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DOI: 10.17775/CSEEJPES.2022.01410
1

A Non-Iterative Network Utilization Pricing Mechanism for P2P Energy

Trading
Yun Liu, Senior Member, IEEE, Yunqiang Gao, Yuanzheng Li, Member, IEEE, Jizhong Zhu, Fellow, IEEE, and Hoay
Beng Gooi, Life Senior Member, IEEE

Abstract—To sustain the operation and maintenance of the active
distribution network (ADN), a network fee should be charged by the
distribution network service provider (DNSP) for facilitating the P2P
energy trading service. To this end, this paper models the interaction
among the DNSP and multiple prosumers as a Stackelberg game, and
then develops a non-iterative and decentralized transactive mechanism
to simultaneously achieve optimal network utilization pricing and P2P
trading. Simulation results in an ADN with four prosumers connecting
to a common substation bus validate the effectiveness and efficiency of
the proposed scheme.
Index Terms—Distribution network service provider, non-iterative,
network fee, prosumer, peer-to-peer trading.
I. I NTRODUCTION
than its iterative counterpart, is developed. Comparative case studies
demonstrate that the proposed approach achieves near-optimal P2P
trading results.
II. M ODELING OF THE P2P E NERGY T RADING
This paper investigates the P2P trading interaction among one
DNSP and N prosumers. For ease of illustration, we consider the
simple and typical distribution topology, where Prosumers 1 ∼ N
are connected to a common bus at the substation, as illustrated in
Fig. 1. The real-time P2P market is cleared periodically to maintain
power balance for the upcoming period [4]. Each energy consumer
should respectively pay the energy producers for the imported energy
and the DNSP for network utilization.

P EER-TO-PEER (P2P) energy trading in an active distribution

network (ADN) can contribute to benefit sharing among multiple
prosumers and efficient accommodation of distributed renewable
A. Optimization of Prosumer Operational Cost
For simplicity, we consider each prosumer to be equipped with a
energy [1]. Based on the adopted approaches, five techniques (i.e., dispatchable generator (DG) and renewable energy to serve a certain
game theory, double auction, constraint optimization, blockchain, and amount of load. The jth prosumer minimizes its operational cost by
artificial intelligence) are commonly investigated in the literature [2]. solving the optimal P2P trading problem for period t as
However, most of the relevant works only focused on the transactive min Costtj (xtj , prjt , [prm
t
, NUPtj,m ]m∈Nj ) =
interaction among homogeneous entities, i.e., the prosumers. X
CosttDGj (pDGjt
)+ (prm t t
+ NUPj,m t
)Pj,m ∆t
Although a P2P market is known for its decentralized, deregulated,
m∈Nj
and autonomous properties, the presence of a distribution network
service provider (DNSP) is inevitable. Generally, the DNSP takes two −prjt Poutj
t t
∆t + prRT t
Pj,0 t
∆t − prFiT P0t,j ∆t (1a)
major responsibilities for P2P energy trading. Firstly, it manages the subject to
ADN operation to physically implement the P2P energy transactions Local constraints:
[3]. Secondly, it is responsible for the update and maintenance of X
t t t
the grid infrastructure. The DNSP cost for providing these services Poutj ≜ pDGj + αj,m Pj,m − P0t,j − ptLj (1b)
should be mainly covered by the prosumers because of their network m∈Nj ∪{0}

