Constitutional Law 1 Case Digest

FINAL REQUIREMENT
IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (7002)
Submitted by: Raddy Christer Padayao

Schedule: Sunday, 8:00 A.M -12:30 P.M
Submitted to: Atty. Gonzalo Malig-on, Jr.
Good day Atty. Malig-on! These are my compilation of case digests as a final requirement
in Constitutional Law 1. This is composed of 100 cases.
Thank you, Atty., And God Bless!

CASE NO. 1
Topic: Understanding the Constitution - Rules in interpretation
Title: Francisco, et al vs House Speaker, et al.
Citation: G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003
Facts:
• Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court
Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the
constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of
impeachment provided for by law.
Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional.
Ruling:
NO. It is unconstitutional. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful
of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative,
executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the
discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated
by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect
without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the
contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the
system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components.
CASE NO. 2
Topic: Political Question vs Justiciable Controversy
Title: Santiago vs Guingona
Citation: G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998
Facts:
• The majority leader informed the body that they had elected Senator Guingona as the
minority leader and the Senate President formally recognized him as the minority leader
of the Senate.
• The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject
petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that,
according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues:
Whether or not the Court have jurisdiction over the petition.
Ruling:
YES. The Court has jurisdiction over the petition. In Tañada v. Cueno, the Court endeavored to
define political question. And we said that "it refers to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular measure."
In this case, the petitioners try to hew closely to these jurisprudential parameters. They
claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the constitution, has not been observed in the selection of
the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of respondents.
Considering the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court has
jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire
whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely
abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
CASE NO. 3
Topic: Judicial Review based on Expanded Judicial Power
Title: Bondoc vs Pineda
Citation: 201 SCRA 792; G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991
Facts:
• In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the
NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga.
Pineda was proclaimed winner.
• Bondoc filed a protest in the HRET. A decision was reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda.
Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the
NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
• On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter
informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the
Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur
to join said political party.
• On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter
informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives
decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the
HRET.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court can review and annul the action of the House to change the party's
representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in a
pending election contest?
Ruling:
YES. The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and
legislative branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the
Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the
constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought
before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this case.
The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against
the strong arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea
for relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court,
as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his rights as
the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must perform its duty under the Constitution
"even when the violator be the highest official of the land or the Government itself"
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the HRET by the House of Representatives
was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc
case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of
Representatives is clearly violative of the constitution.
CASE NO. 4
Topic: Philippines as a State – National Territory
Title: Magallona, et al vs Ermita, et al.
Citation: G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011
Facts:
• This case assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9522, adjusting the country's archipelagic
baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories. It assails it on two principal
grounds, namely:
1. RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine
state's sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the
terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and
2. RA 9522 opens the country's waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all
vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country's nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
NO. RA 9522 does not dismember a large portion of the national territory. It does not discards the pre-
UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively
encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones. It is the culmination of decades-long
negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world's
oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States' graduated authority over a limited
span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
The demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone,
reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone.
Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance
of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will
of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent
areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippines' maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the
Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
CASE NO. 5
Topic: Citizenship - Modes of Acquisition: Citizens of the Philippines
Title: Tecson vs. COMELEC
Citation: G.R. NO. 161434 Mar. 3, 2004
Facts:
• Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, aka FPJ, filed his Presidential candidacy for the
2004 national elections. Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to
disqualify FPJ claiming he is not a natural born Filipino citizen his parents being
foreigners. His father was a Spanish national, being the son of a Spanish subject. While
his mother was an American citizen.
Issue:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Ruling:
Yes. FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Under Article 4 Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution,
natural born Filipino citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those born before
January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers who elected their Philippine citizenship when they reached
the age of majority are also considered natural born Filipino citizens.
FPJ was born in Manila on August 20, 1939 hence the 1935 Constitution would apply to
his case. Under the 1935 Constitution, those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. In the case of FPJ, the petitioners contended that FPJ’s father
was Spanish national being a son of a Spanish subject and his mother was an American citizen.
They also contended that since FPJ was an illegitimate child, assuming his father is proven to be
a Filipino citizen, the Philippine citizenship of his father could not be passed on to him because of
this condition.
There was no evidence presented as to when FPJ’s grandfather was born. Although, his
death certificate identified him to be Filipino, resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and was 84 years
old at the time of his death in 1954. With this, we could deduce he was born sometime in 1870 and
could have benefited from the en masse Filipinization in 1902. Therefore, FPJ’s father is a Filipino
citizen. The 1935 Constitution, which applies to FPJ’s case since he was born in 1939, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
CASE NO. 6
Title: Mo Ya Lim Yao vs Commission on Immigration
Citation: 41 SCRA 29
Facts:
• On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines
as a non-immigrant. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961.
• On the date of her arrival, Asher Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in the country or
within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration.
• After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13,
1962. On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, an alleged Filipino citizen.
• Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate
her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her
authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction.
• The Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya
Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
Issue:
Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
YES. Under Section 15 of CA 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows
the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided
that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien
woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to
Section 16.
Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the
proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceeding in order to be considered as
a Filipino citizen. It should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same
privilege. Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein
as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out
again and again as the occasion may demand.
CASE NO. 7
Title: Valles vs. COMELEC
Citation: 337 SCRA 543, G.R. No. 137000 August 9, 2000
Facts:
• Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and
an Australian mother.
• In 1949, at the age of 15, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. She later
married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral process not only as a
voter but as a candidate.
• In the May 1998 elections, she ran for Governor but Valles filed a petition for her
disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is not a Filipino.
Issue:
Whether or not Rosalind is a Filipino.
Ruling:
YES. She is a Filipino. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
In here, the child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of
his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on
the basis of place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and
at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by
which the US governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902, and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on
April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.
Private respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.
Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a
Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth,
Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of
the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of
jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship.
CASE NO. 8
Title: Balgamelo Cabiling, et al vs Commissioner
Citation: GR No. 183133, July 26, 2010
Facts:
• Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.), Valeriano
Cabiling Ma (Valeriano), Lechi Ann Ma (Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma (Arceli), Nicolas Ma
(Nicolas), and Isidro Ma (Isidro) are the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, a Taiwanese,
and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina.
• They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in the country for almost sixty 60
years. They spent their whole lives, studied, and received their primary and secondary
education in the country. They do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have
not set foot in Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father. They have not even
traveled abroad, and they have already raised their respective families in the Philippines.
• When they were still minors, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien
Certificates of Registration (ACRs). When they reached 21 yrs. old, they claimed
Philippine citizenship in accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935
Constitution.
• The petitioners took their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, however, they failed to
have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry. It was only on July 27,
2005, or more than thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine citizenship that they did
so.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are Filipino citizens.
Ruling:
YES. The petitioners are Filipino citizens. According to Section 1 of C.A. No. 625, the statutory
formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: 1) a statement of election under oath, 2) an oath
of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines and 3) registration of the
statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
In this case, though the petitioners failed to register their election of Philippine citizenship
in the civil registry, the court held that it should not defeat the election and negate the permanent
fact that they have a Filipino mother. They are considered to be Filipino citizens upon their election
of such citizenship as registration is not a mode of acquiring a right. It is just a means of confirming
the fact that citizenship has been claimed.
The court further held that the lacking requirement may still be complied with subject to
the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties.
CASE NO. 9
Topic: Citizenship
Title: Aznar vs COMELEC
Citation: GR No. 83820, May 25, 1990
Facts:
• On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of
candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Cebu Governor 1988 local elections
which he later won.
• Petitioner Jose B. Aznar, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of
Osmeña on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen. Aznar presented the
following evidence to show that Osmena is an American citizen: Application for Alien
Registration of the Bureau of Immigration, Alien Certificate of Registration, Permit to
Re-enter the Philippines, and Immigration Certificate of Clearance.
• COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed
and for lack of sufficient proof that Osmena is not a Filipino citizen.
Issue:
Whether or not Osmeña renounced his Filipino citizenship with the mere possession of an alien
passport.
Ruling:
NO. Mere possession of an alien passport is not enough proof of renunciation of Filipino
citizenship. In the proceedings before the COMELEC, Aznar failed to present direct proof that
Osmena had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.
Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, Osmeña did not lose his Philippine
citizenship by any of the three mentioned above or by any other mode of losing Philippine
citizenship.
In concluding that Osmena had been naturalized as a citizen of the USA, Aznar merely
relied on the fact that Osmena was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance
and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Aznar
assumed that because of the foregoing, Osmena is an American and "being an American", Osmena
"must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that Osmena is a Filipino
remains. It was incumbent upon Aznar to prove that Osmena had lost his Philippine citizenship
however, he failed to positively establish this fact.
CASE NO. 10
Topic: Citizenship - Foundling
Title: Llamansares vs COMELEC, et al.
Citation: G.R. No. 221677-22116700, March 11, 2016
Facts:
• Grace Poe was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Jaro, Iloilo. She was legally
adopted by FPJ and Susan Roces in 1974. She then immigrated to the US in 1991 after
her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares and later became a naturalized American citizen.
• She returned to the Philippines because of his father’s deteriorating medical condition
and eventual death. She quit her job in the US and went home to the Philippines for good
to be with her grieving mother.
• On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her
Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new
Philippine Passport. She renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225
requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship.
• She ran for President on the May 2016 elections and declared she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen. Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her
candidacy on the ground particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a
natural born Filipino citizen since she was a foundling and that her bioligical parents
cannot be proved as Filipinos.
• COMELEC cancelled her candidacy. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not a foundling can be a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
YES. A foundling can be a natural-born Filipino. There is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has
Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. The burden of proof was on private respondents to
show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. Grace Poe’s admission that she is a foundling did not shift the
burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially
as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
There is high probability that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical
features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a
municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing
99% chance that Poe’s biological parents are Filipinos.
All of the foregoing evidence would indicate more than ample probability, if not statistical
certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the
virtually impossible, as the norm.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
CASE NO. 11
Topic: Citizenship - Reacquisition
Title: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC
Citation: 257 SCRA 731; G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996
Facts:
• Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed Governor-elect of Sorsogon. On October 27, 1988,
the League of Cities of Sorsogon President Salvador Estuye filed a petition with COMELEC to
disqualify Frivaldo on the grounds that he was a naturalized citizen of the US.
• Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized as an American citizen but pleaded that he had sought
American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. Frivaldo was considered
as an enemy of the Government at the time and went to the US seeking refuge and his
naturalization is not impressed with voluntariness as he went back after the Marcos Regime to the
country. He argues that he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by participating in the election.
• Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent
Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for
hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February
21, 1988, to which Frivaldo then filed a motion for certiorari and prohibition to the court.
Issue:
Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election.
Ruling:
NO. He was considered a foreigner. The Local Government Code section 42 indicates that a candidate for
local elective office must be a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where is
running.
Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under
Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
If the petitioner really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No.
63, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country
while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon
does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the
citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate
alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially
if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires
strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity
to any other state.
CASE NO. 12
Topic: Citizenship - Reacquisition
Title: Tabasa vs Court of Appeals
Citation: G.R. NO. 125793, August 29, 2006
Facts:
• Petitioner Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. When he was 7 yrs. old, his father
became a naturalized citizen of the US and by derivative naturalization he also acquired US
Citizenship.
• In 1995, petitioner went back to the Philippines and was admitted as a "balikbayan" for one year.
Thereafter, he was arrested and detained by an agent of BID. The Consul General of the U.S.
Embassy in Manila filed a request with the BID to apprehend and deport the petitioner on the
ground that a standing warrant for several federal charges has been issued against him, and that
his passport has been revoked.
• Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order. At the time, when the petitioner filed said petition, he was already
35 years old. While the case was pending, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he
had acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with R.A. No. 8171, and that
because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau.
Issue:
Whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171.
Ruling:
NO. Petitioner did not reacquire his Filipino citizenship under RA 8171. The only persons entitled to
repatriation under RA 8171 are the following:
a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and
b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity.
The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost
their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-
born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or
economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor
children according to the law. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-
born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood
relationship: the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos.
To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition
for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts
of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own,
the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents.
CASE NO. 13
Topic: Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance
Title: Mercado vs. Manzano
Citation: 307 SCRA 630; G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999
Facts:
• Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for
Vice Mayor of the City of Makati. The proclamation of Edu Manzano was suspended in
view of a pending petition for his disqualification with allegations that respondent was
not a Filipino citizen but an American citizen.
• On May 7, 1998, COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition and ordered the
cancellation of the COC of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen.
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective local position.
• Pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers
tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of
the winner.
• Subsequently, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. Respondent
opposed contending that at the time of the Elections, the resolution of the COMELEC
was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even
assuming that Edu Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-
Mayor of the City of Makati.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Manzano is a Filipino citizen and is he qualified to run for Vice
Mayor.
Ruling:
YES. Edu Manzano is a Filipino citizen and thus qualified to run for the position of Vice Mayor
of Makati. The COMELEC held that Manzano acquired US citizenship by operation of the US
laws under the principle of jus soli. His acquisition of his US citizenship was not voluntary. He
was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his
Philippine citizenship since he did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States. It is an
undisputed fact that when Manzano attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter,
and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship
under American law.
Article IV Section 5 of the Constitution provides that dual allegiance of citizens is inimical
to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. Dual citizenship is not dual allegiance as
such dual allegiance and not dual citizenship shall be dealt with by the law.
CASE NO. 14
Topic: Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance
Title: Jacot vs Dal and COMELEC
Citation: GR No. 179848, November 27, 2008
Facts:
• Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from
running for the position of Vice-Mayor in the 2007 Elections, on the ground that he failed
to make a personal renouncement of US citizenship.
• He was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the
US. He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225.
Issue:
Whether or not Nestor Jacot effectively renounced his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run
as a vice-mayor?
Ruling:
NO. Petitioner did not effectively renounce his US citizenship. Under Section 3 of R.A. No.
9225, natural-born Filipino citizens who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country must
take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine
citizenship.
In this provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there it doesn’t
include an expressed renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might arise under
R.A. No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his
Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship. Such oath of allegiance is substantially
similar to the one contained in the COC which must be executed by any person who wishes to run
for public office in Philippine elections.
In this case, the petitioner’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines made before the Los
Angeles PCG and his COC do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied
with for different purposes. The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office,
who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to
administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
CASE NO. 15
Topic: Doctrine of Parens Patriae
Title: Soriano vs Laguardia
Citation: G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009; 587 SCRA 79
Facts:
• On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating
Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC.
• Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints
were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of
the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against Soriano in connection with the above broadcast.
• Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was
then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
• The MTRCB found Soriano liable for his utterances and imposed on him a three-month
suspension from his program.
Issue:
Whether or not the suspension by the MTRCB is invalid for violation of freedom of religion,
speech, and expression.
Ruling:
NO. The suspension is valid and constitutional. Article 3 of the Constitution provides that “no
law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof… and no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press…”
In this case, there is nothing in Soriano’s statements expressing religious belief. The fact
that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically
accord them the character of religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person
cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Consequently, Soriano’s statement can be
treated as obscene, at least taking into consideration that the program is for general viewership and
in a timeslot that would likely reach even the eyes and ears of children, exposing them to a
language that is unacceptable in everyday use. In this sense, the Court finds such utterances not
entitled to protection under the umbrella of freedom of speech.
