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LAST MINUTE NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW

(BASED ON THE PONENCIAS OF JUSTICE CAGUIOA)

1. CONSPIRACY

• There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. In proving conspiracy, direct evidence is not indispensable as
its existence may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime.

• The evidence required to prove conspiracy is of the same weight of evidence needed to establish
the crime itself—proof beyond reasonable doubt.

• The fact that "JR" was able to stab Alde first does not mean that appellant who stabbed him next
can be exculpated from conspiracy. Otherwise, every conspiracy charge may be thwarted by the
mere fact that one of the conspirators beat the others to the act.”

• To be held guilty as a co-conspirator, the prosecution must be able to show, at the very least, with
the same degree of proof required to establish the crime - proof beyond reasonable doubt, that all
participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a
common purpose or design to commit the felony. The participation in the transaction must be
intentional. Otherwise, none of them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and each may only be held
responsible for the results of his own action.

Apart from sweeping conclusions, the prosecution failed to present evidence of evident bad faith,
manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence on the part of Cruz and Carpio. There is also
no showing that they actively participated in granting Halili unwarranted benefits. The only
evidence of the prosecution against petitioners is their presence at the demolition site and the
municipal hall to accompany Mayor Dela Cruz. Cruz's and Carpio's assistance to Mayor Dela
Cruz, in the ordinary course of things, could not have prevented the implementation of the subject
writs; and thus, cannot be said to have an immediate and necessary relation to the supposed grant
of unwarranted benefits to Halili.

• The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission
of the crime itself, or of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or
implement the criminal plan. Thus, the mere knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to
cooperate, mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and mere
companionship, are insufficient to constitute conspiracy.

2. IMPOSSIBLE CRIME

• While the victims testified that he thought the victim was already dead after he was hacked by
another person because the former was already lying on the ground motionless, this statement
cannot sufficiently support the conclusion that, indeed the victim was already dead when the
accused stabbed him. Furthermore, the witness’ opinion of the victims death was arrived at by
merely looking at the latter’s body. No other act was done to ascertain this, such as checking of
pulse, heartbeat, or breathing.

3. SELF-DEFENSE

• A plea of self-defense admits the commission of the act charged as a crime; accordingly, the onus
probandi falls on the accused to prove that such killing was justified — failure to discharge which
renders the act punishable. Here, it is difficult to imagine how Raytos, while attempting to escape,

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was suddenly able to grab hold of Araza’s hand and after relieving the latter of the knife,
proceeded to stab him multiple times in quick succession.

• The mere drawing of a knife by the victim does not constitute unlawful aggression as the peril
sought to be avoided by the accused is uncertain, premature and speculative. Bitoy's supposed act
of holding a weapon from his waist does not pose any actual, sudden or imminent danger to the
life and limb of Siega.

• At the time that Duran shot Grimaldo, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the latter.
When an unlawful aggression that has begun has ceased to exist, the one who resorts to self-
defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor. Aggression, if not continuous,
does not constitute aggression warranting defense of one's self. The condition sine qua non of
unlawful aggression being absent, self-defense cannot be appreciated in favor of the accused.

4. MINORITY AS A DEFENSE

• When a minor above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old is charged with a crime, it
cannot be presumed that he or she acted with discernment. During the trial, the prosecution
must specifically prove as a separate circumstance that the CICL XXX committed the alleged
crime with discernment.”

Both the RTC and the CA erred in convicting CICL XXX, as they both equated "intent to kill" -
which was admittedly established through the evidence presented by the prosecution - with acting
with discernment, which, on the contrary, was not proved,by the prosecution. The prosecution, in
fact, never endeavored to prove that CICL XXX acted with discernment. This is highlighted by
the prosecution's cross-examination of CICL XXX, which focused only on whether Redoquerio
had the motive to falsely accuse CICL XXX of committing a crime, and whether CICL XXX's
father owned a gun.

Side topic: Intent v. Discernment - It is this intent which comprises the third element of [dolo] as
a means of committing a felony, freedom and intelligence being the other two. On the other
hand, discernment is the mental capacity of the child to understand the difference between right
and wrong. While both are products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to
the desire of one's act while the latter relate to the moral significance that person ascribes to the
said act. Hence, a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences
of his negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in negligently handling an air
rifle. It is not correct, therefore, to argue that since a minor above nine years of age but below
fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot
his friend, thus, did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result
of his negligence.