utilization. In fact, network utilization prices (NUPs) for P2P trading

pmin t max
DGj ≤ pDGj ≤ pDGj (1c)
have been extensively considered in the literature, e.g., reference
[4] set the NUP as a time-invariant parameter based on electrical Pj,t 0 /P0t,j ≥ 0 Pj,m
t
≥0 (1d)
distances. However, little attention has been paid to the influence of X
NUP on the P2P transactions, and its optimal pricing strategy. −Pjmax t
≤ Pj ≜ t t t
Pj,m − P0,j − Poutj ≤ Pjmax (1e)
m∈Nj ∪{0}
In the practical operation of a P2P market, the NUP directly
influences the DNSP income. For example, a too low (high) NUP Coupling constraints:
encourages (suppresses) the P2P transactions among prosumers. This t
X t
Poutj = Pm,j (1f)
will lead to a low DNSP income. In this regard, this paper investigates
m∈Nj
the NUP pricing problem in the real-time P2P market environment.
Its contributions are twofold: 1) The optimal NUP pricing problem, where xtj = [PDGj
t t
, [Pj,m ]m∈Nj , Pj,t 0 , P0t,j , Poutj
t
] is the operation
where the DNSP utilizes its market power to maximize its income schedule determined by Prosumer j. ∆t denotes the length of each
from network fee charged for P2P trading, is formulated for the time slot. Nj denotes the neighboring prosumer set Prosumer j
first time. 2) A non-iterative decentralized P2P trading mechanism,
which saves communication overhead and is more socially acceptable

This work was supported by Guangdong Basic and Applied Basic Research DNSP
Foundation under Grant No. 2022A1515011035, Science and Technology
Projects in Guangzhou under Grant No. 202201010354, and National Nature
Science Foundation of China (NSFC) under Grant No. 51807120. (Corre-
t
prRT t
/ prFiT åP / åP t
i ,0
t
0, i
mt å
( j , m) Î
m )Î
Pjt, m
i i
sponding author: Yuanzheng Li.)
t t
Y. Liu, Y. Gao, and J. Zhu are with the School of Electric Power , "i Î
P ,"
2,i 2
NUP 2, m
Engineering, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510641,
China (e-mail: liuyun19881026@gmail.com; yunqianggao1007@163.com; t
zhujz@scut.edu.cn). P3,2 , pr3t
Pro. 1 DG Renewable
Re Load t
Pro. 3 Pro. 4
Y. Li is with the School of Artificial Intelligence and Automation, Ministry P2,3 , pr2t
of Education Key Laboratory of Image Processing and Intelligence Control, Pro. 2
Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China Distribution link
(email: Yuanzheng Li@hust.edu.cn). Substation bus Communciation link
H. B. Gooi is with the School of Electrical and Electronic Engineer-
ing, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639798 (email: ehb-
Fig. 1: Cyber-physical diagram of the P2P trading interaction involving
gooi@ntu.edu.sg). the DNSP and prosumers.
 2

t
is willing to trade with. Pj,m is the energy Prosumer m selling where INC is the total DNSP income, E is the set of distribution
out to Prosumer j. Note that due to distribution losses which are lines that facilitates P2P trading, and
linearized for simplicity [5], only αj,m Pj,mt
can actually be received NUPtj,m (µt ) = dj,m µt (5)
t
by Prosumer j with αj,m being an efficiency parameter close to with µ being the price factor released by the DNSP. Its limit
t t
1. Specially, P0,j /Pj,0 denotes the energy export/import to/from µmin /µmax is regulated by the energy market authority. When
the upstream grid. Poutj , ptDGj and ptLj denote the energy exported
t
a distance-based pricing scheme (e.g., the MW Mile method) is
from Prosumer j to others, DG power output, and prosumer net considered, dj,m can be selected as the electrical distance between
load demand (i.e., actual load minus renewable power). Pjt is the Prosumers j and m [4]. When a distance-independent pricing scheme
total energy flow between Prosumer j and the substation bus with is considered (e.g., the postage stamp method practically adopted in
positive/negative value meaning energy import/export. Pjmax denotes various countries [8]), dj,m just needs to be uniformly set to 1 p.u.
the distribution line flow limit between Prosumer j and the substation C. Interaction among the DNSP and Prosumers
t t
bus. prRT /prFiT is the real-time retail price/feed-in tariff released by
The interaction among the DNSP and prosumers is twofold. In the
the upstream grid operator. prjt is the P2P price to be determined by
upper level, the decision-making interaction between the DNSP and
Prosumer j. NUPtj,m is the NUP for P2P trading between Prosumers
prosumers can be modeled as a Stackelberg game, where the DNSP
j and m to be determined by the DNSP. The objective function (1a)
acts as the leader to set µt , while the prosumers act as the followers to
is to minimize the operational cost of Prosumer j, which includes
react to the NUP by determining their optimal P2P trading schedule.
the DG generation cost1 , P2P trading cost, network fee imposed
The lower level is the P2P trading interaction among the prosumers
on the energy consumer, and main grid trading cost. The feasible
given the NUP. This P2P market can be settled (i.e., trading prices
range spanned by the local constraints (1b)-(1d) can be denoted
and quantities are determined) in a decentralized manner from a self-
by xtj ∈ Xjt . Specifically, (1b) is the power balance constraint
profit-driven perspective following [9]. This reference further proves
of Prosumer j; (1c) denotes the DG power limit; Constraint (1d)
that the lower-level market equilibrium coincides with the social
specifies the non-negativity of traded energy; and (1e) specifies the
optimum satisfying:
line congestion limit. The coupling constraint (1f) is the definition of XN
P2P selling energy of Prosumer j. CosttDGj (ptDGj ) + prRT
t t t t
 
