fields. The Government of Israel also offers short
term summer scholarships for Indian students. India offers ICCR scholarships to Israelis every
year for various courses in Indian institutions.

Indian Diaspora
There are approximately 95,000 Jews of Indian-origin in Israel , who are all Israeli passport
holders. The main waves of immigration into Israel from India took place in the fifties and
sixties.There are about 14,000 Indian citizens in Israel, of whom around 13,200 are care-
givers employed by Israeli elders to take care of them. Others include diamond traders, some
IT professionals and students.
 Israel Palestine Conflict

Brief history of the Conflict

Britain took control of the area known as Palestine after the ruler of that part of the Middle
East, the Ottoman Empire, was defeated in WW1. The land was inhabited by a Jewish
minority and Arab majority. Tensions between the two peoples grew when the international
community gave Britain the task of establishing a "national home" in Palestine for Jewish
people. But Palestinian Arabs opposed the move.

Between the 1920s and 40s, the number of Jews arriving there grew, with many fleeing from
persecution in Europe and seeking a homeland after the Holocaust of WWII. Violence
between Jews and Arabs grew.

In 1947, the UN voted for Palestine to be split into separate Jewish and Arab states, with
Jerusalem becoming an international city.That plan was accepted by Jewish leaders but
rejected by the Arab side and never implemented.

In 1948, unable to solve the problem, British rulers left and Jewish leaders declared the
creation of the state of Israel, a war followed. Troops from neighbouring Arab countries
invaded. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled or were forced out of their homes in
what they call Al Nakba, or the "Catastrophe". By the time the fighting ended in a ceasefire
the following year, Israel controlled most of the territory. Jordan occupied land which
became known as the West Bank, and Egypt occupied Gaza.

Jerusalem was divided between Israeli forces in the West, and Jordanian forces in the East.

Because there was never a peace agreement - each side blamed the other - there were more
wars and fighting in the decades which followed.

In another war in 1967, Israel occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank, as well as most of
the Syrian Golan Heights, and Gaza and the Egyptian Sinai peninsula.

Most Palestinian refugees and their descendants live in Gaza and the West Bank, as well as
in neighbouring Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Neither they nor their descendants have been
allowed by Israel to return to their homes - Israel says this would overwhelm the country and
threaten its existence as a Jewish state.

Israel still occupies the West Bank, and although it pulled out of Gaza the UN still regards
that piece of land as part of occupied territory. Israel claims the whole of Jerusalem as its
capital, while the Palestinians claim East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian
state. The US is one of only a handful of countries to recognise Israel's claim to the whole of
the city.
In the past 50 years Israel has built settlements in these areas, where more than 600,000
Jews now live.

Gaza is ruled by the Palestinian militant group Hamas, which has fought Israel many times.
Israel and Egypt tightly control Gaza's borders to stop weapons getting to Hamas.

There are a number of issues which Israel and the Palestinians cannot agree on.These
include:
• What should happen to Palestinian refugees,
• whether Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank should stay or be
removed,
• whether the two sides should share Jerusalem
• whether a Palestinian state should be created alongside Israel.
President Obama's approach - In syrian crisis context, Obama entered in deal with Iran
leading to the tensions in US- Israel relation . Iran still does not recognise Israel's right to
exist . Obama's Policy strenghthened the status of Iran

Donald Trump’s new Middle East plan,2020"Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the
Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People" . Trump was clearly not a neutral negotiator
having shifted American Embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv , recognised the contested
Golan Heights as part of Israel and closed a Palestinian Mission in Washington and aid to
Palestinian refugees has also been cut. Netanyahu praised it calling it “realistic path to a
durable peace” .Palestine rejected it as a “conspiracy deal” to which “we say a thousand
times over: no, no, no”. Trump called it "deal of the century" .

India's response to Trump’s plan: New Delhi urged Israel and Palestine to engage directly
and explore possibilities of finding an “acceptable” two-state solution for peaceful
coexistence.

2021 Israel Palestine Clashes

Why did this conflict start?
Things escalated since the start of the holy Muslim month of Ramadan in mid-April 2021,
with nightly clashes between police and Palestinians. The threatened eviction of some
Palestinian families in East Jerusalem has also caused rising anger.

Reason behind truce?

After 11 days airstrikes on and rocket attacks from Gaza, Israel and Hamas agreed to an
Egypt-mediated ceasefire.
Both sides are claiming victory and have warned that the ceasefire would hold based on the
ground circumstances.
The Israeli troops were wary of launching a ground invasion this time. In a ground attack,
Israel could inflict more damage on Hamas, but the risk of losing Israeli soldiers would also
be high.
The focus of Israel was on leaving maximum damage to Hamas’s militant infrastructure
through airstrikes. Israel carried out more than 1,800 airstrikes on Gaza. But Airstrikes leave
disproportionate civilian casualties , inviting international pressure. Even those countries
that initially supported Israel’s “right to defend itself” started calling for a ceasefire.
In the UNSC most countries backed an immediate ceasefire. The Biden administration, which
was facing intense pressure from the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, asked for “a
significant de-escalation”.
Israel was also facing internal pressure as its streets were gripped by riots between Jewish
vigilantes and Arab mobs.
Protests were spreading in the West Bank and rockets were coming from the Lebanon
border. Amid intensifying pressure from many sides, the Israeli Security Cabinet unanimously
accepted a “unilateral and mutual” ceasefire with Hamas

Did Israel achieve its goals?

During the course of the attack, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said there were
two ways to deal with Hamas — one, to conquer Hamas and the other to establish
deterrence. The Prime Minister said his aim was “forceful deterrence”, but conquering was
“an open possibility”. Israeli military leaders have claimed that they have killed 225 members
of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and has destroyed Hamas’s elaborate tunnel network and
military and intelligence infrastructure. The claims are however not verifiable.

Way Forward of the conflict

Future seems to be fragile. Any future peace deal will need both sides to agree to resolve
complex issues.

India’s response to the conflict

Statement by India in UN:
India expressed deep concern over violence in Jerusalem, especially on Haram Al Sharif/
Temple Mount during the holy month of Ramadan. The indiscriminate rocket firings from
Gaza targeting the civilian population in Israel and the retaliatory strikes into Gaza was
condemn for having caused immense sufferings of people.
India appealed for Immediate de-escalation and showing extreme restraint and refrain from
attempts to unilaterally change the existing status-quo.
India also asked for immediate resumption of dialogue between Israel and Palestinian and
reiterated India’s strong support to the just Palestinian cause and its unwavering
commitment to the two-State solution.

Conclusion on India Israel Relations

For the Indo-Israeli partnership to realise its full potential, it is imperative for both the
countries to behave as mature democracies and try to understand & appreciate the
compulsions of each other on a variety of regional & international
issues.

While Israel ties are on a strong footing, India cannot ignore the
Palestinians for historic, moral, legal and realist reasons. Therefore,
in India-Israel relations, as the Israel lobby in India claims, the sky is
not the limit. It should be principles. Only that makes a difference
in this all against all, Hobbesian world of international relations.
 India Israel Relations

Syllabus

Recent developments in Indian Foreign Policy : India’s position on the recent crises in
Afghanistan, Iraq and West Asia, growing relations with US and Israel ; Vision of a new world
order.

PYQs
1. Can Israel be termed a 'natural ally' of India? (20 Marks/200 words/ 2010)
2. In the history of foreign policy, seldom have relations between any two nations
blossomed as fast as they have in the case of India& Israel. Discuss.(15 marks/ 200
words/ 2014)
3. Discuss the realistic foreign policy initiatives taken by India to balance its relations
between Israel and the Arab world.(15 marks/200 words/2015)
4. Has the recent Indo-Israeli relationships given a new dynamics to India's stand on
Palestinian statehood?(10 marks/ 150 words/ 2017)
5. "The growing closeness between India and Israel will strengthen the cause of
Palestine. Comment.(10 Marks/150 words/ 2019)

Evolution of the relations

Experts identify 3 phases in India-Israel relations:

1. 1947 to 1992 : Based on Gandhian and Nehruvian principles; sympathy towards the
Palestinian Arabs.
2. 1992 to 2014 :Post-cold war and Post Gulf war reorientation and commencement of
official diplomatic links.
3. 2014 to present : A more "close r and constructive engagement" with Israel under
Prime Minister Modi.

From Nehru to Rao (1947 to 1992)

In 1948, India was the only non-Arab-state among 13 countries

that voted against the UN partition plan of Palestine in the
General Assembly that led to the creation of Israel.
PM Jawaharlal Nehru’s reasoning for the decision to recognise
Israel was that it was “an established fact”, and that not doing
so would create rancour between two UN members. A consulate in Mumbai was established
in 1953 .
At the 53rd UN session, India co-sponsored the draft resolution on the right of the
Palestinians to self-determination.
In the 1967 and 1973 wars, India lashed out at Israel as the aggressor.
In the 1970s, India rallied behind the PLO and its leader Yasser Arafat as the sole and
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
In 1975, India became the first non-Arab country to recognise the PLO as the sole
representative of the Palestinian people.
In 1988, when the PLO declared an independent state of Palestine with its capital in East
Jerusalem, India granted recognition immediately. Arafat was received as head of state
whenever he visited India.

Gandhi on the Israel-Palestine Conflict

Gandhi’s way of looking at the Palestine issue had the

imprint of both ideological as well as political
considerations. As per Simone Panter-Brick’s book, Gandhi
and the Middle East (2008), Gandhi admitted that he was
sympathetic to their “age-long persecution” of the Jews.
But, he proceeded to see it in the light of the valid claims of
the other side. For him , Palestine belongs to the Arab in the same sense that England
belongs to the English or France to the French.”
He urged Jews to seek settlement in Palestine only by the goodwill of the Arabs, and by
attempting a change of Arab heart.

From Rao to Modi (1992 to 2014)

By the early 1990s, India’s quest for recognising Israel
was further catalysed by major changes in world
politics brought by the end of the Cold War and the
disintegration of the Soviet Union.The remarkable
rise of Israel as a leading defense technology and arms
supplier was another attraction that India couldn’t
overlook for long.
The opening of an Indian embassy in Tel Aviv in January 1992 marked an end to four decades
of giving Israel the cold shoulder, as India’s recognition of Israel in 1950 had been minus full
diplomatic ties.
These factors nudged the PV Narasimha Rao-led government to finally take the decision of
establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992. In many ways, there was an element
of inevitability to this decision and it had become a matter of time.
During the UPA’s 10 years in office, the balancing act
intensified, and Mahmoud Abbas, head of the Palestinian
Authority that administers the West Bank, visited in 2005, 2008,
2010 and 2012.

From Modi to present (After 2014)

Israel is Hindutva’s ideal of a “strong state” that deals “firmly” with “terrorists”. Even back in
the 1970s, the BJP’s forerunner Jana Sangh had made the case for ties with Israel. In 2000, L
K Advani became the first Indian minister to visit Israel, and in the same year Jaswant Singh
visited as Foreign Minister.
Modi took full ownership of the relationship with Israel. The first
indication of the new phase came with an abstention by India at
the UN Human Rights Council on a resolution welcoming a report
by the HRC High Commissioner. The abstention was conspicuous
because in 2014, India had voted for the resolution through
which the UNHRC inquiry was set up. In 2016, India abstained
again at on a UNHRC resolution against Israel.
In February 2018, Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel. His itinerary did
not include Ramallah. The word then was that India had “de-hyphenated” the Israel-
Palestine relationship, and would deal with each separately.
Dimensions of India-Israel relations
Political Relations
India announced its recognition of Israel on September 17, 1950. Soon thereafter, the Jewish
Agency established an immigration office in Bombay. This was later converted into a Trade
Office and subsequently a Consulate. Embassies were opened in 1992 when full diplomatic
relations were established.
Since the upgradation of relations in 1992, defense and agriculture formed the two main
pillars of the bilateral engagement. In recent years, relations have seen rapid growth across
a broad spectrum of areas - R&D innovation, water, agriculture and space. Agreements on
cyber security, oil & gas cooperation, film co-production and air transport have also been
signed .

Economic and Commercial Relations

From US$ 200 million in 1992 (comprising primarily trade in diamonds), bilateral
merchandise trade stood at US$ 5.65 billion (excluding defense) in 2018-19, with the balance
of trade being in India’s favour by US$ 1.8 billion.
Trade in diamonds constitutes close to 40% of bilateral trade. India is Israel's third largest
trade partner in Asia and seventh largest globally. In recent years, the bilateral trade has
diversified into several sectors such as pharmaceuticals, agriculture, IT and telecom, and
homeland security. Major exports from India to Israel include precious stones and metals,
chemical products, textiles and textile articles, etc. Major imports by India from Israel
include precious stones and metals, chemicals and mineral products, base metals and
machinery and transport equipment.

Indian software companies, notably TCS, Infosys, Tech Mahindra and Wipro, are beginning
to expand their presence in the Israeli market.

Investment
Indian investments in Israel (April 2000-June 2017) totaled USD 122.4 million . Indian
companies are marking their presence in Israel through mergers and acquisitions .
TCS started operations in Israel in 2005; State Bank of India opened a branch in Tel Aviv in
2007; Jain Irrigation fully acquired NaanDan, an Israeli irrigation equipment manufacturing
company, in 2012 and Sun Pharma has a 66.7% stake in Israel’s Taro Pharmaceutical
Industries.

Agriculture
Under a comprehensive Work Plan for cooperation in agriculture signed on 10 May 2006,
bilateral projects are implemented through MASHAV (Center for International Cooperation
of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and CINADCO (Centre for International Agricultural
Development Cooperation of Israel’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development).
India has benefited from Israeli expertise and technologies in horticulture mechanization,
protected cultivation, nursery management, micro- irrigation and post-harvest
management.

Defense & Security

Israel is master in finer aspects of security. India is Israel's largest buyer of arms . The two
countries have elevated their ties to a strategic partnership; a pillar of this relationship is
defense.
India imports critical defense technologies from Israel. There are regular exchanges between
the armed forces. There is cooperation on security issues, including a Joint Working Group
on Counter-Terrorism. In February 2014, India and Israel signed three important agreements
on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Cooperation in Homeland Security, and
Protection of Classified Material. Since 2015, IPS officer trainees have been visiting the Israel
National Police Academy every year for a one-week long foreign exposure training at the
end of their training in the National Police Academy, Hyderabad.
What India Buys?

• Drones
• LRSAM,MRSAM
• Phalcom AEW
• Torpedoes
• Comp Integrated border Management Systems
• Sniffer dogs

Cooperation in S&T and Space

India-Israel cooperation in S&T is overseen by the Joint Committe on S&T, established under
the S&T Cooperation Agreement signed in 1993. During the visit of PM Modi in July 2017, an
MoU for establishing India-Israel Industrial R&D and Innovation Fund (I4F) was signed. In
July 2017, space agencies-ISRO & Israel Space Agency- signed three agreements on space
cooperation.

Culture and Education

In popular Israeli perception, India is an attractive, alternative tourist destination. Israeli

youth are particularly attracted to India. Air India started direct flights between New Delhi
and Tel Aviv in March 2018. Israeli carrier, El Al, operates direct flights between Mumbai and
Tel Aviv. Several courses related to India are taught at Tel Aviv University, Hebrew University
and Haifa University. Since 2012, Israel has been offering post-doctoral
scholarship to students from India in all fields. The Government of Israel also offers short
term summer scholarships for Indian students. India offers ICCR scholarships to Israelis every
year for various courses in Indian institutions.

Indian Diaspora
There are approximately 95,000 Jews of Indian-origin in Israel , who are all Israeli passport
holders. The main waves of immigration into Israel from India took place in the fifties and
sixties.There are about 14,000 Indian citizens in Israel, of whom around 13,200 are care-
givers employed by Israeli elders to take care of them. Others include diamond traders, some
IT professionals and students.
 Israel Palestine Conflict

Brief history of the Conflict

Britain took control of the area known as Palestine after the ruler of that part of the Middle
East, the Ottoman Empire, was defeated in WW1. The land was inhabited by a Jewish
minority and Arab majority. Tensions between the two peoples grew when the international
community gave Britain the task of establishing a "national home" in Palestine for Jewish
people. But Palestinian Arabs opposed the move.

Between the 1920s and 40s, the number of Jews arriving there grew, with many fleeing from
persecution in Europe and seeking a homeland after the Holocaust of WWII. Violence
between Jews and Arabs grew.

In 1947, the UN voted for Palestine to be split into separate Jewish and Arab states, with
Jerusalem becoming an international city.That plan was accepted by Jewish leaders but
rejected by the Arab side and never implemented.

In 1948, unable to solve the problem, British rulers left and Jewish leaders declared the
creation of the state of Israel, a war followed. Troops from neighbouring Arab countries
invaded. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled or were forced out of their homes in
what they call Al Nakba, or the "Catastrophe". By the time the fighting ended in a ceasefire
the following year, Israel controlled most of the territory. Jordan occupied land which
became known as the West Bank, and Egypt occupied Gaza.

Jerusalem was divided between Israeli forces in the West, and Jordanian forces in the East.

Because there was never a peace agreement - each side blamed the other - there were more
wars and fighting in the decades which followed.

In another war in 1967, Israel occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank, as well as most of
the Syrian Golan Heights, and Gaza and the Egyptian Sinai peninsula.

Most Palestinian refugees and their descendants live in Gaza and the West Bank, as well as
in neighbouring Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Neither they nor their descendants have been
allowed by Israel to return to their homes - Israel says this would overwhelm the country and
threaten its existence as a Jewish state.

Israel still occupies the West Bank, and although it pulled out of Gaza the UN still regards
that piece of land as part of occupied territory. Israel claims the whole of Jerusalem as its
capital, while the Palestinians claim East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian
state. The US is one of only a handful of countries to recognise Israel's claim to the whole of
the city.
In the past 50 years Israel has built settlements in these areas, where more than 600,000
Jews now live.

Gaza is ruled by the Palestinian militant group Hamas, which has fought Israel many times.
Israel and Egypt tightly control Gaza's borders to stop weapons getting to Hamas.

There are a number of issues which Israel and the Palestinians cannot agree on.These
include:
• What should happen to Palestinian refugees,
• whether Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank should stay or be
removed,
• whether the two sides should share Jerusalem
• whether a Palestinian state should be created alongside Israel.
President Obama's approach - In syrian crisis context, Obama entered in deal with Iran
leading to the tensions in US- Israel relation . Iran still does not recognise Israel's right to
exist . Obama's Policy strenghthened the status of Iran

Donald Trump’s new Middle East plan,2020"Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the
Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People" . Trump was clearly not a neutral negotiator
having shifted American Embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv , recognised the contested
Golan Heights as part of Israel and closed a Palestinian Mission in Washington and aid to
Palestinian refugees has also been cut. Netanyahu praised it calling it “realistic path to a
durable peace” .Palestine rejected it as a “conspiracy deal” to which “we say a thousand
times over: no, no, no”. Trump called it "deal of the century" .

India's response to Trump’s plan: New Delhi urged Israel and Palestine to engage directly
and explore possibilities of finding an “acceptable” two-state solution for peaceful
coexistence.

2021 Israel Palestine Clashes

Why did this conflict start?
Things escalated since the start of the holy Muslim month of Ramadan in mid-April 2021,
with nightly clashes between police and Palestinians. The threatened eviction of some
Palestinian families in East Jerusalem has also caused rising anger.

Reason behind truce?

After 11 days airstrikes on and rocket attacks from Gaza, Israel and Hamas agreed to an
Egypt-mediated ceasefire.
Both sides are claiming victory and have warned that the ceasefire would hold based on the
ground circumstances.
The Israeli troops were wary of launching a ground invasion this time. In a ground attack,
Israel could inflict more damage on Hamas, but the risk of losing Israeli soldiers would also
be high.
The focus of Israel was on leaving maximum damage to Hamas’s militant infrastructure
through airstrikes. Israel carried out more than 1,800 airstrikes on Gaza. But Airstrikes leave
disproportionate civilian casualties , inviting international pressure. Even those countries
that initially supported Israel’s “right to defend itself” started calling for a ceasefire.
In the UNSC most countries backed an immediate ceasefire. The Biden administration, which
was facing intense pressure from the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, asked for “a
significant de-escalation”.
Israel was also facing internal pressure as its streets were gripped by riots between Jewish
vigilantes and Arab mobs.
Protests were spreading in the West Bank and rockets were coming from the Lebanon
border. Amid intensifying pressure from many sides, the Israeli Security Cabinet unanimously
accepted a “unilateral and mutual” ceasefire with Hamas

Did Israel achieve its goals?

During the course of the attack, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said there were
two ways to deal with Hamas — one, to conquer Hamas and the other to establish
deterrence. The Prime Minister said his aim was “forceful deterrence”, but conquering was
“an open possibility”. Israeli military leaders have claimed that they have killed 225 members
of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and has destroyed Hamas’s elaborate tunnel network and
military and intelligence infrastructure. The claims are however not verifiable.

Way Forward of the conflict

Future seems to be fragile. Any future peace deal will need both sides to agree to resolve
complex issues.

India’s response to the conflict

Statement by India in UN:
India expressed deep concern over violence in Jerusalem, especially on Haram Al Sharif/
Temple Mount during the holy month of Ramadan. The indiscriminate rocket firings from
Gaza targeting the civilian population in Israel and the retaliatory strikes into Gaza was
condemn for having caused immense sufferings of people.
India appealed for Immediate de-escalation and showing extreme restraint and refrain from
attempts to unilaterally change the existing status-quo.
India also asked for immediate resumption of dialogue between Israel and Palestinian and
reiterated India’s strong support to the just Palestinian cause and its unwavering
commitment to the two-State solution.

Conclusion on India Israel Relations

For the Indo-Israeli partnership to realise its full potential, it is imperative for both the
countries to behave as mature democracies and try to understand & appreciate the
compulsions of each other on a variety of regional & international
issues.

While Israel ties are on a strong footing, India cannot ignore the
Palestinians for historic, moral, legal and realist reasons. Therefore,
in India-Israel relations, as the Israel lobby in India claims, the sky is
not the limit. It should be principles. Only that makes a difference
in this all against all, Hobbesian world of international relations.
 India Japan Relations

Current Status

 Special Strategic and Global Partnership

Current Focus
Deep , broad based action oriented partnership seeking to shape the strategic and economic
architecture.
Evolution of the relations
Deep cultural and historical ties .
Relations in Modern times:
Rabindra Nath Tagore, Okakura Tenshin and other intellectuals
established Indo Japanese association helping Indian expatriates
migrating to Japan .

Azad Hind Fauj was formed with the help of Japan .

Justice Radha Binod Pal became popular in Japan for his dissenting
judgement in favour of Japan at Military Tribunal .
India did not attend San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951 due to its concerns over the
limitations imposed upon Japan’s sovereignty .
1952 – Official diplomatic relations in which India waived all reparation claims .
India was the largest recipient of Japan’s ODA.

India Japan Relations were tepid because they were in opposite camps .
Sanctions were imposed on India due to Pokhran 1

After the end of Cold war

Warming up started

Reasons:

 Rise of China.
 Improvement in India USA relations
 Opening up of Indian Economy

Present state of the relation

 Global partnership between Japan and India in year 2000.

 Annual Summits since 2005.
 2006 – Global and strategic partnership.
 2014 –
o Special Strategic and global Partnership  “Deep, broad based and action
oriented ”
o Japan India Vision 2025  It will guide new era of Japan India Relations .

Areas of cooperation

 Security –
o There is strong synergy between India’s Act East Policy and Japan’s Free and
Open Indo Pacific .
o Both have strengthened Maritime security cooperation
by conducting
  A new foreign and defence ministerial 2+2
dialogue.
 Bilateral exercise – JIMEX.
 Trilateral exercise – Malabar which has become
quadrilateral also.

o ACSA Agreement (India is the sixth country).
o India will be acquiring ShinMaywa US-2 Amphibious
aircraft.

 Economic
o Economic relations are bedrock of partnership as Japan is deeply involved in
crucial projects like high Speed railway system between Mumbai and
Ahmedabad, Quadrilateral Highway.
o Involved in sensitive reasons like India’s North East and Andaman and
Nicobar.(India Japan Act East Forum for development in NE).
o Asia Africa Growth Corridor aims at providing Economic and Infrastructure
alternatives to BRI.
o Japan made an exception to its rule in signing civil nuclear agreement and
supports India’s entry in NSG.
o Currency Swap Arrangement

Areas of concern

There is a need to balance the economic pillar of the strategic partnership which is much
below potential despite CEPA.
 INDIA LATIN AMERICA
Indian diplomacy has been prominent this century, leveraging an economy that has shed inhibitions and
grown impressively. Latin America however remains distant geographically and conceptually. Political
relations are cordial but seldom ascend levels of strategic empathy. Both sides have deepened exchanges
with almost all other regions and international partners in greater measure than with each other.

Still trade has grown over thirty percent annually between 2000 and 2014. Latin American resources are
an ideal fit for Indian technology, industrial capacity and markets. The deceleration, since 2015, has as
much to do with the global slowdown as with the lack of a strategy and measures to consolidate an
evidently complementary relationship.

Political diversity, varying economic endowments, lack of adequate human resources and institutional
underpinning, poor connectivity, and language issues present challenges for Indian stakeholders. A re-
prioritization of the relationship is essential, and should be complemented by more discerning and
energetic diplomacy.

Introduction:
Octavio Paz, the Mexican Nobel Laureate and Ambassador to India in the 1960’s, said: “India did not
enter me through my mind but through my senses. “It appears Latin America and India have a ‘sense’
about each other but their minds are still to be made up.

When India became a nation-state in 1947, independent Latin America had been around over a century.
Latin America was oriented towards Europe and the US. India was ‘non-aligned’. The civilizational
differences created a polite distance, despite abiding mutual admiration for aspects of each other’s
culture.

India has expanded its global diplomatic and economic footprint this century, but Latin America remains
over the horizon in more ways than one. Geographic distance is the supposed reason. This does not
however deter China, whose trade with the region is six times that of India, nor Indians travelling to the
US, whose east and west coasts are as far from India as Sao Paulo and Mexico respectively. Direct air
and shipping links are considered uneconomical. Both sides see each other as exotic tourism destinations
but have not achieved critical travel mass.

Political and diplomatic relations were established soon after 1947, given the absence of disputes and a
shared colonial legacy. Early political exchanges identified some common ground but had little political
impact. India today hosts twenty Latin American and Caribbean embassies and maintains 14 in that
region and plans to add more Paraguay and Dominican republic are two additions. It participates with
Brazil, Mexico and Argentina in the G20. Forums for bilateral dialogue, contact with the Community of
Latin American States (CELAC) and sub-regional forums provide the matrix for engagement.
Economic complementarity has been evident, with Indian companies importing large quantities of
hydrocarbons from Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia and Brazil; edible oils and sugar from Brazil and
Argentina; copper and precious metals from Chile and Peru; wood from Ecuador, etc. In turn India
exports pharmaceuticals, textiles and manufactured products. Trade accelerated this century at thirty
percent annually to hit $46 billion in 2013-14. It then slowed with the fall in prices of commodities,
especially crude oil, India’s principal import.

The main drivers of the relationship have been official patronage and private enterprise. The former has
promoted a strategic partnership with Brazil; a privileged partnership with Mexico; trade negotiations
with Mercosur, Chile, Peru; observer status in the Pacific Alliance; investments in energy, mainly
hydrocarbons; and a variety of agreements for collaboration in agriculture, science and technology,
commerce, etc. Private companies have exploited the economic complementarity to invest and trade in
energy, commodities, manufactures and technology to mutual benefit in most cases. Indian companies
recognise Latin America as an important market for automobiles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and
engineering goods. Over two dozen Indian IT companies have service and development centres there.

Issues and Impediments

Both sides have still to identify the ingredients that will propel exchanges and enhance the substance of a
relationship that is a long way from its true potential. Though the task would seem more complicated for
India, which has to deal with over twenty countries, India’s complex political economy also perplexes
many Latin Americans. Given the lack of cohesion and relatively shallow levels of Latin American
integration – compared to ASEAN or the European Union - India transacts business bilaterally and
occasionally engages in dialogue at regional level.

Political vicissitudes and fluctuating ideological currents have impacted attempts to build durable
friendships. A lack of application, insufficient diplomatic attention, linguistic unfamiliarity, absence of a
diaspora, and generally lower stakes than with other international partners, have conspired to keep both
sides somewhat in the dark about aspects of their political environment important to the relationship..
This led to the neglect, and near demise, of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) forum created in
2003.Consolidation of democracy and centrist politics helps focus both sides on the essential aspects of
their relations.

With high rates of growth come increasing Indian demands for energy, food, minerals and other
material. As Indian industry expands, it looks more closely at markets covering 600 million middle-
income customers in Latin America. Governments and business houses in Latin America recognise the
potential India offers as a destination for their resources and a source of investment. They also glimpse
opportunities for value addition by leveraging India’s strengths, not just in the IT sector, but in renewable
energy, automotive industry, pharmaceuticals and other areas.

Indian investment in Latin American hydrocarbons, pharma, automobiles, agro-processing, engineering,

textiles, chemicals, electronics is estimated around $20 billion, giving it a stake in Latin American
prosperity. Latin American business has a much smaller footprint in India. While the Indian market is
obviously attractive, and the present government emphasizes domestic manufacture by foreign
investors, many factors - some genuine, others imaginary - still inhibit Latin American business in India.
The present government, through its ‘Make in India’ program has removed several hurdles to business,
but still needs to improve its ranking in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index .

In 2015-16, Latin America accounted for less than 3 percent of India’s exports and just over 5 percent of
India’s imports worldwide..

In 2010 the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) came out with a report titled "India: Latin America’s
Next Big Thing? “The study noted India’s potential to mirror the economic performance of China, and the
massive opportunity for more trade and cooperation, but the question mark at the end of the title was
perhaps deliberate, an indication of the challenge. The study emphasized that, in order to boost trade,
both India and Latin America must lower tariffs and trade barriers.

India’s average tariff on Latin American agricultural goods was 65 percent, more than 5 times China’s
average tariff of 12.5 percent. Even though Latin American tariffs on Indian goods were lower—9.8
percent on manufactures— they were well above the OECD range of 4 to 6 percent. A 10 percent
reduction in average tariffs on Indian products could increase exports of Indian goods by 36 percent to
Chile and Argentina.

Physical connectivity, a vital element for future growth of trade, was the other obstacle identified,
specifically the high cost of transport. India, unlike China, has no direct shipping services to this region.
The economics of the shipping industry led to the discontinuance of some attempts in the 1980’s.
Unfortunately no institutional attempt has been made to ensure viability of direct shipping connections,
or even warehousing facilities, by either side.

The complementary nature of the economies of India and Latin America makes for a mutually beneficial
relationship, but neglect can turn into indifference. Edible oil sugar importers from Brazil and Argentina,
just like crude oil or copper importers, are left to their own devices. Little attempt is made to identify and
leverage synergies or opportunities. Collaborative opportunities in pipelines, land lease, port and railway
capacity, refineries, warehousing, etc. in Latin America are considered a bridge too far for the Indian
business establishment, which has not ventured to promote investments in complementary sectors to
ensure supplies and value addition.

Unlike other players in Latin America – US, Europe, China, Japan, Korea – India has still to consider
participation in Latin American financial institutions like the Inter -American Development Bank, the
Andean Development Corporation, the Central American Bank, etc. Latin American Banks have
apparently not even looked at India.

Indo-Latin American business has made a mark through ventures such as the Birla Group (Hindalco)
acquisitions in Brazilian aluminum industry; Brazilian Gerdau’s acquisition of a steel plant (Kalyani) in
India; Marco Polo (Brazil)-Tata joint venture for bus chassis in India; over 350 cinema screens acquired
and run by Mexico’s Cinepolis in India; assembly lines of auto companies Mahindra and Hero in South
America; UPL’s presence in the Latin American agro-chemical market; extensive operations by Indian
pharma companies all over Latin America; and the overarching investments of billions of dollars by
India’s state companies in hydrocarbon exploration in Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela.
A more serendipitous relationship thrives in the IT sector. Over two dozen Indian companies have set up
development and service centres, including business process outsourcing, all over Latin America. The
‘near shoring’ model relies on Indian software and expertise, Latin American human resources, and the
advantage of working in American time zones. With just a few hundred technicians from back home,
Indian software majors employ, train and empower tens of thousands of locals, leverage their language
capabilities for the north American, European and local markets, and avoid the need for long term visas
for more Indian employees.

There are almost no settled Indian origin industrialists or businessmen with the heft to act as nuclei in
Latin America for their erstwhile compatriots, or catalyze investment from there into India, a model that
has created vibrant linkages with other countries. Their modest economic conditions do not generate the
levels of remittances nor tourism to warrant the attention bestowed on communities of Indian origin
elsewhere. This may be the only region where professionals outnumber settlers from India.

Lack of fluency in Spanish and Portuguese is a major disadvantage for Indian companies, whose growth
is consequently often dependent on their local collaborators. Unfamiliarity with India’s ethos also
burdens Latin American companies in India. This calls for an approach that inculcates a deeper
appreciation of the historical, social and linguistic context in which business is to be established and
conducted. Students of Spanish in India are growing in number, but consciousness of Latin American
culture and conditions is missing. Business acumen can overcome some handicaps but cannot establish
an effective corporate presence, nor lobbies to protect business interests, without a commitment that
goes beyond the bottom line.

The Way Forward

The hiatus between the content and the potential of the relationship, when comparing Latin America’s
relations with China, or even South Korea, calls into question the commitment on both sides. In this
century of frenetic diplomacy, a lack of vision, or even comprehension, leads to mental blocks that
impede interaction.

India and Latin America need to better understand each other’s political reality, endowments,
capabilities and priorities, beyond the experience of transitory diplomats. Both sides need to define their
priorities after realistically assessing their capabilities and the prospects for engagement. This calls for a
thorough strategy. Latin America acts through multiple layers of regional and sub-regional
organizations, so arguably India needs to take the lead in identifying and activating the principal actors
and forums.

The articulation of a strategy should start with a hard look at the status of the current relationship. This
should be disaggregated to sub-regional level, and where necessary, identify country-specific issues. The
lack of institutional memory on both sides calls for verification of vital facts and updated statistics. Then
comes the articulation of goals, a program and structure for regional level dialogue. This should include
elements of the India-CELAC joint statement of 2012, following the first meeting at Foreign Minister
level. The statement identified political, economic, technological and other areas of actual and potential
collaboration. In most cases, the commitments remain on paper. Even the minimal pledge to hold annual
Foreign Ministerial meetings has not been fulfilled.
The prime mover is political will. Both sides need to pay more attention to each other. The need for a
higher profile for Latin America in Indian diplomacy is paramount. This has happened with Southeast
Asia and Africa. Summit meetings have been Organised, trade and other agreements signed, and
considerable official funds invested in infrastructure and other projects to upgrade those relationships.
India’s trade with 54 countries in Africa – around $70 billion – is comparable with its trade with 34
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, in volume and composition. Yet the attention to Africa in
impressive in comparison.

Political initiatives need to be supported by economic and social interaction. Consolidation of the juridical
matrix through agreements for investment protection, avoidance of double taxation, extradition,
immigration, lines of credit, elimination of regulatory hurdles, etc. are as important as the forums that
institutionalize dialogue between governments and other stakeholders.

An analysis of the synergies on offer will help engender counterparts on both sides which will serve as a
lobby for common interests. Examples are agricultural and scientific research institutes. Areas of
strength and complementarity need to be studied in depth. Latin American prowess in agriculture,
renewable energy, social engineering can be reciprocated by India’s advances in software, outer space,
biotechnology.

India’s Department of Commerce has in place a Focus Latin America & Caribbean (FOCUS LAC) program
in place since 1997,extended periodically, most recently till 2019. The program basically provides finance
and assistance for Indian exporters to Latin America. It recently began to negotiate free - or preferential
– trade agreements with key Latin American countries: expansion of the existing PTA’s with Chile and
Mercosur and commencement of negotiations for similar agreements with Peru, Ecuador and Colombia.
This engagement needs to be intensified to overcome resistance from local lobbies in India and Latin
American countries struggling with their balance of payments.

The overwhelming financial, industrial and commercial clout of China is driven by an establishment that
has overawed Latin American governments and business. China’s policy papers of 2008 and 2016, on its
relations with Latin America, outline in some detail the specific methodology of engagement in
accordance with China’s priorities. Latin America has accepted the strait-jacket political approach of the
communist regime, as long as the economic engagement remains efficient and predictable, without
inconvenient political and transactional costs.

The Indian establishment cannot match China’s achievements in the foreseeable future and must
concentrate on incremental accretion

India would have to calibrate its campaign taking into account the new realities of a more dynamic Latin
America today. The Indian establishment will have to be more proactive to integrate into Latin American
supply chains. At the same time it has to be sensitive to warning signals such as those emanating from
Venezuela, where Indian companies have had to write off tens of millions in dues for pharma and other
exports.
Nascent cooperation in strategic sectors and industries calls for more attention. India is involved with
Brazil bilaterally through purchase of aircraft, civilian and military; in maritime exercises through the
IBSA; and on situations of international conflict in BRICS. Indian helicopters, armored vehicles and non-
lethal equipment have been sold to some Latin American countries. There is scope for more cooperation
in outer space, nuclear energy, maintenance of defense hardware, cooperation on terrorism. Narcotics
from Latin America entering India through various routes, and trade in chemical precursors from India is
an activity still beneath the radar. Despite agreements in some of these sectors, cooperation has been
minimal and must be spurred by governments.

China’s extends its soft power in the region through Confucius Institutes, strong academic linkages,
language proficiency and propagation. The spread of its film industry threatens to overshadow the
popular image India’s Bollywood enjoys but has failed to commercialize. The Indian establishment would
do well to strengthen aspects of the relationship that distinguish India from China. These would include
India’s civilizational strengths, democratic governance which demands transparency and accountability,
and multilateral issues where Latin America identifies more closely with India than with China.

Although India enjoys a very positive image as a civilization that spawned yoga, classical dance and
music, and other expressions of soft power, academic interaction has been limited. This lacuna has
historic and linguistic roots. Attempts to remedy it are half-hearted. India’s program for technical and
economic collaboration (ITEC)offers a few hundred technical scholarships every year to Latin Americans.
Despite very attractive terms – all expenses paid – to undertake courses for a few weeks to a few months
in prime Indian institutions, the scholarships are underutilized and little feedback is received by the
Indian establishment. Fully paid cultural scholarships on both sides are difficult to come by.

Cultural approximation is essential if populations on both sides are to gain a more authentic appreciation
of each other’s realities. It will also help create the necessary workforce as economic and commercial
relations grow, not to mention tourism. Eventually, linkages between academic institutions, think tanks,
media and other stakeholders will provide the intellectual matrix required by policymakers. For this think
tanks and universities will need to sharpen their focus, with official assistance where necessary.
 India Pakistan Relations

“Brother Enemies”

Timeline
1947 – Partition → War on Kashmir which ended on 1st Jan, 1949 .
Indian troops could manage to evict the aggressors from the 2/3 of
the state of Kashmir partially. War ended with the ceasefire
declaration → LoC.

1960 – Indus Water Treaty

1965 – Second War → Tashkent Declaration aiming to solve all
disputes bilaterally.
1971 War – Ended with Shimla Agreement as a gesture of Goodwill
from India .It converted Ceasefire line into LoC. Agreement to solve
Kashmir bilaterally.

1998 – Operation Shakti → Both became Nuclear weapon state .

1999 – Kargil

2001 – Attack on Indian Parliament → Verge of the war

2004 – Composite dialogue .

The dialogue had eight subjects:

1. Siachen - to be handled by the defence secretary.
2. Sir Creek - to be handled by surveyor general or additional
secretary defence.
 3. Tulbul navigation project - to be handled by secretary water resources.
4. Terrorism and drug trafficking - to be handled by home
secretary.
5. Economic and commercial cooperation - to be handled by
commerce secretary.
6. Promotion of friendly exchanges - to be handled by
secretary culture.
7. Peace and security including CBMs - to be handled by
foreign secretary.
8. Jammu and Kashmir - under the foreign secretary.

2008 – 26/11 attack.

2016 – Uri attack followed by surgical attack.

2019 – Pulawama followed by Balakot ; Abrogation of 370

; Kartarpur Corridor.

2020 – PoK in weather forecast.

 2021 – Ceasefire Agreement. The original
ceasefire was signed in 2003 , four years after
Kargil war. It brought peace until 2006. Not a
single bullet was fired . However, violation
became the norm since 2006 despite an
agreement reached in 2018 to adhere to 2003
agreement . Total 14000 ceasefire violations
have taken place since 2006 . In 2021 itself ,
Pakistan has violated 600 times . It was
announced after the discussion between DGMOs in February. The agreement says ,”In the
interest of achieving mutually beneficial and sustainable peace , the two DGMOs agreed to
address each other’s core issue and concerns which have propensity to disturb the peace and
lead to violence .”

Analysis :
It is not clear as to who brokered the deal and with what motivation and whether it will
sustain . It is yet to be seen how diplomatic relations will be normalised , when the summit
meetings will take place . Some are even hopeful of people to people contacts normalisation
of trade .
There are reports that India will participate in the Pabbi :
Anti-terror exercises in Naushera district of Khyber
Pakhutnwa under the aegis of SCO. In 2020, India had
withdrawn from SCO military exercises (Kavkaz – Russia )

Current Scenario:
We cannot be sure about the sustainability of this positive step as things are only
deteriorating , if seen in a longer context. Pakistan is openly supporting the Khalistan
movement , drones to drop weapons not just in J and K but also in Punjab, tunnels to
infiltrate , sticky bombs in Afghanistan.

Theories behind ceasefire agreement :

1. Both India and Pakistan trying to avoid a two
front war.
2. US pressure
3. Role of UAE.
4. Economic crisis in Pakistan due to FATF grey
listing .
Issues with Pakistan

“India and Pakistan have been antagonists, sufferers of colonial past and cold war policies, and
causalities of their own assumptions about themselves. ”Stephen P Cohen

1. Kashmir:

• India and Pakistan have fiercely contested each other over Kashmir, fighting three major
wars , one minor war and numerous proxy wars.
• Kashmir has gained immense international importance since both India and Pakistan have
acquired nuclear weapons and thus has created a threat to global security
• Considering Kashmir’s geo strategic and geo- economic importance the involvement of
external powers have made the situation more complicated.
• At present , it is a triangular conflict where India controls 55% of the Area, Pakistan controls
30 % and China controls 15%
• India’s perspective on Kashmir
i. It is a domestic issue.
ii. India opposes the internationalisation
iii. Favours Bilateral dialogues
• Recent developments:
i. After Pulawama Attack , 2019 , GoI in August , 2019 changed the
constitutional status of Kashmir
• Pakistan’s Perspective on Kashmir
i. As the sub continent was partitioned on the ground of religion , Kashmir
rightfully belongs to Pakistan .
ii. It prefers resolution of the issue through international mediation officially.
However, it relies on the tool of insurgency , terrorism → “The policy of
thousand cuts”
• Proposed solution to the Kashmir issue
i. Political independence → preferred by Kashmiris , but least likely
ii. Formal partition making LoC as the border →This formula was pursued to
large extent during peace talks often known as “Manmohan – Musharraf
formula ” with following steps:
• Soft borders
 • Demilitarisation
• Joint Management
• Human and economic exchanges
iii. Autonomy for the Kashmir region → Maximum autonomy to Kashmiris on
both sides of the borders (self rule and joint mechanism with India and
Pakistan to oversee the self rule )
• Each proposal presents huge challenge in the implementation in realistic sense. Considering
the domestic politics in both the countries, the government on both the sides will not be in
position to offer concessions. Realistically there is no meaningful solution , until and unless,
there is an extremely strong political will. Bilateral attempts seem unlikely . Greater
involvement of China makes it more difficult.

2. INDUS WATER TREATY

On September 19, 1960, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was signed between India and Pakistan to
share waters from the Indus rivers
system (IRS). The IWT allocates waters
from three western flowing rivers –
Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab – to
Pakistan barring some limited uses for
India in Jammu & Kashmir. India was
given control of the entire water from
the other three rivers – Ravi, Beas, and
Sutlej.
Despite opposition to the IWT and its
criticism since 1960, the IWT has
managed to survive even after three
wars (1965, 1971 and 1999), a number
of military stand-offs (1987, 2001-02, 2008, 2016 and 2019) and several other episodes of political
friction between the South Asian nuclear rivals.

ISSUES
In recent years due to widening of the supply-demand
gap of water in India and Pakistan, there has been a rise
in water nationalism which is further fuelled by the
increasing tensions between the two countries. Besides
state and civil society actors, Pakistan based militant
groups have also raised the issue of IRS waters in their
rallies criticising India for robbing what they call
Pakistan’s waters.
The growing number of multipurpose hydropower
projects on the IRS Rivers to effectively manage the
available waters and generate electricity has become a
cause for tension, as both India and Pakistan contest each
other projects. The issue of the Salal dam emerged in
1970 and was resolved by the two countries in 1978.
The second one was over Baglihar dam which they settled in 2007 with the help of World Bank
appointed Neutral Expert Professor Raymond Lafitte. More complex than Salal and Baglihar dams is
the dispute over Kishanganga Hydro Electricity Project (KHEP). Pakistan took the matter to the
Permanent Court of Arbitration which delivered its final verdict in 2013. Nevertheless, Pakistan has
kept on challenging the construction of the KHEP in Kashmir.
Amidst growing tensions with Pakistan in 2016, for the first time, a question over the IWT was raised
by Prime Minister Modi, “Blood and water cannot flow simultaneously”.
However, The IWT does not have a unilateral exit clause. Technically, under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of
Treaties, there are provisions to
sever and withdraw from the
treaty. However, the provisions
cannot be appropriately used to
abrogate the IWT.
• Even the severance of
diplomatic and consular
relationships between India
and Pakistan cannot
terminate the IWT. Even if
the IWT gets revoked in some way or the other, there are international conventions, rules and
principles which secure the water interests of the lower riparian states.
• The abrogation of the IWT will send alarm bells ringing in India’s other lower riparian country,
Bangladesh which receives about 91% of its waters from the rivers flowing from India.
• Growing collaboration between Pakistan and China on security, economy and water projects,
primarily on the western flowing rivers of IRS, may lead the Chinese to become much more
assertive towards India.
• In northeast India, China cannot divert much water from the Brahmaputra as the river becomes
wide only after reaching India, mainly in Assam. There have been reports of China building dams
over the Sutlej River which flows through Tibet before entering Himachal Pradesh. However, it can
stop supplying India with the hydrological data from Nugesha, Yangcun and Nuxia hydrological
stations for the Brahmaputra river and from a station at Tsada for the Sutlej river for which India
pays around Rs one crore every year. (China stopped sharing hydrological data on the
Brahmaputra with India during the 73 day Doklam standoff in 2017)

2. Sir Creek

Sir Creek is a 96-km strip of water disputed between

India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch marshlands.
Originally named Ban Ganga, it opens up in the
Arabian Sea and roughly divides the Kutch region of
Gujarat from the Sindh Province of Pakistan.
CAUSE OF DISPUTE

The dispute lies in the interpretation of the maritime boundary line between Kutch and Sindh. Pakistan
claims the entire creek as per paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Bombay Government Resolution of 1914
signed between then the Government of Sindh and Rao Maharaj of Kutch. The resolution, which
demarcated the boundaries between the two territories, included the creek as part of Sindh, thus
setting the boundary as the eastern flank of the creek
popularly known as Green Line. But India claims that
the boundary lies mid-channel as depicted in another
map drawn in 1925, and implemented by the
installation of mid-channel pillars back in 1924.

According to the United Nations Convention on Law

of the Sea(UNCLOS) and the Thalweg principle, a
boundary can only be fixed in the middle of the
navigable channel, which meant that it has be divided
between Sindh and Kutch, and thereby India and
Pakistan. India has used this para to consistently
argue that the boundary needs to be fixed in the
middle of the creek. Pakistan, however, claims that Sir
Creek isn't navigable but India claims that since it's navigable in high tide, the boundary should be
drawn from the mid channel.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SIR CREEK

• Fishing resources (Sir Creek is considered to be among the largest fishing gro unds in Asia)
• Strategic location
• Possible presence of great oil and gas concentration under the sea, which are currently
unexploited thanks to the impending deadlock on the issue.

TRIBUNAL AND ISSUES

After the 1965 war, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end
hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute.
The verdict of the tribunal came in 1968 which saw Pakistan getting 10% of its claim of 9,000 km (3,500
sq. miles).
Since 1969, 12 rounds of talks have been held over the issue of Sir Creek, but both sides have denied
reaching any solution.
The region fell amid tensions in 1999 after the Pakistan Navy shot down a MiG -21 fighter plane, but
the last rounds of talks were held in 2012. Since then it’s been status quo.
The Lack of proper maritime boundary leads to crossing of fishermen. The 26/11 attacks in India were
conducted using this route. The route is used to smuggle arms, drugs and petroleum products to India.
 3. SIACHEN
The Siachen glacier demarcates
central Asia from the Indian
subcontinent, and separates
Pakistan from China in the region.
The Saltoro Ridge of the Siachin
glacier serves as a divide that
prevents direct linking of PoK with
China, stopping them to develop
geographical military linkages in
the area. Siachen also serves as a
watchtower for India to keep a deep watch on Gilgit and Baltistan regions of Pakistan.

CAUSE OF DISPUTE
After the 1947-48 war, the agreement that established the ceasefire line and the positions of both
militaries did not delineate beyond gird NJ 9842, which
falls south of Siachen glacier.
The interpretations of both sides regarding the phase
“thence north if the glaciers” is different which acts as a
hindrance for the final resolution of the dispute. Pakistan
argues that the line should go from NJ 9842 straight to
the karakoram pass on the sino-Indian border.
India insists that the line should proceed north from NJ
9842 along the Saltoro range to the border with china.
India favors a joint demarcation of the actual ground
position line (AGPL), followed by a joint verification agreement and redeployment of forces to mutually
agreed positions.

ISSUES
• If Pakistan gets the location advantage in Siachen, it would become a big threat to India from the
west in Ladakh in addition to Chinese threats from Aksai Chin of the east.
• Due to its control over Saltoro Ride, India is better placed to strike a bargain while settling bilateral
territorial disputes with Pakistan in the future.
• Siachen also helps India to keep a close watch on China’s activities as Beijing has vastly improved
its infrastructure in this region. China has developed all weather rail and road links in the Shaksgam
region, which was ceded to China by Pakistan in 1960s.
• Ceding Indian-controlled Karakoram Pass triangle region to Pakistan would have further
strengthened the Sino-Pakistan footprints on these strategic heights.
 4. GILGIT BALTISTAN
On November 1 ( observed every year in Gilgit-Baltistan as
“Independence Day’ ) Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan
announced that his government would give the region
“provisional provincial status”. When that happens, G-B will
become the fifth province of Pakistan, although the region is
claimed by India as part of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu
& Kashmir as it existed in 1947 at its accession to India.

Gilgit-Baltistan is the northernmost territory administered by Pakistan, providing the country’s only
territorial frontier, and thus a land route, with
China, where it meets the Xinjiang Autonomous
Region. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor has
made the region vital for both countries, given the
strategic interests of both countries, CPEC will
continue.

To G-B’s west is Afghanistan, to its south is

Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and to the east J&K.
The plan to grant G-B provincial status gathered
speed over the last few years. While some commentary links it to CPEC and Chinese in terest,
others in Pakistan say the push might have well come from India’s reassertion of its claims after
the August 5, 2019 reorganisation of Jammu & Kashmir.
What is the region’s current status?

Though Pakistan, like India, links G-B’s fate to

that of Kashmir, its administrative arrangements
are different from those in PoK. While PoK has its
own Constitution that sets out its powers and their
limits vis-à-vis Pakistan, G-B has been ruled
mostly by executive fiat. Until 2009, the region
was simply called Northern Areas.

It got its present name only with the Gilgit-

Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-
Governance) Order, 2009, which replaced the
Northern Areas Legislative Council with the
Legislative Assembly. The NALC was an elected
body, but had no more than an advisory role to the Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Northern
Areas, who ruled from Islamabad. The Legislative Assembly is only a slight improvement. It has
24 directly elected members and nine nominated ones.

In 2018, the then PML(N) government passed an order centralising even the limited powers
granted to the Assembly, a move linked to the need for greater control over land and other
resources for the infrastructure projects then being planned under CPEC. The order was
challenged, and in 2019, the Pakistan Supreme Court repealed it and asked the Imran Khan
government to replace it with governance reforms. This was not done. Meanwhile, the Supreme

Court extended it jurisdiction to G-B, and made arrangements for a caretaker government until
the next Legislative Assembly elections.

Why the separate status?

Pakistan’s separate arrangement with G-B go back to the circumstances under which it came to
administer it. On November 1 1947, after J&K ruler Hari Singh had signed the Instrument of
Accession with India, and the Indian Army had landed in the Valley to drive out tribal invaders
from Pakistan, there was a rebellion against Hari Singh in Gilgit.

A small force raised by the British to guard Gilgit, ostensibly on behalf of the Kashmir ruler but in
fact to serve its administration of the Gilgit Agency, on the frontiers of what was then the Soviet-
British Great Game territory, mutinied under the leadership of its commander, Major William
Alexander Brown. Gilgit had been leased to the British by Hari Singh in 1935. The British returned
it in August 1947. Hari Singh sent his representative, Brigadier Ghansar Singh, as Governor, and
Brown to take charge of the Gilgit Scouts. But after taking protective custody of the Governor on
November 1, Brown would raise the Pakistani flag at his headquarters. Later the Gilgit Scouts
managed to bring Baltistan under their control.

Pakistan did not accept G-B’s accession although it took administrative control of the territory.
After India went to the UN and a series of resolutions were passed in the Security Council on the
situation in Kashmir, Pakistan believed that neither G-B nor PoK should be annexed to Pakistan,
as this could undermine the international case for a plebiscite in Kashmir. It also reckons that in
the event a plebiscite ever takes place in Kashmir, votes in G-B will be important too.This is why it
is only being called “provisional” provincial status.

Is granting this status a step towards Pakistan accepting the LoC status quo?
 While India has objected to the plan to make G-B a province of Pakistan and in the recent past
asserted that it will take control of G-B, there is a realisation that it is impossible to change the
map now. In this sense, it can argued that the merger of G-B with Pakistan is a move that could
help both countries put the past behind and move forward on the Kashmir issue, sometime in the
future.

What do the people in G-B want?

The people of G-B have been demanding for years that it be made a part of Pakistan, they do not
have the same constitutional rights Pakistanis have.

There is virtually no connect with India. Some have in the past demanded a merger with PoK, but
the people of G-B have no real connect with Kashmir either. They belong to several non-Kashmiri
ethnicities, and speak various languages, none of these Kashmiri.

A majority of the estimated 1.5 million G-B residents are Shias. There is anger against Pakistan for
unleashing extremist sectarian militant groups that target Shias, and for dictating over the use of
their natural resources, but the predominant sentiment is that all this will improve once they are part
of the Pakistani federation. There is a small movement for independence, but it has very little
traction.

BALOCHISTAN ISSUE

Balochistan is the biggest province of Pakistan. It is

sandwiched between Afghanistan on the north
and Iran on the west. Geostrategically,
geopolitically and geoeconomically it is the most
important place of Pakistan. It is well endowed by
nature and very rich in natural resources. But
unfortunately, the development of Balochistan is
least among the five provinces of Pakistan.
Balochistan has faced five phases of insurgency
from 1948 to till now. In the wave of insurgency,
many people have been killed and abducted by
Pakistani security forces. Baloch freedom fighters are
completely against the state and its machinery.
Pakistan maintains control by disappearing, torturing
and murdering the people and their leaders.

The root causes of movement are that Balochistan

lacks basic facilities like education hospitals etc. The
Pakistan government started many new policies
against Balochi freedom fighters; they marginalised
the Baloch in his own territory. The government of Pakistan has never fulfilled the requirement of
Baloch in politics, military etc. The Gwadar deep port and China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
are also the causes of movement in Balochistan. Baloch leaders feel that one day, Balochistan will be
a colony of China. So the separatist organisations like Balochistan Republican Party, Balochistan
Liberation front etc. fight for the independence of Greater Balochistan.
BACKGROUND
Balochistan is one of the five provinces of Islamic Republic of Pakistan the other three being Punjab,
Sindh and Khyber pakhtunwa. Balochistan covers 3,47,190 sq.km area, about 43% of total area of the
Pakistan. It is the largest of the five and least populous with barely 5% of the total Pakistani population.
The province touches its border by Afghanistan to the north and Northwest, Iran to the south west,
Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and federally administered tribal areas (FATA) to the north east
and the south lays the Arabian Sea. While there has been a low level insurgency in Balochi area of
Afghanistan and Iran. The situation in Pakistan has been considerably worst and the province has been
mostly restive other than a few brief period of relative peace and quiet during several decades of
Pakistan’s existence. Due to the violence and human right violation in Balochistan it is one of the most
disturbed places in the world. Balochistan is well endowed by nature. It has the countries longest
coastline and largest natural gas reserve and contains a vast array of resources such as Coal, Oil,
Copper, Gold, lead zinc.

Geostrategically and geopolitically, Balochistan is the most important region of Pakistan. It also holds
promise for the entire world by being in a position to provide access to the volatile energy rich regions
of Central Asian countries. Topographically the province has mountain ranges in the middle and mid-
Eastern region, hilly region in the West, plane in the coastal south and desert region in the Northwest.
Climatically, it lies in the temperate zone with average annual rainfall of 3 to 12 inches but the some
area of province do not get any rainfall for years. As a result only about 10% of the land is cultivated.
A large number of populations are engaged in cattle rearing. Coastal South is rich in marine life and
lends itself to fish harvesting.

There are many tribes in Balochistan, but the three major tribes are Baloch Brahvi and Pastoon and
these three types are also subdivided into many tribes each tribe is led by a chief normally addressed
as a sardar. Social organisation of the province continues to be based on tribal identity through their
considerable harmony and Unity of purpose towards the common goal of getting their rightful duties
and place from the Pakistan establishment.

History of Balochistan

Historically, Balochistan has witnessed violence for the

control of land and power at different time in the history.
The area of Balochistan has been under the control of
Persian, Afghans, Iranians, Mughal, Sikhs, British and the
also the locals Sardars of that region. It is generally
believed that the traditional Balochi period came into
existence in 12th century when the Baloch formed
powerful tribal unions. After many attempts to organise
the Baloch into one group, Khan of Kalat has proved to be
the most successful and Kalat has been the centre of Baloch nationalism. A Brahvi Prince name as
Ahmed Khan was the first one to exercise power over substantial portion of land inhabited by Balochis
and Brahvis. In 1616 AD he declared himself Khan of Kalat and after acquiring the areas inhabited by
neighbouring Baloch tribes he took the title of khan – I – Balochi.

When Balochistan came under the British control the Bolan Pass (connecting Balochistan to
Afghanistan) was guarded by a strong garrison above the pass at Quetta and neighbouring Baloch
tribes were control through British subsidize to their chief. But the Britishers never really attempted
to govern the Balochis directly. On 14 August 1947 the Pakistan was divided from India and the
province of Balochistan is geographically fell in the part of Pakistan after the creation of Pakistan, Khan
of Kalat declared his is state independent but this happiness of independence state is very short. On
27 march, 1948 the armed forces of Pakistan were mobilized to lunch an operation against the Khan
of kalat and on 28 March, 1948 khan of kalat was captured by Pakistan. It is a bitter irony of fate that
a man named as Mohammad Ali Jinnah who argued case against British authority for sovereignty of
Kalat; he himself gave order to annexe the Kalat in Pakistan territory.

Factors affecting the separatist movement

The people of Balochistan are against the nation and its machinery. The movement has its objective
to protect the interest of Baloch people including their cultural identity, customs and tradition of late
economic interest and social emancipation of its deprived population. Since 27 March, 1948 when
state was captured by Pakistani security forces, Balochistan has faced five waves of insurgency. The
phases of insurgency were started in 1948, 1958, 1962, 1973, and 2004 respectively. But the current
and the most prolonged phase starting in 2004 thousands and thousands of people were killed and
abducted by Pakistani security forces from 1948 to till now.

The representatives of Balochistan at the United Nation human right Commission (UNHRC) and
European Union(EU) Mehran Marri started on 13th August 2016, “the situation in Balochistan is at
Grave as ever. Pakistan military operation has been continuing unabated. The army chief and Prime
minister and the stooge minister have agreed on a national action plan to further isolates Baloch
activists (Through) certain other elimination process of genocide.” The above statement of Mehran
Marri tells clearly the brutality of Pakistani security forces. There are many more causes of movement
given below as follows-

• Marginalisation of Baloch people

In a multi ethnic Society of Pakistan minority groups like Baloch suffer the most. There is a very less
participation of people in politics, Bureaucracy, educational system, armed forces etc. There is a lack
of school and colleges in Balochistan compared with other state of Pakistan. In Pakistan military there
is a negligible participation of Baloch people and military is Pakistan most powerful entity. (Punjabis
who represent 40% of the population and constitutes 90% of the armed forces) In the textbook that
are being used to teach in the subject of sociology in Pakistan the Baloch should have been described
as uncivilized, illiterate and savage. So the Marginalisation of Baloch people laid the separatist
movement.

• Exploitation of resources
The Balochistan province is very rich in natural
resources it has the country’s longest coastline
and largest natural gas reserve and contains a
large array of resources like coal, zinc, lead,
Copper, Gold, oil etc. But its development is least
in all the four provinces. The handing over the
large part of land and mining contract to China has
angered the Balochis. The one more big example of resource exploitation is that “if you go to sui gas
fields in Dera bugti, you will see a cantonment protecting personal ensuring that they are supplied gas
and electricity all day , but if you walk around outside the cantonment you will find Baloch people
living without access to gas that’s two in an area that supplies gas to the entire country”.

• Gwadar Port

The Gwadar port holds great strategic and economic importance for Pakistan. It is a deep sea port
located at cross junction of international sea shipping and oil trade routes. It was given to China for
development in 2006. Over the period of last decade substantial development including housing,
warehouses, Industrial and manufacturing complexes has taken place in Gwadar. But the locals are
not benefited much from all this. Recently, we seen that local Baloch people have attacked on Chinese
workers during working on their project and many have been killed also. It is because local Baloch look
upon the Gwadar’s issue as a case of someone entering your home throwing you out and setting
others instead. The respected Karachi based investigation magazine the Herald had published a cover
story ‘The Great land robbery’ which alleged that the Gwadar Mega project has led to one of the
biggest land scam in Pakistan’s history.

• China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

CPEC was proposed by China to connect Gwadar port to Chinese province of Xinxiang. The
estimated cost of project is 46 billion-dollar this project was signed between Pakistan and China
in April 2015. CPEC has now been subsumed within the larger and ambitious belt and Road
initiative (BRI) of China and it includes several project of road, expressway, motorway, highway
freight train service, energy projects, solar, windmill and hydropower, fibre optics, and
infrastructure.

Balochi Nationalist has opposed the Chinese presence and investment project in Balochistan.
Balochis are feared that wave of investment will bring dsemographic changes turning them into a
minority groups in their own province. It is crystal clear that China has its own geostrategic and
geo-economics interest in Pakistan so at any cost China want to succeed the CPEC project. But
another hand in this multi billion dollar project the local Balochi people not got a profit as they

expect so they oppose this project and killed the Chinese engineer and workers time to time. Out of
330 project of CPEC only 8 have been allocated to Balochistan. The main cause of this project allocation
is that at anyhow the road passes through Balochistan to reach the Gwadar deep port.

Mir Suleman Dawood Khan, the current khan of Kalat observed that “Great game part II is being played
we want our rights. If we do not get them we will be a major player in the Great game part 2. Give us
our rights or we will fight.” The exiled leader and spokesperson of The Baloch national movement
(BNM) calls CPEC as ‘China Pakistan economic exploitation corridor.’ CPEC looks like another sinister
objective in Balochistan. Most of the infrastructure used in CPEC is Chinese and white collared jobs
also gone to the non Baloch Pakistani people. only high risky jobs like outer corridor security and other
has been left for the locals.

Baloch people and their leaders says that we are attacking the CPEC project everyday because it aimed
to turn the Baloch population into a minority and Chinese looting, plundering and taking away
resources so CPEC is also a main cause of separatist Movement in Balochistan.

• Lack of development
Geostrategically the location of Balochistan is very important for Pakistan. And Balochistan is very rich
in natural resources but the development is least here. Many Balochistan areas still face the lack of
basic facilities like school, road, Hospital etc. because the system of Pakistan works here only for their
political economic and strategic gains. They have not any concern for the Welfare of Baloch people.

According to Human Development Index (HDI) data of 2016 is that, Punjab with an HDI score of 0.55
tops the list, followed by Sindh with 0.51, Khyber Pakhtunwa with 0.48, Balochistan expectedly brings
the rear with 0.41. Among the below 15 district 11 are from Balochistan, two each from Sindh and
Khyber Pakhtunwa and none from Punjab. Top 15 districts falling in human development category
including 12 from Punjab. The literacy rate of Balochistan in 2008 is 24.8 percent, figure comparable
to poorest of the countries in the world.

The economy gained from Balochistan province is spent on mainly Punjab and also rest part of the
country. Punjabis dominated Pakistani establishment has concerned most of the benefits for itself at
the cost of other three provinces. Due to this, Bilawal Bhutto said in a rally in Balochistan that “never
considering Balochistan more than our colony.”

• Demographic Reengineering

Balochistan has witnessed five major military operations. But after the death of Nawab Akbar bugti
(An influential tribal chief cum politician); Baloch guerrillas are more organised and strong. Due to fear
of insurgents not any investor has shown their interest at large amount of resources in Balochistan
because they feared that Pakistan will not be able to give the security against Baloch insurgents.

To counter the Baloch insurgents the Pakistan government started demographic engineering. They
started to prove that Balochis are minority in their own Homeland where as pro state Pastoons are in
majority, To achieve their goals Pakistan government started importing Pastoons from Afghanistan to
settle in Balochistan. Now a days many Afghan refugees have settled in Balochistan. And they do not
consider themselves as a Refugee, they have Pakistani passport, and bought the property in Quetta,
the capital of Balochistan.

Balochistan senator Jehanzeb Jamaldini in a meeting of the senates standing committee on 8

September 2015 stated that “the government settled 4 million people in various part of Balochistan
in the part three decades with broader demographic changes in the province, the government is
converting the majority into a minority.”

• Emergence of different ideologies in separatist organisation

A large number of separatist organisations has covered the Anti Pakistan space in Balochistan they
also have the different ideologies, some wants to fight for separation while other are fighting for
Greater autonomy, different groups were led by different tribal leaders.

Balochistan Liberation front was founded by Jumma Khan Marri in 1964. But now days it is lead by Dr
Allah Nazar Baloch (2009 – present). It is the most prominent organisation with large footprint and
great popularity. And the reason of popularity is that this separatist organisation operates all activity
from inside the country.

Balochi Liberation army (BLA) is also a Baloch militant organisation. It is led by Marie tribes. The BLA
is listed as a terrorist organisation by Pakistan and UK. After 2004, they have started the armed
struggle against Pakistan. They targeted the Pakistani security personnel. They fight for the
independence of Greater Balochistan including Iranian and Afghan Balochis.

Balochi Republic party has been led by Brahamdagh bugti after the death of his grandfather Nawab
Akbar Khan bugti. It also advocates the independence of Greater Balochistan. They have the militant
group also known as Baloch Liberation Army, they raise their voices against Pakistan for the human
right violation, killing and kidnapping of Baloch people.
Conclusion
The situation of the conflict in Balochistan is extremely complex. Basically, there are two factors of
conflict—one is historical and other is political. The historical factor includes the ethnicity problem,
while the political factor includes lack of representation at the decision-making level, unusual
distribution of resources, domination Baloch peoples. They are the important factors of the separatist
movement.

INDIA PLAYING ‘BALOCH CARD’

Though India can play Baloch card but

following things have to be mind:

1. Baloch issue is not a matter of

international concern as Kashmir.
The reason s that it does not lie
along a disputed border between two hostile countries
2. Even Baloch insurgency has never achieved the sort of scale of Kashmir
3. Considering insurgency in Kashmir, it is difficult for India to make a moral case for Balochistan
4. Baloch insurgency is fragmented, for e.g., MENDAL & MARRI tribes are closer to India but
BUGTIS are willing to play “foot-sie” to Islamabad
5. A new middle class Baloch is will prefer more urban sabotage rather than old rural ambush
6. India should involve third parties like Afghanistan and Iran as a logistics base to help the
insurgent
7. The low cost option for India will be to encourage the Baloch immigrants living in the
western countries and involve Pakistan in diplomatic fire fights around the world

Thus, India can play Baloch card but it will

have to be more than ‘fistful of rupees and
thousands of rifles’.

CPEC

The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

is earmarked as a flagship project of the Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI), which is a grand
strategy aimed at restoring China’s “rightful’’
great-power status in the world. With an
initial outlay of $46 billion, CPEC is envisaged
as a hub with Gwadar’s port, energy, transport infrastructure and industrial cooperation as its four
main spokes. This project aims to create an alternative route to transport oil and gas to China and to
spurt economic growth and development across its remote western regions.
The CPEC cuts through Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and the trans-Karakoram tract of
Shaksgam, which was illegally ceded by Pakistan to China on March 2, 1963 under a provisional
boundary settlement. The entire region of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) through which the highway passes is
located close to the Siachen Glacier as well as to Ladakh, the current flashpoint between India and
China. Following the effective nullification of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution on August 5, 2019,
India has reiterated its long-standing claim to GB in POK.
Economic motivation apart, China seeks to use the CPEC to consolidate its presence in a disputed
region. If internal instability overwhelms Pakistan in the future, the CPEC affords China an opportunity
to claim Hunza on the basis of specious historical records.
For China, the CPEC is a beachhead in South Asia, to facilitate a broader thrust in the Persian Gulf. It
also provides a maritime connect to Djibouti and the littoral states.
The colossal CPEC project has extracted a high cost across Pakistan. In the case of the Sahiwal
Coal power plant project in Pakistan’s Punjab province, many people were forced to part with
agricultural land. The police slapped terrorism charges against those who resisted. China realises that
India’s support for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of which the CPEC is the lynchpin, is crucial to its
regional success. India’s non-participation in the BRI is predicated on the unacceptability of the CPEC
traversing parts of Jammu and Kashmir illegally occupied by Pakistan and China. It is, as stated by
India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, a project initiated without consulting India. Besides, BRI,
as a whole, lacks transparency and is geared to advancing China’s interests through “debt trap”
financing. It should come as no surprise that India has maintained its consistent position in not
endorsing the BRI.

CPEC AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

Ministry of External Affairs, India

According to MEA, the inclusion of the so-called illegal ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ (CPEC) as a
flagship project of ‘OBOR/BRI’, directly impinges on the issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity of
India. This so-called illegal ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ (CPEC) passes through parts of the
Union Territories of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh which are under illegal occupation of Pakistan,
asserted MEA.

Further, the Government is of the firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally
recognized international norms. They must follow principles of openness, transparency and financial
responsibility and must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty, equality and territorial
integrity of other nations, the MEA stated, adding, Government’s consistent position in this regard has
also been endorsed by other countries.

The India-USA Joint Statement ‘Prosperity through Partnership’ released in June 2017 called upon all
nations to support bolstering regional economic connectivity through transparent development of
infrastructure and the use of responsible debt financing
practices, while ensuring respect for sovereignty and
territorial integrity, the rule of law and the environment,
the MEA told Lok Sbha.

The India-Japan ‘Prosperity through Partnership’ released

in September 2017 also underlined the importance of all
countries ensuring the development and use of
connectivity infrastructure in an open, transparent and
non-exclusive manner based on international standards
and responsible debt financing 1 practices, while ensuring
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the rule of law, and the environment, the MEA
informed.

The European Commission issued a Joint Communication in September 2018 titled ‘Connecting Europe
and Asia – Building blocks for an EU Strategy’ in which it has been highlighted that the European Union
promotes an approach to connectivity, which is sustainable, comprehensive and ru les-based.
Connectivity has to be economically, fiscally, environmentally and socially sustainable in the long term,
according to MEA.

CHINESE STRATEGY

China has been extremely critical of India not joining and wanted India to join the project because
seeking approval for the project from a country as big as India and key country in Asia is itself a low
cost investment for the legitimacy of the Chinese project. India is the key for success for the project
as India can play the role of spoiler. China fears India joining hands with USA in confronting China.
China would even try to mediate between India and Pakistan, that is why it paved the way for India to
join SCO, and if it doesn’t work, it will try to intimidate India. CPEC passes through the Pakistan
occupied region claimed by India and hence it makes a rough road.

Q. The dynamics of CPEC is already causing unprecedented turbulence in Himalayas along

with LAC. Discuss.

INDIA-PAKISTAN TRADE ISSUES

According to a 2018 World Bank report, India-

Pakistan trade has the potential to increase from
USD $2 billion to USD $37 billion if both countries
were willing to take steps towards removing tariff
and non-tariff barriers such as sensitive lists, strict
visa policies, strict quality standards and lengthy
procedures and waiting periods at the border.
However, decades-old animosity and mistrust have contributed to regular setbacks and significant
barriers to normalizing trade relations.

Prior to August 2019, when Pakistan formally suspended trade ties with India after India revoked
Jammu & Kashmir’s special status, formal trade between the two countries was estimated at USD $2
billion—with bilateral trade through formal channels tilted in favor of India.
Pakistan’s exports to India includes vegetable products, textiles, dry dates, rock salt, cement, leather,
surgical instruments, carpets, and gypsum. While India’s exports to Pakistan consist of cotton, organic
chemicals, dyes and pigments, machinery, pharmaceutical items, teas and spices, iron and steel and
plastic goods.

Informal trade between the two countries also takes place through smuggling via land borders or third
countries, such as Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and Singapore. From 2012-2013 informal trade
between India and Pakistan was reported at USD $3.9 billion—almost double formal trade. Informal
trade between the two countries further increases when formal trade is suspended.

BARRIERS TO INDIA-PAKISTAN TRADE

Obstacles to India and Pakistan trade consist of both tariff and non-tariff barriers including:
• strict quality standards,
• sensitive lists (goods on which no tariff concessions are granted),
• lengthy procedures and waiting periods at the border,
• strict visa policies
• Lack of proper infrastructure such as roads, dry ports and rail cargo stations to facilitate trade.

(These factors combined increase both the absolute and relative costs of trade. For example, goods
often must wait several days at the border check posts before they are cleared. If the goods are
perishables, this means they are essentially destroyed before getting to the market.)

• These barriers are also aggravated by the trust deficit on both sides. For example, some in the
Pakistan business community oppose free trade with India, arguing that India’s larger economy
would negatively impact the demand for Pakistani goods in the domestic market compared with
cheaper Indian products (considering that trade with India has historically been in favor of India).
However, this argument overlooks the broader advantages of improving trade. For instance,
Pakistan can import automobile parts from India at a comparatively cheaper price than importing
from EU, Japan, and the UAE. This would make the Pakistani automobiles cheaper for the domestic
consumers, hence increasing their sales.
• The current freeze in trade relations has already impacted multiple industries. For instance, the
Pakistani textile industries often import reactive dyes from India as they are less expensive.
Moreover, about 31 percent of Pakistan’s cement exports go to India. Pakistan also has strengths
in markets it could tap into in India, including surgical and medical equipment, along with other
products.

TERRORISM
The terrorism emanating from Pakistan remains the principal continuing threat to stability in so uth
Asia and not just the security of India, and is a global concern, considering the two are nuclear weapon
states.

The terrorist groups not only operate out of pakistan’s territory but also enjoy active support of its
military and intelligent services in their ongoing covert war against India. Pakistan’s proxy war is an
insidious form of nuclear coercion where Pakistan uses nuclear weapons to protect itself against
India’s conventional retaliation as a response to terrorist attacks. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons act as a
catalytic devise to compel the international community to restrain India. This allows Pakistan to “inflict
thousand cuts” without bearing the cost.
INDIA’S RESPONSES

1. Strategic restraint
2. Strategic restraint started proving counterproductive hence, India went for:
a. Surgical strike after URI attack
b. Balakot airstrike described officially as ‘non military premptive action’
3. Working with international community .eg., india proposed CCIT
The Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism is a proposed treaty which intends to
criminalize all forms of international terrorism and deny terrorists, their financiers and supporters access
to funds, arms, and safe havens. The been under negotiation at the United Nations General Assembly's Ad
Hoc Committee established by Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1 996 on Terrorism and the United
Nations General Assembly Sixth Committee (Legal). The negotiations are currently deadlocked even after
two decades of proposal i.e. through 1996 till 2016.

During the United National Security Council (UNSC) open debate '20 years after the adoption of
resolution 1373’ on combating terrorism on a global front, India’s External Affairs Minister (EAM) Dr
S Jaishankar gave 8-Point Action Plan as part of his zero tolerance policy for terrorism, saying there
are “no good and bad terrorists” and there should be “no ifs and buts” around terrorist activities.

1. “Summon the political will to combat terrorism. Nor should we allow terrorism to be justified and
terrorists glorified. All member states must fulfil their obligations enshrined in international
counter-terrorism instruments and conventions.”
2. “Do not countenance double standards in this battle. Terrorists are terrorists; there are no good
and bad ones. Those who propagate this distinction have an agenda. And those who cover up for
them are just as culpable.”
3. “Reform the working methods of the
committees dealing with sanctions
and counter-terrorism. The practice
of placing blocks and holds on listing
requests without any rhyme or
reason must end.”
4. “Firmly discourage exclusivist
thinking that divides the world and
harms our social fabric. Such
approaches facilitate radicalisation
and recruitment by breeding fear, mistrust, and hatred among different communities. The UNSC
should be on guard against new terminologies and misleading priorities that can dilute our focus.”
5. “Enlisting and delisting individuals and entities under the UN sanctions regimes must be done
objectively, not for political or religious considerations. Proposals in this regard merit due
examination before circulation.”
6. “Linkages between terrorism and transnational organised crime must be fully recognized and
addressed vigorously.”
7. “Combating terrorist financing will only be as effective as the weakest jurisdiction. The Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) should continue to identify and remedy weaknesses in anti-money
laundering and counter-terror financing frameworks. Enhanced UN coordination with FATF can
make a huge difference.”
8. “Adequate funding to UN Counter-Terrorism bodies from the UN regular budget requires
immediate attention. The forthcoming 7th review of the UN's Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
 offers an important occasion to strengthen measures to prevent and combat terrorism and
building capacities of member states.”

What is the objective of FATF?

FATF sets standards and promotes effective implementation of:

a. legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering.

b. The FATF works to identify national-level vulnerabilities with the aim of protecting the
international financial system from misuse.

How many members are there in FATF?

As of 2019, FATF consists of thirty-seven member jurisdictions.

Is India a member of the Financial Action Task Force?

India became an Observer at FATF in 2006. Since then, it had been working towards full-fledged
membership. On June 25, 2010 India was taken in as the 34th country member of FATF.

FATF on terror financing

FATF's role in combating terror financing became prominent after the 9/11 terror attacks in the US. In
2001 its mandate expanded to include terrorism financing. Financing of terrorism involves providing
money or financial support to terrorists. As of 2019, FATF has blacklisted North Korea and Iran over
terror financing. Twelve countries are in the grey list, namely: Bahamas, Botswana, Cambodia,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Pakistan, Panama, Sri Lanka, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia and Yemen.

FATF has 2 types of lists:

• Black List: Countries known as Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories (NCCTs) are put in the
blacklist. These countries support terror funding and money laundering activities. The FATF revises
the blacklist regularly, adding or deleting entries.
• Grey List: Countries that are considered safe haven for supporting terror funding and money
laundering are put in the FATF grey list. This inclusion serves as a warning to the country that it
may enter the blacklist.

FATF & Pakistan

Pakistan has been in the FATF grey list since June 2018 and has been asked to implement the FATF
Action Plan fully by September 2019. It was in the same category from 2012 to 2015 too. Pakistan's
inclusion in the grey list can be attributed to the fact that the country's anti-terror laws are still not in
line with FATF standards and also with the latest UN resolution 2462 that pitches for criminalising
terrorist financing. What Pakistan has mostly done in the past is detain both Masood Azhar and Hafiz
Saeed for 'apprehension' of breach of peace. The FATF seeks freezing of funds, denial of weapons
access and travel ban.

While there were some arrests of LeT, JeM, JuD cadres, they were all apprehended under the country's
Maintenance of Public Order Act and not the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.

Consequences of being in the FATF grey list:

1. Economic sanctions from IMF, World Bank, ADB
2. Problem in getting loans from IMF, World Bank, ADB and other countries
3. Reduction in international trade
4. International boycott

CHINA FACTOR

China has played a critical role in

shaping India Pakistan relations. The
India china Pakistan triangle emerges
in context of unresolved border
disputes and geopolitical ambitions.
The military dimensions of this triangle
started in the year after 1962 war when
china and Pakistan signed border
delimitation agreement. In 1963,
handling of the trans-Karakorum tract,
thus making Kashmir a trilateral issue.

After feeling betrayed from USA in 1965 war, Pakistan started

consolidating its relations with china, though china did not
provide military help, yet it acted as a psychological assault on
India. China helped Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons.

The power asymmetry between Pakistan and India drives

Pakistan towards china and India towards USA or Russia. As
Chinese influence increases in India’s neighbourhood, India’s
outreach to US and Chinese neighbours increases. Today,
china and Pakistan has close strategic and military partnership. India acknowledges that any
conflagration with either Pakistan or china raises the spectre of the “two front war”. Hence, India is
focusing on developing overall deterrent
capability, credibility, advances in acquition
and production of

military equipments, recalibrating military

strategy, relevant training and border
infrastructure development.

Border infrastructure has become a major

source of contention (Doklam, ladakh).
According to Indian military officials, Siachen can be the region for start of war because of the china’s
advantage, unlike Indian Ocean where India has the advantage.
India is rebalancing the deployment towards North rather than just west. China is continuously acting
to restrain India e g., opposing India’s entry in NSG citing NPT or thwarting the efforts to declare
Masood aszhar as a global terrorist at UNSC by technical hold.

Islamic fundamentalism is also a factor to bring China near to Pakistan. The broad mistrust, zerosome
perceptions, volatile responses create a dangerous scenario. Thus it plays central role in Asia’s
geopolitics.

USA FACTOR

Pakistan joined the US Cold War pacts in the 1950s, and it then became a conduit for the decade -long
proxy conflict with the Soviets during the 80s. After 9/11, Pakistan again provided crucial support for
American presence in Afghanistan. Yet their bilateral cooperation remained strained. The US has
suspected Pakistan of playing a duplicitous role in the fight against terror, while Pakistan blamed the
US of being under-appreciative and insensitive to its national security compulsions.

During the Trump era, de-hyphenation of Pakistan from India became a reality. India’s higher
international strategic status demands that this continues progressively. Pakistan has in the interim
moved closer to China but US-Pak mutual interests have not changed. Against the background of
deteriorating US-Pakistan ties, Russia had signed a special agreement with Pakistan in 2018 to allow
its army officers to receive training in Russian military
academies.

Ties between the US and Pakistan have been fractured

and going downhill for a long time, particularly after al-
Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was eliminated in
Abbottabad in 2011 by the US special forces. When
Trump announced in September 2018 the suspension of
all US military assistance to Pakistan over its double-
dealing in Afghanistan, the bilateral relationship had
reached its lowest point. Trump also cut $300 million in
military aid that same month. A year before that, Trump had already infuriated Pakistan’s security
establishment by “appreciating” India’s developmental approach in Afghanistan.

Ties between the US and Pakistan that remained on tenterhooks under Trump are assessed by some
as being on the verge of taking off once again. The Biden administration has expressed the need for
engaging with the Pakistan military. The US wants to withdraw from Afghanistan and Pakistan can play
crucial role in this deal with Taliban due to its geopolitical advantage. To appease Pakistan, the USA
listed the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) as “terrorist”. The action provides Pakistan international
legitimacy to come hard on the Balochistan movement.

India has been literally ousted in Afghanistan “peace settlement” process, as the Afghan peace process
was discussed by four players comprising China, the US, Russia and Pakistan. Despite huge efforts from
India, USA retains Pakistan as its “major non-NATO ally” and refuses to hold Pakistan’s military to
account for exporting terrorism.

Narrow geopolitical interests guiding America’s Pakistan policy will likely continue to affect India's
interests. America’s Pakistan policy validates the Karl Marx saying -“History repeats itself, first as
tragedy, then as farce”.

INDIA’S PAKISTAN POLICY

BLAME AND SHAME/ ISOLATE PAKISTAN

Limitations
• no major power is buying the policy and are willing to
carry on business as usual with Pakistan
• largely for geopolitical reasons
• no one wants to bear the financial burden of a failing
Pakistan
• western powers want exit from Afghanistan
• Russia china and Iran needs Pakistan’s help in
managing Taliban
While India gets endorsement and sympathy for its genuine concerns about cross border terrorism
but when it comes to Pakistan, few are willing to bell the cat, India’s concerted efforts to get Pakistan
on the black list of FATF. It is unlikely that Pakistan will ever be on the black list (so far only Iran and
North Korea).

The Present government’s action in Kashmir has created scope to further the propaganda of
Pakistan. Pakistan has changed its strategy, instead of
major cross border terror attack on civilians; they are
targeting cross border attacks on military and
successfully projecting it as local insurgency. According
to experts, India’s Pakistan policy has run its course and
may be its time for re- engagement. It is yet to be seen
as to what policies government will come up to deter
sub strategic aggressions.

General Bipin Rawat, India’s first CDS held that India

would not just repeat Balakot but would do something beyond. India’s defense minister has also
indicated a possible shift. It is clear that Pakistan’s nuclear red line may not be as sacrosanct. Even
china has deployed its military in POK as a part of CPEC.

Reconciliation will Pakistan remains more

challenging considering Pakistan’s army’s influence.
In India, it is easy to follow the hardliner approach
against Pakistan but it is difficult to explore the
reconciliatory measures simultaneously. However,
after convincing Indian public that government will
teach a lesson to Pakistan, it becomes all the more
difficult. India cannot hold an olive branch with
Islamabad without Pakistan taking concrete actions against anti terror outfits.

Given Pakistan behaves like a tributary state to the Middle Kingdom, and Pakistan’s army’s policy of
needling India, New Delhi’s desire to have normal relations with Pakistan will remain unfulfilled.
India’s Pakistan policy must shift to real politik backed by range of powerful instruments along with
creatively leveraging international environment. India should pursue cultural and commercial ties
with liberal constituencies inside Pakistan and remain open to dialogue with political forces that are
interested in improvement of relations with India.
 India Russia Relations

Evolution of the relationship

1927 – Nehru’s visit to USSR.
1955 – Laid the foundation of Industrialisation in India .
1. Nehru Visited USSR.
2. Khrushchev Visited India .
1962 – Expressed regret .