Freedom of religion as well as of speech and expression, like any other rights, are not
absolute. They may be regulated to some extent to serve important public interests. Arrayed against
the freedom of speech is the right of the youth to their moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social
being which the State is constitutionally tasked to promote and protect. As such, the welfare of the
children and the State’s mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a
substantial and compelling government interest in regulating TV broadcast.
CASE NO. 16
Topic: Sovereignty and the Theory of Auto-limitation
Title: Tañada vs Angara
Citation: G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997
Facts:
• On April 15, 1994, Rizalino Navarro, the Secretary of DTI signed the Final Act
Embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations.
• By signing the Final Act, the Philippines is bound to submit to its respective competent
authorities the WTO Agreements to seek approval. On December 14, 1994, the Senate
adopted Resolution No. 97 to ratify the WTO agreement.
• This is a petition seeking to nullify the ratification of the WTO Agreement.
• Petitioners question the concurrence of the respondents acting in their capacities as
Senators by signing the said agreement and the constitutionality of the WTO agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not sovereignty can be limited by international laws and treaties.
Ruling:
YES. Sovereignty can be limited by international laws and treaties. While sovereignty has
traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however
subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or
impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in
international law is pacta sunt servanda -- international agreements must be performed in good
faith. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By
their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater
benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live
with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly
agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights.
The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality, be considered absolute.
Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership
in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.
A portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the
rationale that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation,
and amity with all nations.”
CASE NO. 17
Topic: Doctrine of Non-Suability of the State
Title: Tan vs. Director of Forestry
Citation: G.R. No. L-24548. October 27, 1983
Facts:
• Bureau of Forestry initiated a public bidding on a certain tract of public forest land
wherein petitioner submitted his bid application. Questions were raised on the wisdom of
the forest land to be declared as a forest reserve or continue with the public bidding to
open the said area for timber exploitation under license and regulation.
• On April 15, 1963, petitioner was awarded the timber license by the Director of Forestry
without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
• On March 9, 1964, the Secretary acting on a case filed by another bidder against the
petitioner, promulgated an order declaring the license issued to the petitioner void ab
initio. Petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Secretary.
Thus, petitioner filed a case in court.
• Petitioner claims that the respondent unlawfully acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber
license without just cause, and in eﬀect, impaired the obligation of contracts. Petitioner
prays for declaring the orders of the Secretary, as well as all his acts and those of the
Director of Forestry implementing said orders, null and void. He is also asking for the
respondent to pay him for pecuniary damage, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees and costs.
• The respondent filed a motion to dismiss and one of their grounds was that the State is
immune from suit without its consent. The court decided in favor of the respondent.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioner’s action in court is a suit against the State and should be dismissed.
Ruling:
YES. The petitioner failed to note that his action is a suit against the State which, under the
Doctrine of State Immunity, the case cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued.
This rule cannot be circumvented by directing the action against the officers of the State instead
of against the State itself which is clearly demonstrated on this case. Based on the facts presented,
it was shown that the suit filed by the respondent really affects the property rights, or interests of
the State and not merely those of the officers of the State, like the government losing its timber
resources and the request of the petitioner for monetary claims for damages. This being the case,
petitioner's suit cannot prosper and suit should be dismissed.
CASE NO. 18
Title: Mobile Philippines Inc. vs Customs Arrastre Service
Citation: 18 SCRA 1120; G.R. No. L-23139, December 17, 1966
Facts:
• Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad consigned to Mobil Philippines.
It was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau
of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later
delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only.
• Petitioner filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre
Service and the BOC to recover the value of the undelivered case plus other damages.
• The respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that not being persons under the
law, they cannot be sued.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents can invoke state immunity.
Ruling:
YES. The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature
does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as
an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity
from suit extended to such government entity.
The Bureau of Customs is part of the Department of Finance with no personality of its own
apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing
and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees,
charges, fines and penalties. To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident.
CASE NO. 19
Title: National Airports Corp vs Teodoro
Citation: 91 Phil 203; G.R. No. L-5122, April 30, 1952
Facts:
• The National Airports Corporation was organized under RA No. 224, which expressly
made the provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to the said corporation. It was
abolished by EO No. 365 and in its place the Civil Aeronautics Administration was
created. Before the abolition, the PAL paid to the National Airports Corporation P65,245
as fees for landing and parking for the period up to and including July 31, 1948. These
fees are said to have been due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., who owned
the land used by the National Airports Corporation as airport. The owner commenced an
action in the court against the PAL.
• PAL countered with a third-party complaint against the National Airports Corporation,
which by that time had been dissolved, and served summons on the Civil Aeronautics
Administration. PAL alleged that it had paid to the National Airports Corporation the fees
claimed by the Capitol Subdivision, Inc.
• The Solicitor General, after answering the third party complaint, filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the third- party complaint, first,
because the National Airports Corporation “has lost its juridical personality,” and,
second, because agency of the Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated and not
possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of suing and being sued.
Issue:
Whether or not the Civil Aeronautics Administration can be subject to the suit.
Ruling:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the
category of a private entity. Although not a corporate body, it was created not to maintain a
necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially a business. Even if revenues is
not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the traveling
public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may,
more than the construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns.
In the light of a well-established precedents, and as a matter of simple justice to the parties
who dealt with the National Airports Corporation on the faith of equality in the enforcement of
their mutual commitments, the Civil Aeronautics Administration may not, and should not, claim
for itself the privileges and immunities of the sovereign state.
CASE NO. 20
Title: China National Machinery & Equipment vs Sta. Maria
Citation: GR No. 185572, April 24, 2012
Facts:
• Petitioner CNMEG was designated by the Republic of China as its prime contractor for
the Northrail project of the Republic of the Philippines. They entered into a Contract
Agreement with the North Luzon Railways Corporation for the construction of the said
project. A subsequent loan agreement was also contracted between the Philippine
government and the EXIM bank as part of the MOU executed between the Philippine
government and China wherein they agreed to finance the project.
• Respondents filed a complaint for Annulment of Contract against CNMEG together with
the government agencies involved with the project. They alleged that the contract
agreement and the loan agreement was unconstitutional.
• Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss citing the trial court did not have jurisdiction as it is
immune from suit. The RTC denied their motion and was concurred by the CA. Hence,
this instant petition for Review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not CNMEG is entitled to immunity from suit.
Ruling:
NO. The court explained the doctrine of state immunity based on the newer restrictive theory
which the Philippines adheres to. The immunity of the state is recognized only with regards to
public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regards to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
Simply put, acts governmental in nature are immune from suits however commercial, private, and
proprietary acts are not covered in this doctrine.
Since the Philippines adheres to this restrictive theory, the petitioner have to ascertain the
legal acts they performed with the various government agencies is governmental in nature.
However, a thorough examination of the facts would show that CNMEG, although being declared
as the prime contractor by the Republic of China, is engaged in proprietary activity. For one, it
was CNMEG who initiated the undertaking of the Northrail project and not the Chinese
government as confirmed by the Chinese ambassador. Second, the loan agreement entered into by
EXIM bank and the Philippine government contained an express waiver of authority.
Thus, piecing together the contents and tenor of the Contract Agreement, the statement of
the Chinese Ambassador, and the loan agreement would reveal the desire of CNMEG to construct
the project in pursuit of a purely commercial activity performed in the ordinary course of its
business. Even though assuming that CNMEG was performing a governmental function, it does
not automatically immune from suit. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the
objects for which the entity was organized.
CASE NO. 21
Title: Professional Video, Inc., vs. TESDA
Citation: G.R. No. 155504, June 26, 2009
Facts:
• TESDA’s conducted two (2) public biddings for the printing and encoding of PVC cards
but it resulted to failed biddings. Because of this the PBAC recommended that TESDA
enter into a negotiated contract with PROVI, entity engaged in the sale of high
technology equipment, information technology products and broadcast devices, including
the supply of plastic card printing and security facilities.
• On December 29, 1999, TESDA and PROVI signed and executed their contract of
service for the provision of goods and services in the printing and encoding of PVC
cards. TESDA would in return pay PROVI Php 39,475,00 within fifteen (15) days after
TESDA’s acceptance of the contracted goods and services. However, TESDA paid
PROVI only P3,739,500.00, leaving an outstanding balance of P35,735,500.00.
• PROVI filed a complaint for sum of money with damages against TESDA. The RTC
granted PROVI’s prayer and issued a writ of preliminary attachment against the
properties of TESDA not exempt from execution in the amount of P35, 000,000.00.
• TESDA responded by filing a Motion to Discharge/Quash the Writ of Attachment,
arguing mainly that public funds cannot be the subject of garnishment. The RTC denied
TESDA’s motion. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not TESDA can invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit.
Ruling:
YES. TESDA replaced and absorbed the National Manpower and Youth Council, the Bureau of
Technical and Vocational Education and the personnel and functions pertaining to technical-
vocational education in the regional offices of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
and the apprenticeship program of the Bureau of Local Employment of the DOLE. Thus, TESDA
is an unincorporated instrumentality of the government operating under its own charter.
Under these terms, both constitutional and statutory, we do not believe that the role and
status of TESDA can seriously be contested: it is an unincorporated instrumentality of the
government, directly attached to the DOLE through the participation of the Secretary of Labor as
its Chairman, for the performance of governmental functions. As an unincorporated
instrumentality operating under a specific charter, it is equipped with both express and implied
powers, and all State immunities fully apply to it.
TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its consent.
CASE NO. 22
Topic: Doctrine of Non-Suability of the State - Can LGUs be sued?
Title: Municipality of San Fernando vs Judge Firme
Citation: 195 SCRA 692; G.R. No. L-52179, April 8, 1991
Facts:
• A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate of Macario
Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of
the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the
impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died and four
others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
• On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a compliant for damages
against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver,
respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third
Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.
• Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action
and non-suability of the State.
Issue:
Whether or not the Municipality of San Fernando may be sued.
Ruling:
NO. The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the
Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."
Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State may not be sued except when it gives
consent to be sued. Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the
State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083.
A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-delict.
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the
other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the
mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it
is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
Is the municipality liable for the torts committed by its employee? The test of liability of the
municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing
governmental or proprietary functions.
CASE NO. 23
Title: USA vs. Guinto
Facts:
• On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, U.S.
Air Force, solicited bids for such contracts through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw. Among
those that submitted their bids were the private respondents.
• The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the private respondents, who
claimed that he had made a bid for four facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area, which
was not included in the invitation to bid.
• The private respondents complained to the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX). The latter,
through its representatives petitioners Reeves and Shouse, explained that the Civil Engineering
concession had not been awarded to Dizon as a result of the February 24 th solicitation. Dizon was
already operating this concession and the expiration of the contract had been extended. Private
respondents filed a case to compel PHAX to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding,
and by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operation of concessions pending litigation
• Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against the
United States of America, which had not waived its non-suability. The individual defendant, as
official employees of the US Air Force, were also immune from suit.
• Trial court denied the petition on the basis that the Court's attention is called by the relationship
between the plaintiffs as well as the defendants, including the US Government, in that prior to the
bidding or solicitation in question, there was a binding contract between the plaintiffs as well as
the defendants, including the US Government.
Issue:
• Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.
Ruling:
NO. The petitioner is not immune from suit. The rule that a state may not be sued without its
consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under
Article II, Section 2.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted
principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted
by most states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a
condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such
society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with
other states.
The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express
consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the state
enters a contract or it itself commences litigation.
CASE NO. 24
Title: Republic of Indonesia vs Vinzon
Citation: GR No. 54705, June 26, 2003
Facts:
• Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, entered into a
Maintenance of Agreement with respondent Vinzon, stating that the latter shall maintain
specified equipment at the former’s Embassy and the Wisma Duta, official residence of
petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin.
• Before the expiration of said agreement, the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister
Counsellor Kasim, found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory. Hence, the
Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement.
• Respondent claims that the termination was arbitrary and unlawful and filed a complaint
against petitioners. In turn, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the
Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit
and cannot be sued as party-defendant in the Philippines, that Ambassador Soeratmin and
Minister Counsellor Kasim are diplomatic agents and therefore enjoy diplomatic
immunity.
• Respondent filed an Opposition alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has expressly
waived its immunity from suit. The trial court denied herein petitioner’s Motion and was
brought up to the Court of Appeals. The petition was again denied by the CA as well as
petitioner’s following motion for reconsideration. Hence, this case was brought to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
• Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity
from suit.
Ruling:
YES. The Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit. By the
principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim “par in parem non habet
imperium,” all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another, for a
contrary attitude would unduly vex the peace of nations. Subject to restrictive theory, it holds that
the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only regarding public acts or acts jure imperii, as
opposed to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii, its
establishment encompasses its maintenance and upkeep and clearly a pursuit of a sovereign
activity. Further, the existence alone, of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action
arising out of an agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a
specified court of the Philippines, is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit.
CASE NO. 25
Title: USA vs Ruiz
Facts:
• The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of
those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US.
• Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US for the construction of
wharves in said base that was wrongly awarded to another group.
• For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.
Issue:
• Whether or not the United States Naval Base may be able to invoke state immunity.
Ruling:
YES. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of
another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles
of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified;
they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied,
it has been necessary to distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental acts and private,
commercial, and proprietary acts. The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign
and governmental acts.
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out
of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities, or economic affairs.
A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have
tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters business contracts. It does not apply where
the contract relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the projects are an integral
part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines,
indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
CASE NO. 26
Title: Amigable vs Cuenca
Facts:
• Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the
Banilad Estate in Cebu City. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the
government used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the
construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
• Amigable filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca,
in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways, for the recovery of ownership and
possession the land plus damages.
• The trial court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in
question on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent.
• Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure a reconsideration, the
plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently certified the case to the
SC, there being no question of fact involved.
Issue:
• Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government.

Ruling:
YES. Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without
going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may
properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without its consent.
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.
It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, which
is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes
manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of
immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her
certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot
to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she
could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership
CASE NO. 27
Title: Department of Agriculture vs NLRC
Citation: G.R. No. 104296, March 29, 1996
Facts:
• Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered a contract for
security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity.
• On September 13, 1990, several guards of Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift
differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as damages.
• The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding petitioner and Sultan Security Agency
jointly liable for the claims of the complainant security guards. The Department of
Agriculture and the security agency did not appeal and made the decision final and
executory.
• The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution, 5 commanding the City Sheriff to enforce
and execute the judgment against the property of the two respondents.
• A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of
injunction, was led by the petitioner with the NLRC and contended that the Labor Arbiter
has no jurisdiction over them and that the decision should be null and void.
• The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived
its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
Issue:
• Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State is applicable?
Ruling:
NO. The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental
entity when it entered the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act
proprietary in character.
The claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims. Act No.
3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising
from contract, express or implied. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by
PD 1145, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit.
The Supreme Court granted the petition of the petitioner. The writ of execution directed
against the property of the Department of Agriculture is nullified, and the public respondents are
hereby enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and implementing any and all writs of execution
issued pursuant to the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter against said petitioner.
CASE NO. 28
Topic: State Principles and Policies - Adherence to International Law (Incorporation Clause)
Title: Kuroda vs Jalandoni
Citation: 83 Phil 171, March 26, 1949
Facts:
• Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda was a former Japanese Lt. General and Commanding
General of the Japanese Imperial Forces from 1943 to 1944 in the Philippines. He was
tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities
committed against military and civilians. The military commission was established under
Executive Order 68.
• Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional. Hence, the Military
Commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the grounds that the Philippines is
not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes).
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional.
Ruling:
YES. EO 68 is constitutional hence the Military Commission has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO
68 was enacted by the President in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of the Constitution which
renounces war as an instrument of national policy.
It is in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law including the
Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence established by
the UN. This includes the principle that all persons, military or civilian, who are guilty of planning,
preparing, waging a war of aggression, and other similar offenses in violation of laws and customs
of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and
regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law
which the Philippines adheres to.
CASE NO. 29
Topic: State Principles and Policies - Adherence to International Law (Incorporation Clause)
Title: Philip-Morris vs. CA
Citation: G.R. No. 91332, July 16, 1993
Facts:
• Petitioner Philip Morris Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of the US and is the
registered owner of the trademark MARK VII for cigarettes. Benson and Hedges (Canada),
a subsidiary of Philip Morris, is the registered owner of the trademark MARK TEN for
cigarettes. Another subsidiary of Philip Morris, the Swiss Company Fabriques de Tabac
Reunies, is the assignee of the trademark LARK. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, a company
organized in the Philippines, manufactures and sells cigarettes using the trademark MARK.
• Petitioner filed a complaint for trademark infringement and damages against Fortune
Tobacco Corporation which was dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners went on appeal to
the CA but CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. The CA found that MARK VII, MARK
TEN and LARK do not qualify as well-known marks entitled to protection even without
the benefit of actual use in the local market and that the similarities in the trademarks in
question are insufficient as to cause deception or confusion tantamount to infringement.
• With the motion for reconsideration denied in the CA, the petitioners filed a petition for
review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent committed trademark infringement against petitioners.
Ruling:
NO. A trademark is any distinctive word, name, symbol, emblem, sign, or device, or any
combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant on his goods to identify and
distinguish them from those manufactured, sold, or dealt in by others. Inarguably, trademark
deserves protection. It is for this reason that the petitioner’s recourse for their entitlement to enforce
trademark rights in this country and the right to sue for trademark infringement in Philippine courts
and be accorded protection against unauthorized use of the Philippine-registered trademarks is
understandable.
Philippines adherence to the Paris Convention obligates the country to honor and enforce
its provisions, however, this does not automatically entitle petitioners to the protection of their
trademark in our country without actual use of the marks in local commerce and trade because any
protection accorded must be made subject to the limitations of Philippine laws.
Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law
are given equal standing, not superior, to national legislative enactments. The fact that international
law has been made part of the law of the land does not imply the primacy of international law over
national law in the municipal sphere.
CASE NO. 30
Topic: State Principles and Policies - Conflict of Municipal Law vs International Law
Title: Ichong vs Hernandez
Citation: 101 Phil 1155, May 31, 1957
Facts:
• RA No. 1180 known as, “An Act to Regulate Retail Business” was enacted which nationalizes the
retail trade business by prohibiting against aliens, as well as associations, partnerships or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade with the exception of aliens who are already
engaged in said business on May 15, 1954 as well as U.S. citizens and juridical entities. It also
prohibits against the establishment or opening by aliens already engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business. Aliens are required to present registration to the
proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses.
• Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the law, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that
said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting
under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner
contends among others, that the law denies alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 1180 is constitutional.
Ruling:
YES, it is constitutional. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Section 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution)
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not.
The Court held that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to
national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country
from dominance and control. The enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State,
thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future. The law does
not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction
between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege.
CASE NO. 31
Topic: State Principles and Policies - Conflict of Municipal Law vs International Law
Title: Gonzales vs Hechanova
Facts:
• The Philippines entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the
importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from
the National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice.
• Then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons
of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters.
• Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association
assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because RA 3452 prohibits the importation of
rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 3452 can prevail over the 2 Executive Agreements?
Ruling:
YES. In case of conflict between international law and municipal law, efforts should first be
exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal
law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the incorporation clause.
In a situation, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a
rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be
upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are
accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
CASE NO. 32
Topic: State Principles and Policies - Separation of Church and State
Title: Ebralinag vs Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu
Facts:
• The petitioners were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu
for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as
required by RA 1265 (An Act making flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions) and by DO No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony
in All Educational Institutions) of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
• Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they taught their children not to salute the flag, sing
the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of
worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or
anything except God". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State.
They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge
transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the
intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control.
Issue:
Whether or not the school children who are members of a religious sect may be expelled from
school for disobedience of RA 1265 and DO No. 8.
Ruling:
NO. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the
amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the
existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil
to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State
has a right and duty to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the
petitioners from the schools is not justified.
The Court is not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag,
singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, will shake up our part of the globe
and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the
flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes". Expelling or banning the
petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in
Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a
ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect
for dully constituted authorities.
CASE NO. 33
Topic: State Principles and Policies - Separation of Church and State
Title: Ymbong vs Ochoa
Citation: G.R. No. 294819, April 8, 2014
Facts:
• Despite calls to withhold support, R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on
December 21, 2012.
• Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The RH
Law violates the right to life of the unborn, the right to health and the right to protection
against hazardous products, and to religious freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary
servitude, among others.
• While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they
argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the
"compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of
religion and the right to free speech.
• The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not the RH law is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
NO. The Court does not find the RH Law unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare
services, methods, devices, and supplies.
However, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in
pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious
freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group
cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves
enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded
so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
CASE NO. 34
Topic: Legislative Department - Reserved lawmaking power
Title: Santiago vs. COMELEC
Citation: 270 SCRA 106 (1997)
Facts:
• Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the
constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through People’s Initiative.
• He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for
the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the
petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing.
• The petitioners Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil
action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the
Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional
provision on people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law
to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice
as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative.
Issue:
Whether or not RA No. 6735 is sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s
initiative.
Ruling:
NO. RA No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
amend. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with
respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended
or repealed" denotes that RA No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local
Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means
that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No.
6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things,
the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
CASE NO. 35
Topic: Legislative Department – On Party-List
Title: Barangay Association for National Advancement (BANAT) vs COMELEC
Citation: G.R. 179271, April 21, 2009
Facts:
• On 27 June 2002, Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency

(BANAT) filed before the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) a petition to proclaim the
full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the
recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s national board of
canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en
banc.
• BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution of
COMELEC to their petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives
provided by the Constitution.
• The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen (13)
parties as winners in the party-list elections in May 2007. The COMELEC announced that,
upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number
of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans
Federation Party v. COMELEC formula.
• Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked the
COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula.
COMELEC denied the consideration.
• Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition
assailing the resolution of the COMELEC in its decision to use the Veterans formula.
Issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list
elections?
Ruling:
(1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of
party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art
VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to
Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list
representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of
the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause
of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes
it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when
the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in
the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20%
of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. We
therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents
an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives.”
(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating
in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote
of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties
from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
CASE NO. 36
Topic: Legislative Department – On Party-List
Title: Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs COMELEC
Facts:
• In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC
Second Division's resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida's (PBB) registration and
accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied
participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-
list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift
the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented." 20 SDHCac
• These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI,
ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a
mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued
Resolution No. 9604, 21 and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of
the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
• Pursuant to paragraph 2 22 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled
summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed
manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have
continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
• The 39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing
the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official
ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Ruling:
NO. The COMELEC did not committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme
Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two
cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: national parties or organizations,
regional parties or organizations, and sectoral parties or organizations.
National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major
or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections
only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in
“well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and
underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized
and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-
defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent
those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of
national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
CASE NO. 37
Topic: House of Representatives – Residence Requirement
Title: Marcos vs. COMELEC
Citation: September 18, 1995
Facts:
• Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her COC for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte on March 8, 1995.On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy
Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for
the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification with the
COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates to the House of
representative. He prayed that an order be issued declaring petitioner disqualified and
canceling the certificate of candidacy.
• On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended COC.
• Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected COC with the COMELEC's Head
Office in Intramuros, Manila on March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's
petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said
Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of
Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" which she sought to rectify by
adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
• On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation
should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the
COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation
of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
• In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of
Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained
a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo.
• On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional
seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her
proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a
period of one year at the time of the May 8, 1995 elections.
Ruling:
YES. It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting
down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The
circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte
instead of her period of residence in the First District, which was "since childhood" in the space
provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second
Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein
petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in
the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a
resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in
the First District, which was Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her
Certificate of Candidacy
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First
District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,
1995 maintains that "except for the time when studied and worked for some years after graduation
in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts
as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last
few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided
in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the
election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she
registered as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa
and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a
resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in
different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for
various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or
to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.
Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City
since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident
of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made
distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.
CASE NO. 38
Topic: House of Representatives – Residence Requirement
Title: Aquino vs. COMELEC
Citation: G.R. No. 120265, Sept. 18, 1995
Facts:
• Petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his COC for the position of Representative for the new
Second Legislative District of Makati City.
• Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify
Agapito A. Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman.
• A day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another COC
amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in Item 8 of his
certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one (1)
year and thirteen (13) days.
• Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three (3) candidates
vied for the congressional seat in the Second District, petitioner garnered thirty eight
thousand five hundred forty seven (38,547) votes as against another candidate, Agusto
Syjuco, who obtained thirty five thousand nine hundred ten (35,910) votes.
• On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion
Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6,
1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
• On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion
to Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein
he manifested his intention to raise, among others, the issue of whether of not the
determination of the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC finding of non- compliance with the residency requirement of one
year against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws.
Ruling:
NO. The COMELEC finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year
against the petitioner is not contrary to evidence and to applicable laws.
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City the latter "must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.
The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be
a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (1) year prior
to the elections. Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Clearly, the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where
he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain,
his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes
of election law. There is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area
for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation,
which is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a
particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to
qualify.
That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual
residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by
origin or by choice.
Clearly it indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992
but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. At the
time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. 24 His birth
certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora.
Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to the COMELEC at various times during his
political career, what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of
record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was
Concepcion, Tarlac.
The property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be
voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila
coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati
(and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in
transferring his physical residence" 27 is not to acquire a new residence or domicile "but only to
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City." 28 The absence
of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions
stated above, the lack of identification — sentimental, actual or otherwise — with the area, and
the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner's
claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati.
CASE NO. 39
Topic: House of Representatives – Quorum
Title: Avelino vs. Cuenco
Citation: 83 Phil 17
Facts:
• In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech to formulate charges against
then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President
followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from
delivering his speech. Before Senator Tañada could deliver his privilege speech to
formulate charges against the incumbent Senate President, the petitioner, motu propio
adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his followers.
• Senator Cabili request to made the following incidents into a record:
o The deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to
continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.
o Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz suggested that respondent be designated to
preside over the session which suggestion was carried unanimously.
o The respondent, Senator Mariano Cuenco, thereupon took the Chair.
• Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary upon motion of Senator Arranz, because
the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner
when the latter abandoned the session.
• Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his
privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said
Resolution No. 68 and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was
unanimously approved.
• The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to
declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco,
contending that the latter had not been validly elected because twelve members did not
constitute a quorum – the majority required of the 24-member Senate.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction on subject matter.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 and 68 was validly approved.
3. Whether or not the petitioner be granted to declare him the rightful President of the
Philippines Senate and oust respondent.
Rulings:
The Supreme Court held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. The court will be against
the doctrine of separation of powers.
In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not
be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The court will not interfere in this case because
the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any
time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. If, as the petition must imply to be
acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate
Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
Yes, it was validly constituted, supposing that the Court has jurisdiction. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House: does
not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute “the House”. There is
a difference between a majority of “the House”, the latter requiring less number than the first.
Therefore an absolute majority of all the members of the Senate less one, constitutes constitutional
majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
The Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the
Senate, since the office depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule
of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that
majority. At any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all
controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all
concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all
their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
CASE NO. 40
Topic: House of Representatives – Rules of Proceedings
Title: Arroyo vs. de Venecia
Citation: G.R. No. 127255, Aug. 14, 1997
Facts:
• A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners
claim are constitutionally mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of
the Constitution.
• The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted
its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and
moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence
of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the
sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair
was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and
Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently
objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report
had by then already been declared by the Chair.
• On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 8240 is invalid because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House.
Ruling:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject
to revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has
agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to
be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case
where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which
the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll
call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of
the House.
CASE NO. 41
Topic: House of Representatives – Discipline of Members
Title: Osmena vs. Pendatun
Facts:
• Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”
where he made “serious imputations of bribery against the President”.
• House Resolution No. 59 was passed. It provided that a special committee composed of
15 congressmen be formed to investigate and evaluate if the petitioner did commit
disorderly conduct when he gave his speech.
• Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for
"declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against
Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as
members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59.
• The special committee, through House Resolution 175, submitted their answer, they
found Osmeña guilty and then suspended him (for 15 mos.)
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is exempt from disciplinary action by virtue of parliamentary
immunity.
Ruling:
NO. Although section 15, Article VI of our Constitution stipulates that "for any speech or debate"
in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in
any other place,” the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7),
recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec.
7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity whose purpose "is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success"
for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he
should be protected from the resentment of everyone it may offend."
It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a
member.
CASE NO. 42
Topic: House of Representatives – Discipline of Members
Title: Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
• The case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of Immigration
and Deportation against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. In Oct 1988, Santiago approved the application for legalization of the
stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith. Two other
criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for
libel, were also filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
• Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena
issued an order for the arrest of petitioner. Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for physical
appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. The
Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until her physical condition would warrant her
physical appearance in court. After a long series of appeals and court battles between Santiago and
Sandiganbayan, in 1995 the latter moved for the suspension of Santiago from office who was
already a senator by then,. Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate president (Maceda) to suspend
Santiago from office for 90 days.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan can validly order the suspension of a member of the Senate.
Ruling:
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of
Congress from RA No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-
equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government — the Legislative, the Executive and
the Judiciary — has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and
effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient
in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there
seems to be "no ifs and buts about it. In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan
merely adhered to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the
Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the suspension of public officials
and employees indicted before it. Section 13 of RA No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned
must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any office
which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the office under which he stands accused.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless,
deems it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner.
CASE NO. 43
Topic: Legislative Department – Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory
Title: Astorga vs. Villegas
Facts:
• House Bill 9266 was filed and passed on the third reading without amendments in the
House of the Representatives. It was then sent to the Senate for concurrence, and referred
to a committee headed by Senator Roxas, who then made minor amendment upon its
approval. Senator Arturo Tolentino also introduced substantial amendments during the
second reading on the Senate. It was approved considering the amendments of Roxas has
been acted upon. The printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary and
Speaker of the House, Secretary of Senate and Senate President, and lastly signed by the
President of the Philippines which became the R.A. 4065.
• An error was discovered later that the Bill passed was not the one approved by Senate. This
caused the withdrawal of signatures of both the Senate President and the President and
declared the R.A. 4065 invalid.
• Respondent Antonio Villegas, Mayor of Manila, recalled 5 police force assigned to
petitioner Vice Mayor Hermino Astorga following the invalidation of RA 4065. Astorga
filed petition compelling the respondent and other officials to comply with RA 4065.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 4065 became a valid in consideration with the Journal Entry Rule.
Ruling:
NO. RA 4065 is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become to law.