min Pj,0 ∆t − prFiT P0,j ∆t
Remark 1: When the ADN adopts the common-bus topology as in ∀xtj ∈Xjt
j=1
Fig. 1, the voltage magnitude constraint can be handled consistently +
X
NUPtj,m (µt )Pj,m
t
∆t (6)
as (1e). Specifically, according to the LinDistFlow equation [6] (j,m)∈E

U0t − 2(rj Pjt + xj Qtj ) = Ujt (2a) subject to (1f).

U0t =1 p.u.; Ujmin ≤ Ujt ≤ Ujmax , j ∈ {1, · · · , N } (2b)
On this basis, the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium in the
upper level can be illustrated as follows: Optimization problem (6) is
where U0t = 1 p.u. is the voltage magnitude of the substation convex and quadratic for a given µt . Thus, it adopts a unique global
bus; Ujt denotes the square of voltage magnitude at Prosumer j; optimal solution denoted by Pj,m t
(µt ), ∀(j, m) ∈ E. Consequently,
Ujmin /Ujmax denotes the minimum/maximum value of Ujt ; rj /xj the optimal solution to the DNSP problem (4) exists since its strategy
denotes the resistance/reactance of the distribution line between the set µt ∈ [µmin , µmax ] is closed. In what follows, an optimal
substation bus and Prosumers j; and Qtj is the reactive power NUP mechanism is developed to dynamically track the time-varying
generation/consumption at Prosumer j which is regarded as a constant Stackelberg equilibrium.
in this study. When Prosumer j exports/imports energy, it follows
III. T HE P ROPOSED M ETHODOLOGY
from (2) that the traded power should satisfy
To determine the optimal NUP of the DNSP and the P2P trans-
U0t − Ujmax − 2xj Qtj U0t − Ujmin − 2xj Qtj
≤ Pjt ≤ . (3) active prices among the prosumers, decentralized P2P transactive
2rj 2rj approaches should be designed. They are facilitated by the commu-
Remark 2: When energy storage and responsive load are considered nication scheme depicted in Fig. 1.
in the model, inter-temporal constraints emerge which can be handled
A. Dual-Loop Iterative Approach
with two methodologies. In the first methodology, the prosumers
(resp. the DNSP) decide their P2P trading schedules (resp. the NUPs) To achieve the aforementioned objective for each period t, a dual-
of the next day all at once. However, the non-iterative feature of loop iterative approach is presented first, which serves as the basis for
online optimization to be detailed in Section III-B can no longer be the development of the non-iterative version as well as a benchmark
utilized. In the second methodology, the inter-temporal constraints for numerical comparison.
can be incorporated into the single-period decision making based on In the inner loop (indexed by κ), an optimal P2P trading among the
the approximate future cost function technique [7], which can be a prosumers can be iteratively achieved following [9] given the NUP
direction of our future research. from the outer loop (indexed by k):
xt,k,κ+1
j = arg min Costtj (xt,k t,k,κ
j , prj
t,k,κ
, [prm ,
t,k
xj ∈Xjt
B. Optimization of the DNSP Income
NUPt,k t,k
j,m ]m∈Nj ) + Penaltyj (xj ) (7a)
The DNSP intends to maximize its income from network fees, by
γ∆t X
addressing the following optimization problem: prjt,k,κ+1 = prjt,k,κ − P t,k,κ+1 t,k,κ+1 

outj − P m,j (7b)
X |Nj | + 1
max INC = NUPtj,m (µt )Pj,m
t
∆t (4a) m∈Nj
µt | {z }
(j,m)∈E
t,k,κ+1
s.t. ≜∆PIBj