• For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond
reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning
that he knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstantial evidence may include
the utterances of the minor; his overt acts before, during and after the commission of the crime
relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used in the commission of the crime; his attempt to
silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus delicti.

5. PLEA OF INSANITY

• In order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of insanity, he must
successfully show that: (1) he was completely deprived of intelligence; and (2) such complete
deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately before the commission of
the offense. The evidence on the alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of execution. In addition, accused-appellant's voluntary

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surrender the following day belies his claim of insanity. This act tends to establish that he was
well aware of what he had just committed, and that he was capable of discernment.

6. TREACHERY

• It must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen
with a view to accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor. Jurisprudence provides that
there cannot be treachery if the meeting between the accused and the victim was casual and the
attack was impulsively done. Here, the deceased Wilbert "was just passing by after making a
phone call at a nearby site" when he was hit in the head by Serad with a piece of wood and then
later on continually hit by Bulutano. it must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by
the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a view to accomplishing the act without risk to the
aggressor.

• That there were other people around that could have lent their help to Araza is inconsequential as
treachery considers only the victim’s means of defense at the time of the attack. Thus, so long as
the accused deliberately employed means to ensure the commission of the crime without risk to
himself from retaliation by the victim, treachery can be properly appreciated.

• The following circumstances negate the presence of treachery: First, the stabbing incident
happened during a drinking spree in which accused-appellant was a part. He did not deliberately
seek the presence of the victim as he was already in the same vicinity as the latter when he
hacked the victim. Second, in killing the victim, accused-appellant did not even use his own
weapon – he merely took a scythe from Arnulfo, who was sitting beside him. Considering that the
accused- appellant's decision to attack the victim was more of a sudden impulse on his part than a
planned decision, it was not proven that the means Renato used in killing Rodolfo was
deliberately and consciously adopted by the former. The incident, which happened at the spur of
the moment, negates the possibility that accused-appellant consciously adopted the means to
execute the crime committed. Thus, it is not possible to appreciate treachery against Renato.

• The fact that Gerry came yelling and threatening his brother Roger and his family prior to the
attack shows that there was no treachery, and that the latter were aware of the imminent danger to
their lives. Certainly, Roger knew that the fight with his brother/Gerry, could lead to greater
physical harm. The existence of a struggle before the attack on the victim Pelita clearly shows
that she was forewarned of the impending attack, and that she was afforded the opportunity to put
up a defense. Indeed, jurisprudence has set that treachery cannot be appreciated simply because
the attack was sudden and unexpected. There must be proof that the accused intentionally sought
the victim for the purpose of killing him or that accused carefully and deliberately planned the
killing in a manner that would ensure his safety and success. Also, the fact that a bladed weapon
was used did not per se make the attack treacherous. And even if it was shown that the attack was
intended to kill another, as long as the victim’s position was merely accidental, alevosia will not
qualify the offense.

7. EVIDENT PREMEDITATION

• Mere lapse of time is insufficient to establish evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to
be appreciated, it is indispensable to show concrete evidence on how and when the plan to kill
was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. The mere fact that Gerry
was armed at the beginning of the altercation does not unequivocally establish that he earlier
devised a deliberate plot to murder the victim. To qualify an offense, the circumstance must not
merely be “premeditation” but must be “evident premeditation.” Hence, absent a clear and
positive proof of the overt act of planning the crime, mere presumptions and inferences thereon,
no matter how logical and probable, would not be enough. Evident premeditation cannot be
appreciated to qualify the offense in this case.

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8. INSTIGATION V. ENTRAPMENT

• Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged
in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and
means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation, officers of the
law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense which
he or she would otherwise not commit and has no intention of committing. But in entrapment, the
criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused, and
law enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses
and schemes; thus, the accused cannot justify his or her conduct. In instigation, where law
enforcers act as co-principals, the accused will have to be acquitted. But entrapment cannot bar
prosecution and conviction. As has been said, instigation is a "trap for the unwary innocent" while
entrapment is a "trap for the unwary criminal.”