1965 – Tashkent Agreement did not go well.

1971 – Treaty of Peace, friendship and cooperation . Helped India
to win 1971 war.
1986 – Red Carpet for Rajiv Gandhi, Gorbachev visited India .

After disintegration of USSR

Boris Yeltsin adopted pro-west policy .

1993 – Treaty of Friendship and cooperation .

2000 – Putin visited India. Strategic Partnership.
2010 – Special and Privileged partnership
2020 – India Russia Annual Summit

Defence Partnership
The Soviet Union was an important supplier
of defence equipment for several decades,
and this role has been inherited by the
Russian federation.

India is the second largest market for the

Russian defence industry. In 2018,
approximately 68% of the Indian Military's
hardware import came from Russia, making
Russia the chief supplier of defence
equipment.
India and Russia have deepened their Make in India defence manufacturing cooperation.

Joint development and production, and joint marketing of armaments and military
technologies.

In October 2018, India inked the historic agreement worth US$5.43 billion with Russia to
procure five S-400 surface-to-air missile defence system, the most powerful missile defence
system in the world ignoring America's CAATSA act. The United States threatened India with
sanctions over India's decision to buy the S-400 missile defense system from Russia.

India and Russia have several major joint military programmes

including:
1. BrahMos cruise missile programme
2. Sukhoi Su-30MKI programme (230+ to be built by Hindustan
Aeronautics)
3. S-400 Triumf (purchase pending)
4. Kamov Ka-226 200 to be made in India under the Make in India
initiative.
5. T-90S Bhishma with over 1000 to be built in India
6. Akula-II nuclear submarine (2 to be leased with an option to buy when
the lease expires)
7. INS Vikramaditya aircraft carrier programme

The S-400 air defence system Issue

The defence relationship with Russia creates with India-US bilateral ties. USA has imposed
sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) , on
Turkey for procurement of the same system.
Yet New Delhi appears determined to proceed with the $5.2-billion deal, having concluded
that the S-400 was cost-effective and will be efficient
in meeting India’s defence needs as compared to rival
systems. The Indian government has stressed that
negotiations were already underway before CAATSA
came into being in 2017, with the Inter-governmental
Agreement (IGA) for its procurement having been
signed in 2016 during the 17th India-Russia summit in
Goa. The contract for its supply was concluded in 2018,
and in recent years, India and Russia have signed a
number of additional defence deals across domains,
including guided missile frigates, T-90 battle tanks, and lease of a nuclear-powered attack
submarine.
It is apparent that US concerns go beyond just CAATSA and Russian arms sales. The presence
of advanced systems such as the S-400 among US allies will clearly impede certain
technology transfers and joint operations, as
evidenced by the immediate suspension of F-35
deliveries to NATO ally Turkey, even before
sanctions under CAATSA came into force. In the
US-India case, where the countries are not formal
allies, the S-400 will nevertheless place constraints
on some contours of what the US envisions for the
future of the US-India defence relationship.
While CAATSA does provide for waivers, acknowledging that there will be friendly countries
with little choice but to continue dealing with proscribed Russian entities, there is no room
for a “blanket exception” of the sort that might entirely insulate countries like India.
Notwithstanding a few key acquisitions, Russia’s overall share of Indian defence imports
has been steadily declining. At the same time, the India-US defence relationship has steadily
heightened, particularly over the last decade. The same is true of Indian relations with the
West and US-allied nations in general, with a significant uptick in imports from Europe and
Israel in recent years, in addition to greater cooperation at the operational level. India
conducts very few military exercises with Russia in comparison to those with the US, Europe,
Japan, and Australia. Indo-Russian exercises also tend to be far less complex, with less focus
on interoperability.
Energy Cooperation

Russia has agreed to build more than 20 nuclear reactors over the next 20 year. It contains
plans to build over 20 nuclear power units in India, as well as cooperation in building Russia-
designed nuclear power stations in third countries, in the joint extraction of natural uranium,
production of nuclear fuel and waste elimination.
Russia is building the 6,000-MW project at the site in Tamil Nadu, which will have six
VVER-1000 nuclear reactors . Two reactors at Kudankulam are currently operational and
two more are being built.

In 2012 Gazprom Group and India's GAIL agreed to LNG shipments to

India of 2.5 million tons a year for the period of 20 years. Indian oil
companies have invested in the Russia's oil sector a notable example is
ONGC-Videsh which has invested over $8 billion with major stakes in oil
fields such Sakhalin-1.

Current state of India Russia Relations

In recent times , the disagreements between India and

Russia, on geopolitics are growing. In December
2020,Lavrov remarked that “India is being an object of
the Western countries persistent, aggressive and
devious policy” to “engage in anti-China games by
promoting Indo-Pacific strategies”.

While India and Russia do have some common interests, Moscow has its own imperatives
that New Delhi should understand. Russian confrontation with the West broadly, and with
the US in particular, forces Moscow to lean more heavily on Beijing. That makes India and
Russia less useful to each other for some time to come.
Russia has been useful to India in some ways, particularly in enhancing Indian military
power. But Moscow’s political compulsion to support China is a warning that New Delhi
should heed. India’s dependence on Moscow for weapons is a vulnerability that the Indian
decision makers need to take more seriously.

India and Russia can think about establishing a “multipolar

global order”, but this is not something that can be conjured
.The world is heading towards a US-China bipolarity. Desire
cannot overcome reality.

The source of divergence between Indian and Russian interests lies in the continuing
problems that Russia faces in its relations with the US.

Former US President Donald Trump may have had a bit of a soft

corner for Putin’s muscular preening, but even his own
administration’s response to Russia was not particularly soft.
President Biden and his administration is likely to be tougher, as seen
during the first conversation between him and Putin. The just-
released Biden ‘interim’ strategic guidance document begins by
pointing at the “growing rivalry with China, Russia and other
authoritarian states”.
Putin has shown little indication that he will soften towards the West either. These are early
days, of course, and things may change – the two countries did agree to extend the New
START nuclear arms treaty just three weeks after Biden took over. But it is difficult to see
much cooperation or even a reduction in tensions between the two sides in the immediate
future.

The consequence of this confrontation is that Moscow has increasingly leaned on China both
for support as well as a way to undermine American power. The military relationship
between the two has become increasingly close: in addition to conventional weapons, Russia
is also helping China set up its missile early warning system, one of the most sensitive bits of
technology for any nuclear power. Particularly striking is what has primarily been an arms
supply relationship has become increasingly broader, at least from Moscow’s perspective.
Putin even said that he would not rule out a military alliance between the two countries, a
remark that Chinese officials did not endorse but did not reject either. Russia has also taken
a harsh and sometimes undiplomatic posture towards the Indo-Pacific, with Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov characterising the Quad as an anti-China game that the US is pushing
India towards – much to India’s discomfiture. As the latest Quad summit demonstrates,
despite Moscow’s opposition, India clearly sees the grouping as a necessary response to
China. Moscow’s game may be designed to undermine the US’ role in the region or to ensure
that Washington and China continue to scuffle, for that is what serves Russia best. But it
does not serve India at all because it is China’s potential hegemony over Asia that New Delhi
should fear more, not American power. It is American weakness, either in capability or
willingness, that would hurt India.

The widening gulf between India and Russia does serve China, however, as does the rift
between Moscow and Washington. With an economy about half the size of India’s, Russia is
not much of a competitor to China. But Russia can still be a source
of high-technology weapons for China. China’s broader
technological base surpasses Russia’s but it still has the odd
weakness: it flies a fifth-generation fighter jet but it needs a
Russian engine, a dependance that Beijing is clearly unhappy
with. More importantly, Russia provides useful political support
for Beijing at a time when China has antagonised many other
powers.
Like all international partnerships, including India-Russia relations, the China-Russia
partnership is one of convenience. But the conditions that gave rise to it are unlikely to
change in the near future. Indian policy should acknowledge this and adjust accordingly.

Recent developments in India Russia Relationship

Visit of Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh V Shringla to Moscow:

The visit aimed at “setting an active and ambitious agenda for
bilateral relations”. Foreign Secretary’s visit was intended to
further deepen our cooperation in all sectors.

Shringla at the Diplomatic Academy also spoke on the India-

Russia cooperation in three strategic geographies – Eurasia,
Indo-Pacific and the Russian Far East, and the Arctic, while
highlighting the need to diversify and expand India-Russia
trade basket. He highlighted the steps taken to enhance trade
with the commencement of negotiations in August 2020 for the India-EAEU Free Trade
Agreement. The priority being attached to the International North-South Corridor was
underlined. He also indicated the need for the operationalisation of a “Green Corridor” and a
Bilateral Investment Protection Arrangement to encourage bilateral trade and investment,
respectively.

He discussed with Lavrov the ways to expand the Vladivostok-Chennai corridor-an

important dimension of the development of Russian Far East. PM Modi had announced a
credit line of 1 bn dollar in 2019. India is looking for investment in new areas such as coal,
timber, LNG, for which there is a huge potential in that region. India is also working on
trilateral India-Japan-Russia Cooperation in the Russian Far East. However, a lot has still to
be done to tap its economic potential by enhancing imports and exports through this route.
Shringla underlining the importance of the Indo-Pacific
region in the current environment stated that India would
like to work closely with Russia under ASEAN and East Asia
Summit, of which both are members. Clarifying the Indian
concept, he added that India perceives it as a free, open,
inclusive region, which embraces all in a common pursuit of
progress and prosperity. For India, the Indo-Pacific region is the vast maritime space
stretching from the western coast of North America to the eastern shores of Africa.

India’s Act Far East Policy

Launched by PM Modi in Vladivostok in 2019, where USD 1 billion Line of Credit was
announced for the development of the region and asserted that India will walk shoulder to
shoulder. Putin had declared the development of far East as national priority.
 India Russia Relations

Evolution of the relationship

1927 – Nehru’s visit to USSR.
1955 – Laid the foundation of Industrialisation in India .
1. Nehru Visited USSR.
2. Khrushchev Visited India .
1962 – Expressed regret .

1965 – Tashkent Agreement did not go well.

1971 – Treaty of Peace, friendship and cooperation . Helped India
to win 1971 war.
1986 – Red Carpet for Rajiv Gandhi, Gorbachev visited India .

After disintegration of USSR

Boris Yeltsin adopted pro-west policy .

1993 – Treaty of Friendship and cooperation .

2000 – Putin visited India. Strategic Partnership.
2010 – Special and Privileged partnership
2020 – India Russia Annual Summit

Defence Partnership
The Soviet Union was an important supplier
of defence equipment for several decades,
and this role has been inherited by the
Russian federation.

India is the second largest market for the

Russian defence industry. In 2018,
approximately 68% of the Indian Military's
hardware import came from Russia, making
Russia the chief supplier of defence
equipment.
India and Russia have deepened their Make in India defence manufacturing cooperation.

Joint development and production, and joint marketing of armaments and military
technologies.

In October 2018, India inked the historic agreement worth US$5.43 billion with Russia to
procure five S-400 surface-to-air missile defence system, the most powerful missile defence
system in the world ignoring America's CAATSA act. The United States threatened India with
sanctions over India's decision to buy the S-400 missile defense system from Russia.

India and Russia have several major joint military programmes

including:
1. BrahMos cruise missile programme
2. Sukhoi Su-30MKI programme (230+ to be built by Hindustan
Aeronautics)
3. S-400 Triumf (purchase pending)
4. Kamov Ka-226 200 to be made in India under the Make in India
initiative.
5. T-90S Bhishma with over 1000 to be built in India
6. Akula-II nuclear submarine (2 to be leased with an option to buy when
the lease expires)
7. INS Vikramaditya aircraft carrier programme

The S-400 air defence system Issue

The defence relationship with Russia creates with India-US bilateral ties. USA has imposed
sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) , on
Turkey for procurement of the same system.
Yet New Delhi appears determined to proceed with the $5.2-billion deal, having concluded
that the S-400 was cost-effective and will be efficient
in meeting India’s defence needs as compared to rival
systems. The Indian government has stressed that
negotiations were already underway before CAATSA
came into being in 2017, with the Inter-governmental
Agreement (IGA) for its procurement having been
signed in 2016 during the 17th India-Russia summit in
Goa. The contract for its supply was concluded in 2018,
and in recent years, India and Russia have signed a
number of additional defence deals across domains,
including guided missile frigates, T-90 battle tanks, and lease of a nuclear-powered attack
submarine.
It is apparent that US concerns go beyond just CAATSA and Russian arms sales. The presence
of advanced systems such as the S-400 among US allies will clearly impede certain
technology transfers and joint operations, as
evidenced by the immediate suspension of F-35
deliveries to NATO ally Turkey, even before
sanctions under CAATSA came into force. In the
US-India case, where the countries are not formal
allies, the S-400 will nevertheless place constraints
on some contours of what the US envisions for the
future of the US-India defence relationship.
While CAATSA does provide for waivers, acknowledging that there will be friendly countries
with little choice but to continue dealing with proscribed Russian entities, there is no room
for a “blanket exception” of the sort that might entirely insulate countries like India.
Notwithstanding a few key acquisitions, Russia’s overall share of Indian defence imports
has been steadily declining. At the same time, the India-US defence relationship has steadily
heightened, particularly over the last decade. The same is true of Indian relations with the
West and US-allied nations in general, with a significant uptick in imports from Europe and
Israel in recent years, in addition to greater cooperation at the operational level. India
conducts very few military exercises with Russia in comparison to those with the US, Europe,
Japan, and Australia. Indo-Russian exercises also tend to be far less complex, with less focus
on interoperability.
Energy Cooperation

Russia has agreed to build more than 20 nuclear reactors over the next 20 year. It contains
plans to build over 20 nuclear power units in India, as well as cooperation in building Russia-
designed nuclear power stations in third countries, in the joint extraction of natural uranium,
production of nuclear fuel and waste elimination.
Russia is building the 6,000-MW project at the site in Tamil Nadu, which will have six
VVER-1000 nuclear reactors . Two reactors at Kudankulam are currently operational and
two more are being built.

In 2012 Gazprom Group and India's GAIL agreed to LNG shipments to

India of 2.5 million tons a year for the period of 20 years. Indian oil
companies have invested in the Russia's oil sector a notable example is
ONGC-Videsh which has invested over $8 billion with major stakes in oil
fields such Sakhalin-1.

Current state of India Russia Relations

In recent times , the disagreements between India and

Russia, on geopolitics are growing. In December
2020,Lavrov remarked that “India is being an object of
the Western countries persistent, aggressive and
devious policy” to “engage in anti-China games by
promoting Indo-Pacific strategies”.

While India and Russia do have some common interests, Moscow has its own imperatives
that New Delhi should understand. Russian confrontation with the West broadly, and with
the US in particular, forces Moscow to lean more heavily on Beijing. That makes India and
Russia less useful to each other for some time to come.
Russia has been useful to India in some ways, particularly in enhancing Indian military
power. But Moscow’s political compulsion to support China is a warning that New Delhi
should heed. India’s dependence on Moscow for weapons is a vulnerability that the Indian
decision makers need to take more seriously.

India and Russia can think about establishing a “multipolar

global order”, but this is not something that can be conjured
.The world is heading towards a US-China bipolarity. Desire
cannot overcome reality.

The source of divergence between Indian and Russian interests lies in the continuing
problems that Russia faces in its relations with the US.

Former US President Donald Trump may have had a bit of a soft

corner for Putin’s muscular preening, but even his own
administration’s response to Russia was not particularly soft.
President Biden and his administration is likely to be tougher, as seen
during the first conversation between him and Putin. The just-
released Biden ‘interim’ strategic guidance document begins by
pointing at the “growing rivalry with China, Russia and other
authoritarian states”.
Putin has shown little indication that he will soften towards the West either. These are early
days, of course, and things may change – the two countries did agree to extend the New
START nuclear arms treaty just three weeks after Biden took over. But it is difficult to see
much cooperation or even a reduction in tensions between the two sides in the immediate
future.

The consequence of this confrontation is that Moscow has increasingly leaned on China both
for support as well as a way to undermine American power. The military relationship
between the two has become increasingly close: in addition to conventional weapons, Russia
is also helping China set up its missile early warning system, one of the most sensitive bits of
technology for any nuclear power. Particularly striking is what has primarily been an arms
supply relationship has become increasingly broader, at least from Moscow’s perspective.
Putin even said that he would not rule out a military alliance between the two countries, a
remark that Chinese officials did not endorse but did not reject either. Russia has also taken
a harsh and sometimes undiplomatic posture towards the Indo-Pacific, with Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov characterising the Quad as an anti-China game that the US is pushing
India towards – much to India’s discomfiture. As the latest Quad summit demonstrates,
despite Moscow’s opposition, India clearly sees the grouping as a necessary response to
China. Moscow’s game may be designed to undermine the US’ role in the region or to ensure
that Washington and China continue to scuffle, for that is what serves Russia best. But it
does not serve India at all because it is China’s potential hegemony over Asia that New Delhi
should fear more, not American power. It is American weakness, either in capability or
willingness, that would hurt India.

The widening gulf between India and Russia does serve China, however, as does the rift
between Moscow and Washington. With an economy about half the size of India’s, Russia is
not much of a competitor to China. But Russia can still be a source
of high-technology weapons for China. China’s broader
technological base surpasses Russia’s but it still has the odd
weakness: it flies a fifth-generation fighter jet but it needs a
Russian engine, a dependance that Beijing is clearly unhappy
with. More importantly, Russia provides useful political support
for Beijing at a time when China has antagonised many other
powers.
Like all international partnerships, including India-Russia relations, the China-Russia
partnership is one of convenience. But the conditions that gave rise to it are unlikely to
change in the near future. Indian policy should acknowledge this and adjust accordingly.

Recent developments in India Russia Relationship

Visit of Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh V Shringla to Moscow:

The visit aimed at “setting an active and ambitious agenda for
bilateral relations”. Foreign Secretary’s visit was intended to
further deepen our cooperation in all sectors.

Shringla at the Diplomatic Academy also spoke on the India-

Russia cooperation in three strategic geographies – Eurasia,
Indo-Pacific and the Russian Far East, and the Arctic, while
highlighting the need to diversify and expand India-Russia
trade basket. He highlighted the steps taken to enhance trade
with the commencement of negotiations in August 2020 for the India-EAEU Free Trade
Agreement. The priority being attached to the International North-South Corridor was
underlined. He also indicated the need for the operationalisation of a “Green Corridor” and a
Bilateral Investment Protection Arrangement to encourage bilateral trade and investment,
respectively.

He discussed with Lavrov the ways to expand the Vladivostok-Chennai corridor-an

important dimension of the development of Russian Far East. PM Modi had announced a
credit line of 1 bn dollar in 2019. India is looking for investment in new areas such as coal,
timber, LNG, for which there is a huge potential in that region. India is also working on
trilateral India-Japan-Russia Cooperation in the Russian Far East. However, a lot has still to
be done to tap its economic potential by enhancing imports and exports through this route.
Shringla underlining the importance of the Indo-Pacific
region in the current environment stated that India would
like to work closely with Russia under ASEAN and East Asia
Summit, of which both are members. Clarifying the Indian
concept, he added that India perceives it as a free, open,
inclusive region, which embraces all in a common pursuit of
progress and prosperity. For India, the Indo-Pacific region is the vast maritime space
stretching from the western coast of North America to the eastern shores of Africa.

India’s Act Far East Policy

Launched by PM Modi in Vladivostok in 2019, where USD 1 billion Line of Credit was
announced for the development of the region and asserted that India will walk shoulder to
shoulder. Putin had declared the development of far East as national priority.
Nicolas Blarel
India: the next superpower?: India's soft
power: from potential to reality?

Report

Original citation:
Blarel, Nicolas (2012) India: the next superpower?: India's soft power: from potential to reality?
IDEAS reports - special reports, Kitchen, Nicholas (ed.) SR010. LSE IDEAS, London School of
Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43445/

Originally available from LSE IDEAS

Available in LSE Research Online: May 2012

© 2012 The Author

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 India’s Soft Power:
From Potential to Reality?
Nicolas Blarel

O ver the last decade, many scholars and analysts have tried to assess India’s emergence
as a major actor in the global arena by looking at such material indicators as economic
growth, military expansion or demographic evolution. As a consequence, these accounts
have mainly overlooked New Delhi’s increased emphasis on developing its ‘soft power’
credentials by using the attractiveness of Indian culture, values and policies. Indian diplomats
like Sashi Tharoor have recently argued that if India is now perceived as a superpower,
it was not just through trade and politics but also through its ability to share its culture
with the world through food, music, technology and Bollywood. However, it is difficult to
determine India’s actual soft power resources, or which of these resources have actually
helped strengthen India’s global status. With such a difficult concept to define and measure,
is it possible to monitor the evolution of India’s soft power over the last decade? Most
saliently, can we compare India’s efforts with those of another emerging Asian power, China?

CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES IN DETERMINING INDIA’S SOFT POWER

‘Power’ in International Relations (IR) has traditionally been defined in relational terms: as the ability of
actor A to influence the behaviour of actor B to get the outcomes he wants. Traditional (neo-) realist
models have emphasised military strength and economic power to determine state capacities. By contrast,
in his seminal book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, eminent IR scholar Joseph
Nye separated three dimensions of power: coercion by using military threats, influence by offering
economic incentives, and finally the ability to co-opt other states or what he also called a ‘soft power’
approach (in contrast to the two previous ‘hard power’ approaches). According to Nye, co-optive power
is ‘the ability of a nation to structure a situation so that other nations develop preferences or define
their interests in ways consistent with one’s nation.’ Nye also argued co-optive power emerges from
soft power and immaterial sources such as ‘cultural and ideological attraction as well as the rules and
institutions of international regimes.’ As a result, the difference between hard and soft power relies on
their relative materiality as soft power is mostly based on intangibles such as the power of example. Soft
power is therefore the ability to modify other states’ preferences because of their perception of you.

However, as the Indian case will demonstrate, the conceptual relationship between hard and soft power
remains unclear. Does a rising power need to develop both hard power and soft power resources to
attain major power status? Do both dimensions of power substitute each other or do they overlap in
a complementary way? Does India today fill these two prerequisites? For instance, the high economic
growth rates since the liberalisation process in 1991 have certainly increased India’s international
attractiveness; does economic power here feed India’s soft power?

In the last decade, India’s soft power has mainly been defined in opposition to hard power considerations.
For example, the most eloquent proponent of India’s soft power, former Union Minister of State
for External Affairs Shashi Tharoor, has argued that past classifications of major power status were
28
becoming archaic and that India had now become
a great power mainly by the ‘power of example’ or
in other words because of its ‘soft power’. Tharoor’s
contention is that today it is not the size of the army or
of the economy that matters (two dimensions where
India has failed to compete with other great powers
like China or the US) but instead it was the country
that told the ‘better story’ which would qualify as
a global player. To support this argument, Tharoor
has discussed components of India’s soft power as
diverse as films and Bollywood, yoga, ayurveda,
political pluralism, religious diversity and openness
to global influences. While the successful export
of cultural products such as Bollywood across the
world has helped raise awareness of Indian culture
and modified existing stereotypes, other soft power
elements such as the institutional model of a long-
lasting democratic and plural political system have also
inspired societies abroad.
But Tharoor also believed India’s soft power had
emerged until now independently of the government’s
policies. In other words, a soft power by default, India
has now to enhance its co-optive power. What are
India’s soft power assets? How have these resources
improved India’s international reputation?
THE INDIRECT AND INCONSISTENT NATURE OF
INDIA’S SOFT POWER
Since soft power is an intangible component of a
state’s power, it is difficult to measure its actual impact.
The advantages of hard power such as military and
economic resources are that they can be measured
and compared, and their direct effects are more or
less palpable. It is easy for example to compare Indian
and Chinese military expenditures. It is impossible
however to quantify the appeal of a country’s values,
culture, institutions or achievements, an appeal which
is inherently subjective and therefore contested and
fluctuating. Furthermore, the indirect nature of India’s
soft power is more difficult to ascertain. It is for example
difficult to assess whether a foreign government
acceded to India’s foreign policy objectives because
of its partiality towards Indian culture. Nevertheless,
in spite of these caveats, some observers of India’s
foreign policy have noticed how certain characteristics
of India’s history, culture and political development
have progressively gained foreign attention.
How these soft power qualities have actually been
actively used by Indian diplomacy to exert international
influence is another matter.
In the last decade, Indian diplomats have started
emphasising the appealing and also ‘familiar’
nature of India’s culture. India has a long history of
civilisational and cultural links with countries in Central
Asia, South-East Asia and the Middle-East. Its riches
have attracted traders and travellers for thousands
of years. Buddhism spread from India to China and
beyond, leading to a sustained exchange of ideas
since ancient times. Even today, the proposal by India
to rebuild the once internationally famous Nalanda
Buddhist University in partnership with China, Japan,
South Korea and Singapore serves as testament to
those historic cultural ties. Similarly, preachers from
India have spread the values of Islam across Asia to
Singapore and Malaysia. Such historical, cultural and
religious ties built along trading routes were regularly
raised by Indian diplomats as they sought to improve
relations with South-East Asia through the ‘Look East’
policy in the early 1990s, emphasising in particular
the religious influences of Hinduism and Buddhism,
as well as the spread of language (especially Sanskrit),
art and architecture throughout Southeast Asia. Today,
as India also tries to re-establish economic relations
with the Gulf countries, it regularly evokes pre-colonial
commercial routes as well as centuries-old cultural-
religious linkages.
Today, alongside China, India offers one of the most
dynamic alternatives to Western cultural values. India’s
film industry, popularly dubbed ‘Bollywood’, is probably
the largest and farthest reaching medium for Indian
culture. It is today the world’s largest film industry,
surpassing Hollywood with an annual output of over
1000 movies. Thanks to satellite TV and internet,
Bollywood movies and Indian soap operas have
reached a growing global audience that has become
increasingly familiar with Indian society and culture.
Another one of India’s most successful and long-lasting
exports, yoga, is now practiced around the world as a
form of exercise, and Indian cuisine, with its distinctive
use of spices, has become popular worldwide. More
directly, cricket has proved to be a strong soft power
29
 resource for India, with cricket diplomacy having notably
positive effects in reducing Indo-Pakistani tensions.
Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s meeting
with Indian Prime minister Manmohan Singh during
the 2011 world cup semi-final in India closely followed
the resumption of high-level diplomatic dialogue
between New Delhi and Islamabad after the 2008
Mumbai attacks. On another level, the creation in
2008 of the rich and internationally-popular Indian
Premier League (IPL) has reinforced the narrative of
India’s rise.
However, while the exportation of these cultural
products has certainly made aspects of life in the
Indian subcontinent more familiar and accessible to
people across the globe, it is not evident how this
element of India’s soft power has helped India fulfil its
foreign policy objectives in the last decade. Whereas
Nye could link American popular culture with the US’
‘co-optive’ power, the effects of the globalisation of
India’s diverse culture are not so explicitly political.
For example, unlike Hollywood’s approach during the
Cold War, Indian films have never really promoted a
certain model for political and cultural development.
India’s large diaspora is also considered to be a major
asset for Indian diplomacy. There are today millions
of Indians spread as far as Fiji, Malaysia, Mauritius,
South Africa and Trinidad. While many of these Indians
originally migrated as labourers for the British Empire
in the 19th century, a new wage of richer and educated
expatriates have found their way to the US, Canada
and Australia in the last decades. These immigrants
have come to play major roles in the political spheres
of these different countries. For example, the educated
Indian-American community has played an important
role in improving Indo-US relations by lobbying
American politicians and by giving a positive image
of India to the American public.
Nye argued that ‘smart’ states can increase their
credibility and soft power capacity by their domestic
and international performance. India’s democratic
record, unprecedented for most decolonised countries
could be regarded as a strong soft power resource. The
new international consensus following the Cold War
around democracy, human rights and market-oriented
economic reforms has reinforced the appeal of India’s
30
political achievements. The stability of India’s democracy
over more than 60 years, especially in a neighbourhood
rife with ethnic conflicts, has demonstrated that unity
in diversity was possible in a democratic format and
there could be an institutional alternative to Western
political systems. India’s democratic, federal and secular
political model (although not always perfect) could
be considered as an institutional model of reasonable
accommodation of minority rights, and of flexible
adjustment to different ethnic and linguistic claims.
While economic power is usually considered a hard
and material asset, a country’s economic development
model could also be interpreted as a soft power
resource to the extent that its accomplishments prove
attractive to others. The recent global successes of
Indian information technology firms such as Infosys
Technologies and Wipro, the achievements of other
multinational companies such as the Tata Group and
the Reliance Group; and the now global reputation
of the Indian Institute of Management (IIMs) and
Indian Institute of Technology (IITs) have contributed
to the development of a new image of India as an
economic powerhouse. The stereotypical image of
underdeveloped, impoverished India has now been
removed by the impression of a modern and dynamic
economy attracting now foreign investments and
workers from different parts of the world.
Soft power is however a difficult resource to leverage,
and India’s political leadership and its diplomatic
instrument have inconsistently capitalised upon these
undoubted soft power resources over the last decade.
References to Indian culture, to its diaspora, to its
political values and to its economic development have
mostly been rhetoric for image-polishing. It poses the
question of whether India has really tried to exploit
its huge soft power potential.
DEVELOPING A SOFT POWER COMPONENT TO
INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY
In practice, India’s soft power remains weak for two
primary reasons. First, Indian diplomacy has neglected
soft power as an important tool of statecraft and has
only recently understood the relevance of ‘cultural
diplomacy’. Second, soft power cannot really exist
without some initial hard power achievements. A
country will only be able to realistically tell a ‘better
story’ if it has material power to build its soft power
on. While goodwill for India abroad has largely been
generated in an unplanned manner, New Delhi does
have the capacity to accentuate soft power through
‘public diplomacy’ or by developing a framework of
activities by which a government seeks to influence
public attitudes in a manner that they become
supportive of its foreign policy and national interests.
India has recently demonstrated the intention to
exploit its soft power resources in a systematic manner
to achieve its objectives, notably by creating a Public
Diplomacy Division in India’s Ministry of External Affairs
in 2006. This new institution’s main objective has
been to intensify the dialogue on foreign policy issues
with all segments of the society at home and abroad.
However, it is a fairly new and small department
and its ability to formulate and implement policies
remains to be seen.
As a result, India has over the last 5 years attempted
to begin to make better use of its soft power assets.
Most notably, the Indian government has explicitly
incorporated a ‘cultural’ element into its foreign
policy. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR)
has set up 22 cultural centres in 19 countries whose
activities ranging from film festivals to book fairs and
art exhibitions, aim to present an image of India as a
plural multicultural society. The Indian government has
also encouraged the use of Hindi abroad by organising
an annual and rotating World Hindi Conference and
by offering Hindi classes in its different centres.
India has also begun to emphasise its democratic
process. Despite India’s important democratic
achievements, New Delhi had historically shied away
from promoting democracy abroad, but since 2000
India has expanded its activities for the development
of democracy abroad, notably in coordination with
the international community. In 2005, India joined the
UN Democracy Fund and contributed $25 million to
it, making it the second biggest donor after the US
($38 million). India’s activities mainly include electoral
assistance and programs to strengthen the rule of law
and to fight corruption. At the regional level, India has
also decided to link its development assistance with
projects of democracy promotion as in Afghanistan.
The Afghanistan example is interesting as India has
direct national interests at stake in the stabilisation of
that country. However, India has deliberately refused to
send any military mission and instead pursued a soft
power strategy to gain Afghan goodwill by delivering
$1.3 billion in economic and logistical assistance. Since
2001, India has concentrated on the reconstruction
of Afghanistan through aid for building infrastructure
like dams and roads and providing scholarships for
Afghan students. Ordinary Afghans seem to have
appreciated India’s ‘soft’ involvement in their country
as 74 percent of them have a favourable image of
India according to a 2009 ABC/BBC/ARD poll (in
contrast to 91 percent of unfavourable opinions of
Pakistan). Elsewhere in the region, India has promoted
a soft power approach through a series of new
initiatives framed around concepts of ‘non-reciprocity’,
‘connectivity’ and ‘asymmetrical responsibilities’, which
indicate a willingness to use economic attractiveness
to persuade its neighbours rather than coercive
military capacities. This has resulted since the 1980s
in a greater political investment in different regional
institutions such as the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the South Asia Co-
operative Environment Programme, the South Asian
Economic Union and BIMSTEC which were created
to enhance cultural and commercial ties. Similarly,
in order to rebuild its trust deficit with countries like
Pakistan and Sri Lanka, India has recently increased
economic cooperation notably by negotiating free
trade agreements. Following the signing of a bilateral
free trade agreement in 2000, Indo-Sri Lankan trade
rose 128 percent by 2004 and quadrupled by 2006,
reaching $2.6 billion. In November 2011, Pakistan
also took further steps toward normal trade and travel
ties with India, agreeing to open up most areas of
commerce with its larger neighbour and to ease visa
rules by February 2012.
31
 India has also progressively tried to include its diaspora
into its foreign policy strategies. Beginning in the
1990s, it became clear that the Overseas Chinese
community was contributing to China’s economic
development. In reaction, India began outreach efforts
to wealthier expatriates who were well situated to play
a vital role in strengthening ties between India and
other countries. The government established in 2000
a High-Level Committee on Indian Diaspora to review
the status of People of Indian Origin (PIOs) and Non-
Resident Indians (NRIs) in the context of constitutional
provisions, laws and rules applicable to them both in
India and countries of their residence. By studying
the characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of this
community, which represents twenty million people
worldwide, this committee aimed to study the role
that PIOs and NRIs may play in the economic, social
and technological development of India. In exchange
for their contribution and based on the committee’s
recommendations, the Indian government reformed
citizenship requirements in 2004 and eased the legal
regime governing the travel and stay of PIOs in India.
A case in point of such cooperation was the decisive
role of the Indian-American community in improving
India’s image in American minds which greatly
contributed to the recent Indo-US rapprochement.
The lobbying efforts carried by the US India Political
Action Committee (USINPAC) proved to be crucial to
get the much debated Indo-US nuclear deal passed
in the US Congress.
Soft power has now become an active element of
India’s diplomacy in parallel with the development
of its hard power resources. India has progressively
understood that these two dimensions of power
should not be placed in opposition to one another,
especially for an aspiring global power. India’s political
and economic appeal would not be possible if it had
not developed robust political institutions over the
last 60 years and sustained high economic growth
rates over the last two decades. Similarly, as India’s
hard power capabilities, notably in the economic and
military realms, have increased over the last decade,
it became important to develop in conjunction a soft
power strategy to give legitimacy and credibility to
India’s leadership role in the world.
32
As the world’s largest democracy, with a vibrant free
press, India has important soft power advantages over
the other rising power in the region, China. Because
of India’s democratic experience, its rise (unlike China)
has been perceived as complementing rather than
challenging the existing Asian and international orders.
Not coincidentally, India’s public diplomacy over the
last 5 years has sought to promote its soft power
credentials in a battle for influence with China in
Asia and around the world. A concrete example of
this new soft power rivalry is visible in Africa today.
Since India cannot match China’s massive financial
investments in Africa, it has been concentrating on soft
power resources such as its information technology
capabilities and its affordable university courses to
attract African students. At the same time it has
promoted its image of the country which inspired the
anti-colonial struggles of the last century and took a
strong principled stand against apartheid to develop
future partnerships in Africa. As a result, by publicising
the pluralist nature of its politics and society, India
intends to prove it is a cooperating, stabilising and
exemplary rising power, in contrast to China’s more
aggressive, if not neo-colonial model.
CONCLUSION: INDIA’S SOFT POWER AS A WORK
IN PROGRESS?
The Indian government’s efforts over the last decade
have helped promote a new and modern image of
India abroad. The increase in foreign direct investments
in recent years (investment inflows of financial year
2006-07 touched over $13 billion, as compared with
$16.5 billion over the whole of the 1990s) may partly
be due to these publicity campaigns that promoted
India’s soft power capacities. Post-liberalisation India
is progressively being seen as a manufacturing hub
for international firms that are making long-term
productive investments in the country. Coincidentally
or not, simultaneously many aspects of Indian culture
like music, food, style and religions have become
fashionable in many parts of the world. However, since
India did not have any meaningful public diplomacy
program until recently, it is not yet perceived as a
political and societal model in other countries.
India has long been content with its indirect soft power capacities. In comparison with Beijing’s well-organised
and centrally mandated ‘charm offensive,’ India’s public diplomacy is still in formation.

To increase its international clout, notably in its growing competition with China over which power tells the
‘better story,’ India will have to use its soft power in a more systematic and planned manner. This process
will most probably take time as it will require a domestic debate on how to balance national interests and
political values and norms. The resolution of this debate will determine how India finds a right mix between
soft and hard power in order to achieve real influence, or what Nye, and many in the Obama administration,
in particular Hillary Clinton, have termed ‘smart power.’ For India to continue to be an attractive power, and
most importantly for it to present a more compelling development model than China, it will also need to
continue to improve its internal economic performance.

In addition, since soft power has a fluctuating value, India will need to resolve its lack of social and economic
equality if it wants to retain its soft power edge. One of the major factors in the rise of India’s profile has
been its impressive economic growth since the early 1990s. Suddenly, India became an appealing economic
model, one that presented a different option from the centralized and authoritarian Chinese model. But the
maintenance of this positive international image will require India to simultaneously become a more equitable
and efficient society, a global economic power, and an economy that commands a major share of the global
wealth, especially from global trade and investment. Decreasing FDI over the last two years cannot solely be
explained by the global economic crisis. India’s lack of proper physical infrastructure, constraining federal
regulations, large and inefficient bureaucratic structures and the perception of massive corruption have all
deterred major investors. Indeed, the popular mobilisation behind anti-corruption crusader Anna Hazare and
the associated civil unrest demonstrates that India still has a way to go to implement the macro-economic
and structural reforms that will enable it to become an inclusive and prosperous economic reference, and
with that, a soft power superpower. ■

33
India – USA Relations
India USA Relations before Independence
1. 1941
a. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour made US to realise the strategic importance
of India against Japan.
2. 1942
a. Roosevelt suggested Churchill about his support to India’s independence 
Evaporated after INC launching Quit India

India USA Relations after Independence(1947) – During Cold war

Dennis Kux’s “Estranged Democracies”

USA’s policy of containment of communism did not match

India’s policy of Non Alignment. John Foster Dulles called
NAM as “immoral”.
1. 1948
a. USA worked with Britain through UN to resolve Kashmir and establish UN
observer force along ceasefire line.
2. 1949
a. In July,India and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement establishing
a ceasefire line to be supervised by the military observers. These observers,
under the command of the Military Adviser, formed the nucleus of the United
Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).
b. Nehru’s visit to US was a diplomatic disaster.
3. 1950
a. India did not support US resolution against China in Korean Crisis
4. Pakistan joined SEATO(1954) and CENTO(1955)  Pakistan received significant
military aid . US looked at Pakistan as a bulwark against southward expansion of
USSR.
5. 1955
a. India Criticised US action in Vietnam War.
6. Though Pakistan was a useful ally , but India was the main prize to win in the most
significant contest with China .
7. 1960
a. September, Indus Water Treaty under Eisenhower
b. Divided south Asia will be vulnerable to Communist
pressures .
8. 1965
 a. USA refused to directly involved in 1965 war, yet backed UN efforts to broker
a ceasefire
b. Economic pressures were applied by suspending long term PL 480 food
assistance .
9. 1971
a. India signed Treaty of Peace and Friendship against
American attempts of rapprochement with China
resulting into deterioration of the relations and USA
waned India by sending USS Enterprise .
10. 1974
a. Pokhran Tests
b. NSG
11. 1987
a. MTCR

India USA Relations after the end of cold war

1. Refuelling rights to USA Military aircraft during Gulf War.
2. 1994
a. Pressurised Russia to block the transfer of Cryogenic
technology .
3. 1996 and 1997
a. Malabar Exercise
4. Defence policy Groups
5. 1998
a. Operation Shakti  Economic Sanctions
6. USA pressuring India to sign NPT and CTBT
India USA Relations after Nuclear Tests
1. 1998-2000
a. 14 round of talks between Strobe
Talbott and Jaswant Singh
2. 1999
a. Kargil Crisis
b. Pro-India Stand
3. 2000
a. Clinton’s visit  Vision Statement
4. 2001
a. Bush administration  Most pro-Indian president :
Wanted a strong India and not a feeble India to balance
China . Hence , he brought India into the global nuclear
industry.
b. De-hyphenation
 c. Global War on Terrorism
5. 2003
a. India China Strategic Partnership
6. 2005
a. US aid for rehabilitation after Tsunami
b. Civil Nuclear Agreement
7. 2008
a. Waiver granted to India from NSG
b. 26/11 attack  delayed conviction of David Headley  distrust
8. 2010
a. Obama endorsed India’s candidature for UNSC  Indispensable partner.
9. 2011
a. Asia Pivot Policy
10. 2013
a. Khobragade episode
11. 2014
a. Obama invited Modi despite past Visa ban. It Shows that not withstanding
Modi;s records US is willing to work with India to manage the rising China .
b. Obama called India USA partnership most defining in 21st century
c. Modi’s visit to USA (2015.2016 2017)  “Chalien Saath Saath”

12. 2015
a. Republic day guest

13. 2016
a. Trump elected. Pushed the relationship in reverse mode in Trade, immigration
and education ties , yet pushed on defence and intelligence cooperation ,
harder. Even toyed with the idea that QUAD might develop into Asian NATO.
b. Modi’s visit.
14. 2017:
a. Released South Asia strategy - acknowledged constructive contribution of
India in Afghanistan - criticised Pakistan.
b. Released National Security strategy - Called India as valuable ally.
15. 2020
a. Namaste Trump  ‘Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership’
16. 2021
a. Biden – As a Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations committee : “By 2020 , the
two closest nations in the world would be India and US.”
b. Secretary of state Antony Blinken : India is a bipartisan success story of our
successive administrators
 The biggest push has come from Prime Minister Narendra Modi overcoming the
“hesitations of history” and taking forward the relationship, first with a Democratic
Obama administration by announcing a Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and
Indian Ocean Region in 2015 , followed by elevating the India-U.S. Strategic and
Commercial Dialogue (2009) into the 2+2 dialogue in 2018 with the (Republican) Trump .

Areas of concern

 Emerging geo-politics in Indo-Pacific – Rise of China . The concept of Indo -Pacific and
the cooperation at QUAD

Indo Pacific –

2007 Shinzo Abe talked about “The pacific and Indian Oceans are now bringing about
a dynamic coupling as cease of freedom and prosperity”

2010 – Robert D Kaplan – Monsoon – Indian Ocean will take the centre stage in the
20th century strategy games of great Power .

2019 – US State Department published a document formalising the concept of “Free

and Open Indo Pacific ”

In 2017, Trump articulated Indo Pacific as ushering a new cold war. This led Indian PM
at Shangri La dialogue 2018 to spell India’s vision of Indo-Pacific i.e. enabler for a
common pursuit of progress and prosperity…..not directed against any country….based
on our principled commitment to Rule of Law.

Over the last two decade , China’s defence spending have increased 6 times according
to SIPRI’s estimates . In response , Indo Pacific arc countries are beefing up their
defences .

QUAD –

Quad is a symbiotic link in the geo-political discourse of Indo-Pacific . It is an informal

dialogue among the four maritime democracies . The first official talks started in 2017
after China’s aggressive posture in South China Sea and East China Sea.
Quad is an idea that is taking shape, members are going for military exercise
(Malabar).

Recent Developments:
Joe Biden is credited for talking the initiative for the summit level meeting which took
place on 12 March, 2021. This is the second high profile foreign policy initiative taken
by Biden in his first 100 days of office . The first one was the speech at Munich security
conference on15th February where he proposed Trans Atlantic Alliance to counter
Beijing . However, neither Germany nor France appeared enthusiastic countering
China .

Significance :
Last time when FMs of Quad met in Tokyo , they could not even issue a joint statement
.But, this time , they have a joint statement which highlights the maritime challenges
in the region and calls for “collaboration , including in maritime security, to meet
challenges to the rule based maritime order in east and south China seas.”
It us a clear indication of a possible future joint action by quad countries . Quad may
not be a full scale alliance but a new mini-lateral taking shape . India welcomed the
immediate focus on vaccines . India is already supplying 60% of the world’s vaccine.
The initiative will boost its manufacturing capacity and can pave the way for becoming
the manufacturing destination for Quad countries reducing dependency on China .
Thus , it will offset the concern of Japan and Australia over India not joining RCEP.

Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: “The Spirit of the Quad”

March 12, 2021

1. We have convened to reaffirm our
commitment to quadrilateral
cooperation between Australia, India,
Japan, and the United States. We bring
diverse perspectives and are united in a
shared vision for the free and open Indo-
Pacific. We strive for a region that is
free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by
coercion. We recall that our joint efforts toward this positive vision arose out of an
international tragedy, the tsunami of 2004. Today, the global devastation wrought by
COVID-19, the threat of climate change, and security challenges facing the region
summon us with renewed purpose. On this historic occasion of March 12, 2021, the
first-ever leader-level summit of the Quad, we pledge to strengthen our cooperation
on the defining challenges of our time.

2. Together, we commit to promoting a free, open rules-based order, rooted in

international law to advance security and prosperity and counter threats to both in
the Indo-Pacific and beyond. We support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and
overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity.
We commit to work together and with a range of partners. We reaffirm our strong
support for ASEAN’s unity and centrality as well as the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-
Pacific. Full of potential, the Quad looks forward to the future; it seeks to uphold
peace and prosperity and strengthen democratic resilience, based on universal
values.
3. Our common goals require us to reckon with the most urgent of global challenges.
Today, we pledge to respond to the economic and health impacts of COVID-19,
combat climate change, and address shared challenges, including in cyber space,
critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure investment, and
humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief as well as maritime domains.

4. Building on the progress our countries have achieved on health security, we will join
forces to expand safe, affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable
access, to speed economic recovery and benefit global health. With steadfast
commitment to the health and safety of our own people, we also recognize that none
of us can be safe as long as the pandemic continues to spread. We will, therefore,
collaborate to strengthen equitable vaccine access for the Indo-Pacific, with close
coordination with multilateral organizations including the World Health Organization
and COVAX. We call for transparent and results-oriented reform at the World Health
Organization. We are united in recognizing that climate change is a global priority
and will work to strengthen the climate actions of all nations, including to keep a
Paris-aligned temperature limit within reach. We look forward to a successful COP 26
in Glasgow. We will begin cooperation on the critical technologies of the future to
ensure that innovation is consistent with a free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-
Pacific. We will continue to prioritize the role of international law in the maritime
domain, particularly as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), and facilitate collaboration, including in maritime security, to meet
challenges to the rules-based maritime order in the East and South China Seas. We
reaffirm our commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea in
accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, and also confirm the
necessity of immediate resolution of the issue of Japanese abductees. As long-standing
supporters of Myanmar and its people, we emphasize the urgent need to restore
democracy and the priority of strengthening democratic resilience.

5. To advance these goals and others, we will redouble our commitment to Quad
engagement. We will combine our nations’ medical, scientific, financing,
manufacturing and delivery, and development capabilities and establish a vaccine
expert working group to implement our path-breaking commitment to safe and
effective vaccine distribution; we will launch a critical- and emerging-technology
working group to facilitate cooperation on international standards and innovative
technologies of the future; and we will establish a climate working group to strengthen
climate actions globally on mitigation, adaptation, resilience, technology, capacity-
building, and climate finance. Our experts and senior officials will continue to meet
regularly; our Foreign Ministers will converse often and meet at least once a year. At
the leader level, we will hold an in-person summit by the end of 2021. The ambition of
these engagements is fit to the moment; we are committed to leveraging our
partnership to help the world’s most dynamic region respond to historic crisis, so
that it may be the free, open, accessible, diverse, and thriving Indo-Pacific we all
seek.
Emerging Scenarios in Indo-Pacific

1st October 2019 – 70th anniversary of People’s Republic of China. China displayed the
military preparedness . Significance  “Militarism is in the air ”

China has built extensive infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region from Djibouti to
Kyaukpyu in Myanmar. Its Maritime Silk Road is as much strategic as economic. Its
economic might is its potent weapon too.

In order to tackle a belligerent China, other countries are also actively upping their
strategic activity in the region. The US has bases from Hawaii to Guam to Okinawa to
Diego Garcia to Djibouti. Japan has a base in Djibouti and is increasingly seen
patrolling in various Indo-Pacific sites. Australia has its outposts at Cocos and
Christmas islands. It undertakes surveillance operations from Butterworth base in
Malaysia and is also operationalising its facility in Manus island of Papua New Guinea.
France has its bases in Reunion and New Caledonia. Britain has Diego Garcia. India too
is building ports in Chabahar, Chittagong, Colombo and Sittwe. It has an agreement
with Japan for access to its facility in Djibouti. India is also building a military base at
the North Agalega island in Mauritius.

India has its own Arihants. The US and others have their own too. Nuclear
Armageddon is not an impossible reality. Avoiding it requires keeping the levels of
engagement below confrontation. The two big powers in the region — India and China
— have thus far avoided any military alliances. It is important to keep the competition
non-militaristic. As suggested by the Australian scholar Rory Medcalf, “development,
deterrence and diplomacy” should be the way forward for Quad.

Analysis
During the First QUAD Summit, the four nations reaffirmed their commitment towards
a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region based on shared values and
principles and respect for international law

XI Jinping’s Miscalculation

Xi Jinping’s miscalculation by orchestrating the

timings of the Covid-19 Pandemic with a
simultaneous belligerent assertiveness all across
the South China Sea and the Indian Himalayas has
resulted in the firming in of a Quadrilateral security Dialogue Forum. There are already
talks within the alliance of making QUAD as the central pillar of an Indo-Pacific
security architecture which will also have ramifications on global security. There are
also talks of expanding the geographic definition of the ‘Indo-Pacific Region’ (IOR) to
include the Western ‘IOR’ comprising the African continent.
The success or failure of Quad will entirely depend on the Chinese counter moves
through economic leveraging and consequently the American checkmate to keep this
nascent and fledgling structure together bound and motivated. Nevertheless, the
primary glue will always be, self defence against communist China, flexing its muscles
and challenging the sovereignty of free independent nations. India happens to be at
the forefront of these Chinese incursions and has been facing a massive build-up of the
PLA in Tibet.

It can be deducted that the military balance in the Indo-Pacific is becoming

unfavourable to all the other users except China. The greatest danger is the erosion of
conventional deterrence to assure a rules-based international order for a free and
open Indo-Pacific.

Some argue that the Quad cannot stay together, because the histories and agendas of
the four partners are too different. However, this is a view of the past. The Quad
cannot be viewed narrowly because in essence it carries a geopolitical agenda for the
larger good of the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In an encouraging sign, the Quad has
already engaged with South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand (the ‘Quad-plus’) on
collective responses to the pandemic.

Road Ahead for QUAD

1. Five Eyes Alliance (FVEY).This is an intelligence-sharing partnership between
the US, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. At this stage, the
inclusion of three more countries viz. India, Japan and South Korea is
recommended so as to counter China’s growing capabilities in military and
cyber technologies.
2. Sale of Indian Military hardware like Brahmos missiles and other such
equipment to QUAD members and SE Asian countries should be encouraged as
part of a politico-military strategy.
3. Many aspects like India’s technological competence to collaborate intrinsically
within QUAD etc. are likely to evolve in the next couple of years. This affiliation
should also enable India to access niche and classified technologies.
4. Indian naval activities in the western Pacific waters and more visits in the SCS
should be enhanced as per the vision of QUAD. Similarly; the other QUAD
members should also visit the IOR as part of a patrolling activity.
5. The Quad will need to be involved in developing a cyber-security strategy that
recognises the varied nature of evolving threats and the importance of
ensuring the security and resilience of alliance members’ networks. Australia’s
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is seeking to secure the technological
future by fostering the ‘Quad Tech Network’.
6. The British government has also floated the idea of a ‘Democracy 10’ (including
the Quad countries) to tackle issues, such as the development of standards for
5G and emerging technologies, that affect the collective interests of the
democratic nations.
 A key to the Quad’s future is to embrace multilateralism and have a nuanced
approach that builds on strategic alliances and partnerships globally. This is a
strategic advantage that autocratic states cannot match. However, as democracies
rally, China will exert its financial clout and military pressure to subdue a state.
Therefore it will be a very dynamic and uncertain evolution of such a coalition at the
global level. For India again it would be a win-win grouping as India would maintain
its autonomy while share its security burden.
. Thus QUAD based jointness would knit a strong deterrence.

Moreover, the Indo-Pacific is being redefined, ironically, by China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), debt-trap diplomacy, fictional territorial claims and a divide-and-rule
strategy. Beijing views the “Indo-Pacific” as a direct threat to the BRI, and in classical
wei qi calculus, as an “encirclement” strategy.

Thus in totality the QUAD initiative can be defined as a Game Changer geopolitical and
geostrategic grouping which can compel China to respect sovereignty of other nations.
Therefore, the joint statement as issued after the first QUAD summit speaks all. It says
“that we will begin cooperation on the critical technologies of the future to ensure that
innovation is consistent with a free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific. We will
continue to prioritize the role of international law in the maritime domain, particularly
as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and
facilitate collaboration, including in maritime security, to meet challenges to the rules-
based maritime order in the East and South China Seas”.

India-USA Defence Partnership

A brief background

1991 – proposals suggested establishing contacts between the three

Services to promote exchanges and explore areas of cooperation.

1995 - An Agreed Minute on Defence Cooperation was concluded instituting a dialogue at

the Defence Secretary level together with the setting up of a Technology Group.

2005 - A 10-year Framework for Defence Relationship established through signing of ‘New
Framework for India-U.S. Defense Relations’. The Defence Framework Agreement was
updated and renewed for another 10 years in June 2015.
2012 - India-US: Defence Trade and Technology Initiative

The Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) was formed in 2012 between the US
and India, to enhance the bilateral relations in defence by venturing into the field of
advanced defence research and development and manufacturing. The aim was to strengthen
the US and India’s defence industrial base by moving away from the traditional “buyer-
seller” dynamic toward a more collaborative approach.
The enabling agreements which have been signed between the two countries are GSOMIA,
LEMOA, COMCASA and BECA. These agreements enhance cooperation and interoperability
between the armed forces of the two democracies. Signing of GSOMIA and up-gradation of
India to the STA-1 status for trade by the US provides a framework for exchange and
protection of classified military information between the U.S industry and the public and
private Indian defence companies. Enhanced bilateral exercises, which over the years have
increased in scope and complexity have enabled a better understanding of each other’s
capabilities and limitations. All these steps provide greater avenues to identify and execute
meaningful projects under DTTI.
A Standard Operating Procedure (SoP) to harmonize the processes for identification,
development, and execution of projects under the DTTI has been formulated and was
ratified .
The inclusion of Indian private industries and fostering the power of innovators has been a
major step in the right direction.
The projects under DTTI will be identified as the near, medium and long term projects. The
near-term projects included so far are Air-launched Small Unmanned Systems, Light Weight
Small Arms Technology and Intelligence-Surveillance-Targetting& Reconnaissance (ISTAR).
The medium-term projects identified are Maritime Domain Awareness Solution and Virtual
Augmented Mixed Reality for Aircraft Maintenance or VAMRAM. The two long term projects
are Terrain Shaping Obstacle and Counter-UAS, Rocket, Artillery & Mortar (CURAM) system
for the Indian Army.
2013 – A Joint Declaration on Defence Cooperation in 2013 , renewed in 2015 . India
participated in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in July-August 2016

2016 - During the visit of Prime Minister Modi visit to the U.S. , the U.S. recognised India as a
"Major Defence Partner", which commits the U.S. to facilitate technology sharing with India
to a level commensurate with that of its closest allies and partners, and industry
collaboration for defence co-production and co-development.This was formalised in the
National Defense Authorisation Act (2017) authorising the Secretaries of State and Defence
to take necessary measures.

USA has helped India in joining the export control regimes (Australia Group, Missile
Technology Control Regime and Wassenaar Arrangement) and has practices consistent
with the Nuclear Suppliers Group where its membership was blocked by China .
In 2018, India was placed in Category I of the Strategic Trade Authorisation, easing exports
of sensitive technologies. This authorisation is the equivalent of NATO allying with Japan,
South Korea and Australia.

The bilateral defence trade increased from less than US$1 billion in 2008 to US$18 billion in
2019
US Secretary of Defence James Austin described partnership as
the central pillar of American policy in Indo-Pacific .

What are foundational agreements?

These agreements govern the nature and scope of U.S. defence partnerships.
The competitive advantage of the U.S. military is maintained primarily by the advanced
technologies that the country develops continuously. The U.S. sells military equipment to
other countries with strict control over their deployment and use.
BECA is the fourth and the last of the foundational agreements that both countries have
concluded, starting with
1. GSOMIA (General Security of Military Information Agreement) in 2002,
2. LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement) in 2016,
3. COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement) in 2018

General Security of Military Information Agreement or GSOMIA – It allow military

technology cooperation for the sharing of classified information between governments
and companies in both countries. However, it did not cover many sensitive technologies
that the COMCASA paved the way for.

Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA)

LEMOA allows the militaries of the US and India to replenish from each other’s bases, and
access supplies, spare parts and services from each other’s land facilities, air bases, and
ports, which can then be reimbursed.
LEMOA is extremely useful for India-US Navy-to-Navy cooperation, since the two
countries are cooperating closely in the Indo-Pacific.

Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA)

The pact allows the US to provide India with its encrypted communications equipment
and systems so that Indian and US military commanders, and the aircraft and ships of the
two countries, can communicate through secure networks during times of both peace and
war.

Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA)?

BECA will help India get real-time access to American geospatial intelligence that will
enhance the accuracy of automated systems and weapons like missiles and armed
drones. Through the sharing of information on maps and satellite images, it will help India
access topographical and aeronautical data, and advanced products that will aid in
navigation and targeting.
Extremely useful for Air Force to Air Force cooperation.
The Indian defence establishment has already used at least five American platforms at the
LAC—

1. C-17 Globemaster III for military transport,

2. Boeing’s Chinook CH-47 as heavy-lift helicopters,

3. Boeing’s Apache as tank-killers,

4. P-8I Poseidon for overland reconnaissance, and

5. Lockheed Martin’s C-130J for airlifting troops.

Trade and investment

U.S.-India Trade Facts

U.S. goods and services trade with India totalled an estimated $146.1 billion in 2019.
Import from USA were $58.6 billion; export to USA were $87.4 billion. The India’s goods and
services trade surplus was $28.8 billion in 2019.

 India is currently USA’s 9th largest goods trading partner with $92.0 billion in total
(two way) goods trade during 2019. Goods imports from USA totalled $34.3 billion;
goods exports from India totalled $57.7 billion. The India’s goods trade surplus was
$23.4 billion in 2019.

 Trade in services with USA totalled an estimated $54.1 billion in 2019. Services
import from USA were $24.3 billion; services export to USA were $29.7 billion. The
India services trade surplus with USA was $5.4 billion in 2019.

Bilateral trade with India is about 3% of U.S. world trade. It is more consequential for
India; in 2019, the United States was India’s largest goods export market (17% share),
and third-largest goods import supplier (7%), after China (14%) and the European
Union (9%).

Investment
U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in India (stock) was $45.9 billion in 2019.

India's FDI in the United States (stock) was $5.0 billion in 2019.
U.S.-India foreign direct investment (FDI) is limited, but growing. Defense sales also are
significant in bilateral trade. Civilian nuclear commerce, stalled for years over differences on
liability protections, has produced major potential U.S. supply contracts, dating to the
second Obama Administration.

Market access and other barriers to trade with India have been long-standing concerns.
Efforts under the Trump Administration to reach a limited bilateral trade deal to address
certain frictions did not conclude. President-Elect Joe Biden has expressed interest in
cooperating with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on global challenges, but it is
uncertain what priority the new Administration will place on bilateral trade issues.

Issues

Tariffs – India has relatively high average tariff rates, especially in agriculture. It can raise its
applied rates to bound rates without violating its commitments under the WTO, causing
uncertainty for U.S. exporters. India opposes the 25% steel and 10% aluminum national-
security-based “Section 232” tariffs that the Trump Administration imposed in 2018. After
India lost its eligibility for a U.S. trade preference program , India imposed higher tariffs of
10% to 25% .The two sides are challenging each other’s tariffs in the WTO.

U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Donald Trump removed India from
GSP, a U.S. trade and development program, for failure to provide “equitable and
reasonable” market access. GSP provides nonreciprocal, duty-free tariff treatment to certain
products imported from qualifying developing countries.
In 2018, India was the largest beneficiary of GSP; over one-tenth ($6.3 billion) of U.S. goods
imports from India entered duty-free under the program .

Services. The United States and India are competitive in certain services industries. Barriers
to U.S. firms’ market access include India’s limits on foreign ownership and local presence
requirements. A key issue for India is U.S. temporary visa policies, which affect Indian
nationals working in the United States. Additionally, India continues to seek a “totalization
agreement” to coordinate social security protection for workers who split their careers
between the two countries.

Agriculture. Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) barriers in USA limit India. Each side also sees
the other’s agricultural support programs as market-distorting.

Intellectual Property (IP). The two sides differ on how to balance IP protection to incentivize
innovation and support other policy goals, such as access to medicines, including for COVID-
19 treatments and vaccines. India remained on the Priority Watch List of the U.S. 2020
Special 301 report, which cited India’s insufficient progress in addressing IP challenges and
noted concerns over India’s treatment of patents, high IP theft rates, and lax trade secret
protection.
Issue of Localization. The United States continues to press India to address its localization
practices, such as in-country data storage, domestic content, and domestic testing
requirements—viewed by the United States as presenting barriers to trade with India.

Investment. India aims to attract foreign investment and has made FDI reforms, such as
raising foreign equity caps for insurance and defense, and other strides to improve its
business environment. From the U.S. view, India’s weak regulatory transparency and other
issues, such as IPR and localization policies, add to concerns about FDI barriers.

Defense Trade. The two nations have signed defense contracts worth more than $20 billion
since 2008, up from $500 million in all previous years combined. Major
anticipated deals include an Integrated Air Defense Weapon System and 30 MQ-9B
SkyGuardian drones. India is eager for more technology-sharing and co-production
initiatives, while the United States urges more reforms in India’s defense offsets policy and
higher FDI caps in its defense sector. India’s multibillion-dollar deal to purchase
the Russian-made S-400 air defense system may trigger U.S. sanctions on India under the
Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act

Regional Integration. Both India and the United States are absent from the Indo-Pacific
region’s two major trade pacts Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and
proposed Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017.

WTO. The United States and India often have opposing stances in the WTO, whose future
direction is unclear amid debate over institutional reforms and negotiations. With
India’s growing integration in the global economy, some policymakers have called on India,
like China, to be a more responsible stakeholder in the rules-based global trading
system. They blame India for impeding WTO progress on issues such as e-commerce customs
duties and fisheries

subsidies. India previously blocked the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which ultimately
entered into force in 2017, until a compromise was reached on treatment of certain food
security programs. The United States and some developed countries also are critical of India,
China, and others for self-designating as developing countries to claim special and
differential treatment under WTO rules.

At Tokyo, in October,2020,India was invited for the first time to attend the Five Eyes (a
signals intelligence grouping set up in 1941 consisting of Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
the United Kingdom and the U.S.) meeting.

What is the Blue Dot Network?

The Blue Dot Network (BDN) is a multi-stakeholder initiative formed by the United States,
Japan, and Australia to provide assessment and certification of infrastructure
development projects worldwide on measures of financial transparency, environmental
 sustainability, and impact on economic development, with the goal of mobilizing private
capital to invest abroad.
It was formally announced on 4 November 2019 at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum in
Bangkok, Thailand on the side lines of the 35th ASEAN Summit. It is led by the U.S.
International Development Finance Corporation, Japan Bank for International
Cooperation, and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia.

The Blue Dot Network is expected to serve as a global evaluation and certification system
for roads, ports and bridges with a focus on the Indo-Pacific region. It has been considered
as a counter-initiative to China's Belt and Road Initiative.
As part of this initiative, infrastructure projects will be vetted and approved by the
network depending on standards, as per which, the projects should meet certain global
infrastructure principles.The projects that are approved will get a “Blue Dot”, thereby
setting universal standards of excellence, which will attract private capital to projects in
developing and emerging economies.
It seems to be planned as a direct counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
However, unlike the BRI, the BDN would not offer public funds or loans for the project.
BDN will serve as a globally recognized seal of approval for major infrastructure projects,
letting people know that projects are sustainable and not exploitative.The new Blue Dot
Network, therefore, is best seen as part of the U.S.A.'s strategy of trying to persuade
developing countries in Asia-Pacific not rely on Chinese funds for infrastructure.
Probal Dasgupta, a strategic expert writes that while Blue Dot may be seen as a counter to
BRI, it will need a lot of work for two reasons. First, there is a fundamental difference
between BRI and Blue Dot — while the former involves direct financing, giving countries
in need immediate short-term relief, the latter is not a direct financing initiative and
therefore may not be what some developing countries need. The question is if Blue Dot
is offering first-world solutions to third-world countries”

Secondly, Blue Dot will require coordination among multiple stakeholders when it
comes to grading projects.

Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018

Signed on 31st December 2018, the act calls for America’s increased engagement in the
Indo-Pacific region and strengthened support, including arms sales, for U.S. allies in the
region.

ARIA states, “Without strong leadership from the United States, the international system,
fundamentally rooted in the rule of law, may wither.... It is imperative that the United
States continue to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific.”

Main Components of ARIA

The act focusses on—

 Promoting United States Security Interests in the Indo-Pacific Region
  Promoting United States Economic Interests in the Indo-Pacific Region
 Promoting United States Values in the Indo-Pacific Region.

Key highlights of the Act:

o Security Interests:
 Authorizes US$ 1.5 billion annually for 5 years to enhance U.S. presence in the Indo-
Pacific
 Reaffirms U.S. security commitments to its allies in the Indo-Pacific, including
Japan, South Korea, and Australia and nations in Southeast Asia.
 A policy goal to peacefully denuclearize North Korea though the campaign of
maximum pressure and engagement.
 Enhances the U.S. diplomatic, economic, and security relationship with India.
 Enforces U.S. freedom of navigation and overflight rights in the Indo-Pacific.
 Regular arms sales and enhanced economic, political, and security relationship
between Taiwan and the United States.
 cybersecurity cooperation.
 Pursue effective arms control and nuclear nonproliferation policies in the Indo-
Pacific region.
o Economic Engagement:
 Economic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region as essential for the growth of the
U.S. economy and success of American businesses.
 Promoting bilateral and multilateral trade in the Indo-Pacific region.
 Promote U.S. exports and additional trade facilitation efforts.
 Penalties for violators of United States' intellectual property.
 Promote energy exports.

o Promoting Values:
 US$ 150 million annually for 5 years for democracy, rule of law, and civil society
support, including $10 million annually for freedom of information efforts in North
Korea.
 Efforts against trafficking-in-persons and human slavery; and sanctions against
human rights abusers.

The act recognizes the hierarchies putting first allies like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines,
Thailand, Australia and New Zealand. At Second pedestal are strategic partners like India
and Security partners like Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam.

Building on the Taiwan Relations Act, the ARIA calls for the U.S. president to support the
transfer of “defense articles” to Taiwan and promote high-level official visits, which were
also encouraged by the Taiwan Travel Act.

Fund Allocation
ARIA directs that only Congress can appropriate funding which means that the President
shall not have any power to do so otherwise.
Significance of ARIA
The Trump administration’s key strategic policy documents—the National Security Strategy
(NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS)—say that allies are invaluable, and the
United States is looking to work more closely with them in the Indo-Pacific region.

ARIA is significant for the United States as it pledges to “develop and commit to a long-term
strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for
the Indo-Pacific.” It outlines the key objectives of that vision. It specifically references the
alliance, recommitting to it and calling for the strengthening of ties between the United
States and Australia.

It is a welcome change for U.S. partners and allies in the region, many of whom have
watched with disappointment as Congress has cut funding for the Asia Maritime Security
Initiative – an older capacity-building initiative – by about half to U.S.$48.2 million.

Response on ARIA

Taiwan: It welcomed ARIA, saying it “underscores U.S. support for and friendship toward
Taiwan, on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act.”

China:
Focusing on ARIA’s Taiwan-related provisions, China: “grossly interferes in China’s internal
affairs.” It Called upon the US to “properly handle the Taiwan issue” – and not violating the
One-China policy and interferes in its internal affairs.

Australia welcomed the Act.

ARIA and India

The Act notes India as a Major Defense Partner, a “unique” status for India, which would
ease defense trade and sharing of technology, including “license-free access to a wide range
of dual-use technologies” as well as promote greater coordination on security policies and
strategies and increased military-to-military engagements.

The ARIA and ASEAN

The US-ASEAN strategic partnership is one of the highlights of the law. The so-called quasi
alliance comprises of the US and six of the ten ASEAN states, including Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Other ASEAN member states are covered
by the associated Lower Mekong Initiative which includes Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and
Vietnam.
o Defense and Security
 Joint maritime exercises in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.
 Calls for Rules-based international system
 Reaffirms its commitment to treaty alliances with the Philippines and
Thailand as per the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Agreement Respecting
Military Assistance respectively.

o Strategic and Economic Partnership

 ASEAN’s economy has grown by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015.
 The value of US-ASEAN total bilateral trade increased by 78 percent since
2004.
 ARIA stresses on the continuation of the US-ASEAN Economic Partnership
 A comprehensive, integrated and multilayer Indo-Pacific energy strategy
 Lower Mekong Initiative
 Established in 2009
 A multinational effort initiated by the US and non-security
alliance states such as Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam.
Myanmar joined LMI in July 2012.

 ARIA mandates a report on the regional engagement through the LMI along
with a report on terrorism in Southeast Asia.
India – USA Relations
India USA Relations before Independence
1. 1941
a. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour made US to realise the strategic importance
of India against Japan.
2. 1942
a. Roosevelt suggested Churchill about his support to India’s independence 
Evaporated after INC launching Quit India

India USA Relations after Independence(1947) – During Cold war

Dennis Kux’s “Estranged Democracies”

USA’s policy of containment of communism did not match

India’s policy of Non Alignment. John Foster Dulles called
NAM as “immoral”.
1. 1948
a. USA worked with Britain through UN to resolve Kashmir and establish UN
observer force along ceasefire line.
2. 1949
a. In July,India and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement establishing
a ceasefire line to be supervised by the military observers. These observers,
under the command of the Military Adviser, formed the nucleus of the United
Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).
b. Nehru’s visit to US was a diplomatic disaster.
3. 1950
a. India did not support US resolution against China in Korean Crisis
4. Pakistan joined SEATO(1954) and CENTO(1955)  Pakistan received significant
military aid . US looked at Pakistan as a bulwark against southward expansion of
USSR.
5. 1955
a. India Criticised US action in Vietnam War.
6. Though Pakistan was a useful ally , but India was the main prize to win in the most
significant contest with China .
7. 1960
a. September, Indus Water Treaty under Eisenhower
b. Divided south Asia will be vulnerable to Communist
pressures .
8. 1965
 a. USA refused to directly involved in 1965 war, yet backed UN efforts to broker
a ceasefire
b. Economic pressures were applied by suspending long term PL 480 food
assistance .
9. 1971
a. India signed Treaty of Peace and Friendship against
American attempts of rapprochement with China
resulting into deterioration of the relations and USA
waned India by sending USS Enterprise .
10. 1974
a. Pokhran Tests
b. NSG
11. 1987
a. MTCR

India USA Relations after the end of cold war

1. Refuelling rights to USA Military aircraft during Gulf War.
2. 1994
a. Pressurised Russia to block the transfer of Cryogenic
technology .
3. 1996 and 1997
a. Malabar Exercise
4. Defence policy Groups
5. 1998
a. Operation Shakti  Economic Sanctions
6. USA pressuring India to sign NPT and CTBT
India USA Relations after Nuclear Tests
1. 1998-2000
a. 14 round of talks between Strobe
Talbott and Jaswant Singh
2. 1999
a. Kargil Crisis
b. Pro-India Stand
3. 2000
a. Clinton’s visit  Vision Statement
4. 2001
a. Bush administration  Most pro-Indian president :
Wanted a strong India and not a feeble India to balance
China . Hence , he brought India into the global nuclear
industry.
b. De-hyphenation
 c. Global War on Terrorism
5. 2003
a. India China Strategic Partnership
6. 2005
a. US aid for rehabilitation after Tsunami
b. Civil Nuclear Agreement
7. 2008
a. Waiver granted to India from NSG
b. 26/11 attack  delayed conviction of David Headley  distrust
8. 2010
a. Obama endorsed India’s candidature for UNSC  Indispensable partner.
9. 2011
a. Asia Pivot Policy
10. 2013
a. Khobragade episode
11. 2014
a. Obama invited Modi despite past Visa ban. It Shows that not withstanding
Modi;s records US is willing to work with India to manage the rising China .
b. Obama called India USA partnership most defining in 21st century
c. Modi’s visit to USA (2015.2016 2017)  “Chalien Saath Saath”

12. 2015
a. Republic day guest

13. 2016
a. Trump elected. Pushed the relationship in reverse mode in Trade, immigration
and education ties , yet pushed on defence and intelligence cooperation ,
harder. Even toyed with the idea that QUAD might develop into Asian NATO.
b. Modi’s visit.
14. 2017:
a. Released South Asia strategy - acknowledged constructive contribution of
India in Afghanistan - criticised Pakistan.
b. Released National Security strategy - Called India as valuable ally.
15. 2020
a. Namaste Trump  ‘Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership’
16. 2021
a. Biden – As a Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations committee : “By 2020 , the
two closest nations in the world would be India and US.”
b. Secretary of state Antony Blinken : India is a bipartisan success story of our
successive administrators
 The biggest push has come from Prime Minister Narendra Modi overcoming the
“hesitations of history” and taking forward the relationship, first with a Democratic
Obama administration by announcing a Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and
Indian Ocean Region in 2015 , followed by elevating the India-U.S. Strategic and
Commercial Dialogue (2009) into the 2+2 dialogue in 2018 with the (Republican) Trump .

Areas of concern

 Emerging geo-politics in Indo-Pacific – Rise of China . The concept of Indo -Pacific and
the cooperation at QUAD

Indo Pacific –

2007 Shinzo Abe talked about “The pacific and Indian Oceans are now bringing about
a dynamic coupling as cease of freedom and prosperity”

2010 – Robert D Kaplan – Monsoon – Indian Ocean will take the centre stage in the
20th century strategy games of great Power .

2019 – US State Department published a document formalising the concept of “Free

and Open Indo Pacific ”

In 2017, Trump articulated Indo Pacific as ushering a new cold war. This led Indian PM
at Shangri La dialogue 2018 to spell India’s vision of Indo-Pacific i.e. enabler for a
common pursuit of progress and prosperity…..not directed against any country….based
on our principled commitment to Rule of Law.

Over the last two decade , China’s defence spending have increased 6 times according
to SIPRI’s estimates . In response , Indo Pacific arc countries are beefing up their
defences .

QUAD –

Quad is a symbiotic link in the geo-political discourse of Indo-Pacific . It is an informal

dialogue among the four maritime democracies . The first official talks started in 2017
after China’s aggressive posture in South China Sea and East China Sea.
Quad is an idea that is taking shape, members are going for military exercise
(Malabar).

Recent Developments:
Joe Biden is credited for talking the initiative for the summit level meeting which took
place on 12 March, 2021. This is the second high profile foreign policy initiative taken
by Biden in his first 100 days of office . The first one was the speech at Munich security
conference on15th February where he proposed Trans Atlantic Alliance to counter
Beijing . However, neither Germany nor France appeared enthusiastic countering
China .

Significance :
Last time when FMs of Quad met in Tokyo , they could not even issue a joint statement
.But, this time , they have a joint statement which highlights the maritime challenges
in the region and calls for “collaboration , including in maritime security, to meet
challenges to the rule based maritime order in east and south China seas.”
It us a clear indication of a possible future joint action by quad countries . Quad may
not be a full scale alliance but a new mini-lateral taking shape . India welcomed the
immediate focus on vaccines . India is already supplying 60% of the world’s vaccine.
The initiative will boost its manufacturing capacity and can pave the way for becoming
the manufacturing destination for Quad countries reducing dependency on China .
Thus , it will offset the concern of Japan and Australia over India not joining RCEP.

Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: “The Spirit of the Quad”

March 12, 2021

1. We have convened to reaffirm our
commitment to quadrilateral
cooperation between Australia, India,
Japan, and the United States. We bring
diverse perspectives and are united in a
shared vision for the free and open Indo-
Pacific. We strive for a region that is
free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by
coercion. We recall that our joint efforts toward this positive vision arose out of an
international tragedy, the tsunami of 2004. Today, the global devastation wrought by
COVID-19, the threat of climate change, and security challenges facing the region
summon us with renewed purpose. On this historic occasion of March 12, 2021, the
first-ever leader-level summit of the Quad, we pledge to strengthen our cooperation
on the defining challenges of our time.

2. Together, we commit to promoting a free, open rules-based order, rooted in

international law to advance security and prosperity and counter threats to both in
the Indo-Pacific and beyond. We support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and
overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity.
We commit to work together and with a range of partners. We reaffirm our strong
support for ASEAN’s unity and centrality as well as the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-
Pacific. Full of potential, the Quad looks forward to the future; it seeks to uphold
peace and prosperity and strengthen democratic resilience, based on universal
values.
3. Our common goals require us to reckon with the most urgent of global challenges.
Today, we pledge to respond to the economic and health impacts of COVID-19,
combat climate change, and address shared challenges, including in cyber space,
critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure investment, and
humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief as well as maritime domains.

4. Building on the progress our countries have achieved on health security, we will join
forces to expand safe, affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable
access, to speed economic recovery and benefit global health. With steadfast
commitment to the health and safety of our own people, we also recognize that none
of us can be safe as long as the pandemic continues to spread. We will, therefore,
collaborate to strengthen equitable vaccine access for the Indo-Pacific, with close
coordination with multilateral organizations including the World Health Organization
and COVAX. We call for transparent and results-oriented reform at the World Health
Organization. We are united in recognizing that climate change is a global priority
and will work to strengthen the climate actions of all nations, including to keep a
Paris-aligned temperature limit within reach. We look forward to a successful COP 26
in Glasgow. We will begin cooperation on the critical technologies of the future to
ensure that innovation is consistent with a free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-
Pacific. We will continue to prioritize the role of international law in the maritime
domain, particularly as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), and facilitate collaboration, including in maritime security, to meet
challenges to the rules-based maritime order in the East and South China Seas. We
reaffirm our commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea in
accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, and also confirm the
necessity of immediate resolution of the issue of Japanese abductees. As long-standing
supporters of Myanmar and its people, we emphasize the urgent need to restore
democracy and the priority of strengthening democratic resilience.

5. To advance these goals and others, we will redouble our commitment to Quad
engagement. We will combine our nations’ medical, scientific, financing,
manufacturing and delivery, and development capabilities and establish a vaccine
expert working group to implement our path-breaking commitment to safe and
effective vaccine distribution; we will launch a critical- and emerging-technology
working group to facilitate cooperation on international standards and innovative
technologies of the future; and we will establish a climate working group to strengthen
climate actions globally on mitigation, adaptation, resilience, technology, capacity-
building, and climate finance. Our experts and senior officials will continue to meet
regularly; our Foreign Ministers will converse often and meet at least once a year. At
the leader level, we will hold an in-person summit by the end of 2021. The ambition of
these engagements is fit to the moment; we are committed to leveraging our
partnership to help the world’s most dynamic region respond to historic crisis, so
that it may be the free, open, accessible, diverse, and thriving Indo-Pacific we all
seek.
Emerging Scenarios in Indo-Pacific

1st October 2019 – 70th anniversary of People’s Republic of China. China displayed the
military preparedness . Significance  “Militarism is in the air ”

China has built extensive infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region from Djibouti to
Kyaukpyu in Myanmar. Its Maritime Silk Road is as much strategic as economic. Its
economic might is its potent weapon too.

In order to tackle a belligerent China, other countries are also actively upping their
strategic activity in the region. The US has bases from Hawaii to Guam to Okinawa to
Diego Garcia to Djibouti. Japan has a base in Djibouti and is increasingly seen
patrolling in various Indo-Pacific sites. Australia has its outposts at Cocos and
Christmas islands. It undertakes surveillance operations from Butterworth base in
Malaysia and is also operationalising its facility in Manus island of Papua New Guinea.
France has its bases in Reunion and New Caledonia. Britain has Diego Garcia. India too
is building ports in Chabahar, Chittagong, Colombo and Sittwe. It has an agreement
with Japan for access to its facility in Djibouti. India is also building a military base at
the North Agalega island in Mauritius.

India has its own Arihants. The US and others have their own too. Nuclear
Armageddon is not an impossible reality. Avoiding it requires keeping the levels of
engagement below confrontation. The two big powers in the region — India and China
— have thus far avoided any military alliances. It is important to keep the competition
non-militaristic. As suggested by the Australian scholar Rory Medcalf, “development,
deterrence and diplomacy” should be the way forward for Quad.

Analysis
During the First QUAD Summit, the four nations reaffirmed their commitment towards
a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region based on shared values and
principles and respect for international law

XI Jinping’s Miscalculation

Xi Jinping’s miscalculation by orchestrating the

timings of the Covid-19 Pandemic with a
simultaneous belligerent assertiveness all across
the South China Sea and the Indian Himalayas has
resulted in the firming in of a Quadrilateral security Dialogue Forum. There are already
talks within the alliance of making QUAD as the central pillar of an Indo-Pacific
security architecture which will also have ramifications on global security. There are
also talks of expanding the geographic definition of the ‘Indo-Pacific Region’ (IOR) to
include the Western ‘IOR’ comprising the African continent.
The success or failure of Quad will entirely depend on the Chinese counter moves
through economic leveraging and consequently the American checkmate to keep this
nascent and fledgling structure together bound and motivated. Nevertheless, the
primary glue will always be, self defence against communist China, flexing its muscles
and challenging the sovereignty of free independent nations. India happens to be at
the forefront of these Chinese incursions and has been facing a massive build-up of the
PLA in Tibet.

It can be deducted that the military balance in the Indo-Pacific is becoming

unfavourable to all the other users except China. The greatest danger is the erosion of
conventional deterrence to assure a rules-based international order for a free and
open Indo-Pacific.

Some argue that the Quad cannot stay together, because the histories and agendas of
the four partners are too different. However, this is a view of the past. The Quad
cannot be viewed narrowly because in essence it carries a geopolitical agenda for the
larger good of the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In an encouraging sign, the Quad has
already engaged with South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand (the ‘Quad-plus’) on
collective responses to the pandemic.

Road Ahead for QUAD

1. Five Eyes Alliance (FVEY).This is an intelligence-sharing partnership between
the US, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. At this stage, the
inclusion of three more countries viz. India, Japan and South Korea is
recommended so as to counter China’s growing capabilities in military and
cyber technologies.
2. Sale of Indian Military hardware like Brahmos missiles and other such
equipment to QUAD members and SE Asian countries should be encouraged as
part of a politico-military strategy.
3. Many aspects like India’s technological competence to collaborate intrinsically
within QUAD etc. are likely to evolve in the next couple of years. This affiliation
should also enable India to access niche and classified technologies.
4. Indian naval activities in the western Pacific waters and more visits in the SCS
should be enhanced as per the vision of QUAD. Similarly; the other QUAD
members should also visit the IOR as part of a patrolling activity.
5. The Quad will need to be involved in developing a cyber-security strategy that
recognises the varied nature of evolving threats and the importance of
ensuring the security and resilience of alliance members’ networks. Australia’s
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is seeking to secure the technological
future by fostering the ‘Quad Tech Network’.
6. The British government has also floated the idea of a ‘Democracy 10’ (including
the Quad countries) to tackle issues, such as the development of standards for
5G and emerging technologies, that affect the collective interests of the
democratic nations.
 A key to the Quad’s future is to embrace multilateralism and have a nuanced
approach that builds on strategic alliances and partnerships globally. This is a
strategic advantage that autocratic states cannot match. However, as democracies
rally, China will exert its financial clout and military pressure to subdue a state.
Therefore it will be a very dynamic and uncertain evolution of such a coalition at the
global level. For India again it would be a win-win grouping as India would maintain
its autonomy while share its security burden.
. Thus QUAD based jointness would knit a strong deterrence.

Moreover, the Indo-Pacific is being redefined, ironically, by China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), debt-trap diplomacy, fictional territorial claims and a divide-and-rule
strategy. Beijing views the “Indo-Pacific” as a direct threat to the BRI, and in classical
wei qi calculus, as an “encirclement” strategy.

Thus in totality the QUAD initiative can be defined as a Game Changer geopolitical and
geostrategic grouping which can compel China to respect sovereignty of other nations.
Therefore, the joint statement as issued after the first QUAD summit speaks all. It says
“that we will begin cooperation on the critical technologies of the future to ensure that
innovation is consistent with a free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific. We will
continue to prioritize the role of international law in the maritime domain, particularly
as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and
facilitate collaboration, including in maritime security, to meet challenges to the rules-
based maritime order in the East and South China Seas”.

India-USA Defence Partnership

A brief background

1991 – proposals suggested establishing contacts between the three

Services to promote exchanges and explore areas of cooperation.

1995 - An Agreed Minute on Defence Cooperation was concluded instituting a dialogue at

the Defence Secretary level together with the setting up of a Technology Group.