The Court stated that the function of an attestation is not of approval. The signature made
by both houses is a mere authentication to signify to the Chief Executive that the enrolled bill was
approved by the Congress. Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No. 2210 states that the
proceedings of the Philippine Commission may be proved by the journals of those bodies of either
house, and it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and its due enactment. It is
the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. However,
in the case at bar, upon discovering that there is an error in the bill passed, Senate President and
President withdrew their signatures as this might bring mischievous consequences not intended by
the law-making body.
The journal of the proceedings of each House is required by the Constitution. The Court
asked to inquire whether the bill signed is the same as the bill approved by the Congress. The
journal discloses that the substantial amendments approved by the Senate were not incorporated
in the printed text sent to the president. Hence, the bill did not become a law.
CASE NO. 44
Topic: Legislative Department – Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory
Title: Morales vs. Subido
Facts:
• Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not
possess a bachelor's degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. Morales was the chief of
detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began
his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the
former Chief, Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a
provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Subido approved the designation
of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for "failure to meet the minimum educational and civil
service eligibility requirements for the said position." Instead, the respondent certified other persons as
qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966.
• Nowhere in the cited provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police department of a
city …” can be qualified for said office.
• Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when
the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion
of the phrase" or has served as chief of police with exemplary record." Morales went on to support his
case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was
signed by an employee in the Senate bill division and can be found attached to the page proofs of the
then bill being deliberated upon.
Issue:
Whether or not the court must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals,
to look searchingly into the matter.
Ruling:
NO. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that
Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The
court cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened.
The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the court act upon the faith
and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective
departments. Otherwise, the court would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to
determine what did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of
the legislative process. The court is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals
must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires
must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected
by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is
not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that
with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the
event of any discrepancy.
CASE NO. 45
Topic: Legislative Department – Privilege of Speech and Debate
Title: Trillanes vs. Oscar Pimentel
Citation: G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008
Facts:
• Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’etat in relation to the “Oakwood Incident.” In the
2007 elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June
30, 2007.
• Petitioner now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate,
alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still pending
resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there was already conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not Trillanes’ election as Senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and serve
his mandate as Senator.
Ruling:
NO. It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of
the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:
“All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required.”
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal action.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release
on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional
liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless
of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale
of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-
appellants like Jalosjos.
CASE NO. 46
Topic: Powers of Congress - General Plenary Powers
Title: League of Cities vs COMELEC
Citation: G.R. No. 176951, Nov 18, 2008
Facts:
• Supreme Court en banc, struck down the Subject 16 of the Cityhood Laws for violating Section
10, Article X of the Constitution. Respondents filed a petition for reconsideration which was
denied by the Honorable Court. A second motion for reconsideration was also denied until on
the 18th of November 2008, the judgement became final and executory.
• The Court then on the 19th of December 2009, unprecedentedly reversed its decision
upholding the constitutionally of the Cityhood Laws.
Issue:
Whether or not the court could reverse the decision it already rendered.
Ruling:
YES. The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law.
Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects
of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a
matter of equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the
effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.
Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood Laws remain
unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the
effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such
as the payment of salaries and supplies by the “new cities” or their issuance of licenses or execution
of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective. This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws
are valid for they remain void. Only the effects of the implementation of these unconstitutional
laws are left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent people who may have relied
on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Court’s declaration of their
unconstitutionality.
CASE NO. 47
Topic: Powers of Congress - Doctrine of Non-Delegation of Legislative Powers
Title: U.S. vs Ang Tang Ho
Citation: 43 Phil 1
Facts:
• At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An
Act Penalizing the Monopoly And Holding Of, And Speculation In, Palay, Rice, And Corn
Under Extraordinary Circumstances”, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and
authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the
necessary rules and regulations.
• The Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
• A complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice
at an excessive price when he sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty
centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed by EO No. 53 of the Governor-General,
under the authority of Section 1 of Act No. 2868.
• Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred
in finding EO No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of
the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868 delegation to the Governor-General
a valid delegation of power?
Ruling:
NO. The said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said Act authorized the
Governor-General to promulgate laws and not merely rules and regulations to effect the law. The
said Act was not complete when it left the legislature as it failed to specify what conditions the
Governor-General shall issue the proclamation as the said Act states “for any cause”. It also failed
to define “extraordinary rise” that such proclamation by the Governor-General aims to prevent.
Lastly, the said Act authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures by
the Governor-General.
It must be conceded that, after the passage of Act No. 2868, and before any rules and
regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price,
even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law
fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. In the absence of a
proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant
committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no
act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the
sale of it at any price was to a crime.
CASE NO. 48
Title: Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA
Facts:
• The petitioner challenges the decision of POEA on the principal ground that it had no
jurisdiction over the case of Vitaliano Saco as he was not an overseas worker.
• Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident
in Tokyo, Japan. His widow sued for damages under EO No. 797 and Memorandum Circular
No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was
cognizable not by the POEA but by the SSS and should have been filed against the State
Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the
position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant.
• The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the
Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are not
considered overseas workers.
• Moreover, the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as
violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority
had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization,
the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not
subject to delegation.
Issue:
Whether Memorandum Circular No. 2 violated the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power.
Ruling:
NO. There was no principle violated. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided
in Section 4(a) of EO No. 797. “The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder
provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).”
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not
what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature.
This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of
the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation.”
CASE NO. 49
Title: Pelaez vs Auditor-General
Facts:
• From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive
orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said
executive orders.
• Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain from
the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.
Issue:
Whether or not the executive orders are invalid, upon the ground that the President does not have
the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department.
Ruling:
Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:
“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in
the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power
is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Such
control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to
create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply
with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power than what
was vested in him by the Constitution.
The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the
respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.
CASE NO. 50
Topic: Powers of Congress - Delegation of Emergency Powers
Title: David vs Arroyo
Facts:
• During the celebration of People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency. The President also issued General Order (G.O.) No. 5 implementing PP 1017. The
President stated that over the past months, elements in political opposition have conspired with extreme
left represented by NDF- CCP- NPA and military adventurists, which caused her to declare such order.
The President considered aims to oust the President and take- over reigns of government as clear and
present danger.
• On March 3, President Arroyo lifted PP 1017. Solicitor General argued that the basis of declaring PP
1017 was that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in
determining the necessity of calling out the AFP. However, despite the contentions of the Solicitor
General, the Magdalo group indicted the Oakwood mutiny and called to wear red bands on their left
arms to show disgust.
• At the same time Oplan Hackle I was discovered, which constitutes plans of bombings and attacks on
PMA Alumni Homecoming in Baguio, the same event where the President was invited. The next
morning after the alumni homecoming celebration, a bomb was found inside the campus.
• Succeeding this announcement was the arrest of Randy David, a Filipino journalist and UP professor
due to a mistake of fact that he was actually involved in the street rallies. Seizure of Daily Tribune,
Malaya and Abante-- all local news publication, took place which, according to the PNP, was meant to
show a strong presence to tell the media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help rebels in
bringing down the government.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the issuance of Presidential Proclamation PP 1017 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
NO. Respondents claim that such petition is moot and academic based on the issuance of PP 1017, but the
Court rejects such contention. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy. In this case, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 which
calls for military aid.
Most people then equate it to martial law, but such case is different wherein the basis then was the 1973
Constitution. Under the present 1987 Constitution, the President may summon armed forces to aid him in
supporting lawless violence.
The President's declaration of state rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or conduction of a public
moment of interest. State of national emergency, however, is the prerogative of the President. Her exercise
of emergency powers such as the taking over of privately owned utility requires delegation from the
Congress, which is entirely different from the martial law.
CASE NO. 51
Topic: Powers of Congress - Test of Valid Delegation
Title: ABAKADA Guro vs. Purisima
Citation: G.R No. 166715, August 14, 2008
Facts:
• Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a
petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5
and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and
properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a
10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties.
• Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress
of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.
• Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for education,
increased emoluments for health workers, and wider coverage for full value-added tax
benefits – these are the reasons why Republic Act No. 9337 (R.A. No. 9337) was enacted.
• The President signed into law the consolidated House and Senate versions as Republic Act
9337. Before the law was to take effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of
petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
• Among others, Petitioners contend that Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337 constitute an
undue delegation of legislative power, in violation of Article VI, Section 28(2) of the
Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power?
Ruling:
NO. In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is
valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;41 and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates
the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. Both tests are intended
to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step
into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be
done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made.
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation
of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under
the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1,
2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation
of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would
be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word shall
is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connote a mandatory order. Its use in a
statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. Where the
law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no
choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions
or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is
the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward.
CASE NO. 52
Topic: Legislative Department – On Pork Barrel Issue
Title: Belgica vs Exec. Secretary
Citation: G.R. No. 208566, Nov. 19, 2013
Facts:
• Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the
Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest
“Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in
the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
• The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members
may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for
realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
• Presidential Pork Barrel. The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the
GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from
the Malampaya Gas Project and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings
of PAGCOR.
• Pork Barrel Scam Controversy. Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of
corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade,
the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been
helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing
projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on
Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
• Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
Issue:
Whether or not the Congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
Ruling:
NO. The Congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional because it violates the following
principles: Separation of Powers and Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of
the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which
the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system,
what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves
dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing
the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers.
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. The Constitution does
grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative
are concerned. That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate
further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
CASE NO. 53
Topic: Legislative Department – On DAP issue
Title: Araullo vs Exec. Secretary
Citation: GR. No. 209287, July 1, 2014 and Feb. 3, 2015
Facts:
• When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth
of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget
Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP).
• The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables
the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting
for next year’s appropriation. So, what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government
project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor
will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings”
by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects.
• Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations
Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
• This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan,
and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was: DAP is unconstitutional
because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Issues:
1. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
2. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
executive.
3. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
4. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
Ruling:
1. NO. The DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited
in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from
the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which
were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
2. NO. There is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for
whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an
unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,
there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer
of funds.
3. NO. The transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President
(and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution
to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made
“within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be
allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the
Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds
to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds
were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate,
they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As
such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the
Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other
instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed,
finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds
withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not
complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should
only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being
withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings”
by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
4. NO. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP
because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National
Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this
case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
CASE NO. 54
Topic: Legislative Department – Riders and Doctrine of Inappropriate Provisions
Title: Guingona vs. Carague
Facts:
• The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for
debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known
as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
• The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled
"Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred
Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the
Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,"
and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions
of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and
Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose."
• The petition seeks the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D.
No. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt
service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.
• Respondents contend that the petition involves a pure political question which is the repeal or
amendment of said laws addressed to the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of the legislative
body and not this Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 are now inoperative as a result
of the ouster of President Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24 of Article VI of the
Constitution.
Ruling:
1. NO. The transitory provision of the Constitution (Section 3, Article XVIII) has precisely been
adopted by its framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President
Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are
inconsistent with the Constitution or are otherwise amended, repealed, or revoked.
An examination of the aforecited presidential decrees show the clear intent that the amounts
needed to cover the payment of the principal and interest on all foreign loans, including those
guaranteed by the national government, should be made available when they shall become due
precisely without the necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds
therefore, since both the periods and necessities are incapable of determination in advance.
2. NO. The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not meet the requirement
and are therefore inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitution which
requires, among others, that "all appropriations, x x x bills authorizing increase of public debt"
must be passed by Congress and approved by the President is untenable. The automatic
appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective execution of debt management policies.
First, for example, it enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of
market conditions. Second, the automatic appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in debt
servicing arising from any deviation from what has been previously programmed. The annual
debt service estimates, which are usually made one year in advance, are based on a
mathematical set or matrix or, in layman's parlance, ‘basket’ of foreign exchange and interest
rate assumptions which may significantly differ from actual rates not even in proportion to
changes on the basis of the assumptions. Absent an automatic appropriation clause, the
Philippine Government has to await and depend upon Congressional action, which by the time
this comes, may no longer be responsive to the intended conditions which in the meantime
may have already drastically changed. In the meantime, also, delayed payments and arrearages
may have supervened, only to worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in the budget
due to penalties and/or demand for immediate-payment even before due dates.
CASE NO. 55
Topic: Legislative Department – One Subject and Title
Title: Tobias vs. Abalos
Citation: G.R. No. L-114783, Dec. 8, 1994
Facts:
• As taxpayers and residents of Mandaluyong, petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No.
7675 otherwise known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as City of Mandaluyong”.
• Prior to the enactment of the statute, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to one legislative
district. Congressman Ronaldo Zamora sponsored the bill and signed by pres. Fidel Ramos
becoming RA No. 7675. A plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The turnout of the plebiscite
was only 14.41% of the voting population: 18,621 voted “yes” while 7,911 voted “no”. Thus,
RA 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Issue:
Whether or not RA No 7675 specifically Art VIII Sec 49 thereof is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
NO. The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the “one city-one representative”
proviso in the Constitution stating that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative” (Article VI, Section 5(3),
Constitution). Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district
for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized cit.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,
Section 5(1), as aforquoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute with the
phrase “unless otherwise provided by law.”
As to the contention that Section 49 of RA No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of
Congress to reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated
upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt
itself on a right which pertains to itself.
CASE NO. 56
Topic: Legislative Department – Three Readings Rule
Title: Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance
Facts:
• RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to
widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending
the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the
constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
• Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of
Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did
not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24
and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 7716 is unconstitutional for having “originated” from the Senate, and not the
House of Representatives.
Ruling:
NO. The enactment of SB. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate proposed an
amendment to a House revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill. On at least two
occasions during the Eighth Congress, the Senate passed its own version of revenue bills, which,
in consolidation with House bills earlier passed, became the enrolled bills.
Thus, the enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate, in the
exercise of its power to propose amendments to bills required to originate in the House, passed its
own version of a House revenue measure. It is noteworthy that, in the case of SB. No. 1630,
petitioners Tolentino and Roco, as members of the Senate, voted to approve it on second and third
readings.
The history of this provision does not support this contention. The supposed indicia of
constitutional intent are nothing but the relics of an unsuccessful attempt to limit the power of the
Senate.
Considering the defeat of the proposal, the power of the Senate to propose amendments
must be understood to be full, plenary and complete "as on other Bills." Thus, because revenue
bills are required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the Senate cannot enact
revenue measures of its own without such bills. After a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it
by the House, however, the Senate certainly can pass its own version on the same subject matter.
This follows from the coequality of the two chambers of Congress.
CASE NO. 57
Topic: Legislative Department – Presidential Veto
Title: Bolinao Electronics Corp. vs. Valencia
Facts:
• This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with preliminary injunction
filed by the Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc. and
Monserrat Broadcasting System, Inc., owners and operators of radio and television stations
enumerated therein, against respondents Secretary of Public Works and Communications and
Acting Chief of the Radio Control Division. Later the Republic of the Philippines, as
operator of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, sought and was allowed to intervene in this
case, said interveners having been granted a construction permit to install and operate a
television station in Manila.
• Petitioners’ applications for renewal of their station licenses were denied because it should be
filed two months before the expiration of the license. Pursuant to Section 3 of Act 3846, as
amended by Republic Act 584, on the powers and duties of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications (formerly Commerce and Communications), he may approve or
disapprove any application for renewal of station or operator license, provided, however,
That no application for renewal shall be is approved without giving the licensee a hearing.