Here, Amurao’s defense of instigation has no merit. Acting on the report from the International
Justice Mission, the NBI agents conducted a valid entrapment. They merely devised a scheme to
facilitate Amurao's illegal activities in order to arrest him.
9. PRESCRIPTION OF OFFENSES

• In resolving issues concerning the prescription of offenses, the Court must determine the
following: (a) the prescriptive period of the offense; (b) when the period commenced to run; and
(c) when the period was interrupted.

Since Perez was charged with the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the prescriptive
period of the offense is found in Section 11 of the same law, which provides that all offenses
punishable under R.A. No. 3019 prescribes in 15 years. R.A. No. 3019 does not explicitly provide
when the period begins to run. For this purpose, reference should be made to Act No. 3326, which
governs the prescription of offenses punished by special penal laws. As a general rule, Act No.
3326 prescribes that prescription is triggered by the commission of the crime. The prescription
shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. If the
commission of the offense is not known at that time, prescription begins to run from its discovery.
This is otherwise referred to as the "blameless ignorance" principle.

The filing of the complaint with the OMB on April 27, 2016 against Perez effectively commenced
the preliminary investigation proceedings. After the filing of the complaint, the OMB was duty-
bound to determine whether probable cause existed to charge Perez with the offenses stated in the
complaint. It was at that point that the prescriptive period was interrupted approximately
14 years and five months after the commission of the alleged offense.

While Act No. 3326 speaks of judicial proceedings to suspend the period of prescription, the
Court had settled in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice that the commencement of
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused serves to interrupt the prescriptive period, even if
the case is not filed yet with the appropriate court..

10. MURDER

• Evidently, the evidence shows that the attack against Basilio, which came from behind, was
sudden, deliberate and unexpected. The victim was completely unaware of any threat to his life as
he was merely walking home with his son. The use of a firearm showed deliberate intent to kill
Basilio and the location and number of gunshot wounds rendered him defenseless and incapable
of retaliation. Hence, treachery was evident in the case at bar, sufficient to qualify the crime to
Murder.

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11. RAPE

• There is no established singular reaction to rape by all victims of this crime. Delay in reporting an
incident of rape is not an indication of fabrication and does not necessarily cast doubt on the
credibility of the complainant. Only when delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to
discredit the complainant. Here, the victim was raped by his own uncle and threatened that she
would be killed if she told her mother about the incident. Thus, the delay in the reporting of the
incident is justified in this case.

• When a rape victim's account is straightforward and candid and is further corroborated by the
medical findings of the examining physician, such testimony is sufficient to support a conviction.

• Even granting that appellant was correct in saying that the medical certificate did not establish his
guilt with reasonable certainty, it is noteworthy that expert testimony is merely corroborative in
character and not essential to conviction since an accused can still be convicted of rape on the
basis of the sole testimony of the private complainant.

• To be sure, that a man and a woman are living in the same house is not enough to rule out the
bestial act of forced sexual intercourse. Moreover, in the landmark case of People v. Jumawan,
the Court declared that even a husband has no ownership over his wife’s body by reason of
marriage, for in assenting to marital union, the wife does not divest herself of her right to
exclusive autonomy over her own body. Hence, a married woman can give or withhold her
consent to sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent
from her in case of her refusal. Here, Ruben anchors his claim of consensual sexual congress on
the fact of his cohabitation with AAA. Such fact of cohabitation, by itself, had no bearing on the
prior forcible advances committed by Ruben upon AAA.