2005 - A 10-year Framework for Defence Relationship established through signing of ‘New
Framework for India-U.S. Defense Relations’. The Defence Framework Agreement was
updated and renewed for another 10 years in June 2015.
2012 - India-US: Defence Trade and Technology Initiative

The Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) was formed in 2012 between the US
and India, to enhance the bilateral relations in defence by venturing into the field of
advanced defence research and development and manufacturing. The aim was to strengthen
the US and India’s defence industrial base by moving away from the traditional “buyer-
seller” dynamic toward a more collaborative approach.
The enabling agreements which have been signed between the two countries are GSOMIA,
LEMOA, COMCASA and BECA. These agreements enhance cooperation and interoperability
between the armed forces of the two democracies. Signing of GSOMIA and up-gradation of
India to the STA-1 status for trade by the US provides a framework for exchange and
protection of classified military information between the U.S industry and the public and
private Indian defence companies. Enhanced bilateral exercises, which over the years have
increased in scope and complexity have enabled a better understanding of each other’s
capabilities and limitations. All these steps provide greater avenues to identify and execute
meaningful projects under DTTI.
A Standard Operating Procedure (SoP) to harmonize the processes for identification,
development, and execution of projects under the DTTI has been formulated and was
ratified .
The inclusion of Indian private industries and fostering the power of innovators has been a
major step in the right direction.
The projects under DTTI will be identified as the near, medium and long term projects. The
near-term projects included so far are Air-launched Small Unmanned Systems, Light Weight
Small Arms Technology and Intelligence-Surveillance-Targetting& Reconnaissance (ISTAR).
The medium-term projects identified are Maritime Domain Awareness Solution and Virtual
Augmented Mixed Reality for Aircraft Maintenance or VAMRAM. The two long term projects
are Terrain Shaping Obstacle and Counter-UAS, Rocket, Artillery & Mortar (CURAM) system
for the Indian Army.
2013 – A Joint Declaration on Defence Cooperation in 2013 , renewed in 2015 . India
participated in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in July-August 2016

2016 - During the visit of Prime Minister Modi visit to the U.S. , the U.S. recognised India as a
"Major Defence Partner", which commits the U.S. to facilitate technology sharing with India
to a level commensurate with that of its closest allies and partners, and industry
collaboration for defence co-production and co-development.This was formalised in the
National Defense Authorisation Act (2017) authorising the Secretaries of State and Defence
to take necessary measures.

USA has helped India in joining the export control regimes (Australia Group, Missile
Technology Control Regime and Wassenaar Arrangement) and has practices consistent
with the Nuclear Suppliers Group where its membership was blocked by China .
In 2018, India was placed in Category I of the Strategic Trade Authorisation, easing exports
of sensitive technologies. This authorisation is the equivalent of NATO allying with Japan,
South Korea and Australia.

The bilateral defence trade increased from less than US$1 billion in 2008 to US$18 billion in
2019
US Secretary of Defence James Austin described partnership as
the central pillar of American policy in Indo-Pacific .

What are foundational agreements?

These agreements govern the nature and scope of U.S. defence partnerships.
The competitive advantage of the U.S. military is maintained primarily by the advanced
technologies that the country develops continuously. The U.S. sells military equipment to
other countries with strict control over their deployment and use.
BECA is the fourth and the last of the foundational agreements that both countries have
concluded, starting with
1. GSOMIA (General Security of Military Information Agreement) in 2002,
2. LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement) in 2016,
3. COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement) in 2018

General Security of Military Information Agreement or GSOMIA – It allow military

technology cooperation for the sharing of classified information between governments
and companies in both countries. However, it did not cover many sensitive technologies
that the COMCASA paved the way for.

Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA)

LEMOA allows the militaries of the US and India to replenish from each other’s bases, and
access supplies, spare parts and services from each other’s land facilities, air bases, and
ports, which can then be reimbursed.
LEMOA is extremely useful for India-US Navy-to-Navy cooperation, since the two
countries are cooperating closely in the Indo-Pacific.

Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA)

The pact allows the US to provide India with its encrypted communications equipment
and systems so that Indian and US military commanders, and the aircraft and ships of the
two countries, can communicate through secure networks during times of both peace and
war.

Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA)?

BECA will help India get real-time access to American geospatial intelligence that will
enhance the accuracy of automated systems and weapons like missiles and armed
drones. Through the sharing of information on maps and satellite images, it will help India
access topographical and aeronautical data, and advanced products that will aid in
navigation and targeting.
Extremely useful for Air Force to Air Force cooperation.
The Indian defence establishment has already used at least five American platforms at the
LAC—

1. C-17 Globemaster III for military transport,

2. Boeing’s Chinook CH-47 as heavy-lift helicopters,

3. Boeing’s Apache as tank-killers,

4. P-8I Poseidon for overland reconnaissance, and

5. Lockheed Martin’s C-130J for airlifting troops.

Trade and investment

U.S.-India Trade Facts

U.S. goods and services trade with India totalled an estimated $146.1 billion in 2019.
Import from USA were $58.6 billion; export to USA were $87.4 billion. The India’s goods and
services trade surplus was $28.8 billion in 2019.

 India is currently USA’s 9th largest goods trading partner with $92.0 billion in total
(two way) goods trade during 2019. Goods imports from USA totalled $34.3 billion;
goods exports from India totalled $57.7 billion. The India’s goods trade surplus was
$23.4 billion in 2019.

 Trade in services with USA totalled an estimated $54.1 billion in 2019. Services
import from USA were $24.3 billion; services export to USA were $29.7 billion. The
India services trade surplus with USA was $5.4 billion in 2019.

Bilateral trade with India is about 3% of U.S. world trade. It is more consequential for
India; in 2019, the United States was India’s largest goods export market (17% share),
and third-largest goods import supplier (7%), after China (14%) and the European
Union (9%).

Investment
U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in India (stock) was $45.9 billion in 2019.

India's FDI in the United States (stock) was $5.0 billion in 2019.
U.S.-India foreign direct investment (FDI) is limited, but growing. Defense sales also are
significant in bilateral trade. Civilian nuclear commerce, stalled for years over differences on
liability protections, has produced major potential U.S. supply contracts, dating to the
second Obama Administration.

Market access and other barriers to trade with India have been long-standing concerns.
Efforts under the Trump Administration to reach a limited bilateral trade deal to address
certain frictions did not conclude. President-Elect Joe Biden has expressed interest in
cooperating with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on global challenges, but it is
uncertain what priority the new Administration will place on bilateral trade issues.

Issues

Tariffs – India has relatively high average tariff rates, especially in agriculture. It can raise its
applied rates to bound rates without violating its commitments under the WTO, causing
uncertainty for U.S. exporters. India opposes the 25% steel and 10% aluminum national-
security-based “Section 232” tariffs that the Trump Administration imposed in 2018. After
India lost its eligibility for a U.S. trade preference program , India imposed higher tariffs of
10% to 25% .The two sides are challenging each other’s tariffs in the WTO.

U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Donald Trump removed India from
GSP, a U.S. trade and development program, for failure to provide “equitable and
reasonable” market access. GSP provides nonreciprocal, duty-free tariff treatment to certain
products imported from qualifying developing countries.
In 2018, India was the largest beneficiary of GSP; over one-tenth ($6.3 billion) of U.S. goods
imports from India entered duty-free under the program .

Services. The United States and India are competitive in certain services industries. Barriers
to U.S. firms’ market access include India’s limits on foreign ownership and local presence
requirements. A key issue for India is U.S. temporary visa policies, which affect Indian
nationals working in the United States. Additionally, India continues to seek a “totalization
agreement” to coordinate social security protection for workers who split their careers
between the two countries.

Agriculture. Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) barriers in USA limit India. Each side also sees
the other’s agricultural support programs as market-distorting.

Intellectual Property (IP). The two sides differ on how to balance IP protection to incentivize
innovation and support other policy goals, such as access to medicines, including for COVID-
19 treatments and vaccines. India remained on the Priority Watch List of the U.S. 2020
Special 301 report, which cited India’s insufficient progress in addressing IP challenges and
noted concerns over India’s treatment of patents, high IP theft rates, and lax trade secret
protection.
Issue of Localization. The United States continues to press India to address its localization
practices, such as in-country data storage, domestic content, and domestic testing
requirements—viewed by the United States as presenting barriers to trade with India.

Investment. India aims to attract foreign investment and has made FDI reforms, such as
raising foreign equity caps for insurance and defense, and other strides to improve its
business environment. From the U.S. view, India’s weak regulatory transparency and other
issues, such as IPR and localization policies, add to concerns about FDI barriers.

Defense Trade. The two nations have signed defense contracts worth more than $20 billion
since 2008, up from $500 million in all previous years combined. Major
anticipated deals include an Integrated Air Defense Weapon System and 30 MQ-9B
SkyGuardian drones. India is eager for more technology-sharing and co-production
initiatives, while the United States urges more reforms in India’s defense offsets policy and
higher FDI caps in its defense sector. India’s multibillion-dollar deal to purchase
the Russian-made S-400 air defense system may trigger U.S. sanctions on India under the
Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act

Regional Integration. Both India and the United States are absent from the Indo-Pacific
region’s two major trade pacts Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and
proposed Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017.

WTO. The United States and India often have opposing stances in the WTO, whose future
direction is unclear amid debate over institutional reforms and negotiations. With
India’s growing integration in the global economy, some policymakers have called on India,
like China, to be a more responsible stakeholder in the rules-based global trading
system. They blame India for impeding WTO progress on issues such as e-commerce customs
duties and fisheries

subsidies. India previously blocked the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which ultimately
entered into force in 2017, until a compromise was reached on treatment of certain food
security programs. The United States and some developed countries also are critical of India,
China, and others for self-designating as developing countries to claim special and
differential treatment under WTO rules.

At Tokyo, in October,2020,India was invited for the first time to attend the Five Eyes (a
signals intelligence grouping set up in 1941 consisting of Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
the United Kingdom and the U.S.) meeting.

What is the Blue Dot Network?

The Blue Dot Network (BDN) is a multi-stakeholder initiative formed by the United States,
Japan, and Australia to provide assessment and certification of infrastructure
development projects worldwide on measures of financial transparency, environmental
 sustainability, and impact on economic development, with the goal of mobilizing private
capital to invest abroad.
It was formally announced on 4 November 2019 at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum in
Bangkok, Thailand on the side lines of the 35th ASEAN Summit. It is led by the U.S.
International Development Finance Corporation, Japan Bank for International
Cooperation, and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia.

The Blue Dot Network is expected to serve as a global evaluation and certification system
for roads, ports and bridges with a focus on the Indo-Pacific region. It has been considered
as a counter-initiative to China's Belt and Road Initiative.
As part of this initiative, infrastructure projects will be vetted and approved by the
network depending on standards, as per which, the projects should meet certain global
infrastructure principles.The projects that are approved will get a “Blue Dot”, thereby
setting universal standards of excellence, which will attract private capital to projects in
developing and emerging economies.
It seems to be planned as a direct counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
However, unlike the BRI, the BDN would not offer public funds or loans for the project.
BDN will serve as a globally recognized seal of approval for major infrastructure projects,
letting people know that projects are sustainable and not exploitative.The new Blue Dot
Network, therefore, is best seen as part of the U.S.A.'s strategy of trying to persuade
developing countries in Asia-Pacific not rely on Chinese funds for infrastructure.
Probal Dasgupta, a strategic expert writes that while Blue Dot may be seen as a counter to
BRI, it will need a lot of work for two reasons. First, there is a fundamental difference
between BRI and Blue Dot — while the former involves direct financing, giving countries
in need immediate short-term relief, the latter is not a direct financing initiative and
therefore may not be what some developing countries need. The question is if Blue Dot
is offering first-world solutions to third-world countries”

Secondly, Blue Dot will require coordination among multiple stakeholders when it
comes to grading projects.

Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018

Signed on 31st December 2018, the act calls for America’s increased engagement in the
Indo-Pacific region and strengthened support, including arms sales, for U.S. allies in the
region.

ARIA states, “Without strong leadership from the United States, the international system,
fundamentally rooted in the rule of law, may wither.... It is imperative that the United
States continue to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific.”

Main Components of ARIA

The act focusses on—

 Promoting United States Security Interests in the Indo-Pacific Region
  Promoting United States Economic Interests in the Indo-Pacific Region
 Promoting United States Values in the Indo-Pacific Region.

Key highlights of the Act:

o Security Interests:
 Authorizes US$ 1.5 billion annually for 5 years to enhance U.S. presence in the Indo-
Pacific
 Reaffirms U.S. security commitments to its allies in the Indo-Pacific, including
Japan, South Korea, and Australia and nations in Southeast Asia.
 A policy goal to peacefully denuclearize North Korea though the campaign of
maximum pressure and engagement.
 Enhances the U.S. diplomatic, economic, and security relationship with India.
 Enforces U.S. freedom of navigation and overflight rights in the Indo-Pacific.
 Regular arms sales and enhanced economic, political, and security relationship
between Taiwan and the United States.
 cybersecurity cooperation.
 Pursue effective arms control and nuclear nonproliferation policies in the Indo-
Pacific region.
o Economic Engagement:
 Economic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region as essential for the growth of the
U.S. economy and success of American businesses.
 Promoting bilateral and multilateral trade in the Indo-Pacific region.
 Promote U.S. exports and additional trade facilitation efforts.
 Penalties for violators of United States' intellectual property.
 Promote energy exports.

o Promoting Values:
 US$ 150 million annually for 5 years for democracy, rule of law, and civil society
support, including $10 million annually for freedom of information efforts in North
Korea.
 Efforts against trafficking-in-persons and human slavery; and sanctions against
human rights abusers.

The act recognizes the hierarchies putting first allies like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines,
Thailand, Australia and New Zealand. At Second pedestal are strategic partners like India
and Security partners like Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam.

Building on the Taiwan Relations Act, the ARIA calls for the U.S. president to support the
transfer of “defense articles” to Taiwan and promote high-level official visits, which were
also encouraged by the Taiwan Travel Act.

Fund Allocation
ARIA directs that only Congress can appropriate funding which means that the President
shall not have any power to do so otherwise.
Significance of ARIA
The Trump administration’s key strategic policy documents—the National Security Strategy
(NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS)—say that allies are invaluable, and the
United States is looking to work more closely with them in the Indo-Pacific region.

ARIA is significant for the United States as it pledges to “develop and commit to a long-term
strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for
the Indo-Pacific.” It outlines the key objectives of that vision. It specifically references the
alliance, recommitting to it and calling for the strengthening of ties between the United
States and Australia.

It is a welcome change for U.S. partners and allies in the region, many of whom have
watched with disappointment as Congress has cut funding for the Asia Maritime Security
Initiative – an older capacity-building initiative – by about half to U.S.$48.2 million.

Response on ARIA

Taiwan: It welcomed ARIA, saying it “underscores U.S. support for and friendship toward
Taiwan, on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act.”

China:
Focusing on ARIA’s Taiwan-related provisions, China: “grossly interferes in China’s internal
affairs.” It Called upon the US to “properly handle the Taiwan issue” – and not violating the
One-China policy and interferes in its internal affairs.

Australia welcomed the Act.

ARIA and India

The Act notes India as a Major Defense Partner, a “unique” status for India, which would
ease defense trade and sharing of technology, including “license-free access to a wide range
of dual-use technologies” as well as promote greater coordination on security policies and
strategies and increased military-to-military engagements.

The ARIA and ASEAN

The US-ASEAN strategic partnership is one of the highlights of the law. The so-called quasi
alliance comprises of the US and six of the ten ASEAN states, including Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Other ASEAN member states are covered
by the associated Lower Mekong Initiative which includes Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and
Vietnam.
o Defense and Security
 Joint maritime exercises in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.
 Calls for Rules-based international system
 Reaffirms its commitment to treaty alliances with the Philippines and
Thailand as per the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Agreement Respecting
Military Assistance respectively.

o Strategic and Economic Partnership

 ASEAN’s economy has grown by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015.
 The value of US-ASEAN total bilateral trade increased by 78 percent since
2004.
 ARIA stresses on the continuation of the US-ASEAN Economic Partnership
 A comprehensive, integrated and multilayer Indo-Pacific energy strategy
 Lower Mekong Initiative
 Established in 2009
 A multinational effort initiated by the US and non-security
alliance states such as Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam.
Myanmar joined LMI in July 2012.

 ARIA mandates a report on the regional engagement through the LMI along
with a report on terrorism in Southeast Asia.
 India – West Asia Relations

Overall analysis of India’s policy

West Asia is most sensitive region of International politics. According to the former vice
president Hamid Ansari (TRAVELLING THROUGH THE CONFLICT) , strategic importance of
West Asia lies in its geography, in its essential resources. He also points that West Asia
suffers from the curse of centrality.
Importance for India
C Rajamohan explains India’s foreign policy strategy in form of 3 concentric circles/Mandals
1. Immediate neighbourhood.
2. Extended neighbourhood
3. The outside world
West Asia is in the second concentric circle.
West Asia is not just a gas station for India, it has huge strategic importance (Rakesh Sood)
Views of Alfred T Mahan.
He advised British India to focus on West Asia to maintain the hegemony
of British empire. India’s security is linked to peace and stability in West
Asia.

What has been India’s policy in West Asia?

One of the earliest decisions on foreign policy matters taken by independent India was
related to West Asia on the creation of Israel. Indian leaders opposed the creation because
of Pakistan factor. India was against making religion , the basis of statehood. India took pro-
Palestinian approach. It is generally believed that there is a domestic determinant of India’s
stand on palestinian issue i.e. The sentiments of Muslim minorities in India.

Views of Ishrat Aziz

The foreign policy of any country including India is based on national interest. It was purely
secular consideration. India knew that creation of Israel will destabilize the entire middle
east. Instability will create security threat for India. It is a wrong assumption that the
sentiments of Muslims shaped India’s west Asia policy. It is to be noted that unlike USA
where there are different lobbies, there is no Muslim lobby in India, directing India’s foreign
policy. India’s foreign policy so far has been conducted in the framework of non-alignment.
West Asia is the best place where India could successfully pursue non-alignment. India could
maintain good relations with Iran, Israel as well as Gulf countries. This shows that even for
West Asian countries, religion is not a consideration.

At present, Gulf countries are strengthening their relations with India even at the cost of
Pakistan.They are looking at India as an opportunity. e.g. Saudi Arabia wants to diversify its
economy rather than just relying on oil exports. Gulf countries are looking at India as a net
security provider. India is also a source of cheap labour. India has huge cultural capital,
diaspora in the region. 30% of UAE population is Indian. (3.5 million).
Former Ambassador Ranjit Gupta described India’s policy as ‘non interventionist, non
judgemental, non prescriptive and non alignment’. India has stayed away from taking sides
in Local conflicts.
What should be India’s policy in West Asia?
West Asia is a highly challenging area because of numerous fault lines. It is not easy to
navigate through ‘the choppy waters’ of the politics in West Asia. So far India has done well.
India could protect its interests, even none of the non state actors in West Asia have directly
targeted India.

There are two schools of thought in India when it comes to policy on West Asia
1. Continue the traditional policy. Maintain low profile.
Prof. Girijesh Pant – West Asia is not a place for display of India’s power. It is a place
for augmentation of India’s power.
Former Ambassador Ranjit Gupta – Our policy should be based on the mature
recognition of the limits of our capabilities. India’s passivity is fine in unpredictable
and volatile environment. If speech is silver, silence is golden.
2. India should play more proactive role.
MEA S Jaishankar : India’s foreign policy should
change in accordance to its changed status. India
should be a leading power and not just a balancing
power. India’s ‘think west’ shall match India’s ‘act
east’. According to him, up till now our foreign
policy towards West Asia was free from ‘strategic
calculations’ driven by market than by strategic interest. However now we are
consolidating the partnership.

C Rajamohan – After many false starts, India is emerging as the swing state. India
has potential to shape the outcomes on many critical issues.
Chinmaya Gharekhan – India should leave the passive approach and should raise its
‘diplomatic profile’.

India adopted the “Look West policy” in 2005. While announcing the new policy, Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh said that “the Gulf region, like South-East and South Asia, is
part of our natural economic hinterland. We must pursue closer economic relations with
all our neighbours in our wider Asian neighbourhood. India has successfully pursued a
‘Look East’ policy to come closer to the countries of South-East Asia. We must come
closer to our western neighbours in the Gulf.”

S Jaishankar as the foreign Secretary in 2016 held that , while Act East Policy is under
consolidation , it is also perhaps time to think West . In the coming days , it may be
expected that Gulf will be the focus of India’s foreign policy .(Speech at Net Growth Annual
Summit)

Nicolas Blarel – ‘RECALIBRATING INDIA’S MIDDLE EAST POLICY’

India is a linked to the region through culture, commerce and colonialism. India needs
multiple engagements. Under Modi govt. India is able to overcome its attitude of looking at
West Asia through the prism of Pakistan.
Achievement in ‘look west’

Though there is a impression that Look East is the most successful initiative but actually from
the very beginning, Look West has been successful. Still India’s trade with South East Asia is
much less than the bilateral trade India has with Gulf Countries ($ 200 bn).

Gulf countries – up till now India has neglected Saudi Arabia, UAE but we have entered into
the strategic partnership. Even India does have good relations with Qatar.
Iran – PM tried to consolidate relations with Iran also. However India Iran relations have
never reached to its optimal potential. The reason is Iran’s aspiration to become the leader
in the Muslim world compels Iran to take pro-Pakistan approach in Kashmir. Iran is also
fearful of Saudi Arabia loosing Pakistan to create instability. India’s compulsions to have
closer relations with USA make it difficult for India to maintain equity in the relations.
According to Iranian diplomat’s New Delhi’s Qiblah is Washington. According to PM Modi,
there is a huge potential. Once we make up our mind, distance is just half a step.
Israel – India always had close relations with Israel. However the relationship has not been
open. Nehru’s policy towards Israel was ‘recognition without relations’. Nehru took
extremely pro-palestinian stand. It used to be said that Nehru tried to look more Arab than
the Arabs themselves. Much before India, Egypt, Jordan recognized Israel. Israel has always
provided critical help in India’s war against Pakistan. Israel’s help was critical in Kargil war. It
was during the time of Narsimha Rao in 1992 that we established full diplomatic relations.
Now across the party consensus is to maintain close relations with Israel.

The basic difference in Congress and BJP’s approach is, Congress’s approach was to keep the
relations in closet , while BJP’s approach is to bring the relationship in lime light .
According to C Rajamohan, Modi’s approach is transparent and more confident.
Turkey – India never had good relations with Turkey. Turkey showered all of her love for
Pakistan because of Turkey’s aspiration to be a leader in Muslim world.
 India-Iran Relations

Iran, one of the richest countries in hydrocarbon and India. Nevertheless, Iran’s strategic
significance to India is crucial, compelling India to remain tied to Iran in face of
insurmountable difficulties. Under the current scenario, had relations been solely based on
energy it would have been easy for india to drift away. However, Iran’s geographical position
is paramount to India’s geopolitical outreach, especially to Central Asia, a rich reservoir of
natural resources. Similarly, Iran is vital for India’s access to Afghanistan in which India has
immense strategic and security interests.
The benefits of India-Iran ties are mutual. An important element in the India-Iran
relationship is India’s status as a huge market for Iranian products. India’s choice of Iran as a
gateway to Central Asia and Afghanistan also has positive repercussions on Iran’s
aspirations of becoming a regional hub for trade and transit. Finally, under the backdrop of
Iran’s nuclear controversy and US efforts to isolate Iran, the continued relationship of the
Islamic Republic of Iran with the world’s largest democracy has immense ideational value.
Such an understanding of reciprocally advantageous consequences motivated India and Iran
to formally sign two consecutive comprehensive joint documents reflecting their vision of
strategic partnership. The first is the ‘Tehran Declaration’ signed in April 2001, and the
second is the ‘New Delhi Declaration’ signed in January 2003. While these documents serve
as a template for greater regional and global cooperation, they also highlight the realisation
of the scope of such a partnership. Notwithstanding these efforts, the cloud of the Iranian
nuclear controversy and India’s need for closeness to the United States had implications on
India-Iran relations. Still, the issues surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme, its regional
role, and resultant antagonism with other countries have its share of pressure on the
potentially deep and broad bilateral ties between India and Iran. Since the onset of this
controversy, India has indulged in a balancing act between its relationship with Iran, on one
hand, and with the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, on the other. The US effort to impose
“maximum pressure” on Iran to ensure its seclusion has its toll on the India-Iran relationship.
Amongst the visible effects of the Iran-US enmity is Iran’s increased ties with China, an
adversary of India. 25-years of strategic partnership between Iran and China is likely to have
further implications on the dynamics of the India-Iran relationship.
The Current Scenario
In order to understand the current depth and anticipate
the future course of India-Iran relations, three core issues
could be underlined, which serve as a pointer to this
trajectory.
The first is Iran’s Farzad-B Gas Field in which an Indian
state-owned company, ONGC, was involved at the
discovery stage. After the detection of gas, a protracted negotiation between the two sides
failed to result in India obtaining the rights to its development, translating into Iran deciding
to independently develop this field.
The second prominent issue that has become a marker of the evolving India-Iran relationship
is the proposed railway line connecting Chabahar to Zahedan, the capital of Iran’s Sistan and
Baluchestan Province. This project was conceived to link the Chabahar Port to Afghanistan,
which is of sizeable strategic interest to India. Recently, the media reported that Iran had
withdrawn its proposal from India. However, India has denied this, officially maintaining that
the two countries are currently in talks to fructify this venture.
The third important issue is the Chabahar Port project. In this
realm, India has achieved considerable success, specifically in
terms of starting the operation of this project after the initial
investment for its development. India’s initial commitment
was in 2003, and the port was finally operationalized in 2016.
Despite the impediments created by US sanctions, the two
countries made significant progress on this front and since
2018, an Indian company has been operating the port.. The
two countries are further exploring ways to boost traffic
towards making the port more economically viable and
increasing its usage for Afghanistan as well as Central Asia.
Notably, in the Indian strategic discourses, Chabahar has often
been portrayed as a strategic gain for India, especially given China’s participation in the
development of Pakistan’s Gwadar Port. However, Iran has avoided linking any strategy
dimension to the Chabahar Port and has articulated its willingness to open the door of its
further development to other countries, including China. The future developments in the
arena of the Chabahar Port and the depth of India’s participation, as well as China’s
presence or absence, will have ramifications on the evolving strategic partnership between
India and Iran.

Analysis
A comprehensive review of the depth, nature, and trajectory of India-Iran relations is also
indicative of the nature of India’s broader approach to the Middle East. The recent
developments where a war-weary United States is increasingly perceived as returning to its
traditional role of an offshore balancer in the Middle East has created avenues for other
powers such as Russia, China, Turkey, and India to make inroads in the region.

India has joined the club of Russian S400 missile defence system, which China, Turkey, and
Iran also belong, reflecting a unique commonality between these five countries. The fact that
the transfer of Russia’s S400 missile defence system is antithetical to US strategic interest,
India’s enlistment in this club may provide some hint to India’s eventual leaning in the
balance of power between the two camps respectively led by the US and Russia in the Middle
East, a region where Iran is a key actor. This, however, is a long-term scenario.
In the foreseeable future, India’s strategic and economic standing is likely to provide it a
limited role in the Middle East; directly impacting its ties with Iran. As India’s strength grows
and it is more capable of projecting power away from its borders, its foreign policy might
witness according changes. Still, India’s offshore manoeuvrability might be constricted by its
position as a state sandwiched by two antagonistic nuclear powers, viz., China and Pakistan,
claiming a large chunk of its strategic resources. Another limitation is that unlike China, India
does not enjoy permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council; an apparent
factor in Iran’s calculations while choosing between India and China.
Despite India’s energy dependence on the Middle East, its economic structure ties it more to
the West. A prodigious portion of India’s GDP constitutes the service sector whose
destination is primarily the West, including the US; a component in India’s risk assessments
in forging ties with Iran. This often causes a mismatch between India’s aspirations and
deliveries, creating a scenario in which its policy towards Iran either looks as ambivalent or
succumbing to US pressure. The truth is that India’s relationship with Iran is as much
predicated on its national interests as its relations with any other country.
Unlike India, China has a rapidly developing manufacturing industry for which it needs raw
material as well as expanding markets and this is a potent aspect in its analysis of
determining the risks of US sanctions while forming ties with Iran. Consequently, the two
countries are establishing a long-term relationship that is likely to prove as a game-changer
in the Middle East and have further negative repercussions on India-Iran relations.

The Abraham Accords, which further consolidates the front against Iran and is potentially
isolating it more, is still another development that may further impede the growth of India-
Iran relations.

For India, Iran proved to be a territory to extend its influence offshore, both economic and
strategic. However, Iran has traditionally tied itself to the Pakistan and is recently drawing
nearer to China in a fashion that may put its relations with India on uncomfortable ground.
Such realisation by India, especially through the painful ways of delayed or failed
negotiations, appears to be instilling a sentiment of fatigue in the Indian attempt of
nurturing closer ties with Iran. These are some indicators that may compel us to believe that
the pace of India-Iran relations may further slow down until a long-term solution to the Iran-
US standoff is found.

India–Iran relations : Timeline

Independent India and Iran established diplomatic relations on 15 March 1950. During much
of the Cold War period, relations between the Republic of India and the erstwhile Imperial
State of Iran suffered due to their different political interests—non-aligned India fostered
strong military links with the Soviet Union, while Iran enjoyed close ties with the United
States.
Following the 1979 revolution, relations between Iran and India strengthened momentarily.
However, Iran's continued support for Pakistan and India's close relations with Iraq during
the Iran–Iraq War impeded further development of Indo–Iranian ties.
In the 1990s, India and Iran supported the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan against the
Taliban regime.. The two countries signed a defence cooperation agreement in December
2002
In 2011, the US$12 billion annual oil trade between India and Iran was halted due to
extensive economic sanctions against Iran.

From the geopolitical perspective, even though the two countries share some common
strategic interests, India and Iran differ significantly on key foreign policy issues.

India has expressed opposition to Iran's nuclear programme and whilst India is against
reconciliation with taliban, Iran favours reconciliation with Taliban, India supports the
presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan unlike Iran.

On 22 May 2016, Prime minister Narendra Modi paid an official visit to Iran. The visit
focused on bilateral connectivity and infrastructure, an energy partnership, and trade.

Just before Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Israel in July 2017, Iran's Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei, urged Muslims in Kashmir to 'repudiate oppressors'.

Issues in India Iran Relations

Iran's Nuclear Interests
India, despite close relations and convergence of interests with Iran, voted against Iran in the
International Atomic Energy Agency in 2005, which took Iran by surprise. Indo-US nuclear
deal was conditional to India supporting the US on the Iran issue.
Infrastructure
A highway between Zaranj and Delaram (Zaranj-Delaram Highway) is being built with
financial support from India. The Chabahar port has also been jointly financed by Iran and
India. India alone plans to invest 20 Billion US dollars towards development of Chabahar
port. India is helping develop the Chabahar Port, which will give it access to the oil and gas
resources in Iran and the Central Asian states. By so doing, India hopes to compete with the
Chinese, who are building Gwadar Port, in Pakistan's Balochistan. Iran plans to use Chabahar
for trans-shipment to Afghanistan and Central Asia, while keeping the port of Bandar Abbas
as a major hub mainly for trade with Russia and Europe. India, Iran and Afghanistan have
signed an agreement to give Indian goods, heading for Central Asia and Afghanistan,
preferential treatment and tariff reductions at Chabahar.
Work on the Chabahar-Milak-Zaranj-Delaram route from Iran to Afghanistan is in progress.
Iran is, with Indian aid, upgrading the Chabahar-Milak road and constructing a bridge on the
route to Zaranj. India's BRO is laying the 213 km Zaranj-Delaram road. It is a part of India's
US$750 million aid package to Afghanistan. The Chabahar port project is Iran's chance to
end its US-sponsored economic isolation and benefit from the resurgent Indian economy.
Along with Bandar Abbas, Chabahar is the Iranian entry point on the north–south corridor.

North-South Transport Corridor

North South Transport Corridor route via India, Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia
The North–South Transport Corridor is the ship, rail, and road route for moving freight
between India, Russia, Iran, Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The route primarily
involves moving freight from India, Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia via ship, rail and road.The
objective of the corridor is to increase trade connectivity between major cities such as
Mumbai, Moscow, Tehran, Baku, Bandar Abbas, Astrakhan, Bandar Anzali, etc.It is expected
that the transport costs will be reduced by "$2,500 per 15 tons of cargo".
Iran China Strategic Partnership

China signed 25-year deal with Iran in challenge to the US

Beijing plans to invest in Iran while buying oil from the Islamic Republic, further straining its
relationship with the US

Iran’s closer integration with China may help shore up its economy against the impact of the
US sanctions, while sending a clear signal to the White House of Tehran’s intentions

China and Iran signed an overarching deal aimed at charting the course of their economic,
political and trade relations over the next 25 years.
Beijing plans to invest in Iran while buying oil from the Islamic Republic, further straining its
relationship with the US which has already been frayed by China’s imports of covertly-
shipped Iranian crude.

The “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" agreement, signed in Tehran in march 2021by

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, has
been in the works since 2016, when President Xi Jinping became the first Chinese leader to
visit the Iranian capital in over a decade.
The latest alliance between Beijing and Tehran is a challenge to US President Joe Biden’s
administration as it sets about trying to rally allies against China, which Secretary of State
Antony Blinken has said is the world’s “greatest geopolitical test."
“The document can elevate bilateral ties to a new strategic level," Foreign Ministry
spokesman of Iran held. The deal focuses on boosting private-sector collaboration and Iran’s
role in Xi’s flagship infrastructure and investment program, the Belt and Road Initiative, he
said.
There is a plan for long-term supply of Iranian crude to China as well as investment in oil,
gas, petrochemical, renewables and nuclear energy infrastructure.
Lured by the prospect of cheaper prices, China has already increased its imports of Iranian oil
to around 1 million barrels a day, eroding US leverage as it prepares to enter stalled talks
with Tehran to revive a nuclear deal.
The Biden administration has indicated that it’s open to reengaging with Iran after then-
President Donald Trump abandoned the accord nearly three years ago and reimposed
economic sanctions, but the two sides have yet to even agree to meet. Iran exported around
2.5 million barrels of oil a day before American penalties resumed.
Iran’s closer integration with China may help shore up its economy against the impact of the
US sanctions, while sending a clear signal to the White House of Tehran’s intentions.
Challenges in the relations :
Iranian experts feel Chabahar, much touted example of New Delhi-Tehran . Geo economic
cooperation, is over hyped and India cooperates with Iran only to balance its equations with
China and Pakistan.
The various shortcomings that are preventing it from achieving its stated objectives and the
overall trajectory of Indo-Iranian partnership.

Post Islamic Revolution, Indo-American relationship has defined Indo-Iran relations

Iran-India relations have always been influenced by international actors. The impact of
regional and trans-regional variables is more serious in Chabahar and it forces Iran and India
to make strategic choices against each other. In recent years, India has moved closer to the
United States and the West and reduced cooperation with Iran and China. India has also
participated in the US super-maximum economic pressure campaign against the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Due to that, it has reduced its commercial relations with Tehran to the
lowest level in recent years.
 India-Israel Relations

Warming Indo-Israeli relations first occurred between an earlier Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee (in office for a full term between 1999 and 2004), and
Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s long-time leader, whose Likud Party was, and remains,
ideologically similar to the BJP. Their “warmth” was reignited when Prime Minister Narendra
Modi was elected in 2014.

While India formally recognised Israel in 1950, bilateral engagement, or “normalisation”

only began formally in 1992. Indian National Congress Party governments, however, did not
have open relations with Israel, believing that visible ties with it would damage India’s
relations with surrounding Islamic states including Palestine, which had India’s “principled
support”, and its own Muslim population. These fears remain unproven.

Zionist Israel, perceiving threats to its security from its Muslim-majority neighbours,
primarily Iran-influenced Hezbollah in Lebanon and now the Palestinian Authority, and Modi,
whose lifelong membership of the right-wing Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sang (RSS), is moving
legislatively towards a Hindu India, share, as said, right-wing values.

India’s relations with Israel have two major policy planks: military-security supply – India has
become the largest market for Israel’s military exports – and a land-based agenda drawing
on Israel’s expertise in fields including agriculture, dairy farming and water management,
boosted by “value-adding” such as training and technology transfers. They also share a fear
of terrorism from Islamic states, Iran in the case of Israel, and for India, from Pakistan, and it
is arguably the greatest area of co-operation between them, involving the exchange of
information on terrorist groups and their activities including recruitment practices, border
security and comparisons of operational experiences.

While the Indo-Israeli relationship, at least under the current leaders, is well cemented,
India’s support for Palestine has shifted. The first line of the Indian Ministry of External
Affairs’ “Updated Note on India-Palestine Relations” states that ‘India’s support for the
Palestinian cause is an integral part of the nation’s foreign policy’, but in his first year in
office (2014) Modi chose to follow a “de-hyphenation” policy in order to deal with both
independently, despite the long-running conflict over delineating the Palestinian state.
Hosting or visiting both leaders as he did in 2017, Modi has again demonstrated his
diplomatic – or fence-sitting – skills.
Timeline of India Israel Relations
1949 – India voted against creation of Israel .
1950 – Official recognition to Israel
1992 – Full diplomatic relations with Embassy in Tel Aviv.
1997 – Ezer Weizman , became first Israeli president to visit India .
2000 – Advani and Jaswant Singh became first minsters to visit Israel and cooperation in anti
terrorism begins .
2017 – Modi becomes the first PM to visit Israel . It was a standalone visit .

2018 – Netanyahu visited India to commemorate 25 years of the relations.

Areas of cooperation
Defence - Israel is becoming Leading supplier . India took UAVs , Falcon AWACs systems,
Barak I surface to air missiles .
Intelligence sharing – Between RAW and Mossad .
Bilateral Trade – 200 million USD in 1992 to 5 billion USD in 2014. Negotiating FTA.

Collaboration in space , Science and technology , agriculture

 India-UAE Relations

The number of Indian nationals residing in the United Arab

Emirates (UAE) has been estimated as over three million,
approximately 27.1% of the country’s population.
While initially engaged in the petroleum industry, Indians are now
spread across the UAE’s economy, in professional services,
manufacturing, transport and construction. The two countries
have agreed to partner to undertake development projects in the region, and India and the
UAE are committed to ‘work together in select countries of sub-Saharan Africa in areas of
priority to them’.
UAE is India’s largest trading partner in the region, the second largest export destination and
fourth largest source of India’s imports. In parallel, India is the UAE’s second largest trading
partner, and a vast source of its imports. The UAE is also India’s “re-export hub” for the
Middle East and North Africa.
Under Modi government , India UAE partnership has become strategic in true sense . UAE is
important for a backchannel diplomacy between India and Pakistan . India UAE have
deepened their defence partnership .
UAE has deported more than 100 fugitives back. As reported in media, UAE has played an
important role in the recent ceasefire agreement .

India and the UAE's bilateral ties have gained momentum amid mutual cooperation in trade,
commerce, culture, heritage healthcare etc; since Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi
came to power in May 2014.
As Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in his speech to the nation on the occasion of
Independence Day on August 15, 2020, India’s neighbours are not the only ones with whom
India shares geographical boundaries, but also those with whom India has close and
harmonious relations. He referred to India’s strong relationship with the countries in West
Asia, particularly the UAE, which further strengthened in the last few years. He personally
thanked the leadership of these countries for their help to the Indian community during the
Covid-19 crisis.”

He added: “Our relationship with the UAE is a multi-faceted one with deep engagements in
trade and investment, tourism, food security, culture, science and technology, defence and
space. Our focus will continue to be on further strengthening our comprehensive strategic
partnership and exploring new areas of cooperation. Food and healthcare have emerged as
important sectors of growth during the pandemic, showing how our strategic ties can adapt
to the changing requirements. Energy will remain an important area of cooperation.
However, we’re not only investing in each other’s energy sector but also working together
for a more sustainable and climate-friendly future. We’re expanding capacities in the field of
renewable energy, particularly in the field of solar energy, including through the
International Solar Alliance. We're committed to working closely with the International
Renewable Energy Agency (Irena) and will also explore possible cooperation in newer areas
like the ‘hydrogen economy’. "

Factors that have contributed to the changing dynamics of the relationship:

1. Diversification of UAE economy: Foreign trade and the oil and gas sectors were the
fulcrum of bilateral relations in the decades preceding the end of the oil era boom. But
since then, the UAE has pursued an aggressive strategy of diversifying its economy, and its
relations with India have benefited as a result.

The focus of bilateral relations have now diversified to include many new sectors after the
official visits of Shaikh Mohammad Bin Zayed and Modi — such as IT, space tech, tourism,
defence manufacturing and renewable energy.

2. Evolving country profile and priorities: The recent upsurge in relations is a reminder
that both the UAE and India have leapfrogged in terms of global reputation and foreign
policy since 1981. India now is not only a growing economic power, but also an
aspirational power. In the 1980s, India was seen as aligned with the Soviet Union — now
we have multidimensional relations with almost all countries. That certainly helps
recalibrate our relations with the UAE. The recent high-level visits of UAE and Indian
leaders also demonstrate the proactive nature of decision-making between the two
countries. The era of passive bilateral relations is over — both nations have demonstrated
that with the same resources as before, there is so much more that can be achieved.

3. Key partners in combating extremism: The UAE and India share a deeply common goal
— fighting terrorism, combating extremism and ideologies of hatred. We cooperate very
closely with Indian authorities in fighting extremists and terrorists — both individuals and
organisations.Both India and the UAE are two moderate nations which have been victims
of terror.

4. Common economic goals: The growing opportunities for jobs in India, along with the
appreciating rupee, booming stock market, structural reforms such as GST, ease of doing
business have all helped prepare a solid foundation for its growth. There are massive
possibilities from the $75-billion fund announced by Modi and Shaikh Mohammad Bin
Zayed.

5. Rigorous follow up to strategic partnership: Another reason for the greater depth in
relations is the rigorous structure of various committees that have been set up following
the high-level visits. Following the elevation of the UAE and India’s relation to a
comprehensive strategic partnership, there are several high-level committees which are
working in parallel to advance the bilateral agenda. A committee on strategic dialogue
committee has been set up which meets twice a year and looks into all matters relating to
bilateral trade. There are also a greater number of highly active fora and advocacy
platforms which have been set up in the past three years, such as the UAE-India Economic
Forum, while the frequency and depth of interaction with existing trade and business
associations have intensified.

6. Greater mobility of people: With a 3.3-million-strong population, the Indian diaspora in

the UAE is the largest in the world, and growing. The UAE has significantly eased visit visa
norms for Indians. The result is greater people-to-people interaction between the two
countries — whether it is Indian tourists seeking a glimpse of the sea, sands and Burj
Khalifa in the UAE, or Emiratis travelling to India for education, investments, medical
treatment or simply on a vacation.
India Saudi Arabia Relations

For long India Saudi relations were affected by Pakistan factor . However, since 90s the
relations have started improving . In 2006, King Abdullah made a special visit which resulted
into Delhi Declaration , the beginning of strategic partnership . It was consolidated in 2010
with Manmohan Singh’s visit which resulted into Riyadh declaration . PM Modi visited Saudi
Arabia in 2016 and was conferred highest civilian award .
Saudi Crown prince Mohammed Bin Salman visited India in 2019.

Saudi Arabia has become the leading supplier of oil , plans to make an investment of 100
Billion USD in next few years.
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 India Africa Relations
Introduction

India and Africa shared a multidimensional relationship since ancient times. The geographical proximity and an easily navigable
Indian Ocean brought the people of the two regions nearer to each other.

Pre-colonial Contacts

India’s pre-colonial ties with Africa have received little attention. Modern history lays testimony to the fact that enterprising
Indian merchants were looking for trade routes across the ocean and they set sail across the Arabian sea to the West in the quest to
find lucrative markets and to explore new frontiers.

The Venetian traveller Marco Polo (1254–1324 AD) had words of praise for the Gujarati and Saurashtrian merchants on Africa’s
east coast whom he considered as the best and most honourable to be found in the world (Polo and Masefield 2009). Vasco de
Gama touched East Africa on his historic voyage to India.

Contacts During Colonial Times

Constant movement of people is one of the most important features of Indo–African relations. This movement of people was not
one-sided. As people from India went to Africa in different capacities, similarly African people also came to India. The slave trade
from the seventeenth century further added to their number.

Indian National Congress (INC) and Africa

The political connections between India and Africa during colonial period were through M.K. Gandhi, Indian National Congress,
Indian diasporas and the presence of the same British colonial rule in many African countries.

Jawaharlal Nehru was the main architect of INC policy towards Africa. He visited Brussels Congress of Oppressed
Nationalities in 1927 where he met leaders from North Africa as well as from Sub-Saharan Africa
India under Nehru, therefore since 1928, linked its own freedom struggle with African struggle against imperialism andcolonialism
and it looked at African decolonization as the continuation of its own struggle.

Indo–African Relations Under Nehru and the Rest of the Cold War Period
As first colonial country to become independent soon after the War, India was historically placed under fully committed
leadership of Nehru to carry forward the movement of liberation and struggle against racial discrimination in Africa. Till African
countries joined the rank of free countries, India strongly took their cause to all international forums such as the UN and
Commonwealth. Nehru put the full weight of independent India behind these unfinished tasks.

Nehru and Indian Diaspora Policy

There are over 3 million People of Indian Origin in Africa. They are spread in Anglophone, Lusophone, Francophone and North
Africa. Indian settlers had joined the independence movement in various African countries. As a result, after the independence of
the African countries, many African leaders were of Indian origin. This helped in maintaining goodwill of India throughout the
continent. The principle of the ‘paramountcy of the natives’ doctrine has been an integral part of India’s foreign policy towards
Africa ever since India became independent in 1947.
Indian residents in Africa had been advised consistently by the Government of India to share the aspirations of their African fellows
and not to ask for special privileges that would identify them as minorities demanding special right over majority. After Indian
independence, Indian settlers in Africa were also looking up to their motherland for help and support. But the foreign policy of
India gave more importance to the ties between India and the African countries; hence the Indians in Africa were told specifically
by Nehru that they were as dear to him as any African, so no special consideration was given to Indian diaspora.

A shuttle change in India’s policy about Indian settlers in Africa came when Mrs. Indira Gandhi visited African countries and
described them as “Ambassadors of India”. It was in contrast from Nehru’s view which sounded outright dissociation of Indian
settlers from India’s policy considerations.

India–Africa in Post-Cold War Period:

India’s Africa policy has gone through some major changes since the end of the Cold War.

India-Africa ties, too, are predominantly bilateral, although recently, a multilateral thrust has been pursued through the
India- Africa Forum Summits. All African countries have a diplomatic representation in India, be it embassies, consulates,
high commissions, or missions, demonstrating a strong political will to collaborate on diplomatic matters. In addition, several
bilateralmeetings take place frequently to reinforce ties and to reaffirm the political will to engage deeper on an increasing
number offronts – diplomatic, strategic and political, but also economically, in areas such as food security and education and
skilling.

Once the Cold War ended and NAM had long lost its purpose, traditional themes that had been benchmarks of Indian diplomacy
with Africa become fruitless. As India opened its economy, economy became the main driver of the relations.
India’s growing presence in Africa is explained by protecting its economic interests and its competition with China.

India has become the second largest export market for many African countries, and one of their most important donors, through
its concessional credit lines. To establish new markets and create new political alliances, India bases its cooperation on fighting
poverty to justify its donors’ activity. It should be noted that at the same time, India is adopting an alliance-based approach with
other regional powers, such as Brazil and South Africa, in order to encourage an inter-regional cooperation and assert the position
of countries of the South on the international stage (IBSA).

In the context of global distributive justice, the Indian government seems to have built its African policy by positioning India as
representative of Gandhian values on the international stage, focusing on “fair cooperation” and “capacity building”
through anexchange of ideas and services that goes beyond the simple trade of consumer goods.

In 1964, India launched its Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme and Special Commonwealth
African Assistance Plan (SCAAP). Under ITEC, India provided assistance under the following major heads—(1) Training
fellowships in India (2) Deputation of Indian experts to undertake specific assignments, (3) project aid and (4) external
assistance by way of techno-economic studies.

Hundreds of African government officials and professionals have been trained in India. Since the liberalisation of the Indian
economy in the 1990s and the decade of high growth that followed, India’s development partnerships have grown in volume and
diversity. In terms of amounts allocated by India for grants loans and training programmes, there has been a four-fold increase
from 2003-4 to 2013-14. Since the early 2000s, India hasbegun to use Lines of Credit or export credits as one of its key
development partnership instruments

In Africa, partnerships are channelled primarily through lines of credit, reflecting India’s economic and commercial interests
on the continent – in particular, access to raw materials and new markets to sustain Indian economic growth. Africa currently
supplies one-fifth of India’s crude oil imports; this figure was zero in 2005. In 2012, mineral products, precious stones,
and metalimports from Africa constituted 86 percent of all Indian commodity imports. India’s investments are
concentrated in resource-rich parts of Africa, including oil investments in fragile states such as Sudan, Nigeria and
Libya.

In the last decade, almost US$ 9 billion in concessional credit was approved for nearly 140 projects in more than 40
African countries, with special emphasis on LDCs and SIDS partners. At the Third India-Africa Forum Summit held in
NewDelhi in October 2015, India made a pledge of concessional credit worth US$10 billion to Africa in the next five years,
a doubling ofits existing commitment, and grant assistance of US$600 million,

Security investments in Africa India’s support in peacekeeping operations in Africa demonstrates its commitment at
bringing peace and development to the continent . India has participated in a number of these peacekeeping operations. It
was involved in the United Nations operations in Mozambique , Somalia , Angola , Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic of
Congo.

India is one of the largest contributors of peacekeepers to UN missions in Africa, with Indian contingents having so far served in 22
UN peacekeeping missions in 16 African countries. Moreover, thousands of African military officers have received
professional training from India. India’s maritime security interests in the Indian Ocean – approximately 80 percent of
India’s energy importstraverse through the Indian Ocean and its different channels – has led to the emergence of defense
agreements and joint naval training programmes with several countries in East Africa and the Indian Ocean island states. This
includes the deployment of Indian naval vessels to patrol territorial waters and support to African coast guards, as well as an
Indian radar surveillance and listening post in East Africa.

Africa’s structural transformation: The untapped potential of India’s development partnerships

China’s and India’s growing global footprint is a major factor in Africa’s structural transformation. The emergence of the two Asian
giants has been shaping the global context in which African countries are restructuring their economies. Moreover, they are active
players on the continent as providers of South-South cooperation. China’s and India’s increasing trade, investment and
development cooperation ties contribute important building blocks for Africa’s structural transformation. China is the main source
of infrastructure finance; India has been promoting capacity for skills development across the continent. Chinese and Indian
investments have gone beyond the traditional focus on energy and resources and are increasingly contributing to the
diversification of African economies and job creation across key sectors, including agriculture, light manufacturing and tradeable
services

Given Africa’s unusual pattern of structural transformation, India could be a more natural partner as far as the search
for new development models is concerned. The India-Africa partnership provides fertile ground enhanced knowledge-
sharing framework.

Role Played By Public and Private Sector Companies in Africa

According to the World Investment Report, India is currently the eighth-largest investor in Africa. Some large Indian
businesses like the Birla Group did invest in East African countries in the 1950s and 60s but such investments were considerably
smaller in magnitude as compared to current flows.

Liberalisation of the Indian economy in 1991 put India on a higher growth trajectory. As a result, India’s energy requirements
increased manifold and energy security concerns moved to the centre stage of India’s foreign policy. Diversification of energy
sources and investment in overseas oil and gas ventures became explicit objectives of India’s foreign policy. Public sector
companies like ONGC Videsh, Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation, and Oil India Limited rapidly expanded their footprint in
Africa with ONGC Videsh occupying the top spot with investments worth US$ 3.01 billion or about 59.8 per cent of total Indian
investment flows to Africa.

High growth and growing middles class in Africa also increased the attractiveness of the continent for India’s private sector. Many
Indian private sector companies like the TATA Group, Bharati Airtel, Essar Group, Reliance, and Varun Beverages also invested
heavily in African countries.

However, the subject did not receive the scholarly attention that it deserves. There are only a few instances of serious
empirical work

A detailed analysis of the Reserve Bank of India’s data on overseas direct investment flows from Indian firms
to African countries between 2008 and 2016 reveals some very interesting facts. Between 2008 and 2016, the
 African continent received foreign direct investment flows worth $52.6 billion or about 21 per cent of India’s total FDI
outflows during the same period . Although the figure seems appreciable, it is important to note that India’s FDI
flows to Africa are concentrated in Mauritius, a tax haven. From 2008 to 2016, Indian FDI outflows to
Mauritius totalled $47.6 billion. Only $5 billion went to the rest of Africa, which represents only 2 per cent of global
Indian FDI outflows. A large share ofIndian FDI to Mauritius is round-tripped back to India, which means that the
actual volume of Indian investment in Africa is much less than reported in the media

Indian investments in Africa are highly concentrated geographically. With a share of 63 per cent and 22 per
cent, East and North African regions attract most of the investments from India. With a share of about 52.9
per cent, Mozambique tops the list. But its top position is largely due to ONGC Videsh’s investment in the Rovuma
gas field, whichaccounts for about 99 per cent of Indian investments in Mozambique.

Options Available for India

India must adopt a more systematic approach to involve the private sector in its development cooperation programme. Its
development cooperation initiatives must try to create positive externalities for Indian companies in Africa. Moreover, development
projects should be targeted to sectors and countries which are of interest to Indian businesses. This will foster trade and investment
relations between India and Africa.

How Modi Government is Nurturing historical links with Africa?

The Modi government’s outreach to Africa has tried to build on India’s traditional ties with the continent. India’s links with
Africa are centuries old, bolstered by trade across the Indian Ocean and a million-strong diaspora across Africa. A shared colonial
legacyand post-independence development experience has framed India’s relationship with Africa. The country’s role as a
champion of anti-colonialism and anti-racism after its Independence in 1947 drew it closer to the African nations as it emerged
as one of the most vocal critics of apartheid in South Africa. Under its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Delhi became a
votary of strong Asian-African solidarity.

Economic engagement with Africa has become central to India’s new approach. This is related to India’s search for energy
security in which Africa is playing an increasingly important role. The country is seeking diversification of its oil supplies away
from theMiddle East and Africa will be playing an important role in India’s energy matrix.

India is now giving sustained attention to Africa, opening diplomatic missions on the continent as well as regular
high-level political interactions. It is promising loans on easy terms to those nations willing to trade with India and
is contributing towardseducation, railways and peacekeeping.

Apart from building economic and commercial ties with Africa, India is also contributing to the development of African countries
through naval cooperation and technical assistance. The Indian Navy is engaged in dealing with pirates off the coast of
Somalia. Ithas been patrolling the waters of the Indian Ocean and helping countries in Eastern and Southern Africa
in tackling piracy and surveillance of the EEZ.

India is investing in capacity building providing more than $1 billion in technical assistance and training to personnel under the
Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program. As a full member of African Capacity Building Foundation
(ACBF), India has pledged $1 million towards ACBF’s sustainable development, poverty alleviation, and capacity building initiative.
India has invested $100 million in the Pan-African E-Network to bridge the digital divide in Africa, leveraging its strengths in
information technology. Indian military academies offer training to military officers from a number of African states.

India has been holding India-Africa summits to reach out to all African nations. The cooperation framework agreed at
the esummits and the Indian initiatives to scale up investment and aid to Africa have underscored India’s aim to foster a
robust partnership between New Delhi and the African continent.
India’s cross-border connectivity with Eastern African countries and Indian Ocean island countries is a natural extension of New
Delhi’s desire to foster more robust people-to-people connections, increase investment-led trade and business opportunities, and
strengthen bilateral partnerships. India is also seeking to reinvigorate its cultural links with East Africa under the rubric of Project
‘Mausam’, an initiative of the Ministry of Culture, which seeks to revive lost linkages with the Indian Ocean ‘world’ (East Africa, the
Arabian Peninsula, the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia).

India’s African cross-border connectivity has three primary forms:

maritime-port connectivity under the government’sSecurity and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) and the
SagarMala initiative;
digital connectivity under the PanAfrican e-Network project on tele-education and tele-medicine (launched in 2004),
and air connectivity in the form of direct flights from Indian cities to African destinations.

Cooperation strategy to address food insecurity in India and Africa

Africa has experienced catastrophic levels of food insecurity.

Reasons

Recurrent droughts exacerbated by El Nino and armed conflicts in the region have severely impaired the coping skills of
the farmers and pastoralists in the region. Although the situation in Rwanda and Uganda, is slightly better, the food
security situation is deteriorating to ‘stressed’ levels for poor households in eastern Rwanda affected by recent floods
and refugees from Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi.

Acute food insecurity and famine-like conditions currently prevail in most of the East African countries. Large parts of South
Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia are facing food crisis and food emergency situations.

Food security has undoubtedly been identified as an important pillar of India’s engagement with Africa several times.
For instance, the ‘India-Africa Framework for Strategic Cooperation’ signed in 2015, acknowledged the need for India and Africa to
partner for food security: “Both sides recognise the need to improve nutritional and food securities of their peoples and
acknowledge the right for adequate food for all and the availability and accessibility of food in quantity and quality sufficient to
satisfy the dietary needs of individuals.”

India’s cooperation with Africa in the area of agriculture and food security has also grown in recent years but the scope
of India’s development cooperation in agriculture is still largely limited to training African scientists and funding small
projects. Indian Lines of Credit, the prime instrument of India’s development cooperation, typically fund small irrigation projects or
help African countriesprocure tractors, agricultural equipment or even cows. At the moment, there is no coherent strategy to
improve agricultural productivity or food accessibility in Africa which was a key commitment in the India-Africa Forum Summit.

Intractable food crises, recurrent droughts, and famine-prone conditions in much of Africa today is similar to the
situation that prevailed in India in the 1960s, however, India-Africa partnership for food security must be very different
from US assistance to India.

Firstly, unlike the United States, India is not a leader in agricultural research. Also, planning research systems to meet the
current needs of Africa is much more complex than the challenges that India faced in the 1960s. Climate change and water
scarcity areserious impediments to agricultural transformation. In fact, Indian agriculture is itself beset with numerous
problems related to droughts and water scarcity. Thus, cooperation for mutual benefit must be the main pillar of India’s
agricultural collaboration withAfrica.
In the context of the challenges of climate change and water scarcity that hamstring Africa (even India), greater attention to
agriculture is the need of the hour. Moreover, agricultural development also gives a boost to rural consumption which in turn
provides an impetus to other sectors of the economy. Therefore, focusing on food security will also help India stand out as a
development partner. Lastly, as a net security provider in the Indian ocean region (within which East Africa falls), India can’t ignore
food security which is a critical component of human security. In a nutshell, India should take the lead in climate smart
agriculturewhich supports small farmers in both India and Africa and helps address hunger in India and Africa, and
also reduces the continent’s dependence on food imports

Can Africa and India cooperate on digital transfer platforms and e-commerce sector?

Over the next decade, e-commerce growth in the African continent and Southeast Asia is expected to outpace that in the developed
world. This is because of the combination of greater internet access and rising disposable incomes equates to strong growth
potential for e-commerce across the developing world.

In the African continent, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, boom in mobile phone usage have helped to facilitate increased
financial inclusion, which in turn has helped to spread e-commerce across Africa along with e-commerce, digitisation has
revolutionised the retail payments system and the payments infrastructure. It is transforming African economies in four major
ways: retail payments system, financial inclusion, sustainable businessmodels, and revenue administration.

Taking the fight over e-commerce at the WTO

India and Africa has a long history of working together by coordinating their views and efforts in institutions of global governance
in order to achieve greater autonomy. The most recent manifestation of this Indo-African synergy played out in the World Trade
Organisation (WTO).
India and South Africa made a joint proposal at the WTO which said that the present moratorium on customs duties on
electronic transmissions can lead to loss of competitiveness among developing countries, since they have higher tariffs on physical
products, while the same product in digital form attracts zero duty. Moreover, with the advent of artificial intelligence and 3-D
printing technology, products which are now delivered through offline mode can easily be transferred electronically, which
makes customs duties on products irrelevant.

The African continental free trade area and its implications for India-Africa trade

The vision of “pan-Africanism” and “collective self-reliance” has long been an integral component of attempts by African leaders
and policymakers to find Africa-driven solutions to African problems. However, due to weak political, economic and
governance structures, these attempts have largely failed to facilitate a structural transformation of the continent and today,
the African nations continue to be fragmented economies working in isolation. Therefore, in order to achieve an African
resurgence, virtually all the African countries have embraced the notion of “regionalism” and “regional integration” as part of
their broader aspirationstowards continental integration.

One such attempt was made at the 18th ordinary session of the African Union (AU), held in Addis Ababa in January 2012, with a
decision to launch a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) by 2017. This was followed by eight rounds of negotiations between 2015
and 2017. A major breakthrough was achieved on 21 March 2018 when leaders from 44 African countries met in Kigali, Rwanda,
and signed a framework agreement to establish what is being called one of the world’s largest trade blocs. The agreement declared
that the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)

The CFTA is an attempt by the African governments to “unlock Africa’s tremendous potential” to deliver prosperity to
all Africans. It seeks to create a single continental market for goods and services with free movement of business people and
investments. By 2030, the African market size is expected to reach 1.7 billion people, with a combined and cumulative consumer
and business spending of US$6.7 trillion.

The CFTA aims to expand intra-African trade through better harmonisation and coordination of trade liberalisation and facilitation
regimes and instruments across subregions (RECs) and at the continental level. As part of the agreement, “countries have
committed to remove tariffs on 90 percent of goods with the remaining 10 percent of items to be phased in at a later stage”
AfCFTA and its impact on India-Africa trade

The AfCFTA will provide a number of opportunities for the Indian firms and investors to tap into a larger, unified, simplified and
more robust African market. It is critical for India to view Africa not just as a destination for short-term returns but as a partner for
medium and long-term economic growth.

The India-Africa Partnership for Sustainability

Few partnerships will be as consequential in the 21st century as the one between India and Africa. Often dubbed as the ‘next
growth frontier’, Africa is in the midst of a resurgence—strengthened democratic processes and a surge in foreign
investment has led to rapid and transformative economic growth in the last decade.

India, for one, despite making serious headway into solar energy, remains heavily dependent on conventional sources for its energy
needs and is the world’s fourth largest carbon emitter. In Africa, energy poverty costs the continent two to four GDP percentage
points per year, and electricity demands are expected to triple by 2030

The natural progression of industrialisation – expansion of manufacturing bases, infrastructure development, and urbanisation –
will further continue to burden the already strained energy resources.
Given these factors, it is clear that both India and Africa will have to conduct their economic transitions in an increasingly “fossil-
fuel constrained world”

The commitment to climate action is reflected in India’s SDG commitments and Africa’s Agenda 2063, which envisions “a
prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development”. Thus, the intersection between common
developmental goals, and the need for a low-carbon transition creates avenues for a multi-sectoral, multi-stakeholder partnership
that will be critical in determining the future of not only these two geographies, but of global growth and development itself.

It is within this context that the India and Africa Partnership for Sustainability was hosted on the sidelines of the United Nations
Environment Assembly (UNEA) on 15 March 2019 in Nairobi, Kenya

Perhaps the most prominent sustainable development partnership between the two regions is reflected through the International
Solar Alliance (ISA), an initiative launched by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at COP21 in 2015, for the “massive deployment of
affordable solar energy”. As ISA Secretary General Mr. Upendra Tripathy highlighted in his keynote address during the Nairobi
conference, Africa has taken a leadership role in solar expansion with half of ISA member states coming from the continent.
Through the ISA, India has pledged a concessional credit line of US$2 billion to Africa over five years for the implementation of off-
grid solar energy projects. The ISA has also partnered with the African Development Bank to develop 10,000 MW of solar power
systems across the Sahel, which aims to provide electricity to approximately half of the 600 million Africans who remain off-grid

The ten guiding principles for India-Africa engagement:

India has an intrinsic interest in helping Africa achieve progress. The spirit of “developing together as equals” defines this bilateral
partnership. A resurging Africa and a rising India can give a strong impetus to South-South Cooperation. In July 2018, Prime
Minister Narendra Modi addressed the Ugandan Parliament during his state visit and outlined a vision for not just a bilateral
partnership with Africa, but also a partnership in multilateral forums by espousing the ‘10 guiding principles for India-Africa
engagement’.

The following are the 10 Guiding Principles for India-Africa engagement, as articulated by PM Modi during his Uganda
visit, and addressed to the African nations:

Africa will be at the top of our priorities. We will continue to intensify and deepen our engagement with Africa. As we
have shown, it will be sustained and regular.

Our development partnership will be guided by your priorities. We will build as much local capacity and create local
opportunities as possible. It will be on terms that are comfortable to you, that will liberate your potential and not
 constrain your future.

We will keep our markets open and make it easier and more attractive to trade with India. We will support our industry
to invest in Africa.

We will harness India’s experience with the digital revolution to support Africa’s development; improve delivery of public
services; extend education and health; spread digital literacy; expand financial inclusion; and mainstream the
marginalised.

Africa has 60 percent of the world’s arable land, but produces just 10 percent of the global output. We will work with
you to improve Africa’s agriculture.

Our partnership will address the challenges of climate change.

We will strengthen our cooperation and mutual capabilities in combating terrorism and extremism; keeping our
cyberspace safe and secure; and supporting the UN in advancing and keeping peace.

We will work with African nations to keep the oceans open and free for the benefit of all nations. The world needs
cooperation and competition in the eastern shores of Africa and the eastern Indian Ocean.

As global engagement in Africa increases, we must all work together to ensure that Africa does not once again turn into
a theatre of rival ambitions, but becomes a nursery for the aspirations of Africa’s youth.

Just as India and Africa fought colonialism together, we will work together for a just, representative and democratic
global order that has a voice for one-third of humanity that lives in Africa and India.

According ‘top’ priority

Africa’s importance to India as a development partner first became visible with the decision to enter into a structured engagement
with African countries under the framework of India Africa Forum Summit (IAFS). Four editions have been held so far—in 2008,
2011, 2015and in 2020.

The Government of India in March 2018 approved the opening of 18 new Indian Missions in Africa to implement the commitments
under IAFS-III over a period of four years from 2018-2021. This will increase the number of Resident Indian Missions in Africa from
29 to 47.

Guided by African priorities

Four main pillars embody India’s development partnership approach with Africa: capacity building and training under Indian
Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC); Lines Of Credit (LOC) or concessional loans and grant assistance; trade; and
investments.

In 2012, the Government of India set up the Development Partnership Administration (DPA) housed under the MEA, to
governIndia’s outgoing development assistance.

From being the fourth-largest investor in the continent, to being the largest employer, to capacity-building initiatives for local
youth, India is continuously working on developing its multi-dimensional relationship with Africa. While providing LOCs through
EXIM Bank to African countries, the selection of projects and method of implementation are arrived at through a consultative
process, keeping in mind local requirements and sentiments.

Open markets and supporting industries to invest

India’s trade with Africa in 2017-2018 was pegged at US$62.66 billion, reflecting an increase of nearly 22 percent over the previous
year, and cumulative investments in Africa amount to US$54 billion, thus making India the fourth-largest investor in Africa. While
both are becoming key trade and investment partners, undoubtedly there remains great uncharted potential.

The goal is to scale up bilateral trade volume to US$150 billion and double Indian investments in Africa to US$100 billion in the
next few years.

Indian initiatives like Focus Africa (2002), Duty-Free Tariff Preference Scheme (DFTP) for Least Developing Countries
(2008), and the institution IAFS and private-led conclaves like Confederation of Indian Industries-EXIM Bank Conclave
on India Africa Project Partnership have succeeded in lifting bilateral trade and investments to new heights.

Improving Africa’s agriculture

There is great potential for stepping up India-Africa collaboration in the agriculture sector, given the complementary sectoral
priorities and similarity of roles in evolving global food markets. Promoting agribusiness by launching incubation centres has been
a critical component of India’s agricultural partnership with Africa.

Pulses, of which India faces a shortage, are a major import item for India from Mozambique and Tanzania. During
PMModi’s July 2016 visit, agreements were signed with Mozambique and Tanzania to incentivise local farmers to grow pulses in
orderto cover the growing Indian demand with a guaranteed minimum procurement price and quantity.

India is also looking to take its cooperative/contract-farming model to African countries, especially in Mozambique, Tanzania,
Kenya, and Malawi. The practice of subsistence agriculture — characterised by extremely limited capital resources and low
productivity of land and labour — is a large and complex challenge for both India and Africa.

Peacekeeping, Defence and Security Cooperation

Peace and security entails not just traditional or hard notions of security connected to military strength and protection from
external threats, but also non-traditional threats such as food security, energy security, and immigration. For India and African
countries, peace and security are intrinsically linked to development.

Today, “over 6,000 Indians currently serve in five peacekeeping operations in Africa wearing blue helmets working to ensure a
future of peace for Africans.” The deployment of the all-Female Police Unit of the United Nations (UN) in Liberia in February 2016
was a remarkable first.

Open and Free Oceans

India aims to enhance cooperation with African countries in order to keep the oceans open and free for the benefit of all nations.
Indeed, the world needs cooperation, rather than competition in the eastern shores of Africa and the Eastern Indian Ocean. To this
end, complementarities can be drawn between Indian Navy’s 2015 Maritime Strategy document and the African Union’s 2050
Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS 2050). Complemented by PM Modi’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region)
and SAGARMALA (port development) initiatives, the AAGC (Asia Africa Growth Corridor), with Africa being an equal partner, can
potentially be a game-changer in the Indian Ocean Region.

Naval cooperation continues to grow strong with regular port visits, transfer of hardware and logistical support, naval intelligence,
and patrolling of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) being undertaken. In December 2018, an Information Fusion Center, based
in Gurugram in India’s National Capital Region, was launched. It will help to track and monitor shipping traffic in the Indian
Ocean, coordinate incident responses, and share submarine safety information. The decision to ‘jointly develop’ naval facilities in
Assumption and Agalega Island, off the coast of Seychelles and Mauritius respectively, has helped to increase the Indian Navy’s
presence in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the Western Indian Ocean region. The Assumption Island deal became embroiled in
Seychelles’ domestic politics where a combined opposition, environmentalists and local population raised concerns.

Addressing non-traditional threats in the Indian Ocean Region is one of the Indian Navy’s most prominent roles. Higher incidences
of natural disasters and regional instabilities in the past decade have necessitated increased deployment of Indian Navy for
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations. While African countries have been significant beneficiaries of
Indian Navy’s HA/DR missions, the latest example came in the aftermath of ‘Cyclone Idai’, a category 4 tropical storm which made
landfall in the port city of Beira, Mozambique, in early hours of 15 March 2019, causing havoc, destruction, and resulting in
hundreds of deaths and displacements. Fortunately, three Indian Navy vessels — INS Sujatha, INS Shardul, and INS Sarathi —
operating in the region, were immediately diverted to render assistance. The Indian Navy was the ‘first responder’ to the disaster

Terrorism
India and Africa both recognise that terrorism poses the single biggest threat to humanity and development. Both have been
victims of and are susceptible to radical terrorism and religious extremism from outfits such as Boko Haram, Al Shabaab,
Jaamat alDawa, and al-Qaeda, among others. To tackle the scourge of terrorism and maintain peace and harmony India
has, in the past, and continues to deploy troops and equipment in various African countries. Over the years, India has provided
training of African military personnel at various Indian institutes such as the Indian Military Academy, Defence Staff College,
and the National Defence College. India has also conducted training courses at the Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK) in New
Delhi, and at otherPeacekeeping Training Centres in Africa dedicated for the training of trainers from upcoming Troop
Contributing Countries (TCC) in Africa.

Cyber Security and Digital Revolution

India, Africa, and the rest of the world is facing new challenges due to development of new technologies. Cyber security is thus a
vital component of digital infrastructure. The best example of India’s digital cooperation with Africa is the Pan African e-Network
(PAeN) project on tele-education and tele-medicine, launched in 2004.

Under this initiative, Indian universities and specialist hospitals are connected to educational and hospital centres in African
countries through seamless and integrated satellite, fibre optics and wireless networks. The network is operational in 48 African
countries with its hub located in Dakar, Senegal.

In September 2018, India’s Ministry of External Affairs launched a new network project – e-VidyaBharati and e-ArogyaBharati
(e-VBAB). The e-VBAB project is different from the earlier PAeN project. While the PAeN project operated on satellite-based
technology, the e-VBAB will establish two separate web-based portals – one each for tele-education and tele-medicine.

Addressing the challenge of Climate Change

The adverse effects of climate change threaten to derail the gains made by decades of economic growth in India and Africa. Both
have large numbers of people without access to electricity, LPG, and modern cooking energy. According to a recent report, around
600 million people lack access to electricity in Africa. Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the
principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities acknowledges the differing responsibilities and
different capabilities of individual countries in addressing climate change.

While the common responsibilities are reflected in the Nationally Determined Contributions of all parties, both India and African
countries believe that differentiation in responsibilities should also be reflected. One point of contention between developed and
developing countries is finance. Developed nations are required to provide financial resources to assist developing countries for
mitigation and adaptation. Both India and African countries fall under the category of ‘pre-2020’ as both signed the
Paris agreement on 22 April 2016. In order to achieve the goals outlined in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development and Paris Agreement, they must fight together.

Just, Representative, Democratic Global Order

While the institutions of global governance that were created after the Second World War, like the UN, International Monetary
Fund, and World Trade Organisation, have served well, they have failed to adapt to the changing global scenario and adequately
represent the voice of the developing world. India —the world’s largest democracy representing one-sixth of humanity, and Africa
— with more than a quarter of UN members, cannot be kept out of the decision-making table. Developing countries must be
adequately represented and should have a genuine voice in institutions of global governance.

Democratic reforms in global institutions are essential. That is why India and Africa have voiced their support for expanding both
permanent and non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council. African countries insist on having two permanent seats in
the reformed Security Council. There are, however, many contenders.
India believes that while a rules-based multilateral international order is essential, it must be reformed at the same time.
PM Modi has advocated a ‘Reformed Multilateralism’ that calls for constructive reforms of the multilateral fora.

People to People contacts

Under PM Modi’s leadership, India’s engagement with the Indian diaspora in African countries has acquired new salience, enabling
a shift from the policy of ‘active-disassociation’ in previous decades, to ‘proactive association’ in recent years. PM Modi’s
charisma, oratory skills, and personal bonds with African leaders have attracted large crowds during his visits, and infused
enthusiasm within the Indian community living in various African countries. However, it is vital for the Indian government to
move beyond rhetoric.

There should be a push towards enhancing people-to-people contacts and sensitising Indian communities about the diversity,
culture, and ways of life of Africans. The nation must refrain from blindly following Western media’s reportage on and portrayals of
Africa. An increase in media contacts is essential for Indians to gain a clear picture of the diversity of the continent. To further
increase people-to-people contacts and boost tourism, the number of direct non-stop flights connecting Indian cities like New Delhi
and Mumbai to African cities must be increased. Airlines such as Air India are already working on expanding their operations in
cities like Nairobi, Dodoma, Dar es Salaam, Maputo, Mahe, Port Louis, Djibouti City, Antananarivo, and Mogadishu.

In spite of increased engagement, incidents of racism and intolerance against African students who come to study in
India are hindering India- Africa relations. India must take strict action against the perpetrators of such acts and
establish effective institutional mechanisms to redress the grievances of foreign nationals and ensure their safety.
Arranging frequent meetings with Residents Welfare Associations and working on community awareness programmes would be a
step in the right direction.

Today, Africa is a continent of limitless possibility, with increasing trade, investments, and a surge in innovation. India’s re-
engagement with Africa is taking place in a fast-changing and dynamic environment. African governments and leaders are playing
an effective role in shaping the continent’s future and the region is witnessing rapid growth. At a time when various non-western
powers like Japan, China, Malaysia, and Singapore are stepping up their presence in Africa, it is imperative for India to regularly
consult with its African partners, and leverage its unique blend of development packages, technology transfer, human resource
development, and infrastructure development in order to be truly recognised as an ‘alternative development partner’.

India-Africa Maritime Cooperation: The case of Western Indian Ocean

A secure maritime environment in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is crucial for both India and African countries for securing
national interests and achieving sustained national development. Such security means not only guarding the coastline or
territories, but also safeguarding the countries’ interests in their exclusive economic zones (EEZs), as well as protecting trade and
shipping routes, and sea-lanes of communications (SLOCs).
India has a vast coastline of 7,500 kilometers and an EEZ of two million square kilometers. It occupies a central position in the IOR,
straddling the main international shipping lanes.

The African continent, for its part, has a vast coastline with 38 of its 54 countries being either coastal or island nations. Africa’s
maritime environment is globally significant as huge amounts of international shipping activities pass through its seas. Indeed,
around 90 percent of the continent’s trade is carried out by sea, thereby making the African Maritime Domain (AMD) crucial for
commercial, security, environmental, and developmental reasons. For the longest time, however, African countries suffered
from a culture of ‘sea blindness’, i.e. it largely ignored its maritime domain—and had little knowledge of the benefits of its
water bodies. It is in the last few years that African countries have started paying more attention to the maritime domain and as a
collective entity has come to realise the importance of its maritime security.

With a booming oil and mining industry, Africa has been at the centre of global attention: various global players like India, China,
and the European Union, are keen to engage Africa’s waters. However, with an increase in resource extraction activities in the seas,
there has been a corresponding rise not only in the volume of sea-traffic but also the rate of maritime crimes. Unfortunately, most
African countries lack the capacity to ensure the security of their declared maritime zones. This has resulted in vast illegal capture
and exploitation of the continent’s marine resources, which in turn is provoking a clamor for better maritime governance. The high
incidence of piracy off the East African coast in Gulf of Aden and in the Niger Delta Region and Gulf of Guinea in West Africa, has
brought the issue of African maritime security to the world’s attention.

African countries such as Kenya, Madagascar, Comoros, Mauritius, Mozambique, Comoros, Somalia, Seychelles, South Africa, and
Tanzania are members of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), which was established in
March, 1997. The organisation is now known as Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).

Moreover, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) has brought India closer to several African littoral states of the IOR. The
IONS was launched in 2008 and has six African member states: Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Tanzania, and South
Africa; Madagascar is an observer state.

India’s approach to maritime cooperation with Africa has essentially revolved around its central security concerns in African
waters. India has reached out to African states through offers of military aid, capacity building, and training assistance. A proactive
re-orientation in India’s nautical outlook towards Africa is also reflected in India’s 2015 Maritime Strategy document. In the
document, India declares that its policy towards the countries in the Western Indian Ocean region has expanded and diversified
intro a broad-based security approach, one which is supplemented by regular naval visits, sharing of best practices to build
capacity through trainings, transfer of naval hardware and logistical support, naval intelligence, joint military exercises and
patrolling of seas, and development of listening stations and posts which are essentially monitoring stations, complete with radars
and surveillance gear for monitoring maritime communications.

China’s rapid growth in Africa: Lessons for India

China’s rising economic interest in Africa has caught the attention of scholars, journalists, and policy makers all over the world.
Although the literature on China’s role in Africa has proliferated remarkably, most studies present a dichotomous understanding of
China’s role in Africa, either as a ‘threat’ or as an ‘opportunity’. In fact, some scholars have even labelled Chinese economic
engagement with Africa as the ‘new scramble’ for African resources. On the other hand, there are scholars, who regard China as
the new economic frontier which is making a great contribution towards African development. Within India, many experts
routinely emphasise the need for India to counter China’s growing influence on the African continent by building closer links with
Africa. Others have expressed concerns over ‘China’s deep pockets’ and India’s inability to match China’s soft loans for
infrastructure. Sadly, there is very little Indian scholarship devoted to the issue of China-Africa relations.

Firstly, Chinese economic engagement with Africa is not limited to resources. Although trade in resources such as
crude oil and copper account for the bulk of trade between China and Africa and China has sanctioned infrastructure
for resource loans worth billions of dollars to countries resource-rich countries such as like Angola and Democratic
Republic of Congo, it would be wrong todismiss China’s growing economic engagement with Africa purely as a means
of acquiring resources. There are many African countries which lack resources, yet their economic ties with China are
growing like never before. Ethiopia, an agricultural country in East Africa, is a case in point. The Ethiopian case completely
rebuts the argument that China’s interest in Africa is limited to resources. Bilateral trade between Ethiopia and China grew at a
rate of 63 per cent per annum between 2002 and 2012 and currently China is the country’s largest export destination. It is
interesting to note that sesame seeds, a product, which has been, introduced in Ethiopia recently, accounts for about 85 per cent
of the exports to China followed by leather and leather goods.

Secondly, China is making a huge economic impact on Africa through trade, development finance, and investment flows.
Demandfor African exports was one of the most direct channels through which China penetrated Africa. Chinese
demand had a huge quantitative impact on most African countries and led to an unparalleled growth in exports from countries
such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ethiopia. In fact, Chinese demand was significant enough to affect world
prices, and led to improvements in terms of trade for these countries. Therefore, the emergence of China as the main export
destination played an important role in reviving their economies during the 2000s.

Indian experts rarely regard Africa as a market for Indian manufactured products and prefer to focus on India’s long-term
commitment to African development, development cooperation initiatives like Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC)
and Lines of Credit (LoCs) as well as the need for African votes for a permanent seat in the United Nations. On the other hand,
China has effectively penetrated the African market. Imports from China overtook the US in 2004 and by 2013; China’s
share in sub-Saharan Africa’s imports was about 14 per cent. There was a dramatic growth in imports of Chinese
manufactured goods early2000s onwards and China is now sub-Saharan Africa’s largest source of manufactured products.

Similarly, Chinese investment flows to Africa have also increased rapidly in recent years. According to the World Investment
Report2016 published by United Nations Conference on Trade Development (UNCTAD), China was the fourth largest investor in
Africa in2014. China’s foreign direct investment stock increased more than three-fold from USD 9 billion in 2009 to USD 32 billion
in 2014 and China overtook South Africa as the largest investor from a developing country in the region. While most of the
Chinese investments in Africa are indeed led by large state owned enterprises which typically invest in infrastructure and resource
sectors, increasingly a large number of private Chinese enterprises have also set up operations in many African countries.

However, the most striking feature of China-Africa relations is the unprecedented growth of official finance from China
to Africa. Although conceptual differences make comparisons between Chinese development finance and official development
assistance from Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries difficult, many estimates suggest
that Chinese financial flows to sub-Saharan Africa are now comparable in scale to traditional Official Development Assistance
(ODA) from OECD countries. Chinese finance is predominantly channeled through China’s Export Import Bank in the form of
concessional loans for infrastructure development. Chinese companies are also building vital infrastructure including, dams,
ports, roads, railways, and bridges in Africa. According to a study by the World Bank, over thirty five African countries have
engaged with Chinaon infrastructure finance deals. Given sub-Saharan Africa’s critical shortage of infrastructure, this is China’s
biggest contributiontowards African development. Indian LoCs are largely directed towards infrastructure development in
Africa, but it is quite clear that India cannot match China in terms of scale.

According to Ted Bauman, senior research analyst at Banyan Hill Publishing, “it is clear that China’s primary goal with
foreign investment is geopolitical and not economic.” But the main trouble is that these investments helps to bind
countries to China politically, and through debt obligations, creates a form of leverage. China is using its hefty
economic prowess to build political ‘soft power’ through its ‘Go Out’ policy, wherein China sends its employees of its
state-run companies to Africa, as well as investment money.
Moreover, there has been multiple concerns over Chinese labour practices, often viewed as unfair, with various cases reported of
poor and harsh working conditions. The types of precarious labour conditions typically include cases of low salary below the
minimum wage standards, language barriers, unfair termination of contracts, lack of holidays, medical care, insurance, and other
benefits.

Not without its fair share of criticisms

There is no doubt that Indian projects, capacity, and skills development programmes has positively impacted the lives of many
Africans. However, at the same time, there is a realisation that our partnership is yet to reach its true potential. Indian engagement
in Africa is not without its criticism. The principle concern has been India’s poor track record when it comes to project
delivery and implementation. India is viewed to be slow in delivering on its development partnership commitments, especially
in comparison to China. Also, few agribusiness firms have been criticised for land-grabbing and displacing local population.
Cumbersome bureaucracy on both ends also makes it difficult for funds to reach its intended beneficiaries.
In such an instance, India’s main challenge is to bridge the gap between rhetoric and practice, and this is where India has made
positive strides.

While China’s economic muscle and heft in Africa is unmatchable, India does not see itself in a competition with China. At the
same time, there is growing realisation in Africa that Beijing’s terms of engagement are less than desirable. This has given India a
window of opportunity to take on more projects in Africa. Unlike China, India’s partnership with Africa is based on a model of
cooperation that is responsive, demand-driven, free of conditions and one that liberates Africa’s potential, rather than constraining
its future.

India, China and fortifying the Africa outreach

The COVID-19 pandemic has been a great leveller across the world. But its effects stand to be devastating particularly in Africa,
where economic and public health conditions are extremely vulnerable. Although African countries moved quickly to curb the
initial spread, they are still woefully ill-equipped to cope with a public health emergency of such magnitude due to shortages of
masks, ventilators, and even basic necessities such as soap and water.

As Asia’s two largest economies and long-standing partners of Africa, India and China have increased their outreach to Africa
through medical assistance. Their efforts are directed to fill a part of the growing African need at a time when not many others
have stepped in to help.
Beijing’s donation diplomacy

China, being Africa’s largest trading partner, was quick to signal its intent to help Africa cope with the pandemic. It despatched
medical protective equipment, testing kits, ventilators, and medical masks to several African countries. The primary motive of such
donations has been to raise Beijing’s profile as a leading provider of humanitarian assistance and “public goods” in the global
public health sector. China’s billionaire philanthropy was also in full display when tech founder Jack Ma donated three rounds of
anti-coronavirus supplies. These consignments were transported mostly by Ethiopian aircraft. Chinese embassies across Africa have
taken the lead by coordinating both public and private donations to local stakeholders and have also embarked on a donation blitz
of cash even as the sub-optimal quality of China’s medical supplies and its deputing of medical experts have been a major cause
for concern.

New Delhi’s focus

For India, the pandemic presents an opportunity to demonstrate its willingness and capacity to shoulder more responsibility. The
fact that even with limited resources, India can fight the virus at home while reaching out to developing countries in need is
testament to India’s status as a responsible and reliable global stakeholder. Nowhere has India’s developmental outreach been
more evident than in Africa with the continent occupying a central place in Indian government’s foreign and economic policy in
the last six years. Africa has been the focus of India’s development assistance and also diplomatic outreach, as evident in plans to
open 18 new embassies. These efforts have been supplemented by an improved record of Indian project implementation in Africa.

India’s role as ‘the pharmacy of the world’, as the supplier of low-cost, generic medicines is widely acknowledged.
Pharmaceutical products along with refined petroleum products account for 40% of India’s total exports to African markets. India is
sending consignments of essential medicines, including hydroxychloroquine (HCQ) and paracetamol, to 25 African countries in
addition to doctors and paramedics at a total cost of around ₹600 million ($7.9 million) on a commercial and grant basis. The
initial beneficiaries were the African Indian Ocean island nations of Mauritius, the Seychelles, Comoros, and Madagascar under
India’s ‘Mission Sagar’. While transportation and logistics remain a concern, most of the consignments have already reached
various African states.

A timely initiative has been the e-ITEC COVID-19 management strategies training webinars exclusively aimed at training health-
care professionals from Africa and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) nations and sharing of best
practices by Indian health experts. Nigeria, Kenya, Mauritius, and Namibia have been beneficiaries.