• Thus, the notices of hearing were sent by respondents to petitioners. Clearly, the intention of
the investigation is to find out whether there is ground to disapprove the applications for
renewal. According to petitioner however, the violation has ceased to exist when the act of
late filing was condoned or pardoned by respondents by the issuance of the circular dated
July24, 1962.The lone reason given for the investigation of petitioners' applications, i.e., late
filing thereof, is therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist
and, hence, there is no reason nor need for the present investigation. They were summoned
by Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for operating even after their permit has
expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued operation sans license and their
continuing operation had caused damage to his department.
Issue:
Whether or not the President can veto a condition attached to an appropriation in the
appropriation bill.
Ruling:
Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriation bill. However, when a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items
of the same, the President cannot veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular
item or items to which it relates. (Art. VI, Sec. 20)
It may be observed from the wordings of the Appropriations Act that the amount
appropriated for the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service was made subject to the
condition that the same shall not be used or expended for operation of television stations in Luzon
where there are already existing commercial television stations. This gives rise to the question of
whether the President may legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill. But this is not a novel question. A little effort to research on the subject would
have yielded enough authority to guide action on the matter. For, in the leading case of State vs.
Holder 2 it was already declared that such action by the Chief Executive was illegal. This ruling,
that the executive's veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that
the same produced no effect whatsoever, and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill,
therefore, remains. Any expenditure made by the intervenor PBS, for the purpose of installing or
operating a television station in Manila, where there are already television stations in operation,
would be in violation of the express condition for the release of the appropriation and,
consequently, null and void. It is not difficult to see that even if it were able to prove its right to
operate on Channel 9, said intervenor would not have been entitled to reimbursement of its illegal
expenditures.
CASE NO. 58
Topic: Legislative Department – Presidential Veto
Title: PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez
Facts:
• HB No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and
approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions
and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted
by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in
the “pork barrels” allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. Pursuant
to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution,
Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.
• On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have
become RA 7663, entitled “An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government
of the Philippines From January One To December Thirty One, Nineteen Hundred And Ninety-
Four, And For Other Purposes” (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his
Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he
imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt reduction scheme cannot be
validly done through the 1994 GAA.” And that “appropriations for payment of public debt,
whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign
Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4,
Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and
maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges
(SUC’s),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the
Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization
of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,” which requires the prior
approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well
as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the “Specific Prohibition” which states that the
said Modernization Fund “shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer
planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers”
6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment
pension and gratuityfunds.7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court,
Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a)
for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on
Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and (f) State
Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) are constitutional
2. Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the
automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional?
Ruling:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process
(Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). There is, therefore, sound basis
to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the
validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution. The vetoed provision on the
debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177(Foreign Borrowing Act)
and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the
repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law. In the veto of
the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said
special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some
government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that
purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the
special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the “one-fund policy” (e.g., R.A. No. 4618
for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O.
No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Management’s Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is
unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be
the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other
hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended—70% by administrative and 30% by
contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should
strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of
Health is an “appropriate” provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the
appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed
by the President without also vetoing the said item (Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia,
11 SCRA 486 [1964]).
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “use of Fund” for the AFP
modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to
Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the “congressional or legislative veto.” However the
case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto
as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on
other grounds. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were
properly vetoed. Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization
fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted
for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the
obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec.10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself.
The veto of said special provision is therefore valid. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief
of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP
Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article
VI of the Constitution. Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the
language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to
deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000
CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is
not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in
another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are
existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations
to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to
complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue.
Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate.
Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take “necessary and proper
steps” to carry into execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]). These
steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.
CASE NO. 59
Topic: Legislative Department – Legislative Inquiry
Title: Senate vs. Ermita
Citation: G.R. No. 169777 Apr. 20, 2006
Facts:
• This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing
E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its
declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
• In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those
employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
• The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for
them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of
massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wiretapping, and the role of military in the so-called
“Gloriagate Scandal”.
• Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464,
Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress, valid and constitutional.
Ruling:
NO. Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional
The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege.
The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of
necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an
exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought
in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged,
it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests
for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By
the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is frustrated.
CASE NO. 60
Title: Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon
Citation: G.R. No. L-89914; November 20, 1991
Facts:
• The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public Officers) started its
investigation on the sale of the equity of Romualdez to Lopa Group. The SRBC looked into the
possible violation of the law in the case with regard to RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act).
• The petitioners, Bengzon et.al, filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the
alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or
thirty-nine (39) corporations. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of
its jurisdiction and legislative purpose.
Issue:
Whether the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry has a valid legislative purpose.
Ruling:
NO. The court held that the investigation made was not in aid of legislation because the speech
given by Sen. Enrile didn’t contain suggestion of contemplated legislation but merely pointed to
the need to determine whether the relatives of Pres. Aquino, particularly Mr. Ricardo Lopa, had
violated the law.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec.
1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may
refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed
legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters
vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.
CASE NO. 61
Title: Standard Charter vs Senate
Citation: G.R. No. 167173, Dec 27, 2007
Facts:
• SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in Metro
Manila for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation Code
(RA 8799).
• Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of
legislation, to prevent the occurrences of a similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent
Committee then set an initial hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation thereto.
• SCB stressed that there were cases allegedly involving the same issues subject of legislative
inquiry, thus posting a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent Committee to continue with
the inquiry.
Issue:
Whether the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon the judicial
powers vested solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases.
Ruling:
YES. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as initiated in
the privileged speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practices
committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion
of the said speech "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the
occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future."
The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may
not be enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the
committees of the Senate or the House of Representatives cannot penalize violators even there is
overwhelmingly evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory
or remedial legislation, respondent Committee can only recommend measures to address or
remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include
in its Report a recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best,
the recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such Report would only be persuasive,
but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the
offender.
CASE NO. 62
Title: Arnault vs. Nazareno
Facts:
• In the latter part of October 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of
P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum and P 500,000
to the second sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a non-resident American, thru his two attorney-in-
fact in the Philippines, as represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates respectively.
However, Ernest H. Burt was not the original owner of the estate. He bought the first from San
Juan de Dios Hospital and the second from the Philippine Trust Company. In both instances,
Burt was not able to pay the necessary amount of money to complete his payments. As such,
his contract with said owners were cancelled.
• On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the
Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an absolute deed of sale in
consideration of the sum of P750,000. The Philippine Government then, through the Secretary
of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which the money
was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October 1949,
as stated at the outset.
• On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special
committee to investigate the transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee
created by the resolution called and examined various witnesses, among the most important of
whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was
the apparent irregularity of the Government’s paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for
his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited
anyway long before October 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible
for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.
• Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to
him on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in
the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two
checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he drew on said account two
checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc.,
with the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself
cashed.
• It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000
that gave rise to the present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the
senate then approved a resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this resolution which
brought him to jail and is being contested in this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name
of the person to whom he gave the P440,000.
2. Whether or not the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
3. Whether or not the privilege against self-incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned.
Ruling:
1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative
body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any
question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate,
or to expel a member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness
to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. The
materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry
and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the
necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself
are determined by the sum of the information to be gathered because of the investigation, and not
by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.
2. NO. Senate is a continuing body, and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical
dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the
Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted
as in the present case. Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds,
i.e., abuse their power and keep the witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are disregarded,
Court is always open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.
3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is the
name of that person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim
before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name, he would incriminate himself,
necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to
a person to him unknown. “Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal
to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable.”
Since according to the witness, himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to
a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, Court found no basis
upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.
CASE NO. 63
Title: Gudani vs. Senga
Facts:
• The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election
fraud and the surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials
of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any
legislative inquiry without her consent.
• AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan
et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the
two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them.
• As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of
War and the time-honored principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to
be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfully violating an order of a
superior officer.
Issue:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.
Ruling:
YES. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-
in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military
justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military
officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance.
Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the
President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel
the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the
President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent
on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court
recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be
formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers
from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power
as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s
prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance
of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of
officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply
with the final orders of the courts.
CASE NO. 64
Title: Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation
Citation: G.R. No. 180643
Facts:
• On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal.
• In the September 18, 2007 hearing, Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials
and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs. and during which he admitted that Abalos of
COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further
narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to
accept the bribe.
• However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
• He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring
that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid
down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an
order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
Issue:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege.
Ruling:
YES. The communications are covered by executive privilege. The revocation of EO 464 (advised
executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws, and jurisprudence,
including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid
of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept
has Constitutional underpinnings. The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the
subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the
area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudences cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1. The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential

power.”
2. The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President
or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with
the President.
3. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by
a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence”
and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground
that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence
between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making
process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a
“quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without
the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second,
the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity”
test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third,
there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But
petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for
eleven (11) hours. Not only that, but he also expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions
from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
CASE NO. 65
Title: Calida vs Trillanes
Citation: G.R. No. 240873, September 3, 2019
Facts:
This Court resolves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Solicitor General Jose C.
Calida, Milagros O. Calida, Josef Calida, Michelle Calida, and Mark Jorel Calida. They pray that
Antonio Trillanes IV, then a sitting Senator, be permanently prohibited from conducting a
legislative inquiry into their alleged conflict of interest on government contracts awarded to their
security services company. They also pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners claim that Proposed Senate Resolution No. 760 does not contain any intended
legislation. Instead, it merely calls for an investigation on any conflict of interest regarding the
award of government contracts to Vigilant Investigative and Security Agency, Inc., a company
owned by petitioner Calida and his family. They likewise claim that respondent Trillanes acted
without authority in issuing invitations to the resource persons, as the invitations were sent out
without the Senate body's approval of the proposed resolution.
Furthermore, petitioners insist that the investigation is clearly intended merely to target and
humiliate them. Thus, they pray that respondent Trillanes, as the chair of the Senate Committee
on Civil Service, Government Reorganization, and Professional Regulation (Committee on Civil
Service), be prohibited from conducting a legislative inquiry against them.
Issue:
Whether or not the investigation is in aid of legislation.
Ruling:
YES. Although this case became moot since respondent Trillanes has reached the end of his two-year term
as Senator.
The legislative power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation is conferred by Article VI, Section 21
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
While this power is not found in the present Constitution's precursors, this Court in Arnault v.
Nazareno clarified that such power did not need textual grant as it was implied and essential to the
legislative function.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence
of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information — which is not infrequently true —
recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such
information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
Nonetheless, despite the constitutional grant, the power of both the House of Representatives and
the Senate to conduct investigations in aid of legislation is not absolute. Citing Watkins v. United States,
this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee emphasized that "no inquiry is an end itself."
It explained that an investigation in aid of legislation must comply with the rules of procedure of each
House of Congress, and must not violate the individual rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, this Court
explained further that a legislative inquiry must prove to be in aid of legislation and not for other purposes,
pronouncing that "Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency." It declared:
No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees are, they cannot assume the power
reposed upon our prosecutorial bodies and courts. The determination of who is/are liable for a crime or
illegal activity, the investigation of the role played by each official, the determination of who should be
haled to court for prosecution and the task of coming up with conclusions and finding of facts regarding
anomalies, especially the determination of criminal guilt, are not functions of the Senate. Congress is neither
a law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself; it must
be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e., legislation. Investigations
conducted solely to gather incriminatory evidence and "punish" those investigated are indefensible. There
is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.
Additionally, legislative inquiry must respect the individual rights of the persons invited to or
affected by the legislative inquiry or investigation. Hence, the power of legislative inquiry must be carefully
balanced with the private rights of those affected. A person's right against self-incrimination and to due
process cannot be swept aside in favor of the purported public need of a legislative inquiry.
CASE NO. 66
Title: Balag vs Senate
Citation: GR No. 234608, July 3, 2018
Facts:
This is a case of petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer of an issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to annul, set aside and enjoin
implementation of the Senate P.S. Resolution No. 504 and October 18, 2017 Order of Complaint
by the Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs filed by Arvin R. Balag
(petitioner) against the Senate of the Philippines, et. al. (respondent).
On September 17, 2017, a first-year law student from the University of Santo Tomas named
Horacio Castillo III, allegedly died due to hazing-related activities conducted by the Aegis Juris
Fraternity. On September 20, 2017, the senate released Senate Resolution No. 504 entitled “a
Resolution Directing the Appropriate Senate Committees to Conduct an Inquiry, In Aid of
Legislation, into the Recent Death of Horacio Castillo III Allegedly due to Hazing-Related
Activities” filed by Sen. Paolo Benigno Aquino IV.
When the petitioner attended the hearing dated on October 18, 2017, Sen. Grace Poe asked the
petitioner if he was the president of Aegis Juris Fraternity however, the petitioner refused to answer
and invoked his right to self-incrimination. Sen. Panfilo Lacson reminded that it was just a “simple
question” to invoke self-incrimination and warned the petitioner that he may be cited in contempt,
but the petitioner still refused to answer. According to Sen. Grace Poe, the petitioner’s signature
appeared on the document for the application of the Aegis Juris Fraternity in the organizational
sheet submitted in the school administration and it was indicated therein that the petitioner was the
President, yet he still refuses to answer the simple question asked.
The petitioner was then cited in contempt and was ordered to place in detention under the Senate
Sergeant at Arms’ supervision after the senate hearing. Sen. Panfilo Lacson gave the petitioner a
chance to purge out of contempt, however, the petitioner still refused to answer and invoked his
right to self-incrimination. When the petitioner was asked of the question of whose decision it was
to bring the victim to the hospital, the petitioner submitted a plea to lift his contempt and stated
that he was a member of the Aegis Juris Fraternity, however, he does not know who the president
was because he was enrolled at another university at the time of the incident. The question asked
before his plea was again repeated and the petitioner invoked again his right to self-incrimination.
Issue:
Whether or not the Senate Committee acted with grave abuse of discretion in conducting the
legislative inquiry and citing the petitioner in contempt.
Ruling:
YES. However, the court denied the petition for being moot and academic. In the present case, the
Court finds that there is no more justiciable controversy to be decided up since in its resolution
dated December 12, 2017, the Court ordered in the interim the immediate release of petitioner
pending resolution of the instant petition. Thus, petitioner was no longer detained under the
Senate's authority.
However, the court still resolved the case despite being moot and academic. The court ruled that
the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of the Senate during inquiries in
aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry. The court stated
that the interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its legislative inquiry should be
balanced. The Senate can continuously and effectively exercise its power of contempt during the
legislative inquiry against recalcitrant witnesses, even during recess. Such power can be exercised
by the Senate immediately when the witness performs a contemptuous act, subject to its own rules
and the constitutional rights of the said witness. However, during recess, the Senate will be
prevented from effectively conducting legislative hearings. But the Senate may still exercise its
power of contempt during legislative hearings while on recess provided that the period of
imprisonment shall only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry upon the approval or
disapproval of the Committee Report. Thus, the Senate's inherent power of contempt is still potent
and compelling even during its recess. At the same time, the rights of the persons appearing are
respected because their detention shall not be indefinite.
CASE NO. 67
Topic: Legislative Department – Executive Immunity
Title: Estrada vs. Desierto
Citation: G.R. No. 146710-15, Mar. 2, 2001
Facts:
• After the sharp descent from power of Chavit Singson, he went on air and accused
the petitioner of receiving millions of pesos from Jueteng lords. Calls for resignation filled
the air and former allies and members of the President’s administration started resigning
one by one.
• In a session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the
House to the Senate. The impeachment trial formally opened which is the start of the
dramatic fall from power of the President, which is most evident in the EDSA Dos rally.