• On its own, the testimony of AAA establishes that what happened “sometime in July 2003” was
that XXX put her hand on his penis. She likewise testified that nothing else happened as XXX
was interrupted because BBB already arrived from the market. Thus, the prosecution’s evidence
failed to establish the most crucial element of the crime of rape—that is, the sexual intercourse
between the accused and the complainant. Neither could XXX be convicted through his
admission that he had sexual intercourse with AAA in 2007. This is because the Information filed
in this case accused XXX of having sexual intercourse with AAA “sometime in July 2003.”
While it is true that the exact place and time of the commission of the crime is not an element of
the crime of rape, XXX still could not be convicted of the crime for to do so would be to offend
the basic tenets of due process in criminal prosecutions. The Court cannot therefore use the
“admission” by XXX, as his admission pertains to his having sexual intercourse with AAA in
2007, or when AAA was already 14 years old—beyond the age set for statutory rape.
Consequently, for this act to be considered rape, the prosecution needed to prove that XXX
employed force and intimidation to cow AAA into submission. Again, the information charges the
accused for the events in 2003, not 2007. It cannot therefore offer evidence for events other than
what happened in 2003. Applying the variance doctrine, XXX can thus be held guilty of the lesser
crime of acts of lasciviousness, defined and punished under Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to R.A. No. 7610, as a charge of acts of lasciviousness is necessarily included in
a complaint for rape.

12. DIRECT BRIBERY

• The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the
following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or
through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has
been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime,
or to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act
relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.

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The existence of the first element of the crime is undisputed, it being established by the
prosecution, and admitted by Catubao himself, that he held the position of Forth Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Cavite at the time of the
incident complained of. The second element is also undoubtedly present. It is an established fact,
therefore, that Catubao received a gift of at least P3,000.00 from Atty. Perito and Ragasa. The
fourth element is likewise undoubtedly present because the resolution of the estafa cases filed
against Ragasa indubitably relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.

The third element, however, was not duly proven. Apart from the testimonial evidence of Atty.
Perito and Ragasa, the prosecution presented no other evidence that the money was solicited by
Catubao and that it was given in consideration of the latter finally acting on the case. The
existence of the third element, therefore, boils down to the credibility of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. However, they failed to establish the third element. This is so because the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were so marred by inconsistencies that they are no
longer believable.

13. MALVERSATION

• Notably, Article 217 of the RPC provides that the failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable upon demand by any duly authorized
officer gives rise to the presumption that he has put such missing funds to personal use. While
demand is not an element of Malversation, it is a requisite for the application of the presumption.
Hence, absent such presumption, the accused may still be proven guilty, albeit based on direct
evidence of Malversation. Otherwise stated, to support a conviction for the crime, the Prosecution
must nonetheless present evidence clearly evincing misappropriation of public funds.

14. THEFT V. ROBBERY

• The elements of robbery are: (1) there is a taking of personal property; (2) the personal property
belongs to another; (3) the taking is with animus lucrandi; and (4) the taking is with violence
against or intimidation of persons or with force upon things. Theft, on the other hand, is
committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation
of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of another without the latter's
consent. Thus, the distinguishing element between the crimes of robbery and theft is the use of
violence or intimidation as a means of taking the property belonging to another; the element is
present in the crime of robbery and absent in the crime of theft.
Here, Petitioner should have been convicted of the crime of theft, not of robbery. The testimonies
of the witnesses reveal that the snatching of the personal property was without violence or
intimidation of persons or with force upon things. For the requisite of violence to be satisfied in
cases of simple robbery, the victim must have sustained less serious physical injuries or slight
physical injuries in the occasion of the robbery.

15. ESTAFA

• The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation, punished under Article 315(l)(b)
of the RPC are: (1) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration
or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same,
even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (2) that there is conversion or diversion of
such property by the person who has so received it or a denial on his part that he received it; (3)
that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another; and (4) that there be demand
for the return of the property.

• Anent the first element, when "the money, goods, or any other personal property is received by
the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration,

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the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing
received.” Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the
thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner.

• Indeed, the long-standing general rule is that criminal liability for Estafa is not affected by
payment, indemnification, reimbursement of or compromise as to the amounts misappropriated,
or by the novation of the contract. Nevertheless, in cases involving the type of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), where there is an underlying contractual relationship or bilateral
agreement between the parties which they can modify or alter, the Court has consistently
acknowledged at the same time the possible effects of novation. The Court held that in these
cases, novation may serve to either prevent the rise of criminal liability, or to cast doubt on the
true nature of the original basic transaction, whether or not it was such that the breach of the
obligation would not give rise to penal responsibility, as when money loaned is made to appear as
a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to. The prevention of the rise of criminal liability
happens when there is novation before an Information is filed in court.