µmin ≤ µt ≤ µmax (4b) where γ > 0 is a tuning parameter. The prosumer scheduling (7a)
minimizes the operation cost of Prosumer j based on the latest P2P
1 The DG cost can be approximated by Costt t t 2
DGj (pDGj ) = aj (pDGj ∆t) +
trading prices and NUP, where Penaltyj (xtj ) is similarly defined
bj ptDGj ∆t + cj with aj , bj , cj ≥ 0 being cost parameters. as (11) to penalize for failure of convergence due to e.g., agent
 3


misbehavior, and vanishes after convergence [9]. The P2P prices INCt − INCt−1
µt + ∆µ, if >0

t+1
update (7b) imitates the price bargaining process based on the demand µ = µt − µt−1 , (9a)
 t
and supply relationship in a multi-bilateral trading environment. µ − ∆µ, otherwise
t,k,κ
Process (7) iterates until ∆PIBj ≤ ϵ (ϵ is a sufficiently small γ∆t  t X
prjt+1 = prjt − P tm,j .

P outj − (9b)
positive number) for all j ∈ {1, · · · , N }, i.e., inner-loop convergence |Nj | + 1 m∈N j
is reached. The decision variables of Prosumer j after inner-loop 2) Based on the price signals of the previous step, each prosumer
convergence are denoted by xt,k∗j and prjt,k∗ . determines its optimal operation and trading schedule:
In the outer loop k, after receiving the converged P2P trading
t,k∗
quantities Pj,m (∀(j, m) ∈ E), the DNSP can update the price factor xt+1
j = arg min Costj (xt+1
j
t+1
, prjt+1 , [prm ,
xt+1 ∈Xjt+1
following  j

 t,k INCt,k∗ − INCt,(k−1)∗ NUPt+1 t+1

j,m ]m∈Nj ) + Penaltyj (xj ) (10)
µ + ∆µ, if >0
µt,k+1 = µt,k − µt,k−1 (8)
 t,k
µ − ∆µ, otherwise where
 2
 
γ 1  t+1
Penaltyj (xt+1
j )= t+1
Poutj t
∆t − Poutj ∆t − prj − prjt
where ∆µ > 0 is the step size, and INCt,k∗ = 2 γ
t t,k∗ t
(µt,k∗ ). Its intuition is that the
P 2
(j,m)∈E NUP j,m (µ )Pj,m γ X 
t+1 t 1  t+1 t 
DNSP income increases first and then decreases with µt increasing. + Pj,m ∆t − Pj,m ∆t + prm − prm . (11)
2 m∈N γ
Thus, when µt locates in the uphill section, it should be perturbed j

to increase, and vice versa. This updated price factor is sent back to This non-iterative process is more consistent to the current trading
the prosumers for the next round of inner-loop iterations. practice, i.e., the DNSP and sellers first release their prices, and then
the buyers determine the buying quantities accordingly. As there is no
TABLE I. Dual-loop iterative approach for period t
chance for the DNSP to adjust its NUP as in the iterative approach,
∆µ in (9a) should be chosen carefully. Specifically, a small ∆µ is
unable to track the ADN operation change in consecutive periods,
while a large ∆µ will render the NUP adjustment coarse and degrade
the decision optimality. Besides, feasibility, which may not be strictly
guaranteed without the inner-loop iteration (7), can be measured by
the prosumer power imbalance as
t t
X t
∆PIBj = Poutj − Pm,j . (12)
m∈Nj
t
A sufficiently small ∆PIBj
can be made up by fine tuning the traded
energy with the upstream grid, which will not substantially impact
the optimality.
TABLE II. DG Parameters
DG No. aj CNY/kWh2 bj CNY/kWh min kW
PDGj max kW
PDGj
1&4 0.0144 0.3 0 500
2&3 0.012 0.55 0 350