• On January 20, the President submitted two letters – one signifying his leave from
the Palace and the other signifying his inability to exercise his powers pursuant to Section
11, Article VII of the Constitution. Thereafter, Arroyo took oath as President of the
Philippines.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President.
2. Whether or not the impeachment proceedings bar the petitioner from resigning.
Ruling:
1. For a resignation to be legally valid, there must be an intent to resign, and the intent must be coupled by
acts of relinquishment which may be oral or written, express or implied, for as long as the resignation is
clear. In the press release containing his final statement, he acknowledged the oath-taking of Arroyo as
President; he emphasized he was leaving the Palace without the mention of any inability and intent of
reassumption; he expressed his gratitude to the people; he assured will not shirk from any future challenge
that may come ahead in the same service of the country. This is of high-grade evidence of his intent to
resign.
2. Petitioner’s contention that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under
section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning is not affirmed by the Court. The exact nature of an
impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding,
it cannot be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down
when most of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private
prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and
the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against
the petitioner when he resigned.
CASE NO. 68
Topic: Legislative Department – Executive Privilege
Title: Almonte et. Al. vs. Vasquez
Facts:
• The case is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum
and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Neria Rogado and Elisa Rivera,
as chief accountant and record custodian of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB) to produce “all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all
evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988” and to enjoin him
from enforcing his orders. An anonymous and unsigned letter purportedly written by an employee
of the EIIB, was sent to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished to several government
offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman. In the letter were allegations as to the misuse of
funds from the savings of unfulfilled plantilla positions, among other forms of corruption and abuse
of power.
• As a response to the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied allegations. Petitioner Perez also
denied the issue for the savings realized from the implementation of E.O. No. 127, since the DBM
only allotted for the remaining 947 personnel, and that the disbursement of funds for the plantilla
positions for overt and covert personnel had been cleared by COA.
• Jose F. Sano, the Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman’s office found their responses
unsatisfactory; therefore he asked for authority to conduct an investigation. Anticipating the grant
of his request, he issued a subpoena to petitioners, compelling them to submit their counter-
affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses, as well as subpoena duces tecum to the chief of the
EIIB’s Accounting Division, ordering him to bring “all documents relating to Personal Service
Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB
for 1988.”
Issue:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to provide
documents relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.
Ruling:
YES. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on
military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount
importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though,
consequently thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation
of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as,
but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases
which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine the circumstances of the case that there is
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling
production, no similar excuse can be made for privilege resting on other considerations.
CASE NO. 69
Topic: Legislative Department – Prohibitions
Title: Civil Liberties Union vs. Exec. Sec.
Facts:
• Petitioners Ignacio Lacsina, Luis Mauricio, Antonio Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in
83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being
resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284
issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.
• Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive

officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not
more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must
relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but
in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be
a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
• The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to

Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners,
the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those
provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of
the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for
appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB.
2. Whether or not the prohibition apply to positions held in ex officio capacity.
Ruling:
1. NO. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government
or elsewhere is concerned. Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition
against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective
and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another
provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their
tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. While all other appointive officials in
the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their
tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution
itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to
all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant
to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution "must be
given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself,
to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2),
Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3),
Article VII; and the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council
by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
2. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article
VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that
these posts do not comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. The
term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done
in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or
authority than that conferred by the office." The additional duties must not only be closely related
to but must be required by the official's primary functions. If the functions required to be performed
are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to the
primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the purview of
"any other office" prohibited by the Constitution.
CASE NO. 70
Topic: Legislative Department – Prohibitions
Title: Public Interest Center vs Elma
Citation: GR No. 138965, June 30, 2006
Facts:
Elma was appointed as Chairman of the PCGG on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his tenure as PCGG
Chairman, he was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second
appointment but waived any renumeration that he may receive as CPLC.
Petitioner questions Elma's concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC. They contend that the
appointments contravene Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioners also maintained that respondent Elma was holding incompatible offices.
He also claimed that it is Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution that should be applied in
his case. This provision, according to him, would allow a public officer to hold multiple positions if (1) the
law allows the concurrent appointment of the said official; and (2) the primary function of either position
allows such concurrent appointment. Since there exists a close relation between the two positions and there
is no incompatibility between them, the primary functions of either position would allow respondent Elma's
concurrent appointments to both positions. He further added that the appointment of the CPLC among
incumbent public officials is an accepted practice.
Issue:
Whether or not the concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for being
incompatible offices.
Ruling:
The ruling that the concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for being
incompatible offices, does not render both appointments void. Following the common-law rule on
incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his first office as PCGG Chairman when
he accepted the second office as CPLC.
CASE NO. 71
Topic: Executive Department – Executive Power
Title: Marcos vs. Manglapus
Citation: 177 SCRA 668 and 178 SCRA 760
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people
power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his
return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is
just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and
his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events: failed Manila
Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders, Channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists plan of Marcoses to
return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer, Honasan’s failed coup,
communist insurgency movements, secessionist movements in Mindanao, devastated economy because of
accumulated foreign debt, and plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies.
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel
documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in
the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned
the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and
health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process
and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according
to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President Aquino may prohibit
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Ruling:
"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to
other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter
one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any
country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security,
public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country
cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to
return to one’s country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well-considered view that
the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our
Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the
return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare.
President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe
away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines.
CASE NO. 72
Title: Biraogo, et al vs. Phil Truth Commission
Citation: GR No. 192935, December 7, 2010
Facts:
After a month in office, President Benigno Aquino III issued EO No. 1 on July 30, 2010 creating the
Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). The PTC was tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation
of reported cases of graft and corruption involving third level public officers during the administration of
Aquino's predecessor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. All it can do is gather, collect, and assess evidence of graft
and corruption and thereafter submit its findings and make recommendations to the Office of the President,
Congress, and the Ombudsman. It cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
Private citizen Louis Biraogo and a group of congressmen led by Lakas Kampi CMD chairman Rep. Edcel
Lagman filed in the Supreme Court separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
constitutionality of EO No. 1 based on their belief that the creation of the PTC constitutes usurpation of the
legislative power to create public office, threatens the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, and
violates the equal protection clause of the Philippine Constitution for specifically targeting certain officials
of the Arroyo administration.
Biraogo, the petitioner, asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body
of the Office of the President. Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be
empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law and such power cannot
be presumed.
The petitioner adds that the President is only authorized by law (Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987) to reorganize his office, thus, his cannot serve as the basis for the creation of the PTC.
Issue:
1. Whether the president can create public office such as the PTC without usurping the powers of Congress.
2. Whether the purpose of the PTC transgresses the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
Ruling:
1. The President has the authority to create the PTC, not a public office. Majority of the members of
the Supreme Court rejected the justification of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the creation of the PTC
finds basis on the president’s power of control over all executive offices. The Decision stressed that
“control” is essentially the power to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly,
the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The majority also rejected
the OSG’s claim that the E.O. finds basis under sec. 31 of the Administrative Code, which authorizes the
president to restructure the Office of the President. Clearly, “restructure” under the said provision refers to
reduction of personnel, consolidation or abolition of offices by reason of economy or redundancy. This
presupposes an already existing office. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision.
2. The majority members of the Supreme Court held that E.O. 1 should be struck down as violative of
the equal protection clause. Laying down a long line of precedents, the ponencia reiterated that equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person against intentional and arbitrary discrimination.
The Decision stressed that the clear mandate of the PTC is to investigate and find out the truth
“concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration” only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been
made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. The Arroyo administration, according
to the ponencia, is just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of
its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation gave the majority an impression
that the PTC is just being used “as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution” and that E.O.
1 is only an “adventure in partisan hostility.”
While the Court recognized that the creation of the PTC was inspired with noble intentions, the
ponencia nonetheless reminded the government of the ethical principle that “the end does not justify
the means.” It emphatically closed by stressing that the search for the truth must be within
constitutional bounds, for “ours is still a government of laws and not of men.”
CASE NO. 73
Title: Pichay vs Office of Deputy Exe. Secretary for Legal Affairs
Citation: GR. No. 196425, July 24, 2012
Facts:
On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12)
creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or
hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against presidential
appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President. However, on November 15,
2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC
and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA),
more particularly to its newly established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a
complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board
of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the
LWUA Board of Trustees (BOT), which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of 445,377 shares of stock
of Express Savings Bank, Inc. Petitioner, along with the other members of the BOT of LWUA, was required
to submit their respective written explanations and in compliance, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint as a case involving the same transaction was already pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether or not EO No. 13 violates the equal protection clause insofar as limiting the IAD-ODESLA’s
investigation only to presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in the government.
Ruling:
NO. The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from
the government. It is embraced under the due process concept and simply requires that, in the application
of the law, “all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.” The equal protection clause, however, is not absolute but subject to reasonable
classification so that aggrupation bearing substantial distinctions may be treated differently from each other.
There are substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in
government from non-presidential appointees and those that occupy the lower positions in government. In
Salumbides v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court ruled on the substantial distinctions between elective
and appointive public officials: The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate,
with a definite term and may be removed only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive
officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the
appointing authority.
CASE NO. 74
Topic: Executive Department – MARCOS BURIAL
Title: Ocampo, et al vs Enriquez, et al
Citation: G.R. No. 225973, Nov. 8, 2016
Facts:
During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly
announced that he would allow the burial former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga
Bayani ("LNMB"). Duterte won the May 9, 2016 elections.
On August 7, 2016, Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to AFP Chief of Staff
General Ricardo R. Visaya regarding the interment of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan
ng Mga Bayani.
On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a directive to the Philippine Army on
the Funeral Honors and Service for President Marcos.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and
Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court.
Issue:
1.) Whether respondents Defense Secretary and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave abuse of
discretion when they issued the assailed memorandum and directive in compliance with the verbal
order of President Duterte to implement his election campaign promise to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB
2.) Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violated the
Constitution, and domestic and international laws
3.) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and their
cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement
as a soldier and former President to interment at the LNMB
4.) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of former President
Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into an agreement with the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines as to the conditions and procedures by which his remains shall be brought back to
and interred in the Philippines
Ruling:
The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence.
As the OSG logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people,
its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related
to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB. Tañada v. Angara already
ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing.
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.” The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the “basic political creed of the nation” by Dean
Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its
power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.
CASE NO. 75
Topic: Executive Department – Power of Control
Title: Lacson-Magallanes Co. Inc vs Pano
Facts:
Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land was a
forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to Lacson-
Magallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner.
Jose Paño was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands denied
Paño’s request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office
of the President.
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Paño. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary
of Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive
Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any provision
whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it
is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.
Issue:
Whether the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary.
Ruling:
YES. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his constitutional powers in person. However, the
president may delegate certain powers to the Executive Secretary at his discretion. The president may
delegate powers which are not required by the Constitution for him to perform personally. The reason for
this allowance is the fact that the resident is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive
and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the
President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that “under our constitutional setup the Executive
Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to
affirm, modify, or even reverse any order” that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
including the Director of Lands, may issue.
The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, shall remain valid until
reversed, disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In this case, no reprobation was made hence the
decision granting the land to Paño cannot be reversed.
CASE NO. 76
Topic: Executive Department – Control of Executive Departments
Title: Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora
Citation: G.R. No. 142801-802, July 10, 2001
Facts:
The Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) was created as part of the structural
organization of the Ministry of Finance through the issuance of Executive Order No. 127 by former
President Corazon Aquino. The EIIB was tasked to evaluate intelligence reports, gather evidence on illegal
activities affecting the national economy and aid in the prosecution of cases; coordinate with external
agencies in monitoring financial and economic activities of persons or entities which may adversely affect
national financial interest; provide for the guidelines in the conduct of intelligence and investigation
operations; and perform such other appropriate functions. The EIIB was assigned to primarily conduct anti-
smuggling operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs by virtue of Memorandum
Order No. 225 issued by former president Aquino.
Subsequently, former President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No. 191 ordering the
deactivation of the EIIB and the transfer of its functions to the Bureau of Customs and the National
Bureau of Investigation on the ground that: the designated functions of the EIIB are also being
performed by the other existing agencies of the government; and that there is a need to constantly
monitor the overlapping of functions among these agencies. Executive Order No. 196 was issued
creating the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force Aduana. He also issued Executive Order No.
223 whereby all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein were separated from the
service pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting to abolition, redundancy, merger, division,
or consolidation of positions.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed the present case invoking the court’s power of judicial review of
Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223. Petitioners contend that the issuance of the said executive
orders is: (a) a violation of their right to security of tenure; (b) tainted with bad faith as they were
not actually intended to make the bureaucracy more efficient but to give way to Task Force Aduana
the functions of which are essentially and substantially the same as that of EIIB; and (c) a
usurpation of the power of Congress to decide whether or not to abolish the EIIB.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General maintains that: (a) the President enjoys the totality of the
executive power provided under Sections 1 and 7, Article VII of the Constitution, thus, he has the
authority to issue Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223; (b) the said executive orders were issued in
the interest of national economy, to avoid duplicity of work and to streamline the functions of the
bureaucracy; and (c) the EIIB was only deactivated and not abolished.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the President has the authority to carry out reorganization in any branch or
agency of the executive department.
2. Whether or not the reorganization in this case is valid.
Ruling:
1. YES. The President is empowered by the Administrative Code to validly reorganize his office
even without congressional authority in order to achieve economy and efficiency.
The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with
the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the
power to destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by
authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may
be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence. The exception is that, as
far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the President’s
power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain
laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.
In the whereas clause of Executive Order No. 191, former President Estrada anchored his
authority to deactivate EIIB on Section 77 of Republic Act 8745, the General Appropriations
Act for fiscal year 1999. It provides:
Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the
President of the Philippines, no changes in key positions or organizational units in any
department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational structures and
funded from appropriations provided by this Act.
The Supreme Court said that the above provision recognizes the authority of the President
to effect organizational changes in the department or agency under the executive
structure. Such a ruling further finds support in Section 78 of Republic Act No. 8760. Under
this law, the heads of departments, bureaus, offices and agencies and other entities in the
Executive Branch are mandated to conduct actual streamlining and productivity improvement
in agency organization and operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued
for the purpose by the Office of the President.
Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987,
the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize
the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may transfer
the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. The EIIB is a
bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the
President. Hence, it is subject to the President’s continuing authority to reorganize.
2. YES. The reorganization is valid.
The Solicitor General invoked the distinction between deactivation and abolition. To
deactivate means to render inactive or ineffective or to break up by discharging or reassigning
personnel, while to abolish means to do away with, to annul, abrogate or destroy completely.
Abolition denotes an intention to do away with the office wholly and permanently. While
in abolition, the office ceases to exist, the same is not true in deactivation where the office
continues to exist, albeit remaining dormant or inoperative. Deactivation and abolition are
both reorganization measures. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department is concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate the
function of a particular office or certain law may grant him the broad authority to carry out
reorganization measure.
An examination of the pertinent Executive Orders shows that the deactivation of EIIB and
the creation of Task Force Aduana were done in good faith. It was not for the purpose of
removing the EIIB employees, but to achieve the ultimate purpose of E.O. No. 191, which is
economy. While Task Force Aduana was created to take the place of EIIB, its creation does
not entail expense to the government.