Africa as an export market: An analysis of Indian pharmaceutical industry

Pharmaceuticals are a major component of India’s trade expansion strategy, particularly with the country’s stated objective of
diversification of exports in terms of both products as well as destinations. India’s historical role in supporting a large number of
relatively poorer nations – particularly in Africa- dealing with their HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria disease burden through low-cost,
generic medicines is widely acknowledged. Pharmaceutical products dominate India’s exports to Africa and along with petroleum
products, account for about 40 % of total Indian exports into African markets.

India, Africa and the quest for reformed multilateralism

Across the system, multilateralism is severely eroding as nations become more inward-focused, directing their attention and
strategies towards improving domestic manufacturing capacities and reducing dependence on foreign imports. Protectionist
tendencies are on the rise in addition to the pressures of constrained mobility and fear of reduction in financial resources essential
for tackling climate change and achieving SDGs. It seems that a tussle between unilateralism and multilateralism is going to shape
much of the discourse on international cooperation.

Africa and multilateralism

Such developments amid a retreat of globalism gravely increase the vulnerabilities and risks for the developing, low-income
countries in the Global South, the largest concentration of which is in the African continent.

Africans have a long-standing commitment to multilateral approaches and understanding of the integral role multilateralism plays
in fostering development, prosperity and peace. But unfortunately, efforts in this direction by the African countries often go
unnoticed.India and Africa jointly aspires to strengthen multilateralism.
India, Africa and global governance

Essentially, India and Africa’s partnership strives to achieve greater autonomy and ensure that the agenda of the global South is
prioritised. Although the institutions of global governance that were created after the Second World War, like the UN,
WTO, IMF, have served well, they have failed to adapt to the rapidly changing global scenario and adequately represent
the voice of the developing world. Therefore, democratic reforms in global institutions are quintessential; that is why India and
Africa have voiced their support for expanding both permanent and non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council

India’s quest for ‘reformed multilateralism’ essentially calls for constructive reforms. In this endeavour, African nations will have a
critical role to play purely because of the sheer numerical strength in the UN. This stance has been continuously reiterated in
various multilateral platforms such as NAM, BRICS, and IBSA because for far too long, alignments, alliances, and assumptions have
been rooted in the legacies of colonialism and ideologies of the Cold War.

The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor

India’s and Japan’s co-envisioned Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) was announced at the 52nd Annual Meeting of the African
Development Bank (AfDB) summit in Gandhinagar, India, on May 22-26, 2017. During the announcement, Prime Minister
Narendra Modi stated that both India and Japan aim to achieve closer developmental cooperation in Africa.

Indeed, many comparisons have been drawn between the AAGC and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, since both encompass Africa
and the Indian Ocean as key constituents. Chinese strategic circles have responded critically to the AAGC initiative, arguing that
the AAGC is a “duplication of the freedom corridor” that was originally proposed by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during his
2016 meeting with Modi in Tokyo.

India-Japan Joint Statement, released on November 11, 2016, indicated that both India and Japan should develop cooperation in
Africa, and must aim “to promote industrial corridors and industrial networks in Asia as well as in Africa. This document unveils
India’s and Japan’s strategically ambitious proposition in the Indo-Pacific region, factoring in Africa and the Indian Ocean.
According to the vision document, the AAGC will focus on four key target areas:

1) development and cooperation;

2) “quality infrastructure” and digital and institutional connectivity;

3) enhancing capabilities and skills;

4) establishing people-to-people partnerships. The overriding goal is to enhance “growth and interconnectedness between and
within Asia and Africa

In brief, the AAGC vision document promotes an inter-continental framework of cooperation between Asia and Africa with a focus
on developmental cooperation. It is therefore a “people-centric” proposition that focuses on the peoples of Africa and Asia. With an
emphasis on “quality infrastructure” and “digital and regulatory connectivity,” the vision document further illustrates that the
AAGC is an initiative, based on a consultative mechanism, that aims to better integrate Africa by establishing strategic linkages
with other regions such as India, South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Oceania. In this mechanism, the African continent
constitutes the cornerstone of the AAGC proposition.

A reading of this vision document suggests that the AAGC aims to attain three general objectives:

first, advancing both India’s and Japan’s individual and mutual outreach towards the African continent, focused mainly on
developing “quality infrastructure investment”;

second, linking Africa with the Indian Ocean Region within an intercontinental context of Asia-Africa cooperation, whereby Japan
and India are envisaged as playing leading roles, with African countries also becoming a part of the decision-making process;

and third, to shape a liberal and value-based Indo-Pacific order as per their proposed Vision 2025
Accordingly, the AAGC proposition fits within the more overarching Vision 2025. Conceptualized between India and Japan in 2015
as part of their “Special Strategic and Global Partnership,” its main thrust is to develop a “deep, broad-based and action-oriented
partnership” in the Indo-Pacific region.

Affirming a commitment to a “peaceful, open, equitable, stable and rule-based order” in the region, Vision 2025 demands for
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity where the emphasis is on an “open global trade regime” along with “freedom of
navigation and overflight,” among other things. It stresses the focus on “reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructures” aimed at
enhancing connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region, which not only complements India’s Act East and Japan’s Expanded Partnership
for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI) initiative but, as argued later on in this paper, forms a strategic convergence between Japan’s and
India’s security interests in the Indo-Pacific region.

Japan’s Growing Africa Interest

As a resource centre and a continent of 54 countries, Africa attracts significant interest and investment from around the world,
including Asia’s three major economies – Japan, China, and India. Japan’s Africa policy first received meaningful attention in 1993
during the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). Tokyo’s official position was that the decline of
assistance from developed countries towards Africa represented an opportunity for Japan. It was therefore contended that Japanese
foreign policy should pay serious attention to Africa.

Tokyo seeks to promote its investment in “high-quality infrastructure” in comparison to what it regards as “substandard” Chinese
infrastructure. Furthermore, Japan criticizes Chinese engagement with Africa as “unethical” and alleges that Beijing’s outreach is
based on offering cheap goods, providing ODA in an attractive but unaccountable manner, and exists to take advantage of African
resources.17 Likewise, Japan contends that the deals China offers to African states are not in accord with international norms and
are unfavourable for Africa’s future development. This Japanese reservation towards the Chinese-backed initiatives is thus part of
the growing Sino-Japanese strategic competition over influencing project finance on connectivity and infrastructure promotion in
Asia and beyond.
But there are additional reasons why Japan is concerned over China’s increasing influence in Africa. Apart from many other factors,
for many years Japan has advocated reforms to the United Nations (UN) and UN Security Council (UNSC). In order to achieve
these reforms, the support of the 54 African countries is crucial. India is Japan’s partner under the G-4 grouping. China as a
permanent member of the UNSC, on the other hand, does not want to concede any advantage to Japan or India.

India’s Evolving Africa Policy

Labelling Africa as a “top priority” in India’s foreign and economic policy, Prime Minister Modi has stated that India’s relationship
with Africa is based on a new developmental partnership, forming a “model of cooperation” which is “demand-driven and free of
conditions.” This Indian approach unveils Narendra Modi’s Africa policy, revealing a similarity between India’s and Japan’s
outlooks. Accordingly, forging closer cooperation in the field of energy, greater market access, co-development of infrastructure,
and establishing greater maritime contacts through connectivity are the highlights of India’s Africa policy. In all of these areas,
Modi seems to be offering a new context to India-Africa cooperation.19 Whereas India’s policy towards Africa has traditionally
been based on long-term historical and cultural connections, under Modi India’s Africa policy can be seen in a new light in which
four specific changes are noticed.

First, India previously pursued a “Focus Africa” policy initially targeted at a limited number of countries in Africa. This
policy underModi has changed today to focus on the entire continent. In other words, India’s Africa policy today is continental in
spirit, not bound to specific countries or any quarter in Africa.

Second, departing from India’s earlier outlook, Africa is increasingly seen as a continental partner or collaborator. Today,
India isbuilding its relations with Africa as a partner in multilateral forums relating to climate change, trade regimes, and UN
reforms

Third, India seeks to enhance the developmental partnership between India and Africa and give it a new direction. This
represents a departure from earlier stances, when India had viewed developmental challenges as an “international responsibility”
and rejectedthe “donor-recipient” approach.

Fourth, Africa is seen as a partner in the maritime domain, promoting an intercontinental Asia-Africa cooperative
framework inthe Indian Ocean Region where India can be a leading player. This is aptly noticed in Modi’s speech at the second
Raisina Dialoguein New Delhi on January 17, 2017, where he stated that India wants to build its own development part nerships
that “… extend from the islands of the Indian Ocean and Pacific to the islands of the Caribbean and from the great continent of
Africa to the Americas.” This Indian perspective complements the spirit of the AAGC as well as establishes a parity of
understanding with Japan both in Africa and the Indian Ocean. Both countries, however, face a formidable challenge in the face
of China’s increasing emergence in the region.

China as Strategic Competitor

Africa’s resource and strategic significance in global politics have encouraged China to pursue a robust policy. Consequently,
Beijing has invested heavily in diplomatic, economic, and political ties with Africa resulting in the substantial China-Africa
engagement that exists today. Indeed, politically China has accorded the highest priority to Africa in an effort to bolster
international recognition of its “one China” policy.

China’s first white paper vis-à-vis the continent, China’s Africa Policy, was released in January 2006 and built the foundation for a
multi-layered engagement between China and Africa. China’s relations with the African Union (AU) have progressed under Xi
Jinping and allows Beijing to engage the continent multilaterally. Further, the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has
been instrumental in institutionalising larger Sino-Africa relations. Significantly, promoting investment in Africa and the Indian
Ocean Region (IOR), establishing connectivity, and building infrastructure are crucial parts of China’s Belt and Road Initiative,
otherwise known as “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) – the flagship project of Chinese President Xi Jinping, first announced in 2013.

The prime aim of the BRI has been to position China as the epicentre of regional and global economics and geopolitics. Beijing’s
“One Belt” implies land corridor connectivity from China to Central Asia and Western Asia, going all the way to Europe; whereas
“One Road” implies maritime connectivity through the Strait of Malacca to India, the Middle East, and East Africa, known also as
the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The importance to China of Africa and the Indian Ocean is outlined in the document Vision
for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative, which was released on June 20, 2017. It explains the new initiatives
and maritime routes that China intends to promote in the Indo-Pacific region. Prominence is accordingly placed on the
importance of the blue economy with a focus on the Indian Ocean.

Consequently, China attaches strategic significance to its naval outreach in the Indian Ocean Region, which also encompasses the
East African coast. In fact, Beijing has placed significant emphasis on key maritime zones, capacity-building exercises, building
infrastructure, and promoting investment for the protection of maritime zones. In recent years, China’s strategic positioning in the
Indian Ocean Region has also increased with the PLA Navy (PLAN) being vigilant and active in addressing non-traditional security
issues such as piracy.

India-Japan Strategic Convergence

The rise of China’s presence in the IOR has concerned numerous countries, including India and Japan to whom it poses a strategic
challenge. In particular, Japan and India both hold strong reservations regarding China’s Belt and Road Initiative. As part of this
initiative, India has officially expressed strong objections to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), stating that it affects
India’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Besides, India has called for China to hold “meaningful dialogue” on connectivity and corridor initiatives, which are the main
aspects of the BRI. Similar to India’s stance, Japan under Abe initially expressed a cold response over China’s BRI, maintaining that,
“Tokyo would like to see how the concept of OBOR would be materialised.” Even though Japan sent political representation to
attend the May 2017 Belt and Road Forum (BRF) meeting in Beijing and Abe has publicly praised the BRI, Tokyo has in fact been
rather reluctant to demonstrate overt support. Offering instead only “conditional support” to the BRI, Abe has recently affirmed
that, “it is necessary for infrastructure to be open to use by all, and to be developed through procurement that should be
transparent and fair.

Following similar reservations, Japan has so far decided not to join the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),
noting that the AIIB falls short on “fair governance,” mainly relating to offering clarity on debt repayment and loan sanctions.

In response to China’s growing ambitions, Tokyo and New Delhi agreed in 2015 to enlarge industrial networks and regional value
chains with an “open, fair and transparent” business environment in the Indo-Pacific region. Later, in 2016, both countries
enhanced this idea by forming synergy between India’s Act East policy and Japan’s Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure
(earlier known as PQI), which stresses greater connectivity between Asia and rest of the world, including Africa.30 EPQI seems to
have entered in direct competition with the BRI, since both the initiatives mainly focus on infrastructure investment and intend to
promote corridors and connectivity, regionally and globally.

The two countries’ growing strategic convergence is underlined, furthermore, by the fact that India’s Act East policy under Modi
envisages Japan as a “special” global partner, while Japan’s EPQI under Abe factors India as a key country in Japan’s regional and
global outreach. Indeed, India’s rising clout as a power has encouraged Japan to collaborate with India factoring Africa in the IOR.
In particular, Japan has been concerned over China’s rising maritime profile in Africa and its maritime presence in the IOR.
Beijing’s growing counter-piracy operations along the African coasts, participation in the UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs),
and capacity-building exercises have been a serious cause of concern for Japan for some time. As a result, Japan has begun to
show greater interest in Africa, primarily through security contributions where Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDFs) have played a
key role in various counter-piracy operations, in the UNPKO in South Sudan, and in expanding its first overseas base, from just an
airfield to a military base, in Djibouti.

The arrival of the AAGC is therefore an amalgamation of both Japan’s and India’s growing strategic convergence in the Indo-
Pacific region. In 2016, Abe introduced Tokyo’s global foreign policy vision through the concept “Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Strategy.” In this vision, one of Japan’s focus areas was on how to establish strategic cooperation between Asia and Africa, with
Japan playing a leading role. This idea was echoed in Abe’s speech at TICAD VI on August 27, 2016, when he stated: “Japan bears
the responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Ocean and of Asia and Africa into a place that values
freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion, and making it prosperous. Japan wants to work
together with you in Africa in order to make the seas that connect the two continents into peaceful seas that are governed by the
rule of law.

The AAGC is therefore an ambitious proposition between India and Japan to expedite their respective objectives in Africa and
Indian Ocean. On Tokyo’s part, the attempt to establish this connection, factoring India as a partner in the AAGC vision, has a
sequential route which was articulated by Abe in his influential speech entitled “Confluence of the Two Seas” as far back as August
22, 2007, in the Indian Parliament. He argued that Japan and India must take the lead, since both possess the “ability” and
“responsibility” to nurture and enrich the Pacific and the Indian Ocean as “seas of clearest transparency.” Abe spoke of establishing
a network spanning the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean, incorporating countries like Australia, India, and the United States.34 In
addition, Abe echoed that the time had arrived for an “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” through shared partnerships with like-
minded countries.
Is Asia-Africa growth corridor the answer to China’s BRI?

The AAGC, unlike the BRI which is a unilateral initiative of China, is a bilateral initiative between Japan and India. The spirit of the
AAGC is furthermore based on a “consultative” character where Africa has a role to play in the decision-making process on
projects, which is not so much the case with the BRI. Furthermore, funding for the promotion of BRI projects comes essentially
fromChinese banks or from Chinese government sources or through collaborative measures where Beijing holds a dominant
say in project financing.

This is not the case with the AAGC which intends to generate private, government, and also international funding, including from
the African Development Bank. China’s BRI proposition is also more expansive, ambitious, and global, encompassing other
continents apart from Africa and Asia. Differences notwithstanding, both initiatives exhibit to a certain extent overlapping and
competing intentions. The success of AAGC will therefore largely depend upon to what extent India and Japan can push forward
this idea ahead of China’s BRI.

India and Japan need to pursue structured and pointed cooperation both in the context of Africa and the Indian Ocean Region to
make the intended objectives of AAGC a success. But while a comparison between AAGC and China’s BRI is unavoidable, AAGC
currently neither poses a challenge to China’s BRI, nor is its mandate as comprehensive. Indeed, the vision of AAGC is not to
compete with any other proposition per se, but to engage in more meaningful developmental partnerships, both within and outside
of Africa. This invites a serious nurturing between India and Japan whereby the forthcoming leadership summit meeting between
Shinzo Abe and Narendra Modi in September will be crucial for the progress of AAGC.
 India-Nepal relations: recent advances, issues & challenges.
Nepal is the world’s 45th-biggest country in the world, with a population of 29
million people. The country’s total area is almost equal to that of Bangladesh
and is double Sri Lanka’s. Thus, if only for its size, Nepal is too big a nation-
state to be a vassal. The country takes pride in its history of never having been
colonised and has an important geostrategic position, with India and China
on either side.

Following Independence, India emulated Britain’s approach in having a treaty-

based relationship with Nepal, which led to Nepal’s grudging acceptance of
India’s dominion.

To be sure, China’s engagement in Nepal is not new. More importantly —

and contrary to how it is portrayed in Nepal—it is not entirely positive.
However, the engagement is crucial, since China’s newfound economic power
is as yet unmatched. This challenges India’s privileged position in Nepal.
Indian govt has taken various initiatives and has indicated that it intends to
address Nepal’s concerns regarding India.

Nepal’s eagerness to engage with China fits perfectly in Nepal’s long tradition
of pursuing a diversified foreign policy and partners, taking advantage of its
key geostrategic position.

In light of this stance, it is important to understand Nepal’s policy motivation.

New Delhi was for long perceived in Kathmandu as “hawkish” and “selfish” in
dealing with sensitive matters, which in turn projected an unlikeable image of
India. The most notable instances of this include different river treaties,
reluctance to respond to regular border-encroachment complaints, high-
structure build-up along the border, inundation complaints, the armed border
forces’ harsh behaviour, trade and transit crises, and embargoes. These
experiences led Nepal to look for other options. Thus, the communist parties of
Nepal have consistently protested against India, and the Nepali Congress too
has shown reservations, indicating a broad political consensus on this approach
to India.

There are historical reasons that explain the dynamics of the Nepal–India
bilateral relationship. To maintain a sphere of influence, India needs sufficient
soft power, as well as hard power, along with the confidence to act. As scholar
Aparna Pande argues, “Managing a sphere of influence is not only a function of
telling others what to do but being able to expend resources that deny space to
competitors.

Indeed, the nature of India-Nepal relations has always been a mixed bag. Due
to its provisions and protocols, the 1950 treaty quickly became controversial
and set the conflictive tone of the bilateral relationship. The provisions of the
1950 Indo-Nepal Peace and Friendship Treaty related to secret letters
associated with arms procurement limited Nepal from purchasing arms fro m
third countries without “informing” india. Nepali politicians argued that the
treaty constrained Nepal as an ally and a state under India’s security umbrella.
In 1988, King Birendra’s decision to purchase anti-aircraft guns from China
prompted then Indian Foreign Secretary K.P.S. Menon to warn Nepal of its
existential uncertainty. Over the years, the incompatibility between the two
countries only worsened in various domains.

Areas of contention: Border, water, commerce

Another area of grievance is trade and commerce. Because of its geographical

constraints, Nepal has found itself heavily reliant on India, never acquiring the
comparative advantage to increase exports. Local enterprises fail to grow,
being simply unable to compete against lower-priced Indian products that flood
the market.
Trade and connectivity issues: India’s imposition of non-tariff barriers and
lack of standard infrastructure have added to Nepal’s discontent with India.
The transaction costs for exports and imports are unsustainably hig h. It takes
42 days to reach export destination via Indian ports and 35 days to reach Nepal
from the suppliers’ point, which account for US$2,700 shipping cost per
container. As a result, as of 2018, the country’s trade deficit ratio is at a
staggering 1:14.9. Nepal’s largest trading partner is India (the total trade
accounting for 65 percent), with whom Nepal runs the largest trade deficit.

Hydropower related issues: Another longstanding dispute between India and

Nepal relates to the provisions of existing river treaties and their
implementation. Nepali stakeholders claim that India has taken undue
advantage of its generosity in sharing water, by using ambiguous provisions
and providing far less benefits than the upper riparian state duly deserves. They
claim that India’s handling of the issues involving the Koshi and Gandaki
rivers has been far from satisfactory. The Mahakali agreement has remained in
limbo for over two decades. In 2008, the collapse of Koshi’s embankment
unleashed massive flooding, highlighting India’s failure to take precautionary
measures and its refusal to take responsibility.

Nepal’s bureaucrats and water experts are reluctant to talk about any new framework
agreements due to past experiences. The country appears to be in denial, as suggested
by former Indian diplomat S.D. Muni in terms of India–Nepal water cooperation.
 China-Nepal relations: recent advances:
Amidst such historically complicated relationship between the two neighbours, China
has emerged as the new partner towards which Nepal has sought to tilt towards in the
recent past. The following sections discuss the new prospects that China’s
proximity has brought to Nepal.

Hydropower and infrastructure cooperation:

China has undertaken 15 projects in Nepal, including four hydropower plants, and the
country’s second international airport at Pokhara, with 14 others in the pipeline.

China has completed the construction of the 30MW upper trishuli hydropower project
in 2019, a US 350 million$ nepali police training academy as well in 2018. However,
Chinese infrastructure projects have also witnessed major challenges related to
cost escalation, project related displacement concerns etc. Already there are
complaints that the Pokhara airport the Chinese are building is vastly overpriced. It
was estimated to cost about US$140 million but was contracted to a Chinese company
at US$216 million with loans from the China EXIM Bank.

The chinese trade presence in Nepal has increased significantly over the years and
stood at roughly 2billion$/year in 2017. China today has emerged the largest foreign
investor in Nepal ahead of India and the influx of chinese tourists has steadily
increased over the years.

The Trans-Himalayan railway

China and Nepal have agreed to “intensify implementation of the MoU on

Cooperation under the BRI to enhance connectivity,” which includes ports,
roads, railways, aviation and communications in the framework of the Trans -
Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network.

India poses a legitimate question: Is the trans-Himalayan railway up to

Kathmandu economically viable, since several costly tunnels are needed
before the railway reaches the lower mountains and plains?

India might be overplaying the risk. First, excluding Kathmandu, the Chinese
Qinghai-Tibet railway—already fully operational up to Shigatse (Xigaze)—is
expected to soon reach the Nepal border in Kerung (Gyirong). From Kerung it
will be a 100-km-long railway to Kathmandu.
 A combined transportation system of rail and truck via that route reduces the
journey substantially.

Second, for its part, Nepal views the Chinese railway as an opportunity to bring
Chinese pilgrims and tourists to Lumbini, the birthplace of the Buddha, and to
the popular valley of Pokhara. Incidentally, in the first quarter of 2018, for the
first time, Nepal welcomed more Chinese than Indian tourists .

However, the economic viability of the Kerung (China-Nepal border) to–

Raxaul (Indian border) route is uncertain, with India emphasizing its own
centrality in the project and China planning to reach out to the Gangetic plains
via Nepal.

The dynamics of Nepal’s relations with India differ from that with China.
Nepal views its engagement with China from a different perspective. Due to the
much-debated “debt trap,” Nepal is cautious and has asked China to fund the
railway as a grant and not as a loan. China, for its part, has also learned from
its international failures, be it debt problems with host countries or political
instability in some countries in Latin America and Africa where its plans did
not materialise. Thus, it is understandable that China wants a stable Nepali
government, and many have speculated that China is behind the merger of
communist parties in Nepal.
Even without the rail connectivity and BRI, the China–Nepal engagement has
strengthened in sectors such as hydropower, aviation, tourism,
telecommunications, people-to-people relations, cultural exchanges, political
exchanges, industry and technology

The way forward

The recent joint communiqués between India and Nepal seem to have all the
right words and tone for a constructive move forward in their bilateral
relations. Immediately after the successive visits of Modi and Oli, there has
been unprecedented progress in several areas. For instance, a joint inspection
team visited the bordering areas prone to flooding, something that has not
happened in the past. Similarly, contrary to expectations, the joint Eminent
Persons Group (EPG) has finalised their recommendations on the revision of
the 1950 treaty, and submitted them to the two prime ministers for possible
implementation. Another joint meeting has agreed to finalise modalities to
implement the grand project of water connectivity, and India is willing to
provide financial and technical support. The Oli government wants ships to
enter Nepali waters by 2020.

Recent Indian initiatives in India-Nepal relationship

Institutional mechanism: India and Nepal have several bilateral institutional dialogue
mechanisms, including the India Nepal Joint Commission co-chaired by External
Affairs Minister of India and Foreign Minister of Nepal. The Fourth Joint
Commission Meeting was held in New Delhi in 2016, while the 5th meeting was held
in Kathmandu in 2019.

2015 earthquake relief assistance: The total Indian relief assistance to Nepal
amounted to over US$ 67 million. The Government of India announced a post-
earthquake reconstruction package of US$ 1 bn (which comprises US$ 250 mn grant
and US$ 750 mn concessional Line of Credit).

Connectivity linkages: In recent years, India has been assisting Nepal in development
of border infrastructure through upgradation of roads in the Terai areas; development
of cross border rail links at Jogbani-Biratnagar,
During the visit of Prime Minister of Nepal in April 2018, the two Prime Ministers
jointly inaugurated the Integrated Check Post in Birgunj (Nepal) built with GoI
assistance. In 2019, both sides inaugurated the 69-km Motihari-Amlekhgunj pipeline,
having a capacity of 2 million metric ton per annum which would ensure
uninterrupted, cheaper supply of oil to Nepal. The project has been almost completely
financed by India.

Defence cooperation: India and Nepal have wide-ranging cooperation in the defence
sector. India has been assisting the Nepal Army (NA) alternately in India and in
Nepal. Since 1950, India and Nepal have been awarding each other’s Army Chief
with the honorary rank of General in recognition of the mutual harmonious
relationship between the two armies.
Gorkha Soldiers in the Indian Army : The Gorkha regiments of the Indian Army are
raised partly by recruitment from hill districts of Nepal. Currently, about 32,000
Gorkha Soldiers from Nepal are serving in the Indian Army.

Power: India and Nepal have a Power Exchange Agreement since 1971 for meeting
the power requirements in the border areas of the two countries, taking advantage of
each other's transmission infrastructure. India is currently supplying a total of about
450 MW of power to Nepal.

India’s recent connectivity initiatives to Nepal

The MoU signed between India-Nepal on the Raxaul–Kathmandu railway

has also been well received. However, despite generous announcements, India
continues to send mixed signals. First, in terms of the land and air connectivity,
the response has been sluggish: the gap between providing access to Vizag Port
and new air routes to Nepal is two years. Nepal’s request to access India’s west
ports is at a nascent stage and will take some more years.

Regarding China’s inroads into Nepal, an option for India would be to defend
the status quo by attempting to block Nepal’s options to diversify its
cooperation with neighbours, through projects such as the infrastructure
development by Chinese investment. However, such a policy is bound to fail
because Nepal is determined to take advantage of cooperation opp ortunities
with foreign partners, including China.

China is winning hearts and minds in Nepal through generous strategic charity.
After the 19 th Party Congress, it will continue to “use economic diplomacy as
the foundation of its foreign policy.” Therefore, the way forward for India
would be to depart from its exclusively traditional security angle and be
proactive with innovative strategies and policies.

As things are, Nepal cannot dispense with its reliance on India. India is
and will remain vital for the country in many ways. However, Nepal is now
a member of China’s massive BRI, which puts India in a difficult position .
As ORF analysts, Harsh V. Pant and Abhijnan Rej rightly put it, “New Delhi
has found itself utterly unprepared to deal with an assertive Chinese foreign
policy under Xi Jinping.
Nepal is equally eager about the prospects of being road-connected with
Myanmar and Thailand through BIMSTEC as it is with the BRI on the northern
front. Therefore, India may want to institutionalize the current approach, which
seems to be in the best interest of both

India-Nepal Treaty of Peace & Friendship – 1950: the need for revision

Introduction- the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Nepal and India,
concluded on July 31, 1950, has become an emotional issue in Nepal and the demand
for its abrogation has regularly featured in election manifestos.

Many Nepalese commentators have argued that the treaty was signed by the then
Maharaja, prime minister and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Nepal,Jang Bahadur
Rana, who was not an elected representative. Most importantly, the Rana regime
fell within six months of the signing of the treaty.

Subsequent governments in Nepal have been expressing their reservations over the
treaty ever since. With the introduction of multiparty democracy in Nepal in 1990, the
treaty became an important electoral issue for some political parties in Nepal. In 1994,
for example, the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML)
campaigned on that issue vigorously.

Both the countries agreed in September 2008 to form a high-level committee headed
by the foreign secretaries of the two countries to examine the treaty and suggest
possible revisions. There is a view in India that the review process could be delayed
due to the civil conflict and political instability in Nepal.
Former Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran also dismissed the contention of Pusppa
Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) that the treaty was an ‘unequal pact’, and pointed out that
under the pact ‘Nepali citizens enjoy special privileges in India.

Review of the 1950 treaty

Aim of the treaty- The treaty was signed with an objective to strengthen the
relationship between the two countries by recognising historical values and
perpetuating peace in the region. It provided the foundation for India and Nepal
relations. The treaty contains 10 articles.
Article 1: the two countries acknowledge each other’s territorial integrity and
sovereignty.
Article 2: says that they have to inform each other in case of friction with
neighbouring countries.
Articles 5: secret letters associated with Article 5 deal with arms imports of Nepal
Article 6: national treatment of each other’s citizens in economic matters
Article 7: reciprocal treatment to nationals in matters concerning residence, protection
and trade.
.
Necessity of the treaty- It needs to be mentioned here that land-locked Nepal
conducts trade with the outside world through India. As K.V. Rajan observed, the
treaty ‘basically offered economic opportunities in India for Nepalese nationals
against Nepalese assurances that India’s security concerns would be respected’
The international and regional situation during the 1950s, when the treaty was signed,
was wholly different from what it is today. The world was then reeling under the Cold
War. The international community was divided into three blocks of capitalist,
communist and non-aligned nations. India as a newly independent country with a
weak military and troubled by internal disturbances was suspicious of the Chinese
adventurism in Tibet. It was also apprehensive of the communist influence in Nepal.
As an Indian scholar has noted, ‘India was also perturbed by the Chinese claim that
Tibet is China’s palm and Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Ladakh and NEFA are five fingers.
With the palm already under Chinese grip the security of other Himalayan countries
was endangered.’

The Chinese annexation of Tibet changed the strategic significance of Nepal. India
decided to strengthen its northern frontier by taking Nepal into confidence.
Expressing India’s concern, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said ‘We cannot allow
anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened
because that would also be a risk to our security’.

Nepal, which was striving for recognition in the community of nations and was facing
domestic upheaval due to protests against Rana rulers, was surprised by the Chinese
claim on Tibet. S.D. Muni has observed that the then ‘external environment,
particularly the developments in China and Tibet and the Chinese attitude of
acquiescence towards the Indo-Nepalese ties also contributed a great deal in the
evolution and perpetuation of “special relations” between the two countries’.
The Ranas also were looking for an opportunity to enter into some kind of
understanding with India to pacify the democratic movement. During 1947–1950,
Ranas’ policy towards India was ‘guided by winning over India’s sympathy or to
prevent [it] from supporting the democratic movements in Nepal which had its base in
India’.
Both Nepal and India identified China as a potential threat. The commonality of
interests and requirements resulted in the signing of the treaty. The treaty was not
a military alliance but a kind of partnership between the two countries to prevent the
Chinese threat.
The treaty also included socio-economic and cultural aspects of the relationship for
mutual benefit. Nevertheless, the treaty is regarded as an unequal one by the
nationalists in Nepal and is often used by both domestic and external forces to create
anti-India sentiments in Nepal.
The Maoists have argued that the treaty is responsible for underdevelopment in Nepal
and that it has been hindering Nepal from adopting a free foreign policy.
Irritants in the treaty- Nepali Perceptions.
1) Some Nepalese scholars argue that the treaty was signed with a Rana prime
minister who was not elected by the people and therefore does not represent
the Nepali political consensus. They also refer to the unequal status of the
signatories (it was co signed by the then Indian ambassador and King of
Nepal) as an example of the built in inequality in the treaty.

2) Under the provisions of the treaty, neither country can unilaterally impose
restrictions on the free movement of their people across the border. However,
the Nepalese analysts allege that India had unilaterally imposed restrictions on
Nepal in the past.

3) India has deliberately kept Nepal dependent on itself and created

insurmountable difficulties in implementing a development policy based on
market liberalism, because it was not ideologically palatable to India during
1950–1990.

4) Nepal feels uncomfortable with the 1965 arms agreement. In case of purchases
from a third country, Nepal has to inform India. There were accusations that
India did not supply arms to Nepal when it required them the most. The
allegation was made by the then King Mahendra who was facing strong
resistance from democratic forces in the early 1960s. India did not supply
arms because it apprehended that the arms would be used against civilians.
India also did not supply surplus arms in early 1960s due to the Sino India
conflict in 1962. India took similar steps in 2005 when King Gyanendra
assumed power directly after dismissing the elected government. Nepal then
decided to buy arms from China and Pakistan, much to India’s discomfort.
Nepal also vigorously supported China’s entry into South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

5) Another criticism which frequently appears in Nepalese writings is that India

has demanded reciprocal ‘national treatment’ for its citizens in Nepalese
territory and access to all of Nepal’s natural resources, while Nepalese citizens
are being discriminated against while acquiring property in India
Interestingly, the reciprocity arrangement was first breached by Nepal in 1958
when King Mahendra imposed restrictions on Indians and foreigners to
purchase immovable property. Later, the King justified this on the grounds of
checking influx from India and brought in a new law which restricted
commercial and business activities by Indians in 1970.

Indian Concerns- Indian perspectives

1) Of late, some groups in Siliguri, West Bengal, have demanded abrogation of
the treaty in order to restrict border movement from Nepal into Darjeeling and
 Siliguri. They demand introduction of a passport-visa system and granting of
citizenship rights only to those Nepalese who had come into India prior to the
signing of the treaty in 1950. It is believed that if the border is not regularised,
the new Nepali migrants might outnumber the original inhabitants, posing a
serious law and order threat in the near future for the hills and plains in the
Darjeeling district. A major concern for India is the demand for Greater Nepal
in the Indian states bordering Nepal.

2) At the same time, Nepal is of great strategic relevance for India. There are 28
passes on the boundary between Nepal and China Professor Hari Bansh Jha
observed that the open border had benefitted around ‘3.5 million to 6 million
Nepalese men and women in gainful employment in India.’

3) In recent years, Nepal is believed to have become a safe haven for terrorists,
smugglers and anti-India elements sponsored by Pakistan’s Inter-Service
Intelligence (ISI).

Benefits of the treaty

The 1950 treaty addressed the security concerns of both states to a large extent. While
signing the treaty, both countries were, in a way, seeking to address the issue of
Chinese adventurism in this region.
For all practical purposes the treaty provided a security guarantee to Nepal against
China. However, China has all along tried its best to neutralise Indian influence in
Nepal and bring Nepal into its own sphere of influence.

Nepal has also benefited from the conflict between China and India. It has played the
Chinese card effectively as a bargaining tool against India. Nepal purchased anti-
aircraft guns, medium range surface-to-surface missiles (SSM), and assault rifles from
China in 1962 and 1988. King Mahendra allowed China to build the Arniko highway
to link Lhasa with Kathmandu, which was started in 1963 and completed in 1965.
It has to be noted that the Kings of Nepal were worried about alleged Indian support
to democratic elements in Nepal and pursued a close relationship with China to offset
Indian pressures.
King Birendra violated the spirit of the 1950 treaty and entered into a secret deal with
China for purchasing Chinese arms.

Kalapani border issue:

The Nepal-India border was delineated by the Sugauli Treaty of 1816, under which it
renounced all territory to the west of the river Kali, also known as the Mahakali or the
Sarada river. The river effectively became the boundary.

The issue: The rival territorial claims centre on the source of the Kali.
Nepal’s case is that the river originates from a stream at Limpiyadhura, north-west of
Lipu Lekh. Thus Kalapani, and Limpiyadhura, and Lipu Lekh, fall to the east of the
river and are part of Nepal’s Far West province in the district of Dharchula.

New Delhi’s position is that the Kali originates in springs well below the pass, and
that while the Treaty does not demarcate the area north of these springs,
administrative and revenue records going back to the nineteenth century show that
Kalapani was on the Indian side, and counted as part of Pithoragarh district, now in
Uttarakhand. Both sides have their own British-era maps as proof of their positions
Strategic importance of Kalapani issue.

Importance of Kalapani: Since the 1962 war with China, India has deployed the
ITBP at Kalapani, which is advantageously located at a height of over 20,000 ft and
serves as an observation post for that area.

During the Doklam crisis, a senior official in the Chinese Foreign Ministry raised
temperatures by suggesting that India would not be able to do anything if the PLA
decided to walk in “through Kalapani or into Kashmir, through PoK”, both
trijunctions like Doklam.
Though China has said nothing about the road construction to Lipu Lekh, it has
protested similar road building activity at other places on the Indian side close to the
LAC, including Ladakh.
In view of all this, Kalapani and the approach to Lipu Lekh has only grown in
strategic importance for India, especially as relations between the two countries have
remained uneven over the last few years, and China has upped its game for influence
in India’a neighbourhood.

For its part, India perceives Nepal to be tilting towards China under the leadership of
Prime Minister K P Oli and his Nepal Communist Party. Responding to Nepal’s
protests, India has said it is ready to discuss the matter at foreign secretary level talks
between the two countries.
 India – West Asia Relations

Overall analysis of India’s policy

West Asia is most sensitive region of International politics. According to the former vice
president Hamid Ansari (TRAVELLING THROUGH THE CONFLICT) , strategic importance of
West Asia lies in its geography, in its essential resources. He also points that West Asia
suffers from the curse of centrality.
Importance for India
C Rajamohan explains India’s foreign policy strategy in form of 3 concentric circles/Mandals
1. Immediate neighbourhood.
2. Extended neighbourhood
3. The outside world
West Asia is in the second concentric circle.
West Asia is not just a gas station for India, it has huge strategic importance (Rakesh Sood)
Views of Alfred T Mahan.
He advised British India to focus on West Asia to maintain the hegemony
of British empire. India’s security is linked to peace and stability in West
Asia.

What has been India’s policy in West Asia?

One of the earliest decisions on foreign policy matters taken by independent India was
related to West Asia on the creation of Israel. Indian leaders opposed the creation because
of Pakistan factor. India was against making religion , the basis of statehood. India took pro-
Palestinian approach. It is generally believed that there is a domestic determinant of India’s
stand on palestinian issue i.e. The sentiments of Muslim minorities in India.

Views of Ishrat Aziz

The foreign policy of any country including India is based on national interest. It was purely
secular consideration. India knew that creation of Israel will destabilize the entire middle
east. Instability will create security threat for India. It is a wrong assumption that the
sentiments of Muslims shaped India’s west Asia policy. It is to be noted that unlike USA
where there are different lobbies, there is no Muslim lobby in India, directing India’s foreign
policy. India’s foreign policy so far has been conducted in the framework of non-alignment.
West Asia is the best place where India could successfully pursue non-alignment. India could
maintain good relations with Iran, Israel as well as Gulf countries. This shows that even for
West Asian countries, religion is not a consideration.

At present, Gulf countries are strengthening their relations with India even at the cost of
Pakistan.They are looking at India as an opportunity. e.g. Saudi Arabia wants to diversify its
economy rather than just relying on oil exports. Gulf countries are looking at India as a net
security provider. India is also a source of cheap labour. India has huge cultural capital,
diaspora in the region. 30% of UAE population is Indian. (3.5 million).
Former Ambassador Ranjit Gupta described India’s policy as ‘non interventionist, non
judgemental, non prescriptive and non alignment’. India has stayed away from taking sides
in Local conflicts.
What should be India’s policy in West Asia?
West Asia is a highly challenging area because of numerous fault lines. It is not easy to
navigate through ‘the choppy waters’ of the politics in West Asia. So far India has done well.
India could protect its interests, even none of the non state actors in West Asia have directly
targeted India.

There are two schools of thought in India when it comes to policy on West Asia
1. Continue the traditional policy. Maintain low profile.
Prof. Girijesh Pant – West Asia is not a place for display of India’s power. It is a place
for augmentation of India’s power.
Former Ambassador Ranjit Gupta – Our policy should be based on the mature
recognition of the limits of our capabilities. India’s passivity is fine in unpredictable
and volatile environment. If speech is silver, silence is golden.
2. India should play more proactive role.
MEA S Jaishankar : India’s foreign policy should
change in accordance to its changed status. India
should be a leading power and not just a balancing
power. India’s ‘think west’ shall match India’s ‘act
east’. According to him, up till now our foreign
policy towards West Asia was free from ‘strategic
calculations’ driven by market than by strategic interest. However now we are
consolidating the partnership.

C Rajamohan – After many false starts, India is emerging as the swing state. India
has potential to shape the outcomes on many critical issues.
Chinmaya Gharekhan – India should leave the passive approach and should raise its
‘diplomatic profile’.

India adopted the “Look West policy” in 2005. While announcing the new policy, Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh said that “the Gulf region, like South-East and South Asia, is
part of our natural economic hinterland. We must pursue closer economic relations with
all our neighbours in our wider Asian neighbourhood. India has successfully pursued a
‘Look East’ policy to come closer to the countries of South-East Asia. We must come
closer to our western neighbours in the Gulf.”

S Jaishankar as the foreign Secretary in 2016 held that , while Act East Policy is under
consolidation , it is also perhaps time to think West . In the coming days , it may be
expected that Gulf will be the focus of India’s foreign policy .(Speech at Net Growth Annual
Summit)

Nicolas Blarel – ‘RECALIBRATING INDIA’S MIDDLE EAST POLICY’

India is a linked to the region through culture, commerce and colonialism. India needs
multiple engagements. Under Modi govt. India is able to overcome its attitude of looking at
West Asia through the prism of Pakistan.
Achievement in ‘look west’

Though there is a impression that Look East is the most successful initiative but actually from
the very beginning, Look West has been successful. Still India’s trade with South East Asia is
much less than the bilateral trade India has with Gulf Countries ($ 200 bn).

Gulf countries – up till now India has neglected Saudi Arabia, UAE but we have entered into
the strategic partnership. Even India does have good relations with Qatar.
Iran – PM tried to consolidate relations with Iran also. However India Iran relations have
never reached to its optimal potential. The reason is Iran’s aspiration to become the leader
in the Muslim world compels Iran to take pro-Pakistan approach in Kashmir. Iran is also
fearful of Saudi Arabia loosing Pakistan to create instability. India’s compulsions to have
closer relations with USA make it difficult for India to maintain equity in the relations.
According to Iranian diplomat’s New Delhi’s Qiblah is Washington. According to PM Modi,
there is a huge potential. Once we make up our mind, distance is just half a step.
Israel – India always had close relations with Israel. However the relationship has not been
open. Nehru’s policy towards Israel was ‘recognition without relations’. Nehru took
extremely pro-palestinian stand. It used to be said that Nehru tried to look more Arab than
the Arabs themselves. Much before India, Egypt, Jordan recognized Israel. Israel has always
provided critical help in India’s war against Pakistan. Israel’s help was critical in Kargil war. It
was during the time of Narsimha Rao in 1992 that we established full diplomatic relations.
Now across the party consensus is to maintain close relations with Israel.

The basic difference in Congress and BJP’s approach is, Congress’s approach was to keep the
relations in closet , while BJP’s approach is to bring the relationship in lime light .
According to C Rajamohan, Modi’s approach is transparent and more confident.
Turkey – India never had good relations with Turkey. Turkey showered all of her love for
Pakistan because of Turkey’s aspiration to be a leader in Muslim world.
 India-Iran Relations

Iran, one of the richest countries in hydrocarbon and India. Nevertheless, Iran’s strategic
significance to India is crucial, compelling India to remain tied to Iran in face of
insurmountable difficulties. Under the current scenario, had relations been solely based on
energy it would have been easy for india to drift away. However, Iran’s geographical position
is paramount to India’s geopolitical outreach, especially to Central Asia, a rich reservoir of
natural resources. Similarly, Iran is vital for India’s access to Afghanistan in which India has
immense strategic and security interests.
The benefits of India-Iran ties are mutual. An important element in the India-Iran
relationship is India’s status as a huge market for Iranian products. India’s choice of Iran as a
gateway to Central Asia and Afghanistan also has positive repercussions on Iran’s
aspirations of becoming a regional hub for trade and transit. Finally, under the backdrop of
Iran’s nuclear controversy and US efforts to isolate Iran, the continued relationship of the
Islamic Republic of Iran with the world’s largest democracy has immense ideational value.
Such an understanding of reciprocally advantageous consequences motivated India and Iran
to formally sign two consecutive comprehensive joint documents reflecting their vision of
strategic partnership. The first is the ‘Tehran Declaration’ signed in April 2001, and the
second is the ‘New Delhi Declaration’ signed in January 2003. While these documents serve
as a template for greater regional and global cooperation, they also highlight the realisation
of the scope of such a partnership. Notwithstanding these efforts, the cloud of the Iranian
nuclear controversy and India’s need for closeness to the United States had implications on
India-Iran relations. Still, the issues surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme, its regional
role, and resultant antagonism with other countries have its share of pressure on the
potentially deep and broad bilateral ties between India and Iran. Since the onset of this
controversy, India has indulged in a balancing act between its relationship with Iran, on one
hand, and with the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, on the other. The US effort to impose
“maximum pressure” on Iran to ensure its seclusion has its toll on the India-Iran relationship.
Amongst the visible effects of the Iran-US enmity is Iran’s increased ties with China, an
adversary of India. 25-years of strategic partnership between Iran and China is likely to have
further implications on the dynamics of the India-Iran relationship.
The Current Scenario
In order to understand the current depth and anticipate
the future course of India-Iran relations, three core issues
could be underlined, which serve as a pointer to this
trajectory.
The first is Iran’s Farzad-B Gas Field in which an Indian
state-owned company, ONGC, was involved at the
discovery stage. After the detection of gas, a protracted negotiation between the two sides
failed to result in India obtaining the rights to its development, translating into Iran deciding
to independently develop this field.
The second prominent issue that has become a marker of the evolving India-Iran relationship
is the proposed railway line connecting Chabahar to Zahedan, the capital of Iran’s Sistan and
Baluchestan Province. This project was conceived to link the Chabahar Port to Afghanistan,
which is of sizeable strategic interest to India. Recently, the media reported that Iran had
withdrawn its proposal from India. However, India has denied this, officially maintaining that
the two countries are currently in talks to fructify this venture.
The third important issue is the Chabahar Port project. In this
realm, India has achieved considerable success, specifically in
terms of starting the operation of this project after the initial
investment for its development. India’s initial commitment
was in 2003, and the port was finally operationalized in 2016.
Despite the impediments created by US sanctions, the two
countries made significant progress on this front and since
2018, an Indian company has been operating the port.. The
two countries are further exploring ways to boost traffic
towards making the port more economically viable and
increasing its usage for Afghanistan as well as Central Asia.
Notably, in the Indian strategic discourses, Chabahar has often
been portrayed as a strategic gain for India, especially given China’s participation in the
development of Pakistan’s Gwadar Port. However, Iran has avoided linking any strategy
dimension to the Chabahar Port and has articulated its willingness to open the door of its
further development to other countries, including China. The future developments in the
arena of the Chabahar Port and the depth of India’s participation, as well as China’s
presence or absence, will have ramifications on the evolving strategic partnership between
India and Iran.

Analysis
A comprehensive review of the depth, nature, and trajectory of India-Iran relations is also
indicative of the nature of India’s broader approach to the Middle East. The recent
developments where a war-weary United States is increasingly perceived as returning to its
traditional role of an offshore balancer in the Middle East has created avenues for other
powers such as Russia, China, Turkey, and India to make inroads in the region.

India has joined the club of Russian S400 missile defence system, which China, Turkey, and
Iran also belong, reflecting a unique commonality between these five countries. The fact that
the transfer of Russia’s S400 missile defence system is antithetical to US strategic interest,
India’s enlistment in this club may provide some hint to India’s eventual leaning in the
balance of power between the two camps respectively led by the US and Russia in the Middle
East, a region where Iran is a key actor. This, however, is a long-term scenario.
In the foreseeable future, India’s strategic and economic standing is likely to provide it a
limited role in the Middle East; directly impacting its ties with Iran. As India’s strength grows
and it is more capable of projecting power away from its borders, its foreign policy might
witness according changes. Still, India’s offshore manoeuvrability might be constricted by its
position as a state sandwiched by two antagonistic nuclear powers, viz., China and Pakistan,
claiming a large chunk of its strategic resources. Another limitation is that unlike China, India
does not enjoy permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council; an apparent
factor in Iran’s calculations while choosing between India and China.
Despite India’s energy dependence on the Middle East, its economic structure ties it more to
the West. A prodigious portion of India’s GDP constitutes the service sector whose
destination is primarily the West, including the US; a component in India’s risk assessments
in forging ties with Iran. This often causes a mismatch between India’s aspirations and
deliveries, creating a scenario in which its policy towards Iran either looks as ambivalent or
succumbing to US pressure. The truth is that India’s relationship with Iran is as much
predicated on its national interests as its relations with any other country.
Unlike India, China has a rapidly developing manufacturing industry for which it needs raw
material as well as expanding markets and this is a potent aspect in its analysis of
determining the risks of US sanctions while forming ties with Iran. Consequently, the two
countries are establishing a long-term relationship that is likely to prove as a game-changer
in the Middle East and have further negative repercussions on India-Iran relations.

The Abraham Accords, which further consolidates the front against Iran and is potentially
isolating it more, is still another development that may further impede the growth of India-
Iran relations.

For India, Iran proved to be a territory to extend its influence offshore, both economic and
strategic. However, Iran has traditionally tied itself to the Pakistan and is recently drawing
nearer to China in a fashion that may put its relations with India on uncomfortable ground.
Such realisation by India, especially through the painful ways of delayed or failed
negotiations, appears to be instilling a sentiment of fatigue in the Indian attempt of
nurturing closer ties with Iran. These are some indicators that may compel us to believe that
the pace of India-Iran relations may further slow down until a long-term solution to the Iran-
US standoff is found.

India–Iran relations : Timeline

Independent India and Iran established diplomatic relations on 15 March 1950. During much
of the Cold War period, relations between the Republic of India and the erstwhile Imperial
State of Iran suffered due to their different political interests—non-aligned India fostered
strong military links with the Soviet Union, while Iran enjoyed close ties with the United
States.
Following the 1979 revolution, relations between Iran and India strengthened momentarily.
However, Iran's continued support for Pakistan and India's close relations with Iraq during
the Iran–Iraq War impeded further development of Indo–Iranian ties.
In the 1990s, India and Iran supported the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan against the
Taliban regime.. The two countries signed a defence cooperation agreement in December
2002
In 2011, the US$12 billion annual oil trade between India and Iran was halted due to
extensive economic sanctions against Iran.

From the geopolitical perspective, even though the two countries share some common
strategic interests, India and Iran differ significantly on key foreign policy issues.

India has expressed opposition to Iran's nuclear programme and whilst India is against
reconciliation with taliban, Iran favours reconciliation with Taliban, India supports the
presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan unlike Iran.

On 22 May 2016, Prime minister Narendra Modi paid an official visit to Iran. The visit
focused on bilateral connectivity and infrastructure, an energy partnership, and trade.

Just before Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Israel in July 2017, Iran's Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei, urged Muslims in Kashmir to 'repudiate oppressors'.

Issues in India Iran Relations

Iran's Nuclear Interests
India, despite close relations and convergence of interests with Iran, voted against Iran in the
International Atomic Energy Agency in 2005, which took Iran by surprise. Indo-US nuclear
deal was conditional to India supporting the US on the Iran issue.
Infrastructure
A highway between Zaranj and Delaram (Zaranj-Delaram Highway) is being built with
financial support from India. The Chabahar port has also been jointly financed by Iran and
India. India alone plans to invest 20 Billion US dollars towards development of Chabahar
port. India is helping develop the Chabahar Port, which will give it access to the oil and gas
resources in Iran and the Central Asian states. By so doing, India hopes to compete with the
Chinese, who are building Gwadar Port, in Pakistan's Balochistan. Iran plans to use Chabahar
for trans-shipment to Afghanistan and Central Asia, while keeping the port of Bandar Abbas
as a major hub mainly for trade with Russia and Europe. India, Iran and Afghanistan have
signed an agreement to give Indian goods, heading for Central Asia and Afghanistan,
preferential treatment and tariff reductions at Chabahar.
Work on the Chabahar-Milak-Zaranj-Delaram route from Iran to Afghanistan is in progress.
Iran is, with Indian aid, upgrading the Chabahar-Milak road and constructing a bridge on the
route to Zaranj. India's BRO is laying the 213 km Zaranj-Delaram road. It is a part of India's
US$750 million aid package to Afghanistan. The Chabahar port project is Iran's chance to
end its US-sponsored economic isolation and benefit from the resurgent Indian economy.
Along with Bandar Abbas, Chabahar is the Iranian entry point on the north–south corridor.

North-South Transport Corridor

North South Transport Corridor route via India, Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia
The North–South Transport Corridor is the ship, rail, and road route for moving freight
between India, Russia, Iran, Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The route primarily
involves moving freight from India, Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia via ship, rail and road.The
objective of the corridor is to increase trade connectivity between major cities such as
Mumbai, Moscow, Tehran, Baku, Bandar Abbas, Astrakhan, Bandar Anzali, etc.It is expected
that the transport costs will be reduced by "$2,500 per 15 tons of cargo".
Iran China Strategic Partnership

China signed 25-year deal with Iran in challenge to the US

Beijing plans to invest in Iran while buying oil from the Islamic Republic, further straining its
relationship with the US

Iran’s closer integration with China may help shore up its economy against the impact of the
US sanctions, while sending a clear signal to the White House of Tehran’s intentions

China and Iran signed an overarching deal aimed at charting the course of their economic,
political and trade relations over the next 25 years.
Beijing plans to invest in Iran while buying oil from the Islamic Republic, further straining its
relationship with the US which has already been frayed by China’s imports of covertly-
shipped Iranian crude.

The “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" agreement, signed in Tehran in march 2021by

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, has
been in the works since 2016, when President Xi Jinping became the first Chinese leader to
visit the Iranian capital in over a decade.
The latest alliance between Beijing and Tehran is a challenge to US President Joe Biden’s
administration as it sets about trying to rally allies against China, which Secretary of State
Antony Blinken has said is the world’s “greatest geopolitical test."
“The document can elevate bilateral ties to a new strategic level," Foreign Ministry
spokesman of Iran held. The deal focuses on boosting private-sector collaboration and Iran’s
role in Xi’s flagship infrastructure and investment program, the Belt and Road Initiative, he
said.
There is a plan for long-term supply of Iranian crude to China as well as investment in oil,
gas, petrochemical, renewables and nuclear energy infrastructure.
Lured by the prospect of cheaper prices, China has already increased its imports of Iranian oil
to around 1 million barrels a day, eroding US leverage as it prepares to enter stalled talks
with Tehran to revive a nuclear deal.
The Biden administration has indicated that it’s open to reengaging with Iran after then-
President Donald Trump abandoned the accord nearly three years ago and reimposed
economic sanctions, but the two sides have yet to even agree to meet. Iran exported around
2.5 million barrels of oil a day before American penalties resumed.
Iran’s closer integration with China may help shore up its economy against the impact of the
US sanctions, while sending a clear signal to the White House of Tehran’s intentions.
Challenges in the relations :
Iranian experts feel Chabahar, much touted example of New Delhi-Tehran . Geo economic
cooperation, is over hyped and India cooperates with Iran only to balance its equations with
China and Pakistan.
The various shortcomings that are preventing it from achieving its stated objectives and the
overall trajectory of Indo-Iranian partnership.

Post Islamic Revolution, Indo-American relationship has defined Indo-Iran relations

Iran-India relations have always been influenced by international actors. The impact of
regional and trans-regional variables is more serious in Chabahar and it forces Iran and India
to make strategic choices against each other. In recent years, India has moved closer to the
United States and the West and reduced cooperation with Iran and China. India has also
participated in the US super-maximum economic pressure campaign against the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Due to that, it has reduced its commercial relations with Tehran to the
lowest level in recent years.
 India-Israel Relations

Warming Indo-Israeli relations first occurred between an earlier Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee (in office for a full term between 1999 and 2004), and
Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s long-time leader, whose Likud Party was, and remains,
ideologically similar to the BJP. Their “warmth” was reignited when Prime Minister Narendra
Modi was elected in 2014.

While India formally recognised Israel in 1950, bilateral engagement, or “normalisation”

only began formally in 1992. Indian National Congress Party governments, however, did not
have open relations with Israel, believing that visible ties with it would damage India’s
relations with surrounding Islamic states including Palestine, which had India’s “principled
support”, and its own Muslim population. These fears remain unproven.

Zionist Israel, perceiving threats to its security from its Muslim-majority neighbours,
primarily Iran-influenced Hezbollah in Lebanon and now the Palestinian Authority, and Modi,
whose lifelong membership of the right-wing Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sang (RSS), is moving
legislatively towards a Hindu India, share, as said, right-wing values.

India’s relations with Israel have two major policy planks: military-security supply – India has
become the largest market for Israel’s military exports – and a land-based agenda drawing
on Israel’s expertise in fields including agriculture, dairy farming and water management,
boosted by “value-adding” such as training and technology transfers. They also share a fear
of terrorism from Islamic states, Iran in the case of Israel, and for India, from Pakistan, and it
is arguably the greatest area of co-operation between them, involving the exchange of
information on terrorist groups and their activities including recruitment practices, border
security and comparisons of operational experiences.

While the Indo-Israeli relationship, at least under the current leaders, is well cemented,
India’s support for Palestine has shifted. The first line of the Indian Ministry of External
Affairs’ “Updated Note on India-Palestine Relations” states that ‘India’s support for the
Palestinian cause is an integral part of the nation’s foreign policy’, but in his first year in
office (2014) Modi chose to follow a “de-hyphenation” policy in order to deal with both
independently, despite the long-running conflict over delineating the Palestinian state.
Hosting or visiting both leaders as he did in 2017, Modi has again demonstrated his
diplomatic – or fence-sitting – skills.
Timeline of India Israel Relations
1949 – India voted against creation of Israel .
1950 – Official recognition to Israel
1992 – Full diplomatic relations with Embassy in Tel Aviv.
1997 – Ezer Weizman , became first Israeli president to visit India .
2000 – Advani and Jaswant Singh became first minsters to visit Israel and cooperation in anti
terrorism begins .
2017 – Modi becomes the first PM to visit Israel . It was a standalone visit .

2018 – Netanyahu visited India to commemorate 25 years of the relations.

Areas of cooperation
Defence - Israel is becoming Leading supplier . India took UAVs , Falcon AWACs systems,
Barak I surface to air missiles .
Intelligence sharing – Between RAW and Mossad .
Bilateral Trade – 200 million USD in 1992 to 5 billion USD in 2014. Negotiating FTA.

Collaboration in space , Science and technology , agriculture

 India-UAE Relations

The number of Indian nationals residing in the United Arab

Emirates (UAE) has been estimated as over three million,
approximately 27.1% of the country’s population.
While initially engaged in the petroleum industry, Indians are now
spread across the UAE’s economy, in professional services,
manufacturing, transport and construction. The two countries
have agreed to partner to undertake development projects in the region, and India and the
UAE are committed to ‘work together in select countries of sub-Saharan Africa in areas of
priority to them’.
UAE is India’s largest trading partner in the region, the second largest export destination and
fourth largest source of India’s imports. In parallel, India is the UAE’s second largest trading
partner, and a vast source of its imports. The UAE is also India’s “re-export hub” for the
Middle East and North Africa.
Under Modi government , India UAE partnership has become strategic in true sense . UAE is
important for a backchannel diplomacy between India and Pakistan . India UAE have
deepened their defence partnership .
UAE has deported more than 100 fugitives back. As reported in media, UAE has played an
important role in the recent ceasefire agreement .

India and the UAE's bilateral ties have gained momentum amid mutual cooperation in trade,
commerce, culture, heritage healthcare etc; since Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi
came to power in May 2014.
As Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in his speech to the nation on the occasion of
Independence Day on August 15, 2020, India’s neighbours are not the only ones with whom
India shares geographical boundaries, but also those with whom India has close and
harmonious relations. He referred to India’s strong relationship with the countries in West
Asia, particularly the UAE, which further strengthened in the last few years. He personally
thanked the leadership of these countries for their help to the Indian community during the
Covid-19 crisis.”

He added: “Our relationship with the UAE is a multi-faceted one with deep engagements in
trade and investment, tourism, food security, culture, science and technology, defence and
space. Our focus will continue to be on further strengthening our comprehensive strategic
partnership and exploring new areas of cooperation. Food and healthcare have emerged as
important sectors of growth during the pandemic, showing how our strategic ties can adapt
to the changing requirements. Energy will remain an important area of cooperation.
However, we’re not only investing in each other’s energy sector but also working together
for a more sustainable and climate-friendly future. We’re expanding capacities in the field of
renewable energy, particularly in the field of solar energy, including through the
International Solar Alliance. We're committed to working closely with the International
Renewable Energy Agency (Irena) and will also explore possible cooperation in newer areas
like the ‘hydrogen economy’. "

Factors that have contributed to the changing dynamics of the relationship:

1. Diversification of UAE economy: Foreign trade and the oil and gas sectors were the
fulcrum of bilateral relations in the decades preceding the end of the oil era boom. But
since then, the UAE has pursued an aggressive strategy of diversifying its economy, and its
relations with India have benefited as a result.

The focus of bilateral relations have now diversified to include many new sectors after the
official visits of Shaikh Mohammad Bin Zayed and Modi — such as IT, space tech, tourism,
defence manufacturing and renewable energy.

2. Evolving country profile and priorities: The recent upsurge in relations is a reminder
that both the UAE and India have leapfrogged in terms of global reputation and foreign
policy since 1981. India now is not only a growing economic power, but also an
aspirational power. In the 1980s, India was seen as aligned with the Soviet Union — now
we have multidimensional relations with almost all countries. That certainly helps
recalibrate our relations with the UAE. The recent high-level visits of UAE and Indian
leaders also demonstrate the proactive nature of decision-making between the two
countries. The era of passive bilateral relations is over — both nations have demonstrated
that with the same resources as before, there is so much more that can be achieved.

3. Key partners in combating extremism: The UAE and India share a deeply common goal
— fighting terrorism, combating extremism and ideologies of hatred. We cooperate very
closely with Indian authorities in fighting extremists and terrorists — both individuals and
organisations.Both India and the UAE are two moderate nations which have been victims
of terror.

4. Common economic goals: The growing opportunities for jobs in India, along with the
appreciating rupee, booming stock market, structural reforms such as GST, ease of doing
business have all helped prepare a solid foundation for its growth. There are massive
possibilities from the $75-billion fund announced by Modi and Shaikh Mohammad Bin
Zayed.

5. Rigorous follow up to strategic partnership: Another reason for the greater depth in
relations is the rigorous structure of various committees that have been set up following
the high-level visits. Following the elevation of the UAE and India’s relation to a
comprehensive strategic partnership, there are several high-level committees which are
working in parallel to advance the bilateral agenda. A committee on strategic dialogue
committee has been set up which meets twice a year and looks into all matters relating to
bilateral trade. There are also a greater number of highly active fora and advocacy
platforms which have been set up in the past three years, such as the UAE-India Economic
Forum, while the frequency and depth of interaction with existing trade and business
associations have intensified.

6. Greater mobility of people: With a 3.3-million-strong population, the Indian diaspora in

the UAE is the largest in the world, and growing. The UAE has significantly eased visit visa
norms for Indians. The result is greater people-to-people interaction between the two
countries — whether it is Indian tourists seeking a glimpse of the sea, sands and Burj
Khalifa in the UAE, or Emiratis travelling to India for education, investments, medical
treatment or simply on a vacation.
India Saudi Arabia Relations

For long India Saudi relations were affected by Pakistan factor . However, since 90s the
relations have started improving . In 2006, King Abdullah made a special visit which resulted
into Delhi Declaration , the beginning of strategic partnership . It was consolidated in 2010
with Manmohan Singh’s visit which resulted into Riyadh declaration . PM Modi visited Saudi
Arabia in 2016 and was conferred highest civilian award .
Saudi Crown prince Mohammed Bin Salman visited India in 2019.

Saudi Arabia has become the leading supplier of oil , plans to make an investment of 100
Billion USD in next few years.
Comments and Perspectives

India’s Soft Power International Studies

49(3&4) 351–376
in South Asia © 2012 JNU
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London,
New Delhi, Singapore,
Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/0020881714534033
http://isq.sagepub.com

Patryk Kugiel

Abstract
Asymmetrical power relations and India’s contested leadership in South Asia
are two major impediments to ensuring peace and stability in, and integration
of, the region. After having unsuccessfully tested the hard power approach
to impose its will in the region, India has turned towards soft power. It now
tries to rebuild its positive image in the region and attract more neighbours
into a vision of shared prosperity and peace through soft power. This essay
presents an overview of the most recent initiatives aimed at improving India’s
soft power in its neighbourhood and attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of
this strategy. It finds that despite some flaws in this approach, it could bring
tangible positive effects and has the potential to transform relations in South
Asia in the long run.

Keywords
Soft power, India, foreign policy, South Asia, security

Introduction
South Asia is a peculiar region marred by inter-state animosities, developmental
challenges and a number of paradoxes. Despite civilizational, historic and ethnic
linkages among the countries, it is one of the least integrated and most unstable
regions in the world. Intra-regional trade does not exceed 5 per cent and is ham-
pered by political tensions, poor infrastructure and tariff and non-tariff barriers.
After over 60 years of independence, many borders are still contested (for example,
India–Pakistan and India–Bangladesh) and inter-state relations suffer from
cross-border terrorism, illegal migration, arms and drug trade. The fact that
many ethnic and religious groups straddle across borders (Pashtuns in Pakistan
and Afghanistan, Bengalis in India and Bangladesh and Tamils in India and
Sri Lanka) adds another level of complexity and makes foreign policies of many

Patryk Kugiel is an analyst in the International Economic Relations and Global Issues
Programme at the Polish Institute of International Affairs. E-mail: kugiel@pism.pl
The author wishes to thank the anonymous referees for their useful comments on the
essay.
352 Patryk Kugiel

states hostage to domestic compulsions. Although many of its problems would

require regional solutions, regional cooperation is still one thing that is lacking as
illustrated in the limited success of the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC).
One crucial feature of South Asia is ‘asymmetrical power relations’ created by
the obvious domination by India in terms of every parameter—population, terri-
tory, economy or military. India is not only the centrally located, largest country
in the region, but also the only one which shares borders with all South Asian
states except Afghanistan, whereas the rest of them have common borders only
with India, with the exception of Pakistan, which is also adjacent to Afghanistan.
Paradoxically, what should give India a privileged position in the region consti-
tutes both an asset and a liability in practice. In fact, India’s ambitions to play the
role of a regional leader have often been rejected and resisted not only by Pakistan,
but also by its smaller neighbours. India’s sheer size and unparalleled potential
used to be a constant source of apprehension and distrust among other South
Asian states and between regional partners. Therefore, Indian strategists are still
wondering how to translate the country’s natural leadership in the region into a
truly acceptable leadership.
Over the decades, India has pursued different strategies to deal with its trou-
bled neighbourhood and ascertain its special role. One of the most common
approaches was the use of hard power in terms of military build-up, interventions
(for example, in the East Pakistan crisis in 1971 and Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict
during 1983–1990) and economic pressure (for instance, the blockade imposed
on Nepal in 1989). In the post-Cold War period, India has tried to overcome its
regional limitations by engaging more at the Asian and global level without
really solving persisting problems in South Asia (Basrur, 2010). In the last two
decades, India has also used more soft power strategies towards its neighbours to
extract cooperation by increasing its own attractiveness and credibility. This
essay focuses on this latest approach in order to evaluate how India’s soft power
can improve the country’s standing in South Asia and contribute towards a more
prosperous region.
The basic assumption of this essay is that India’s image problem is one of the
important constraints in developing a more stable and cooperative regional
environment in South Asia. It is observed that ‘the hiatus between India’s self-
perception as a status-quo power and its perception by the neighbouring states as
a regional bully is a main cause of stalemate in the South Asian security
environment’ (Mitra, 2003, p. 399). Regardless of India’s true intentions in the
region, the country’s image as a hegemon has adversely affected regional security,
political relations and economic cooperation. If India could effectively improve
its attractiveness and build more trust in relations with its smaller neighbours, it
would find it much easier to promote its interests and achieve regional stability.
This offers a special place for the country’s soft power.
This essay starts with a brief overview of the soft power concept and then
places it in the Indian context. Before analyzing the soft power strategy in South

International Studies, 49, 3&4 (2012): 351–376

India’s Soft Power in South Asia 353

Asia, a short summary of India’s soft power potential and its practical use in for-
eign policy is provided. It then tries to assess how successful the soft power strat-
egy has been so far in strengthening India’s relations with neighbours and what
can be done to further enhance its effectiveness. The essay concludes with three
observations. It is argued that in the last two decades, India has indeed introduced
more soft power strategies, which have brought about some positive outcomes in
its regional policy. If India continues this approach in the future and addresses the
deficiencies in its policy, it can soon gain the image of a legitimate and accepted
regional leader.

Conceptual Explanation
The term ‘soft power’ was first coined and popularized by an American neolib-
eral scholar, Joseph Nye (1990), in his book entitled Bound to Lead: The
Changing Nature of American Power. It was soon used by academia, media and
policy-making establishments and included in foreign policy strategies not only
in the US, but also in the European Union (EU), Japan, Australia and China. In
opposition to neorealists, who emphasize military and economic might, propo-
nents of soft power argue that this form of power has become equally important
in the increasingly interdependent post-Cold War world transformed by the glo-
balization process, popularization of communication technologies and the emer-
gence of new non-state actors. ‘Soft’ or ‘co-optive power’ rests on the ability to
shape the preferences of the others to do what you want rather than coerce them
(sticks) or influence them (carrots) to do what you want (Nye, 2004, p. 2). According
to Nye, a country’s soft power stems from three sources: ‘its culture (in places
where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at
home and abroad) and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and
having moral authority)’ (Nye, 2004, p. 11). Soft power is then understood as
different from both military power and economic power.
As the ‘soft power’ concept has changed over time, it has become larger in
scope. In an extended definition proposed by Joshua Kurlantzick (2007, p. 6),
soft power means ‘anything outside of the military and security realm, including
not only popular culture and public diplomacy, but also more coercive economic
and diplomatic levers, like aid and investment and participation in multilateral
organizations’. In this sense, it could also include, for instance, development
cooperation (foreign aid), which rests on the economic capabilities of the country
but is often used as a tool for creation of goodwill and long-term relationships in
friendly countries. To sum up, when a country has considerable soft power, its
foreign actions would be seen as more legitimate and others would be more will-
ing to comply with its objectives.
It is important to note that despite its increasing popularity, soft power is still a
highly contested concept with many unresolved theoretical and practical flaws.

International Studies, 49, 3&4 (2012): 351–376

354 Patryk Kugiel

It has been criticized for being too vague and elusive. Critics point at the second-
ary character of soft power in relation to hard attributes (Rothman, 2011). Due to
its very nature, soft power is also more subjective, elusive and difficult to measure
than hard power. It is much easier, for example, to count the number of tanks a
country possesses than quantify the attractiveness of a country’s culture or the
legitimacy of its policies. The mere possession of soft power resources does not
guarantee that a country would know how to use them to influence the behaviour
of others. Soft power is about people’s perceptions and, hence, works in a longer
perspective. It is subject to individual contexts. What can be seen as attractive for
some can be perceived as repulsive by others. For instance, Indian Bollywood
movies may be a great source of Indian soft power in many Asian or African coun-
tries but will be less appreciated in Europe, which is not used to this kind of aes-
thetics. Similarly, Hollywood productions may work well among young Indians,
but not necessarily among more conservative youth in Iran. Moreover, it is very
problematic to prove the causal relationship between the attractiveness of a coun-
try’s culture or values and specific decisions made by the governments of other
states on specific issues. The fact that young Pakistanis may like American popu-
lar culture does not necessarily make the Pakistani government accept the US
drone attacks in its territory.
It is also important to note that soft power and hard power are not exclusive
realms but two extremes on a continuum of power. As explained by Nye (2006),
‘it is a mistake to rely on hard power or soft power alone’; the best situation is
when the two are effectively combined, which can be termed ‘smart power’. The
whole discussion about soft power theory is far from over, although it has laid
emphasis on the importance of soft attributes of power in executing a state’s for-
eign policy. Despite its deficiencies, soft power has entered the lexicon of interna-
tional relations in recent years.

Soft Power in Indian Discourse

Soft power is not a new phenomenon in India even though its understanding and
application have changed over the decades. If the term had been used during the
Cold War period, India could have been considered among the greatest soft pow-
ers in the world. The newly independent and under-developed country had simply
no other option to realize its global ambitions except through its soft attributes—
exposing the richness of its culture, instead of the misery of its economy, and
pursing foreign policy backed by the power of moral arguments rather than argu-
ments of power. As a founder of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a sound
critic of imperialism and colonialism, and a proponent of disarmament, India pre-
sented value-based policies that generated goodwill especially among developing
countries. With growing interest in Indian spirituality in the West, the non-violent
heritage of Mahatma Gandhi and an attractive culture, India subsequently gained

International Studies, 49, 3&4 (2012): 351–376

India’s Soft Power in South Asia 355

sympathy in the developed world. However, the gradual departure from Nehruvian
idealism towards realpolitik in India’s foreign policy decreased in many ways its
soft power and changed its character. According to Malone (2011a, p. 252), a defi-
nite departure from the Nehruvian framework in Indian foreign policy, since the
1990s, means that the country now ‘closely follows Nye’s prescription for soft
power in today’s world’.
The ascendance of the soft power approach in Indian foreign policy is not
apparent and clearly stated. Unlike China (Kurlantzik, 2007), India does not have
any official doctrine that explicitly recommends a greater role for soft power in
the country’s external relations. Several references to soft power can be found in
the speeches of leading politicians, but they do not occupy a major place there.
Soft power does not attract much attention among the security and strategic com-
munities in India, which is best illustrated by the limited number of publications
on the subject. It seems that the new, pragmatic and realist-driven foreign policy
is dominated by security concerns and economic priorities.
However, the argument that soft power plays an increasing role in Indian for-
eign policy can be clearly deduced from several practical decisions made in the
last decade, which have strengthened the state’s soft power capabilities.
Consequently, a growing number of Indian scholars and policy-makers have made
reference to India’s soft power. For instance, Raja Mohan (2003) considers the
Indian diaspora as the greatest asset to the country’s soft power. Shashi Tharoor is
one of the most prominent proponents of the use of soft power in Indian diplomacy.
He makes an argument that soft power, and not economic or military or nuclear
strength, ‘is one attribute of independent India to which increasing attention should
now be paid around the globe’ (Tharoor, 2008). In the context of Indian cultural
festivals held in foreign countries, Dr. Karan Singh, the president of the Indian
Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), said that ‘earlier cultural diplomacy was
considered peripheral, now the message is clear: soft power is important and the
idea behind the festival is to project India as a plural, multicultural society and to
achieve the goals of political diplomacy’ (cited in Shukla, 2006).
Indian experts are well aware of the intricate relationship between the two
facets of power and acknowledge that both of them are essential—an opinion
coming very close to Nye’s concept of ‘smart power’. Taking lessons from India’s
historic mistakes, Tharoor (2008, p. 43) points out that ‘the great flaw in Nehruji’s
approach was that his soft power was unrelated to any acquisition of hard power;
and as the humiliation of 1962 demonstrated, soft power becomes credible when
there is hard power behind it’. This argument may be quite representative of the
views of the current Indian leaders, and suggests that rather than witnessing a shift
from hard to soft power in Indian policy, one can expect that India will try to
combine the two facets of power into a more complex strategy.
An analysis of the ongoing discussions on India’s soft power reveals a clear
division among scholars regarding its character and strength. While some authors
are highly optimistic about India’s potential in this area (Tharoor, 2012;
Purushothaman, 2010), others are more modest in their assessments. Even though

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Christian Wagner (2010) considers India a ‘soft power by default’, he calls it a

‘defensive soft power’, which does not promote its political model abroad and
uses soft power to attract foreign investors rather than exert influence elsewhere.
He also makes a very important distinction between available huge ‘capacities’
and limited ‘capabilities’, which are required to ‘increase the country’s interna-
tional clout’. Jacques E. C. Hymans (2009) has interestingly observed that a
number of attributes of India’s soft power may be simultaneously its ‘soft vulner-
ability’. David Malone (2011b) points out the ‘defensiveness of the government’
in the use of India’s soft power.
Many experts point, at the same time, to many deficiencies and weaknesses
inherent in Indian democracy, economic situation and society, which hamper
India’s rise as a soft power. As observed by one expert, ‘soft power is very impor-
tant, and India now has more of it than it did twenty years ago. Nonetheless, India
remains a minor soft power in the contemporary world’ (Hymans, 2009, p. 234).
To sum up, while keen observers of India agree about the great potential of its soft
assets, most of them suggest that India needs to learn more about using this
resource in pursuit of its foreign policy goals. Moreover, the efficient use of soft
power will rely on overcoming many domestic challenges.

Characteristics of Indian Soft Power

The specific attributes and resources of India’s soft power have already been
described in more detail elsewhere (Lee 2010, Wagner 2010, Tharoor 2012,
Purushothaman, 2010), but it is helpful to provide here a short summary of its
characteristics. In order to better understand the change in Indian foreign policy,
the following section aims to show how soft power has been transformed into a
concrete state policy. The general framework developed by Joseph Nye, who
divides soft power into three groups (culture, political values and foreign poli-
cies), seems to characterize the Indian case well.

Culture
Being one of the world’s oldest civilizations, India’s rich culture constitutes the
single most important source of its soft power. It has fascinated outsiders since at
least the times of Alexander the Great, bringing to India invading armies, travel-
lers, merchants, migrants and religious refugees fleeing persecution in other places.
India is also the birthplace of Buddhism, which spread to Central, East and Southeast
Asia, and Hinduism, which left its strong imprint on Southeast Asian cultures.
These old civilizational links and shared religious heritage were already used by
Nehru, albeit with mixed results, in the promotion of a common Asian identity
(Mohan, 2007b), and still remains a valuable asset today. India’s art, classical

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music and dance, yoga, traditional medicine (Ayurveda), principles of non-violence,

philosophy, spirituality and even cuisine and fashion find more and more follow-
ers around the world. As observed by one analyst, India, alongside China, ‘offers
one of the most dynamic alternatives to Western cultural values’ (Blarel, 20012).
In addition to this, development of media technology has allowed India to dis-
seminate its modern popular culture (music, movies, TV serials, etc.) to the fur-
thest corners of the world. As summarized by Tharoor (2008),

So when India’s cricket team triumphs or its tennis players claim Grand Slams, when a
Bhangra beat is infused into a western pop record or an Indian choreographer invents
a fusion of Kathak and ballet, when Indian women sweep the Miss World and Miss
Universe contests or when Monsoon Wedding wows the critics and Lagaan claims an
Oscar nomination, when Indian writers win the Booker or Pulitzer prizes, India’s soft
power is enhanced.

India is also making inroads into areas likes sports where it traditionally had little
experience. Despite its traditional poor performance in the Olympics, India, in
recent years, has been trying more deliberately to use sports to promote its rising
power. The formation of a professional cricket league, the Indian Premiere League,
in 2008, holding the Commonwealth Games in Delhi in 2010 and conducting the
Indian Grand Prix in Formula 1 racing in Noida (near Delhi) in 2011 are a few
cases in point. India’s strength in cricket is especially important in countries where
this game is popular, and ‘cricket diplomacy’ has played a special role in the
political history of South Asia.1
In recent years, India has been trying to use its cultural assets in its foreign
policy through more active cultural diplomacy and promotional activities.
Although culture is inherently linked with people and the prime agents respon-
sible for dissemination of cultural heritage and values are Indians, both living in
India and abroad (diaspora), there are more activities undertaken by the govern-
ment. These include programmes conducted by Indian embassies worldwide,
the special Public Diplomacy Department created at the Ministry of External
Affairs (MEA), the ICCR, and other agencies, and public–private partnerships.
Complementary to official initiatives are those events organized by the private
sector such as the entertainment industry, media houses, business organizations
and NGOs.
The main public institution created specifically to promote Indian culture
abroad and foster people-to-people links has been the ICCR. It runs Indian cul-
tural centres abroad, chairs of Indian Studies at foreign universities, provides
scholarships/fellowships, and organizes festivals of Indian culture, seminars, con-
ferences, etc. The new quality of Indian cultural diplomacy is well seen in the
expansion of the ICCR’s activities. The network of Indian cultural centres in dif-
ferent parts of the world has increased from 22 in 2007 to 35 in 2013 and the
ICCR plans to open 15 new centres ‘in order to expand its reach and promote
India’s soft power’ (ICCR, 2013a). It already has established 93 chairs of Indian

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358 Patryk Kugiel

Studies at various universities abroad, where the deputed Indian academics/scholars

teach different aspects of India including Indian languages (ICCR, 2013b). The
ICCR also administrates scholarship programmes to foreigners willing to study in
India. Currently, it offers about 2,325 scholarships under 21 scholarship schemes
to students from about 80 countries for graduate, postgraduate and doctoral stud-
ies as well as in professional courses. There are some 3,550 foreign students cur-
rently studying in India in a single year (ICCR, 2013c). The foreign scholarship
schemes occupy the second largest ICCR expenditures (after Indian centres
abroad), which accounted for `2,857.30 lakhs in 2010–2011 (ICCR, 2013d).
Although Indian cultural and promotional activities are still less as compared to
China (which has established about 500 Confucius Institutes around the world),
these constitute an important element of the soft power approach in the country’s
external relations.

Political Values
With its open, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society and a secular, federal and
democratic state, India has abundant resources for soft power. As a tolerant coun-
try built on the idea of ‘unity in diversity’, India can possibly serve as a model for
many other internally divided countries. The endurance of a democratic system in
a relatively poor, illiterate and immensely diverse society provides a strong argu-
ment for promotion of democracy as the best political system. Although India has
been a democracy since its independence in 1947, it was only the end of the Cold
War and the subsequent replacement of the ideological confrontation between
communism and capitalism by competition between authoritarianism and democ-
racy that gave more significance to India’s democratic credentials. Many in the
West, therefore, hoped that India would become an important ally in global efforts
for promotion of democracy. To their disappointment, instead of aligning with the
West, India has opted for a more moderate approach.
India recognizes the value and political utility of its democracy in foreign rela-
tions, especially while dealing with democratic partners (the US, the EU and
Japan), but it is quite reluctant to export its model to other countries. It prefers to
support democracy in other states by the power of its own example rather than by
active outside pressure. As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said in a speech at
the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2011 (in the aftermath of the
Western intervention in Libya), ‘A democratic, plural and secular India can con-
tribute to tolerance and peaceful co-existence among nations’ (Times of India,
2011). He, however, warned that ‘The observance of the rule of law is as impor-
tant in international affairs as it is within countries. Societies cannot be reordered
from outside through military force. People in all countries have the right to
choose their own destiny and decide their own future’.
The difference between India and Western democracies regarding the promo-
tion of democracy is real and is based on ideological differences and historical

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India’s Soft Power in South Asia 359

legacy. It comes from India’s colonial past and the ‘principles of the Non-Aligned
Movement, such as state sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-intervention
and non-interference’ (Kugiel, 2012). In fact, except for a few examples when
India extended minor support for electoral processes or training to parliamentari-
ans, it has not played a prominent role in Western-led international efforts to pro-
mote democracy (Jain, 2009). India has been consistent in its stand that democracy
cannot be imposed from outside.
Yet, after the end of the Cold War, India has made some attempts to solve the
dilemma between the principles of sovereignty and the right to intervention, and
the pragmatism of its foreign policy and value of democratic governance (Mohan,
2007a). According to Muni (2009), there was a strategic shift in India’s position
on promoting democracy at the global level around the year 2000. India became
one of the founding members of the Community of Democracies in that year and
the UN Democracy Fund in 2005, even though it is one of the least active mem-
bers. It is important, however, to see these decisions in the international context
and especially in the context of the India–US rapprochement rather than as a gen-
uine policy of exporting the ‘Indian model’ of democracy.
As claimed by an Indian expert, ‘India joined the US-led “democracy promo-
tion” campaign at the global level for strategic considerations’ (Muni, 2009,
p. 12). This was not only ‘a function of the emerging Indo-US strategic partner-
ship’, but also an attempt to isolate Pakistan and China and use democracy as a
deterrent to terrorism and extremism (Muni, 2009, pp. 14–16). To sum up, India’s
position on democracy is very pragmatic: it can occasionally promote democracy
when it serves its interests; at the same time, it tries to distinguish itself from the
more offensive policy of Western states, seen sometimes as meddling in other
countries’ internal affairs. In that sense, Indian policy on democracy promotion is
coherent with the soft power approach, but it is designed to address expectations
different from that of Western powers. In fact, although India may be losing a
chance to distinguish itself positively in Western eyes from major authoritarian
powers like China, it earns some goodwill in many developing countries, which
find Western policies to be intrusive and imperialistic.
Foreign Policy
India’s non-violent struggle for independence and its support for decolonization,
disarmament and peaceful co-existence of nations helped the country garner
much appreciation in many parts of the world. Its active role in the NAM contrib-
uted to its positive image and helped position itself as a spokesperson for the
developing world. Although much of this attractiveness had decreased towards
the end of the Cold War, as India pursued a more pragmatic foreign policy, new
strengths arose. A ‘Look East Policy’ promulgated in 1991 repeated the calls for
stronger economic interdependence and offered more concessions to its smaller
neighbours in South Asia. Mohan (2005, p. 269) observes that ‘modesty and
pragmatism have emerged as the principal features of India’s changed grand
strategy’. A shift in negotiating strategy at multilateral forums was also a clear

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360 Patryk Kugiel

indication that India wanted to get rid of its traditional image as a country ‘that
can’t say yes’ (Cohen, 2004). Simultaneously, a stronger engagement with the
West in the last decade eased the way for the acceptance of its rise on the global
stage, leading to the American endorsement of India as an ‘emerged power’. The
country’s accession to prestigious groups such as G20, Brazil, Russia, India,
China and South Africa (BRICS), and India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) also
boosted India’s international image.
Although India sometimes appears to be an indecisive and passive player that
cannot take sides on important issues, it is actually one of the few countries that
managed to maintain friendly relations with almost every country. In other words,
despite its closeness to the West in recent years, it has maintained close relations
with internationally isolated regimes such as Iran and Myanmar; it has remained
a strong supporter of Palestine’s independence even while building strong secu-
rity and intelligence links with Israel, and it has expanded its interests in Africa
without alarming the international community as China did. It gives India a poten-
tial position that has not been effectively used so far—that of a reliable mediator
in major conflicts and crises.
In its quest for a larger global role and an unwavering bid for permanent mem-
bership in the UN Security Council, India strives to promote its image as a respon-
sible and status quo power rather than as a revisionist state. India does not make
territorial claims. It does not press for restructuring the existing international
order; instead it tries to convince other powers to let it take its ‘rightful’ place at
the high table. Indeed, the country’s stance resembles in many ways the much
better known China’s strategy of a ‘peaceful rise’, promoted in order to mitigate
the fears of other states. India’s contribution to UN peacekeeping is yet another
source of its credibility. The US–India nuclear deal, signed in 2006, serves as a
proof that its foreign policy strategy is finally bringing positive outcomes. Despite
exercising its nuclear option in 1998 and remaining outside the non-proliferation
regime, India has managed to project itself as a ‘responsible nuclear power’ and
eventually gained de facto recognition as a member of the nuclear club—a favour
that seems to be out of reach for Pakistan.
As India’s international image has improved over the last decade, it has insti-
tuted new tools to explain its policy. In 2006, a dedicated Public Diplomacy
Division (PDD) was created within the MEA to manage and promote a positive
image of India to the outside world. According to Ian Hall (2012, p. 1090), the
novelty of the new institution means three things: ‘it is actively seeking new audi-
ences within India, in the West and in [the] developing world; it is being more
interactive and democratic by engaging the wider public on foreign relations
issues and it seeks to utilize new media rather than traditional methods’. In 2013,
PDD had four officials, along with a Joint Secretary, and around 40 supporting
staff.2 Its major tasks include production of publications (such as the flagship
India Perspective, distributed in 17 languages in 160 countries through diplo-
matic missions), documentary films and other material about the rich diversity of
India; organization of seminars and conferences with national and international

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India’s Soft Power in South Asia 361

universities, think tanks and research organizations; development of effective

Web 2.0 strategies and utilization of a full range of social media tools to increase
its outreach in the modern world (Public Division Department,). In 2013, PDD
had some 100,000 friends on Facebook, around 70,000 people on Twitter and
about one million viewers on You Tube. Although it has no specific long-term
strategy to promote its soft power abroad, it concentrates on opportunities created
by the presence of the Indian diaspora.3
Aimed at using the Indian diaspora strategically, a new Ministry of Overseas
Indian Affairs was created in 2004 to strengthen the links between overseas
Indians and their motherland and employ their potential for economic, political
and soft power gains. It must be stressed that Indians living abroad are the first
contact point for foreigners linked to Indian culture and history. The new ministry,
among other things, provides a special overseas card that confers many privileges
on people of Indian origin, organizes conferences, seminars and campaigns, and
promotes the interests of the Indian diaspora with host countries (Hall, 2012).
Another element of India’s rising soft power is foreign aid. Although the coun-
try began to provide assistance to less developed countries in the 1950s and its
major programme of technical assistance was launched in 1964, it is only in the
last 10 years that it has expanded significantly in terms of geographical reach,
modes of support, financial scale and organizational capabilities. Despite being a
developing country with numerous challenges, India has increased the budget for
foreign assistance, which stood at about US$ 1.2 billion in 2008 (Chanana, 2009).
Indeed, as much as one-third (`3,233.93 crores) of the whole budget of the
Ministry of External Affairs in 2012–2013 was assigned to Technical and
Economic Cooperation (MEA, 2013). Although most of India’s foreign aid has
traditionally been given to immediate neighbours in South Asia, more resources
have been made available to Afghanistan and African countries recently. Moreover,
India has started transferring more aid in the form of grants and loans, along with
the traditional technical assistance. It is also aligning development assistance
more strategically with the promotion of its image as an information technology
(IT) hub by establishing IT centres in developing countries and initiating regional
IT projects such as e-Pan Africa Network. With the growing development coop-
eration becoming increasingly complex, the government created in 2012 a new
structure—Development Partnership Administration (DPA)—within the MEA to
deal with development assistance programmes. Although it is not yet a separate
development agency, such as United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), as expected by some, the establishment of DPA clearly shows that India
now treats external aid as an increasingly important foreign policy tool.
Importantly, unlike the Western donors, India provides foreign assistance to
serve better the interests of the receiving countries. Foreign Secretary Ranjan
Mathai (2013) said at the South–South conference in Delhi on 15 April 2013:

Our engagement is demand-driven and responds to the developmental priorities of our

partner countries. We do not attach conditionalities, we do not prescribe policies and

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362 Patryk Kugiel

we do not challenge national sovereignty. We promote a mutually beneficial exchange

of development experiences and resources.