IV. C ASE S TUDY

This dual-loop iterative process is illustrated in TABLE I, which
continues until outer-loop convergence is reached, i.e., when µt,k
oscillates around a certain value. The limitations to this approach
are: 1) it requires high communication overhead, and the time of
convergence may not be suitable for implementation in a real-time
P2P market. 2) An iterative market clearing is not the status quo and
can hardly be accepted by the stakeholders.
B. Non-Iterative Transactive Approach
To avoid these limitations, we further develop for each period a
non-iterative version of the transactive approach, which is motivated
by the idea of online optimization [10]. The idea represents a family
of machine learning methods, where a learner attempts to tackle
some predictive task by learning from a sequence of data instances
one by one at each time [11]. Consequently, the aforementioned
iterative subroutines are not required to be fully executed. The prices
and trading quantities are only allowed to be submitted once for
each period, and thus the iterative indices k and κ are omitted
thereafter. Specifically, in the upcoming trading period t + 1, the
following two steps, which are based on the past information and
P2P communication, should be sequentially executed:
1) The DNSP and each prosumer update the price factor and P2P
trading price, respectively:
A case study is performed in an ADN with one DNSP and four
prosumers (as depicted in Fig. 1) for a typical day with a period of
∆t = 5 minutes. Specifically, 98% ≤ αj,m = αm,j ≤ 99% for
t t
any line (j, m), Pjmax = 90 kW, prRT ≡ 1.1 CNY/kWh, prFiT ≡
min max
0.5 CNY/kWh, µ = 0 CNY/kWh, and µ = 0.34 CNY/kWh
throughout the day. The ADN adopts a fully connected topology
with dj,m = 1 p.u. for simplicity. Each prosumer is equipped with a
single DG with parameters in TABLE II. The net load evolution of
each prosumer is plotted in Fig. 2(a). To exhibit that the proposed
time-varying NUP mechanism can increase the benefit of the DNSP,
Case 0 is performed with a constant µt = (µmin + µmax )/2 =
0.17 CNY/kWh as in [4]. Further, the results of the non-iterative
approach (denoted by Case 2) are compared to those of the dual-
loop iterative approach (denoted by Case 1). The numbers of outer
iterations and aggregated inner iterations at each period are plotted
in Fig. 2(b), which demonstrates the efficiency and practicability of
the non-iterative transactive approach.
The P2P trading results of different cases are illustrated in Fig. 3.
Specifically, although the optimal NUP in Case 2 follows the trend
of that in Case 1, their difference can be observed in Fig. 3(a).
Nevertheless, it can be observed from Figs. 3(b) and (c) that the
evolutions of DNSP income and prosumer costs are almost identical
in these two cases mainly because these values are not very sensitive
in the vicinity of the optimal NUP. Moreover, the DNSP income of
 4

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Fig. 3: The P2P trading results of different cases: (a) NUP; (b) DNSP
t , ∀j .
income; (c) Prosumer costs; (d) Imbalanced powers ∆PIB j

Cases 1 and 2 are significantly higher than that of Case 0. Fig. 3(d)
plots the prosumer imbalanced powers, which are shown to be within
a sufficiently small ±5 kW range most of the time.
Yun Liu (Senior Member, IEEE) obtained the B.Eng. (First Class Hons.) and
TABLE III. Economic Analysis of Different Cases Ph.D. degrees from the College of Electrical Engineering, Zhejiang University,
Pro. 1 Pro. 2 Pro. 3 Pro. 4 DNSP Hangzhou, China, in June 2011 and June 2016, respectively. His work
Cost Cost Cost Cost Income experience includes the University of Central Florida, Nanyang Technological
Case 0 1324.6 4165.5 3739.1 1049.3 397.2 University, and Shenzhen University. He is currently an Associate Professor
Case 1 1364.7 4211.4 3787.3 1095.7 481.3 in the School of Electric Power Engineering, South China University of
Rel. Err. Technology, Guangzhou, China. His research interests include microgrid,
3.03% 1.10% 1.29% 4.42% 21.17%
to Case 0 cyber-physical smart grid, distributed control/optimization, and cyber security.
Case 2 1370.9 4224.6 3790.3 1113.3 473.6 Dr. Liu is the Associate Editor for IET Smart Grid.
Rel. Err.
0.45% 0.31% 0.08% 1.61% -1.60%
to Case 1