Firstly, there is no employment of new personnel to man the Task Force. E.O. No. 196
provides that the technical, administrative and special staffs of EIIB are to be composed of
people who are already in the public service, they being employees of other existing
agencies. Secondly, the thrust of E.O. No. 196 is to have a small group of military men under
the direct control and supervision of the President as base of the government’s anti-smuggling
campaign. The idea is to encourage the utilization of personnel, facilities and resources of the
already existing departments instead of maintaining an independent office with a whole set of
personnel and facilities. And thirdly, it is evident from the yearly budget appropriation of the
government that the creation of the Task Force Aduana was especially intended to lessen
EIIB’s expenses.
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued
in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal or
separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. If the abolition, which is
nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat
security of tenure, otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes and whatever abolitio
is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid abolition as where there is merely a change of
nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample
funds.
In the present case, petitioners’ right to security of tenure is not violate because the
abolition of EIIB within the competence of a legitimate body is done in good faith and suffers
from no infirmity. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the
incumbents.
Hence, the petition was denied for lack of merit.
CASE NO. 77
Topic: Executive Department – Power of General Supervision over LGU’s
Title: Dadole vs. COA
Citation: G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002
Facts:
In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances of
P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod
of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge.
On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the disputed Local
Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that:
In the light of the authority granted to the local government units under the Local Government
Code to provide for additional allowances and other benefits to national government officials and
employees assigned in their locality, such additional allowances in the form of honorarium at rates
not exceeding P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in municipalities may be granted.
There being no statutory basis to grant additional allowance to judges in excess of P1,000.00
chargeable against the local government units where they are stationed, this Commission finds no
substantial grounds or cogent reason to disturb the decision of the City Auditor, Mandaue City,
disallowing in audit the allowances in question. Accordingly, the above-captioned appeal of the
MTC and RTC Judges of Mandaue City, insofar as the same is not covered by Circular Letter No.
91-7, is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
On November 27, 1995, Executive Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, for and on behalf of the
petitioner judges, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COA. In a resolution
dated May 28, 1996, the COA denied the motion.
Issue:
Whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President
and for not having been published and whether the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the
City of Mandaue that provides for additional allowances to judges contravenes the annual
appropriation laws enacted by Congress.
Ruling:
On the first issue, the court declared LBC 55 to be null and void. Although our Constitution guarantees
autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control
by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution provides that:
Sec.4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.
This provision (Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution) has been interpreted to exclude
the power of control. In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on
the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter."
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim, the difference between control and supervision was further delineated.
Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not
followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide
to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officials
merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they
have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done
or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the
act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. Under our present
system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The members of the Cabinet and other
executive officials are merely alter-egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President,
at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended
or reversed. In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers
emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject
to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their
legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given
them by the Constitution and the law.
Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or
she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers
over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local
affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the
Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the
wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because
it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative
departments in governing municipal corporations.
Furthermore, LBC 55 is void on account of its lack of publication, It has come to our knowledge that DBM-
CCC No. 10 has been re-issued in its entirety and submitted for publication in the Official Gazette per letter
to the National Printing Office dated March 9, 1999. Would the subsequent publication thereof cure the
defect and retroact to the time that the above-mentioned items were disallowed in audit? The answer is in
the negative, precisely because publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law
to inform the public of the contents of the law or rules and regulations before their rights and interests are
affected by the same. From the time the COA disallowed the expenses in audit up to the filing of herein
petition the subject circular remained in legal limbo due to its non-publication. As was stated in Tañada v.
Tuvera, "prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot be dispensed with, for the reason
that it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it."
CASE NO. 78
Topic: Executive Department – Can the President remove the Deputy Ombudsman?
Title: Gonzales vs Office of the President
Citation: GR. No. 196231
Facts:
A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical injuries) was
filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and
four others. Private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a
similar charge. While said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the National
Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents
and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative
adjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza
and his fellow police officers in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that the
material allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant
the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP
issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against the
same police officers, for failure of the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due
notice.
However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando
Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman.
Mendoza and his colleagues filed for a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman
Gutierrez for final approval, in whose office it remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp.
Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate
attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight HongKong
Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry
against the blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and
Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the conduct
of public hearings and executive sessions. The IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed
serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing
Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification,
in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative
disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no
opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner
was dismissed from service. Hence the petition.
Issue:
Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally created Office of the
Ombudsman.
Ruling:
YES. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor is not exclusive. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive
and covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those
officials removable by impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that
they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while
Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials,
Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor.
A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the
inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent
disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively.
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in
the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that
would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor
without in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all
government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and balance"
intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to
protect one another from administrative liabilities.
CASE NO. 79
Topic: Executive Department – Limitations to Appointment Power
Title: De Castro vs JBC
Citation: G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
Facts:
On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and,
accordingly, directing the Judicial and Bar Council: (1) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of
candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
by May 17, 2010; (2) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice; (3) To submit
to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17,
2010; and (4) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancies in the
Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with
this decision.
Motions for reconsideration were herein filed by the petitioners with the aversion that a plain reading of
Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not lead to an interpretation that exempts judicial
appointments from the express ban on midnight appointments.
Issue:
Whether judicial appointments are exempted from the ban on midnight appointments stated under Section
15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
YES. We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby raised
and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March 17, 2010.
Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments in the Judiciary. The decision of March 17, 2010
has fittingly observed: Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
We cannot allow the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to suit
the purpose of any quarter.
CASE NO. 80
Topic: Executive Department – Ad Interim or Recess Appointments vs Regular
Title: Matibag vs. Benipayo
Citation: G.R. No. 149036
Facts:
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelec’s EID by
then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity.
On March 2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together with other
commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad interim appointment, respondent
Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the
Law Department.
Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular
No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of
employees are prohibited during the election period. Benipayo denied her request for
reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6,
2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She
also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against Benipayo,
alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC
Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent
administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant
petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that
the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions
on the independence of the COMELEC.
Issue:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad
interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Ruling:
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact
that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies
in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They
were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee
Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs.
Bautista. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by
the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make
appointments that take effect immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent", this provision should
be harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the
independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad
interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to
make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give
meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the
framers of the Constitution.
CASE NO. 81
Topic: Executive Department – Pardon distinguished from Amnesty
Title: Barroquinto vs. Fernandez
Facts:
Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder. As
the latter had not yet been arrested the case proceeded against the former, and he was sentenced to
life imprisonment.
Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of
the Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an
act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period from December
8, 1941, to the date when particular area of the Philippines where the offense was actually
committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation.
Jimenez decided to submit his case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission presided by the
respondents herein, and the other petitioner Loreto Barrioquinto, who had then been already
apprehended, did the same.
The Amnesty Commission returned the cases of the petitioners to the CFI-Zamboanga, without
deciding whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of the said Amnesty Proclamation, on the
ground that inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admitted having committed the
offense, because Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed the victim,
they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
Issue:
Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in an amnesty.
Ruling:
NO. The respondents failed to differentiate between amnesty and pardon.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary that he
should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or
offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the
evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within
the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that “invocation of the
benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance.”
CASE NO. 82
Topic: Executive Department – Pardon distinguished from Amnesty
Title: Vera vs. People
Citation: 7 SCRA 152, January 31, 1963
Facts:
In the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Vera and others were charged with the complex crime of
kidnapping with murder of Amadeo Lozanes, alias Azarcon. Upon their motion, invoking the
benefits of Amnesty Proclamation of the President, series of 1946, the case was referred to the
Eighth Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, which actually tried it.
During the hearing, none of the petitioners-defendants admitted having committed the crime
charged. In fact Gaudencio Vera, the only defendant who took the witness stand instead of
admitting the killing of the deceased Lozañes categorically denied it. Hence, the Amnesty
Commission held that it could not take cognizance of the case on the ground that the benefits of
the Amnesty Proclamation could be invoked only by defendants in a criminal case who admitting
the commission of the crime, plead that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance
movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation.
Consequently, the Commission ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for trial.
Issue:
Whether or not Vera and others can avail the benefit of Amnesty without admission of guilt.
Ruling:
Petitioners contend that to be entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation No. 8, it is not necessary for
them to admit the commission of the crime charged, citing in support of their submission the cases of
(Barrioquinto, et al. vs. Fernandez, et al), (Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte v. De los Santos, et al.) and
(Viray v. Amnesty Commission, et al.) to the effect that "in order to entitle a person to the benefits of
Amnesty Proclamation (No. 8), it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non,
admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a
defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense
committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation.
But said cases have been superseded and deemed overruled by the subsequent cases of (People v. Llanita,
et al) and (People v. Guillermo, et al) wherein the court held that — It is rank inconsistency for appellant
to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an act which, according to him, he has not committed. Amnesty
presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime,
he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this
case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty
is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations
against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would being
the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation.
CASE NO. 83
Topic: Executive Department – Effect of Pardon
Title: Monsanto vs. Factoran
Citation: G.R. No. 78239, Feb. 9, 1989
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the complex
crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. Monsanto appealed her conviction to this
Court which subsequently affirmed the same.
She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended
by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted. By reason of said pardon, Monsanto
wrote the Calbayog City Treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as Assistant
City Treasurer.
As referred, the Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without
the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.
Seeking reconsideration, Monsanto wrote that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the
crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore
the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension.
Monsanto’s basic theory is that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of
the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal
in this Court. When pardon was issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because
there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the President has declared her not guilty of the crime
charged and has accordingly dismissed the same.
Issue:
Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive
is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.
Ruling:
NO. The public officer, who is granted pardon, cannot be reinstated to her former position. But
she can apply for reappointment and undergo the usual procedure for a new appointment.
Monsanto had been convicted of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents
and sentenced of prision correccional as minimum, and of prision mayor as maximum. The penalty
of prision mayor carries the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the
principal penalty. The penalty of prision correccional carries, as one of its accessory penalties,
suspension from public office.
The benign mercy of pardon is of British origin, conceived to temper the gravity of the King's
wrath. But Philippine jurisprudence on the subject has been largely influenced by American case
law.
Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of
the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive
magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated
officially to the Court. A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and
delivery is not complete without acceptance.
CASE NO. 84
Topic: Executive Department – Effect of Violation of The Terms of Pardon
Title: Torres vs Director of Bureau of Prisons
Citation: G.R. No. 122338, Dec. 29, 1995
Facts:
This case is an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of the petitioner Wilfredo Torres.
Sometime before 1979 petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the
crime of estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from eleven (11)
years, ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days to thirty-eight (38) years, nine (9) months and
one (1) day, and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75. These convictions were affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on 2 November 2000.
On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President of the
Philippines on condition that petitioner would “not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner
prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from
confinement.
On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the “Board”) resolved to recommend to the
President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. In making its
recommendation to the President, the Board relied upon the decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs.
Director of Prisons (68 Phil. 154 [1939]) and Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol (108 Phil.
356 [1960]). The evidence before the Board showed that on 22 March 1982 and 24 June 1982,
petitioner had been charged with twenty counts of estafa.
On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President of the Philippines
informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending cancellation of the conditional pardon
previously granted to petitioner. On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional
pardon of the petitioner. On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued “by
authority of the President” an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner
was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his
sentence.
Issue:
Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can
be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and
accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
Ruling:
The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are
purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny
under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial
for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal
Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code,
no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction
therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation
of his conditional pardon.
Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally
pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the
offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code
is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (1) to proceed
against him under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code; or (2) to proceed against him
under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period,
upon a convict who “having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate
any of the conditions of such pardon.” Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the
petitioner under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the
President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
CASE NO. 85
Topic: Executive Department – Calling Out Power, Declaration of State of Rebellion
Title: Lacson vs. Perez
Citation: May 10, 2001
Facts:
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well
as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR.
Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected.
Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the
issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the
declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof.
Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against them were filed,
would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are
allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders
were issued against them.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders
allegedly effected by the same.
Ruling:
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant
petition has been rendered moot and academic.
Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular
warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of
rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not
based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because
an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing
for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in which a
warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer
responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal
ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold
departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare
the hold departure orders, null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that
purpose.
Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to,
together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from
arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in
connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.
CASE NO. 86
Topic: Executive Department – Military Powers
Title: Fortun vs GMA
Citation: GR. No. 190293, March 20, 2012
Facts:
On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family of Maguindanao
gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In response to this carnage, President
Arroyo issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front. On December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress. On December 9, 2009,
Congress convened in joint session to review the validity of the President’s action. But two days later, or
on December 12, 2009, before Congress could act, the President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and
restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ in Maguindanao,
render the issues moot and academic.
Ruling:
YES. the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao,
rendered the issues moot and academic
Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate that the Court should be
cautious in entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative
department. The issue of constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of
2010, must be the very issue of the case, that the resolution of such issue is unavoidable.
The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable. President Arroyo withdrew her
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint
houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same.
Under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to
proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not
only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the
suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the
ground, a power that the President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow
Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress
defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step
in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it
becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact
convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the
Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.
Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did
not take over the operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao. The President did not
issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No
indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either
released or promptly charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court
respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is that the President intended by her action to address
an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the rebellion was
localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply armed government presence.
CASE NO. 87
Topic: Executive Department – Constitutionality of Martial Law in Mindanao
Title: Lagman vs Medialdea
Citation: G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017
Facts:
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial Law in the
whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus therein. On
May 25, the president submitted a written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law
declaration (as required by the Constitution).
The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According
to the report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in
Marawi City (and might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing
rebellion and lawless violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades. Proclamation 216 is now assailed
by several petitioners.
Issue:
1.) Whether the petition is reviewable by the court under Section 18, Article VII
2.) Whether the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual
actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately
3.) Whether the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of graduated powers granted
the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely (1) calling out powers, (2) suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, and (3) declaration of martial law.
4.) Whether there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
Ruling:
1.) YES. The only requisite to challenge the validity of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and declaration of martial law is that the petitioner should be a citizen. He need not
even be a taxpayer.
2.) YES. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the
Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This is completely independent from
Congress’ duty to review.
It is meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President in the exercise
of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke
the proclamation or suspension, such a revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
The Court is not allowed to “undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.” On the
other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise
events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court, Congress could probe deeper and further; it
can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.
The Court’s review power is only passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition “in an
appropriate proceeding” by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress’ review mechanism is automatic
in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or
suspension was made.
The court held that it can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently
from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of
Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power to review.
3.) NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President’s decision pertaining
to which extraordinary power should he use to avail in a given set of facts or conditions. To do so
would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an
infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.
The sequence of “graduated powers” does not refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the
Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called “graduation of powers” does not dictate or
restrict the manner by which the President decides which power to choose.
4.) YES. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court
considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the
declaration.
The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts
and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation.
The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases
tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to ascertain if there is probable
cause for a declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet,
with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof.
As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are
thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the
matter asserted. The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the
Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that
more likely than not, actual rebellion exists.
CASE NO. 88
Topic: Executive Department – Diplomatic Power
Title: Nicolas vs Romulo
Citation: GR No. 175888, February 11, 2009
Facts:
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He was
charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime on November 1,
2005 and was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape in the RTC of Makati. The court
ordered Smith detained at the Makati City Jail until further orders.
On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of
Philippine law enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government, and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the United States government,
provided for under new agreements between the Philippines and the United States, referred to as the
Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 19, 2006 which states:
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of
America agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between our two
nations, Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, be returned to U.S. military
custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.