This self-assessment of India as an altruistic donor stands, however, in opposition

to some critical opinions, which consider pragmatism as the prime motive behind
India’s aid. Mullen and Ganguly (2012) observe that ‘India’s assistance effort is
clearly enmeshed into a larger set of foreign-policy goals: ensuring secure sources
of energy for an expanding economy, opening markets for India’s increasingly
export-oriented industrial and service sectors, and bolstering geostrategic ties
with key neighbors’. Without solving this apparent contradiction, it is possible to
conclude that India does care about how it is perceived in the developing world
and tries to distinguish itself positively from the West and other donors.
Another important source of India’s soft power is the economic growth
achieved in the last two decades. Economic liberalization in the early 1990s and
the ensuing fast development played a crucial role in changing the image of India
as an impoverished country to an emerging and attractive market. A large pool of
English-speaking people, excellence in the IT industry and a large consumer mar-
ket have collectively strengthened India’s image in the West and attracted foreign
direct investment. The Indian growth model, based on domestic consumption and
services, has compelled some observers even to talk in terms of the people-centric
‘Mumbai consensus’ as opposed to pro-market oriented ‘Washington consensus’
and state-centric, export driven and manufacture-based ‘Beijing consensus’ (Bajaj,
2010). According to Tharoor (2008, p. 40), ‘The old stereotype of Indians as snake
charmers and sadhus lying on beds of nails has now been replaced by one of
Indians as software gurus and computer geeks’. In fact, it seems that both the
stereotypes of ‘IT India’ and ‘spiritual India’ coexist and work hand in hand to
enhance the country’s soft power.
Economic development has given India another tool to foster its power of
attraction in the world and generate a more positive ‘brand of India’ in order to
attract more investment. A major instrument created to use and empower soft
power in the economic field has been the India Brand Equity Foundation
(IBEF)—a private–public partnership established in 2006. Since then, it has been
publishing reports, data and surveys about the Indian economy and organizing
direct promotional and investments campaigns such as the ‘India Everywhere’ at
the economic summit in Davos in 2006, ‘India@60’ in many Western countries in
2007 or ‘Incredible India’, a global tourism campaign launched in 2007. Besides,
Indian business organizations such as the Federation of Indian Chambers of
Commerce and industry (FICCI), Competition Commission of India (CII), The
Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASOCHAM) and
bilateral chambers of commerce operating in many countries have also played an
important role in enhancing India’s soft power in the economic field.
The above examples show that India has accumulated significant soft power in
recent years, thanks to its modest and pragmatic foreign policy, economic devel-
opment and the rising significance of its democratic and plural political system. It

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India’s Soft Power in South Asia 363

has also taken important steps to use its soft power through various structures and
institutions (the Ministry of Overseas Indians, PDD and DPA) by undertaking
cultural promotion, public diplomacy and development assistance programmes.
They help India improve its international standing and credibility. As global pub-
lic opinion polls show, India enjoys a relatively positive image but it still needs
improvement. About 40 per cent of people, living in 21 countries, who were sur-
veyed in 2011 and 2012, had favourable views on Indian influence in the world,
while 27 per cent of them gave negative ratings. People who view India’s role
positively attribute this mostly to the country’s traditions and culture (48 per cent),
and to its economy, products and services (19 per cent). On the other hand, the
major factors responsible for negative opinions are related to the way India treats
its people (29 per cent), followed by Indian traditions and culture (25 per cent;
BBC Worldview, 2012). This evaluation suggests that India has a toolbox of soft
power instruments and policies to address major issues in its immediate
neighbourhood.

India’s Charm Offensive in South Asia

South Asia has played a major role in the rediscovery of soft power as a tool of
Indian foreign policy and, therefore, become an important part of the new Indian
approach. Three major reasons can be given to the shift in Indian strategy towards
the region. First, previous hard power policies proved to be unsuccessful in influ-
encing neighbours and bringing about the desired changes in their behaviour
(Wagner, 2005). The withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from
Sri Lanka in 1990 and the escalating tensions in India’s relations with Pakistan
showed the limitations of hard power. The fact that both India and Pakistan
became officially nuclear weapons states has also made a military solution to their
conflict less likely. Second, India had to revamp its negative image in the region
in earlier years. Christian Wagner (2010) argues that the compulsion to improve
India’s relations with neighbouring countries was the main reason behind the shift
from the hard power to the soft power approach in South Asia. Ian Hall (2012,
p. 1,091) claims that India’s new public diplomacy stems partly from a realization
that its reputation in its ‘near abroad’ region ‘is not as good as it might be’. Third,
China’s ‘charm offensive’ in the region, perceived by many as an Indian sphere of
influence, rang alarm bells in New Delhi and called for a similar response. In
recent years, China embraced the South Asian states with unwavering diplomatic
support to Sri Lanka in international forums, large financial assistance and invest-
ments in infrastructure such as Gwadar port in Pakistan and Humbantota in
Sri Lanka, and establishing Confucius Centres across the region.4
To break the regional deadlock and improve its legitimacy in South Asia, India
has over the years included more soft power elements in its regional strategy. The
new soft power approach consists of a benign foreign policy, promotion of eco-
nomic interdependence, strong cultural cooperation and foreign assistance.

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364 Patryk Kugiel

Besides, some changes in the international environment, such as globalization and

the war on terrorism, had a positive impact on India’s regional soft power.
The first and most important change in Indian foreign policy towards the region
came with the promulgation of the Gujral doctrine in the mid-1990s. By empha-
sizing the principle of ‘non-reciprocity’ in its relations with smaller neighbours
and offering unilateral concessions, India wanted to present itself as a benign
hegemon, more responsive to the fears and concerns of its partners. In stark con-
trast to the past policy of interventions in the neighbourhood, (Pakistan in 1971,
Sri Lanka in 1987–1990, the Maldives in 1988), India has also done its best not to
be seen as interfering in the domestic affairs of others.
As part of the new strategy, India has also started pushing hard for regional
economic cooperation. Despite its tense relations with Pakistan, India has granted
its neighbour unilaterally the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status in 1996, pushed
for a regional free trade area under the SAARC in 2004, and signed a bilateral
free trade agreement (FTA) with Sri Lanka in 1998—all these deals involved
more preferential regulations towards smaller neighbours. It has also agreed to
renegotiate bilateral treaties with Nepal and Bhutan. In one of the clearest expla-
nations of the new approach, the then Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, said in
February 2005, ‘The challenge of our diplomacy lies in convincing our neigh-
bours that India is an opportunity, not a threat, that far from being besieged by
India, they have a vast, productive hinterland that would give their economies far
greater opportunities for growth than if they were to rely on their domestic mar-
kets alone’ (quoted in Mohan, 2007a, p. 114). This was confirmed a year later by
Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon (2006) who argued that ‘we must give our
neighbours a stake in our own economic prosperity’ to promote the idea of ‘dense
interdependence’.
Foreign aid has played a larger role in relations with South Asian neighbours.
Despite the expanding geographical reach of Indian aid, South Asia has remained
its single largest beneficiary. In 2012–2013 about 78 per cent of the budget for
Technical and Economic Cooperation managed by the MEA was allocated to the
South Asian countries. The largest part (36.2 per cent) of it went to Bhutan to
finance ongoing infrastructure projects, and Afghanistan received about 15 per
cent (MEA, 2013). In fact, India stepped up its assistance to Afghanistan after
2001, emerging as the fifth largest bilateral donor there. India also launched an
ambitious aid programme, including the construction of 50,000 houses in
Sri  Lanka after the civil war ended there in 2009. As summarized by Wagner
(2010, p. 335), ‘India’s aid program and her unilateral economic concessions for
the least developed South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
members are good examples of a soft power approach’.
In recent years, India has also intensified its public diplomacy to reach fellow
South Asians directly. Hall (2012, pp. 1,096–1,097) maintains:

externally, the PPD initially concentrated on improving India’s image in its immediate
region and the developing world, leaving public diplomacy directed at the West, as well

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India’s Soft Power in South Asia 365

as at East and South East Asia, largely in the hands of embassies and consulates… from
2006 to 2009, a series of conferences and workshops was organized with participants
from Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, South
Africa, Taiwan, and Tajikistan. The PDD also generated about 20 documentaries a year
on India and its region, mainly in English and South Asian languages, including ver-
sions in Dari and Pashto for Afghan audiences, as well as books in Tamil and Nepali.

Although these initiatives still seem modest as compared to the size of the region,
it suggests that India is increasingly aware of the importance of changing the per-
ception of the neighbouring states vis-à-vis New Delhi.
A new opportunity for India was created by the recent democratization proc-
esses in several South Asian states, namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal,
Pakistan and the Maldives. India is the oldest, most stable and relatively mature
democracy in the region. In the Democracy Index 2011 prepared by the Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2012), India was ranked 39th position worldwide and
much ahead of the second country from South Asia—Sri Lanka (57th position).
Freedom House also gives India the best rank for the state of its democracy and
considers it, in its most recent report entitled Freedom in the World, to be the only
‘free’ country in South Asia (Freedom House, 2013). More importantly, democ-
racy is rooted deep in India, as shown by regional surveys such as the State of
Democracy in South Asia Report (2008). Bearing in mind the size of the Indian
state and the diversity of its society, one can claim that India has responded to the
ethnic and religious tensions much better than most of its neighbours.
Despite these assets, however, India has been rather cautious in acting on the
delicate matter of democracy promotion. Departing from its old image as a
regional bully, it does not want to be seen as infringing on the sovereignty of other
states. Trying to bridge the gap between the principle of non-interference and the
preference for a democratic South Asia, India has focused more on engaging civil
society and presented an official offer of support to interactions among peoples of
South Asia. In this context, Shyam Saran (2005) said: ‘We will promote people-
to-people interaction and build upon the obvious cultural affinities that bind our
peoples together. We need to go beyond governments and engage the peoples of
South Asia to create a compact of peace and harmony throughout our region’. In
line with this modest ambition, India has supported the democratic process, espe-
cially in Afghanistan and Nepal.
The last element of India’s soft power approach in the region has been the more
active cultural and educational cooperation. The fact that India shares a common
cultural and linguistic heritage and religious and ethnic links with many South
Asian countries can be seen as a major soft power asset. In fact, Pakistan and
Bangladesh used to form one political and cultural organism until the partition in
1947; Nepal is one of the few countries in the world with a significant Hindu
majority; Sri Lanka is home to a large chunk of Tamil population, and the Buddha
statues in Bamyan or monuments of Ghaznavid dynasty in Delhi point to the old
contacts between India and Afghanistan. This naturally creates a strong cultural

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366 Patryk Kugiel

affinity between India and its neighbouring countries. Indian pop songs and
Bollywood movies are said to be extremely popular in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
This is partly a natural process and partly the effect of initiatives that successive
governments in India have taken.
The ICCR has played a major role in promoting Indian culture in South Asia.
It has sponsored Chairs of Indian studies at universities in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka,
Nepal and Bangladesh (see Table 1). During the last decade, the ICCR opened
cultural centres in Kabul and Kathmandu (in 2007), Dhaka and Thimphu (2010)
and Male (2011). The Indian Cultural Centre in Colombo has been functioning
since 1998. Thus, the ICCR has cultural centres in all SAARC member-countries
except in Pakistan. The centres run libraries, offer courses and classes on yoga,
Indian classical dance and music, organize musical performance, seminars, film
screenings, etc.
The ICCR has also increased the number of scholarships for students from the
SAARC countries. There is a special programme for Afghanistan, which has been
awarded over 650 scholarships every year. It offers separate programmes for citi-
zens from Afghanistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka along with a
few regional and general schemes open to other nationals. The total number of
scholarships for South Asian students stood at 1,030, which was 45 per cent of the
total 2,235 scholarships India offered annually to over 80 countries. Further, India
has backed the SAARC initiative of establishing a South Asian University
designed as a centre of excellence in the region, which started its operations in
Delhi in 2011. In another important educational initiative, India is now working
with Singapore, China and Japan, to reopen after centuries the famous Nalanda
University. Muni (2010) notes that ‘Nalanda University is destined to emerge as a
strong instrument of soft power at two levels: for the rising Asia in relation to the
West and for India in relation to Asia’.
Pakistan’s omission forms a major gap in India’s regional soft power approach.
India’s cultural, educational and development programmes in South Asia do not
cover Pakistan. India has not set up any cultural centre in Islamabad; nor has it
established any chairs of India studies at Pakistani universities. Furthermore, not
a single student from Pakistan is granted an ICCR scholarship. Apart from the
humanitarian assistance offered after the earthquake in Kashmir in 2005, India has
not provided any development assistance to Pakistan. India’s relations with Pakistan
are especially difficult and entangled by crucial security and political concerns.
However, this gap is sought to be bridged by non-governmental institutions,
cultural associations, business, media corporations and individual initiatives. One
important example is ‘Aman ki Asha’ (Hope for Peace)—a campaign by two lead-
ing media houses in both countries, The Jang Group in Pakistan and The Times of
India in India. Since 2010, they have jointly organized campaigns aimed at achiev-
ing peace and cordial diplomatic and cultural relations between the two nations.
Besides, several think tanks, both in India and abroad, are engaged in facilitating
track-two dialogue between Indian and Pakistani experts on crucial issues of
importance to both countries and the region. Moreover, Indian business leaders

International Studies, 49, 3&4 (2012): 351–376

Table 1. Major India’s Soft Power Initiatives in South Asia

Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan Maldives Nepal Sri Lanka Pakistan

ICCR Chairs Nangarhar University of – – Tribhuwan University –
University Dhaka (Dhaka) University of Colombo
(Jalalabad) (Kathmandu) (Colombo)
Pokhara University
(Pokhara)
Indian Cultural Indian Culture Indira Gandhi Nehru Indian Cultural Indian Cultural Indian Cultural –
Centres Centre—Kabul Cultural Centre— Wangchuk Centre—Male Centre— Centre—Colombo
Dhaka Cultural Kathmandu
Centre—
Thimphu
Scholarship 679 102+ – 37 119 65+ –
schemes Special Scholarships Bangladesh Aid to Maldives—20 Silver Jubilee Sri Lanka
for Afghanistan— Scholarship General Cultural Scheme—64 Scholarship
675 Scheme—100 Scholarship Commonwealth Scheme—60
General Cultural Commonwealth Scheme—13 Scholarship Commonwealth
Scholarship Scholarship Commonwealth Scheme—55 Scholarship
Scheme—4 Scheme—2 Scholarship Scheme—5
IOR-ARC Scheme Scheme—4 IOR-ARC Scheme
Technical and (491.16 15.19 280.00 1171.06 30.00 270.00 290.00 0
Economic per cent) (8.66 per cent) (36.21 per cent) (0.93 per cent) (8.35 per cent) (8.97 per cent)
cooperation—
2012/13 in
rupees crores
(share in total)
Source: List of ICCR’s Chairs Abroad, http://www.iccrindia.net/chairslist.html, accessed on 11 April 2013.
368 Patryk Kugiel

and organizations have reached out to their Pakistani counterparts, reflected in the
recent increase in bilateral trade. In 2012, trade between India and Pakistan surged
by 21 per cent to US$ 2.4 billion (The Express Tribune, 2013). In the absence of
progress in inter-governmental relations, the regional authorities are becoming
more active in bridging the differences between the two countries. A recent exam-
ple is the joint declaration issued in December 2013 by the Chief Ministers of
Pakistani and Indian states of Punjab (Mohan, 2013).
The people-to-people interactions are still hampered by difficulties in obtain-
ing Indian visas for Pakistani nationals. Anti-Pakistan tirades in some Indian TV
shows and programmes do not help in generating positive opinions about India
among the Pakistani public. Rather, they keep bilateral relations in a vicious cycle
of mutual distrust, accusations and stereotypes. In sum, the message India sends
to its neighbours is rather mixed and often quite confusing.

Effectiveness of the Soft Power Approach in South Asia

It is important to analyze how Indian soft power has influenced the South Asian
countries’ perceptions and policies towards India. This is not, however, an easy
question to answer due to the very nature of soft power. One of the major flaws of
the soft power concept is that it works in the long run and, therefore, proving a
causal relationship between the soft power policies of one country and change in
the behaviour in another is often impossible. It is commonly accepted that the best
available tool to measure the soft power of any country is public opinion polls to
assess the change in attitudes towards the state in question. At the same time, one
needs to note a possible discrepancy in opinions expressed by civil society and the
ruling elites. This problem may be especially important in undemocratic states,
where official policies may not reflect the wishes of the governed.
Evaluating the effectiveness of Indian soft power in South Asia is very difficult
because of the lack of relevant data. So far, there are no comprehensive compara-
tive studies of Indian soft power in the region. There is also no systematic approach
or instrument in the MEA, which would allow us to evaluate the effectiveness of
initiatives undertaken in neighbouring countries.5 Moreover, in South Asia, there
are no regular public surveys held across the region on India’s image in different
states. Therefore, one has to rely on a few global surveys that have been occasion-
ally organized in South Asian countries. The other useful tool to asses ‘power of
attraction’ is the number of people that go to a country for tourism, work or any
other reason. Thus, the number of foreigners visiting the country is used here as a
supplementary index. Finally, the opinions of scholars and experts are also helpful
in grasping the general trends in inter-state relations. In this context, the following
facts are presented here.
First, India has experienced a period of relatively good and cooperative rela-
tions with most of its neighbours during the last decade. Even if it has not realized

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India’s Soft Power in South Asia 369

its major objectives yet, its relations with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and
Nepal have witnessed an upward trend and more mutual trust has been built. It can
be argued that at least some credit for this must go to the new Indian strategy
characterized by modesty and pragmatism and a greater insistence on soft power.
India’s promotion of the idea of ‘deeper inter-dependence’ and its unwillingness
to get directly involved in internal conflicts in Sri Lanka and Afghanistan and also
in the political transition in Nepal have helped to get rid of its previous image of
being a regional hegemon. Even though India today is a more powerful country
and has acquired new strength, thanks to its economic growth and ascendance on
the global arena during the last two decades, regional elites have less to worry
about it than in the past. By its low profile responses and less unilateral approach
to regional crises ‘twenty-first century India is a relatively benign regional power’
(Basrur, 2010, p. 280).
Second, an overview of the available public opinion surveys in South Asian
countries reveals that India already has considerable soft power in the region.
India is clearly the most popular country among the South Asian states in surveys
conducted in Bangladesh, Nepal, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. In Nepal, more than
eight out of ten (84 per cent) respondents said that they had a rather positive opin-
ion about their big neighbour (Gallup/SADF, 2011). At the same time, about four
out of ten Nepalese held positive views about Bangladesh (44 per cent), Sri Lanka
(43 per cent), Bhutan (40 per cent) and the Maldives (39 per cent). Pakistan and
Afghanistan had the least positive ratings among the Nepalese, 33 per cent and 26
per cent respectively.
India was also found to be the most positively perceived South Asian country
among Bangladeshis. About eight out of ten people (80 per cent) held positive opin-
ions about India, while only 10 per cent held negative views (Gallup/SADF, 2012).
About four out of ten respondents held positive views on Sri Lanka (40 per cent),
Nepal (46 per cent), the Maldives (43 per cent) and Bhutan (41 per cent). With
regard to Pakistan and Afghanistan, only about 33 per cent and 24 per cent of the
respondents respectively held some positive views.
A study conducted in Sri Lanka in 2006 shows that some 49 per cent of the
surveyed population had positive views about India (GlobeScan, 2006). India also
gets an encouraging opinion in Afghanistan. A survey conducted there in 2010
shows that 71 per cent of Afghans held a favourable (42 per cent) or very favour-
able (29 per cent) opinion about India as opposed to 36 per cent who had a some-
what unfavourable (22 per cent) or very unfavourable opinion about India (14 per
cent; ABC News/BBC/ARD, 2010). This was again a much better result that
Pakistan—one of the least favourably seen country in Afghanistan. This stems
partly from the popularity of Indian culture and partly due to the political sup-
port and development assistance that India has been providing to Afghanistan in
recent years. Another survey conducted in 2012 shows that only 4 per cent of
Afghans are aware of the Indian development projects in their local areas. Even
though the number is not high, India received the fifth best result in the country

International Studies, 49, 3&4 (2012): 351–376

370 Patryk Kugiel

after the US (35 per cent), Germany (9 per cent), Japan (9 per cent) and Australia
(5 per cent) (Hopkins, 2012).
Another survey shows that India’s leadership in Asia is largely accepted by the
general public in smaller countries in the region, except Pakistan (Gallup Europe,
2010). About 54 per cent of Afghans, 48 per cent of Sri Lankans and 46 per cent
of Bangladeshis approve of India’s leadership in Asia, while only 7 per cent of
Pakistanis share this view (see Table 2).
Unfortunately, there are no public opinion surveys available from the Maldives
and Bhutan. One can, however, quite rightly assume that the outcomes would not
be dramatically different from most of the other South Asian countries. At the same
time, several surveys confirm that Pakistanis are predominantly very negative
towards India—about seven out of ten people (72 per cent) are unfavourable, includ-
ing a majority (55 per cent) that is ‘very unfavourable’ (Pew Research Centre, 2012).

Table 2. Measuring India’s Popularity in South Asia (in percentage)

Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan Nepal Maldives Sri Lanka Pakistan

Favourable 74a
78b – 84c – 49d 15f
views about (2009) (2012) (2011) (2006) (2012)
India (including
27 very
favourable,
47 somehow
favourable)
Unfavourable 21a 10b – n.a. – 4d 47f
views on (2009) (2012) (2006) (2012)
India (Including
13—
somewhat
unfavourable,
8—very
unfavourable)
Approval 54 46 – – – 48 7
of India’s
leadership in
Asiae
Disapproval 32 24 – – – 9 66
of India’s
leadership in
Asiae
Sources: aABC News/BBC/ARD poll. (2009).
b
Gallup/SADF (2012).
c
Gallup/SADF (2011).
d
GlobeScan (2006).
e
Gallup (2010).
f
BBC World Service Poll (2012).

International Studies, 49, 3&4 (2012): 351–376

India’s Soft Power in South Asia 371

Less than a quarter (22 per cent) had positive opinions. The data also shows that
India is seen by Pakistanis as a major danger to their country, in fact, bigger than the
Taliban (58 per cent) and al Qaeda (47 per cent). Given the history of military con-
flict between the two countries, it is perhaps not surprising that roughly eight out of
ten Pakistanis (79 per cent) say that India is a serious threat to their nation, including
57 per cent who believe that it is a very serious threat. Another study conducted by
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in 2012 confirms that in Pakistan, 47 per
cent had unfavourable views about India (up eight points since 2011, and the highest
percentage of negative ratings in the survey), while only 15 per cent viewed India’s
influence favourably (stable since 2011) (BBC World Service Poll, 2012). Pakistanis
are also the least willing to accept India’s leadership role in Asia (7 per cent in
favour and 66 per cent against) (Gallup Europe, 2010).
Additional sources of evaluating India’s attractiveness in the region can be
obtained from the available statistics on tourism and migration. India is the most
preferred destination in the region for tourism and work among the citizens of
neighbouring countries. In 2012, over 18 per cent of all foreign arrivals in India
were from the seven SAARC countries. Although it is still not a lot for India,
especially when compared to the patterns in other regions of the world (for
example, about 80 per cent of foreign visitors to Poland are from the neighbouring
countries), India is often a very important destination for its neighbourhood. Most
visitors are from Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Interestingly, more people come to
India from war-torn Afghanistan or Nepal than from Pakistan (see Table 3). People
from South Asia visit India not only for tourism, but also to work and settle down.
Available data shows that at least for Bangladesh and Nepal, India is an important
destination for work and migration. For example, 33 per cent of Nepalese and 13
per cent of Bangladeshis have friends or relatives living in another South Asian
country, which is almost always India (Gallup/SADF, 2011 and 2012).
These results must be viewed in the context of the severely restricted visa
regimes in the case of nationals from some countries. Only citizens of Nepal and
Bhutan can go to India without a visa (Bureau of Immigration, 2013). In 1992, the
member-countries of SAARC agreed to exempt certain categories of dignitaries
from visa requirements. The list now includes 24 categories of entitled persons
(SAARC Secretariat, 2013). In 2010, India introduced a new facility—visa on
arrival (VoA), but this is available only to citizens from eleven countries, and

Table 3. Foreign Tourists Arrivals in India in 2008 and 2011 (in persons and per cent)

Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan Nepal Maldives Sri Lanka Pakistan SAARC Total
2008 33041 540092 7483 77966 55889 228548 1054483 5366966
0.62% 10.06% 0.15% 1.45% 1.04% 4.26% 19.65%
2011 89605 463543 15489 119131 53999 305853 18.06% 6309222
1.42% 7.35% 0.25% 1.89% 0.86% 4.85%
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Tourism, Market Research Division, Bureau of Immigration
India Tourism Statistics, 2008, 2011.

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372 Patryk Kugiel

none from South Asia. For obvious reasons, Pakistani nationals face the most dif-
ficulties. The visa procedure has become especially harsh and discriminatory after
the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, and the number of visitors from Pakistan has
declined considerably. An Indian commentator said,

Since 26/11, India’s visa policy, never too liberal, became very restrictive, thanks to
Home Minister P. Chidambaram. The stark truth is that both India and Pakistan seek to
control ‘people-to-people’ contacts to prevent an independent, organized and powerful
constituency challenging its foreign policy from developing in either country; espe-
cially if it be one critical of its hard line. (Noorani, 2013)

In a very positive development in September 2012, India signed with Pakistan

a much-awaited liberalized visa agreement, introducing for the first time group
tourist and pilgrim visas, separate visas for businessmen and visa on arrival for
those over 65 years of age (The Hindustan Times, 2012).
The evaluation of India’s soft power approach in South Asia is, by compulsion,
selective and incomplete. Nevertheless, recent trends in inter-state relations and
the image of India in neighbouring countries offer a positive lesson for India.

Conclusions
Despite its theoretical and practical flaws, soft power occupies an important place
in contemporary international relations and has been incorporated into the foreign
policy strategies of many countries. India has significant soft power resources and
is, in fact, one of the few countries capable of providing alternative political, eco-
nomic and cultural models to the West. However, India has only recently redis-
covered the importance of its international attractiveness and has started using
soft power capabilities by developing new instruments and strengthening institu-
tions responsible for its projection abroad. In the end, India’s soft power at the
global level depends on internal reforms that will help solve persisting develop-
mental, societal and political deficiencies. Needless to say, soft power has already
an important role to play at the South Asian level.
Although more comprehensive and detailed studies are required to understand
and evaluate properly the effectiveness of India’s soft power in the region, this
essay allows us to draw three general conclusions. First, there are signs that India
has deliberately incorporated soft power elements into its regional strategy. This
is based on past experience of the inefficacy of the hard power approach and the
belief that reducing the trust deficit and generating acceptance for its leadership
role in the region are important conditions for the realization of its regional and
global objectives. If India can effectively mitigate fears among its smaller neigh-
bours, it may find them more willing to engage in closer economic and political
cooperation. This soft power approach entails, among other things, a modest and
pragmatic foreign policy, prioritization of economic cooperation, more active

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India’s Soft Power in South Asia 373

public diplomacy and cultural and development cooperation. A shift in India’s

policy in the region points to India’s new charm offensive in South Asia.
Second, there are some indications that this soft power approach may bring
about positive outcomes. Even without solving important persisting issues with
its neighbours, the new strategy has helped to move these relations in a positive
direction. Available public opinion polls show that India has already amassed a
significant capital of goodwill in a few South Asian countries (Afghanistan, Nepal,
Sri Lanka and Bangladesh), which gives it a significant advantage in realizing its
foreign policy objectives. In particular, the example of Afghanistan, where India
has got favourable views through its civilian engagement in the last one decade,
points that this approach can indeed bear fruit. It is thus important that India con-
tinues to expand the soft power approach through more active cultural and public
diplomacy. It should strengthen people-to-people contacts, encourage more trade
and investments, increase foreign aid and share its democratic experience with
neighbouring countries. Further, India should play a more proactive role in
enhancing regional cooperation and integration through the SAARC process.
Interestingly, there is a huge discrepancy between societies and the ruling elites
in their attitudes towards India. The more positive feeling of the public stands in
stark contrast to the distrustful and difficult relations at the inter-governmental
level. One can argue, however, that this gap should narrow in the future as India
continues its soft power approach. Soft power works in the long-term and the
results of current decisions can be seen only after a few years. As democracy takes
root across the region, national authorities will find it harder to go against the
wishes and preferences of their peoples and pursue confrontational policies
towards India. This opens up even more space for Indian soft power to attract
people in South Asia to the idea of shared prosperity and peace. India should con-
vince more people in the region that as its economy develops, it creates more
opportunities than threats for them.
Third, a notable flaw in India’s soft power approach in South Asia is the
exclusion of Pakistan from this policy. Given the fact that India–Pakistan ten-
sions remain a major impediment to closer regional cooperation in South Asia
and a serious threat to peace and security, much more needs to be done to rebuild
mutual trust and confidence. Public opinion surveys in Pakistan show wide-
spread distrust and suspicion towards India, which can best be addressed by soft
power instruments. Regardless of recurring military confrontations along the
border, political tensions or geostrategic competition, India needs to do much
more to reach Pakistani citizens directly through Indian cultural centres, Chairs
of Indian studies, ambitious scholarship programmes, new development coopera-
tion projects, further liberalization of the visa regime and fostering academic and
business links. Although India has justified concerns about the threat of terrorism
emanating from Pakistan, treating all Pakistanis as potential terrorists is not only
unfair, but also counterproductive. Reaching Pakistani civil society directly and
promoting a positive image of India as a reliable partner and amicable neighbour

International Studies, 49, 3&4 (2012): 351–376

374 Patryk Kugiel

is currently the best strategy available to ensure regional peace and stability in
the long run.

Notes
1. For a more comprehensive analysis of this element, see Arne Næss-Holm (2008).
2. An interview with PDD official, 16 April 2013, New Delhi.
3. An interview with PDD official, 16 April 2013, New Delhi.
4. For details see Palit (2010).
5. An Interview with an official in PDD, MEA, New Delhi, 16 April 2013.

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To the Point
ROLE OF INDIAN DIASPORA
 What is Diaspora?
 The Diaspora encompasses a group of people who can either trace their origins to India or who are
Indian citizens living abroad, either temporarily or permanently.

 Indian Diaspora
 17.5 million strong Indian diaspora over 100 countries includes :
 Non-Resident Indians (NRIs),
 Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) and
 Overseas Citizens of India (OCI).

PIO and OCI card holders were merged under OCI category in 2015.
Diaspora in numbers
 The International Migration Report, 2019 declares Indian diaspora to be world's largest ( 17.5 million):

 In the Arab Gulf states alone, the number of Indians was estimated at around 8.5 million.

 USA – 4.4 million (1.3 % of American population)

 In Canada Indian Diaspora--3% of its population.

 Nearly 7 lakhs— is the fastest growing in Australia 2.8% of Australia’s population

 1.5 million strong Indian diaspora in UK contributes around 6 percent to UK's GDP.

 100,000 Indians living permanently in the Nordic region—Sweden

Considering the size of Indian diaspora it is aptly mentioned that the ‘sun never sets in the Indian
diaspora’.
 History and
Evolution
Ø Girmityas or Jahajis
Indian example of Ø Descendants of indentured Indian labourers.
large scale migration Ø Brought to Fiji, Mauritius, South Africa, East Africa,
began during the Caribbean and South America (Trinidad and Tobago,
Guyana and Suriname)
British rule as
Ø To work on sugarcane plantations
indentured labourers
Ø The term Girmitiya was coined by Mahatma Gandhi
to former colonies like who referred to himself as first Girmitiya.
Fiji, Kenya and
Malaysia (also known
as Girmitiya people).
 Evolution of the Diaspora policy

 Nehruvian phase
 India opted for a policy of distancing itself from the
Diaspora, given its economic status and apprehension
that its interference could offend host countries. The
Diaspora policy was limited to cultural and humanitarian
dimensions.

 Addressing the Lok Sabha in 1957, Nehru said about the

diaspora, “We want to have no vested interests at the
expense of the population of those countries…if they
adopt the nationality of that country we have no concern
with them. There may be sentimental concerns but
politically they cease to be Indian nationals.”

 The Nehruvian trend was continued and extended to till

late 80s.
Mobilisation of the Indian diaspora began during the tenure of Rajiv Gandhi:

Rajiv Gandhi was the first Prime Minister who changed the diaspora policy by inviting
Indians abroad, to participate in nation-building

Sam Pitroda, who was entrusted with the task of modernising telecommunications in
India.  Grievances like red tape, multiple clearances, distrust of government in
fulfilling promises were addressed through hesitant reforms and promotional
measures.
In 1987 when Sitiveni Rabuka ousted an Fiji Indian majority government in Fiji . Rajiv
Gandhi, in a major departure from established policy, protested vehemently,
imposed trade sanctions against Fiji, got it expelled from the Commonwealth and
raised the issue at the United Nations  Energised the Indian diaspora, generating
faith in them that India would not be a silent witness, as it was in the past, to
discrimination, racism and disenfranchisement of Indians abroad.
 After the end of cold war, the emergence of a multipole centric foreign policy, structural shift in the
global economy and India’s economic reforms based on Liberalization, Privatization & globalization
allowed Indian government to change its outlook towards Diaspora and reviewed its diaspora policy.

 Atal Bihari Vajpayee led government saw the long-terms strategic value of the engagement when he
called for ‘partnership among all children of mother India’.

 In response to the growing Indian diaspora, the government established the Ministry of Overseas
Indian Affairs in 2004.
Modi Doctrine on Diaspora :

 PM Modi made the diaspora a centrepiece of his foreign policy .

 Prime minister Modi calls Indian diaspora as

 our 'Rashtradoots’
 the informal and permamnent ‘ambassadors’ for India.

He addressed Indian diaspora in different parts of the world from Madison Square, New York to Kigali,
Rwanda, Houston.

 Modi Doctrine on Diaspora is often described in terms of 3 Cs:

 ‘connect with India’;
 ‘celebrating cultural heritage; and
 ‘contribute’

 Relaxation of the visa norms for the overseas communities, merger of OCI + POI , improving physical
connectivity and the Ease of Doing Business have been the policy consequences of Modi’s intensive
outreach to the diaspora.
Significance of Diaspora
Paramjit Sahai in his book ‘Indian Cultural Diplomacy: Celebrating Pluralism in a
Globalised World’ writes how country’s foreign policy ‘rests upon four inter-linked pillars:
1. economic diplomacy,
2. peace diplomacy,
3. environmental diplomacy and
4. diaspora policy’.
 Building translational networks: The Diaspora provides important links not only emotional, but also
cultural, social, and political. For example Ireland's Prime Minister Leo Varadkar and Portugese Prime
Minister Antonio Costa are of Indian origin.

 Lobbying for India: The educated Indian diaspora are politically influential in their country of
residence.Act as Informal Ambassadors and help cultivate soft power . Lobby for Indian interests
 Examples - In USA - Indian community lobbied for support - during Kargil war,1998 Pokhran
Nuclear tests and Civil Nuclear deal

 Defence and security goals: Groups like the United States India Political Action Committee (USINPAC),
Friends of India, Canada India Foundation (CIF) and Canada India Business Council (CIBC), are
actively pushing for India's interests.

 Messenger of India’s soft power: Yoga, Bollywood, Indian cuisine among others is famous across the
world.
 Recovering artefacts: For example- The Indian Pride Project successfully lobbied to bring back the
Nataraja from Australia, and sandstone Yakshi from the United States.

 Source of Capital and Investment - Diaspora’s motives to invest in India are in contrast to non-
diaspora FDI. Their investments are long lasting as many of them wish to establish a long-term
base in India.

 Remittances - According to Global Migration Report 2020 , India recieves highest remittance of
$78.6 billion from Indians living abroad .

 The migration of less-skilled labour (especially to West Asia) has also helped in bringing down
disguised unemployment in India.
Challenges faced by Indian Diaspora:
 The Diaspora have been critical of bureaucratic procedures and slow pace of economic reform.

 Racism - Rising incidence of hate speech and crimes against Indian Diaspora by the locals due to
racism, communalism emboldened by coming of ultra nationalist and far right governments in
many countries.

 Increasing anti globalization has resulted in stricter visa rules in many countries including USA,
Australia etc.

 Conflicts - Sectarian crisis, terrorist activities and war in the Middle East countries leave our
diaspora vulnerable to attacks.
 Adverse local laws to encourage more employment from locals such as Nitaqat Law of Saudi
Arabia (mandates one local to be hired in place of 10 migrants).

 Brain Drain results in substantial drop in the supply of professionals for running institutions
and organisations in India.

 Money laundering and insurgent activities are sometimes promoted by the money coming as
remittances. Example - Khalistan movement, Kashmir
Challenges for Indian Government?
1. The diaspora engagement is yet to produce desired results in the form of large investments and
economic participation of the diaspora in India’s economic participation of the diaspora in India’s
initiatives like ‘Make in India’.

2. Broad coverage - The policy is slanted towards engaging the diaspora in the West, especially USA.

3. Diverse nature of the diaspora - Heterogeneous in social, economic and demographic characteristics .
Specific challenges are expected to arise in Middle East, where a large section of the Indian diaspora is
often under stress due to difficult working conditions , sudden lay-offs , confiscation of visas.

4. Objectives/priorities – whether diaspora is being seen from a political objectives for mobilisation of
financial resources or for their greater participation in Indian political and economic affairs.
What should be done?
High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, 2000
under the Chairmanship of Dr. L M Singhvi
The Committee has recommended to the Government that dual citizenship should be permitted to foreign
citizens of Indian descent settled in certain countries, within the rubric of the Citizenship Act,1955.

A clearly defined Diaspora policy ,suitably calibrated with country-specific plans.

Welfare of Indian Women married to NRIs/PIOs - A special cell should be created for free legal counselling
for the families of girls contemplating marriage to NRIs/PIOs. An affidavit stating his current marital status
should be a mandatory pre-requisite to the issuance of a marriage registration certificate.
Problems of Overseas Indian Labour –

Establishing a welfare fund for repatriated overseas workers in distress;

Negotiating a Standard Labour Export Agreement' with the host countries;

Monitoring and supervision of both the employment contracts, and the conditions of our
overseas workers by our Missions;

Launching compulsory insurance schemes covering the risks faced by our overseas workers;

Establishing mechanisms for pre-departure counselling and the provision of legal assistance
locally, instituting training programmes for human resource development and skills
upgradation;
Economic Development (Investment, International Trade, Industrial Development And Tourism) -Special
measures should be devised to facilitate the involvement of the Diaspora with India in this sector. Suitable
mechanisms should be devised to avail of such expertise.

Government should also consider setting up Special Economic Zones, exclusively for projects to be set
up by NRIs/PIOs.

A dedicated single-window set-up, which would provide consultancy services for overseas Indian
investors .

Indian banks should make a special arrangements to facilitate payments in rupees against incoming
foreign exchange.

Extending fiscal incentives, such as reducing corporate tax rates to levels at or below competitive
international levels, removing restrictions on repatriation of profits and eliminating needless
licensing requirements would be extremely useful in attracting investment.
Tourism -There should be greater focus on promoting tourism among 2nd generation PIOs. Special tour
packages, pilgrim packages and other packages tailor-made for this section of the Diaspora should be
developed and publicised.

Education -A large reservoir of highly qualified PIOs in senior academic positions in almost every
academic institution in countries like the USA, Canada and the UK. leverage this extraordinary
resource. Concerted efforts should be made to introduce India Studies in universities with a sizeable
Indian Diaspora.

Health -The PIOs have distinguished themselves in the field of medicine and healthcare in the countries
of their settlement. It is felt that it should be possible to attract significant investments and expertise
from them in the field of health care and medical research.

Standing Committee of Parliament - A Parliamentary Standing Committee on Indian Diaspora should be

constituted. It should have in it, members with an interest in Diaspora affairs. This Committee could
also act as focal point for interaction with Parliamentarians of Indian Origin in other countries.
With the world’s largest diaspora being India’s, the time is ripe to think of an Indian
diaspora policy.
As a definite starting point, a standing committee in the Parliament, as recommended
by L.M. Singhvi committee , could be instituted to actually ascertain the pros and cons
of this in a bipartisan manner.

This will help in understanding the diaspora’s contribution in specific countries and
formalise its role as an effective catalyst in India’s political, economic, trade and aid-
related issues.
 Indian
Diaspora
• What is Diaspora?
• Trace their origins to India or who are Indian citizens living
abroad.
• Modi  'Rashtradoots’. informal ‘ambassadors’ for
India Madison Square, Kigali, Rawanda.

• Migration began during the British rule  indentured labourers

 Fiji, Kenya and Malaysia (Girmitiya people).
• ‘sun never sets in the Indian diaspora’.

• The International Migration Report, 2019  world's largest:

• Arab Gulf states  8.5 million.
• Canada  3% of its population.
• Nearly 7,00,000— is the fastest growing in Australia .
• 1.5 million  UK contributes  6 percent to UK's GDP.
• 100,000 Indians living permanently in the Nordic region--
Sweden
•
• Indian Diaspora
• Non-Resident Indians (NRIs),
• Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) and
• Overseas Citizens of India (OCI).

•PIO and OCI card holders were merged under OCI category
in 2015.
• Evolution of the Diaspora policy
• Nehruvian phase
• Distancing itself from the Diaspora
• economic status
• Interference
• Diaspora policy was limited to cultural and
humanitarian dimensions.
• Lok Sabha in 1957 “We want to have no vested
interests at the expense of the population of those
countries…if they adopt the nationality of that
country we have no concern with them. There may
be sentimental concerns but politically they cease to
be Indian nationals.”
 The Nehruvian trend was continued and extended to till 1990s.

• Rajiv Gandhi
• End of cold war reviewed its diaspora policy.

• Atal Bihari Vajpayee r ‘partnership among all children of mother

India’.
• In response to the growing Indian diaspora, the government
established the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs in 2004.

• Modi Doctrine on Diaspora is often described in terms of 3 Cs:

• ‘connect with India’;
• ‘celebrating cultural heritage; and
• ‘contribute’

• Programs of Indian Government to engage its diaspora:

• Scholarship Programme for Diaspora Children (SPDC) under
which 100 scholarships per annum  undergraduate courses.
• Know India Program (KIP) is a flagship initiative for Diaspora engagement
which familiarizes Indian-origin youth (18-30 years) with their Indian roots
and contemporary India.
• Under Minimum Referral Wages (MRW), increased the minimum wages
of Indian workers industrial workers, domestic servants, cleaners and
labourers.
• E-migrate system  foreign employers to register in the database. It
ensures the welfare and check on exploitation met to emigrants.
• Madad Portal to take timely and speedy action on grievances addressed by
people living abroad.
• Indian Community Welfare Fund
• Pravasi Bharatiya divas , Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Awards ,Pravasi
Teerth Darshan Yojna
• Study India Program
• Skill Banks and PKVY - MEA + Ministry of Skill Development and
Entrepreneurship (MSDE)  Pravasi Kaushal Vikas Yojana (PKVY).
• Incentives to NRIs for investing exempt from several taxes and other
charges. NRI seats are reserved in all the medical, engineering and other
professional colleges.
• VAJRA (Visiting Advanced Joint Research) Faculty Scheme  overseas
scientists and academicians Indian Public funded academic and research
institutions.
 PRAVASI BHARATIYA DIVAS (PBD)
 Celebrated after every 2 years.
 Marks the return of Gandhi from South
Africa to Mumbai on 9 January1915.
 Pravasi Teerth Darshan Yojna:
 Launched at PBD 2019
 Sponsored by Center and the State.
 Is organised twice a year.
 PIO  45 to 65 years never been to
India previously low-income group.
 The government will bear all the expenses
 First preference to people from Girmitiya
countries.Girmityas or Jahajis 
Fiji,Mauritius, South Africa, East Africa,
Malay Peninsula, Caribbean and South
America (Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana
and Suriname)
 Know India Programme(KIP)
 By Ministry of External Affairs
 For Indian-origin youth (18-30 years)
 Since 2003
 PIO youth (excluding NRIs) with preference to
those from Girmitiya countries
 Minimum qualification enrolled for graduation
 Girmityas or Jahajis
 Descendants of indentured Indian labourers.
 Fiji, Mauritius, South Africa, East Africa,
Caribbean and South America (Trinidad and
Tobago, Guyana and Suriname)
 Sugarcane plantations
 The term Girmitiya was coined by Mahatma
Gandhi who referred to himself as first Girmitiya.
Paramjit Sahai in his book ‘Indian Cultural
Diplomacy: Celebrating Pluralism in a Globalised
World’ writes how country’s foreign policy ‘rests
upon four inter-linked pillars:
1. economic diplomacy,
2. peace diplomacy,
3. environmental diplomacy and
4. diaspora policy’.
• Role played by Diaspora :
• Building translational networks: Emotional, cultural,
social, and political. Former Ireland's Prime Minister
Leo Varadkar and Portugese Prime Minister Antonio
Costa are of Indian origin.
• Lobbying for India: The educated Indian diaspora are
politically influential
• Examples - Kargil war,1998 Pokhran Nuclear
tests and Civil Nuclear deal

• Defence and security goals: Groups like the United

States India Political Action Committee (USINPAC),
Friends of India, Canada India Foundation (CIF) and
Canada India Business Council (CIBC), are actively
pushing for India's interests.
• Messenger of India’s soft power: Yoga,
Bollywood, Indian cuisine.
• Recovering artefacts: For example- The
Indian Pride Project successfully lobbied to
bring back the Nataraja from Australia,
and sandstone Yakshi from the United
States.
• Contribution in other fields:
• Source of Capital and Investment
• Helpful in transfer of technology
• Boosts foreign trade
• Development of soft power
• Remittances - According to Global
Migration Report 2020 , India
recieves highest remittance of $78.6
billion from Indians living abroad .
• Migration of less-skilled labour (especially
to West Asia)  disguised unemployment in
India.

• Stable investments  long-term base in

India.
• Challenges faced by Indian Diaspora:
• Bureaucratic procedures and slow pace of economic
reform.
• Racism
• Increasing anti globalization
• Conflicts - Sectarian crisis, terrorist activities and war in
the Middle East
• Adverse local laws  Nitaqat Law of Saudi Arabia
(mandates one local to be hired in place of 10 migrants).
• Brain Drain
• Money laundering and insurgent activities are
sometimes promoted by the money coming as
remittances. Example - Khalistan movement.
• The NRIs are not allowed to set up their firms directly in
India due to which India is not able to take the advantage
of their entrepreneurial skills.
• Minimum Referral Wages policy have been detrimental 
Bangladesh and Pakistan.
Challenges for
Indian
Government?
1. The diaspora engagement is yet to produce desired results in the form of large
investments and economic participation of the diaspora in India’s economic
participation of the diaspora in India’s initiatives like ‘Make in India’.

2. Broad coverage - West, especially USA.

3. Diverse nature of the diaspora - Heterogeneous in social, economic and demographic

characteristics . Specific challenges are expected to arise in Middle East, where a
large section of the Indian diaspora is often under stress due to difficult working
conditions , sudden lay-offs , confiscation of visas.

4. Objectives/priorities – whether diaspora is being seen from a political objectives for

mobilisation of financial resources or for their greater participation in Indian political
and economic affairs.
High Level Committee on
the Indian Diaspora, 2000
under the Chairmanship of
Dr. L M Singhvi
Dual citizenship should be permitted  Citizenship Act,1955.

A clearly defined Diaspora policy ,suitably calibrated with country-specific plans.

Welfare of Indian Women married to NRIs/PIOs - A special cell should be created

for free legal counselling for the families of girls contemplating marriage to
NRIs/PIOs. An affidavit stating his current marital status should be a mandatory pre-
requisite to the issuance of a marriage registration certificate.
 What should be done?
 Demands of dual citizenship
 More of Howdy Mody Houstan,Texas;New York - Madison Square ;London - Wembley
Stadium
 Reverse Brain Drain - Encouraging them to come back to India with significant skill sets
and tech knowledge
 Encouraging to invest in social sector - Rural sanitation, health initiatives, education etc
.
 Continue with rescue efforts like Operation Sankat Mochan, Operation Rahat , Mission
Vande Bharat (Covid-19 Rescue). This gives a sense of entitlement to the diaspora.
 Provide supporting environment for NRIs to invest in India — especially in rural
development — by offering attractive interest rates on deposits.
 Leverage Social media link and strengthen the diaspora connect.
 India-Myanmar Relations
Background

India and Myanmar share a 1,643 km long land border as well as a mar- itime boundary
in the Bay of Bengal, and have a shared history as well as cultural and religious
connections. Burma was a province of British India until 1937, from which point it
became a separate British colony. The British famously exiled India’s last Mughal
emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, until his death in Rangoon.

While populations had moved between the two countries for centuries, the Indian
presence in Burma increased under the Raj as the British brought Indians into
administration, police and defence, and the Indian Burmese community became a
commercial elite.

India and Burma became independent in 1947 and 1948 respectively. India’s approach to
Burma/Myanmar may be divided into three distinct phases since independence, reflecting
changes in the bilateral relationship but also changes in India’s Myanmar policy. The
period 1948–62 was marked by friendship and international solidarity, while the years
1962–91 saw an unprecedented level of hostility as India embarked on its open
condemnation of the Tatmadaw. From 1991 onwards, as India’s Myanmar policy
metamorphosed into a gradual engagement with the junta, the stage was set for a new
phase in the relationship.

1948–62: friendship and international solidarity

The period 1948–62 witnessed largely cordial Indo-Burmese relations, and three themes
stand out as particularly relevant: close relations at the highest political levels, a similar
ideological affinity and co-operation in international affairs, and the situation of the
Indian diaspora in Burma. Indeed the close friendship between Jawaharlal Nehru and U
Nu resulted in almost annual official and private visits in the years 1948–62.

Carefully balancing between its larger neighbours India and China, U Nu’s Burma
nevertheless favoured India. New Delhi supplied arms to Rangoon’s counter- insurgency
efforts in 1949, and four years later U Nu and Nehru worked to counter increasing Naga
demands for independence on the volatile Indo-Burmese border. In July 1951, India and
Burma signed a “Treaty of Friendship and Peace” in Rangoon, agreeing on “everlasting
peace and unalterable friendship.” Efforts were made to revive Indo- Burmese trade, and
in 1954 Nehru cancelled significant parts of Burma’s debt to India.

Close ideological and political affinity between the political elites led to a close
alignment in international affairs. In the early post-Independence period India and Burma
sought active places in international politics, the countries’ foreign policies marked by
adherence to notions of ‘pan- Asian’ ideals, neutralism and non-alignment, as well as
socialist-inspired notions of equity and justice. The countries frequently co-operated in
forums that were central to the new Third World movement such as the UN, taking on
roles as leaders of the decolonised and decolonising countries. Indeed Burma wished to
emulate the Nehruvian approach in world politics, remaining non-aligned while at the
same time taking a leadership role.

In April 1954, India and China signed the Panchsheel Treaty, agreeing to principles of
peaceful co-existence, mutual non-aggression and non-interference. At Nehru’s
instigation, Burma and China agreed adherence to the same principles two months later.
India and Burma were among the initiators of the 1955 Bandung conference, which laid
the foundations for the 1961 establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

Closeness in Sino-Burmese relationship: In parallel with India and Burma’s emerging

leadership role in international affairs, however, a closer Sino-Burmese relationship
created apprehension in New Delhi. Chinese economic assistance, joint Sino-Burmese
military operations in Shan state and the 1960 signing of a Sino- Burmese border
agreement and treaty of friendship all created growing concern in India, at a time when
Sino-Indian relations were strained over the border issue.

Anti-Immigrant sentiment in Myanmar:

Early post-independence Indo-Burmese relations were also affected by problematic

issues at home, such as the fate of Burmese people of Indian origin. The number of
Indians residing in Burma at the time of independence is estimated to between 700,000
and 800,000, and these were hard hit by the early measures to nationalise land and
industry.

The colonial legacy created lasting Burmese apprehensions about India and the Indian
Burmese (or ‘kalas), due to their role in the colonial apparatus of domination & their
relative economic success. Indeed Sino- Burmese relations were also strained by similar
Burmese fears of domination, and the Chinese population in Burma also experienced
antipathy. Wishing to limit foreign economic interests, U Nu’s government introduced
the 1948 Land Alienation Act, which forbade sale of land to non-Burmese nationals, and
the 1949 Burma Land Nationalisation Bill, which reclaimed Indian-owned land. In 1953,
over 10,000 Indians were dismissed from various Burmese government services. Indian
official reactions were muted. While the government facilitated repatriation, Nehru in
1950 encouraged Indians in Burma to change nationality and settle permanently.

1962–91: from friendship to antagonism

When General Ne Win in 1962 set aside U Nu in a coup, India condemned the move.
Burma became a military one-party regime under the Burma Socialist Programme Party
(BSPP), also dominating the country’s external relations. While the setting aside of the
democracy in Burma provoked strong negative reactions in Delhi, India’s attention was
soon diverted by the October 1962 war with China. The Burmese military regime’s
neutral stand on the Sino-Indian war was in Delhi interpreted as support for China,
straining Indo-Burmese relations further.
The same year, however, China began endorsing the Communist Party of Burma (CPB)
in its insurrection against the central government, making it the best armed of Burma’s
many insurgencies. China’s support for CPB created a lasting strain on Sino-Burmese
relations.

However, by the late 1970s this was reduced, and by the mid-1980s the CPB support was
no longer a matter for bilateral diplomatic relations. Eventually Beijing worked to
restrain the CPB insurgency, and in 1989 the CPB was dissolved.

General Ne Win’s “Burmese Way to Socialism” entailed a comprehensive xenophobic

nationalism, limiting foreign economic and cultural participation and favouring the
dominant Burman (Bamar) identity. The autarkical economic policies brought a drastic
reduction in cross-border trade and prevention of external investments and foreign
participation in the economy. The Indian diaspora was again hard hit. Large proportions
lost their means of livelihood, while their bank accounts were simply closed down. In
addition, anti-Indian sentiments prevalent in the Burmese population flared up.

While Indo-Burmese relations were severely strained over the issue of the Indian
diaspora, In the mid-1960s Ne Win visited Delhi and Lal Bahadur Shastri visited
Rangoon Spurred on by insurgencies in north-east India, the Indo- Burmese border was
settled through a boundary agreement signed on 10 March 1967, and the period also saw
some co-operation on counter-insurgency operations in the border areas. From the mid-
1970s, however, relations again cooled. U Nu, exiled from Burma by Ne Win’s regime,
was granted political asylum by India, which in turn became a sticking point between the
countries.

Sino Burmese relations & the end of the “paukphaw” era post 1967 riots: In
comparison, Chinese diplomatic reactions to the extensive anti-Chinese riots in Burma in
1967 were strong, effectively ending the era of friendly Sino-Burmese ‘paukphaw’
(sibling or cousin) relations.

Indo-Burmese co-operation in international matters soon decreased. India officially

disapproved of the undemocratic nature of the Burmese regime, while Burma became the
subject of relative international isolation. In addition, Ne Win and the BSPP chose to lead
an isolationist policy combining economic self-reliance with nationalist seclusion,
gradually withdrawing from most of the diplomatic connections U Nu had built up. As a
result, in 1979 Burma withdrew from the Non-Aligned Movement.

1987: after a hiatus of nearly 20 years, Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Rangoon was the first
Indian visit on prime-ministerial level since his mother’s 1969 visit. Aiming to improve
bilateral relations, any headway created by Gandhi’s visit was, however, thoroughly
undermined by the events of 1988.

1988: suppression of pro-democracy protests in Myanmar: Indo-Burmese relations

reached an all-time low following the August 1988 pro-democracy demonstrations in
Burma and the military regime’s brutal repression of protests. India was the first and only
Asian country to criticise the new Tatmadaw junta of September 1988, the State Law and
Order Restoration Council (SLORC).

Furthermore the Indian embassy in Rangoon actively helped pro-democracy activists

during the protests, famously turning the embassy library into a makeshift hospital and
providing financial support for democracy activists. The Indian government established
refugee camps in Mizoram and Manipur states, and the government run All India Radio
(AIR) began broadcasting Burmese- language reports on the SLORC repression, read out
by U Nu’s daughter. New Delhi wished to limit involvement with Yangon, as the capital
was renamed, even more so after the regime placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest
from June 1989. Furthermore, when Suu Kyi was awarded the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize,
India’s Prime Minister Narasimha Rao lauded the recognition.

The strong Indian stance against the new regime in Myanmar – the country’s new name
from 1989 – caused considerable offence within the SLORC, creating an impetus to seek
allies elsewhere.

Thus while both Myanmar and China countries faced internal crises as well as strong
international condemnation following their crackdown on the 1988 uprising and the 1989
Tiananmen Square protests respectively, Yangon and Beijing soon built a close
relationship. As the extent of this relationship became clear, Indian security analysts and
foreign policy circles began reviewing India’s policy towards Myanmar, fearing
expanded Chinese influence in India’s neighbourhood.

1991 to today: India’s policy of engagement:

In the early 1990s, Indian security and foreign policy circles pressed for a change in the
policy towards Myanmar, opting for engagement with the Tatmadaw. In March 1993,
India’s Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit visited Myanmar, and discussed Indian concerns
with Myanmar’s military co-operation with China. The first high-level contact since the
repression of the 1988 pro-democracy demonstrations, Dixit’s visit was understood as a
breakthrough, confirming New Delhi’s policy change.

The policy change was desirable for a number of reasons, China’s economic growth and
increased influence in Myanmar became an overriding concern, making India’s Myanmar
policy take on new and important geostrategic dimensions.

India’s geostrategic interests in Myanmar: Writing in 2000, J.N. Dixit argued that the
main reason for the review of Indo-Myanmar relations was “Myanmar’s geostrategic
importance for India”, pointing out the shared border with the Indian north-east, China
and Bangladesh, as well as its relevance for Indian security interests in the Bay of Bengal
and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. However it was “equally important to ensure that
Myanmar does not become part of an exclusive area of influence of other powers in the
region with whom India has uneasy relations. China, for instance”.

While most countries had severed their ties to Myanmar after 1988, China quickly
became the country’s closest ally and economic partner, and its largest provider of
development aid. Spurred on by a new willingness by the SLORC regime to set aside the
dirigiste approach of the Ne Win era, Sino-Burmese co-operation grew to encompass
economic, military and infrastructure development. The alignment facilitated a massive
military expansion and rearmament in Myanmar with China as the largest supplier.

Sino-Burmese trade boomed and China invested heavily in Myanmar’s infrastructure,

also benefiting Chinese aims of using Myanmar as “a corridor for the southward flow of
Chinese goods” and opening up the western provinces. In Delhi, this development was
viewed with deep suspicion – an infrastructure corridor from Yunnan to the Bay of
Bengal could potentially transport soldiers just as easily as goods. Suspicion turned to
fear when in 1992 China was reported to have set up bases or even intelligence-gathering
facilities on the Burmese Greater Coco and Hainggyi islands.

Under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, India embarked upon a new and more pro-active
direction in foreign policy, which combined a gradual approach towards the remaining
superpower, the USA, with a turn towards East Asia and especially the ASEAN states
through the “Look East Policy” (LEP).

While often assumed to be a mainly economically motivated policy, LEP also aims for a
strategic engagement of Southeast Asia as a result of “India’s search for new friends and
partners after the loss of its superpower patron in 1991”. Thus the LEP has economic,
diplomatic and strategic aspects, and the total sum of these affect India’s relations to
Myanmar. Myanmar has come to attain a central place within the LEP due to its
geographical location, geostrategic relevance and natural resources.

India’s main objectives: security, connectivity, economic and maritime dimensions

In addition to the ‘China factor’ and India’s own orientation eastwards, four geostrategic
considerations have guided India’s Myanmar policy over the last two decades. First, a
growing Indian wish to stabilise and develop India’s northeast has made the need for co-
operation with Myanmar on cross-border security issues evident. Second, Myanmar’s
position as a connecting point between South and East Asia is central, as Myanmar is
understood as key to improving connectivity to the greater Southeast Asian region.
Third, Myanmar’s natural resources and particularly its gas and oil reserves make it an
interesting trading partner. Finally, Myanmar’s position in the Bay of Bengal littoral
region, in which India aims for regional leadership, is of key importance.

A main driver behind India’s co-operation with Myanmar remains the need to stabilise
and develop India’s north-east, which poses a significant security challenge for the
central authorities. As mentioned above, Myanmar and India share a 1,643 km border
along the Indian states of Manipur, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh and
Myanmar’s Sagaing region and Chin and Kachin states. The border cuts across the
homelands of a number of ethnic communities, many of which have led insurgencies
against the central authorities in both Myanmar and India. The border is also porous, and
militant groups operate out of both India’s and Myanmar’s territory, often protected by
the local neighbourhoods or local authorities. Furthermore the “Free Movement Regime”,
which allows tribal communities to cross the border without visa restrictions, aids
trafficking in illegal goods.

Following India’s growing engagement with Myanmar, closer military co-operation in

the border areas took place from the first half of the 1990s onwards (operation golden
bird), resulting in a number of counter-insurgency operations, joint military operations
against insurgents along the border were thus resumed and strengthened in autumn 2000,
spring 2001 and autumn 2001 and became annual joint winter campaigns. Co-operation
mainly works to counter the major militant groups that oppose the Indian central
government, such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland and its two factions,
Isak-Muviah (NSCN-IK) and Khaplang (NSCN-K), the United Liberation Front of
Assam (ULFA)

Gradually, an understanding of the need to develop India’s north-east and improve

infrastructure has gained ground in Indian foreign and security policy. Enhanced
connectivity is a central objective of India in Myanmar, both in order to connect India
proper to its own north eastern states, and in order to connect to Myanmar, using its
neighbour as a gateway to the ASEAN countries.

A number of infrastructure initiatives have been established or are currently underway,

such as roads, railways and pipelines such as:

India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway project: The project aims to connect the

three countries through the construction of a highway from Moreh in Manipur state via
Mandalay and Yangon in Myanmar to Mae Sot in Thailand. The Indian side has wished
for a weekly bus service between Imphal and Mandalay for several years, with relatively
low fares and a visa-on-arrival scheme for travellers, making movement between the
countries easier.

The Kaladan multi-modal transport project has long been one of India’s flagship
projects in Myanmar. Initiated in 2003, an agreement was reached between India and
Myanmar in 2008. The project will link the ports of Kolkata (India) and Sittwe
(Myanmar) by shipping route, and link Sittwe further up the Kaladan river by boat to
Mizoram in India.

The main rationale from the Indian side has been to improve connectivity between India
proper and the north-eastern states through creating an alternative to the Siliguri corridor.

Geostrategic relevance of Myanmar: Myanmar’s importance as a connecting point

between South and East Asia has been much emphasised, and the country is often seen as
the ‘crossroads’ of Asia, or as India’s ‘land bridge’ towards South-east and East Asia. In
1996, ASEAN leaders agreed that Myanmar would be admitted as a member state, and
the following year Myanmar became a member. ASEAN’s engagement of Myanmar and
Myanmar’s 1997 ASEAN membership coincided with India’s growing engagement with
both Myanmar and ASEAN through the LEP. A strategic consensus thus emerged
between India and ASEAN on the need to wean Myanmar away from China.

The first of these was the Bangladesh-India-Sri Lanka-Thailand Econ- omic Co-operation
(BIST-EC), established in June 1997. Having attended the inaugural meeting as an
observer, Myanmar became a full member in December the same year, and the
organisation was renamed BIMSTEC.

Another similar initiative is the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation, which from 2000 has
worked to improve connectivity and economic and cultural exchanges between its
member countries India, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. A closer
regional co-operation has also been sought by China, such as through the 1999
“Kunming Initiative” or the BCIM co-operation between Bangladesh, China, India and
Myanmar. From 2013 onwards, however, renewed interest has emerged in the BCIM
economic or trade corridor,

Geo-Economic importance of Myanmar: Over time, India’s own economic rise has
made access to resources and markets, as well as energy security, increasingly important,
and in light of this access to Myanmar’s natural resources, gas and oil reserves are
interesting for India

While the Indian oil and gas industry is heavily involved in Myanmar’s energy sector, it
is, relative to the Chinese industry, less profitable. Moreover, it is also hampered by the
lack of oil and gas infrastructure between the two countries. While an MOU on the sale
of natural gas from the Shwe field to India was signed in 2006, India nevertheless
eventually lost out to China, as Indian attempts at establishing a pipeline between India
and Myanmar, via Bangladesh or India’s north-east, did not succeed. China, in contrast,
constructed a double pipeline between Kyakpyu and Kunming in five years, and has a 30-
year contract on the gas from the Shwe field.

In April 1995, the first India–Myanmar Border Trade Agreement was implemented.
Since then three border trading posts connecting Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland have
been put into place. The bilateral trade increased from USD 87 million in 1990–91 to
USD 1.9 billion in 2012–13 to USD 2.16 billion in 2016 . India is one of the main
importers of Myanmar’s agricultural items, and the main exporter of pharmaceuticals to
Myanmar & India is the fifth largest trading partner of Myanmar.

Chinese economic presence in Myanmar: According to ADB (2016) data, continuously

since 2001 China has been the leading source of Myanmar’s import. It reached 3.04
billion USD in 2015 and constituted 28 percent of all Myanmar’s imports. Once the gas
and oil pipelines became operational, China became the main export destination in 2014
and the value of export reached 7.72 billion USD (43 percent of all Myanmar’s export)

Defence cooperation between India-Myanmar: The maritime domain is an area where

Indo-Burmese co-operation has been relatively successful, achieving extensive
collaboration. Important objectives on the Indian side have been to acquire intelligence
on the claimed Chinese presence in Myanmar, and more particularly the alleged Chinese
bases on Burmese islands.

Joint yearly naval exercises have been held since 2003, and the Myanmar navy, or
Tatmadaw Yay, takes part in the annual MILAN exercises led by the Indian navy. The
close co-operation has intensified during Thein Sein’s government, and Myanmar naval
vessels in 2013 made their first port calls to mainland India. Following the port call, the
two navies conducted joint exercises and patrolled their joint maritime boundary. India
decided to supply several offshore patrol vessels to Myanmar, and give training to
officers of the Myanmar navy.

The increased Indian willingness to support the Myanmar navy was later interpreted as
central to a conscious change in Indian defence policy, originating within the military,
intelligence and foreign policy circles in South Block, and taking place in the latter half
of 2013. Using India’s military branches, the main aim is seen as furthering India’s
interests in the immediate and strategically important neighborhood, also
countering China’s influence.

Barriers to India’s achievement of its objectives in Myanmar:

While India’s engagement with Myanmar in the maritime domain has been relatively
successful, India’s achievement of its objectives in the areas of security and economic
development, trade and connectivity has been hampered by a number of constraints.
Despite the radical turn- around in India’s Myanmar policy in 1991, in practice it took
several years before India managed to implement a powerful policy. It was not until the
early 2000s that tangible results were seen in the form of several bilateral agreements,
and defence and security co-operation was carried out on a more regular basis.

Particular importance has been accorded to Jaswant Singh’s period as India’s Foreign
Affairs minister in 1998–2002, and his “Eastern Strategy”. In part, it took a long time to
establish a basic trust following the strong Indian condemnation of Myanmar in 1988.
Also, the BJP government placed greater emphasis on trade as a foreign-policy tool,
lending greater support to Indian investment in Myanmar than the previous governments.
In addition, the BJP added a cultural dimension to the engagement with Myanmar,
emphasizing the Indian roots of Buddhism.

In 2004 the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) junta’s leader Senior General
Than Shwe visited India – the first head of state visit for 20 years. After BJP lost the
2004 Indian elections, Manmohan Singh’s United Progressive Alliance government
(2004–2014) continued and intensified the policy of engaging with Myanmar.

A main obstacle for the Indian projects in Myanmar has simply been problems of
implementation. As shown by several projects such as the Kaladan project, the “India-
Myanmar Friendship Road” and the Trilateral highway, several years have gone by
between establishment and finalisation of projects. It is implied that these projects have
not received the necessary support from government circles in Delhi, whose approach
towards the infrastructure projects in particular has been termed ‘lackadaisical’ by Indian
observers. Lack of security in border areas and on the main Indian roads to the
border areas is also a main reason why cross-border trade remains low.

The democratisation process and the ‘Sino-Indian Great Game’ in Myanmar: From
late 2010 onwards Myanmar’s political landscape underwent significant changes:
national and local elections were held, a new parliament was convened, and Thein Sein
was elected President. Eventually the SPDC was dissolved. Aung San Suu Kyi was
released from house arrest; The National League for Democracy (NLD) re-emerged as a
legal political party and won 43 seats in parliament in 2012. The changes prompted
enthusiastic responses from supporters of a greater Indian engagement with Myanmar, as
well as internationally.

A dominant line of argument was that India needed to strengthen its approach and
engagement, in light of China’s comparative strategic advantages. Again, the notion of a
‘Sino-Indian Great Game’ in Myanmar came centre stage – on the Indian side.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh travelled to Myanmar in 2012, significantly supporting

both the new semi-civilian government and its opposition through meetings with Thein
Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi.

While Myanmar’s opening up has seemingly created new opportunities for bilateral
contact and co-operation, it could, however, also constitute a new turning point for
India’s Myanmar policy. Myanmar’s democratisation process is likely to make it
easier for Indian politicians to agree on a coherent Myanmar policy, not marked by
conflicting loyalties towards the different political actors in Myanmar. The
November 2015 elections in Myanmar, and Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for
Democracy’s overwhelming victory, have been warmly welcomed in India. At the same
time, however, the democratisation may make it all the more urgent for India to utilise its
established relation to Myanmar, as the number of Myanmar’s potential co-operation
partners has increased rapidly since 2011, and will increase even further with NLD in
power. In comparison to the years of international sanctions, Myanmar is now in a
position to pick and choose, which leaves India as just one of many potential suitors.

Myanmar is now attracting considerable funding, an example being the Japanese

assistance to and co-operation with Myanmar. In 2013 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited
Myanmar, and Japan soon after cancelled Myanmar’s USD 3.7 billion debt. Increased
Japanese engagement is understood as motivated by a wish to counter Chinese
influence.

Furthermore President Thein Sein’s 2011–2012 suspensions of the Chinese funded

Myitsone Dam project and the Letpadaung copper mine have widely been
interpreted as a sign that Myanmar will work to limit the Chinese dominance –
particularly by the Indian press.

Security ties & the related challenges for India-Myanmar relations:

 • India’s border with Myanmar is densely forested the cover of which is used by
insurgents to pursue anti-India agendas, sometime without the knowledge of
Myanmarese authorities.

• Myanmar presents what Samir Das calls a “frontier dilemma” for India’s Look
East policy.

• However, in recent times, Myanmar government has taken several steps against
Indian insurgent groups. U. Thein Sein reassured India that Myanmar will not let
its territory be used by insurgent groups from the Northeast against India.

• Mechanism of regular Joint Consultative Committee meetings between the two

countries affirms the shared commitment to fight terrorism and insurgent activity.
In a recent meeting the need for enhanced cooperation between security forces
and border guarding agencies was emphasized

• At least half a dozen Indian insurgent groups including the United Liberation
Front of Asom (Ulfa) and the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang
faction, are alleged to have training camps in northern Myanmar

• It is critical to note that the most significant long term connection that northeast
insurgents have enjoyed, that with the United Wa State Army (UWSA) which is
closely aligned with China.

• UWSA is the largest source of weapons for Northeast insurgents including the
NSCN (K). For China, its linkage with the UWSA is a strategic priority, even
more so than its relationship with the Myanmar government which is gradually
democratizing

• Breaking these covert Chinese connections with insurgent groups like the UWSA
with the help of Myanmar is a priority for long term stability in the Northeast.

Civil war and ethnic conflicts within Myanmar:

• Struggles for ethnic and sub-national autonomy has pitted the dominant Burmese
community disproportionately represented in the Government against the other ethnic
minority groups

• Panglong Agreement: Agreement signed in 1947 by General Aung San and

different tribes which promised full autonomy for internal administration in frontier
regions where Kachin, Chin, Shan and other tribes lived. However, with
establishment of military rule, the agreement was abandoned which resulted in
emergence of autonomous armed groups directly challenging the government

• Since 2011, the government has opened negotiations with warring factions and
entered into ceasefire negotiations & there is a demand for developing new Panglong
 Agreement that calls for true federalism and respect for human rights. The success of
peace-building in Myanmar is hinged on its ability to resolve the ethnic crisis

• In a bid to stabilize the situation, President Thein Sein sought for all round cease fire
with autonomous militant groups to ensure peaceful environment for elections in
2015

• The United Wa State Army, believed to be the largest and best equipped of the
country’s armed ethnic groups, has remained largely on the sidelines of the peace
process and did not sign the latest nation-wide cease fire agreement. Also missing is
the Kachin Independence Organization, which controls vast areas of Kachin State, in
Myanmar’s northeast.

• It has been reported that these two groups, which operate on the Myanmar-China
border, had come under pressure from China not to sign. China has denied these
allegations

The ‘Second Coast’ and its implications for Northeast India

• Myanmar’s 2,276 km long coastline in the Bay of Bengal has the potential to provide
the ‘second coast’ to China to reach the Indian Ocean and achieve strategic presence
in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. Especially transportation logistics to the
‘second coast’ from landlocked south west Chinese provinces like Yunnan have both
economic and strategic benefits.

There have been reports of Chinese built SIGINT listening stations in the Andaman
Sea at least at Manaung, Hainggyi, Zadetkyi and the Coco Islands in Myanmar.
Additional reports indicate that the Chinese maybe pushing Myanmar for a listening
facility on Ramree Island, Rakhine state, which also holds the deep sea Kyaukpyu
port developed for oil and gas transportation. China is building an integrated
transport system linking the Kyaukpyu port to Yunnan Province in South West China
with the sole aim of reducing energy shipping through the Malacca Strait and South
China Sea. The plans include a railroad project from Kunming, the capital of
Yunnan, to Kyaukpyu to complete the logistics loop to the ‘second coast’

Further north from Kyaukpyu port is the capital Sittwe of Rakhine state where China
has assisted the Myanmar Navy built a naval base. Interestingly, India’s northeast
serving Kaladan River Multi modal transport system feeds off the Sittwe port being
developed by India, being the closest to the Kolkata port.

As per Indian Navy’s assessment, China’s control of Myanmar’s ports from Sittwe in
the north to Cheduba, Bassein and a string of other military assets on the ‘second
coast’ can enable it to enforce anti-access/area denial to deny the Indian Navy the
ability to operate in its littoral waters in the Bay of Bengal. Such escalating scenarios
have grave implications for Northeast India from clandestine arms shipments that
pass through these waters for the insurgent groups in the region. Contraband arms
shipments seized in the past from Chittagong port and Cox’s Bazaar in Bangladesh
originated through arms traffickers in Cambodia and Thailand ports.

The coastal border points between Bangladesh and Myanmar have become a haven
for contraband arms transit due to inadequate patrolling of their huge coastline in the
past by these two countries. These shipments can land on the coasts of South
Bangladesh and Northwest Myanmar and then smuggled inland in smaller
consignments into Northeast India. The neighboring transit state in Myanmar namely
Rakhine has rampant ethnic strife and Chin state has ethnic insurgencies and is not
fully controlled by the Myanmar government.

India needs to put in place a well-coordinated approach to secure the maritime and
land neighborhood of the Bay of Bengal and Northeast India. This would include
strengthening naval and coastal patrol assets in the littoral waters off the Andaman
and Nicobar islands as well as enhanced strategic assets at the Northeastern borders
opposite the ‘second coast’.
India has to work with Bangladesh, which faces a huge national security threat as the
landing zone of trafficked arms through the Bay of Bengal by conspiring foreign
terrorist organizations operating from its soil with support of local elements. The
Myanmar government is challenged by insurgent militias still running loose, who are
aided and abetted externally for short sighted strategic gains inside the country. India
needs to support Myanmar in establishing the firm rule of the laws of its government
throughout its length and breadth. India would need earnest diplomatic efforts to
push relations with both Bangladesh and Myanmar in a mutually supportive security
partnership against common foes of all the legitimate stakeholders in this strategic
theatre.

Thus it may be too early to predict Naypyidaw’s preferred policy towards China vis-à-vis
other potential cooperation partners. In addition, Burmese nationalism and xenophobia
have been and remain powerful drivers in the country’s politics and international
relations, particularly in relation to China and India, and may remain so in the future.

Recent literature has aimed to ‘deconstruct’ this notion of a ‘Sino-Indian rivalry’ in

Myanmar, as China’s leverage far outweighs India’s, and as the Tatmadaw’s position
nevertheless prevents either country’s manipulation of Myanmar. It has also been argued
that the triangular relationship between India, China and Myanmar might be better
understood “in terms of respective spheres of influence rather than direct confrontation

Views of prominent scholars:

Rajiv Bhatia
While India views Myanmar as its gateway to ASEAN, Myanmar saw ASEAN as its
bridge to South Asia.

On major political issues, India was forthright in its support to Myanmar, especially to its
fledgling democratic institutions, the initiative for national reconciliation and peace, and
the ongoing economic and political reform process under difficult circumstances. New
Delhi has offered to share India’s own experiences in evolving parliamentary rules,
procedures and practices as well as managing Union-State/Region relations, allocation of
powers and resources between the Union and States etc

A way to deepen the bilateral is by activating a proposal to establish an India-Myanmar

Foundation, tasked with expanding people-to-people exchanges. A China-Myanmar
Foundation is already underway; India should not be far behind.

President Htin Kyaw has set the stage for a new level of bilateral engagement. To
concretise this, Indian leaders may have to await in-depth interactions with Suu Kyi who
is now routinely portrayed by media as the de facto prime minister of Myanmar.

Harsh V. Pant

Indian diplomacy has a tough job at hand as all major powers are now wooing Myanmar.
China and Myanmar pledged to forge closer ties as “blood brothers” and enhance trade.
Even the Obama administration views Myanmar’s transition to democracy as one of its
key foreign policy achievements

Myanmar’s transition to a civilian government has given India more strategic space to
manoeuvre. But as in the past, the future of bilateral ties will not be determined by just
democracy

C. Raja Mohan

Modi has his task cut out in bridging the growing gap between the potential and reality of
India’s partnership with Myanmar. The problem in Delhi is not in the lack of a vision for
the future of the relationship, but India’s problems in translating that into practical
outcomes over the last two decades.

The new dynamic of international position of Myanmar offers both challenges and
opportunities for the Modi government. For one, India no longer has a privileged access
to the markets in Myanmar. It has to compete with global businesses in the country. At
the same time, as Thein Sein told the PM, Myanmar wants to take full advantage of
India’s prospects for rapid economic growth under Modi. As its diversifies its
international relations, India remains an important political partner for Myanmar.
 India Myanmar Relations- Rohingya crisis

What is the Rohingya issue in Myanmar?

Considered by the United Nations as the “most persecuted minority group in the world”, the
Rohingyas are a stateless group of people concentrated in western Myanmar and facing
brutal assaults from the Burmese state and military. The Rohingya see themselves as
(Muslim) natives of Arakan (Rakhine), a state in Myanmar, whereas Myanmar’s
government and the majority Buddhist community sees them as Bengali Muslims from
Bangladesh who migrated there during the colonial period and continue to do so.
The Rohingyas were stripped of their Burmese nationality by the 1974 Emergency
Immigration Act and then the 1982 Citizenship Act. There are numerous restrictions on
them, including on their movement, access to the economy, education, health and other
rights. This results in their legalised persecution by the government.
Myanmar has been under severe attack from the international community in recent times for
what is being considered as ‘genocide’ against the Rohingya Muslims.
In the aftermath of the recent incidents of terrorism in the state by the Rohingya militant
group, ARSA, a fresh wave of refugees have made their way to Bangladesh and other
countries in the region
— adding to the Rohingya refugee population in these countries. Some 40,000 Rohingyas
have also found their way to India.

What has been the response of the new government in Myanmar?

There has been no change in the government’s policy towards the Rohingya community,
as positioning itself against the Buddhist majority whose leaders are vociferously anti-
Rohingya, is considered a risky political move.
Even Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Laureate who fought for decades for democracy and
reform in Myanmar, has been conspicuously quiet on the issue.

Despite the return of democracy in 2015, the military continues to have a strong hold over
the civilian government in Myanmar, especially on key issues such as defence, border
affairs and home affairs.
An Independent and Representative Advisory Commission led by former UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan was allowed by the government to seek “lasting solution” to the
Rohingya crisis. This was the first time any concrete initiative was undertaken by the
Myanmar authorities after the 2012 Rakhine State riots between the Rakhine Buddhist
majority and the Rohingya Muslim minority.

How has the international community responded to the crisis?

While Human Rights Watch has called the military crackdown on Myanmar a case of ‘ethnic
cleansing,’ the UN’s office of Human Rights has declared that the crisis in the South
East Asian country ‘could tantamount to crimes against humanity’.
Kofi Annan-led Advisory Commission on Rakhine State submitted its report to the State
Counsellor and de facto Foreign Minister Aung San Suu Kyi. The Commission, appointed
last September, strongly recommended a review of the 1982 citizenship laws and specifically
 pointed to the slow and sporadic process of citizenship verification, which has covered only
10,000 Rohingya since 2014. Suu Kyi has termed the Annan report as constructive.
The assault on the Rohingyas has also been fast gaining attention from Jihadists around the
world, making the ground ripe for extremism. The West has been particularly wary about the
possibility of a breeding ground for religious terrorism as a response to Myanmar’s brutality
and has been urging neighbouring Muslim majority countries to strongly resist the repression
of the Rohingyas.
In addition, there have been protests rallied out in countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and
Bangladesh to denounce the military assault in Myanmar and the inaction of Su Kyi.
India’s Stand on the issue

India primarily considers it as an internal affair of Myanmar.