The total costs of the prosumers and income of the DNSP are
documented in TABLE III for the three cases. By comparing the
results of Case 1 to Case 0, it can be observed that the time-varying
optimal NUP scheme can significantly increase the DNSP income by Yunqiang Gao obtained the B.Eng. degree from the College of Electrical
21.17% compared to the conventional fixed NUP scheme. Meanwhile, Engineering, Hebei University of Technology, Tianjin, China, in June 2021.
He is currently working toward the M.Eng. in the School of Electric Power
by comparing the results of Case 2 to Case 1, it can be concluded Engineering, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou, China. His
that the non-iterative transactive approach can indeed achieve near- major research interest includes P2P energy trading.
optimal P2P trading, where the DNSP income merely decreases by
1.60% and the prosumer costs increased by 1.61% at most.
V. C ONCLUSION
This paper investigates the optimal network utilization pricing
problem involving the DNSP and multiple prosumers. Distinguished Yuanzheng Li received the M.S. degree and Ph.D. degree in Electri-
from the existing research, its merits lie in: 1) The optimal NUP pric- cal Engineering from Huazhong University of Science and Technology
ing problem is formulated as a single-leader multi-follower Stackel- (HUST), Wuhan, China, and South China University of Technology (SCUT),
berg game. 2) To resolve the problem, a non-iterative P2P transactive Guangzhou, China, in 2011 and 2015, respectively. He has published several
peer-reviewed papers in international journals. His current research interests
approach is developed, which makes a compromise between solution include optimal power system/microgrid scheduling and decision making,
optimality and efficiency compared to its iterative counterpart. stochastic optimization considering large-scale integration of renewable en-
ergy into the power system and multi-objective optimization.
R EFERENCES Dr Li was a recipient of the Excellent PhD Thesis Foundation of SCUT in
2013 and 2014, respectively, the State Scholarship Fund of China Scholarship
[1] W. Tushar, C. Yuen, T. K. Saha, T. Morstyn, A. C. Chapman, M. J. E. Council Award in 2013, the National Scholarship for Ph.D. Students of China
Alam, S. Hanif, and H. V. Poor, “Peer-to-peer energy systems for Awards in 2014. Dr Li serves as a reviewer for several international journals,
connected communities: A review of recent advances and emerging such as IEEE Transactions on Power Systems and IEEE Transactions on Smart
challenges,” Appl. Energy, vol. 282, p. 116131, 2021. Grid.
 5

Jizhong Zhu (Fellow, IEEE) was born in Sichuan, China in 1966. He received
the B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. degrees in electrical engineering from Chongqing
University, Chongqing, China, in 1985, 1987, and 1990, respectively. His work
experience includes Chongqing University; Brunel University, U.K.; National
University of Singapore; Howard University; ALSTOM Grid Inc. and SEPRI,
CSG. He is a Fellow of IEEE and a Professor at the School of Electric Power
Engineering, South China University of Technology. His research interests
include power system operation and control as well as renewable energy
application.

Hoay Beng Gooi (Life Senior Member, IEEE) received his Ph.D. degree from
Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio in 1983. He worked as Assistant Pro-
fessor at Lafayette College, Easton, Pennsylvania during 1983-85 and Senior
Engineer at Control Data – Energy Management System Division, Plymouth,
Minnesota before joining Nanyang Technological University (NTU) in 1991,
Singapore. He is an Associate Professor with the School of Electrical and
Electronic Engineering. He has served as Co-Director of SP Group-NTU
Joint Lab since 2020 and Chairman, LMAG, IEEE Singapore since 2021.
He received Outstanding Associate Editor Award in 2021 for his contribution
towards IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. His current research interests
include microgrid energy management systems dealing with energy storage,
condition monitoring, electricity market, and spinning reserve.