16. LIBEL

• The rules on venue of criminal actions for libel:

a) Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published.

b) If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense.

c) If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.

d) If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may
be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the
time of the commission of the offense.

According to Bonifacio v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, "the Information must
allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as
evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the
case of newspapers." The Information in question complies with the Bonifacio directive because
it alleges with particularity Port Area, Manila as the place where the alleged defamatory article
was printed and first published as evidenced or supported by the records of the case. The
Information need not parrot the provisions of Article 360 of the RPC and expressly use the phrase
"printed and first published." If there is no dispute that the place of publication indicated in the
Information, which is Manila in the present case, is the place where the alleged defamatory article
was "printed and first published," then the law is substantially complied with. After all, the filing
of the Information before an RTC of the City of Manila would, borrowing the phraseology
of Bonifacio, forestall any inclination to harass the accused. Besides, it is incumbent upon the
accused to show that Port Area, Manila is not the business or editorial office of Malaya in the face
of evidence in the records of the case that it is so.

17. SECTION 21, RA 9165; CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE

• The dangerous drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense of sale and/or possession of
dangerous drugs. It is important that the State establish, with moral certainty, the integrity and

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identity of the illicit drugs sold to be the same as those examined in the laboratory and
subsequently presented in court as evidence.

• Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.

• The procedure in Sec. 21 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality.

• Section 21, RA 9165 plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of
the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after seizure and confiscation. In
addition, the inventory must be done in the presence of the accused, his counsel, or
representative, a representative of the DOJ, the media, and an elected public official, who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and
photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place
of apprehension. And only if this is not practicable, does the IRR allow that the inventory and
photographing be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. By the same token, this also means that the three
required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of apprehension — a
requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust
operation is, by its nature, a planned activity. Simply put, the buy-bust team has enough time and
opportunity to bring with them said witnesses.

• While the IRR provides alternative places for the physical inventory and photographing of the
seized drugs, whenever practicable, a barangay hall, is not one of them. Also, the illegal drug
was not marked immediately upon seizure and confiscation. It must be noted that marking is not
found in R.A. No. 9165 and is different from the inventory-taking and photography under Section
21 of the said law. However, this Court had consistently held that failure of the authorities to
immediately mark the seized drugs would cast reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus
delicti.

• Failure to comply with the requirements of Sec. 21 may be excused where the following obtained:
(1) the existence of justifiable grounds to allow departure from the rule on strict compliance; and
(2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team. In these exceptional cases, the seizures and custody over the confiscated
items shall not be rendered void and invalid.

Here, while the police officers were not able to explain why only two of the three required
witnesses were at the place of arrest and why no elected official was available the police officers
nevertheless showed earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure. To ensure that the
integrity of the seized items were preserved, the police officers conducted a preliminary inventory
at the place of the arrest as preferred by law. Also, the police officers conducted another
inventory, this time in the police station where all the three required witnesses were available and
were, in fact, present.

• For the said saving clause to apply, the prosecution must first recognize the lapse or lapses on the
part of the buy-bust team and justify or explain the same.

18. ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPTIONS ACT

• The essential elements of violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019, as amended, are:

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a) The accused is a public officer discharging official, administrative or judicial functions or

private persons in conspiracy with them;

b) The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official
duty or in relation to his public position;

c) The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence, and

d) His action caused injury to the Government or any private party, or gave unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference.

On the other hand, to determine the culpability of private respondents under Section 3(g) of RA
3019, it must be established that: (1) they are public officers; (2) they entered into a contract or
transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) such contract or transaction is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

• It must first be considered that there are three modes by which the offense for violation of Section
3(e) may be committed:

(1) Through evident bad faith;

(2) Through manifest partiality

(3) Through gross inexcusable negligence

Here, the Informations alleged that petitioner committed two counts of violation of Section 3(e)
through evident bad faith. However, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner on the modality of
gross inexcusable negligence, which is separate and distinct from the modality of evident bad
faith petitioner was charged with in the Informations. This stark variance, as correctly pleaded by
petitioner, is violative of his constitutional right to due process, specifically his right to be
informed of the nature of the accusation against him.

xxx Hence, while all three modalities may be alleged simultaneously in a single information for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, an allegation of only one modality without mention of
the others necessarily means the exclusion of those not mentioned. Verily, an accusation for a
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 committed through evident bad faith only, cannot be
considered as synonymous to, or includes an accusation of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019
committed through gross inexcusable negligence.