Even as Delhi has maintained a cautious stance, it has been receiving Rohingya refugees and
allowing them to settle in different parts of the country over the years particularly after the
communal violence in Rakhine state in 2012. There are approximately 40,000 Rohingya
estimated to be living across India as illegal immigrants. Even if they possess UNHCR
certificates, the government doesn’t recognise them as it is not a signatory to the Refugee
Convention. The government has a plan to deport them back to neighbouring Myanmar. The
government's plan has, however been challenged in the Supreme Court.
In the joint statement issued by India and Myanmar on Modi’s visit, the previous
formulations towards were repeated whereby India condemned the recent incidents as
terrorist attacks. It also noted that the problem in Rakhine is also one of lack of economic
development, and India has promised assistance.
Reasons behind India’s Rohingya-Myanmar policy:
Under the neighbourhood first and look East policies, Myanmar assumes a key
role to connect with southeast Asia and cut off China from the Bay of Bengal.
India’s criticism of the military junta for its suppression of the democracy
movement in the 80s and 90s had an adverse impact on the bilateral relationship for
years.
Moreover, India has real security interests too, like those concerning the Naga rebels,
which depend on the goodwill of the Myanmar regime.

With the political and military establishment in Myanmar more or less on the same page on the
Rohingya question, PM Modi’s reiteration of the Rohingya as primarily a security issue
rather than a human rights issue of a stateless and persecuted minority, was a welcome
respite to both sides of the Myanmarese leadership, beleaguered as they are by the blunt
international criticism on this front.
Meanwhile, in keeping with its Myanmar policy, at the World Parliamentary Forum on
Sustainable Development in Bali, India abstained from the Bali Declaration because of a
reference to “violence in Rakhine state”.
However, India’s security and diplomatic establishments have been concerned at events in
Myanmar since 2012 and the “disproportionate response” by the security forces since last
year, for their potential to radicalise the Rohingya.
India believes “quiet diplomacy” is its only option but is worried it will be increasingly
drawn into the situation.
Impact of Rohingya crisis on India

The issue has raised four important issues for India's consideration.
1. First, the initial stirrings of jihadi group activity is more than apparent in violence
hit areas of Myanmar. For India, the problem is that ARSA (a Rohingya militant
group responsible for the recent attacks) has a definite Pakistani link, with some
reports noting that the group may have been trained there, or even in Afghanistan.
2. The second issue for India, arises from the first. The movement of Rohingyas across
the subcontinent underlines that the community is well-networked throughout the
region. This raises serious fears about ingress of terrorists in the guise of refugees.
This trend is already apparent in Europe where Islamic State terrorists hid among
entering the continent and launch attacks in Paris that killed more than a hundred and
thirty.
3. The third issue for India is the stability of Bangladesh. Coping with nearly a
quarter of a million refugees is a difficult task for even the most advanced
economies. For Bangladesh, the human catastrophe is a nightmare.
4. The fourth issue is overall relations with Myanmar at a time when it is being wooed
by China and Russia. India has not backed the call for a Commission of Enquiry,
reasonably noting that the present Myanmar government has hardly had a year in
office and needs time to work through a problem that is more than four decades old.
China, on the other hand, has condemned the terrorist attacks, and has not hesitated
to offer mediation between Myanmar and Bangladesh. China and Russia had earlier
blocked a UN Security Council statement expressing concern at the humanitarian
crisis. Recent statements by Myanmar's officials indicate that they would be again
seeking support from these countries, as well as Turkey. With India still grappling
with north east insurgent camps based in Myanmar, the room for manoeuvre seems
limited.
On the other side, there are also factors that provide for India’s intervention in the issue:
A hefty dose of humanitarian assistance will provide the underbelly for strengthening the
much talked about "soft power" of the Indian state. Just being soft will however hardly draw
results. In the longer term, it is useful to remember that the Rakhine State was once a hub of
commercial trade with natural links to the subcontinent. At a time of a search for
connectivity across the continent, this should be a thrust for both stabilisation efforts and
commercial outreach by Indian institutions and Ministries alike.

India-Myanmar-Bangladesh Complexities

The Rohingya issue has always cast a shadow on relations between Myanmar and
Bangladesh, who share a 271-km-long border over the provinces of Chin and Rakhine.
Bangladesh has seen the influx of Rohingya refugees before, but the current numbers were
perhaps last seen only in the early 1990s and has faced the political and security fallout of the
largest influx of refugees ever since its independence.
In 1978, more than 200,000 Rohingya fled into Bangladesh following a security crackdown
prior to a national census. Most of them returned home after a bilateral pact was signed
under pressure from China, the US and the UN.
The Indian prime minister’s remarks during the recent visit were in line with the previous
Indian foreign policy position on the Rohingya issue – which has become so aligned with
Myanmar that India does not even use the term ‘Rohingya’.
However, Indian statements made in Myanmar – while Bangladesh had to face the
fallout of thousands of refugees across the border – led to complications.
When the Indian Prime Minister’s visit took place, the security situation was the main
focus. Since then, the number of refugees have increased at an alarmingly fast pace.
There was rising public anger in Bangladesh about India’s position which led to Dhaka’s
diplomatic overdrive because of which New Delhi had to modify its position on the
Rohingya issue, to also acknowledge that there is now a refugee crisis. Pushed by
Bangladesh, India had to ask Myanmar for “restraint” in its military operations against the
Rohingya in its Rakhine state. This was the first time that India acknowledged that there is an
ongoing refugee crisis, rather than just talk about violence perpetrated by Rohingya militants.
For the Bangladesh state, the perennial Rohingya issue is viewed through a lens of multiple
threats, as concerns over terrorism, disquiet over vulnerability to entrenchment of foreign
terror groups and domestic political equations being influenced by the Rohingya issue. There
is also a risk of merging with local populations, which poses a high degree of hidden threats
to communities.
There is also a particular belief in Bangladesh that India was “privileging” its strategic
goals in Myanmar. This is because India has been keen not to give more diplomatic capital
to China than it already has with Myanmar over the Rohingya issue. Earlier this year,
China had offered to mediate between Myanmar and Bangladesh.
India was in a “catch-22 situation” on the Rohingya issue. Both Myanmar and Bangladesh
are crucial for fighting insurgency in the northeast, as well as for India’s ‘Look East’ policy
and connectivity projects. Faced with India’s support for Myanmar, Bangladesh could grow
closer to the Islamic bloc of countries.
Bangladesh’s reliance is now rather shifting towards UN, the West and Muslim members of
ASEAN.

REFUGEES IN INDIA
Refugee crises may be caused by any number of reasons but the most common, in Indian
context, are war (Bangladesh), domestic conflicts (Tibet, Sri Lanka), natural disasters
(famine), environmental displacement, human trafficking and—this one will turn up at all
our doorsteps soon—climate change.

Composition of Refugees in India

According to the UNHCR, there were 204,600 refugees, asylum seekers and “others of
concern” in India in 2011.
India is the largest refugee receiving country in South Asia. Refugee groups that have sought
asylum in India include Tibetans, the Tamil from Sri Lanka, Partition refugees from
erstwhile East and West Pakistan, the Chakmas from Bangladesh, Bhutanese refugees from
Nepal, Afghans, Rohingya and other refugees from Myanmar and refugees from Somalia,
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan.
As per 2015 data:

Tibetan Sri Lankan Myanma Afghanista Other

Tamils r n Countries

100,00 73,000 16,300 13,200 2100

0

India’s policy on refugees

India is not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol and does not have a
national refugee protection framework. However, it continues to grant asylum to a large
number of refugees from neighbouring States and respects UNHCR’s mandate for other
nationals, mainly from Afghanistan and Myanmar. While the Government of India deals
differently with various refugee groups, in general it respects the principle of non-
refoulement for holders of UNHCR documentation.
Since India does not have any specific laws to deal with refugees, the policy has been
traditionally based on a combination of judicial pronouncements and ad hoc executive
policies. In India, the law that deals with entry and exit of foreign nationals is the
Foreigners Act, 1946. It does not recognise refugees as a special category needing
humanitarian protection. The process of deciding who is a refugee is also unclear.
While the Indian government deals with asylum-seekers from Tibet and Sri Lanka, the
office of UNHCR in New Delhi deals with asylum-seekers from other countries.
The three principles underlying India’s treatment of refugees was spelt out in
Parliament by Jawaharlal Nehru in 1959 with reference to Tibetan refugees. They
include:
refugees will be accorded a humane welcome;
the refugee issue is a bilateral issue; and
the refugees should return to their homeland once normalcy returns there.
Q. 10 Every now and then there is a clamour in India for abrogating Indus water Treaty as a response to
Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism and intransigence . Give your views.

What is IWT?
The Indus Waters Treaty is a water-distribution treaty between India and Pakistan, brokered by the World
Bank, to use the water available in the Indus River and its tributaries.
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was signed in Karachi on 19 September 1960 by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
and Ayub Khan.

The Treaty gives control over the waters of

1. the three "eastern rivers" — the Beas, Ravi and
Sutlej with a mean annual flow of 33 million acre-
feet (MAF) — to India,
2. the three "western rivers" — the Indus, Chenab and
Jhelum with a mean annual flow of 80 MAF — to
Pakistan.

India was allocated about 18% of the total water carried by

the Indus system while Pakistan was allocated the remainder.

The treaty allows India to use the western river waters for limited irrigation use and unlimited non-
consumptive use for such applications as power generation, navigation, floating of property, fish culture,
etc.

Seen as one of the most successful international treaties, IWT has survived frequent tensions, including
conflict, and has provided a framework for irrigation and hydropower development for more than half a
century.

Former U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower described it as "one bright spot ... in a very depressing world
picture that we see so often."

How the Treaty works:

The Treaty sets out a mechanism for cooperation and information exchange between the two countries
regarding their use of the rivers, known as the Permanent Indus Commission, which has a commissioner
from each country. The Treaty also sets forth distinct procedures to handle issues which may arise:
1. “questions” are handled by the Commission;
2. “differences” are to be resolved by a Neutral Expert; and
3. “disputes” are to be referred to a seven-member arbitral tribunal called the “Court of Arbitration.”

India's Generosity
India conceded 80.52 per cent of the aggregate water flows in the Indus system to Pakistan. It also gave Rs
83 crore in pounds sterling to Pakistan to help build replacement canals from the western rivers. Such
generosity is unusual of an upper riparian.
Yet, the Pakistan leadership considers the sharing of the waters with India an unfinished business. What is
disputable is the question whether the Indian projects on the western rivers, in particular Jhelum and
Chenab, as Pakistan claims, conform to the technical stipulations. Pakistan politicises the issue.

Abrogation of the Treaty

The present government is reportedly thinking of abrogating the treaty as a measure against the continued
proxy war by Pakistan against India.

Can the treaty be restructured?

Article XII of the IWT says that it “may from time to time be modified” but by a duly ratified treaty
concluded for that purpose between the two governments. Pakistan will see no merit in any modification
having already got a good deal in 1960.

India’s best option, therefore, would be to optimise the provisions of the treaty.

Arguments against abrogation

1. According to Praveen Swami, abrogation would not solve India’s terror problem .It is neither
sustainable legally nor strategically.

Why not feasible legally?

When the treaty was originally signed, provisions were made only for the modification or
replacement by a “duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two Governments.”
In 1969, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties laid out circumstances in which treaties
which do not contain a denunciation clause may be repudiated.

Treaties are not necessarily permanently binding upon the signatory parties. As obligations in
international law are traditionally viewed as arising only from the consent of states, many treaties
expressly allow a state to withdraw as long as it follows certain procedures of notification.

If a party has materially violated or breached its treaty obligations, the other parties may invoke
this breach as grounds for temporarily suspending their obligations to that party under the treaty. A
material breach may also be invoked as grounds for permanently terminating the treaty itself.

It is not Strategically feasible because it will allow anti-India elements to accuse India of water
terrorism.

If India, today abrogates the treaty , nothing will change on ground. Pakistan will continue to
receive water till India plans and completes its storage or water diversion projects. So without
Pakistan actually impacted , it will be a God sent opportunity to anti-India lobbies. There is no point
abrogating the treaty , without making impact.

2
 Abrogation will damage India’s relations with other states with which India has treaties such as
Bangladesh and Nepal. At the same time China can threaten part of water supply in retaliation.

When India is projecting itself as a responsible state to gain membership in NSG and UNSC, it
wouldn’t be a wise step.

Arguments in favour of abrogation

Brahma Chellaney : According to him the treaty is unfavourable to India. Since, isolating Pakistan is not
working, India may consider the step that will compel Pakistan to mend its ways.

Hydro-diplomacy has been scarcely used by India . Whereas efficiently used by Pakistan, China and others.
Water, as a leverage can be more powerful than nuclear weapon.
Other countries are also breaching the treaties like US coming out of Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. It is highly
unbalanced embodying the doctrine of restricted sovereignty compelling upstream nations to forego major
river usage for the benefit of downstream states.

Way forward
Something short of abrogation:
1. Build dams on western rivers to reduce flow of water to Pakistan.
2. Renegotiate the terms of agreement
3. Keep the post of commissioners vacant.
Whatever options India takes, it should be legally , strategically , diplomatically and morally appropriate.
Unilateral withdrawal will only establish India as irresponsible player. We should not ignore, the advice of
Gramsci that whatever action one takes , it should be able to garner the consent in its favour.

3
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Syllabus Recent developments in Indian Foreign
Policy : India’s position on the recent
crises in Afghanistan, Iraq and West
Asia, growing relations with US and
Israel ; Vision of a new world order.
 Can Israel be termed a 'natural ally' of India? (20 Marks/200
PYQs words/ 2010)

In the history of foreign policy, seldom have relations between

any two nations blossomed as fast as they have in the case of
India& Israel. Discuss.(15 marks/ 200 words/ 2014)

Discuss the realistic foreign policy initiatives taken by India to

balance its relations between Israel and the Arab world.(15
marks/200 words/2015)

Has the recent Indo-Israeli relationships given a new dynamics

to India's stand on Palestinian statehood?(10 marks/ 150
words/ 2017)

"The growing closeness between India and Israel will strengthen

the cause of Palestine. Comment.(10 Marks/150 words/ 2019)
Understanding
the trend
In context of India

India-Israel-Palestine/Arab

Israel and India : Natural ally?

Recent acceleration in India – Israel relations
India’s balancing act between Arab/Palestine and Israel
India’s stand on Palestinian statehood.
Recent dynamics and India’s stand on Palestinian statehood.
“The lesson learnt by Israel is weak don’t survive.
You make peace or alliances with the strong. I like
soft power .But hard power is better.”
Brief history of the Confllict
Britain took control Palestine after Ottoman Empire defeated in WW1  a
Jewish minority and Arab majority

1920s - 40s  Jews arriving there grew

1947 : UN Palestine split + Jerusalem becoming an international city.

1948 - British rulers left and Jewish leaders declared the creation of the state of
Israel  war followed

Another war in 1967, Israel occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank, as well
as most of the Syrian Golan Heights, and Gaza and the Egyptian Sinai peninsula.

Gaza is ruled by the Palestinian militant group Hamas.

 Issues :

whether
whether a
Jewish
What should whether the Palestinian
settlements in
happen to two sides state should
the occupied
Palestinian should share be created
West Bank
refugees, Jerusalem alongside
should stay or
Israel.
be removed,
President
Obama's Nuclear deal with Iran 
approach US- Israel relation
Donald Trump’s new Middle East plan,2020
• "Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the
Palestinian and Israeli People"
• Trump not a neutral negotiator
• shifted American Embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv ,
• recognised the contested Golan Heights as part of Israel
• closed a Palestinian Mission in Washington
• cut aid for Palestinian refugees
• Netanyahu
• “realistic path to a durable peace”
• Palestine
• “conspiracy deal” to which “we say a thousand times over: no,
no, no”.
India's engage directly and explore possibilities
response: of finding an “acceptable” two-state
solution for peaceful coexistence.
2021 Israel Palestine Clashes
Why did this conflict start?
Eviction of some
Month of Ramadan Palestinian families in
East Jerusalem.
Course of the conflict??
Reason behind truce?
• Egypt-mediated ceasefire.  Both sides are claiming
victory.
• Israeli troops were wary of launching a ground invasion .
• Airstrikes
• UNSC
• Biden administration  liberal wing of the Democratic
Party
• Internal pressure  riots between Jewish vigilantes and
Arab mobs.
• Protests were spreading in the West Bank and rockets
were coming from the Lebanon border.
"Men and nations behave wisely when
they exhaust all their alternatives"
Did killed 225 members of Hamas
Israel
achieve
its
goals? Destroyed Hamas’s elaborate tunnel
network and military and intelligence
infrastructure.
Future?
Fragile
Acceptable to Both
India’s response?
Express our deep concern over violence in Jerusalem, especially on Haram Al
Sharif/ Temple Mount during the holy month of Ramadan.

The indiscriminate rocket firings from Gaza targeting the civilian

population in Israel, which we condemn, and the retaliatory strikes into
Gaza, have caused immense suffering and resulted in deaths.
Immediate de-escalation is the need of the hour  show extreme restraint,
desist from actions that exacerbate tensions, and refrain from attempts to
unilaterally change the existing status-quo.
Immediate resumption of dialogue between Israel and Palestinian.

Reiterate India’s strong support to the just Palestinian cause and its
unwavering commitment to the two-State solution.
Reading between the lines:
• “indiscriminate rocket firings from Gaza” on
civilian targets in Israel, but not of the Israeli
strikes inside Gaza;
• the customary omission since 2017 of any
reference to East Jerusalem as the capital of a
Palestinian state; and
• the hyphenation of “Haram Al Sharif/Temple
Mount”, equating claims of both Israel and
Palestine
Response of Israel
 Why Israel is not satisfied
at India’s stand ?
No explicit support
‘just Palestinian ‘status quo’ for Israel’s right to
cause’ and the Israel’s planned self defence + No
‘two state evictions of explicit support for
solution.’ Palestinians . Israel’s action in
Gaza.
India’s response to the future conflicts
will depend primarily on three factors:
• What will Biden administration do regarding the
Israel Palestinian talks.
• What will happen to Abraham Accords? Will UAE
rethink its decision
• India’s leadership role at UNSC as non-
permanent member may not allow it to play safe
and New Delhi will have to take sides rather than
balancing.
Way forward for India?
India should carefully calibrate amongst
the 3 pillars.
The structural differences +
absence of explicitly shared
enemies  abstract notion of
global terrorism  Former NSA
(Brajesh Mishra) in 2003 .
To realise its full potential 
mature democracies
India cannot ignore the
Palestinians
principled stand  Indians believe in
Dharma
 Maritime security

Defining maritime security

Just like how security remained a contested concept in IP’s, in the same manner maritime
security also remain contested. There is no single, universal, internationally accepted definition
of maritime security. Different countries have different views on what constitutes maritime
security.

Traditional maritime security threats, involving defence against military threats and the
protection of national interests and sovereignty at sea, figure prominently in the maritime
security priorities of all countries.

Some countries even include non-traditional security threats even going to the extent of
including environmental threats and illegal fishing at sea as part of maritime security.

The perspectives of individual countries on maritime security vary according to their

geographical circumstances, particularly whether or not they have extensive maritime zones,
and their national maritime interests, such as whether they have large national shipping fleets
or distant water fishing interests.

Countries that have extensive areas of maritime jurisdiction areas prefer a broad definition of
maritime security. For example Australia, China, India.

Adopting a comprehensive and inclusive approach, India defines maritime security as collection
of all those issues that pertain to the seas, and have a bearing on national security. These
include both traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats.

Countries that have relatively small maritime zones and are also distant water fishing nations
are hesitant to include fishing issues within the definition of maritime security. For example-
Thailand

Components of Maritime Security

Traditional maritime security threats:

Traditional maritime security threats are related to conflicts between the states at seas. They
can compromise of:
 1. Skirmishes over Delimitation of maritime boundaries between countries with conflicting
claims over territorial waters, EEZ, Continental shelf as well as access to resources

The maritime territorial disputes are a much larger concern in Southeast Asia (SE
Asian waters), where a plethora of disputes in the South China Sea and between
states in archipelagic Southeast Asia can undermine the region’s progress toward
cooperation on maritime issues

2. Possibility of an infringement of countries waters by foreign navies[threatening maritime

sovereignty]

3. Competition among states to increase their power and influence at seas[for example
between USA China India][might trigger arms race threatening the stability][conflicts
arising from power projection at sea]

4. Imposition restrictions on freedom of navigation in territorial seas, Exclusive Economic

Zone by states as well as at international straits in violation of UNCLOS

The capabilities being acquired by regional navies are not to deal with non-traditional threats
but are rather for conventional warfare. Warfare at sea between adversaries is very much a
possibility.

Several potential causes of conflict at sea between states exist in the regions, including on the
Korean Peninsula, across the Taiwan Strait, or over disputed territories, such as the the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in East China Sea or in the South China Sea.

Non-Traditional maritime security threats

Non-Traditional maritime security threats are those threats arising from non-state
actors(Pirates Terrorists traffickers etc) as well as from degradation of marine environment.

Piracy and Armed robbery at sea:

Piracy and armed robbery against ships are major security problems at seas. Attacks by Somali
pirates off the Horn of Africa and far out into the Arabian Sea attracted most attention
(between 2005 and 2011). Incidents of Piracy and armed attacks also exist in south and South
East Asian waters.

Beginning in 2005, pirates operating mostly from Somalia began to hijack commercial ships with
alarming regularity, with such incidents peaking in 2010. Following global attention and the
growing notoriety of Somali piracy, a series of steps were taken by industry and various
governments which had resulted in a sharp drop in incidents in 2012.

Nonetheless, as late as 2012, maritime piracy costed the global economy somewhere between
$5.7 and $6.1 billion

Maritime terrorism

The vulnerability of the maritime sector to attack by terrorists has been of concern.

Some possibilities:

Terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda have threatened to target maritime economic lifelines. If
terrorists were to hijack a vessel transporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) to conduct a suicide
mission in the Strait of Malacca, then it would “devastate Southeast Asia’s economies and
environment and severely disrupt trade as the Straits could be closed to shipping and fishing.”

Terrorists could also take control of a large tanker or cargo vessel for the purpose of ramming it
into the Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) or Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) storage tanks or pipes
located on the docks of several seaports

Marine Pollution

Marine pollution is emerging as a major threat to the fishing industry, coastal tourism, and
fragile marine habitats.

Marine pollution originates either from land-based sources, such as run-offs from rivers, illegal
dumping, storm-water, and sewage or sea-based sources, from ships and offshore oil and gas
installations

The massive oil leak from the West Atlas oil rig in the Timor Sea between August and November
2009 as well as the oil leak in the Gulf of Mexico highlights the serious threat to the marine
environment posed by accidents involving offshore installations.

Land-based marine pollution (LBMP) is becoming more serious in many parts of the region due
to coastal development, greater numbers of people living near the coast, and the lack of
effective regimes for dealing with Land Based Marine Pollution.

Ship-based marine pollution is an increasing problem in some parts of the region, including the
Malacca Strait and the South China Sea, due to increased shipping traffic and the lack of
effective monitoring and surveillance systems.

Climate Change:
Sea level rise, increasing intensity and frequency of extreme weather events due to climate
change can have devastating impact on socio-economic well being of coastal communities as
well as marine habitats and fish stocks.

Ocean acidification is a major problem that will have a very serious impact on coral reef systems

Illegal Unreported and Unregulated fishing (IUU):

IUU fishing has emerged as a serious challenge to maritime security. IUU fishing not only
depletes fishing but also leads to clashes between different groups of fishers and alleged illegal
fishermen and maritime law enforcement forces. These incidents can assume more serious
dimension when they occur in areas of disputed sovereignty where clashes or armed “stand-
offs” might occur between law enforcement units of neighbouring countries.

Trafficking and smuggling:

The seas have also become the main medium for illegal trafficking in arms, drugs, and people.

Importance of Maritime Security for India:

India is geo strategically located at the heart of the Indian Ocean and its socio-economic and
political fabric is highly influenced by the ocean around it.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi while dedicating INS Vikramaditya to the nation, emphasized
that India’s growth story is being linked to the India’s maritime security and said that India need
to secure and keep the sea-lanes open to improve commerce .

The Indian Navy, in its inaugural maritime strategy statement, made clear that providing
maritime security is a fundamental aspect of ensuring national security.

The above views mentioned by PM and Indian Navy itself is a recognition that the good order at
sea is important to national development and security.

Maritime security and Economic prosperity have been inter-related and interdependent:

India’s economic progress and prosperity depends very much on international trade, which is
carried overwhelmingly by sea as is energy, the lifeblood of our industry. 95 per cent of India’s
trade by volume and 68 per cent of trade by value come via the Indian Ocean. Nearly 80 per
cent of India’s crude oil requirement—is imported by sea via the Indian Ocean.

With the economic centre of gravity shifting to Asia there are tremendous opportunities for
India in terms of trade most of which happens through sea. Securing sea lines of communication
through which Indian trade passes became vital to India’s energy and economic security.

In addition to trade, oceans surrounding India is valuable source of fishing and mineral
resources.

While maritime domain offers tremendous opportunities for India’s prosperity and well being
yet its maritime security is under constant threat of being undermined, whether by state actors
as well as non-state actors such as pirates, smugglers, and terrorists etc.

India has been a serious threat attractor since early times (colonial invasion occurred when India
was weak at seas). The threat factor has always remained embedded in India’s tryst with
destiny even after independence and shows no sign of waning. The 2008 Mumbai terror attacks
is the latest incident where India had to face unexpected challenge from maritime domain.

India’s maritime security threats can be categorized under two heads-Traditional and non-
traditional security threats.

Traditional maritime security threats:

India faces traditional maritime security challenge in the form of increasing Chinese military
presence in the Indian ocean region and for that matter in the wider Indo-Pacific region(for
example SCS).

In 2014 Chinese submarine and warship docked at srilankan port. In 2019, the Chinese
‘research’ vessel Shiyan 1, was seen near the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. In August 2020, in
the middle of the ongoing conflict in eastern Ladakh on the Sino-Indian border, China sent its
Yuan Wang class research vessel into the Indian Ocean. China obtaining Srilanka’s Hambantota
port on a 99-year lease, its presence in Gwadar in Pakistan, opening of a military base in
Djibouti and naval push westward of Malacca strait is indeed worrisome for india. This
increasing presence of China in Indian Ocean is maritime security threat to India.

India suspects that the naval capabilities being acquired by china, military deployments in Indian
Ocean are not to deal with non-traditional threats but are rather for conventional warfare in the
event of any conflict.

China’s increasing military deployments in the Indian Ocean will give it the ability to disrupt
India’s Seaborne trade thereby threatening our energy security and economic wellbeing. So
securing the sea lanes of communication through which Indian trade passes from any Chinese
adventurism is vital for India’s national security.

Also, any Conflict between India and china at land borders could spill over to maritime domain
that is conflict at land borders between India and china can trigger conflict at seas between the
two and India should be prepared to deal with this threat.

Also with its military presence China can keep a close surveillance over India’s strategic assets
and its naval activities offshore the Indian Ocean. Undoubtedly, such sensitive strategic
activities constitute a serious threat to India’s national security interests

India’s Defence secretary at the Third Edition of the Goa Maritime conclave held that
“Unprecedented expansion of Navies can start ‘new genre’ of arms race in the region”. While
we talk of non-traditional threats, we cannot ignore the impact of expansion of conventional
navies in the Pacific.

[China has not only increased its forays into the Indian ocean region but has also set up a base
in Djibouti and is also expanding Navy at an unprecedented rate]

Non-traditional security threats:

India’s maritime security is also under threat from non-traditional security threats in the form of
piracy armed robbery terrorism Climate change and these issues figured prominently in the
‘open debate on maritime security’ chaired by PM Modi at UNSC.

India faces an onerous task to protect its long coastline of 7,500 kilometers and huge
infrastructure assets being created along the coast from the potential threat of non-state
actors(particularly terrorists). India’s maritime vulnerability came into sharp focus in November
2008 when Mumbai was the target of terrorist attack. The perpetrators of this attack arrived
India through sea.

Beginning in 2005, pirates operating mostly from Somalia began to hijack commercial ships with
alarming regularity, with such incidents peaking in 2010. While piracy has declined noticeably in
the Indian Ocean since 2013 due to efforts of various countries including India, it could once
again prove a threat to Indian commerce.

A recent IPCC report (released in August 2021) warned that India will suffer more frequent and
intense heat waves, extreme rainfall events and erratic monsoons, as well as more cyclonic
activity, among other weather-related calamities, in the coming decades due the climate
change and the consequences would be devastating for India’s coastal communities.
In addition to the above mentioned issues smuggling, illegal fishing, and human trafficking are
all also major maritime concerns for India

Non-traditional threats such as piracy, maritime terrorism, armed robbery, illegal unreported
and unregulated(IUU) fishing, human trafficking, narcotics and arms trafficking will have a
direct impact on the safety and economic well being of the people.

While delivering a lecture in 2019, Indian Navy Chief Karambir Singh said, "All traditional and
non-traditional security challenges require India to commit substantial effort, resources and
continuously evolve its strategy for maritime security in the region.”. India is trying to balance
between the two narratives-between Traditional security narrative that’s about china and the
non-traditional that’s about human security.

Why India took Maritime security as one of issue at UNSC:

Traditionally India has been a nation predominantly focused on land based resources.
Consequently, for a long time, the country concentrated mainly on land-based security
challenges with a lower priority given to maritime ones. These land-based security challenges
included threats from terrorism, conflict with neighbouring countries (Pakistan, China) etc.

India is moving from being a sea-blind nation, to one that has a clear vision of the potential as
well as the dangers associated with the sea.[sea blind to sea vision nation]

Over the past decade and a half, Series of unanticipated events such as the trauma of rampant
piracy, 26/11 Mumbai attacks[maritime terrorism], increase in frequency and intensity of
natural calamities due to climate change, India’s act east initiative, the looming menace of
China’s Navy, rise in inter-state tensions in the Indo-Pacific region have stimulated a sharper
focus on maritime security in India.

China’s aggressive rise has unleashed an era of great power competition, geopolitical power
plays at seas. The prospect of state based conflict becoming more dire (serious) and more
dangerous.

Today countries across the world are dependent on sea like never before. Maritime security
challenges are also becoming more severe because of increased reliance of countries on sea like
never before. Environmental degradation and climate change causing devastation to coastal
communities. Recently UNSC Higher official quoted as saying, “the first half of 2020 saw a
nearly 20 percent increase in reported acts of piracy and armed robbery despite an overall
decline in the volume of maritime traffic due to covid-19 pandemic”.

Maritime domain is “so vast and challenges are so diverse that going alone is not an option for
practically any country” as no nation has the resources required to provide safety and security
throughout the entire maritime domain. So, the entire Global community has to join hands to
counter maritime threats. [This is another reason why India raised issue of Maritime security at
UNSC]

Further, there is lack of necessary frameworks for cooperation among states to deal with
maritime domain which has resulted in the growth of unlawful actions across seas. As the
economic activities are extending in the maritime sphere, the states cannot neglect the threat of
maritime terrorism, piracy, maritime pollution, illegal fishing, and irregular migration through
the ocean, small arms trafficking, illegal narcotic and human trafficking through the seas.

It is with the above mentioned thoughts in mind India had brought the issue of Maritime
security to UNSC.

Presiding over a UN Security Council Open Debate on maritime security, PM Modi called upon
nations to build a framework a framework of mutual understanding and cooperation for the
protection of our shared maritime heritage(Oceans).

Maritime Panchsheel:

India had put forward five basic principles towards the world community on Maritime security.
It is referred to as Maritime Panchsheel. These principles include:

Principle 1: Removing barriers from legitimate maritime trade

The prosperity of all countries is dependent on the active flow of maritime trade.
Obstacles to flow of maritime trade can be a challenge for entire global economy.

Free maritime trade is associated with Indian Civilization since time immemorial.
Thousands of years ago, the Lothal port during Indus Valley Civilization was associated
with maritime trade. Lord Buddha’s message of peace could spread in the world in a free
maritime environment in ancient times.

In today’s context, India has defined the vision of SAGAR- Security and Growth of all in
the region based on this open and inclusive ethos. Through this vision, India aim to
create an inclusive structure of maritime security in our area. This is the vision of safe,
secure and stable maritime domain.

Principle 2: The settlement of Maritime disputes should be peaceful and on the basis of
international law only.
 Settlement of Maritime disputes in a peaceful manner is very important for mutual trust
and confidence. It is only through this that we can ensure Global peace and stability.

With this understanding and maturity India has resolved its maritime boundary dispute
with its neighboring country Bangladesh.

Principle 3: Countries should, together fight natural calamities and maritime threats created by
non-state actors.

Principle 4: Countries have to preserve the maritime environment and maritime resources.

keeping our maritime environment free from pollution caused by plastics and oil spills.

Taking joint action against over-fishing and marine poaching.

Principle 5: Countries should encourage responsible maritime connectivity

Infrastructure development is important to increase the maritime trade but at the same
time the fiscal sustainability and absorption capacity of the countries should be kept in
mind for the development of such infrastructure projects. For this countries have to
evolve proper Global norms and standards.

Global roadmap for maritime security cooperation can be created on the basis of these
principles.

Major steps taken by India to boost maritime security:

Indian Navy released its Maritime strategy document, titled “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian
Maritime Security Strategy” in 2015. This document stresses the importance of controlling both
the Sea Lines of Communication and the chokepoints as a part of India’s maritime strategy.

India has been actively championing the idea of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), proposing
initiatives like Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) and the Indo-Pacific Oceans’
Initiative (IPOI), and engaging bilaterally as well as within plurilateral and multilateral platforms
with its Indo-Pacific partners.

In 2015, PM Modi put forward the vision of SAGAR or ‘Security and Growth for all in the Region’
with the goal to strengthen economic and security connections with its maritime
neighbours while also assisting them in the development of their maritime security
capabilities. For this, India would collaborate on information sharing, coastline surveillance,
infrastructure development, and capability enhancement with its maritime neighbours. Further,
SAGAR focuses on cooperative measures for sustainable use of the oceans.

Under SAGAR policy Indian Navy has been assisting countries in the Indo-Pacific region in
tackling piracy, search and rescue operations, disaster relief.

Under the same SAGAR vision India launched Mission SAGAR in 2020 to deliver Covid-19 related
assistance to the countries in the Indian Ocean region. As part of this Mission, INS Kesari
successively visited Maldives, Mauritius, Madagascar, Comoros and Seychelles to deliver
assistance to our maritime neighbors in dealing with the Covid crisis. India’s humanitarian
assistance included supplies of essential food items, medicines, Ayurvedic medicines and
deployment of Medical Assistance Teams (MAT) to Mauritius and Comoros.

To counter Chinese rising Naval presence in the Indian Ocean Region, India is expanding its
strategic footprint in the Indian ocean:

India has secured access to strategic Duqm port in Oman for military use and logistical
support (It can counter China’s presence in Gwadar and Djibouti).

India signed an agreement with Seychelles to develop military facilities and station
Indian military personnel at Seychelles’s Assumption Island.

In 2015, India signed an agreement with Mauritius to develop sea and Air transport
facilities on AGALEGA Island in Indian Ocean. This will strengthen Mauritius capabilities
to Police its territorial waters. The outpost at Agaléga will be useful to support the
operation of India’s fleet of Boeing P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft.

India is developing Strategic chabahar port which is just 100 kilometers away from
Gwadar.

Both India and France signed a maritime cooperation agreement which would allow the
Indian Navy ships to use France’s naval facilities in the Indian Ocean (Reunion and
Mayotte) and the southern Pacific Ocean (French Polynesia and New Caledonia).

India is also trying to expand its presence in China’s periphery:

To further the vision of Indo-Pacific, India’s Act East Policy has been geared toward
deeper economic engagement with Southeast Asia and broader cooperation with East
Asia and the Pacific Island countries.

In the South China Sea and the Eastern Pacific, India is gradually treating Vietnam just as
China views Pakistan in South Asia: as a strategic heft. In 2016 both sides agreed for a
“Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” plan of Action wherein India reiterated its
 commitment to provide necessary assistance in developing Vietnam’s defence
capabilities as well as providing a new line of credit facility for the country. Moreover, on
the logistics front, the implementation of the US$100 million Line of Credit for building
high-speed patrol vessels to be used by the Vietnamese Border Guards is a classic
example of India’s strategic support.

Under the AEP, India has sought to deepen ties with not just with Vietnam but even
Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, Singapore, ASEAN and other
countries in the Asia Pacific.

To expand security ties with friendly countries India recently decided (August 2021) to
deploy four ships for a two-month period to southeast Asia, the South China Sea and the
western Pacific. As part of their deployment, the Indian ships will take part in annual
joint war drills involving the United States, Japan and Australia off the coast of Guam.
These maritime initiatives enhance synergy and coordination between the Indian Navy
and friendly countries, based on common maritime interests and commitment towards
Freedom of Navigation at sea.

India has established IFC-IOR(Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region) in 2018 at
Gurugram to coordinate with regional countries on maritime issues. As part of this, India has
started to build radar networks across some of the smaller developing Island states in the Indian
Ocean, including Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Mauritius and Bangaladesh which will enhance maritime
safety and security in the region. The setting up of IFC-IOR underscores the governmental
approach and effort in line with the vision of our Hon’ble Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi
towards Security and Growth of All in the Region (SAGAR).

India has translated its rhetoric on the Indo-Pacific idea to specific institutional changes. For
instance, India’s Ministry of External Affairs has created a new Indo-Pacific Division as well as a
new Oceania Division.

In April 2019, India set up an Indo-Pacific Division in the Ministry of External Affairs
(MEA). The division is meant to integrate under one Indo-Pacific umbrella, the Indian
Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
region, and the Quadrilateral of the US, Japan, Australia, and India.

An Oceania division was created in the MEA in September 2020 to bring India’s
administrative and diplomatic focus on the region stretching from western Pacific (with
 the Pacific islands) to the Andaman Sea. This is the region where China is trying to
maintain its dominance and India is willing to underscore its own relevance. Besides
countries in Southeast Asia, the Oceania division will include Pacific Island states such as
the Cook Islands, Tuvalu, Papua New Guinea, Nauru, the Marshal Islands, the Solomon
Islands, and Tonga.

In November 2019 Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched the Indo-Pacific Oceans
Initiative (IPOI) at the East Asia Summit. IPOI seeks to ensure security and stability of the
regional maritime domain. It is an open, non-treaty based initiative for countries to work
together for cooperative and collaborative solutions to common challenges in the region.

India has been engaging bilaterally as well as within plurilateral and multilateral platforms with
its Indo-Pacific partners under the platforms which include:

1. the 2+2 dialouges with the Unites states, Japan and Australia;
2. the trilateral dialogues involving India-Japan-United States; Japan-Australia-India (JAI),
Russia-India-Chin; India-Australia- Indonesia; India-Australia-France;
3. and the Quadrilateral meetings involving India, Japan, Australia, and the United States.

India has been an active participant in mechanisms such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association
(IORA), the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus),
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), and Mekong Ganga Economic Corridor, in addition to
convening the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS).

Through the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC), India is moving toward
engaging with the Pacific Island countries.

India has also been preparing a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for “dealing with disaster
related situations in the Indo-Pacific” and will be shared with all concerned nations. This SOP
will enhance collective preparedness of nations to deal with weather related calamities.
 NAFTA: North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement

NAFTA is not an example of integration at

par with either EU, ASEAN or SAARC. It
has been just a free trade agreement. First
free trade agreement between developed
and developing countries. It was proposed
by H. W. Bush, and implemented by
Clinton administration. This shows that
there was bipartisan support for NAFTA in
USA. However, later on there was
resentment against NAFTA. Even Obama
administration wanted to revise it. Trump
administration took aggressive posture, called it as worst trade deal ever.
US has forced NAFTA countries to revise the terms and conditions. The main reason being
US-China rivalry. After USA, Canada is the second largest trading partner of China. China has
huge investments in Mexico and other Latin American countries.
According to Robert D Kaplan, USA has been ignoring the challenge to its hegemony in its
own backyard.

1. Porous border give opportunity to non state actors, to enter in USA.

2. Reduction of tariffs give opportunity to China to enter into US market where Mexico
acts as a back channel route.

USMCA(United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement) vs. NAFTA — What Are the

Differences?
A Brief History of USMCA
On September 30, 2018, following a series of
intensive negotiations, Canada, Mexico, and the U.S.
agreed to create a NAFTA 2.0 — later re-named as
the USMCA.

This new agreement will continue to accommodate mutually beneficial trade between the
three nations while addressing several concerns including job losses and the suppression of
wages in the U.S., worker exploitation in Maquiladoras, the rise of e-commerce, and
intellectual property protection.
The USMCA was largely driven by the Trump administration’s approach to trade and a desire
to return manufacturing, and manufacturing jobs, to U.S. soil.

What Are the Key Differences Between USMCA and NAFTA?

1. Dispute Settlement Provisions
Under the new agreement, Canada will completely withdraw from The Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS), although the settlement will remain in place in some cases
between the U.S. and Mexico. This means investors from Canada and the U.S. will no longer
have access to investor-state dispute resolution in these countries.

2. Rules of Origin for Automobile

The Trump administration repeatedly raised concerns that NAFTA encouraged the
outsourcing of automobile production, at a detriment to U.S. manufacturing and jobs.

NAFTA required automobiles to have 62.5% of components manufactured in Mexico, the

U.S., or Canada to qualify for zero tariffs. Under the USMCA, this will increase to 75%.

In addition, between 40% and 45% of automobile parts must be manufactured by employees
who earn more than $16 an hour.

3. Intellectual Property
A few additions have been made to address intellectual property and the digital economy.

For example, the USMCA will extend the terms of copyright from 50 to 70 years beyond the
life of the author. Other clauses will protect internet companies to ensure they’re not liable
for the content their users produce and the prohibition of duties on eBooks and music.

4. De Minimis Threshold
The de minimis (duty-free) threshold has been increased from $20 to $150 for imports into
Canada and from $50 to $100 for imports into Mexico. This might adversely impact retailers
in Canada and Mexico, who will be harder hit financially when importing low-value goods.

5. Government Procurement
The USCMA will allow all parties to maintain protocols allowing the preferential treatment of
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The agreement also recognizes the use of
electronic tendering procedures and protections against corruption and fraud for businesses
partaking in government procurement.

6. Environmental Standards

When a project has the potential to have a detrimental impact on the environment, the
USMCA specifies that an environmental impact assessment must be completed to minimize
or mitigate the effects. In the U.S., compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act
should satisfy this requirement.

7. Canadian Dairy Market

Reforms to Canada’s dairy pricing system will provide U.S. farmers with exclusive access to
the Canadian dairy market. Under USMCA, U.S. dairy exports are predicted to increase by
more than $314 million a year.

8. Certification of Origin
Under the USMCA, participating countries can attain a certification of origin through
informal documentation, including commercial invoices. This will negate the need for
businesses to complete a formal certificate of origin and can be completed by the importer,
exporter, or producer.

9. Sunset Clause
NAFTA did not include an Update Deadline or a Sunset Clause. USMCA’s Sunset Clause will
require the participating parties to revisit and renegotiate their terms — or withdraw from
the agreement entirely — on or before its 16th year post-implementation. This ensures trade
issues are not neglected.
PSIR Syllabus : Statutory Institutions/Commissions : Election Commission, Comptroller and
Auditor General, Finance Commission, Union Public Service Commission, National
Commission for Scheduled Castes, National Commission for Scheduled Tribes, National
Commission for Women; National Human Rights Commission, National Commission for
Minorities, National Backward Classes Commission

Underlying idea about the commissions:

In present time, the concept of governance is changing. There is an increase in realisation

that government alone cannot provide good governance. Governance is changing from
‘government centric to citizen centric’. Without involvement of civil society, it is not possible
to ensure transparency and accountability. Even policy making is becoming so complex and
multidimensional that inputs from bureaucracy is not sufficient.
Hence, keeping above requirement in mind, government of India has created certain bodies
like NHRC, NCM etc. They are expected to perform the role as –

 Watchdog bodies
 Grievance Redressal Mechanism along with Judiciary
 They have the functions that which are of investigative, evaluative, monitoring,
consultative in nature
 They are expected to promote the consciousness in the field of civil rights, human
rights
 They promote research and are expected to work in a close cooperation with civil
society
The unique nature of these bodies in India is that , they are part of the governmental
institutions, depend on government for funds, functions, functionaries; but at the same
time they have to act as an institution to ensure accountability, answerability.
Some of the commissions like NHRC, National Commission on Minority etc. is a part of
evolving international law, treaties etc., whereas commissions like for SC and ST have their
origin in the Indian constitution itself.

Though government of India has created such an infrastructure but they are often called as
‘Malnourished child of government of India’.
National Human Rights Commission(NHRC)

 Statutory
 Established in 1993
 Protection of Human Rights Act(PHRA), 1993
 Objectives
o To strengthen the institutional
arrangements through which human
rights issues could be addressed
o To look into allegations of excesses,
independently of the government, in a
manner that would underline the
government’s commitment to protect
human rights.

 Composition: As per Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993

o A Chairperson who has been a CJI or a Judge of the SC.
o 1 Member who is, or has been, a Judge of the Supreme Court;
o 1 Member who is, or has been, the Chief Justice of a High Court;
o 3 Members out of which at least one shall be a woman to be appointed from
amongst persons having knowledge of, or practical experience in, matters
relating to human rights
o The Chairpersons of
1. the National Commission for Backward Classes,
2. the National Commission for Minorities,
3. the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights
4. the National Commission for the Scheduled Castes,
5. the National Commission for the Scheduled Tribes
6. the National Commission for Women and
7. the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities
o There shall be a Secretary-General who shall be the CEO of the Commission
and shall, subject to control of the Chairperson, exercise all administrative
and financial powers.

Appointment of Chairperson and other Members

As per Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993

 The Chairperson and the Members shall be appointed by the President by warrant
under his hand and seal after obtaining the recommendations of a Committee
consisting of
 1. The Prime MinisterChairperson;
2. Speaker of the House of the People
3. Minister in-charge of the Ministry of Home Affairs in the Government of India
4. Leader of the Opposition in the House of the People
5. Leader of the Opposition in the Council of States
6. Deputy Chairman of the Council of State

Resignation and removal of Chairperson and Members

 The Chairperson or any Member may resign by writing to the President of India.
 The Chairperson or any Member shall only be removed from his office by order of the
President of India on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity after the
Supreme Court, on reference being made to it by the President, has, on inquiry by the
Supreme Court.
 The President may remove the Chairperson or any Member:
o is adjudged an insolvent; or
o engages during his term of office in any paid employment outside the duties
of his office; or
o is unfit to continue in office by reason of infirmity of mind or body; or
o is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; or
o is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for an offence which in the
opinion of the President involves moral turpitude.

Term of office of Chairperson and Members

A person appointed as Chairperson shall hold office for a term of three years from the date
on which he enters upon his office or until he attains the age of seventy years, whichever is
earlier and shall be eligible for re-appointment.
A person appointed as a Member shall hold office for a term of three years from the date on
which he enters upon his office and shall be eligible for re-appointment . No Member shall
hold office after he has attained the age of seventy years.
On ceasing to hold office, a Chairperson or a Member shall be ineligible for further
employment under the Government of India or under the Government of any State.

Functions of the Commission are:

o To inquire into any violation of human rights or negligence in the prevention of such
violation by a public servant, either suo motu or on a petition.
 o To intervene in any proceeding involving allegation of violation of human rights
pending before a court.
o To visit jails and detention places to study the living conditions of inmates and make
recommendation thereon.
o To review the constitutional and other legal safeguards for the protection of human
rights and recommend measures for their effective implementation.
o To review the factors including acts of terrorism that inhibit the enjoyment of human
rights and recommend remedial measures.
o To study treaties and other international instruments on human rights and make
recommendations for their effective implementation.
o To undertake and promote research in the field of human rights.
o To spread human rights literacy among the people and promote awareness of the
safeguards available for the protection of these rights.
o To encourage the efforts of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) working in the
field of human rights.
o To undertake such other functions as it may consider necessary for the promotion of
human rights.

Analysis
NHRC is an expression of India’s concern for protection of human rights.
In 1993 the Indian govt. passed the protection of human rights act which defined human
rights more broadly to include legally recognized rights under domestic laws including
fundamental rights but also talks about rights recognized under international conventions
which are yet to be domestically recognized or constitutionalized.
Under the PHRA act 1993 and in accordance with the ‘Paris principles’,
an organization which
A. Could play an advisory role with respect to govt. policies
B. Must or could monitor allegations of violation of human rights by
the state.
C. Must be independent and autonomous with a pluralistic
composition.
The NHRC was also formed in 1993 in accordance with above ideas.

Achievements of NHRC.
1. Chakma refugees: In 1998 the NHRC recommended against the deportation of
Chakma refugees and argued that it violates their right to life. Ultimately forcing the
state to withdraw from considering deportation.
2. TADA and POTA Act: NHRC argued against granting vast policing powers over terror
related matters to be covered under TADA and POTA act. NHRCs recommendations
became a crucial component in the SC striking down these acts as unconstitutional
 3. 2002 Gujrat riots: It saw NHRC recommending the
transfer of cases of riot victims from Gujrat to other
states on NHRCs findings about the atmosphere of fear
and intimidation that could deny a fair trial to the victims.

Issues related to NHRC

Justice V R Krishna Iyer called NHRC as “the biggest post office in India”
(forwarding complaints to the government and its replies to complainants).
Famous lawyer Rajeev Dhavan said it had
“assumed a stance far too grandiose not
commensurate with its resources and internal will”
and was “a mere showpiece to convince the world that the
government is committed to human rights protection.”

1. The autonomy of NHRC has been a matter of concern as it is dependent for its
administrative and financial requirements upon the law ministry.
2. The commission is not eligible to enquire into any matter after one year from the
date of occurrence of the incident. Many activists have argued that this is too small a
time period where oppressed individual or groups may be facing an immediate threat
to their lives and thus may not be willing to report these violations.
3. The advice of the NHRC is merely recommendatory and not binding. The Commission
cannot penalize any authority or department for not following its orders or
directions.
4. The overlapping nature of the jurisdiction between NHRC and other agencies can
often lead to a situation where victims of human rights violations may find it tough to
obtain grievance redressal by approaching any one agency.
5. Lack of Jurisdiction: The NHRC is failing at primarily reaching all the parts of the
country.Eg- Jammu and Kashmir.
6. Shortcomings in Investigations: The NHRC does not have the means to carry out any
investigations with its own agenda and mode, but has to redirect such a request to
the Central or State Government so that they can appoint an Officer to undertake
such an investigation. Further, the time limit placed on the investigation hampers
the working of the NHRC, since they can only investigate a case for one year after its
admission in the Commission. This affects the work and quality of investigation
undertaken by the NHRC, and a great number of grievances may go unaddressed.
7. Ceremonial Figure: The NHRC is commonly treated as a post-retirement platform for
judges, officers and bureaucrats.
8. Inadequacy of funds severely compromises its activities.
 9. Excess representation of judges and lack of human right experts and civil liberty
experts.Further, its functioning is bureaucratic, as most of the members in it are
there due to their political clout.

Recommendations for NHRC

The Human Rights Commission has the powers of a civil court, and proceedings before it
are deemed to be judicial proceedings. This provides strong reasons for its findings to be
treated — at the very least — as quasi-judicial, and binding upon the state .

The commission should be empowered to provide interim and immediate relief

including monetary relief to the victim.

The commission should be empowered to punish the violators of human rights, which
may act as deterrent to such acts in the future.
The interference of the government and other authorities in the working of commission
should be minimum, as it may influence the working of commission.

Armed forces: The definition should be restricted to only army, navy, and air force.
Further, even in these cases the Commission should be allowed to independently
investigate cases of violation of rights.

Commission’s membership: Members of NHRCs should include civil society, human rights
activists, etc. rather than only ex-bureaucrats.

Amending law: Misuse of laws by the law enforcing agencies is often the root cause of
human right violations. So, the weakness of laws should be removed and those laws
should be amended or repealed if they run contrary to human rights.

Independent Staff: NHRC should have its independent investigating staff recruited by
itself, rather than the present practice of deputation.

Conclusion:
NHRC began its journey with much promise. But along the way, it seems to have lost all its
teeth. Over the years, there have been cases of human rights abuse across the country,
particularly in Jammu and Kashmir, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and the northeast region which
prompted its contemporary chief HL Dattu to call it as "toothless tiger" .
SOLI SORABJEE, former Attorney General called NHRC as ‘TEASING ILLUSION’.
NHRC needs immediate changes like making it obligatory for the government to immediately
enforce the decisions of NHRC. It also needs to undergo diversification of scope and potential
pool of members of NHRC by ensuring greater representation of women in the governing
body of NHRC.
 One Belt, One Road (OBOR)

Previous Year Questions

2019

What is OBOR?

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (also known as One Belt, One Road (OBOR)) is one of President Xi’s
most ambitious foreign and economic policies. It aims to strengthen Beijing’s economic leadership
through a vast program of infrastructure building throughout China’s neighbouring regions. Many
foreign policy analysts view this initiative largely through a geopolitical lens, seeing it as Beijing’s
attempt to gain political leverage over its neighbours.

"Belt" is short for the "Silk Road Economic Belt," referring to the proposed overland routes for road
and rail transportation through landlocked Central Asia along the famed historical trade routes of
the Western Regions; whereas "road" is short for the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road", referring to
the Indo-Pacific sea routes through Southeast Asia to South Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

The initiative was incorporated into the Constitution of the People's Republic of China in 2017. The
Chinese government calls the initiative "a bid to enhance regional connectivity and embrace a
brighter future."

The project has a target completion date of 2049, which will coincide with the centennial
anniversary of the People's Republic of China's founding. It is being seen as a plan for a sino-centric
international trade network. In response the United States, Japan and Australia had formed a
counter initiative, the Blue Dot Network in 2019.

What was the original Silk Road?

The original Silk Road arose during the westward expansion of China’s Han Dynasty (206 BCE–
220 CE), which forged trade networks throughout what are today the Central Asian countries of
Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as
modern-day India and Pakistan to the south.

Overview of BRI
1. Reaches 4.4 billion people (65% world population)
2. 30% of global GDP (As per OECD)
 3. 75% of known energy reserves
4. Trade volume in last 5 years between China and its BRI partners - $6 trillion
5. More that 126 nations (2019) and 29 international organisations have signed up for BRI

When did OBOR start?

OBOR was unveiled by Xi Jinping in September and October 2013 during visits to Kazakhstan and
Indonesia. Xi’s vision is an ambitious program of infrastructure building to connect China’s less-
developed border regions with neighbouring countries. OBOR is arguably one of the largest
development plans in modern history.

China released official documents to elaborate on its vision for the BRI, although not detailed in
March 2015 titled “Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road.”

However, the document did not address issues such as a project selection process, the nature of
consultation, and terms of negotiations in a structured way.

The stated objectives of OBOR

The stated objectives are "to construct a unified large market and make full use of both international
and domestic markets, through cultural exchange and integration, to enhance mutual understanding
and trust of member nations, resulting in an innovative pattern of capital inflows, talent pools, and
technology databases."

The Belt and Road Initiative addresses an "infrastructure gap" and thus has the potential to
accelerate economic growth across the Asia Pacific, Africa and Central and Eastern Europe. A report
from the World Pensions Council (WPC) estimates that Asia, excluding China, requires up to US$900
billion of infrastructure investments per year over the next decade, 50% above current infrastructure
spending rates. The gaping need for long term capital explains why many Asian and Eastern
European heads of state "gladly expressed their interest to join this new international financial
institution focusing solely on 'real assets' and infrastructure-driven economic growth".

The initial focus has been infrastructure investment, education, construction materials, railway and
highway, automobile, real estate, power grid, and iron and steel.
The project builds on the old trade routes that once connected China to the west, Marco Polo and Ibn
Battuta's routes in the north and the maritime expedition routes of Ming dynasty admiral Zheng He
in the south. The Belt and Road Initiative now refers to the entire geographical area of the historic
"Silk Road" trade route, which has been continuously used in antiquity.

Projects and Costs

The project involves building a big network of roadways, railways, maritime ports, power grids, oil
and gas pipelines, and associated infrastructure projects.

The project covers two parts.

1. The first is called the “Silk Road Economic Belt,” which is primarily land-based and is
expected to connect China with Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe.
2. The second is called the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” which is sea-based and is
expected to connect China’s southern coast to the Mediterranean, Africa, South-East Asia,
and Central Asia.
3. Information Silk Road through the construction of “cross-border optical cables,”
“transcontinental submarine optical cable projects,” and “spatial (satellite) information
passageways.”
4. Polar Silk Road - In January 28, 2018, China’s State Council Information Office released a
white paper detailing the country’s official Arctic policy.

They contain the following six economic corridors:

1. The New Eurasian Land Bridge, which connects Western China to Western Russia
2. The China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor, which connects North China to Eastern Russia via
Mongolia
3. The China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor, which connects Western China to Turkey via
Central and West Asia
 4. The China-Indochina Peninsula Corridor, which connects Southern China to Singapore via
Indo-China
5. The China-Pakistan Corridor, which connects South Western China through Pakistan to
Arabia sea routes
6. The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor, which connects Southern China to India via
Bangladesh and Myanmar

Additionally, the maritime Silk Road connects coastal China to the Mediterranean via Singapore-
Malaysia, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz.

Estimated money committed for the project

China has announced investments of over $1 trillion in the various infrastructure projects and is
funding them by offering low-cost loans to the participating countries.

China has already spent an estimated $200 billion and Morgan Stanley has predicted China’s overall
expenses over the life of the BRI could reach $1.2–1.3 trillion by 2027. However, some estimates
shows that it can go up to $8 Trillion .

If completed, BRI transport projects could reduce travel times along economic corridors by 12%,
increase trade between 2.7% and 9.7%, increase income by up to 3.4% and lift 7.6 million people
from extreme poverty.

The BRI has been presented as a strategic “bag” or “container” into which virtually everything can
be thrown (Yu 2018)

Institutional Framework of BRI

Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation

The Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (also known as the Belt and Road Forum or
BaRF) is an international political and economical forum.

First BaRF – (May 2017 in Beijing)

Foreign heads of state and government and representatives from more than 130 countries and 70
international organizations participated.More than 270 concrete results were achieved in 5 key areas
: Policy, Infrastructure, Trade, Finance ,People-to-People Connectivity.
Second BaRF - In April 2019 in Beijing.Leaders of 40 countries and international organizations
attended the Forum, A Joint Communique of 283 concrete results in six categories was announced at
the end of the Forum.

OBOR’s Importance to China

China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative is the centrepiece of its foreign policy and domestic
economic strategy.

Peter Cai , in his analysis for the Lowy Institute for International Policy titled “Understanding China’s
Belt and Road Initiative” ,argues that notwithstanding strategic calculations behind OBOR, some
of the enterprise’s key drivers “are largely motivated by China’s pressing economic concerns.” It is
these economic imperatives that confirm the durability of China’s ambitions, which will have far-
reaching implications for Asia and the world.

China wants to use connectivity and infrastructure development in neighbouring regions to address
regional imbalances within China, particularly between landlocked western provinces and the
prosperous sea-facing regions in the east. Beijing reckons, for instance, that a poor restive province
like Xinjiang will over time develop through improved infrastructure, exposure to market pressures
and trade via Pakistan, which the CPEC will enable.

China’s comparative advantage as low cost manufacturing base is ending as wages rise in the
country and hence its leadership “wants to capture the higher end of the global value chain.” To this
end, China needs to upgrade its industry, make it more innovation and quality-driven with a view to
export high-end Chinese manufactured goods to countries in the neighbourhood participating in
OBOR – at the expense of Western-manufactured goods. Importantly, Beijing will not only export
higher-end goods via OBOR, it also wants to “encourage the acceptance” of Chinese technological
standards as part of its ambition to “become an innovation-based economy and a leader in research
and development”.

OBOR also helps China address the problem of excess capacity it has faced since the 2008 financial
crisis. China would like to move its surplus to countries in Southeast Asia via foreign direct
investment, so that they can build their infrastructure and produce goods locally. This strategy has
been informed by China’s own experience of industrialisation in the 1980s when it “imported second-
hand production lines from Germany, Taiwan, and Japan”.

The project will help the internationalisation of the Yuan and encourage Chinese companies to
issue Yuan bonds to fund projects for the OBOR initiative. As more and more trade will get
channelised through the route, the demand for Chinese currency will increase. This will further help
increase its weightage in the International Monetary Fund and special drawing rights.

OBOR is also designed to promote the flagship Made in China 2025 economic development strategy
of Beijing.

China wants to restructure the economy to avoid the so-called middle-income trap. In this scenario,
which has plagued close to 90 percent of middle-income countries since 1960, wages go up and
quality of life improves as low-skilled manufacturing rises, but countries struggle to then shift to
producing higher-value goods and services.

Through the OBOR, china’s immediate goal is to gain pre-ponderance in South Asia. The
characteristics of the South Asian region creates favourable conditions for the OBOR. The region is
populated by developing economies which are driven by intensive external capital investment and
large populations. As Srinath Raghavan writes,South Asia has at least three attributes that make it
well-suited for integration by connectivity and trade: the highest population density in the world,
linguistic and ethnic overlap across borders, and the presence of a large number of cities close to the
borders.
What are the potential roadblocks?

There is a significant lack of political trust between China and a number of important OBOR
countries.

Nearly two-thirds of OBOR countries have a sovereign credit rating below investable grade. Some
key OBOR countries such as Pakistan are unstable, which poses significant security risks to Chinese
companies as well as personnel working there.The Pakistani military has, for example, promised to
raise a special military unit of 12 000 soldiers to protect China–Pakistan Economic Corridor projects.

Next problem is caution on the part of over-leveraged and risk-averse Chinese financers. After Xi
announced OBOR, Chinese state-owned financial institutions followed with a raft of policies that
echoed the president’s grand vision. Yet, despite these public pledges of support, many Chinese
bankers and especially those from listed commercial banks such as ICBC are concerned about the
feasibility of OBOR projects. They are worried about the many risks associated with overseas loans,
including political instability and the economic viability of many projects.

The reservations of Chinese financiers and businesspeople about OBOR also need to be seen in the
context of the worsening debt problem within China’s financial system, especially the number of
non-performing loans on banks’ balance sheets.

Influential economic policymakers in China are also concerned that the political impetus behind
OBOR could drive China into investing in white elephant projects abroad. They are worried that
some countries will take advantage of OBOR and sign up to Chinese projects with no intention of
repaying the loans.

Moreover, Some BRI investments have involved opaque bidding processes and required the use of
Chinese firms , thereby promoting monopoly and corruption.

The project has witnessed adverse domestic public

sentiments based on Human Right violations and
ideological factors .For example in Kazakhstan, mass
protests against the construction of Chinese factories
happened in 2019, driven by concerns about costs as
well as anger over the Chinese government’s treatment
of Uighurs in Xinjiang Province. Similar protests were
seen in Srilanka as well.

The smaller members are apprehensive about Debt

diplomacy of China. According to a 2018 report by the Centre for Global Development, 8 BRI
countries are vulnerable to debt crises, surpassing 20 percent of GDP in some countries.

According to Harsh V Pant, the combination of strategic and economic drivers is not always easy to
reconcile. In this case, China’s strategic objectives make it difficult to sell the economic aspects of the
initiative to China’s neighbours.
OBOR : A Threat to US Hegemony

Experts have labelled the OBOR as Chinese new imperialism, and as an instrument that will allow
China to establish itself as a hegemon. The OBOR is not just a means to establish physical
manifestations of Chinese hard power in the form of infrastructural projects but also a way to purvey
Chinese soft power. The rectitude that China shows while extending a helping hand to participating
countries is a strategic manoeuvre for what experts term as “debt trap diplomacy.” In the
beginning , it aimed for the pushback against the much-touted U.S. “pivot to Asia,” . Xi called for
“Asia for Asians”

The project is being dubbed as China’s Marshall Plan.According to Mukul Sanwal , China’s Belt and
Road Initiative’s conclusion, planned for 2049—the centenary of the founding of the People’s
Republic of China—aims to create a negotiated order in world economy and politics. Just like in the
1950s, the US too shaped institutions, rules and approaches to serve its interests, which was
described as creating the “liberal order.” The Marshall Plan offered aid only to those who agreed to
these new rules and the new order extended to the global commons. This was part of the strategy to
control—either directly or indirectly—resources, markets and industrial infrastructure of newly
independent countries.

Such a network would expand the international use of Chinese currency, thereby adversely affecting
the hegemonic position of US Dollar.

OBOR and India

“India will not join BRI as India believes in a ‘softer and collaborative diplomacy’ wherein there is a
‘sense of partnership.” Dr. S. Jaishankar

China has indicated that it would like India to participate in the enterprise but Delhi has balked on
essentially two grounds:

1. One that the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of OBOR which runs
between Xinjiang and Gwadar in Balochistan, goes through territories India claims, namely
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Gilgit-Baltistan.
2. Delhi sees OBOR as a unilateral, national initiative of the Chinese which other countries are
not obligated to buy into.

Official Spokesperson's response to a query on participation of India in OBOR/BRI Forum

May 13, 2017

India received formal invitation to participate .

1. India believes that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognized

international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality.
 2. Connectivity initiatives must follow principles of financial responsibility to avoid projects
that would create unsustainable debt burden for communities; balanced ecological and
environmental protection and preservation standards; transparent assessment of project
costs; and skill and technology transfer to help local communities.
3. Connectivity projects must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
4. India believes in expansion and strengthening of connectivity as is evident from
a. ‘Act East’ policy, where India is pursuing the Trilateral Highway project;
b. under our ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy we are developing multimodal linkages with
Myanmar and Bangladesh;
c. under our ‘Go West’ strategy, we are engaged with Iran on Chabahar Port and with
Iran and other partners in Central Asia on International North South Transport
Corridor.
d. BBIN initiative is aimed at enhancing logistics efficiencies in South Asian region.
e. Ratified the TIR Convention.
5. India urged China to engage in a meaningful dialogue on its connectivity initiative, ‘One Belt,
One Road’ which was later renamed as ‘Belt and Road Initiative’.

India is concerned about particularly four specific corridors that constitute major components of the
BRI and run through India’s South Asian neighborhood:

1. the CPEC,
2. the BCIM Economic Corridor,
3. the Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor, and
4. the MSR

These have direct bearing on India’s strategic interests. They run close to India’s continental and
maritime borders and are affecting its security interests and strategic environment. China’s
engagement with India’s immediate neighbours through these corridors threatens to alter existing
power dynamics in the region. Regarding the continental route, India’s primary concern is the CPEC
and increasing unease about Chinese connectivity investments in Nepal.

Former Indian foreign secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar noted in 2016 that the “interactive
dynamic between strategic interests and connectivity initiatives – a universal proposition – is on
particular display in our continent.” He went on to caution against countries using connectivity “as
an exercise in hard-wiring that influences choices.”

According to Shyam Saran, China sees the BRI as a response to what it considers is a containment
strategy pursued by the US. India does not need to sign on to a containment strategy but the
strengthening of its security links with the US, Japan, Asean and Australia would give it more room
for manoeuvre vis-à-vis China and greater confidence to participate in the BRI.

However, the Critiques of India’s strategy to either ignore the ambitious scope of OBOR or resent
Pakistan’s involvement in the flagship CPEC project believe that ,for a country that is quite self-
conscious about its international image, it looks exceedingly odd for India to idly watch as China sets
about altering the landscape around it.
Shiv Shankar Menon asserts that the BRI represents an opportunity for India. It will markedly change
the economic and strategic landscape within which we operate, and India must prepare for that
change.

C Raja Mohan too accepts that, India may oppose the BRI, but China’s rise has begun to irrevocably
alter the economic geography of the Subcontinent.
 QUAD
What is an Alliance?

An alliance (or alignment) is a formal (or informal) commitment for security cooperation
between two or more states, intended to augment each member’s power, security, and/or
influence..

What are the types of Alliances?

Alliances can be either formal or informal arrangements.

1. A formal alliance is publicly recognized through the signing of a treaty ,e.g NATO
2. Informal alliances are much looser and less stable and rely, to a large extent, on the
word of the parties, e.g QUAD.

Some call QUAD as an informal alliance aimed at countering China’s influence in Indo-Pacific.
However, India doesn’t consider QUAD as an alliance rather it considers its association with
QUAD as a “Strategic handshake”. But countries such as Russia and China view QUAD as an
alliance with anti-China tendencies.

QUAD:

QUAD is an informal strategic forum for dialogue comprising four nations, namely -- United
States of America (USA), India, Australia and Japan. One of the primary objectives of the Quad is
to contain china and to work for a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.

Rise fall and Revival of QUAD

Rise of QUAD:

1.QUAD has humanitarian origins. It began as adhoc grouping(Tsunami Core group) in

2004 to provide humanitarian assistance after the devastating Indian Ocean earthquake
and tsunami. India USA Japan and Australia worked together in Tsunami relief and
reconstruction.

2.Inspired by the success of this ad-hoc coordinating mechanism in dealing with Tsunami
relief and reconstruction, former Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe mooted the idea of
QUAD as a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.
 His proposal to hold the quadrilateral security dialogue was kicked off when in May 2007
the first meeting of QUAD was attended by senior officials from the respective countries
on the sidelines ASEAN regional forum summit in Manila. This meeting was followed by
joint military exercises under Exercise Malabar (Malabar naval exercises) between the
navies of these four countries in the same year.

Reasons for Fall QUAD (QUAD 1.0):

One the main reason for the fall or collapse of QUAD was the “China’s response to
QUAD” initiative. Beijing registered strong diplomatic protests with each of the quad
member countries.

With the political change in Australia in 2008 the new Australian Labor Government
pulled out from grouping for fear of upsetting china.

Even India found it inconvenient to go ahead as New Delhi felt it unwise to provoke
China.

QUAD therefore got junked or collapsed under the weight of Chinese demarches.

Revival of QUAD (QUAD 2.0):

One decade later in 2017 the stage was once again set for the QUAD to return. This time
there was little hesitation among the members of the QUAD in standing up to china.

1.QUAD meeting in 2017 was attended by officials from the foreign ministries of
respective countries.

2. Sep 2019, QUAD meeting was represented by foreign ministers from respective
countries.

3.All four navies participated in their first joint exercise in over a decade in November
2020.

4.March 2021 QUAD summit was landmark as it was attended heads of the respective
countries virtually.

5.For the first time in Sep 2021, the leaders of the four countries met together in Person.

All these developments - several rounds of QUAD meetings after its revival and military
exercises highlight that the QUAD is gaining momentum
 Reasons for revival of QUAD:

Power transition is happening in Indo-Pacific with China’s growing power accompanied by

America’s relative decline. However the China’s rise was threatening rather than being peaceful.
Its conduct in the South China Sea as well as in the Wider Indo-Pacific created nervousness
among several powers in the region. China’s rise has presented a serious challenge to a rules-
based international order.

1.China’s aggressive behaviour in South China Sea:

 China’s appetite for expansion in the South China Sea continues to grow at an
alarming rate. It has been building artificial islands with Military facilities. These new
islands have made surrounding nations as well as other powers that have stakes in
the region pretty nervous.
 Aggressive assertion of its sovereignty claims in the SCS: “Nine-dash line” that
Beijing pushing aggressively as the basis of its claims includes virtually the whole of
the South China Sea, including areas claimed by its neighbors, like Vietnam and the
Philippines. In pursuit of this China has forcibly occupied parts of Vietnam’s Parcel
and Spratley Islands. (Chinese have rejected UNCLOS. Nine -dash line maritime
boundary which China has been pushing for has no basis in international law.)
 China’s rejection of International tribunal’s ruling in South China Sea Case shows its
disrespect for international laws and rules.
 China militarizing islands (seeking) to ensure that it alone has the right to regulate
maritime traffic in the South China Sea emerged as a threat to freedom to
Navigation

Even China’s aggressive and provocative behaviour can be seen on India’s borders(Doklam
incident, Galwan valley face-off).Even China responded very aggressively to Australia in context
of Covid crisis.

2.From SCS now china started moving into the Indian Ocean. Slowly it has been increasing its
Naval Presence and Economic footprint in the Indian Ocean region causing concern for the
countries in the Indian ocean region about the way it conducts itself in this region. [All four
Countries of QUAD had their own reservations on even BRI.]

It is in response to this China’s assertive/agressive foreign policies over the last decade Quad has
been revived to manage the negative externalities arising out of Chinese rise. The Quad’s rebirth
therefore highlights the growing suspicion and unease diplomats in Washington, Tokyo,
Canberra and New Delhi feel about China’s meteoric military and economic rise.

What motivated India’s Participation in QUAD?

 1.India has long sought for power equilibrium with China. Participating in the Quad
assists India or gives leverage to India to put forward a demand to China that it endorses
a multipolar Asian structure.

2.To push back china from its assertive and provocative approach: China’s emergence as
a revisionist power through its BRI has threatned India’s strategic interests in the
immediate and extended neighborhood, particularly around the Indo-Pacific region.

3. China’s Maritime Silk Road poses a challenge to India’s maritime superiority. Beijing’s
militarization approach in the South China Sea, its provocative approach to Japan in the
East China Sea dispute, and its rising assertiveness vis-à-vis the India–China boundary
dispute have further compelled New Delhi to find strategic consonance with the Quad
members.

New Delhi’s Quad stance is not an explicit move against China but rather is a calculated
strategic move to protect its interests, including maritime interests and ambitions, in view of a
“revisionist” China in the Indo-Pacific.

At the same time, India is cognizant of severe limitations of QUAD. QUAD does not necessarily
guarantee India’s security against China in the backdrop of any anticipated conflict or
eventuality pertaining to India–China boundary dispute. For example Doklam crisis between
China and India made it clear that none of the Quad states would intervene substantially on
India’s behalf to affect the outcome in New Delhi’s favor.

Chinese perspective on QUAD:

China had seen QUAD as the first step towards an Asian NATO. China sees QUAD as an
embryonic alliance to counter its rise. China claims this group was aimed containing china in
Indo-Pacific.

[In response to China’s attempts to potray the QUAD as “Asian NATO”, Jaishankar said that it
was a seeming “misrepresentation of reality”. The Quad, he averred, was but a “platform for
four countries to cooperate for their benefit and for the benefit of the world…. Unlike NATO, a
Cold War term, the Quad looked very much to the future, reflecting globalisation and the
compulsions of countries to work together.”]

Russia’s reservations on Quad:

Russia also made its displeasure clear over New Delhi’s warming up to the idea of a
quadrilateral engagement involving the US, India, Japan and Australia in the Indo-Pacific.
Russia suggested “that sustainable security architecture in the Asia Pacific region cannot be
achieved through bloc arrangement (Quad) and is only possible through an open ended
collective basis.”

Russian can see Quad as another example of the US attempting to maintain its unipolar world.

Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov had used the term 'Asian NATO' in the context of
emerging alliances in Asia that was seen as an indirect reference to Quad.

Both China and Russia see the Quad as a military and security coalition in-the-making in the
IOR.

QUAD’s Agenda

QUAD’s agenda is still evolving adopting itself to new challenges, but it can be surely said that
QUAD don’t have limited agenda(of security and defence) but has broad substantive agenda.

Minister for External Affairs S Jaishankar- 'Quad has broad, substantive agenda; seeing it with
limited agenda is partly gamesmanship of critics’

QUAD started to focus on a broad range of issues and challenges that the region is facing from
disaster relief to military exercises to corona virus. The virtual Quad Summit in March 2021
reflected precisely this. On the sidelines of this summit, they pledged to create working
groups on COVID-19 vaccines, climate change, and technological innovation and supply-chain
resilience to cooperate with each other in areas of COVID-19 vaccine distribution, climate
change, technology, and science expertise----

QUAD’s vaccine diplomacy: QUAD is planning to produce one billion vaccine doses in India. They
will be distributed across south east asia. Presently most of the south east asian countries use
Chinese vaccines.

QUAD’s geo-economic dimension: QUAD is working to provide credible alternative to China’s

OBOR which is opaque, self serving. The four countries are working on sustainable Regional
infrastructure scheme as an alternative to OBOR.

QUAD is also focusing on building resilient supply chains and technologies. QUAD is discussing
5g networks semiconductors. China has monopolized both these sectors(5g and
semiconductors).
The Quad has also declared its commitment to exploring opportunities for cooperation in
counterterrorism.

QUAD members also has on the mind to cooperate in areas of Artificial intelligence Quantum
technology etc

The plan behind expanding its agenda to broad range of issues and challenges that the region is
facing is to sway countries in Indo-Pacific away from China.

From the agenda of the QUAD we can conclude that QUAD attempting to counter china not only
in just military terms but also economically technologically.
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3. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

What is RCEP:
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP) was signed by 15 countries led by China,
Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and the
10-country ASEAN group. It is billed as one of the
world’s largest Free Trade Agreement (FTA),
accounting for nearly 30% of the global GDP
covering 30% of the world’s population.

Negotiations on RCEP started in 2013 and was led by

ASEAN with 6 other of its major trading partners with
which it had an FTA. India also was one of the initial
negotiating party 2013 onwards but decided to opt
out in 2019 in the backdrop of its unaddressed
concerns

India’s economic concerns with respect to RCEP are:

It already runs a trade de cit FTA with a number of RCEP
members: India’s huge trade de cit with China is a matter of
concern for the former, despite both sides not having signed
even a FTA. For example: India runs a trade de cit of 50
billion$ with China. India’s fears are that entering into RCEP
would mean further lowering tari s to Chinese goods which
may “ ood” the Indian market leading to even higher trade
de cit s for India vis-a-vis China.

Further, in India’s experience with the already signed free

trade agreements with the ASEAN group, South Korea and
Japan, its visible that India's trade de cit with these
countries or groups rose very sharply during the 2011-2019
period. For example: India's trade de cit with ASEAN rose
from about $5 billion to about $22 billion.

Moreover, India was unable to ensure countermeasures like an auto trigger mechanism to raise
tari s when the value of imports crossed a certain threshold value

In agriculture & dairy sector: Indian farm sector had concerns with respect to the in ux of dairy
goods on a large scale from New Zealand, Australia.

Concerns with respect to rules of origin related matters to prevent routing of goods
through third countries: in the absence of clarity of rules of origin (the criteria used to

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determine the national source of origin of goods), an important Indian concern is that Chinese
goods may be routed/dumped through third countries which enjoy lower tari s with India.

Issues related to investment clauses and dispute settlement: India wanted RCEP
negotiations to not include MFN clause for investment sector as it did not want to extend MFN
bene ts in Investment sectors to countries with which it had unresolved border disputes.

Further safeguards envisioned in investment chapter in RCEP negotiations also pertained to

Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism which are likely to supersede the
jurisdiction of domestic courts/judicial system.

Issues related to better market access for Indian companies in the service sector,
particularly with respect to movement of skilled professionals: In contrast to their market
access commitments under goods, commitments made by RCEP members for services trade
liberalisation do look shallow in terms of the coverage of the sectors. Movement of natural
persons, an area in which India had had considerable interest, is considerably restricted. RCEP
members have allowed relatively limited market access only to individuals in managerial
positions or those having high levels of skills

Lack of adequate safeguards for addressing non-tari barriers faced by Indian goods:
Issues related to India’s concerns on non-tari barriers faced by Indian goods, for example its
pharmaceutical and IT sector in China.

RCEP and its strategic dimensions:

• Japan and Australia which have serious concerns with Chinese assertiveness in south China
regions and the broader Indo-Paci c have gone ahead with RCEP. Despite both being Quad
members and Japan propounding the idea of Strategic Resilience Initiative. India on the other
hand an unresolved border with China and an ongoing stando in Aksai Chin region.

• India is seen by many ASEAN members and Japan as the only other sizeable power/economy
which can stand up to China in the region. Absence of India in RCEP may further allow China
to further increase its market penetration in ASEAN region, Japan, South Korea etc. Currently
China has no FTA with Japan and South Korea, with RCEP may thus further enable
penetration of Chinese goods in these markets.

• India’s look east policy envisages a closer relationship with ASEAN countries in the economic
and strategic/defence arena. India currently has an FTA in goods with ASEAN countries and
comprehensive economic partnership with Japan and South Korea. However, given that RCEP
will have a wider coverage and deeper tari cuts than the existing FTA’s India has with ASEAN,
its market penetration and in uence in these markets may decrease vis-a-vis China.

Way forward:

• Cognizant of India’s economic and strategic weight, led by Japan, ASEAN members have
o ered India an observer status in RCEP. Moreover, given India’s role as one of the chief

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negotiators in RCEP since its inception, RCEP members have waived o for India an 18
months period for granting entry to new members.

• In the short term India may consider being an observer at RCEP meetings following which it
may reconsider entering the grouping at a later stage if its outstanding concerns are
addressed.

• Further, India may now need to more proactively complete the long pending India-EU FTA or
India-USA FTA to ensure that it does not nd itself locked out of major american and european
markets.

TYPES OF TRADE AGREEMENTS

Trade agreements is an accord between two or more countries for a speci c terms of trade,
commerce, transit or investment. They mostly involve mutually bene cial concessions.

Depending on the terms and concession agreed on by the participating bodies, there are several
types of trade agreements-

Free Trade Agreement

A free trade agreement is an agreement in which two or
more countries agree to provide preferential trade terms,
tari concession etc. to the partner country. Here a
negative list of products and services is maintained by
the negotiating countries on which the terms of FTA are
not applicable hence it is more comprehensive than
preferential trade agreement. India has negotiated FTA
with many countries e.g. Sri Lanka and various trading
blocs as well e.g. ASEAN.

Preferential Trade Agreement

In this type of agreement, two or more partners give
preferential right of entry to certain products. This is
done by reducing duties on an agreed number of tari
lines. Here a positive list is maintained i.e. the list of the
products on which the two partners have agreed to provide preferential access. Tari may even
be reduced to zero for some products even in a PTA. India signed a PTA with Afghanistan.

Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement

Partnership agreement or cooperation agreement are more comprehensive than an FTA. CECA/
CEPA also looks into the regulatory aspect of trade and encompasses and agreement covering
the regulatory issues. CECA has the widest coverage. CEPA covers negotiation on the trade in
services and investment, and other areas of economic partnership. It may even consider
negotiation on areas such as trade facilitation and customs cooperation, competition, and IPR.

India has signed CEPAs with South Korea and Japan.

Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement

CECA generally covers negotiation on trade tari and TQR rates only. It is not as comprehensive
as CEPA. India has signed CECA with Malaysia.

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PERSPECTIVES
1. COVID-19: Vaccine nationalism, ethical issues and
challenges

What is vaccine nationalism?

Many developed countries are found to be indulging in
vaccine nationalism i.e they are signing Advance
Purchase Agreements (APA’s) with pharmaceutical
companies developing vaccine candidates to purchase
vaccines in large amounts to vaccinate their whole
populations in short time. This can have serious
repercussions as it can result in a clear divide between
the developed countries with 100% vaccinated
population and the developing world in Asia, Africa and
Latin America with large segments of unvaccinated
populations. Further these advance purchases can delay
the availability of vaccines to frontline health workers,
vulnerable old age population in the developing world by a
few years leading in a large number of avoidable deaths.

What are the ethical dilemmas with vaccine nationalism?

It is true that states have a responsibility to protect the lives of their citizens, however any
responsible state also has a responsibility at the global level. Thus , it is not enough to protect
only their citizens. It is important to ensure that people around the world have access to
vaccines in an equitable way.

Given that initially vaccine production will be limited and demand will far exceed
availability, what principles should the state apply while deciding who should receive the
priority in getting access to vaccines?
While all citizens are equal before the state, the principle of reasonable classi cation should be
applied along with the equity principle. All frontline workers, health workers and social care
workers, police and others at high risk of getting the infection (old age citizens) must be given a
priority in access to vaccines.

For example: Today, 10% of all infections have occurred in healthcare workers. It would be unfair
not to protect them before everyone else gets a chance.

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 Current A airs Target 2021 29 November 2020

What is Pro t vs Pro teering:

Should pharmaceutical companies be free to sell the drugs they produce at the cost they
wish to under a “free market” system?
Or

Should there be a limit on the pro ts they can be allowed to make by selling vaccines in
the middle of a pandemic?
It is important to di erentiate between Pro t & Pro teering: While pro t is made by a reasonable
economic activity by producers or traders without resorting to “unfair or unethical practices”.

Pro teering means making pro t by use of unethical means. It is illegal to hoard, for black
marketing, essential goods in drought-a ected areas. Overcharging of commodities and
services during any natural disaster is always a scandal. It is a crime against humanity to make a
pro t during any human tragedy.

Even the dharmashastra texts make a distinction between labh, ‘pro t’ and lobh, ‘greed’ and
some examples of lobh that they o er are selling prohibited goods, mortgaging the same
property more than once, and milking a debtor by not letting him pay o his loan because ‘he is
greedy for interest”

What can be done

There has to be prioritisation for high-risk groups in all countries, especially in the least
developed, low- and middle-income nations. That framework has to be accepted by the global
community without dispute. In this, the COVAX partnership is a mechanism for ensuring that.

Option 1: To consider Covid-19 related technologies as a public good:

A public good is a common property of the nation and such goods are not excludable or there
should not be any rivalries in dealing with it. If it is a public good, governments must step in to
regulate its development, innovation, manufacture, sale, and supply ultimately to the public. If
there is public nancing for technology development, there is no scope for grant of patent
protection. A public good cannot be submitted to the vagaries of market uctuations of pricing
dependent on demand-supply dynamics. Governments should be the custodian of public
goods.

History has shown us how to eradicate diseases for the global good of our own countries — but
also for all. The successful eradication of major diseases such as smallpox or polio required a
global e ort and the availability of vaccines to all who needed it anywhere in the world.

WHO has urged member countries to treat COVID-19 technologies as a “public good”.

When Dr. Jonas Salk came up with a polio vaccine that was approved for the general population
to use, he refused to patent it. When asked who owns the patent, his answer was this. “Well, the
people, I would say,” he told journalist Edward R. Murrow in 1955. “There is no patent. Could
you patent the sun?”

We need this sort of leadership — a leadership which will guide us away from incredible pro ts
to humanity’s survival, and lay stress on the need for the open source production of vaccine
without any commercial ownership of any COVID-19 vaccine.

Shubhra Ranjan IAS 2

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 Current A airs Target 2021 29 November 2020

The positive news is that we are confronted with clear and simple action that comes at an
eminently a ordable cost that would save hundreds of thousands of lives, if not millions of future
lives. And that is in the self-interest of everyone, especially the rich world.

Option 2: to consider the use of Compulsory Licensing or Voluntary Licensing mechanisms

for ensuring a ordability of COVID-19 vaccines.
If such an idealistic outcome of treating vaccines as a public good does not materialise based
on basic human rights for availability of accessible and a ordable health care, then some
regulation mandated by the UN General Assembly must be thought of.

The WTO rules recognize that while private companies are allowed to make pro ts, they cannot
be at the cost of the large public health. Taking cognizance of the possibility of con ict between
the pro tability motive of private companies and the public health concerns of governments, the
WTO made provisions for Compulsory Licensing (CL). This is a provision where the government
intervenes when patent clauses regarding availability, reasonable pricing, local production and
technology transfer are not met by the patent holder. Compulsory licensing is an “involuntary
contract” issued by the national government between a “willing buyer” or local manufacturer and
an “unwilling seller” or patent holder foreign company.

Coercion to issue “voluntary licensing” to subsidiary companies in many developing countries

such as India, Egypt, Thailand and Brazil by the patent holder is another option

Examples of use of CL due to public health concerns: Thailand and Brazil have done this.
India utilised this provision for the rst time on March 9, 2012 to grant licence to Natco Pharma
Hyderabad against the will of patent owner Bayer, Germany, to manufacture Sorafenib tosylate,
a life-saving anti-cancer drug for kidney and liver tumours, with 97% cost reduction. It is sold by
Bayer under the brand name, Nexavar. This is an extreme step available with India if rich
countries go for advance purchase and hoarding of a COVID-19 vaccine produced in India by
multinational pharma companies and deny India’s supply needs.

Conclusion:
While artha, ‘material well-being’, was elevated by the ancients to one of the goals of life. The
pursuit of money is proper because it creates the material conditions for the pursuit of other
goals. The good life also has other goals as well, in particular, dharma, ‘moral well-being’, which
is invariably placed higher than artha.

When there is a con ict between the two goals, dharma is always expected to prevail.
Clearly, there is clearly a right and a wrong way to pursue wealth.

Shubhra Ranjan IAS 3

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 Current A airs Target 2021 29 November 2020

GAVI the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization is a public–private global health
partnership with the goal of increasing access to immunisation in poor countries. It currently
supports the immunization of almost half the
world's children, giving it power to negotiate
better prices for the world's poorest countries
and remove the commercial risks that
manufacturers faced in serving this market. It also
provides funding to strengthen health systems
and train health workers across the developing
world.

Founded in 2000, based in Geneva, Switzerland.

COVAX initiative:
COVAX is one of three pillars of the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator of WHO.
Bringing together governments, global health organisations, manufacturers, scientists, private
sector, civil society and philanthropy, with the aim of providing innovative and equitable access
to COVID-19 diagnostics, treatments and vaccines. The COVAX pillar is focussed on vaccines.

Coordinated by Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, and the WHO, COVAX will achieve this by acting as a
platform that will support the research, development and manufacturing of a wide range of
COVID-19 vaccine candidates, and negotiate their pricing. All participating countries, regardless
of income levels, will have equal access to these vaccines once they are developed. The initial
aim is to have 2 billion doses available by the end of 2021, which should be enough to protect
high risk and vulnerable people, as well as frontline healthcare workers.

Shubhra Ranjan IAS 4

ff
 Russia-India-China(RIC)

• The idea of trilateral contacts between Moscow, Delhi and Beijing belonged
to Yevgeny Primakov (Russia’s Foreign Minister in 1996-1998.)
• Foreign Ministers of Russia, India and China held their first meeting in 2002,
on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session.
• The RIC format is being complemented by new mechanisms, such as
consultations on the level of foreign policy agencies, secretariats of the
Security Councils, academic forums and, finally, summits.
• The first meeting of the leaders of Russia, India and China was held in 2006
as part of the G20 summit in St. Petersburg.
• The consolidation of the foreign policy coordination of the three countries
continues within the framework of the UN, the G20, BRICS, the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), the East Asia Summit, the Asia-Europe
Meeting (ASEM), etc.
• Binding Factor for RIC - Now strong partnership between Beijing and
Moscow and the time-tested relations between Moscow and New Delhi.

• Bilateral Highlights

• Russia-China:
o USSR and the People’s Republic of China established diplomatic

relations in 1949.
o The USSR became the first foreign state to announce the recognition of

the PRC.
 o Signed Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation in
2001.
o Traditionally warm relations between Russia and China.
o The process of connecting the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with

China’s One Belt and One Road will connect China and East Asia with
Europe by land, air and sea (Northern Sea Route).
o The political dialogue between Russia and China is very intensive. The

leaders of the two countries meet at least five times a year.

o The countries have intensified cooperation for the development of the

Far East.
o Since 2010, China has been Russia’s largest trading partner.

• Russia-India:
o 70 years of mutually beneficial partnership
o Diplomatic relations between the USSR and India were established in

1947.
o After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia and India signed the

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1993. This became the

founding document of the bilateral relations.
o In 2000, the two countries signed the Declaration on Strategic

Partnership.
o According to Mandala Theory, Russia is suppose to be a friend due its

geographical location.
o India shares the status of Special and privileged partnership.

• India-China:
o Diplomatic relations started in 1950. However ,the history of cultural

and economic cooperation of the two most ancient civilizations dates

back over 2,000 years (the Great Silk Road).
o Two fastest growing centers of power.
o Together with China and Russia, India is becoming one of the main

driving forces in the area of Greater Eurasia

• Global Significance of RIC:

o Geography - 19 percent of the global landmass
o GDP - 33 percent of global GDP.
o All three countries are nuclear powers
 o Only India is not (although a probable candidate) a permanent
members of the UN Security Council .
o Platform for the emergence of Eurasian century
o Role in Regional Stability – like in Afghanistan through Moscow
Format, development of Central Asian nations , stabilization of Korean
peninsula, Rohingya crisis .
o Reform of global institutions: like the UN and the WTO.
o Energy security - Russia is a major exporter and India and China are
major consumers.

• Agenda of RIC
o Extensive political agenda ranging from the situation in Venezuela, Syria

and Afghanistan, Iranian nuclear program and arms control, the

situation on the Korean Peninsula and other issues.
o Economy -
o To protect the principles of fair competition in world trade and

finance
o To promote the formation open system of international economic

relations, free from protectionism and politically motivated

restrictions, to develop integration associations.
o Sustainable trade policies and reform of WTO;
o Streamlining governance of global supply of oil and prices,resolving

the trade war between major economies, upholding rule based

order
o Climate change problem and its mitigation strategy.
o Regional development in least developed regions like Africa and South

Asia
o Security: Peaceful resolving of Syrian proxy war crisis, Middle East

turbulence (Saudi-Qatar divide, peace in Iraq etc.) and terrorism

problem in South Asia.
o Institutional reforms–
o Bringing reforms of organizations like UN and IMF etc
o Strengthening of global institutions and enhancing credibility and

influence of organs like WTO, UN,

 o United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), United Nations
Convention on Law of Seas (UNCLOS)

• Challenges faced by RIC:

o Pakistan Angle: China's bonhomie with Pakistan as well as Russia has

drawn closer to Pakistan to expand its defence markets.
o China’s aggressive policies in Indian Ocean
o India China bilateral issue like Doklam crisis, China’s disapproval for
India’s NSG and UNSC membership and opposition towards declaring
Masood Azhar as terrorist in UN, China raising Kashmir issue in UNSC on
behalf of Pakistan.
o India- US- Japan Axis - India is seen as a 'Swing State' between RIC and
JAI(Japan-America- India) groupings.However ,India can act as the
bridge between RIC and JAI(Japan America and India)

• How can India Benefit from RIC

o Can engage with China on NSG membership and sanctions on Pakistan’s

terror activities etc.

o Economic opportunity :
o India can widen its source of investments and trade.
o Can streghthen its bid for UN permanent membership, as the other two

are the permanent UNSC members.

o Strengthening of bilateral relations: Issues between India-China, India-

Russia can be dealt more effectively

RIC forms the core of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
o India cannot cede geostrategic space in the Eurasian supercontinent to

China and Russia alone will not be able to prevent the emergence of
China as a hegemon in Eurasia.
o Interest convergence in Eurasia, like, for instance, on Afghanistan and

Central Asia.
o The Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral is a significant multilateral

grouping, because it brings together the three largest Eurasian

countries which are also incidentally geographically contiguous.
o Through RIC summits India can build upon the gains of PM Modi’s
meetings with Xi Jinping in Wuhan,Mamallpuram and with President
Putin in Sochi
To the Point
ROLE OF INDIAN DIASPORA
 What is Diaspora?
 The Diaspora encompasses a group of people who can either trace their origins to India or who are
Indian citizens living abroad, either temporarily or permanently.

 Indian Diaspora
 17.5 million strong Indian diaspora over 100 countries includes :
 Non-Resident Indians (NRIs),
 Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) and
 Overseas Citizens of India (OCI).

PIO and OCI card holders were merged under OCI category in 2015.
Diaspora in numbers
 The International Migration Report, 2019 declares Indian diaspora to be world's largest ( 17.5 million):

 In the Arab Gulf states alone, the number of Indians was estimated at around 8.5 million.

 USA – 4.4 million (1.3 % of American population)

 In Canada Indian Diaspora--3% of its population.

 Nearly 7 lakhs— is the fastest growing in Australia 2.8% of Australia’s population

 1.5 million strong Indian diaspora in UK contributes around 6 percent to UK's GDP.

 100,000 Indians living permanently in the Nordic region—Sweden

Considering the size of Indian diaspora it is aptly mentioned that the ‘sun never sets in the Indian
diaspora’.
 History and
Evolution
Ø Girmityas or Jahajis
Indian example of Ø Descendants of indentured Indian labourers.
large scale migration Ø Brought to Fiji, Mauritius, South Africa, East Africa,
began during the Caribbean and South America (Trinidad and Tobago,
Guyana and Suriname)
British rule as
Ø To work on sugarcane plantations
indentured labourers
Ø The term Girmitiya was coined by Mahatma Gandhi
to former colonies like who referred to himself as first Girmitiya.
Fiji, Kenya and
Malaysia (also known
as Girmitiya people).
 Evolution of the Diaspora policy

 Nehruvian phase
 India opted for a policy of distancing itself from the
Diaspora, given its economic status and apprehension
that its interference could offend host countries. The
Diaspora policy was limited to cultural and humanitarian
dimensions.

 Addressing the Lok Sabha in 1957, Nehru said about the

diaspora, “We want to have no vested interests at the
expense of the population of those countries…if they
adopt the nationality of that country we have no concern
with them. There may be sentimental concerns but
politically they cease to be Indian nationals.”

 The Nehruvian trend was continued and extended to till

late 80s.
Mobilisation of the Indian diaspora began during the tenure of Rajiv Gandhi:

Rajiv Gandhi was the first Prime Minister who changed the diaspora policy by inviting
Indians abroad, to participate in nation-building

Sam Pitroda, who was entrusted with the task of modernising telecommunications in
India.  Grievances like red tape, multiple clearances, distrust of government in
fulfilling promises were addressed through hesitant reforms and promotional
measures.
In 1987 when Sitiveni Rabuka ousted an Fiji Indian majority government in Fiji . Rajiv
Gandhi, in a major departure from established policy, protested vehemently,
imposed trade sanctions against Fiji, got it expelled from the Commonwealth and
raised the issue at the United Nations  Energised the Indian diaspora, generating
faith in them that India would not be a silent witness, as it was in the past, to
discrimination, racism and disenfranchisement of Indians abroad.
 After the end of cold war, the emergence of a multipole centric foreign policy, structural shift in the
global economy and India’s economic reforms based on Liberalization, Privatization & globalization
allowed Indian government to change its outlook towards Diaspora and reviewed its diaspora policy.

 Atal Bihari Vajpayee led government saw the long-terms strategic value of the engagement when he
called for ‘partnership among all children of mother India’.

 In response to the growing Indian diaspora, the government established the Ministry of Overseas
Indian Affairs in 2004.
Modi Doctrine on Diaspora :

 PM Modi made the diaspora a centrepiece of his foreign policy .

 Prime minister Modi calls Indian diaspora as

 our 'Rashtradoots’
 the informal and permamnent ‘ambassadors’ for India.

He addressed Indian diaspora in different parts of the world from Madison Square, New York to Kigali,
Rwanda, Houston.

 Modi Doctrine on Diaspora is often described in terms of 3 Cs:

 ‘connect with India’;
 ‘celebrating cultural heritage; and
 ‘contribute’

 Relaxation of the visa norms for the overseas communities, merger of OCI + POI , improving physical
connectivity and the Ease of Doing Business have been the policy consequences of Modi’s intensive
outreach to the diaspora.
Significance of Diaspora
Paramjit Sahai in his book ‘Indian Cultural Diplomacy: Celebrating Pluralism in a
Globalised World’ writes how country’s foreign policy ‘rests upon four inter-linked pillars:
1. economic diplomacy,
2. peace diplomacy,
3. environmental diplomacy and
4. diaspora policy’.
 Building translational networks: The Diaspora provides important links not only emotional, but also
cultural, social, and political. For example Ireland's Prime Minister Leo Varadkar and Portugese Prime
Minister Antonio Costa are of Indian origin.

 Lobbying for India: The educated Indian diaspora are politically influential in their country of
residence.Act as Informal Ambassadors and help cultivate soft power . Lobby for Indian interests
 Examples - In USA - Indian community lobbied for support - during Kargil war,1998 Pokhran
Nuclear tests and Civil Nuclear deal

 Defence and security goals: Groups like the United States India Political Action Committee (USINPAC),
Friends of India, Canada India Foundation (CIF) and Canada India Business Council (CIBC), are
actively pushing for India's interests.

 Messenger of India’s soft power: Yoga, Bollywood, Indian cuisine among others is famous across the
world.
 Recovering artefacts: For example- The Indian Pride Project successfully lobbied to bring back the
Nataraja from Australia, and sandstone Yakshi from the United States.

 Source of Capital and Investment - Diaspora’s motives to invest in India are in contrast to non-
diaspora FDI. Their investments are long lasting as many of them wish to establish a long-term
base in India.

 Remittances - According to Global Migration Report 2020 , India recieves highest remittance of
$78.6 billion from Indians living abroad .

 The migration of less-skilled labour (especially to West Asia) has also helped in bringing down
disguised unemployment in India.
Challenges faced by Indian Diaspora:
 The Diaspora have been critical of bureaucratic procedures and slow pace of economic reform.

 Racism - Rising incidence of hate speech and crimes against Indian Diaspora by the locals due to
racism, communalism emboldened by coming of ultra nationalist and far right governments in
many countries.

 Increasing anti globalization has resulted in stricter visa rules in many countries including USA,
Australia etc.

 Conflicts - Sectarian crisis, terrorist activities and war in the Middle East countries leave our
diaspora vulnerable to attacks.
 Adverse local laws to encourage more employment from locals such as Nitaqat Law of Saudi
Arabia (mandates one local to be hired in place of 10 migrants).

 Brain Drain results in substantial drop in the supply of professionals for running institutions
and organisations in India.

 Money laundering and insurgent activities are sometimes promoted by the money coming as
remittances. Example - Khalistan movement, Kashmir
Challenges for Indian Government?
1. The diaspora engagement is yet to produce desired results in the form of large investments and
economic participation of the diaspora in India’s economic participation of the diaspora in India’s
initiatives like ‘Make in India’.

2. Broad coverage - The policy is slanted towards engaging the diaspora in the West, especially USA.

3. Diverse nature of the diaspora - Heterogeneous in social, economic and demographic characteristics .
Specific challenges are expected to arise in Middle East, where a large section of the Indian diaspora is
often under stress due to difficult working conditions , sudden lay-offs , confiscation of visas.

4. Objectives/priorities – whether diaspora is being seen from a political objectives for mobilisation of
financial resources or for their greater participation in Indian political and economic affairs.
What should be done?
High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, 2000
under the Chairmanship of Dr. L M Singhvi
The Committee has recommended to the Government that dual citizenship should be permitted to foreign
citizens of Indian descent settled in certain countries, within the rubric of the Citizenship Act,1955.

A clearly defined Diaspora policy ,suitably calibrated with country-specific plans.

Welfare of Indian Women married to NRIs/PIOs - A special cell should be created for free legal counselling
for the families of girls contemplating marriage to NRIs/PIOs. An affidavit stating his current marital status
should be a mandatory pre-requisite to the issuance of a marriage registration certificate.
Problems of Overseas Indian Labour –

Establishing a welfare fund for repatriated overseas workers in distress;

Negotiating a Standard Labour Export Agreement' with the host countries;

Monitoring and supervision of both the employment contracts, and the conditions of our
overseas workers by our Missions;

Launching compulsory insurance schemes covering the risks faced by our overseas workers;

Establishing mechanisms for pre-departure counselling and the provision of legal assistance
locally, instituting training programmes for human resource development and skills
upgradation;
Economic Development (Investment, International Trade, Industrial Development And Tourism) -Special
measures should be devised to facilitate the involvement of the Diaspora with India in this sector. Suitable
mechanisms should be devised to avail of such expertise.

Government should also consider setting up Special Economic Zones, exclusively for projects to be set
up by NRIs/PIOs.

A dedicated single-window set-up, which would provide consultancy services for overseas Indian
investors .

Indian banks should make a special arrangements to facilitate payments in rupees against incoming
foreign exchange.

Extending fiscal incentives, such as reducing corporate tax rates to levels at or below competitive
international levels, removing restrictions on repatriation of profits and eliminating needless
licensing requirements would be extremely useful in attracting investment.
Tourism -There should be greater focus on promoting tourism among 2nd generation PIOs. Special tour
packages, pilgrim packages and other packages tailor-made for this section of the Diaspora should be
developed and publicised.

Education -A large reservoir of highly qualified PIOs in senior academic positions in almost every
academic institution in countries like the USA, Canada and the UK. leverage this extraordinary
resource. Concerted efforts should be made to introduce India Studies in universities with a sizeable
Indian Diaspora.

Health -The PIOs have distinguished themselves in the field of medicine and healthcare in the countries
of their settlement. It is felt that it should be possible to attract significant investments and expertise
from them in the field of health care and medical research.

Standing Committee of Parliament - A Parliamentary Standing Committee on Indian Diaspora should be

constituted. It should have in it, members with an interest in Diaspora affairs. This Committee could
also act as focal point for interaction with Parliamentarians of Indian Origin in other countries.
With the world’s largest diaspora being India’s, the time is ripe to think of an Indian
diaspora policy.
As a definite starting point, a standing committee in the Parliament, as recommended
by L.M. Singhvi committee , could be instituted to actually ascertain the pros and cons
of this in a bipartisan manner.

This will help in understanding the diaspora’s contribution in specific countries and
formalise its role as an effective catalyst in India’s political, economic, trade and aid-
related issues.
To the Point
ROLE OF INDIAN DIASPORA
 What is Diaspora?
 The Diaspora encompasses a group of people who can either trace their origins to India or who are
Indian citizens living abroad, either temporarily or permanently.

 Indian Diaspora
 17.5 million strong Indian diaspora over 100 countries includes :
 Non-Resident Indians (NRIs),
 Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) and
 Overseas Citizens of India (OCI).

PIO and OCI card holders were merged under OCI category in 2015.
Diaspora in numbers
 The International Migration Report, 2019 declares Indian diaspora to be world's largest ( 17.5 million):

 In the Arab Gulf states alone, the number of Indians was estimated at around 8.5 million.

 USA – 4.4 million (1.3 % of American population)

 In Canada Indian Diaspora--3% of its population.

 Nearly 7 lakhs— is the fastest growing in Australia 2.8% of Australia’s population

 1.5 million strong Indian diaspora in UK contributes around 6 percent to UK's GDP.

 100,000 Indians living permanently in the Nordic region—Sweden

Considering the size of Indian diaspora it is aptly mentioned that the ‘sun never sets in the Indian
diaspora’.
 History and
Evolution
Ø Girmityas or Jahajis
Indian example of Ø Descendants of indentured Indian labourers.
large scale migration Ø Brought to Fiji, Mauritius, South Africa, East Africa,
began during the Caribbean and South America (Trinidad and Tobago,
Guyana and Suriname)
British rule as
Ø To work on sugarcane plantations
indentured labourers
Ø The term Girmitiya was coined by Mahatma Gandhi
to former colonies like who referred to himself as first Girmitiya.
Fiji, Kenya and
Malaysia (also known
as Girmitiya people).
 Evolution of the Diaspora policy

 Nehruvian phase
 India opted for a policy of distancing itself from the
Diaspora, given its economic status and apprehension
that its interference could offend host countries. The
Diaspora policy was limited to cultural and humanitarian
dimensions.

 Addressing the Lok Sabha in 1957, Nehru said about the

diaspora, “We want to have no vested interests at the
expense of the population of those countries…if they
adopt the nationality of that country we have no concern
with them. There may be sentimental concerns but
politically they cease to be Indian nationals.”

 The Nehruvian trend was continued and extended to till

late 80s.
Mobilisation of the Indian diaspora began during the tenure of Rajiv Gandhi:

Rajiv Gandhi was the first Prime Minister who changed the diaspora policy by inviting
Indians abroad, to participate in nation-building

Sam Pitroda, who was entrusted with the task of modernising telecommunications in
India.  Grievances like red tape, multiple clearances, distrust of government in
fulfilling promises were addressed through hesitant reforms and promotional
measures.
In 1987 when Sitiveni Rabuka ousted an Fiji Indian majority government in Fiji . Rajiv
Gandhi, in a major departure from established policy, protested vehemently,
imposed trade sanctions against Fiji, got it expelled from the Commonwealth and
raised the issue at the United Nations  Energised the Indian diaspora, generating
faith in them that India would not be a silent witness, as it was in the past, to
discrimination, racism and disenfranchisement of Indians abroad.
 After the end of cold war, the emergence of a multipole centric foreign policy, structural shift in the
global economy and India’s economic reforms based on Liberalization, Privatization & globalization
allowed Indian government to change its outlook towards Diaspora and reviewed its diaspora policy.

 Atal Bihari Vajpayee led government saw the long-terms strategic value of the engagement when he
called for ‘partnership among all children of mother India’.

 In response to the growing Indian diaspora, the government established the Ministry of Overseas
Indian Affairs in 2004.
Modi Doctrine on Diaspora :

 PM Modi made the diaspora a centrepiece of his foreign policy .

 Prime minister Modi calls Indian diaspora as

 our 'Rashtradoots’
 the informal and permamnent ‘ambassadors’ for India.

He addressed Indian diaspora in different parts of the world from Madison Square, New York to Kigali,
Rwanda, Houston.

 Modi Doctrine on Diaspora is often described in terms of 3 Cs:

 ‘connect with India’;
 ‘celebrating cultural heritage; and
 ‘contribute’

 Relaxation of the visa norms for the overseas communities, merger of OCI + POI , improving physical
connectivity and the Ease of Doing Business have been the policy consequences of Modi’s intensive
outreach to the diaspora.
Significance of Diaspora
Paramjit Sahai in his book ‘Indian Cultural Diplomacy: Celebrating Pluralism in a
Globalised World’ writes how country’s foreign policy ‘rests upon four inter-linked pillars:
1. economic diplomacy,
2. peace diplomacy,
3. environmental diplomacy and
4. diaspora policy’.
 Building translational networks: The Diaspora provides important links not only emotional, but also
cultural, social, and political. For example Ireland's Prime Minister Leo Varadkar and Portugese Prime
Minister Antonio Costa are of Indian origin.

 Lobbying for India: The educated Indian diaspora are politically influential in their country of
residence.Act as Informal Ambassadors and help cultivate soft power . Lobby for Indian interests
 Examples - In USA - Indian community lobbied for support - during Kargil war,1998 Pokhran
Nuclear tests and Civil Nuclear deal

 Defence and security goals: Groups like the United States India Political Action Committee (USINPAC),
Friends of India, Canada India Foundation (CIF) and Canada India Business Council (CIBC), are
actively pushing for India's interests.

 Messenger of India’s soft power: Yoga, Bollywood, Indian cuisine among others is famous across the
world.
 Recovering artefacts: For example- The Indian Pride Project successfully lobbied to bring back the
Nataraja from Australia, and sandstone Yakshi from the United States.

 Source of Capital and Investment - Diaspora’s motives to invest in India are in contrast to non-
diaspora FDI. Their investments are long lasting as many of them wish to establish a long-term
base in India.

 Remittances - According to Global Migration Report 2020 , India recieves highest remittance of
$78.6 billion from Indians living abroad .

 The migration of less-skilled labour (especially to West Asia) has also helped in bringing down
disguised unemployment in India.
Challenges faced by Indian Diaspora:
 The Diaspora have been critical of bureaucratic procedures and slow pace of economic reform.

 Racism - Rising incidence of hate speech and crimes against Indian Diaspora by the locals due to
racism, communalism emboldened by coming of ultra nationalist and far right governments in
many countries.

 Increasing anti globalization has resulted in stricter visa rules in many countries including USA,
Australia etc.

 Conflicts - Sectarian crisis, terrorist activities and war in the Middle East countries leave our
diaspora vulnerable to attacks.
 Adverse local laws to encourage more employment from locals such as Nitaqat Law of Saudi
Arabia (mandates one local to be hired in place of 10 migrants).

 Brain Drain results in substantial drop in the supply of professionals for running institutions
and organisations in India.

 Money laundering and insurgent activities are sometimes promoted by the money coming as
remittances. Example - Khalistan movement, Kashmir
Challenges for Indian Government?
1. The diaspora engagement is yet to produce desired results in the form of large investments and
economic participation of the diaspora in India’s economic participation of the diaspora in India’s
initiatives like ‘Make in India’.

2. Broad coverage - The policy is slanted towards engaging the diaspora in the West, especially USA.

3. Diverse nature of the diaspora - Heterogeneous in social, economic and demographic characteristics .
Specific challenges are expected to arise in Middle East, where a large section of the Indian diaspora is
often under stress due to difficult working conditions , sudden lay-offs , confiscation of visas.

4. Objectives/priorities – whether diaspora is being seen from a political objectives for mobilisation of
financial resources or for their greater participation in Indian political and economic affairs.
What should be done?
High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, 2000
under the Chairmanship of Dr. L M Singhvi
The Committee has recommended to the Government that dual citizenship should be permitted to foreign
citizens of Indian descent settled in certain countries, within the rubric of the Citizenship Act,1955.

A clearly defined Diaspora policy ,suitably calibrated with country-specific plans.

Welfare of Indian Women married to NRIs/PIOs - A special cell should be created for free legal counselling
for the families of girls contemplating marriage to NRIs/PIOs. An affidavit stating his current marital status
should be a mandatory pre-requisite to the issuance of a marriage registration certificate.
Problems of Overseas Indian Labour –

Establishing a welfare fund for repatriated overseas workers in distress;

Negotiating a Standard Labour Export Agreement' with the host countries;

Monitoring and supervision of both the employment contracts, and the conditions of our
overseas workers by our Missions;

Launching compulsory insurance schemes covering the risks faced by our overseas workers;

Establishing mechanisms for pre-departure counselling and the provision of legal assistance
locally, instituting training programmes for human resource development and skills
upgradation;
Economic Development (Investment, International Trade, Industrial Development And Tourism) -Special
measures should be devised to facilitate the involvement of the Diaspora with India in this sector. Suitable
mechanisms should be devised to avail of such expertise.

Government should also consider setting up Special Economic Zones, exclusively for projects to be set
up by NRIs/PIOs.

A dedicated single-window set-up, which would provide consultancy services for overseas Indian
investors .

Indian banks should make a special arrangements to facilitate payments in rupees against incoming
foreign exchange.

Extending fiscal incentives, such as reducing corporate tax rates to levels at or below competitive
international levels, removing restrictions on repatriation of profits and eliminating needless
licensing requirements would be extremely useful in attracting investment.
Tourism -There should be greater focus on promoting tourism among 2nd generation PIOs. Special tour
packages, pilgrim packages and other packages tailor-made for this section of the Diaspora should be
developed and publicised.

Education -A large reservoir of highly qualified PIOs in senior academic positions in almost every
academic institution in countries like the USA, Canada and the UK. leverage this extraordinary
resource. Concerted efforts should be made to introduce India Studies in universities with a sizeable
Indian Diaspora.

Health -The PIOs have distinguished themselves in the field of medicine and healthcare in the countries
of their settlement. It is felt that it should be possible to attract significant investments and expertise
from them in the field of health care and medical research.

Standing Committee of Parliament - A Parliamentary Standing Committee on Indian Diaspora should be

constituted. It should have in it, members with an interest in Diaspora affairs. This Committee could
also act as focal point for interaction with Parliamentarians of Indian Origin in other countries.
With the world’s largest diaspora being India’s, the time is ripe to think of an Indian
diaspora policy.
As a definite starting point, a standing committee in the Parliament, as recommended
by L.M. Singhvi committee , could be instituted to actually ascertain the pros and cons
of this in a bipartisan manner.

This will help in understanding the diaspora’s contribution in specific countries and
formalise its role as an effective catalyst in India’s political, economic, trade and aid-
related issues.
Russia Geo-Politics
Russia is Vast , Vastest , Immense .

6 million square miles vast, 11

time zone, Bear is the symbol of
Russia. Growling , majestic and
ferocious.
Bear in Russian means medved
which means one who likes honey.
Russia’s defining characteristic is its indefensibility.

Why Russia is difficult to defend?

• Core of Russia is Moscow. It is not protected by rivers,
mountains and oceans. Russia’s only defence is its
inhospitable climate and the forests.

How to define Russia’s history

• Chronicle of agony of surviving invasion after invasion.

History of permanent struggle

Attacks on Russia-have been from
2 directions.
• From steppes -connects Russia to Central
Asia-The path used by Mongols.
• From north European Plain-brought Nazis.

Note : Russia can produce enough food but cannot transport it

efficiently.
Russia’s dilemma:- Either centralised Govt or torn by uprising.

Russia has to integrate powerful centrifugal forces.

It requires centralised bureaucracy and vast security apparatus.

Thus Russia has 2 core geographical problems.

• Holding the empire together.

• Maintaining the Empire.

Since the majority will not be Russian they have to maintain by force. Russia
is geopolitically unstable.
Russia’s Problems :-
• Very little of its territory is useful.
• Maintaining huge territory requires big Army.
• It also requires big internal security and
intelligence.
• Expansion makes Russia look Aggressive .
• Russia has to maintain strong state.
Holding the empire and maintaining the security  One
undermines the other.

Present Russia faces three borders

• Asian Siberia
• Central Asia
• Caucuses

Greatest expansion of Russian empire occurred under Soviets

from 1945 to 1989.
Causes of Collapse
• Over stretching itself in Central Europe , taxed its
ability to control the region while economically
exploiting it. It became net loss.
• Expansion of Russia justified extension of NATO
• Costly arms race.
• Massive Military Build up undermining its economy
Russia’s
vulnerabilities
• Caucuses
• Ukraine
• Baltic States
It needs to access warm water ports.
 What is
Russia’s • Empire management
problem:-
Pipelines
• Nordstream – connects Germany via
Baltic Sea
• Yamal – Feeds Poland and Germany
through Belarus
• Bluestream – Takes Gas to Turkey via
Black Sea
• South Stream – Was to ensure that
even during disputes with Ukraine , it
still have access to European Market
Russia is a riddle wrapped in mystery inside an enigma, but
perhaps there is a key i.e. National Interest. There is nothing
they admire so much as strength and there is nothing they
have less respect than Weakness. Winston Churchill , 1939

Putin is a student of history. He learnt the lessons of Soviet

years. Tim Marshal
 SAARC

The idea of co-operation in South Asia, technically speaking, is older that the Indian Republic.
It was first discussed in the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi on April 1947 .
Possibly due to the effects of cold war and the strained Indo-Pak relations resulting in two
wars, the region remained politically and economically incoherent . The trust deficit among
the countries in the region could not make them think seriously on the issue. While there was
a fear among the other six nations about the use of such organisation by India in its favour
and the possibility of India behaving in typical big brotherly attitude to browbeat them,
India’s apprehension was that such an organisation might be used by her smaller neighbours
to extract undue concessions by expressing their fear of being bullied by India. Pakistan was
also sceptical about formation of such an organisation which might be used by India to
enhance her propaganda against Pakistan.
Origin of SAARC
 In the ending years of 70s, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka agreed, in principle, upon the creation of a trade
bloc and to provide a platform for the peoples of South Asia to work
together in a spirit of friendship, trust and understanding. President Ziaur
Rahman took initiative by formally writing to his counterparts in the
region giving his vision for the region and compelling arguments for the
need of such a regional organisation.
In 1983, the international conference held by Indian Minister of External Affairs P.V.
Narasimha Rao in New Delhi, the foreign ministers of the inner seven countries adopted the
Declaration on South Asian Association Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and formally
launched the Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) initially in five agreed areas of
cooperation namely,

Finally, SAARC charter was adopted during the inaugural summit of SAARC held in Dhaka on
8th December, 1985 the guiding principles of which were:

 Cooperation within the framework of the Association shall be based on respect for
the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-
interference in the internal affairs of other States and mutual benefit.
 Such cooperation shall not be a substitute for bilateral and multilateral cooperation
but shall complement them.
 Such cooperation shall not be inconsistent with bilateral and multilateral obligations”

 Two of the most important features of SAARC are that all decisions are to be taken by
consensus and that bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the
deleberations.

Afghanistan joined SAARC as its eighth member state in April 2007.

Observers
States with observer status include Australia, China, the European Union, Iran, Japan,
Mauritius, Myanmar, South Korea and the United States. At the behest of China, Pakistan
has proposed to upgrade the former’s status to full member but it was turned down after
Indian objection.

SAARC’s achievements
SAFTA

SAFTA was envisaged primarily as the first step towards the transition to a Customs Union,
Common Market and Economic Union. The SAFTA Agreement was signed on 6 January 2004
during Twelfth SAARC Summit held in Islamabad, Pakistan. Under this agreement, SAARC
members were to bring their duties down to 20 per cent by 2009. However, SAFTA is yet to
be implemented.
SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme
South Asian University

Where SAARC failed

SAARC almost failed to accomplish its ambitious objectives since its birth ,due to the political
difference, conflicts and poor economic state of the member countries. Most of the
programs and achievements exist only in official documents.
The intra-regional trade of SAARC amounts to just 5% of member countries’ trade.
While different regions of the world have progressed even to monetary union, SAARC has
failed to even come up with a free trade agreement.
Reasons for failure
Weak Cultural Identities - Pakistan wants to assert itself as Islamic State and calls India a
Hindu State. The debates regarding identity are similarly going on in Sri Lanka and
Bangladesh. The pursuit of maintaining distinct cultural identity by every country has not
allowed the region to come together. Rivalry between India and Pakistan, the two largest
members of SAARC, has cast its shadow on SAARC.
The region still faces many unresolved border and maritime issues. These unresolved
borders have led to problems of Terrorism, Refugee Crisis, Smuggling, Narco-Trade. The
unresolved issues continue to restrict cooperative relations.
Suggestions for the future
India has already taken the leadership on the agreements for bettering intra-regional
connectivity. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s plan for a SAARC satellite that can launch the
space exploration dreams for all countries of the region is a powerful idea.
India’s internal politics has sometimes played a negative role to India’s aspirations vis-à-vis
SAARC. India has to forcefully articulate South Asian Vision so as to avoid these internal
domestic disruptions. The objectives and targets of SAFTA should be fulfilled.

India-SAARC
India is a founding member of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
that was set up in 1985 as an organization to build a connected and integrated South Asia
with the larger aim of promoting the development and progress of all countries in the
region. India continues to support various initiatives in the SAARC framework to achieve
closer cooperation in diverse areas. Out of the eighteen SAARC Summits held so far, India has
hosted three, viz. the second (Bengaluru, November 1986), the eighth (New Delhi, May 1995)
and the fourteenth (New Delhi, April 2007).

As per our ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy, India is an active development partner and is
engaged in several projects in these countries. India’s engagement with these countries is
based on a consultative, non-reciprocal and outcome-oriented approach, while focussing
on delivering benefits like greater connectivity, improved infrastructure, stronger
development cooperation in various sectors area, security and broader people-to-people
contacts. India has been steadfast in its commitment of sharing the fruits of technological
advances with like-minded countries in its neighbourhood. In this context, India's initiative of
extending its National Knowledge Network (NKN) to the countries of South Asia has been
extended to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Bhutan.
India launched a South Asian Satellite (SAS) in May 2017 from Sriharikota. Demonstration
terminals of SAS have been installed in Bhutan, Maldives, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh
and Sri Lanka.. As a yet another major contribution of India to cooperation in the SAARC
framework, India is home to South Asian University (SAU). It was established through an
Inter-Governmental Agreement at the 14th SAARC Summit (April 2008) to provide world
class educational facilities and professional faculty to students and researchers from SAARC
countries.
India also hosts the Interim Unit of SAARC Disaster Management Center (IU) at the Gujarat
Institute of Disaster Management (GIDM), Gandhinagar.
India is fully aware of challenges in South Asia, with cross-border terrorism being the most
serious of those challenges. At the last Informal Meeting of SAARC Foreign Ministers held in
New York on the sidelines of UN General Assembly on 26 September 2019, India stressed
how the problems that beset SAARC were not just a story of missed opportunities but also
of deliberate obstacles, terrorism being one of them and that elimination of terrorism in
all its forms is a precondition not only for fruitful cooperation, but also for the very
survival of our region itself.

India-SAARC & Covid-19

At the initiative of the Prime Minister, a Video Conference of SAARC Leaders on combating
COVID-19 was held on 15 March 2020. It demonstrated the shared resolve of countries in the
SAARC region to fight together the unprecedented challenge of the coronavirus pandemic.
India created a COVID-19 Emergency Fund with an initial offer of USD 10 million to meet
the costs of immediate actions. India’s humanitarian relief in the region includes supply of
essential drugs, antibiotics, medical consumables, COVID protection and testing kits, and
other laboratory and hospital equipment  SAARC Disaster Management Centre (Interim
Unit) in Gandhinagar, with the assistance of MEA, MoHFW and our Missions, have set up a
dedicated website on Covid-19 for use by SAARC countries.
A video conference of health professionals representing all SAARC countries at the level of
Director General of Health Services (DGHS) was held in March 2020. A video conference of
trade officials of SAARC countries was held in April 2020 to discuss the impact of travel
restrictions and the larger COVID-19 situation on intra-regional trade.

India has developed a ‘SAARC COVID19 Information Exchange Platform (COINEX)’ platform
for use by all SAARC countries to facilitate exchange of specialized information and tools on
COVID-19 among designated health professionals. Under India’s e-ITEC network, training of
healthcare personnel in our
neighbourhood has been
conducted with content
delivery by super specialty
medical institutes like AIIMS
and PGI Chandigarh. AIIMS
New Delhi has also separately
held a series on Covid 19.
 SAARC

The idea of co-operation in South Asia, technically speaking, is older that the Indian Republic.
It was first discussed in the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi on April 1947 .
Possibly due to the effects of cold war and the strained Indo-Pak relations resulting in two
wars, the region remained politically and economically incoherent . The trust deficit among
the countries in the region could not make them think seriously on the issue. While there was
a fear among the other six nations about the use of such organisation by India in its favour
and the possibility of India behaving in typical big brotherly attitude to browbeat them,
India’s apprehension was that such an organisation might be used by her smaller neighbours
to extract undue concessions by expressing their fear of being bullied by India. Pakistan was
also sceptical about formation of such an organisation which might be used by India to
enhance her propaganda against Pakistan.
Origin of SAARC
 In the ending years of 70s, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka agreed, in principle, upon the creation of a trade
bloc and to provide a platform for the peoples of South Asia to work
together in a spirit of friendship, trust and understanding. President Ziaur
Rahman took initiative by formally writing to his counterparts in the
region giving his vision for the region and compelling arguments for the
need of such a regional organisation.
In 1983, the international conference held by Indian Minister of External Affairs P.V.
Narasimha Rao in New Delhi, the foreign ministers of the inner seven countries adopted the
Declaration on South Asian Association Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and formally
launched the Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) initially in five agreed areas of
cooperation namely,

Finally, SAARC charter was adopted during the inaugural summit of SAARC held in Dhaka on
8th December, 1985 the guiding principles of which were:

 Cooperation within the framework of the Association shall be based on respect for
the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-
interference in the internal affairs of other States and mutual benefit.
 Such cooperation shall not be a substitute for bilateral and multilateral cooperation
but shall complement them.
 Such cooperation shall not be inconsistent with bilateral and multilateral obligations”

 Two of the most important features of SAARC are that all decisions are to be taken by
consensus and that bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the
deleberations.

Afghanistan joined SAARC as its eighth member state in April 2007.

Observers
States with observer status include Australia, China, the European Union, Iran, Japan,
Mauritius, Myanmar, South Korea and the United States. At the behest of China, Pakistan
has proposed to upgrade the former’s status to full member but it was turned down after
Indian objection.

SAARC’s achievements
SAFTA

SAFTA was envisaged primarily as the first step towards the transition to a Customs Union,
Common Market and Economic Union. The SAFTA Agreement was signed on 6 January 2004
during Twelfth SAARC Summit held in Islamabad, Pakistan. Under this agreement, SAARC
members were to bring their duties down to 20 per cent by 2009. However, SAFTA is yet to
be implemented.
SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme
South Asian University

Where SAARC failed

SAARC almost failed to accomplish its ambitious objectives since its birth ,due to the political
difference, conflicts and poor economic state of the member countries. Most of the
programs and achievements exist only in official documents.
The intra-regional trade of SAARC amounts to just 5% of member countries’ trade.
While different regions of the world have progressed even to monetary union, SAARC has
failed to even come up with a free trade agreement.
Reasons for failure
Weak Cultural Identities - Pakistan wants to assert itself as Islamic State and calls India a
Hindu State. The debates regarding identity are similarly going on in Sri Lanka and
Bangladesh. The pursuit of maintaining distinct cultural identity by every country has not
allowed the region to come together. Rivalry between India and Pakistan, the two largest
members of SAARC, has cast its shadow on SAARC.
The region still faces many unresolved border and maritime issues. These unresolved
borders have led to problems of Terrorism, Refugee Crisis, Smuggling, Narco-Trade. The
unresolved issues continue to restrict cooperative relations.
Suggestions for the future
India has already taken the leadership on the agreements for bettering intra-regional
connectivity. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s plan for a SAARC satellite that can launch the
space exploration dreams for all countries of the region is a powerful idea.
India’s internal politics has sometimes played a negative role to India’s aspirations vis-à-vis
SAARC. India has to forcefully articulate South Asian Vision so as to avoid these internal
domestic disruptions. The objectives and targets of SAFTA should be fulfilled.

India-SAARC
India is a founding member of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
that was set up in 1985 as an organization to build a connected and integrated South Asia
with the larger aim of promoting the development and progress of all countries in the
region. India continues to support various initiatives in the SAARC framework to achieve
closer cooperation in diverse areas. Out of the eighteen SAARC Summits held so far, India has
hosted three, viz. the second (Bengaluru, November 1986), the eighth (New Delhi, May 1995)
and the fourteenth (New Delhi, April 2007).

As per our ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy, India is an active development partner and is
engaged in several projects in these countries. India’s engagement with these countries is
based on a consultative, non-reciprocal and outcome-oriented approach, while focussing
on delivering benefits like greater connectivity, improved infrastructure, stronger
development cooperation in various sectors area, security and broader people-to-people
contacts. India has been steadfast in its commitment of sharing the fruits of technological
advances with like-minded countries in its neighbourhood. In this context, India's initiative of
extending its National Knowledge Network (NKN) to the countries of South Asia has been
extended to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Bhutan.
India launched a South Asian Satellite (SAS) in May 2017 from Sriharikota. Demonstration
terminals of SAS have been installed in Bhutan, Maldives, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh
and Sri Lanka.. As a yet another major contribution of India to cooperation in the SAARC
framework, India is home to South Asian University (SAU). It was established through an
Inter-Governmental Agreement at the 14th SAARC Summit (April 2008) to provide world
class educational facilities and professional faculty to students and researchers from SAARC
countries.
India also hosts the Interim Unit of SAARC Disaster Management Center (IU) at the Gujarat
Institute of Disaster Management (GIDM), Gandhinagar.
India is fully aware of challenges in South Asia, with cross-border terrorism being the most
serious of those challenges. At the last Informal Meeting of SAARC Foreign Ministers held in
New York on the sidelines of UN General Assembly on 26 September 2019, India stressed
how the problems that beset SAARC were not just a story of missed opportunities but also
of deliberate obstacles, terrorism being one of them and that elimination of terrorism in
all its forms is a precondition not only for fruitful cooperation, but also for the very
survival of our region itself.

India-SAARC & Covid-19

At the initiative of the Prime Minister, a Video Conference of SAARC Leaders on combating
COVID-19 was held on 15 March 2020. It demonstrated the shared resolve of countries in the
SAARC region to fight together the unprecedented challenge of the coronavirus pandemic.
India created a COVID-19 Emergency Fund with an initial offer of USD 10 million to meet
the costs of immediate actions. India’s humanitarian relief in the region includes supply of
essential drugs, antibiotics, medical consumables, COVID protection and testing kits, and
other laboratory and hospital equipment  SAARC Disaster Management Centre (Interim
Unit) in Gandhinagar, with the assistance of MEA, MoHFW and our Missions, have set up a
dedicated website on Covid-19 for use by SAARC countries.
A video conference of health professionals representing all SAARC countries at the level of
Director General of Health Services (DGHS) was held in March 2020. A video conference of
trade officials of SAARC countries was held in April 2020 to discuss the impact of travel
restrictions and the larger COVID-19 situation on intra-regional trade.

India has developed a ‘SAARC COVID19 Information Exchange Platform (COINEX)’ platform
for use by all SAARC countries to facilitate exchange of specialized information and tools on
COVID-19 among designated health professionals. Under India’s e-ITEC network, training of
healthcare personnel in our
neighbourhood has been
conducted with content
delivery by super specialty
medical institutes like AIIMS
and PGI Chandigarh. AIIMS
New Delhi has also separately
held a series on Covid 19.
PERSPECTIVES
Soft Power in Indian
Foreign Policy
David M Malone
This essay addresses first how the
concept of soft power emerged,
how it has evolved and then
examines one significant effort by
India to project soft power to the
east. It thereafter looks at some
major features of Indian foreign
policy, discusses how soft power
might or might not relate to them,
and zeroes in on how Indians,
including the Indian government,
may distinguish between “public
diplomacy” and soft power in
their conceptions of Indian
foreign policy.
The author is very grateful to Niranand Kumar
for research assistance with this paper.
David M Malone (dmalon@idrc.ca) is a
Canadian public servant and scholar at the
International Development Research Centre.
He is the author of Does the Elephant Dance?
Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy.
Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   september 3, 2011  vol xlvi no 36
T
he year 2011 has been declared “the
year of India in Canada”, offered by
New Delhi as an opportunity for
Canadians to experience the civilisational
pull of that great nation through shows by
top I­ndian classical and contemporary
artists, even rock bands. Trade shows, lit-
erary festivals and cultural performances
(often overlapping) have been rolling out
from coast to coast – across four and a half
time zones! One high point in June: the In-
dian International Film Awards extrava-
ganza that touched down on Toronto in
June this year and created a minor frenzy
in the city. All of this came on the heels of
the announcement late last year of the
start of negotiations for a Canada-India
economic cooperation agreement.
The million or so Canadians of Indian ex-
traction – a number that is five times greater
proportionately than that in the United
States (US) – are undoubtedly pleased by
all the attention. But for others, the ques-
tion arises as to why India is courting
C­anada culturally, when Canada pursues its
(mostly commercial) aims in India without
much attempt to woo wider Indian public
opinion through the arts or otherwise.
This essay addresses, first, how the con-
cept of soft power emerged, how it has
evolved, then examines one significant
e­ffort by India to project soft power to the
east. It thereafter looks at some major fea-
tures of Indian foreign policy, discusses
how soft power might or might not relate
to them, and zeroes in on how Indians,
i­ncluding the Indian government, may
distinguish between “public diplomacy”
and soft power in their conceptions of
I­ndian foreign policy.
The article is indebted to an earlier one
that appeared in this journal by Itty Abra-
ham in 2007, who discussed several
a­spects of the wider suite of instruments
and phenomena that together contribute
both to India’s soft power today and to
that which may develop even more strongly
in the future (Abraham 2007).
What Is ‘Soft Power’?
The concept was first formulated by
American scholar and frequent policy-
maker, Joseph S Nye Jr, who defined
it in 1990 as “when one country gets
other countries to do what it wants” and
as “co-optive power” (Nye 1990: 166).
He n­oted:
Today…the definition of power is losing its
emphasis on military force…The factors of
technology, education and economic growth
are becoming more significant in inter­
national power (ibid: 154).
Later, he described the determinants of
soft power as growing out of “a country’s
culture; …out of our values – democracy and
human rights, when we live up to them”
(Nye 2004). In 2006, he elaborated further:
Power is the ability to alter the behaviour of
others to get what you want, and there are
basically three ways to do that: coercion
(sticks), payment (carrots) and attraction
(soft power) (Nye 2006).
He also mentioned the key role of civil
s­ociety in generating US soft power “from
Hollywood to Harvard”.1
Discussion of the “soft power” ingredi-
ents in India’s international relations took
off parallel to Nye’s evolving views. C Raja
Mohan argued as early as 2003 that “India
could always count itself among the few
nations with strong cards in the arena of
soft power”, asserting that India’s biggest
“instrument” of soft power was its dias­pora.
India’s diaspora is certainly an asset, but
far from the only one. Beyond its cultural
and civilisational riches, its vibrant (if at
times chaotic) democracy, its free media,
its mostly independent j­udiciary, its
d­y namic civil society, and the impressive
struggle for human rights since independ-
ence all make it attractive to publics in
much of the world where these character-
istics of its national experience are known.
In addition, India’s largely non-violent
d­efeat of colonialism served as an impor-
tant beacon for freedom movements and
newly independent countries elsewhere in
the 1950s and 1960s.
Shashi Tharoor, briefly minister of state
for external affairs, 2009-10, spoke and
35
PERSPECTIVES
wrote about soft power often, noting,
“Hard power without soft power stirs up
resentments and enmities; soft power
without hard power is a confession of
weakness” (Tharoor 2009). This descrip-
tion might apply as readily to the US as to
India, both countries seeking to attain and
to project internationally pluralist diversity
and tolerant secularism. And in a world
awash in conflict stemming from failure to
generate comity within nations, India’s
success in weaving together so many
e­thnic, religious, caste and other strands
within its society is a singularly strong
a­dvertisement for its exciting national
e­xperiment, however frustrating the fight
against poverty in India has often proved.
The abject failure of Indira Gandhi’s
p­eriod of emergency rule, 1975-77, decisively
repudiated by the electorate, generated a
growing sense internationally of the en-
during nature of India’s democracy. Thus,
an interpretation of India as the perma-
nent anchor of its subcontinent and wider
region, albeit still one afflicted with much
poverty, social challenge and internal
v­iolence, is now widely credited globally,
reinforcing the internationally compelling
narrative of its accelerating economic
growth as of the early 1990s. Democracy
has thus become a key, positive element of
India’s international identity.
S D Muni, in a useful recent survey of
the democracy dimension in Indian for-
eign policy, examines why the promotion
of democracy has not evolved as a central
theme of India’s international relations,
possibly because of its earlier orientations:
“Some analysts have attributed this to
I­ndia’s policy of non-alignment which
drew its rationale from anti-colonialism
and anti-imperialism”, in connection with
which “democracy promotion might have
breached the solidarity of the anti-colonial
and anti-racial movement led by India
u­nder the umbrella of non-alignment”
(Muni 2009: 8). More recently, however,
India has joined in a number of multilater-
al democracy promotion forums, includ-
ing the Community of Democracies of
which it became a founding member in
2000. Muni quotes Prime Minister Atal
B­ehari Vajpayee in 2001 as stating: “The
shape of our new world order will be
d­etermined by the success of pluralistic
democratic societies in destroying the
36
i­deo­logy of bigotry and hatred which
drives terrorism” (ibid: 10). Nevertheless,  in
c­ontrast to the US at times, India’s official
view has not wavered that democracy can-
not be “imposed from outside” (ibid: 13).
In sum, there is a growing consensus
that the power of attraction exerted by
cultural affinities and shared values can
greatly contribute to international credi-
bility. India’s soft power potential lies,
among other things, in its democratic cre-
dentials, secular values, pluralistic society,
considerable pool of skilled English-
speaking professionals, varied culture
(particularly Bollywood movies), and its
food and handicrafts. India, over millen-
nia, has offered refuge and, more impor-
tantly, religious and cultural freedom, to
Jews, Parsis, several varieties of Chris-
tians, and Muslims, a factor that should be
better known internationally than it has
been to date (Tharoor 2009).
As argued by Sunil Khilnani, India’s
greatest asset remains its “accumulated
political legitimacy” rather than any
h­y pothetical or real accumulation of
power.2 And political legitimacy lies at
the core of “soft power” for any state.
South-east and Wider Asia
In 2010, Uma Purushothamam noted the
saliency of Indian “soft power” in south-
east Asian countries, describing them as
“civilisational neighbours” (while also
noting that, helpfully, unlike several con-
tiguous neighbours, none of the south-
east Asian countries entertain border dis-
putes with India).
In the post-Independence period, India
failed to make the most of its cultural ties to
the Asian region. Indeed, its cultural diplo-
macy then was perceived as somewhat
gauche in Asia, insofar as it seemed to suggest
that some south-east Asian countries were
I­ndia’s “cultural colonies”. Moreover, Indian
foreign policy initiatives arguing for Asian
solidarity failed to gain traction because east
and south-east Asian nations had no desire to
subordinate their national identities to high-
minded notions of Asian r­egional unity; nor
did they agree with the claim that India was
the “mother of all civilisations” in Asia (ibid).
And India was then seen primarily as eco-
nomically lagging (in contrast to the early
success of the “Asian T­igers”), and not yet
much of a geostrategic player.
september 3, 2011  vol xlvi no 36  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly
Recognising the need to shed earlier
notions of cultural superiority, India has
since the early 1990s engaged more prag-
matically with Asians on cultural and other
issues, relying as much on contemporary
art forms as those relating to its heritage:
India’s film stars like Amitabh Bachchan,
Aishwarya Rai or Shah Rukh Khan have
b­ecome icons of India’s cultural image. If,
t­oday their ‘presence’ in millions of homes
across south-east Asia is a source of joy and
fellow feeling, then their contribution to
e­nhancing the comfort level between India
and south-east Asia cannot be insignificant
(Deware 2006: 171).
Cricket has also fostered strong rela-
tions between India and some other Asian
nations beyond its immediate neighbour-
hood. The new Indian 20/20 League, in
which New Zealand and Australian play-
ers participate, has attracted wide interest
in those countries and in some other Asian
nations. The October 2010 Commonwealth
Games in Delhi – in spite of gross organisa-
tional shortcomings – proved a meaning-
ful selling point with the many Asian and
Pacific Commonwealth countries.3
All of these factors generate “pull” for
India, in ways that have little to do with
economic growth or military might.
India’s youth is a crucial asset in Asia.
“It is the power and energy of our human
capital, young and old, that has been
central to the Indian transformation”
(Nilekani 2009: 26-27). Thus, unsurpris-
ingly, in Singapore, the finance and infor-
mation technology (IT) sectors welcome
young I­ndians with open arms and many
com­panies, banks and financial institu-
tions have started visiting top Indian cam-
puses for recruitment purposes (Duttagupta
2008). Indeed, India has emerged as an im-
portant source of skilled workers in much
of Asia (Kaur 2009: 84).
In south-east Asia, efforts are afoot to
promote
networking of universities [by] the linking
of Indian higher education institutions with
the ASEAN University Network, cooperating
on accreditation, joint research, exchange
of professors and students in information
technology, biotechnology, biomedics, and
the social sciences, including economics
(Deware 2006: 172).
Moreover, India provides numerous
scholarships for Asian students in India,
parti­c ularly through the Indian Council
for Cultural Relations (ICCR). The Indian

government also helps in the establishment
of chairs related to India and its languages
in universities of south-east Asia. 4
The Indian diaspora is a crucial actor in
India’s influence in Asia. South-east Asia
alone accounts for an estimated 6.7 mil-
lion people of Indian origin (Sridharan
1996). The significant economic resource
represented by diaspora and migrant
labour r­emittances back to India has
guided much of Delhi’s efforts to engage
this large community. Between 2007 and
2008, these r­emittances increased nearly
45%, and they proved robust even during
the 2008-09 global economic crisis (Gov-
ernment of I­ndia 2009: 5-6). But while
such remittan­ces are much welcomed by
India, the treatment of Indian citizens
(and, in the case of Malaysia, citizens of
Indian origin) by host countries can give
rise to criticism within India, often with
considerable justification.
But diasporas can also generate inter-
national tensions. The power struggle
b­etween ethnic Indians and indigenous
islanders in Fiji over past decades has
soured diplomatic relations between the
two countries, not least when the ethnic
Indian community was adversely affected
by the coups of 1999 and 2000 in Suva. In
response, the Indian government exerted
what diplomatic pressure it could through
bilateral and multilateral channels but
with limited effect, culminating in the
closure of the Indian High Commission in
Suva (Sridharan 2008: 83). In fact, India
has scant capacity to guarantee basic
l­abour rights and promote the interests of
its diaspora communities: “given its myriad
domestic challenges...it is unrealistic to
expect that it [India] can influence events
in other countries on behalf of its people”
(Government of India 2009).
The flow of tourists between Asia and
I­ndia has increased both in absolute num-
bers and in relative terms in recent years,
although not yet dramatically (Acharya
2008: 15). Tourism, particularly religious
tourism, is a potentially greater asset in
I­ndia’s relations with Asian nations. Bud-
dhist tourism, already a major draw, has
significant potential to generate further
a­rrivals from Asian markets (Koldowski and
Martin 2008: 128). The launch of a new
Buddhist circuit special luxury train in 2007,
and Japanese-supported development of
Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   september 3, 2011  vol xlvi no 36
tourist infrastructure along the circuit mark
its growing significance (ibid: 128-29).
India could attract many more tourists
from Asia, but this will require a better
understanding of the value-for-money
available in other Asian tourist desti­nations,
and the minimum requirements of comfort
and facilities that Asian tourists, including
from China, have come to expect during
their travels abroad. India’s often over-
priced, subpar hotels, combined with at
times chaotic local conditions for tourists,
and unsympathetic state b­ureaucracies in
charge of many tourist sites, are hardly the
Asian ideal for family holidays, even when
the archaeological and other attractions
themselves are stupendous. If these con-
cerns remain unaddressed, the “Incredible
India!” conveyed in the excellent Indian
tourism promotional campaign is destined to
remain in reality the “incredibly inconven-
ient and expensive” India for many Asians.
Thus, after a weak start in implement-
ing its “Look East Policy” in the 1990s,
I­ndia’s relationships in the area have
i­ntensified greatly during the past decade,
in spheres ranging from trade and invest-
ment to defence and anti-terrorism coop-
eration. India’s determined efforts to pro-
mote its historical, cultural and educational
assets have been an important part of the
mix, but a strategy relying e­xclusively or
principally on civilisational and cultural
links would have fared p­oorly (as the early
Look East Policy did) (Mohan 2007).
Foreign Policy and Soft Power
As a gross generalisation, three factors
shape the foreign policy of most countries:
history, geography and capability. And
each of these has decisively influenced
I­ndian foreign policy, in different ways at
different times. India’s power of attraction,
the foundation of any country’s “soft power”,
derives from each.
It is India’s newly recognised global eco-
nomic significance and potential that lends
weight to the country’s international profile.
Its foreign policy, regional concerns and
geostrategic views have remained largely
unknown to the rest of the world, parti­
cularly to a heedless west, which had
become comfortable with its interpretation
of India as a none-too-straightforward
i­nter­national performer frequently dis-
rupting cosy multilateral gatherings with
PERSPECTIVES
its high-minded and literate (if sometimes
dis­ingenuous) interventions. But today, its
i­nternational actions and positions matter
more and are perceived differently.
Any country’s preoccupations nearly
i­nevitably involve immediate neighbours.
It is by them that we are influenced, and
them, above all others, we might influ-
ence. And views on the neighbourhood
within India vary considerably. In 2006,
while making the rounds of official Delhi,
a senior member of the security and f­oreign
policy establishment introduced me (con-
fidentially) to two different views of
I­ndia’s neighbourhood: “I think our neigh-
bours are mostly thugs and crooks. How-
ever, the prime minister believes that if
our neighbours mostly are so, we Indians
must have something to do with that.”
In recent years, in seeking to improve
often very frayed ties with contiguous
neighbours, India has been experimenting
more often with asymmetric diplomacy,
offering more than it would have in the
past in an effort to lay to rest its reputation
as a regional bully.5 (This reputation was
often undeserved, of course. India was
o­ften indifferent to most of its neighbours
for long stretches of time.) From N­ehru
onwards, civilisational and other historic
links were much emphasised in India’s
d­eclaratory neighbourhood diplomacy,
but it is perhaps only recently that India’s
“pull” has become a strong one, with its
economic progress, unmatched to date in
most of the neighbouring countries, elicit-
ing mixed emotions. I was told repeatedly
in Pakistan in early 2010 that what Paki-
stanis find hard to endure with respect to
India nowadays is a sense of drawing
away from them and the fractious family
quarrels that constantly beset bilateral
ties between New Delhi and Islamabad.
Pakistanis lucidly observe New Delhi in-
creasingly reaching beyond neighbours to
secure its place at the global table of influ-
ence (from which Pakistan is o­ften absent,
for example in the G-20 forum).
China is not a neighbour like the others.
Including Tibet, its territory is three times
greater than that of India and its national
economic output also three times that of
I­ndia. Finally, and most tellingly, its per capita
gross domestic product (GDP) is three times
larger. Thus, China, to which Buddhism and
many other Indian influences flowed in past
37
PERSPECTIVES
millennia, experiences India quite differ-
ently than do its smaller neighbours.
Only Rival for Beijing
In the overall scheme of things for Beijing,
New Delhi is its only serious rival for influ-
ence in Asia in decades to come, Japan’s
advanced if stagnant economy notwith-
standing. The 1962 border war between
the two countries was much easier to
overcome in China, which won, than in
India, which lost. And, while the quest of
both countries for natural resources and
food security beyond their borders might
cause them to rub up against each other,
neither is seeking to destabilise the other,
China’s growing presence in south Asia
being motivated above all by the search
for markets and access to the sea for eco-
nomic purposes.
The slogan Hindi Chini, Bhai Bhai!
was always more aspirational than con-
vincing, not least because the values
e­spoused by the two governments, as ref­
lected through their political systems,
could not have been much more different.
And thus, while cultural and other forms
of outreach by India to China (and vice
versa) can help inflect a frequently tense
relationship, soft power instruments are
not likely to prove particularly effective as
compared to fairly narrow calculations of
economic and geostrategic self-interest
and mutual accommodation. Growing eco-
nomic interdependency is more likely to
stabilise the relationship than might factors
relating to soft power. Seen through a wider
lens, Pocha (2003) points out that both
China and India have been projecting soft
power globally, but in very different ways
– C­hina’s principal calling card has been
its economic success, while India has re-
lied on a mix of constitutional, political,
economic, and cultural assets.
India’s emergence as a major actor on the
global stage, offering a development model
that for some years now has been strikingly
successful in terms of growth (while failing
depressingly in terms of distribution) has
a­llowed it to establish a meaningful partner-
ship with two other leading democracies in
the developing world, each a dominant
a­ctor on its own continent. Under the banner
of the new IBSA group, India, Brazil and
South Africa are working hard to build con-
tent into the concept, at last giving practical
38
expression to the idea of South-South
c­ooperation, too long an empty vessel. The
emphasis on democratic kinship within this
formation, which might be taken as a dig at
China, should perhaps also be seen as an
e­ffort by India, a more explicit one than
u­sual, to develop a “soft power” component
to its diplomacy.
In temperament, notably through their
individualism, optimism and innate entre-
preneurship, Indians resemble Americans
more than any other nationality I know.
Their governments ultimately overcame
their mutual allergy, rooted in cold war
d­ynamics and India’s quest for strategic
a­utonomy at its time of greatest fragility
a­fter Independence, through the success of
Indian migration to the US and through the
logic of mutually beneficial commercial
ties. This was also achieved because the US,
newly sobered by the costs and failures of
several post-9/11 ventures, recognised that
its values were strongly reflected in those of
Indians and of their government. (The
proxy for their rapprochement was the
US-India nuclear agreement of 2008.) The
result has been positive for both countries,
particularly at a time when the US recog-
nises the reality of a multipolar geo-strategic
dispensation. In this relationship, shared
values of, above all, democracy have played
an important role, at least rhetorically. It
is clear that beyond diplomatic pronounce-
ments, and with the US accepting to a much
greater degree the equality of the two states
than in the past, the values and interests
that the two parties bring to a negotiating
table today are more consonant than at
any time since I­ndia’s Independence.
In all of these critical relationships,
a­ttributes of “soft power” can play varying
roles but, as Nye himself has stressed in
e­spousing, as of 2004, the concept of
“smart power” (involving elements of both
soft and hard power), soft power alone
cannot achieve much in an often-contentious
world. And no amount of cultural promo-
tion can undo the damage internationally
caused by spectacular corruption scandals
such as the alleged 2G spectrum scam cur-
rently under investigation (Malone 2011).
Conflicting Impulses
In deciding how to project its values inter-
nationally, India has, to date, exhibited
a rather clear path. On democracy, it
september 3, 2011  vol xlvi no 36  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly
a­dvertises its own credentials when relat-
ing to other democratic countries, and
joins in multilateral activity centred on
democracy, for example, as an early con-
tributor of $10 million to the United
N­ations Democracy Fund (UNDEF).6 In
a­ddition, India has supported a role for
the Commonwealth (under the “Harare
Declaration” of 1991) in restoring or im-
proving democracy in countries experi-
encing internal challenges – for example,
Cameroon and Fiji.7 But, unlike western
demo­cracies, it avoids promoting democ-
racy publicly vis-à-vis patently undemo-
cratic regimes, for example, Myanmar.
Under attack from much of Indian civil
s­ociety and some of the media on its
a­cquiescence in Myanmar’s dictatorship, it
did recently re-establish personal contact
with Myanmar opposition leader and
N­obel Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi,
whose family had strong connections with
India and who won the Jawaharlal Nehru
Award for I­nternational Understanding in
1995.8 Overall, criticism of the political
systems of partner countries does not
come readily to Indian diplomacy, in stark
contrast to the more strident (and at times
selective) approach of western countries.
Likewise, India has subscribed to major
international human rights treaties (al-
though not to those optional protocols
that would allow its citizens to appeal at
the international level when domestic
a­venues for redress prove fruitless). And
India, much to its credit, volunteered to be
amongst the first to undergo a peer review
at the UN’s new Human Rights Council in
Geneva in April 2008, under a process
known as Universal Periodic Review. As
with any country, India’s performance
u­nder the terms of various UN treaties and
covenants raises questions, but, by and
large, both official expert bodies consulted
and national delegations have praised
I­ndia’s struggle to enshrine and respect a
number of key human rights, while raising
questions about a number of specific
i­ssues, including caste discrimination and
the Armed Forces Special Powers Act
(AFSPA).9 In addition, restrictions on for-
eign funding to Indian non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) were mentioned as
inhibiting research into and activism
on certain politically sensitive problems
within India, including application of the

AFSPA. A close reading of the proceedings
of this periodic review suggests that
I­ndian delegates were only too happy to
lap up praise for the many positive fea-
tures of India’s struggle for human rights
but less inclined to answer, with any
d­egree of specificity, some of the sharper
questions that arose, as pointed out by
some Indian civil society groups (Forum-
Asia 2008).
In sum, India has integrated both
d­emocracy promotion and human rights
performance into its foreign policy, but
carefully chooses form, forum and mes-
sages on these topics, seeking to insulate
bilateral relationships from them as much
as possible.
Conclusions: Public Diplomacy
or Soft Power?
The discussion here suggests that Indian
approaches to developing and projecting
its soft power have focused mostly on the
power of attraction exercised by its cultural
riches and heritage, as well as carefully
considered promotion of human rights and
democratic development at the multilateral
level, while eschewing the i­ntroduction
of the promotion of Indian values into bi­
lateral relationships with countries pos-
sessing different political systems. And
while civil society and the media at times
criticise this latter characteristic of Indian
foreign policy, notably with respect to
M­yanmar, in the political circles of New
Delhi it seems widely accepted.
India could make more of its soft power
attributes, as argued by Shashi Tharoor
and others, but it would do so at a cost in
some sensitive and important bilateral
r­elationships (for example, Iran and
M­yanmar). It is not clear that a country
only recently successful in hoisting itself to
the high table of global influence has had
much of an interest in doing so. But India
can and should open itself more readily to
outside scrutiny by researchers and others.
Indeed, it has every interest in doing so.
Were India’s achievements and remain-
ing problems better understood inter­
nationally, including, for example, the
real if incomplete progress made in com-
bating caste discrimination, the country’s
image would be even more positive than it
already is. Further, as India’s civil society
and media already lay bare all of the
Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   september 3, 2011  vol xlvi no 36
d­eficits of Indian governance and society,
what possible benefit is there to be derived
from excessive defensiveness abroad? It is
the inclusiveness of India’s politics and the
dynamism, pluralism and fractiousness
of its public that largely make India so
a­ttractive at the international level.
As India grows more self-confident
i­nternationally, this defensiveness of the
government (particularly the government
bureaucracy) may fade with the realisa-
tion that, whether official India likes it or
not, information on India, warts and all, is
fully accessible today by the rest of the
world. And the world, accessing India in
full, tends to admire what it sees more
than it deplores the country’s short­
comings. In this sense, a more inclusive
and wide-ranging public diplomacy would
doubtless serve India even better than
does its current approach.
Notes
1 See www2.ihis.aau.dk/political-economy/NYE.
doc. Nye eventually coined the term “smart
p­ower”, combining elements of attraction, incen-
tives and the possibility of coercive measures, in
the run-up to the 2008 US presidential election,
which received a degree of media play in US me-
dia and Democratic Party circles, but which has,
so far, failed to take root.
2 Correspondence with the author, 6 April 2010.
3 For an excellent analysis see Rahman (2010).
4 See “Chairs” and “Scholarships” on the ICCR
website (www.iccrindia.org/chairs.htm). Outside
south-east Asia, growing cooperation on education
is taking place through exchanges and rec­ruitment
of Indian students in South Korea, New Zealand,
Singapore, and, particularly, Australia.
5 India has achieved lastingly positive links with
only two of its neighbours: Bhutan and the
M­aldives, hardly the most significant of the lot.
6 UNDEF Donor Contributions Table: 2005-11 avail-
able at: http://www.un.org/democracyfund/Do-
nors/donors_index.html.
7 The Commonwealth’s current secretary-general
is Kamalesh Sharma of India, who earlier served
as special representative of the UN Secretary-
General in east Timor during crucial years of that
young country’s state-building efforts. For infor-
mation on the Commonwealth Secretariat, see:
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/.
8 Ministry of External Affair’s foreign secretary,
Nirupama Rao, met Aung San Suu Kyi on 20 June
2011 during a high level delegation visit led by
external affairs minister S M Krishna. See I­ndian
media coverage: http://www.thefinancialex-
press-bd.com/more.php?news_
id=140371&date=2011-06-24
9 See UN Document A/HRC/8/26 of 23 May 2008.
Discussion of caste discrimination in India is of-
ten raised under the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, which suggests a profound mischaracterisa-
tion of the phenomenon, and makes it easy for the
Indian government to bat away related questions
and criticism. The appreciation of 37 human
rights-related NGOs and independent research
bodies was less complimentary than that of gov-
ernments and UN bodies. See UN document A/
HRC/WG.6/1/IND/3 of 6 March 2008.
PERSPECTIVES
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39
 String of Pearls
The String of Pearls is a geopolitical theory on potential Chinese government intentions in the Indian
Ocean region (IOR). It refers to the network of Chinese military and commercial facilities and
relationships along its sea lines of communication, which extend from the Chinese mainland to
Port Sudan in the Horn of Africa. The sea lines run through several major maritime choke points such
as the Strait of Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Lombok Strait as well as
other strategic maritime centres in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Maldives, and Somalia.

The term as a geopolitical concept was first used in an internal US Department of Defense report,
"Energy Futures in Asia" in 2005.

Such a system would encircle India and threaten its power projection, trade, and potentially
territorial integrity. China's support for India's traditional enemy of Pakistan and its Gwadar Port is
viewed as a threat, compounded by fears that China may develop an overseas naval military base in
Gwadar, which could allow China to conduct expeditionary warfare in the IOR. From the east, the
deep-water port of Kyaukpyu is also viewed with a similar concern.

The emergence of the String of Pearls is indicative of China's growing geopolitical influence through
concerted efforts to increase access to ports and airfields, expand and modernise military forces, and
foster stronger diplomatic relationships with trading partners. The Chinese government insists that
China's burgeoning naval strategy is entirely peaceful and is only for the protection of regional trade
interests.

However, a 2013 analysis by The Economist found the Chinese moves to

be commercial in nature. Although it has been claimed that China's
actions are creating a security dilemma between China and India in the
Indian Ocean, that has been questioned by some analysts, who point to
China's fundamental strategic vulnerabilities

In ‘The Costliest Pearl: China’s Struggle for India’s Ocean’, author Bertil
Lintner asserts that China is purposefully making itself an “Indian Ocean
power”, and stealing a march over India, as well as over other Indian
Ocean powers like the U.S., the U.K. and France with investments and
maritime strength in Djibouti, Mauritius, Seychelles, the Maldives,
Myanmar and Christmas Island near Indonesia.

China has employed a combination of hard military tactics, political patronage, and an ever-widening
list of economic dependents to gain a foothold in South Asia, progressing relatively unchecked in this
quest. India, the traditional South Asian naval power, has been unable to match China on both
strategic and economic support to countries in the region.
India needs more foreign investment, technology transfers and political support if it is to be able to
challenge China – as it will surely seek to do at some point in the future, given their overlapping
goals.

China and India’s maritime footprint in the Indian Ocean

Strategic options for New Delhi
The concept of strategic buffer zones in the naval domain is enshrined in great power politics. In the
current era, naval powers like the United States and China have both established cushions to avoid
anti-access and area denial tactics from adversaries. The Eastern Pacific Ocean acts as a strategic
barrier against any adversarial action taken on US mainland while the South China Sea does the
same for China. India should develop a similar outlook to guard against Chinese encirclement of its
strategic space. Disregarding its longstanding policy of “strategic autonomy,” India may recognise
the benefits of partnering with non-residential maritime powers in the Indian Ocean. India needs to
shed its traditional strategic reticence and ensure the safety of its own SLOCs.

Thus, the way forward for New Delhi would be to operationalise logistical agreements with France
and the United States, in order to upgrade naval relations to gain berthing rights to Diego Garcia,
Mayotte Island, and La Réunion, and allow its own bases to be used for logistical support by the
French and American navies. Additionally, India can offer similar reciprocal berthing rights to
Australia and gain access to its naval base in Cocos Islands.

By cultivating naval cooperation with these states, New Delhi will benefit from tacit naval alliances in
the future. Furthermore, it will benefit from developing, at the very least, logistical support stations
on Assumption Island in the Seychelles and Agalega in Mauritius, building upon its already existing
listening post in northern Madagascar. Correspondingly, New Delhi can step up the use of existing
berthing rights with Duqm Port in Oman and Maputo in Mozambique.
The options for India are simple — either it acquiesces to a Chinese hierarchy in the region by
letting Beijing encroach upon its sphere of influence, or it takes a stand to preserve its strategic
space and counters China’s containment strategy by expanding its nautical reach.

Further, connecting these offshore stations with its on-shore naval commands and island-based
operating bases will allow the Indian Navy a larger operational expanse beyond its immediate
buffer zones. These logistical bases can also enhance India’s capability to establish sea-denial in the
Indian Ocean, demonstrating the breadth of Indian naval power. These moves should be
accompanied with counter-theatre presence in the Western Pacific, and diplomatic outreach to South
Asian nations that are being courted by China. A combination of these strategies might not
guarantee against Chinese influence in littoral South Asian nations, but will at least ensure that India
is not tied down by Chinese client states in its own sphere of influence.

A strategically-isolated India will not be able to balance the financial and military might of China,
and clinging onto a Cold War era non-alignment mentality might seem dynamic in the short-term,
but in the long term, New Delhi’s ability to manoeuvre shipping lanes in its own backyard could be
threatened by the Chinese.

India’s Countermeasures for China’s String of Pearls

India imports 70 per cent of its oil and gas energy requirements and depends on free access to sea
routes for its trade to ensure its continued economic development. Against the background of the
1962 war with China, as well as continued border disputes with China and Pakistan along its northern
border, India understandably feels compelled to counter China’s growing maritime influence and
safeguard its maritime interests in the Indian Ocean.

Evolving India’s Look East Policy, which was initially launched as an effort to integrate India’s
economy with South East Asian nations, is now turned into a more robust military to military
partnership with important nations in that region. Important military and strategic agreements have
been made with Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore.
India has agreed to develop Myanmar’s Sittwe port. India has also developed strategic naval
relationship with Myanmar to upgrade and train its navy which gives India an increased footprint in
the area.

India is also developing bilateral military relationships with key countries in Indian Ocean region
which include Australia, Indonesia and Gulf Cooperation Council countries. India has good relations
with IOR countries like Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles and is making efforts to strengthen these
ties further. India has aided Maldives government with several battleships and Helicopters. India is in
talks with Seychelles to create an Indian military base on one of its Islands. India already has a
military base in Madgascar which overlooks Mozambique Channel.

India has developed Chhabahar port in Iran, opening a new land sea route to Central Asian
countries by-passing Pakistan. Chhabahar give India a strategic postion since it overlooks Gulf of
Oman, a very strategic oil supply route.

India has made strategic agreements for military cooperation in the region with Japan, Australia
and USA. The four countries carry out joint military exercises in the IOR region and are known as the
‘Quad’

India has also invested a lot diplomatically in countries like Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan and Mongolia – all surrounding China.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi recast India’s Look East Policy as Act East Policy with emphasis on
developing infrastructure in the East Asian countries.
India is strengthening its cultural connect with the countries on the Indian ocean littoral based on the
basis of common history under the project names ‘Mausam’. By invoking the historical linkage, this is
India‟s attempt to remind the 39 littoral countries that there is a shared cultural heritage among us
and therefore let us not be influenced by extra-territorial powers.

The response of India to String of Pearls is well planned and timely execution of the planned strategic
initiatives would play a key role in making India’s presence in Indian Ocean a strong Leader.
Strategic importance of Taiwan
•The U.S. State Department at the time
stated that strategically no location in
the Far East, with the exception of
Singapore, occupied such a controlling
position. Taiwan’s geography tells the
story.
Situated at the edge of the South China Sea’s shipping
lanes, Taiwan is positioned 100 miles east of China. To
the south it is 200 miles from the Philippines, 700
miles from China’s Hainan Island, and 900 miles from
Vietnam and the Spratly Islands. It is linked to the
north with the Ryukyu Islands, and lies 700 miles from
Japan’s home islands
Historically, Taiwan’s pivotal location off the China coast and
between Northeast and Southeast Asia has served a variety of
strategic purposes for regional powers, both offensive and
defensive. In the contemporary era, Taiwan remains
geographically at the intersection of most of East Asia’s danger
points. (Even a conflict on the Korean Peninsula could be
impacted by operations that might be launched from Taiwan.)
 Throughout the war,
Taiwan served as the
The bombers were staging area and major
When Japan bombed launched from the island supply base that
Pearl Harbor on of Taiwan, which was sustained Japan’s armies
December 7, 1941 then under Japanese in Southeast Asia and as
military rule. the control point for all
shipping through the
Taiwan Strait.
 Current Developments

1st October, 2021, 72nd

anniversary China flew US , UK conducted First Quad summit in Announcement of
100 over fighter jets military exercises Washington AUKUS
into Taiwan’s AIDZ
Background
• Taiwan is separated from main land China by
Taiwan state. Governed independently since
1949 .
• 1st non-communist frontier against China.
• 1954 Mutual defence treaty with USA (1955-89).
• 1971 US-China rapprochement Nixon-Kissinger.
• 1971 PRC became member on UNSC.
 Political Parties in
Taiwan

Democratic
Progressive Party
KMT – For integration
(DPP) – Tsai – against
integration
US Taiwan – Policy of Strategic Ambiguity
• 1954 Mutual defence treaty
• 1979 Taiwan relations act –One China Policy
• 1972, 78, 82 US –China Communique
• 1982, 6 assurances, US acknowledge that Taiwan
is the part of China but reject the use of force
• US doesn't agree to consult China on Arm sales to
China US Aims to maintain stability
• US does not support Taiwan's independence. US in Taiwan Strait and want
gives arms to Taiwan for it’s defence. both Beijing and Taipei to
• Both Trump and Biden have emboldened Taiwan. maintain the status quo
• Biden Administration “Rock Solid Commitment to
Taiwan”.
Geo-Politics : World is
reading the Tea leaves
•US status has been dented
due to messy exit from
Afghanistan
•Aukus along with
China Dream – 2049 – unification
of Taiwan, 2019 China’s defence
white paper- China will resolutely
defeat anyone attempting to
separate Taiwan to China

maintaining one China policy

There Will Not Be a New Cold War
The Limits of U.S.-Chinese Competition
By Thomas J. Christensen

For the past few decades, Chinese scholars, pundits, and

diplomats have often falsely accused the United States of
adopting a “cold war mentality” toward China. They usually
level these accusations when Washington enhances the U.S.
military’s position in Asia or bolsters the military
capabilities of its allies and partners in East Asia.
It is true that in the post–Cold War era, the United States
and its allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific have been
engaged in a strategic competition in the military sphere
with China, which has been modernizing its forces and
increasing their power projection capabilities. Thus far, the
United States has successfully deterred mainland China
from settling its many sovereignty disputes in the East
China Sea, in the South China Sea, and across the Taiwan
Strait through the use of force. It is also true that the United
States and its closest allies have banned the sale of weapons
and have tried to limit the transfer of certain military
technologies to China.
Until very recently, that is as far as a cold war analogy could
fly. The United States’ Cold War containment of the Soviet
Union and its allies in the 1950s and 1960s was a full-
spectrum effort that went beyond the military realm. That
effort was designed to limit economic contact with those
countries and cripple their economies at home while
frustrating their diplomacy abroad. In stark contrast, since
the beginning of China’s reform era in 1978, no actor other
than the Chinese people themselves has done more to assist
China’s broad economic development than the United
States. Open U.S. markets for Chinese exports, large-scale
U.S. investment in Chinese industry, and hundreds of
thousands of Chinese students in American universities
were all essential to China’s fast-paced growth and
technological modernization. Moreover, the United States
has asked China to play a more active role in international
diplomacy, or, as former Deputy Secretary of State Robert
Zoellick put it, to pull its weight as a “responsible
stakeholder” on the international stage. China has answered
the invitation only in fits and starts, but Zoellick’s entreaty
belies the notion that Washington has been trying to
prevent Beijing from gaining greater international influence
for decades.
All this may now be changing as Washington’s political
circles grow more hawkish. Especially since President
Donald Trump took office in 2017, many U.S.
commentators have been predicting a new Cold War
between the United States and China. They cite as evidence
not only the intensifying military competition in the Indo-
Pacific (which is not really new) but also more novel
phenomena: the U.S.-Chinese trade war and calls for broad-
scale economic decoupling; Washington’s placement of
Huawei and many other Chinese companies and
institutions on the Commerce Department’s so-called
export control entities list and the Treasury Department’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control list, which together prevent
U.S. firms and institutions from engaging in business
activities with those Chinese entities without a license; the
December 2017 National Security Strategy lumping China
and Russia together as adversaries; and the Trump
administration’s sweeping description of China’s
international economic policies as “predatory.” COVID-19
has hardly helped the bilateral relationship. Rather than
cooperating to tackle a common problem, the United States
and China have battled over who is to blame for the
pandemic and which political system is more capable of
responding to it.
In the second half of 2020, in various speeches, government
documents, articles, and tweets, the Trump administration
basically declared a cold war on China. China’s behavior, it
argued, was designed to overthrow the existing liberal
international order and replace it with Chinese hegemony.
Trump administration officials portrayed China as an
existential threat to the United States and the basic
freedoms that Washington has traditionally defended. As
was the case with the Soviet Union, they argued, the only
credible long-term solution was for the United States to lead
a global alliance of like-minded states to weaken China
abroad and to foster fundamental political change within
China.
Critics of such a policy might say that the United States is
creating a self-fulfilling prophecy: by declaring a cold war,
Washington is unnecessarily creating one. But nothing akin
to the U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese Cold War of the 1950s
and 1960s is in the offing, regardless of what strategies the
United States itself adopts. The Cold War was a complex set
of relationships involving many countries. No single power,
no matter how mighty, can create a cold war on its own.
NOT A COLD WAR
U.S.-Chinese strategic competition, which is real and carries
dangers, lacks three essential and interrelated elements of
the United States’ Cold War with the Soviet Union and its
allies: the United States and China are not involved in a
global ideological struggle for the hearts and minds of third
parties; today’s highly globalized world is not and cannot
easily be divided into starkly separated economic blocs; and
the United States and China are not leading opposing
alliance systems such as those that fought bloody proxy
wars in the mid-twentieth century in Korea and Vietnam
and created nuclear crises in places such as Berlin and
Cuba. Without any one of these three factors, the U.S.-
Soviet Cold War would have been much less violent and
dangerous than it actually was. So although China’s rise
carries real challenges for the United States, its allies, and
its partners, the threat should not be misconstrued. The
voices calling for a cold war containment strategy toward
China misunderstand the nature of the China challenge and
therefore prescribe responses that will only weaken the
United States.
If Washington unilaterally adopts an anachronistic cold war
stance toward China, the United States will alienate allies
that are too economically dependent on China to adopt
entirely hostile policies. Although these allies share many of
Washington’s legitimate concerns about Beijing’s policies,
most U.S. allies and partners do not view China as an
existential threat to their own regimes’ survival. If President
Joe Biden maintains something akin to the Trump
administration’s cold war posture toward China, the United
States would only weaken itself by undercutting the greatest
competitive advantage the United States holds over China:
alliances and security partnerships with over 60 countries,
many of which are the most technologically advanced states
in the world. Compare this with China’s rogues’ gallery of
partners: North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, and
Zimbabwe come to mind.
One might argue that the real difference between the Cold
War and contemporary U.S.-Chinese strategic competition
is China’s limited global power in comparison to the reach
of the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s. The United
States’ lead over China in overall national power around the
world is still substantial. This, however, can provide
Americans only limited comfort. As early as 2001, I argued
that China was developing major asymmetric coercive
threats to U.S. forces and to U.S. bases in East Asia, a region
of geostrategic significance. China is much more powerful in
the region than it was then and is already much more
powerful than any single U.S. ally in Asia.
No single power, no matter how mighty, can create a cold war on its own.