• The presence of evident bad faith requires that the accused acted with a malicious motive or
intent, or ill will. It is not enough that the accused violated a provision of law or that the provision
of law violated is clear, unmistakable and elementary. To constitute evident bad faith, it must be
proven that the accused acted with fraudulent intent. There is manifest partiality "when there is a
clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than
another.” Gross inexcusable negligence requires more than simple negligence. A public officer
is guilty of gross inexcusable negligence when there is a breach of duty that is
committed flagrantly, palpably, and with willful indifference.

• In criminal cases involving Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, in relation to alleged irregularities in procurement committed by public
officers, findings of violations of procurement laws, rules, and regulations, on their own, do not
automatically lead to the conviction of the public officer under the said special penal law. It must
be established beyond reasonable doubt that the essential elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019
are present. In this case, while the prosecution may have shown how procurement laws had not
been strictly followed, it nonetheless failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the elements for a

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violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Evident bad faith and manifest partiality are absent, owing
to the prosecution's failure to prove fraudulent and malicious intent on the part of the petitioners.
Gross inexcusable negligence was likewise not proven as the prosecution was not able to show
that petitioners acted with want of even slight care and conscious indifference as to the
compliance with their duties.

19. RA 7610

• There is no crime of grave oral defamation in relation to Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Section
10(a) is clear in that it punishes acts of child abuse which are "not covered by the Revised Penal
Code." Hence, on this point, Briñas is correct -she cannot be convicted of grave oral defamation
under the RPC in relation to Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610. From the plain language of Section
10(a), the acts punished under it and those punished under the RPC are mutually exclusive. Acts
which are already covered by the RPC are excluded from the coverage of Section 10(a). Further,
a conviction for child abuse under Section 10(a) in relation to Section 3(b)(2) of R.A. 7610
requires the presence of intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth of the child
as a human being. Indeed, the evidence presented shows that Briñas' acts were only done in the
heat of anger, made after she had just learned that the private complainants had deceivingly used
her daughter's name to send a text message to another student, in what Briñas thought was part of
a bigger and harmful scheme against the student body. Notably, in the present case, the
prosecution failed to prove other circumstances which may indicate said intent to debase, degrade
or demean. Thus, due to the prosecution's failure to prove the presence of specific intent to
debase, degrade, or demean the victims' intrinsic worth and dignity, Briñas cannot be held guilty
of child abuse under R.A. 7610.

20. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (RA 9208)

• Section 4 of RA 9208 refers to those acts which directly involve trafficking in persons, such as
recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring, receiving, buying, offering, selling, or trading persons
to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary
servitude, or debt bondage. Meanwhile, Section 5 refers to those acts that promote or facilitate
any of the aforementioned predicate acts of Trafficking in Persons. Section 4 and Section 5 of RA
9208 are separate and distinct offenses with their own corresponding penalties. Section 6 provides
for qualifying circumstances of Trafficking in Persons under Section 4, which when alleged and
proved, will merit the imposition of the maximum penalty.

Here, the RTC found that Roxas violated Section 5(a) of RA 9208 for knowingly leasing a room
for the purpose of prostitution. Unfortunately, in spite of this, it still convicted Roxas of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons as regards minors AAA and BBB and Trafficking in Persons as regards
CCC. The CA, for its part, affirmed the RTC's ruling. The RTC and the CA thus committed
serious error as the proper denomination of the offense is Acts that Promote Trafficking in
Persons under Section 5(a). In this regard, it should be noted that the offenses punished under
Section 5 cannot be qualified by Section 6 as what the latter seeks to qualify is the act of
trafficking and not the promotion of trafficking. Only violations of Section 4 on Trafficking in
Persons can be qualified. Section 5 on Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons, being separate
and distinct offenses, cannot be qualified as the law does not expressly provide therefor.

“When the time is right, the Lord will make it happen.”