The maritime disputes between China and Japan, Taiwan,

and several Southeast Asian states (including the U.S. ally
the Philippines) pose the greatest risks of involving the
United States and China in direct conflict. Fortunately, as
Oystein Tunsjo recently argued, crises and even conflicts
over such maritime disputes, though dangerous, should be
much more manageable than conventional U.S.-Soviet
conflict on land in central Europe would have been during
the Cold War. States cannot easily seize and maintain
control of maritime territory. Moreover, with the important
exception of Taiwan, disputed islands, rocks, and reefs near
China are not tempting targets for invasion.
Beyond power differentials and geography, three other
factors render contemporary U.S.-Chinese strategic
competition less dangerous than the U.S.-Soviet Cold War.
If the United States and China were both leading opposing
and economically independent alliance blocs based on
fundamentally opposing ideologies, the U.S.-Chinese
strategic competition would quickly move on to land and
could easily spread from East Asia to all corners of the
globe. Even if China were unable to project its own military
power to challenge the United States in far-flung areas of
the world, it could supply, train, and support ideologically
compatible, pro-Beijing proxies that could then attack U.S.
allies and partners in those regions. In other words, the
current regional U.S.-Chinese rivalry in East Asia could go
global. It would look much more like the Cold War, since
local conflicts between U.S. and Chinese proxies would be
backstopped by U.S. and Chinese nuclear weapons and
long-range conventional strike weapons.
Fortunately, this is all still in the realm of political science
fiction. There is little evidence that China is trying to spread
an ideology around the world or that its relations with other
countries are based on an ideological litmus test. Some
observers made a lot out of President Xi Jinping’s statement
at the 19th Party Congress in November 2017, when he
argued that China’s path could be an alternative to the so-
called Washington consensus. “The path, the theory, the
system, and the culture of socialism with Chinese
characteristics have kept developing, blazing a new trail for
other developing countries to achieve modernization. It
offers a new option for other countries and nations who
want to speed up their development while preserving their
independence,” said Xi. His statement seems aimed more at
justifying the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) form of rule
and economic policies than calling to export a “China
model” abroad.
Xi’s subsequent statements after the Party Congress
support this interpretation. The December 2017 Dialogue
with World Political Parties, hosted by Beijing, included
representatives of 300 political parties from 120 countries.
At the Dialogue, Xi denied that China was exporting an
ideological model, stating, “We do not ‘import (shuru)’
foreign models, nor do we ‘export (shuchu)’ the Chinese
model; we cannot demand other countries to reproduce
(fuzhi) the Chinese way of doing things.” This dialogue
would have been a prime occasion for Xi to evangelize the
China model. In fact, the CCP in the reform era has
consistently added the term “with Chinese characteristics”
to its description of Beijing’s brand of so-called socialism,
which relies on market pricing for growth and suffers from
much higher inequality than most avowedly capitalist
states, including the United States. It is difficult to export a
model if its own advocates say that it requires deep roots in
Chinese history and culture.
CHANGING HEARTS AND MINDS?
Beijing is authoritarian and often frighteningly repressive at
home, constructing mass “reeducation” camps in Xinjiang
and repressing Tibetans, dissident political voices,
journalists, and human rights defenders. Unlike Russia,
however, which actively attempts to undermine democracy
in eastern Europe and beyond, China seems agnostic about
other countries’ domestic structures. Instead, Beijing
appears much more concerned with those countries’
postures toward the CCP’s rule at home, Chinese
sovereignty disputes, and economic cooperation with China,
in that order of importance. A RAND report cleverly refutes
the Trump administration’s lumping together of Russia and
China: “Russia Is a Rogue, Not a Peer; China Is a Peer, Not
a Rogue.” A former Chinese diplomat stationed in Russia,
Shi Ze, summed up the difference between Moscow and
Beijing this way: “China and Russia have different attitudes.
Russia wants to break the current international
order….Russia thinks it is the victim of the current
international system, in which its economy and its society
do not develop. But China benefits from the current
international system. We want to improve and modify it,
not to break it.”
Like Moscow, though, Beijing has adopted illiberal methods
to influence opinion around the world. Laura Rosenberger,
a highly experienced U.S. government official, has argued in
these pages that Beijing has adopted Russian-style Internet
attacks to undermine confidence in democracy. Her article
focuses on examples of disinformation campaigns in Hong
Kong, but her lessons almost certainly apply to Taiwan as
well. China’s behavior in these regions that it claims as its
own, however, does not appear representative of Beijing’s
policies abroad. China’s influence operations in foreign
countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and even the
United States have also been cited as examples of
ideological revisionism. While concerning, these are
fundamentally different from the attacks on democracy in
Hong Kong and Taiwan. During the COVID-19 crisis,
Beijing’s “Wolf Warrior” diplomats and media outlets
lashed out at foreign governments and commentators that
criticized China’s initial handling of the crisis and decried
its lack of transparency and free speech. The same holds for
foreign criticism of Beijing’s repression of Uyghurs in
Xinjiang or suppression of dissent by Chinese intellectuals,
lawyers, journalists, and human rights activists. But rather
than trying to undermine those nations’ liberal
democracies, Beijing has focused its efforts on changing
those countries’ attitudes and policies toward CCP rule and
preventing governments from supporting other disputants
in Beijing’s many sovereignty disputes, including in the
Taiwan Strait.
A Stanford University Hoover Institution report is perhaps
the most prominent critique of China’s attempts to
influence foreign countries. Even this report, however,
argues that Beijing’s goals are largely meant to protect CCP
rule from external criticism, rather than to export China’s
authoritarian model abroad. China’s approach does not
target foreign democracies themselves and is a far cry from
Mao’s or Stalin’s support of communist revolution abroad.
Beijing’s attempts to gain influence are still a serious
problem for free societies, even if they are not the basis for a
new Cold War. By using money to influence elections and
media coverage and by pressuring academics and students
to adopt positions acceptable to Beijing on the topics
mentioned above, the CCP is harming important
institutions in free societies, even if it is not undermining
the foundation of liberal democracy writ large. That harm is
potentially serious enough to warrant the vigilance not only
of governments but of academic leaders and journalists.
China’s approach is a far cry from Mao’s or Stalin’s support of communist
revolution abroad.

Elizabeth Economy notes that local Chinese governments

hold classes for foreigners in government effectiveness.
Some of the pupils are academics and experts, and others
are government officials from neighboring states. China
also conducts classes in governance and economic
development in authoritarian environments such as those
in Cambodia and Sudan. This practice might come closest
to CCP authoritarian evangelism. But it would be much
more concerning and likely to create a cold war
environment if China were training pro-authoritarian
parties and groups in otherwise democratic countries about
how to seize authoritarian control of their states and
destroy democracy. This would resemble Soviet and
Chinese communist support of international communist
organizations in the early Cold War. Current Chinese
education programs seem primarily to be an effort at public
diplomacy, showing the world that the Chinese governance
model works and is legitimate despite criticism from the
United States and other democracies about China’s lack of
civil liberties and democratic elections.
Until Trump took office, the United States arguably had a
more ideologically fueled foreign policy than China. This
tendency is likely to return with the Biden administration.
The United States supported democratization and backed
pro-reform “color revolutions” in North Africa, the Middle
East, central Europe, and Central Asia. Trump, however,
largely abandoned this traditional bipartisan form of
ideological revisionism under the banner “America first.”
Trump also abandoned liberal institutional reform efforts
such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and even attacked
existing multilateral economic agreements that the United
States created, such as the World Trade Organization.
Finally, Trump seemed comfortable dealing with foreign
dictators and was as likely to criticize liberal democracies as
authoritarian states. Trump’s tenure therefore pushed the
United States and China even further from the ideological
Cold War of the 1950s and 1960s. China did not export its
ideology as it did in the Mao era, and the United States no
longer exported its own in the Trump era.
The closest thing to an ideologically driven effort by the
Trump administration in East Asia was the “Free and Open
Indo-Pacific” campaign with four of the leading regional
democracies: the United States, Japan, Australia, and India.
This so-called Quad or Security Diamond was Japanese
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s brainchild and could
hypothetically create a geographic and political arc of sorts
around China. The four countries’ security cooperation is
improving but still falls far short of a cold war–style
multilateral alliance, especially when considering the
inclusion of traditionally nonaligned India and all Quad
members’ strong economic ties with China itself. Other
important U.S. democratic allies in Asia, including South
Korea and the Philippines, seem to want nothing to do with
a multilateral security effort aimed at China, especially an
ideological one. Moreover, actual or potential U.S. regional
partners, such as postcoup Thailand and communist
Vietnam, do not qualify for an ideologically oriented
alliance and do not want to choose between the United
States and China.
ENDING THE OWN GOALS
Biden’s approach to China is appropriately rooted in
rebuilding frayed relations with U.S. allies and partners.
Many of these actors share U.S. concerns about China’s
assertive behavior abroad and its unfair economic practices
at home. The Biden administration’s focus on coalition
building is wise, but it would be a mistake to try to base
alliances and partnerships solely on shared ideology or to
press allies and partners to choose between the United
States and China.
Chinese experts are confident that Beijing can prevent an
encircling cold war alliance from forming in the Indo-
Pacific. They point out that China, not the United States, is
the biggest economic partner for many of the United States’
most important allies in the Asia-Pacific, including Japan,
South Korea, and Australia. Yang Jiemian, the brother of
China’s top diplomat Yang Jiechi, argues that a cold war
would break the transnational production chain and be too
costly for U.S. allies in Europe and Asia that negotiate with
China independently of the United States.
Despite tensions over sovereignty disputes in the South
China Sea, the ten member states of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are also economically
dependent on China. Chinese analysts recognize that these
states are poor candidates for a U.S.-led, anti-China
coalition. Experts also note that Japan and South Korea are
suspicious of each other. These tensions are aggravated by
the bitter history of Japanese imperialism in East Asia and
also by how contemporary political actors have
manipulated, hidden, and resurrected those historical
memories for electoral political advantage.
In Beijing, May 2012

Shannon Stapleton / Reuters

The Trump administration created two new sources of
friction with allies: trade disputes initiated by the United
States against its longtime allies—Japan, Korea, and the
European Union; and particularly contentious and often
public disputes regarding burden sharing within U.S.
alliances. In the case of Japan, U.S. tariffs on both China
and Japan in 2018 led to a significant warming of Japanese-
Chinese relations. U.S. tariffs on Japan hurt Tokyo’s
interests, as did the Trump administration’s withdrawal
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. What is less widely
recognized, though, is that Japanese companies, like
American ones, have been hurt by U.S. tariffs on China
because so many Japanese and American firms finish their
manufacturing in China or sell parts into supply chains that
have China as their endpoint and the United States as a
major target market. In October 2018, Abe was the first
Japanese prime minister to travel to China in several years.
Overall diplomatic and economic relations between the two
most powerful countries in Asia seem to be warming. What
holds for Japan also holds for Korea, which saw a drop in its
exports of semiconductors, a key Korean industry, after the
U.S.-Chinese trade conflict began.
The Biden team recognizes that alliances and partnerships
are the United States’ greatest strength in competition with
China. Avoiding the Trump administration’s own goals of
weakening those relationships would be wise and should
prove relatively easy. It would be a mistake, however, for
Washington to assume that U.S. partners and allies want to
side with the United States against China on many issues or
that they might assist Washington in slowing Chinese
economic growth or limiting Chinese international
influence as the U.S.-led alliance system did toward the
Soviets during the Cold War.
It would also be a mistake to center U.S. alliance policy or
multilateral diplomacy on an ideological struggle with
Beijing. Many important potential U.S. partners, such as
Vietnam or Thailand, are not like-minded states, and many
liberal states that are potential U.S. partners, such as India
and South Korea, do not want to base their strategic
cooperation with the United States on a zero-sum approach
toward Beijing. The same can be said for many states within
the European Union. The EU shares a number of U.S.
concerns about China’s abrasive diplomacy and
assertiveness in the decade following the financial crisis of
2008. The EU is in the process of developing ways to better
protect member states from intellectual property theft and
espionage. In a March 2019 security paper, the European
Commission even called China a “systemic rival promoting
alternative forms of governance.” But the same European
Commission strategy paper emphasized the need for
cooperation and economic integration with Beijing and
even a “strategic partnership.” And in late December 2020,
the EU concluded a broad bilateral investment treaty that
should link European economies even closer to China in the
future. This is hardly a cold war.
THE LIMITS OF CHINESE INFLUENCE
The prospect of a cold war alliance on the other side of the
U.S.-Chinese divide is even weaker. China has formal
alliance relations only with North Korea and a strong
security partnership with Pakistan. China has enjoyed
especially close relations with a few members of ASEAN,
particularly Laos and Cambodia. Still, these relations have
mostly prevented ASEAN from taking a unified position
against China in the South China Sea disputes. They haven’t
bolstered China’s ability to project power abroad or to
counter the U.S.-led alliance system in East Asia. One
possible exception is Cambodia, where China has obtained
special port rights that could facilitate a persistent Chinese
navy presence there. Even there, however, Cambodian
postcolonial nationalism has pushed back against such an
outcome.
Through China’s major Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),
launched in 2013, Beijing will likely gain special
relationships with more Asian and African states, and
Beijing’s global influence will grow accordingly. But those
special relationships are much more likely to serve Beijing
by preventing such countries from adopting policies that
counter China’s interests, not by encouraging those
countries to join an allied effort to harm the interests of the
United States and its allies. This reality can still pose
challenges for the diplomatic efforts of the United States
and its allies. For example, Greece, a NATO member,
blocked an EU human rights complaint against China after
the Chinese shipping giant COSCO invested heavily in the
Greek port of Piraeus as part of the BRI. Still, even here,
Beijing seemed to be exploiting its special relationship to
defend its political system at home, not to turn Greece into
an offensive platform against NATO’s security interests.
From the United States’ perspective, China’s most
important security relationship is with Russia, another
great power with considerable military wherewithal. That
cooperative relationship includes joint military exercises,
arms sales, and diplomatic cooperation at the United
Nations to block U.S. and allied efforts to pressure or
overthrow leaders such as Syrian President Bashar al-
Assad. But the Sino-Russian relationship does not reach the
level of a true alliance. It is hard to imagine direct Chinese
involvement in Russia’s struggles with Georgia or Ukraine
or in any future conflict in the Baltics. Similarly, it is
difficult to imagine that the Russian military would insert
itself directly in a conflict across the Taiwan Strait or other
East Asian maritime disputes. In fact, Russia sells
sophisticated weapons systems to Vietnam and India, rivals
in China’s sovereignty conflicts.
The strongest force for bringing Russia and China closer
together is their shared aversion to previous U.S.
administrations’ pursuit of regime change and so-called
color revolutions in areas ruled by repressive regimes.
China has not attempted to undermine democracies in the
way that Russia has, but it often joins Moscow in
international forums to oppose the efforts of the United
States and other liberal democracies to pressure countries
over domestic governance failures and humanitarian
crimes. Chinese-Russian cooperation on such issues has
been strongest in Syria, as the two states vetoed multiple
draft resolutions critical of the Assad regime and in
Venezuela, where the United States has called for the
overthrow of President Nicolás Maduro’s regime.
China is indeed famous for its investments in resources and
infrastructure in the most democratically deficient parts of
the world. Equally important, China exports its surveillance
technologies (such as high-resolution cameras and facial
recognition software) for profit, potentially bolstering some
of the world’s most repressive governments. Especially if
the United States jettisons “America first” and returns to its
traditional posture of fostering democracy abroad during
the Biden administration, this practice will be of serious
concern. Still, China sells such equipment to any willing
buyer, regardless of regime type, so it would be an
exaggeration to say that this export policy is designed to
spread authoritarianism and undermine democracy. China
also does significantly more business with the advanced
economies of the world, including many liberal democracies
allied or aligned with the United States in Asia and Europe.
In fact, according to the 2016 China Statistical Yearbook,
the United States and seven of its allies made up eight of
China’s top ten trading partners. Given that CCP legitimacy
at home requires economic performance, it would be
foolhardy for Beijing to alienate the advanced liberal
democracies that supply valuable inputs for Chinese
manufacturers, assist China in its technological
development, and provide final markets for manufactured
goods produced in China. Although Beijing and Russia will
continue to resist U.S. attempts to support color
revolutions, only Russia, which is much less integrated with
global production chains, will likely support the spread of
illiberal forms of government abroad.
A CAUTIONARY TALE
Globalization, interdependence, and transnational
production are, of course, two-way streets, and many
advanced economies with liberal ideologies depend on
China for their own economic well-being. China is the
largest trading partner of important U.S. allies and is also a
major target of their foreign direct investment. And while
many of these actors have been nervous about China’s turn
away from a more reassuring and moderate foreign security
and economic policy since the financial crisis of 2008, they
do not yet share Washington’s increasingly frequent
portrayal of China as a major security or ideological threat.
This is why calls to seek cold war–style decoupling from the
Chinese economy is not only unrealistic but unwise. The
United States’ network of over 60 global allies and security
partners includes many of the most advanced, high-tech
economies in the world, including Australia, France,
Germany, Israel, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and the
United Kingdom. This U.S.-led security network is what
gives the United States the power projection necessary to be
a truly global superpower. China’s lack of a similar network
limits its power projection greatly. Many U.S. partners
would likely side with the United States if a rising China
were to become aggressive and expansionist.
Chinese elites almost certainly know this. That is one of the
many reasons that a rising China has remained relatively
restrained. China has not been in a shooting conflict since
1988 and has not been in a full-scale war since 1979.
Deterrence works and is likely to continue to work under
the right set of military and diplomatic conditions. Absent
an unexpected turn by China toward aggressive military
adventures, no U.S. ally would sign on to a U.S.-led cold war
containment policy toward China. The Trump
administration itself lacked full consensus on the purpose of
policy initiatives such as the U.S.-Chinese trade war. Was
the plan to create leverage to open up the Chinese economy
further and thereby create deeper U.S.-Chinese integration?
U.S. allies who face market closure, state subsidies, and
international property rights violations might welcome this
plan. But if U.S. tariffs and other restrictions were simply
designed to slow Chinese economic growth, a position much
more akin to a cold war strategy, then the United States
would quickly lose allied support.
A consensus formed during the Trump administration,
however, that in certain high-tech areas such as 5G
communications, it would be best for the United States and
its allies to forgo deep integration with certain Chinese
providers, such as Huawei. Here, the Trump administration
had strong domestic backing in both parties for a policy that
would prevent the United States and its key security
partners from relying on Chinese systems. Moreover, the
race to set the initial standards for 5G around the world has
enormous implications for future business transactions, the
next generation of industries built on artificial intelligence
(AI), and the development of future automated weapons
systems.
Until Trump took office, the United States arguably had a more ideologically
fueled foreign policy than China.

In these limited but important sectors of the economy,

competition with China very well might look like a zero-
sum, U.S.-Chinese cold war long into the future. The high-
tech arena might resemble the military arena since the arms
embargo was created in 1989, with the United States trying
to do as much as possible to limit Chinese progress in 5G
and AI. But even the bilateral struggle between China and
the United States over 5G illustrates the low likelihood that
the world will become divided into cleanly split economic
blocs. Even though most U.S. friends and allies understand
the security risks of having a Chinese firm such as Huawei
deeply embedded in their communications infrastructure,
the United States struggled to get close allies such as the
United Kingdom and Germany on board to fully forgo the
purchase of Huawei products and services. The United
States’ ability to convince like-minded states to exclude
Chinese products would quickly decrease if U.S. efforts
expanded from boycotting a narrow set of relevant
telecommunications technologies clearly linked to national
security to boycotting a much broader set of technologies.
Any attempt simply to harm the Chinese economy or
encourage others to decouple their economies from China’s
would fail in the twenty-first century.
A similar cautionary tale could be told about the U.S.
government’s treatment of almost all Chinese foreign
economic activities, including infrastructure investment, as
“predatory,” as the 2018 National Defense Strategy
summary stated. Such a sweeping condemnation rings
hollow in East Asia, Central Asia, and South Asia, where the
World Bank has identified more significant infrastructure
needs than can be fulfilled even by the massive Belt and
Road Initiative. Rather than complaining about Chinese
loans, the United States and its allies should be competing
with China in economic diplomacy. The Trump
administration was wise to create and secure congressional
funding (through the BUILD Act) for the $60 billion
International Development Finance Corporation. By
portraying U.S. money as good and all Chinese money as
predatory, however, the United States risks competing
poorly with China in that arena. Most countries will still
welcome Chinese investments and expansive know-how in
infrastructure construction and do not appreciate being
labeled dupes by the United States.
Similarly, Washington argues that China is practicing “debt
trap” diplomacy by creating unsustainable levels of debt in
target countries. That claim, though, is likely to fall on deaf
ears in Asia. The sole major example of a direct debt-equity
swap was for a 99-year Chinese lease on the Sri Lankan port
of Hambantota. This remains the exception rather than the
rule. Even in that case, it is doubtful that Beijing’s initial
efforts were primarily designed to create debt distress that
could be exploited later. Moreover, unless someone is
willing to fund new projects through outright grants rather
than loans—and neither EU states nor the United States
seem willing to do so—any new projects are going to involve
an increase in the target country’s overall debt, regardless of
the source of the new loans. And since market incentives
alone are not drawing European and U.S. banks to invest in
Asian infrastructure, China is often the only game in town.
The United States’ closest Asian ally, Japan, understands
this reality better than the United States. Japan has not only
stepped up its own infrastructure aid and investment in
Asia but also expressed a willingness to partner with
China’s BRI efforts in places such as India.
WHAT TO WATCH FOR
China’s vital position in the global production chain and the
lack of struggle for ideological supremacy between
authoritarianism and liberal democracy mean that the rise
of a new Cold War is unlikely. Two factors would need to
change to produce something akin to the U.S.-Soviet Cold
War. If China were to start a conscious campaign to bolster
authoritarianism and undermine democracies around the
world, then U.S. and Chinese allies would quickly begin
butting up against each other. If Beijing were to swap out
parts of the global production chain with Chinese rather
than foreign producers and rely less on global markets, then
China might be more willing to accept the cost of an
ideological struggle. Such an outcome could also occur if
countries other than China overreact to the lessons of the
COVID-19 pandemic and fall prey to an antiglobalization
nationalism that reverses the global economic trends tying
China and every other major economy into the
transnational production chain.
The United States and its many international partners
should also be studying the results of Beijing’s recent so-
called dual circulation economic model. At least
rhetorically, this approach aims to privilege domestic
consumption and manufacturing over international
linkages, although it clearly leaves significant room for the
latter as well. Running in the other direction is China’s
recent greater opening of its financial sector to U.S.
investment banks and the December 2020 PRC-EU
Bilateral Investment Treaty.
If policymakers and scholars are concerned about a new
Cold War, they should study China’s integration with and
decoupling from a highly globalized economy. They should
also study developments in Chinese foreign policy toward
international conflicts and civil wars in which liberal
political forces are pitted against authoritarian ones. Until
China breaks sharply from its recent past on both scores, a
U.S.-Chinese cold war will not occur.
Link of the Article :
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-
states/2021-03-24/there-will-not-be-new-cold-war
UKRAINE
Unresolved conflict in Ukraine b/w
Russia and USA in Donbas region
represent by far the greatest danger of
a new war in Europe and by far the
greatest risk of new crisis b/w USA and
Russia Anatol Lieven
CURRENT SCENARIO:-
• Russia has deployed 100 ,000 troops .

Ukrainian American and European are

alarmed

Germany has stopped the construction of

a gas pipeline from Russia.

The head of CIA has raised issue with the

Putin directly.

US Secretary of state Blinken has shot

strongly worded statements .
BACKGROUND
1. Protests erupted in Kiev in Nov 2013 against Ukrainians
President Viktor Yanukoyych who rejected a deal for
greater economic integration with EU .He was compelled
to fled the country in feb 2014.
2. In March 2014, Russian troops took control of Ukraine’s
Crimean region.
3. In May 2014, Pro Russian separatists in Donetsk and
Luhansk held referendum to declare the independence
from Ukraine.
4. Since then crisis has escalated involving US and E.U, at
odds with Russia.
5. Even a Malaysian Airline plane was shot over Ukrainian
Air space killing 298 passengers on board allegedly due
to Russian built Surface to Air missile.
2015 Minsk Accords:-

France Germany Russia Ukraine

• Ceasefire
• With drawl of heavy weaponry
• Full Ukrainians Govt Control on conflict zone
OUTCOME OF THE ACCORD:-Unsuccessful
• 2016 NATO announced deployment of 4 battalions
• Ukraine has been targetted with Cyber attack
• Russia mobilising forces towards the border in Marc-Apr 2021
and again in Nov 2021
Sticking point
• Russia want broad autonomy for the separatist regions .
• Ukraine want First control .
GEO POLITICS OF UKRAINE:- Taliban victory
creates new dynamics.
• American defeat in Afghanistan may lead Russia and china
to act more recklessly
• Humiliated Biden , to recover prestige may respond
recklessly.
• Full scale war may have potential to escalate into nuclear
war.
• Even a limited war can ruin global economy.
• China may seize opportunity to conquer Taiwan
• US may suffer two front war.
• Russia has superiority of Armed forces over Ukraine, US has
limited forces in Europe, Europeans are not willing to
confront Russia militarily hence chances of Russia is high
and humiliation of USA is big possibility.
PUTIN :My passion with kiev is running out.

Putin is unhappy about :-

• Increased US Military aid to kiev
• Deployment of Turkish Drones in Ukraine
• NATO Warship patrolling in Black sea.
Syllabus topics:
United Nations : Envisaged role and actual record; Specialized UN agencies—aims and
functioning; need for UN reforms.

United Nations(UN)

Quotes on UN
"The UN was not created to take mankind to heaven, but to save
humanity from hell." Former United Nations Secretary-General Dag
Hammarskjöld, in a speech on May 1954.

“UN is the creation of member states and is therefore malleable to their wishes. It will
succeed , if they wish ,otherwise it will become the relic of the past” – Harry S Truman

“UN is the mirror of our society. It cannot be more successful than we want . It is not UN’s
failure . It is our failure.”

About UN
The United Nations (UN) is an international organization founded in 1945. It is currently
made up of 193 Member States.

Article 1 of the 1 UN Charter talks about the purposes of the United Nations. They are:
1. maintaining international peace and security,
2. developing friendly relations among nations,
3. achieving international cooperation in solving international problems and
4. harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

A Brief History of UN :
In 1899, the International Peace Conference was held in The Hague to elaborate
instruments for settling crises peacefully, preventing wars and codifying rules of warfare.
It adopted the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and
established the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which began work in 1902. This court was
the forerunner of UN International Court of Justice.

The forerunner of the United Nations was the League of Nations, an organization conceived
in circumstances of the First World War, and established in 1919 under the Treaty of
Versailles "to promote international cooperation and to achieve peace and security."
The International Labour Organization (ILO) was also created in 1919
under the Treaty of Versailles as an affiliated agency of the League.

In August 1941, American president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British

prime minister Winston Churchill issued a statement that came to be
called the Atlantic Charter.
The United States joined the war in December 1941, and for the first time
the term ‘United Nations’ was coined by President Roosevelt to identify
those countries which were allied against the axis powers.

The United Nations finally came into existence on October 24, 1945 after
being ratified by 51 nations, which included five permanent members
(France, the Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the UK and the US) and 46
other signatories.

The first meeting of the General Assembly took place on January 10, 1946.

Article 2 talks about the principles of the United Nations. These principles are:
1. Principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from
membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance
with the present Charter.
3. To settle international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state
5. Not assisting any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or
enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations
act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance
of international peace and security.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state; but this
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.
The main organs of the UN are There are 17 Specialized Agencies:
1. the General Assembly,
1. FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of
2. the Security Council,
the United Nations
3. the Economic and Social Council,
2. ICAO: International Civil Aviation
4. the Trusteeship Council, Organization
5. the International Court of Justice, 3. IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural
6. the UN Secretariat. Development
4. ILO: International Labour Organization
MAIN COMMITTEES 5. IMF: International Monetary Fund
1. First Committee (Disarmament & 6. IMO: International Maritime Organization
International Security) 7. ITU: International Telecommunication
2. Second Committee (Economic & Financial) Union
8. UNESCO: United Nations Educational,
3. Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian &
Scientific and Cultural Organization
Cultural) 9. UNIDO: United Nations Industrial
4. Fourth Committee (Special Political & Development Organization
Decolonization) 10. UNWTO: World Tourism Organization
5. Fifth Committee (Administrative & 11. UPU: Universal Postal Union
Budgetary) 12. WHO: World Health Organization
6. Sixth Committee (Legal) 13. WIPO: World Intellectual Property
Organization
14. WMO: World Meteorological Organization
15. World Bank Group
a. IBRD: International Bank for
Achievements in the last 75 years Reconstruction and Development
 UN Peacekeeping operations - U.N. b. IDA: International Development
peacekeepers have, since 1945, undertaken Association
over 60 field missions and negotiated over c. IFC: International Finance
170 peaceful settlements that ended Corporation
regional conflicts. At present, peacekeepers are in 20 hot spots around the world.
 Decolonisation - Worked for ending Colonial rule in about Eighty nations mainly
from Asia and Africa.
 Human Rights - The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights empowered the
U.N. to act as custodian for the protection of human rights.
 Work of UN specialised agencies –
They have made significant difference in almost all aspects of human life, including
education, health, poverty reduction, the rights of women and children, and climate
change.
o UN’s World Food Programme, Food and Agriculture Organisation has helped
improving nutritional security.
o UNESCO has been instrumental in protecting the world’s most important
natural and historic places.
o WHO - In 1948, it created the World Health Organisation (WHO) to deal with
communicable diseases like smallpox, malaria, HIV.
 In 2002, the UN established the UN criminal court to try those who have committed
war crimes, genocide, and other atrocities.
 Nuclear proliferation - UN passed a resolution to commit to the elimination of
nuclear weapons in 1946. Countries like South Africa, Kazakhstan have committed to
 ending nuclear weapon research programmes and submit to inspections by the UN
International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA).
 Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals - The U.N. has
made progress with its eight MDGs followed by 17 SDGs to enhance social,
environmental and economic progress by 2030.
 Refugee Rehabilitation - In 1950, the UN created the High Commissioner for
Refugees to take care of the millions who had been displaced due to World War II.
 Environment - In 1972, the UN environment programme was created. Paris Climate
Deal under UNFCCC.

Some instances of failures:

In 1970, when the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), all five superpowers owned
nuclear weapons and several countries – North Korea, Israel, Pakistan, and India –
developed nuclear weapons.

UN failed to resolve the disputes during cold war era like Vietnam crisis or Cuban missile
crisis incident.

Israeli occupation (1948-Now)

Ever since the creation of the Jewish state in 1948, Palestinians have been fighting against
Israel’s ethnic cleansing of Palestinians . Today Israel controls 85 percent of historic
Palestine. It also imposes a crippling blockade on Gaza and continues its construction of
illegal settlements on occupied lands in defiance of several UN resolutions.

The United States has also used its veto power several times to counter UN Security Council
resolutions that have condemned Israel’s use of force against Palestinian civilians.

Kashmir dispute (1948-Now) -

Cambodia violence (1975-1979)

After the end of the US-Vietnam War and the Cambodian civil war in 1975, the Khmer Rouge
regime took control of Cambodia turning it into a socialist country, by using the policy of
ultra-Maoism. The regime carried out genocide between 1975-1979, killing nearly 25 percent
of the country.

Somali civil war (1991-Now)

Since the ouster of dictator Mohamed Siad Barre by the Somali Rebellion in 1991, the
decades-long civil war has raged between rival clans in the country.

The UN peacekeeping mission, UNOSOM, which was set up in December 1992 to facilitate
humanitarian aid to people trapped by civil war and famine, has since failed because of the
lack of government to communicate with and repeated attacks against UN officers.
Rwandan civil war (1994):
The civil war between the Rwandan Armed Forces and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) began in 1990 and lasted until 1994. UNPK mission failed.

Darfur conflict in Sudan (2003-Now)

Some 200,000 people have been killed .

Iraq invasion (2003-2011)

More than one million Iraqis have died as a result of the conflict in their country since the US-
led invasion in 2003.
The intervention and regime change sought by the US left Iraq with civil and economic
instability, and vulnerable to terrorism by Daesh in the coming years.

UN Resolution 1483 attempted to legitimise the invasion that was carried out under the false
assertion by the US and the UK that the Saddam regime was in possession of Weapons of
Mass Destruction.

Syrian civil war (2011-Now):

The Syrian regime launched a brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters who took to the
streets in March 2011, with its leader Bashar al Assad saying he would “relentlessly fight
terrorist groups”— referring to the pro-democracy protesters.

The UN Security Council tried to pass several resolutions to address the conflict, but Russia
utilised its veto power at least a dozen times to protect its ally, Assad.

Yemen civil war (2014-Now)

The war in Yemen, which began in 2014, between forces loyal to the internationally-
accepted government of President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi backed by Saudi Arabia and
Iranian-backed Houthis has turned more violent after a Saudi-led international coalition
started operations against Houthis in March 2015.

The UN has failed to send humanitarian aid, food and drugs to civilians amid a blockade
imposed on the war-torn country.

Rohingya Crisis, Myanmar (2017-Now)

Myanmar launched a major military crackdown on the Muslim ethnic minority.

China stood behind Myanmar on the Rohingya crisis by blocking efforts for the Rohingya in
the UN Security Council.

Challenges ahead:
 1. Peace and Security issues - Conflict between states,violence and massive human
rights violations within states, terrorism threats from organized crime and the
proliferation of weapons - particularly WMD, but also conventional
2. Terrorism: Nations that support groups that are widely linked to terrorism, such as
Pakistan, are not held accountable . To this date, the UN still does not have a clear
definition of terrorism (CCIT)
3. Nuclear Proliferation: In 1970, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty was signed by
190 nations. Despite this treaty, nuclear stockpiles remain high, and numerous
nations continue to develop these devastating weapons.
4. Non-Conventional Challenges -
a. Climate Change
b. Growing population: The world population is projected to increase by more
than one billion people within the next 15 years, reaching 8.5 billion in 2030,
and to increase further to 9.7 billion in 2050 and 11.2 billion by 2100 
unsustainable levels.
c. Population Ageing
d. Refugee crisis: 65.6 million people around the world have been forced from
home by conflict and persecution. They have been denied a nationality and
access to basic rights such as education, healthcare, employment and
freedom of movement.
e. UN needs to strengthen its expertise in areas such as ocean health, renewable
energy systems, urban design, disease control, technological innovation,
public-private partnerships, and peaceful cultural cooperation.

Moreover, the current pandemic situation has put additional stress on the concept of
multilateralism in general and on UN in particular. Shashi Tharoor rightly notes that,
“COVID-19 has revealed a world of nation-states locked into a destructive zero-sum
contest”. This is evident from the legitimacy crisis being faced by the WHO , one of the
specialised agencies of UN.

Reforms Required
In an interview to The Guardian (2015), former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that
the Security Council must either reform or risk becoming increasingly irrelevant: “If we don’t
change the council, we risk a situation where the primacy of the council may be
challenged by some of the new emerging countries.”

The former United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, in 1954, “The aim of UN
was not to take mankind to heaven, but to save humanity from hell.

However, even this modest objective requires timely reforms within the institution to help
it overcome element of obsoleteness .
What kind of reforms is needed?

Reform in UN Charter
a. Article 2(7) of the UN charter doesn’t permit UN
intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign
states. However, post cold war period require
greater intervention in domestic affairs. UN
intervenes on the basis of UNGA resolution based
on ‘responsibility to protect’.
b. U.N. Charter's anachronistic enemy state clauses
- The “enemy state” clauses still exist in the
Charter and spell out discriminatory
arrangements against the former enemy states of
World War II.
Article 53 provides that “no enforcement action
shall be taken under regional arrangements or by
regional agencies without the authorization of
the Security Council, with the exception of
measures against any enemy state,” thus
allowing, theoretically at least, enforcement action to be taken without the council’s
authorization in the event that the former enemy states challenge international peace
and security.
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P or RtoP) is a
global political commitment which was
endorsed by all member states of the United
Nations at the 2005 World Summit in order to
address its four key concerns to prevent
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity.
The principle of the Responsibility to Protect is
based upon the underlying premise that
sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect
all populations from mass atrocity crimes and
human rights violations.
The authority to employ the use of force under
the framework of the Responsibility to Protect
rests with United Nations Security Council and
is considered a measure of last resort.

Article 107 justifies action taken by the Allied powers against the former WWII enemy
states
Article 77 contains reference to enemy states in relation to the U.N. trusteeship.

While it is widely believed that the enemy state clauses have become obsolete in today’s
global politics, their existence in the charter remains an embarrassment for the countries
defined as former enemy states.

It is high time the U.N. shed its image as an institution created by the victorious Allied
powers and become an organization ensuring a level playing field for all member states
and their peoples in both name and substance.

Why is this problematic?

These states are respected member of the U.N. . For example – Japan pays nearly 10
percent of its regular budget and has been elected as a non-permanent member of the
Security Council for 11 times.
 Russia, for example, has cited in the past Article 107, in addition to the Yalta Treaty of
1945, to justify its territorial claims over the disputed islands off Hokkaido seized by
Soviet troops at the end of WWII.

Japan, together with other former Axis powers, demanded the removal of the enemy
state clauses in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War. - Their efforts resulted in
a General Assembly resolution adopted during the 50th anniversary session in 1995, in
which the U.N. expressed “its intention to initiate the procedure … to amend the Charter,
with prospective effect, by the deletion of the ‘enemy State’ clauses from Articles 53, 77
and 107 at its earliest appropriate future session.”

The enemy state clauses, however, remained unchanged today because the revision of
the U.N. Charter, which is an international treaty, requires cumbersome procedures:
1. It must be adopted with a two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly
2. Ratified by two thirds of the U.N. members, including all of the five permanent
members of the Security Council.

P5 members fear that the removal of the enemy state clauses might prompt a host of
demands for more controversial revisions of the charter, including an expansion in the
number of permanent members on the Security Council.

Others think that removal of the enemy state can wait until agreement on more
substantive issues, such as reform of the Security Council, is reached.

3. Structural Reforms –
a. UNGA needs greater role and further powers as UNSC remains paralyzed due to
veto power, it has been suggested that UNGA should be given power to override
veto by special majority. India’s former representative to the UN, Hardeep Puri in
his book ‘Perilous interventions: The Security Council and politics of Chaos’, has
mentioned about the internal chaos in the decision making.
b. UNSC too requires reforms in following domains:
i. Transparency in functioning of UNSC
ii. Veto Reforms – Veto power has effectively disabled the UN and except for
some exceptional circumstances (Korea & Gulf war), building consensus
among P5 countries, for the purpose of collective security has become
next to impossible.
What should be done?
1. Abolish veto outrightly.
2. Restrict the use of veto powers—Veto power should be used only when its
non-use can severely affect a country’s core national interest.
3. Give overriding power to UNGA.

Any reform of the veto will be very difficult: Articles 108 and 109 of the United
Nations Charter grant the P5 (5 permanent members) veto over any amendments to
 the Charter, requiring them to approve of any modifications to the UNSC veto power
that they themselves hold.

4. Membership Reforms in UNSC:

Responsibilities and powers of the UNSC

If there is a security crisis anywhere in the world, the matter is brought before the
UNSC and they try to reach an agreement either through mediation, appointing
special envoys, dispatching a UN Mission or requesting the UN Secretary-General
to settle the dispute.

If the matter escalates, ceasefire directives are issued and peacekeeping forces and
military observers dispatched.

Furthermore, if the circumstances are very dire then sanctions and financial
penalties are imposed, arms embargoed, and travel bans can also be issued.

To “ensure prompt and effective action” the Council was created as a strictly limited
membership body.

The current membership of UNSC reflect post-WWII structure. It doesn’t actually

reflect the changes that have occurred in the international system after the end of
the cold war. Emerging nations like India, Brazil, South Africa etc needs
representation in the UNSC as permanent members.The existing membership reflects
a regional imbalance, with no representation from Africa or Latin America and
Europe being over-represented in the council.

In 1965, the membership of the Security Council was expanded from 11 to 15 to

include 4 non-permanent members.

United Nations adopted a consensus resolution in its 69th General Assembly on

September 14, 2015 to move from Inter-Governmental Negotiations (IGN) to a Text-
Based Negotiations (TBN) process for reforming the United Nations Security Council.

G4
It comprises of Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan which support each
other's bids for permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council.

However, the G4's bids are often opposed by the Uniting for Consensus
movement.

Uniting for Consensus (UFC)

 It is a movement, nicknamed the Coffee Club, that developed in the 1990s
in opposition to the possible expansion of permanent seats in the United
Nations Security Council.

The prime movers of the club include Italy, Spain, Australia, Canada, South
Korea, Argentina and Pakistan. While Italy and Spain are opposed to
Germany's bid for Security Council's permanent membership, Pakistan is
opposed to India's bid.

Similarly, Argentina is against Brazil's bid and Australia opposes Japan's.

Canada and South Korea are opposed to developing countries, often
dependent on their aid, wielding more power than them at the UN.

China(not a member of UFC) too, has been dismissive of the G4 particularly

against three of its members for differing reasons — India and Japan
considering their historically difficult relations with China, and Germany
because it is not a developing country.

African Union (“Ezulwini Consensus”) supports an extended SC of 26 members. Africa

will receive 2 permanent seats, accompanied by the right to veto and 2 non-
permanent seats.

5. Strengthening the Financial Resources: All 193 member states are meant to
contribute annual funds for UN general operations, calculated based on the size of
each country and its economy.For 2019, net contributions were set at 2.85 billion U.S.
dollars, with the U.S. asked to pay 674.2 million U.S. dollars. It should be paid in full
within 30 days. However, only a few dozen countries ever comply in time. Added to
this is the backlog of unpaid annual dues from previous years.The Trump
administration has already quit the UN's education and culture body UNESCO, citing
"mounting arrears" as well as anti-Israel bias in the organisation and a need for
fundamental reform. He has also cut support to the UN program for Palestinian
refugees UNRWA, decided to block funding to WHO, and to the UN Population Fund
(UNFPA) over abortions.
6. Reforms in UN Programmes - Jeffrey D. Sachs in his study presented at World
Economic Forum suggests : Some UN programs should be merged or closed, while
other new SDG-related UN programs should be created.
7. UN Peacekeeping requires reforms - In recent years, these missions have been
deployed to increasingly difficult and complex environments. Even as demand for
peacekeeping has increased, core business processes of the UN have not kept up with
these demands. Threats to peace in places such as Syria and Yemen indicate new and
complex challenges. UNPK missions suffer with issues like slow, unresponsive service
delivery;micro-management by governing bodies; trust deficit with Member States
 and with staff; inadequate resourcing of and ineffective implementation of
mandates, and lack of transparency and accountability.

The landmark Brahimi report of 2000 put forth renewed vision for UN Peacekeeping
by making peace keeping stronger, more effective and comparatively cost efficient.
The report called for renewed political commitment on the part of Member States;
Significant institutional change; Increased financial support.

In 2017, Secretary-General António Guterres also proposed reforms in the United

Nations peace and security architecture.

There is a need to shift towards the primary agency for sustaining peace from
international to the national and local level. All the functional areas of the UN can
beleveraged to generate sustaining peace outcomes and broadens the institutional
responsibility for peace .
Conclusion:
UN , with all its flaws, has been the most important platform for dialogue. The UNGA has
given equal voice to all countries , big and small . However, as Former EAM Shushma Swaraj
said , if UN is unwilling to accept the reform, it will erode its own legitimacy and will meet
the fate of League of Nations.

Also the UN needs to ponder on what PM Modi said while speaking at U.N.’s Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) that Only reformed multilateralism with a reformed United
Nations at its center can meet the aspirations of humanity.
 United
Nations(UN)
75 years of UN
world leaders came together at a one-
day high-level meeting of the UN
General Assembly

‘’The Future We Want, the UN We

Need: Reaffirming our Collective
Commitment to Multilateralism’
•Quotes on UN
•"The UN was not created to take mankind to heaven, but to save humanity
from hell." Former United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld
•
•“UN is the creation of member states and is therefore malleable to their
wishes. It will succeed , if they wish ,otherwise it will become the relic of the
past” – Harry S Truman
•
•“UN is the mirror of our society. It cannot be more successful than we want . It
is not UN’s failure . It is our failure.” Tharoor
About UN
The United Nations (UN) is an international organization
founded in 1945. It is currently made up of 193 Member States.

Article 1 of the 1 UN Charter talks about the purposes of the

United Nations. They are:
1. maintaining international peace and security,
2. developing friendly relations among nations,
3. achieving international cooperation in solving international
problems and
4. harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of
these common ends.
The main organs of the UN are
1. the General Assembly,
2. the Security Council,
3. the Economic and Social Council,
4. the Trusteeship Council,
5. the International Court of Justice,
6. the UN Secretariat.

MAIN COMMITTEES
1. First Committee (Disarmament & International Security)
2. Second Committee (Economic & Financial)
3. Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian & Cultural)
4. Fourth Committee (Special Political & Decolonization)
5. Fifth Committee (Administrative & Budgetary)
6. Sixth Committee (Legal)
Achievements in the
last 75 years
• UN Peacekeeping operations - since 1945, over 60 field missions and
negotiated over 170 peaceful settlements -are in 20 hot spots around the
world.
• Decolonisation - About Eighty nations mainly from Asia and Africa.
• Human Rights -The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
custodian for the protection of human rights.
• Work of UN specialized agencies –
• They have made significant difference in almost all aspects of human
life, including education, health, poverty reduction, the rights of
women and children, and climate change.
• UN’s World Food Programme, Food and Agriculture Organisation has
helped improving nutritional security.  Nobel Prize 2020
• UNESCO has been instrumental in protecting the world’s most
important natural and historic places.
• WHO - In 1948, it created the World Health Organisation (WHO) to
deal with communicable diseases like smallpox, malaria, HIV.
 In 2002, the UN established the UN criminal court to try
those who have committed war crimes, genocide, and other
atrocities.
 Nuclear proliferation - UN passed a resolution to commit to
the elimination of nuclear weapons in 1946South Africa,
Kazakhstan inspections by the UN International Atomic
Energy Agency(IAEA).
 Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable
Development Goals  8 MDGs  17 SDGs social,
environmental and economic progress by 2030.
 Refugee Rehabilitation - In 1950, the UN created the High
Commissioner for Refugees to take care of the millions who
had been displaced due to World War II.
 Environment - In 1972, the UN environment programme
was created. Paris Climate Deal under UNFCCC.
Some instances of
failures:
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), five superpowers  North
Korea, Israel, Pakistan, and India

•UN failed to resolve the disputes during cold war era like Vietnam crisis or
Cuban missile crisis incident.

•Israeli occupation (1948-Now)

creation of the Jewish state in 1948 Israel’s ethnic cleansing of
Palestinians Israel controls 85 percent of historic Palestine. It also imposes
a crippling blockade on Gaza and continues its construction of illegal
settlements on occupied lands in defiance of several UN resolutions.

•Kashmir dispute (1948-Now)

Cambodia violence (1975-1979)
Somali civil war (1991-Now)
Rwandan civil war (1994):
Darfur conflict in Sudan (2003-Now)
Iraq invasion (2003-2011)
US-led invasion in 2003.
UN Resolution 1483 attempted to legitimise the invasion that was carried out under the false assertion
by the US and the UK that the Saddam regime was in possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Syrian civil war (2011-Now):

The UN Security Council tried to pass several resolutions to address the conflict, but Russia utilised its
veto power at least a dozen times to protect its ally, Assad.
Yemen civil war (2014-Now)
The UN has failed to send humanitarian aid, food and drugs to civilians amid a blockade imposed on
the war-torn country.

Rohingya Crisis, Myanmar (2017-Now)

China stood behind Myanmar on the Rohingya crisis by blocking efforts for the Rohingya in the UN
Security Council.

The International Criminal Court has been criticized for prosecuting only African leaders while not
acting against Western powers.
Challenges ahead
 1. Peace and Security issues - Conflict between states,violence
and massive human rights violations,organized crime and the
proliferation of weapons - particularly WMD, but also
conventional
2. Terrorism: Pakistan- China  India proposed a draft
Conventional document on the Comprehensive Convention on International
Terrorism (CCIT) at the UN in 1986
Challenges 3. Nuclear Proliferation: In 1970, the nuclear non-proliferation
treaty was signed by 190 nations. Despite this treaty, nuclear
stockpiles remain high, and numerous nations continue to
develop these devastating weapons.
 a. Climate Change
b. Growing population: 11.2 billion by 2100 unsustainable
levels.
c. Population Ageing
d. Refugee crisis: 65.6 million  denied a nationality and access
to basic rights such as education, healthcare, employment and
Non - freedom of movement.

Conventional e. Ocean health, renewable energy systems, urban design, disease

control, technological innovation, public-private partnerships,
Challenges and peaceful cultural cooperation.
f. Current pandemic  additional stress on the concept of
multilateralism in general and on UN in particular. Shashi
Tharoor rightly notes that, “COVID-19 has revealed a world of
nation-states locked into a destructive zero-sum contest”. 
WHO .
Reforms Required
• In an interview to The Guardian (2015), former UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan : “If we don’t change the council, we risk a situation where the
primacy of the council may be challenged by some of the new emerging
countries.”

• Former EAM Shushma Swaraj -“The LoN went into meltdown because it was
unwilling to accept the need for reform. We must not make that mistake,”
•
• PM Modi, speaking at U.N.’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on the
subject ‘Multilateralism after COVID-19: What kind of UN do we need at the
75th Anniversary?’ said ,“Only reformed multilateralism with a reformed
United Nations at its center can meet the aspirations of humanity,”

• The former United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, in 1954,

“The aim of UN was not to take mankind to heaven, but to save humanity from
hell.

• However, even this modest objective requires timely reforms within the
institution to help it overcome element of obsoleteness .
What kind of reforms
is needed?
 Article 2(7) of the UN charter doesn’t permit UN intervention in the
domestic affairs of sovereign states. UN intervenes on the basis of
UNGA resolution based on ‘responsibility to protect’.
U.N. Charter's anachronistic enemy state clauses - 
discriminatory arrangements against the former enemy states of
World War II.

• Article 53 provides that “no enforcement action shall be taken under

Reform in UN regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the
authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures
Charter against any enemy state,”
• Article 107 justifies action taken by the Allied powers against the
former WWII enemy states
Article 77 contains reference to enemy states in relation to the U.N.
trusteeship.

• An embarrassment for the countries defined as former enemy states.

 • Respected member of the U.N  Japan pays nearly 10 percent
of its regular budget non-permanent member
• Russia Article 107territorial claims over the disputed
islands off Hokkaido seized by Soviet troops at the end of WWII.

Japan, together with other former Axis powers, demanded the

removal in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War. - UNGA
resolution-- 50th anniversary session in 1995unchanged

Reform in UN cumbersome procedures:

Charter 1. It must be adopted with a two-thirds majority vote in the

General Assembly
2. Ratified by two thirds of the U.N. members, including all of the
five permanent members of the Security Council.

• P5 host of demands
• can wait  substantive issues
 a. UNGA needs greater role UNSC remains paralyzed due to veto power override
veto by special majority.
‘Perilous interventions: The Security Council and politics of Chaos’, has mentioned
about the internal chaos in the decision making.

a. UNSC too requires reforms in following domains:

i. Transparency in functioning of UNSC
ii.Veto Reforms – Korea & Gulf war
Structural Reforms –
• What should be done?

1. Abolish veto outrightly.

2. Restrict the use of veto powers—>core national interest.
3. Give overriding power to UNGA.

• Any reform of the veto will be very difficult: Articles 108 and 109
 • Responsibilities and powers of the UNSC
• If there is a security crisis anywhere in the world, the matter is brought before the UNSC and
they try to reach an agreement either through mediation, appointing special envoys,
dispatching a UN Mission or requesting the UN Secretary-General to settle the dispute.

• If the matter escalates, ceasefire directives are issued and peacekeeping forces and
military observers dispatched.

• Furthermore, if the circumstances are very dire then sanctions and financial penalties are
Membership Reforms in UNSC: imposed, arms embargoed, and travel bans can also be issued.

• To “ensure prompt and effective action” the Council was created as a strictly limited
membership body.

• The current membership of UNSC reflect post-WWII structure. It doesn’t actually reflect the
changes that have occurred in the international system after the end of the cold war.
Emerging nations like India, Brazil, South Africa etc needs representation in the UNSC as
permanent members.The existing membership reflects a regional imbalance, with no
representation from Africa or Latin America and Europe being over-represented in the
council.
 In 1965 11 à 15

Membership 2015
Reforms in
1965
UNSC:
United Nations adopted a consensus
resolution in its 69th General
Assembly à 2015 to move from Inter-
Governmental Negotiations (IGN) à
Text-Based Negotiations (TBN)
process for reforming the United
Nations Security Council.
 • G4
• Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan
• permanent seats on the United Nations Security
Council.

Membership • Uniting for Consensus (UFC)

Reforms in • Coffee Club,
UNSC: • Developed in the 1990s
• Italy, Spain, Australia, Canada, South Korea,
Argentina and Pakistan.
• China
 • 193 member states

Strengthening the Financial

• Contribute annual funds  size of each country and its economy.
Resources • 20192.85 billion U.S. dollars
• only a few dozen countries ever comply in time.
 Reforms in UN
Programmes

• Jeffrey D. Sachs  World Economic Forum

suggests : Some UN programs should be
merged or closed, while other new SDG-
related UN programs should be created.
 • In 2017, Secretary-General António Guterres
• sustaining peace outcomes and broadens the
institutional responsibility for peace .
UN Peacekeeping requires
reforms

• ‘mode 2.0’ of multilateralism EU African

Union, ASEAN or the League of Arab States
India ends month-long UNSC presidency: A look at key achievements
India's tenure as president ended with the first resolution being adopted by the UNSC on the
situation in Afghanistan following the takeover of Kabul by Taliban.
India's month-long presidency of the powerful United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) ended on (August 31)
with substantive outcomes on key global issues.

India is currently a non-permanent member (for a two-

year term) of the 15-nation UNSC. It assumed the
rotating Presidency of the UN body for the month of
August.
The outcomes:
 India began its Presidency with a high-level signature event on maritime
security presided over by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. India’s permanent
representative to UN Tirumurti described it as “path-breaking” in many
ways since this was the first time the Prime Minister of India chaired the
Security Council.
 The event was the first time when there was a comprehensive debate on
the holistic concept of maritime security. There was also a presidential
statement on maritime security which was also the first such statement on
the concept.
 External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar chaired the two other signature
events - on Peacekeeping and Technology and the briefing on Islamic State
on.
 India also exchanged a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the
UN in support of the 'Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping'
initiative and to UN C4ISR Academy.
 For the first time, the Security Council held an open debate focused
exclusively on how technology can aid in peacekeeping and for the first
time, it adopted a presidential statement on the topic of technology and
peacekeeping.
 He added that for the first time, India drafted a resolution on
peacekeeping focused on ensuring accountability for crimes against
peacekeepers. The resolution was sponsored by 80 member states,
including all 15 members of the UNSC.
 India's presidency of the UNSC ended with the first resolution being adopted
by the Council on the situation in Afghanistan following the takeover of
Kabul by the Taliban.
 Under India’s presidency, the UNSC successfully steered the discussions on
various peace and security issues that are on its agenda, including
Myanmar, Syria, Yemen, and the Middle East Peace Process.
 US –China Realtions : The New-Cold War?

The Cold War was a period of ideological and geopolitical struggle between the Soviet
Union and the United States and their respective allies, the Eastern Bloc and the
Western Bloc, after World War II. The period is generally considered to span the 1947
Truman Doctrine to the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union. The term "cold" is used
because there was no large-scale fighting directly between the two superpowers, but
they each supported proxy wars.

It was characterised by psychological warfare, propaganda campaigns, espionage, far-

reaching embargoes, rivalry at sports events and technological competitions such as
the Space Race.

The current state of US - China relation

o Trade relations - The Trump administration has been at odds with China on trade
issues .U.S. has cited security concerns in blocking China Mobile Ltd., the world's
largest mobile operator, from entering the U.S. market; stopped Chinese-made
drones from government fleets and discouraged the deployment of Chinese
transformers on the power grid. The Trump administration has also tried to
constrain the global reach of China's Huawei Technologies Co., the world's largest
telecommunications equipment manufacturer in 5G trials.

o Geo-Strategic relations - The 2017 National Security Strategy labeled China a

“revisionist power” and major strategic rival

o The Sino-American rivalry includes conflict of internal characteristics like ruling

ideology, domestic institutions, or the personalities of particular leaders.

o Former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster maintains that China is a threat
“because its leaders are promoting a closed, authoritarian model as an
alternative to democratic governance and free-market economics.”
1
o Secretary of State Mike Pompeo : In his view, relations have deteriorated
because “it’s a different Chinese Communist Party today than it was 10 years ago.
… This is a Chinese Communist Party that has come to view itself as intent upon
the destruction of Western ideas, Western democracies, Western values.”

o The situation is similar to cold war era Soviet Union which George Kennan
described in his “X” article (“The Sources of Soviet Conduct”) - Moscow's
relentless and internally motivated urge to expand and Communist Party’s
authoritarian rule is similar to Jinping's China.

o Timothy Garton Ash believes that the “primary cause of this new cold war is the
turn taken by the Chinese communist party leadership under Xi Jinping since
2012: more oppressive at home, more aggressive abroad.”

o As conceived by Kenneth Waltz, a country’s foreign-policy is primarily the result

of its internal characteristics. Thus, U.S. foreign policy is sometimes attributed to
its democratic system, liberal values, or capitalist economic order.While China's
policies reflects communist, non-democratic and coercive outlook.
o Structural factors responsible for New cold war - Being the two most powerful
countries in the international system , they are bound to be each other’s
greatest potential threat. Both are actively competing for power and influence
in a variety of domains.

o Incompatibility of their respective strategic objectives, which derive in part from

geography and from the legacies of the past century.
o China seeks secure neighborhood (similar to Monroe Doctrine by USA in the
Western Hemisphere). Thus it would like to push the United States out of the
region
o On the other hand ,the United States being current global hegemon has many
reasons to remain in Asia. As John Mearsheimer has explained, preventing
China from establishing a dominant position in Asia strengthens U.S. security.

o Role of Leadership - A superpower rivalry had been brewing slowly under Barack
Obama was accelerated with the advent of the Trump administration.

o Role of Pandemic and US elections - Trump has blamed China for covering up the
coronavirus pandemic he has mocked as "Kung Flu," and "China Virus".The
rhetoric of US elections have similarly worsened the relations

2
 o Visa restrictions have been put on each other's officials, jounalists, students,
businessmen and citizens

This has resulted in a zero-sum conflict in which neither side can get what it wants
without depriving the other. Thus , it can be safely concluded that the new cold war
has begun and is manifesting itself in various geographies.

New Cold-War across geographies

• New Cold-War in Asia - According to prime minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien

Loong,“Asian countries see the US as a resident power that has vital interests in the
region. At the same time ,China is a reality on the doorstep. Asian countries do not
want to be forced to choose between the two".Loong also urges the US not to see this
as a rerun of 1946. “China is far from a Potemkin village or the tottering command
economy that defined the Soviet Union in its final years . Any confrontation between
the great powers is unlikely to end, as the cold war did, in one country’s peaceful
collapse.”

• New cold war in Europe- Europe declared China “a systemic rival”. Most EU countries
are looking to diversify their supply chains, limit foreign subsidies, or review how they
regulate sensitive Chinese inward investments. But do not want to be dragged into
Trump’s all-out war. Europe wants its own way(Sinatra Doctrine).

• New cold war in Latin America - countries are proving to be China-centric. Chile,
probably the most free-market economy on the continent, counts China as its main
trading partner both in terms of imports and exports.Xi Jinping, has extended BRI right
across Latin America, signing up 14 of the region’s 20 countries. China has surpassed
Brazil as Argentina’s biggest trade partner. In Brazil, exports to China rose by 13.1% in
the first five months of the year compared with the same period in 2019. A third of
Ecuador’s debt – $18.4bn (£15bn) – is owed to Chinese . Mexico, Venezuela and Bolivia
also have strong trading links with China.

• New cold war in Africa - China is the biggest creditor.African countries have borrowed
as much as $150bn – almost 20% of their external debt – from China(Data by Johns
Hopkins University).In recent years, China’s lending has grown to exceed the combined
loans of the IMF, the World Bank and the Paris Club

• New cold war at UN - China is making inroads as US is slowly exiting

o At World Health Organization , Chinese-backed Ethiopian candidate, Dr Tedros
Adhanom Ghebreyesus won
3
 o China itself now heads four of the UN’s 15 specialist agencies.
o Prior to the election for director-general of the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) in 2019, China wrote off $78m in debt owed by the Cameroonian
government, whose nominated candidate coincidentally withdrew .
o China has also become active in the UN Human Rights Council, sponsoring
motions and in July 2019 crushing western criticism of China’s treatment of 1
million Uighur Muslims.

• The new cold war and India

o Both US and China wants countries to join their blocks. Many countries are trying
to hedge, but the scope for neutrality or non-alignment is narrowing. For
many,India's strategic autonomy seems to erode with India coming closer to USA

o According to Shiv Shankar Menon," India should avoid permanent alliances: “The
ideal position for India, of course, is to be closer to both China and the US "

• According to Kishore Mahbubani -"countries containing 20% of the world population

are willing to join an anti-China alliance, but the rest would not"

• Dr Keyu Jin, an associate professor at the London School of Economics, says there is a
global divide: “The emerging markets want to learn from and aspire to the China
model".

• China has courted its allies, Trump has insulted his - Mira Rapp-Hooper, in her new
book Shields of the Republic, documents both how Trump has gloried in the
destruction of alliances, and the price the US is paying.

• Conclusion

Its going to be a long conflict.Both sides have a genuine and shared interest in
keeping their rivalry within boundaries, both to avoid unnecessary clashes and to
facilitate cooperation on issues where U.S. and Chinese interests overlap (climate
change, pandemic prevention, etc.). Washington must be clear about its own red
lines and make sure it understands Beijing’s.

4
LAND OF MANIFEST DESTINY
The divinely ordained right of US to expand its borders to
the pacific oceans and beyond.
John Sullivan ( 1845)
• City upon a hill is a phrase derived from
teaching of salt and light in the Jesus Christ
sermon on the mount

• You are the light of the world. A city located

on a hill can't be hidden.
— Matthew 5:14 (World English Bible)
It is used in USA to refer America as beacon of hope
for the world.
First used by John F Kennedy
 Imperative of the USA Foreign Policy

• Core objective:-
Prosperity and Security of Homeland

Means to achieve :-
US Hegemony
 Meaning of Hegemony

Realist • Overwhelming
material power
view
• Leadership
Gramscian
view
Hegemon is a state that is so powerful that it dominant
over all other states in the system.
-Mearsheimer
 Hegemonic structure—
Single powerful state controlling the system.
-Robert Gilpin
Hegemon is needed to maintain open and liberal
world economy .
-Charles kindle Berger
 VIEWS ON US HEGEMONY
1. US Should seek Global Hegemony
-Robert Gilpin
2. US Should seek only Regional hegemony
-Mearsheimer
REASON:-
1.Global hegemony is virtually impossible because
projecting massive forces across the oceans is too
difficult.
2.State can attain Nuclear Monopoly to gain
hegemony but it is also unlikely as rival state will go at
length to pursue retaliatory Nuclear forces of their
own
 Definition of Geo Politics

• Geopolitics-
How countries and other
groups compete to control
over geographical entity .
 Alfred Thayer Mahan:-
The Influence of Sea Power Upon
History
• The role of sea power in national security policy.
In peace time, its commercial use and its control
during the war
• One who controls the oceans will control the
world. Indian ocean is key to seven Seas.
whosoever will control Indian ocean will
dominate Asia, the destiny of the world will be
decided on its waters.

British control of seas and decline of naval strength

of European state paved the way for its hegemony
• He famously listed six fundamental elements
of sea power: geographical position, physical
conformation, extent of territory, size of
population, character of the people, and
character of government. Based largely on
those factors, Mahan envisioned the United
States as the geopolitical successor to the
British Empire.
 James Holmes
Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century:
The Turn to Mahan.

With regard to Mahan’s elements of sea power,

China in the heart of east-central Asia and has a
lengthy sea-coast, a huge population, a growing
economy, growing military and naval power,
and, at least for now, a stable government.
China’s political and military leaders have not
hidden their desire to supplant the United
States as the predominant power in the Asia-
Pacific region.
Halford John Mackinder
 Mackinder’s Heartland Theory:
Mackinder gave this theory in 1904. This theory regards political history as
a continuous struggle between land and sea powers with the ultimate
victory going to the continental power
Whoever rules the Heartland commands the
World-Island; whoever rules the World-Island
commands the World.
 Spykman rimland theory
• The coastal areas or littorals of Eurasia are
key to controlling the World Island, not the
Heartland.
• China will be a continental power of huge
dimensions in control of a large section of
littorals of the group of marginal seas, which
he calls Asian Mediterraneans.
 Asian Mediterraneans.

Marginal seas:-
Sea of Japan
East China Sea
South China sea
Major seas:-
Indian Oceans
Pacific Oceans
Spykman on China
• A modern ,Vitalized and Militarised China is a
going to be a threat not only to Japan but to
the western powers in Asiatic Mediterranean.

• US must recognise once and for all that the

power constelations in Asia is of everlasting
concern to USA in both time of war and peace.
 Geo Politics of USA
• The inevitable Empire
• The indispensable Nation--Madeleine Albright

“Reports of my death have been greatly

exaggerated”---- Mark Twain
• Americans are not important because of who
they are, but because of where they are.
-- Samuel P. Huntington
 SOURCES OF POWER OF USA
• Location-The two vast oceans insulate it from
Asian and European powers, deserts from
Mexico and lakes and forest from Canada .
• Impressive Geography-
Great Mississippi basin with intra coastal
waterways lengthiest than the rest of the world
combined.
• US has capital , food surplus, technology,
soft power, physical insulation, in excess of any
other country of the world.

• There are 50 American state ,which add up to

form a Nation, in a way , the 27 sovereign
state of Europe can never.
 US foreign Policy
• Uptill World War-1 &2 :-

Isolationism- The single power which was not

only functional but thriving.

Consolidated its new found power by creating

the global architecture to entrench its position.
 Naval Domination
Formation of NATO .
1.Placed all of the world’s surviving Naval Assets
under US.
2. NATO led US to control North Atlantic &
Mediterranean the two bodies required for the
resurgence of any European power
NATO BASES
Hub And Spoke Model / San Francisco
System
1.Seizure of Japan Pacific Empire gave access to
US to the bases in Pacific.
2.1951 -Formal alliance with Australia and New
Zealand established hegemony in Southern
Pacific and mutual defence treaty with
Philippines.
3.1952- Security treaty with Japan brought
Japan Navy under American security Umbrella.
4.1953- US -Republic of Korea defence treaty.
5.1954-US-Republic of China or Taiwan treaty
 Hub And Spoke Model
• Bilateral treaties
• ARF (Asian Regional Forum) / East Asia
Summit
• As the countries of the region starting
developing close relation with china they
preffered multilateral platform.
• Initially US was not invited so it was seen as
challenge to US hegemony.
• Presently USA is a member.
 QUAD-2017
• Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD, also
known as the Quad or QUAD) is a strategic
dialogue between the United States, India,
Japan and Australia that is maintained by talks
between member countries.
 AUKUS
• AUKUS , is a trilateral security pact between
Australia, the United Kingdom and the United
States, announced on 15 September 2021 for
the Indo-Pacific region.
Bretton Woods Institutions(1944)
• US took advantage of European failures .
• European states had no option .
• US positioned , US dollar the obvious and only
choice to serve as global currency.
• European states wanted access to American
markets and US Navy for the safety.
• Asian powers were included in Bretton woods.
• WTO made the system global.
 History of Hegemony of Dollar
• Only reserve currency after the end of cold
war.
• Bretton woods system made all currency
pegged to US Dollar, which In turn pegged to
the price of the Gold.
• Bretton woods institution instituionalized
Dollars global hegemony.
• Dollars came to dominate global finance ,
trade and banking.
• All foreign currency reserves were held in
Dollars.
1960’s- Strain on Dollar
USA did not have enough Gold to Honor the
convertibility , due to financial outflows .
1971- Nixon Shock
It ended direct convertibility US dollar into Gold.
It introduced floating exchange rate .
1990’s- US became net debtor to the world for
the first time.
2000-
• 2000- Proliferation of the global value chains,
particularly the china integration in the world
economy , Net debt exploded to 1/4th of US
GDP in 2008 and 2/3rd of US GDP by 2020.
• 2018- Tariff war
 Present status of Dollar
• Still US Dollar share as a reserve currency of
countries and institutions is 60%,
Euro-22% ,Chinese renminbi 2.5%.

• World needs for Dollars allows US govt to

borrow at lower cost, giving US a advantage of
dollar 100 billion per year.
 WHY DOLLARS IS RESILIENT ?
• Size of US Economy –Economy size give heft.
China will become bigger economy than USA,
But it may nit get such heft.
When it is easy to transect business and invest
easily with confidence during crisis, it is
preferable .
Without transparent liquid open market
currency has littlle chance to become key
reserve currency.
• US alliance system also help dollars.
• Allies wish to support the order.
• USA alliances with advanced countries.

• Petrodollars-1945 Agreement with Saudi Arabia

created petrodollars.
• Petroleum trade is in dollar.
• Oil exporting countries receive dollar for their
export.
• If value of dollar will decline the revenue of these
countries will decline
Euro challenge :-
Rigid banking system ,debt burden.
Renminbi challenge:-
State controlled , lack of investment protection
 USA HARD POWER
• Military power :-
• Most powerful military
• Highest military budget $700 billion 2019,
• 800 military bases
• First space force
• USA size of economy-The economy of the United
States is a highly developed free-market
economy. It is the world's largest economy by
nominal GDP and net wealth and the second-
largest by purchasing power parity (PPP).
 USA SOFT POWER
• Democracy
• Demography
• Science & Technology
• Market Economy
 US STRATEGY
Offshore balancing :-
Offshore balancing is a strategic concept used in realist analysis
in international relations. It describes a strategy in which
a great power uses favored regional powers to check the rise of
potentially-hostile powers. This strategy stands in contrast to
the dominant grand strategy in the United States, liberal
hegemony. Offshore balancing calls for a great power to
withdraw from onshore positions and focus its offshore
capabilities on the three key geopolitical regions of the
world: Europe, the Persian Gulf, and Northeast Asia.

It reduces the cost of large scale military deployments.

• Prevent potential challenges
• Eurasian power:- Russia and China
• US involvement in Korean and Vietnam war
and in Afghanistan war aimed at preventing
the rise of Eurasian power.
 THREATS TO US HEGEMONY
• 1. Russia
• 2.China
• 3.Iran
• 4.Turkey
• 5.Non-State Actor
• 6.Germany
• Brazil, Mexico,Japan,India
• “God takes special care of drunks ,children
and USA.
-Otto von Bismarck
WHO

2019 Mains PSIR

PSIR, 2019

PSIR, 2017

Why in news?
WHO is being criticised of being downplaying the severity of the corona virus, initially, allegedly under Chinese
pressure. This triggered USA's exit plan.

Introduction
The World Health Organization (WHO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for international
public health. Its main objective is " attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health."

It is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, with six semi-autonomous regional offices and 150 field offices
worldwide.

History
The WHO was established on 7 April 1948, which is commemorated as World Health Day. It has 194 members.

Objectives of WHO
Article 1 of the WHO constitution talks about attaining “the highest possible level health by all peoples.”

The WHO’s strategic priorities are rooted in the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals, a set of
seventeen objectives for ending poverty by 2030.
Broadly, the WHO’s powers are recommendatory in nature and include proposing conventions, agreements,
public health practices and international nomenclatures.

WHO’s core functions can be divided into three categories:

 a. Normative functions, including international conventions and agreements, regulations and non-binding
standards and recommendations;
b. Directing and coordinating functions, and essential medicine activities and its specific disease programs;
c. Research and technical cooperation functions, including disease eradication and emergencies.

In an extraordinary crisis, the WHO can declare a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC),
which it has done 6 times:

1. during the 2009 swine flu (H1N1) epidemic;

2. in reaction to a reversal of progress in eradicating polio in 2014;
3. amid the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa;
4. during the 2016 Zika virus outbreak in the Americas;
5. once the ongoing Ebola epidemic reached the city of Goma in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2019;
and
6. amid a global outbreak of a new coronavirus in 2020.

Flagship publication - The World Health Report

The structure of WHO

The organisation has a three-tiered structure, comprising:

1. The World Health Assembly (WHA), the supreme decision making comprising all member states to
determine policy direction;
2. The 34-member Executive Board, comprising technical experts to oversee the implementation of WHA’s
decisions. On 22 May, Dr. Harsh Vardhan, India’s Union Minister of Health and Family Welfare was
elected as Chair of the Executive Board of the World Health Organization (WHO)
3. The Secretariat — headed by the Director General — functioning as WHO’s administrative and technical
organ with the overall responsibility for implementing its activities.

Criticism/Concerns related to WHO

WHO’s characterisation as a technical organisation, its vague mandate, limited funding, lack of defined
functions, transparency issues and confusion about the extent of its “authority” over states have weakened the
functioning of the organisation.

The pressure for change has been building after a series of missteps by WHO - Overreacting to the 2009-10 H1N1
flu pandemic ; not reacting fast enough to the Ebola crisis in West Africa ; confused handling of Zika Virus

Critics believe that the WHO has been reduced to a coordinating body, beholden to the interests of rich member
states. Its functional efficiency has been disadvantaged with organisational lethargy, absence of decisive
leadership, bureaucratic indolence, underfunded programmes, and inability to evolve to meet the needs of the
21st century.

1. Handling of Corona pandemic and China’s influence -

a. Immediate criticism relates to the handling of Corona pandemic and submitting to China’s
influence. The organization’s repeated deference to Beijing exacerbated the spread of the disease.
b. China has lobbied the W.H.O. to promote traditional Chinese medicine, which Xi has worked to
harness as a source of national pride and deployed as a soft-power tool in developing countries,
2
 despite skepticism from some scientists about its effectiveness. Last year, the W.H.O. offered an
endorsement of traditional Chinese medicine. The move was criticized by animal rights activists, who
argued that it could contribute to a surge in illegal trafficking of wildlife whose parts are used in
Chinese remedies.
c. WHO’s relationship with Taiwan - Taiwan is unable to efficiently share information about its own
outbreaks directly with the WHO because of China’s demands that Taiwan be denied formal
representation within the U.N. system. USA wants Taiwan back as observer
d. China’s control on global governance - The Middle Kingdom, as China calls itself—is not simply
geographic. It implies that China is the cultural, political, and economic center of the world. This
Sino-centrist worldview has shaped China’s outlook on global governance. China wants to gain
centrality in international systems. These institutions, created mostly by Western powers after World
War II, include the World Bank,the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations, among
others. President Xi Jinping, has called for China to “lead the reform of the global governance
system,” transforming institutions and norms in ways that will reflect Beijing’s values and priorities.

2. Constrained and conditional Finances - As of 2018, it has a

budget of over $4.2 billion. Contributions are assessed by a
‘formula which includes GDP per capita.

The WHO relies on contributions from member states (both

assessed and voluntary) and private donors for funding.

In 2011, hit by the global financial crisis, member states cut

the WHO’s budget, reducing it by 13 percent from the
previous year.

In 2000, the WHO received 49 percent of its money as

“assessed contributions” from member states. About 80
percent is now made up of “voluntary contributions”.

While assessed contributions can be spent as per the

organisation’s priorities approved at the World Health
Assembly, the irregular voluntary contributions are
allocated in consultation with the donors.

Contingency Fund for Emergencies - The USD 100 million

Fund meant for disease outbreaks is still significantly
underfunded .

In spite of such fund , the WHO announced a new fund for the COVID-19 pandemic 
COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund will be hosted by the U.N. Foundation and the Swiss Philanthropy
Foundation.

3. Leadership crisis : Director General Tedros Adhanom has been criticised for his leadership abilities during this
pandemic. In contrast, Gro Harlem Brundtland, former Director General of the WHO (1998-2003),
spearheaded the global health response with a host of significant policy decisions. This resulted in timely
containment of SARS despite an unfavourable response from China

3
4. Structural stress - The WHO is unique among UN agencies because its structure includes six regional offices,
each with its own director elected by and answerable to their own regional member states .There is
political friction between its headquarters and its six regional offices . Tension between Geneva and the
WHO’s Africa office, in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo, contributed to the agency’s poor response to the 2014
Ebola outbreak(took five months to declare it a PHEIC)

5. Reorienting priorities - It was founded in 1948 – an era in global health when the entire focus was infectious
diseases and Non-communicable diseases (such as heart diseases, cancer and diabetes) just weren't that
prominent. Today, global health has become far more complex. Lifestyle diseases such as cardiovascular
disease, cancer, obesity and type 2 diabetes.

6. WHO’s preponderance is being challenged by several new players, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria, Gavi –The Vaccine Alliance, and Unitaid. These new organisations have been
formed not only as a result of growing interest in and better financing of global health issues, but also
because many have found the World Health Organization to be insufficiently effective.
7. One size fits all - Evaluation of its work shows that the organisation must become more strategic based on
the needs of individual countries.
8. Non-state actors - In 2016, after two years of negotiations, the World Health Assembly adopted a framework
for the World Health Organization’s engagement with non-state actors (FENSA) . The framework is intended
to strengthen the engagement with NGOs, the private sector, non-profit foundations and academic
institutions – while also avoiding conflicts of interest and undue influence. The World Health Organization
must not allow itself to be influenced by private interests. During the swine flu epidemic in 2009, advisers
were accused of being too closely tied to vaccine manufacturers. During the work on new guidelines for
sugar intake, published in 2015, the organisation came under strong pressure from sugar industry interests .

WHO and USA

The decision of Donald Trump is based on Four factors -

1. His general perception of multilateral institutions as talking shops

2. Perceived failure of WHO in handling the Covid crisis effectively
3. Alleged Chinese influence and
4. His efforts of re-election .
5. Taiwan
The US is the WHO’s largest contributor; it paid a total of $893 million in both assessed and voluntary
contributions in 2019. At 22% ($234 million), it has the highest share among assessed contributions of all
member states. On the other hand, China’s total contribution stands at $85 million (only 0.21% of WHO’s entire
revenue), and its assessed contribution stands at 12% ($75 million). Though China’s funding to the WHO has
grown by 52% since 2014, this is primarily due to a sharp increase in the calculation of its assessed contributions.

Leaving won't be easy

 To leave the organization formally, the U.S. is supposed to give a one-year notice and pay outstanding
dues, according to the WHO constitution . The U.S. owes $198 million in unpaid membership dues.
 Since the decision has apparently been taken without the approval of Congress, and as the withdrawal
will become effective only on July 6 next year, there is a possibility that Congress or courts might reverse
the withdrawal.
 USA has been a beneficiary - The U.S. has been at the forefront of developments of global health policy
which have been largely focused on issues that could threaten the health and safety of Americans. US's
4
 presence in WHO has given it an edge in R&D and selectively developing its corporate interests
especially in pharma sector . Thus, if USA leaves , it will have to forego these benefits as well as health
intelligence.
 Joe Biden has promised to revoke it.

Challenges for WHO after US Exit

 Finances -The U.S. is WHO's top funder(15% of the budget) .
 Technical expertise - USA has strong R&D which was instrumental in eradicating any diseases like Polio(
Now in just two countries: Afghanistan and Pakistan).
 Legitimacy Crisis and Domino Effect: Due to WHO's less than satisfactory response to Covid-19 and
alleged meddling from Beijing , the reliability is already being questioned. USA's exit shall further
strengthen this.
 Bipolar Health structure - World could end up having one international health branch being led by China
through its Belt and Road initiative, one through Europe and Africa with the World Health Organization
and the United States using its own channels like PEPFAR or the Global Fund.

Way Forward

Still many countries, especially in Africa and Asia, rely predominantly on the WHO for enforcing policy decisions
governing public health. Therefore , the trust and capability of the organisation needs to be safeguarded.

This is the time when WHO is needed the most. The world should come together to complement its efforts
rather than stigmatising it . Its better to reform WHO than to leave it altogether.

Universal health coverage – one of the UN’s sustainable development goals for 2030 is can possibly be achieved
with an empowered World Health Organization, not a weak one.

5
YEMEN CONFLICT:

SUMMARY:

● The seven-year-old conflict in Yemen is between the internationally recognized

government, which is backed by a Saudi-led military coalition, and Houthi rebels
supported by Iran.
● The country’s humanitarian crisis is said to be the worst in the world, due to
widespread hunger, disease, and attacks on civilians.
● As the UN-backed, two-party peace process has stalled, some experts have
suggested that better representing the many parties involved in the conflict would
yield better results.

How did the war start?

The conflict has its roots in the failure of a political process supposed to bring stability to Yemen
following an uprising in 2011 that forced its long-time authoritarian president, Ali Abdullah Saleh,
to hand over power to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi.

As president, Mr Hadi struggled to deal with a variety of problems, including attacks by jihadists,
a separatist movement in the south, the continuing loyalty of security personnel to Saleh, as well
as corruption, unemployment and food insecurity.

The Houthi movement - known formally as Ansar Allah (Partisans of God) - took advantage of
the new president's weakness.

The Houthis, who champion Yemen's Zaidi Shia Muslim minority and fought a series of
rebellions against Saleh during the previous decade, seized control of their northern heartland
of Saada province in early 2014 and then began advancing southwards.

Disillusioned with the transition, many ordinary Yemenis - including Sunnis - supported them,
and in late 2014 and early 2015 the rebels gradually took over the capital, Sanaa.

The Houthis and security forces loyal to Saleh - who was thought to have backed his one-time
enemies in a bid to regain power - then attempted to take control of the entire country, forcing
Mr Hadi to flee abroad in March 2015.

Alarmed by the rise of a group they believed to be backed militarily by regional Shia power and
rival Iran, Saudi Arabia and eight other mostly Sunni Arab states began an air campaign aimed
at defeating the Houthis, ending Iranian influence in Yemen and restoring Mr Hadi's government.

The coalition received logistical and intelligence support from the US, UK and France.

What's happened since then?

At the start of the war Saudi officials forecast that it would last only a few weeks. But six years of
military stalemate have followed.

Coalition ground troops helped drive the Houthis and their allies out of much of the south after
landing in the port city of Aden in August 2015. However, the rebels have not been dislodged
from Sanaa and much of the north-west.

The Houthis also weathered the collapse of their alliance with Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2017. The
former president was killed fleeing Sanaa after he appeared to switch sides.
In 2018, the coalition and its allies - now joined by Saleh loyalists - attempted to break the
deadlock by launching a major offensive to capture from the Houthis the Red Sea city of
Hudaydah, whose port is the principal lifeline for millions of Yemenis at risk of famine.

After six months of fierce fighting, the warring parties agreed a ceasefire. The agreement
required them to redeploy their forces from Hudaydah, establish a prisoner exchange
mechanism, and address the situation in the city of Taiz, which has been besieged by the
Houthis since 2015.

While hundreds of prisoners have been released, forces have not been fully redeployed and the
siege of Taiz continues, raising fears that the battle for Hudaydah's port could resume at some
point and trigger a humanitarian catastrophe.

In 2021, the Houthis went on the offensive in Marib, the government's last stronghold in the
north and the capital of an oil-rich province.

The UN has called for a ceasefire, warning that an all-out battle for the provincial capital could
put two million civilians at risk and cause mass displacement.

The Houthis have also stepped up their ballistic missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia,
often hitting civilian infrastructure. Saudi and US officials have accused Iran of smuggling parts
for the sophisticated weapons, as well as conventional arms like rifles and rocket-propelled
grenade launchers, into rebel-held Yemen in violation of a UN arms embargo. Iran has denied
the allegation.

President Hadi's government has been based for the past six years in the southern port city of
Aden, but it has struggled to provide basic services and security and the president himself
continues to be based in Saudi Arabia.

The government's authority there has also been challenged by the separatist Southern
Transitional Council (STC), which is its ally in the war against the Houthis but wants an
independent South Yemen, which existed from 1967 until unification with the north in 1990.

n 2018, STC-aligned forces supported by the United Arab Emirates ousted Saudi-backed Hadi
loyalists from Aden and several neighbouring provinces, accusing the president of
mismanagement and links to Islamists. The infighting ended when Saudi Arabia intervened in
late 2019, months after the UAE announced the withdrawal of its forces from Yemen.

The Riyadh Agreement offered the STC a role in government in exchange for a withdrawal of its
forces from Aden and their integration into the military and security forces. But the deal has not
been fully implemented and tensions remain high.

Militants from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the local affiliate of the rival
Islamic State group (IS) have also taken advantage of the instability, carrying out deadly attacks
and occasionally seizing territory from the government in the south.
As a result of the escalation of hostilities in 2021 the prospects for a nationwide ceasefire and a
political solution appear slim.

However, UN efforts to reboot peace talks were boosted by changes to the US policy towards
Yemen announced by President Joe Biden in 2021. He revoked the Trump administration's
designation of the Houthis as a terrorist group and ended support for what he called "offensive
operations" by the Saudi-led coalition.

What's been the human cost?

The UN says the war has resulted in shocking levels of suffering.

In December 2020, it reported that the conflict had caused an estimated 233,000 deaths,
including 131,000 from indirect causes such as lack of food, health services and infrastructure.

Tens of thousands of civilians have been killed or wounded as a direct result of the fighting,
including more than 10,000 children.

The conflict has also caused what the UN says is the world's worst humanitarian disaster.

Four million people have been forced to flee their homes and more than 20.7 million - 71% of
the population - are in need of some form of humanitarian assistance or protection for their
survival.

They include 5 million who the UN says are on the brink of famine, and almost 50,000 who are
already experiencing famine-like conditions.

GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS:

What happens in Yemen can greatly exacerbate regional tensions. It also worries the West
because of the threat of attacks - such as from al-Qaeda or IS affiliates - emanating from the
country as it becomes more unstable.

The conflict is also seen as part of a regional power struggle between Shia-ruled Iran and
Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia.

Gulf Arab states - backers of President Hadi - have accused Iran of bolstering the Houthis
financially and militarily, though Iran has denied this.

Yemen is also strategically important because it sits on a strait linking the Red Sea with the Gulf
of Aden, through which much of the world's oil shipments pass.