And the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 which states:
The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines and the Embassy of the
United States of America agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed
between the two nations, upon transfer of Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine
Corps, from the Makati City Jail, he will be detained at the first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG)
Building, U.S. Embassy Compound in a room of approximately 10 x 12 square feet. He will be
guarded round the clock by U.S. military personnel. The Philippine police and jail authorities,
under the direct supervision of the Philippine Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) will have access to the place of detention to ensure the United States is in compliance
with the terms of the VFA.
Petitioner Jovito Salonga, et al. challenged the validity of the said agreements contending that the
Philippines should have custody of Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional since
it violates Art. XVlll, Sec. 25 of the constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the VFA is constitutional and the Romulo-Kenney Agreements in accordance with the
provisions of the VFA itself.
Ruling:
The SC ruled The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States, entered on February 10, 1998, is constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December
19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA.
VFA is Constitutional. The SC ruled that “the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has
been recognized as a treaty by the United States,” and “the fact that (it) was not submitted for advice and
consent of the United States does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty
recognized by the said State.”
Section 25, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall
not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held
for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”
The issue, the Court said, is “whether or not the presence of the US Armed Forces in Philippine territory
pursuant to the VFA is allowed ‘under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and recognized as a treaty
by the other contracting State.’” “It is,” the Court ruled. “The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to
provide for the joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US
Mutual Defense Treaty,” the Court held. The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951 was signed
and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate.
The Court however ruled that “the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are
agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA
itself because such detention is not “by Philippine authorities.” Article V, Section 10 of the VFA provides
that the confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of the United States personnel shall be carried
out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States authorities.
CASE NO. 89
Topic: Executive Department – Diplomatic Power
Title: Bayan vs. Zamora
Citation: G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000
Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and
negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos
approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998, and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved
it by 2/3 votes.
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and
not Section 21, Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner, under the provision cited, the “foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are
sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is
requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all
the members of the senate.
Issue:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?
Ruling:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or
facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions
of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of
determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.
The Constitution, makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.” We find nothing in section
25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the
Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because,
under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.
CASE NO. 90
Topic: Executive Department – Deportation of Undesirable Aliens
Title: Go Tek vs. Deportation Board
Facts:
The Board, composed of Manuel A. Concordia, Arturo A. Alafriz and Manuel V. Reyes, in its resolution
of April 21, 1964 denied Go Teks motion. The Board reasoned out that a conviction is not a prerequisite
before the State my exercise its rights to deport an undesirable alien and that the Board is only a fact-finding
body whose function is to make a report and recommendation to the President in whom is lodged the
exclusive power to deport an alien or a deportation proceeding.
In view of the denial of his motion to quash, Go Tek on June 10, 1964, filed in the Court of First Instance
of Manila a prohibition action against the Board. On July 8, 1964, the court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the board from hearing Go Tek's case.
After hearing, the trial court (Judge Federico C. Alikpala presiding) in its decision of 31, 1964 granted the
writ prohibition and the Board to desist from taking cognizance of the Go Tek.
The court, citing the said obiter dictum in the Qua Chee Gan case, held that mere ion of forged dollar checks
is not a ground for deportation under the Immigration Law; that under section 37(3) of the law before an
alien may be deported for having been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or
more for a crime involving moral turpitude a conviction is and that since Go Tek had not been convicted of
the offense punished in article 168, the deportation was premature.
The Board appealed to this Court on the ground that the decision is contrary to law. The Solicitor General
contends that the trial court erred in assuming that the President may deport undesirable aliens only to
grounds enumerated by law; in holding that mere possession of forged dollar checks is not a ground for
deportation and that a criminal conviction is necessary, and in not finding that the Board has jurisdiction
over Go Tek's case.
The parties stipulated that the Deportation Board is an of the President of the Philippines charged with the
investigation of undesirable aliens and to report and recommend proper action on the basis of its findings
therein."
Issue:
Whether or not the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground not
specified in Section 37 of the Immigration Law and although the alien has not yet been convicted of the
offense imputed to him.
Ruling:
YES. A thorough comprehension of the President's power to deport aliens may show the baselessness of
the instant prohibition action of Go Tek. The President's power to deport aliens and the investigation of
aliens subject to deportation are provided for in the following provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code:
SEC. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the
Philippine Islands shall not be deported expelled or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his
own country by the Governor-General except upon prior investigator, conducted by said Executive
or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such case the
person concerned shall he informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed
not less than three days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard
by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing
witnesses.
On the other hand, section 37 of the Immigration Law Provides that certain aliens may be arrested upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and
deported upon the Commissioner's warrant - "after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien."
So, under existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of the President,
after due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and (2) by the
Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section 37 of
the immigration Law.
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57
L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercise by the Chief Executive "when he deems such
action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation.
CASE NO. 91
Topic: Executive Department – Fiscal Autonomy
Title: GSIS vs Heirs of Caballero
Citation: G.R. No. 158090, Oct. 4, 2010
Facts:
Respondent Fernando C. Caballero (Fernando) was the registered owner of a residential lot situated at Rizal
Street, Mlang, Cotabato. On the said lot, respondent built a residential/commercial building consisting of
two (2) stories.
In his complaint, Fernando alleged that there were irregularities in the conduct of the bidding. CMTC
misrepresented itself to be wholly owned by Filipino citizens. It misrepresented its working capital. Its
representative Carmelita Ang Hao had no prior authority from its board of directors in an appropriate board
resolution to participate in the bidding
Fernando further alleged that the GSIS allowed CMTC to bid despite knowledge that said corporation has
no authority to do so. After trial, the RTC, in its Decision dated September 27, 1994, ruled in favor of
petitioner and dismissed the complaint. In the same decision, the trial court granted petitioner's counterclaim
and directed Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals paid by CMTC in the amount of ₱249,800.00. The
foregoing amount was collected by Fernando from the CMTC and represents payment, which was not
turned over to petitioner, which was entitled to receive the rent from the date of the consolidation of its
ownership over the subject property.
Aggrieved by the Decision, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal. The CA, in its Decision dated December
17, 2002, affirmed the decision of the RTC with the modification that the portion of the judgment ordering
Fernando to pay rentals in the amount of ₱249,800.00, in favor of petitioner, be deleted.
Issue:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed an error of law in holding that GSIS'
counterclaim rentals collected by private respondent from Carmelita Mercantile Trading Corporation is in
the nature of a permissive counterclaim which required the payment by GSIS of docket fees before the trial
court can acquire jurisdiction over said counterclaim.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291,
which exempts it from "all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds," cannot operate to exempt
it from the payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which
empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme
Court now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without
transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court's independence − fiscal
autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees,
including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which
established the JDF and the SAJF expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to "guarantee the
independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy." Legal fees therefore do
not only constitute a vital source of the Court's financial resources but also comprise an essential element
of the Court's fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to
government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF
and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court's guaranteed
fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.
CASE NO. 92
Topic: Judiciary Department – Judicial Power
Title: Garcia vs Board of Investments
Facts:
Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a
group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI it has its plant site for the products “naphta cracker”
and “naphta” to be based in Bataan.
In February 1989, one year after the BPC began its production in Bataan, the corporation applied to the
BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner
Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI granted private respondent BPC’s application, stating that the
investors have the final choice as to where to have their plant site because they are the ones who risk capital
for the project.
Issue:
Whether the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of the investors
without considering the national interest.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and ordered
the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta as feedstock
maintained .The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Court’s judicial power to settle actual
controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he wrote the
reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify the
BOI’s action in letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by our own government, could
have been very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word of a great Filipino leader, to wit: “he
would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation”.
CASE NO. 93
Topic: Judiciary Department – How Judicial Review is Exercised
Title: PACU vs. Sec. of Education
Citation: 97 Phil. 806
Facts:
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act No.
2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the
ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first be secured
from the Secretary of Education before a person may be granted the right to own and operate a private
school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed
by private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from
being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution,
and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said
right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government.
PACU also avers that such power granted to the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative
power; that there is undue delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which
the Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts
to censorship.
Issue:
Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
NO. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any
injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution
provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives
of all education to wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and
vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State control of private education was
intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino morals. This is
still part of the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.
CASE NO. 94
Topic: Judiciary Department – How Judicial Review is Exercised
Title: Dumlao vs. COMELEC
Facts:
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed
his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.
Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken
his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also
a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
Said Section 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the

Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as
disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the
same elective local office from which he has retired.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an actual controversy, and the petitioners is the proper party of the case.
Ruling:
Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks
to prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely
affected by the application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed
before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is
being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in
effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a detailed
factual record Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC.
The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra).
In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition,
that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that neither one has been
convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for local
elective positions. Neither one of them has been called to have been adversely affected by the operation of
the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional theirs is a generated grievance. They have no
personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no locus
standi in seeking judicial redress.
CASE NO. 95
Topic: Judiciary Department – Legal Standing
Title: Joya vs PCGG
Facts:
Petitioners are artists (Joya, Nakpil, Armida Siguion Reyna, Malang, Ang Kiu Kok, Polotan, Kasilag,
Almario, et. al). They seek to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the Auction Sale by Christies of
New York of Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacanang during
people power. They claim that the items are part of protected cultural properties and part of Filipino
cultural heritage and hence cannot be disposed. They contend that the items are public properties
collectively owned by Filipinos.
They allege that some of the items were in fact donated by private persons, and that the real ownership of
the paintings belongs to the foundation or corporations, only that the public has been given the chance to
view and appreciate the items on exhibit.
The PCGG wrote to President Aquino to request authority for the consignment agreement between the
Philippines and Christies
COA however made an audit and found that the agreement was of doubtful legality, and that it was highly
disadvantageous to the Philippines. The Director of National Museum issued a certification that the items
were not part of protected cultural properties.
President Cory also approved it. The sale proceeded earning $13M.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi
Ruling:
NO. The rule is that before the court may inquire into any matter, the question must be raised by the
proper party, there must be an actual case or controversy, that the question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity and that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.
The courts will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who
has legal standing. Legal Standing means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as the result of governmental act. Interest means material
interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved. Moreover, it must be personal and not based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional
right of some third or unrelated party.
It is not a taxpayer’s suit. A taxpayer’s suit can only prosper if the governmental acts being questioned
involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds for the purpose
of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes misapplication of funds, which may be enjoined at the
instance of a taxpayer.
CASE NO. 96
Topic: Judiciary Department – The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity
Title: Umali vs. Guingona
Citation: G.R. NO. 131124, March 21, 1999
Facts:
Osmundo Umali, petitioner, was appointed Regional Director of Bureau of Internal Revenue by
Pres. Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 19, 1993 to March 15, 1994 and
Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4, 194.
On August 1 1994, President Ramos received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner
for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as
Regional Director, more particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance.
Upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former President authorized the issuance of
an Order for the preventive suspension of the petitioner and immediately referred the Complaint
against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for
investigation.
Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. And was directed him to send his
answer, copies of Statement of Assets, and Liabilities for the past three (3) years, and Personal
Data Sheet. Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC Office.
On August 23, the petitioner filed his require answer. After evaluating the evidence on record,
the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding an prima facie evidence to
support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges against petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting upon the
recommendation of the PCAGC, then Pres. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152
dismissing petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the
law.
Issues:
1. Whether or not AO No. 152 violated petitioner’s right to security of tenure.
2. Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process in the issuance of AO No. 152.
3. Whether or not the PCAGC is a validly constituted government agency and whether or not the
petitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of the
trial court’s decision.
4. Whether or not the ombudsman’s resolution dismissing the charges against the petitioner is
still basis for the petitioner’s dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO No. 152.
Ruling:
1. NO. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his security
of tenure. The petitioner claimed that as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal Revenue he is
CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure however it is anemic of evidentiary support. But it
was fatal that he couldn’t provide sufficient evidence on this matter.
2. NO. The Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three issues to be sure, petitioner was
not denied the right to due processes before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed
his answer and other pleadings with respect to these alleged violations of internal revenue laws
and regulations and he attended the hearings before the investigatory body.
3. The constitutionality of PCAGC was only posed by the petitioner in his motion for
reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It is too late to raise the said issue for
the first time at such late stage of proceedings below.
4. The administrative action against petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal
case. Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted by the
PCAGC and not on the criminal charges before the ombudsman.
Note: The petition is dismissible because the issue raised by the petitioner does not constitute
any valid legal basis for overturning the findings and conclusions by the Court of Appeals.
However, considering antecedent facts and circumstances, the Court has decided to consider the
dismissal and because the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is no longer
interested in pursuing the case. Finally, the Solicitor General has no more basis to enact AO No.
152.Wherefore, in the light of foregoing effective and substantive supervening events, and in the
exercise of its equity powers, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition. Accordingly, AO No. 152
is considered lifted and petitioner can be allowed to retire with full benefits.
CASE NO. 97
Topic: Judiciary Department – The decision on the constitutional question must be
determinative of the case itself
Title: Hacienda Luisita vs Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
Citation: G.R. No. 171101, 22 November 2011
Facts:
In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at redistributing public and
private agricultural lands to farmers and farmworkers who are landless. One of the lands covered
by this law is the Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential
expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac. Hacienda Luisita was bought in 1958 from the
Spanish owners by the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), which is owned and/or
controlled by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law administration filed an
expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform (now DAR) so that the land can be distributed to the farmers at cost. The RTC rendered
judgment ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.
In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the government’s case against TADECO. The CA dismissed
it, but the dismissal was subject to the condition that TADECO shall obtain the approval of FWB
(farm worker beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock Distribution Plan) and to ensure its implementation.
Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two alternative modes in
distributing land ownership to the FWBs. Since the stock distribution scheme is the preferred
option of TADECO, it organized a spin-off corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as vehicle
to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers.
After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock Distribution Option
Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC),
led by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI through
Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.
From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the farmworkers. Such
claim was subsequently contested by two groups representing the interests of the farmers – the
HLI Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. In 2003, each of them wrote letter petitions before the
DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation of the SDOA. They claimed that they
haven’t received those benefits in full, that HLI violated the terms, and that their lives haven’t
really improved contrary to the promise and rationale of the SDOA.
The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review the terms of the SDOA
and the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the report and the recommendations of the Task Force, the
DAR Sec recommended to the PARC (1) the revocation of Resolution 89-12-2 and (2) the
acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through compulsory acquisition scheme. Consequently, the PARC
revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands covered by the SDP to the mandated
land acquisition scheme under the CARP law. These acts of the PARC was assailed by HLI via
Rule 65. On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657,
insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock transfer in
lieu of outright agricultural land transfer. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly
to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4,
Art. XIII of the Constitution.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners for the revocation/nullification of SDOA (herein respondents)
are real party-in-interests.
2. Whether or not Section 31 of RA 6657 is constitutional
Ruling:
YES. The Supreme Court held that Supervisory Group, AMBALA and their respective leaders are
real parties-in-interest.
The SDOA identifies the “SDP qualified beneficiaries” as “the farmworkers who appears in the
annual payroll, inclusive of the permanent and seasonal employees, who are regularly or
periodically employed by HLI.” Galang and the Supervisory group who were admittedly employed
by HLI comes within the definition of real party-in-interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court, as one benefited or injured by the judgment in a suit, and thus, entitled to sue.
Assuming arguendo that they are not regular farmworkers, Article XIII of the Constitution
categorized them as “other farmworkers” entitled to “receive a just share of the fruits” of the land.
In this issue on constitutionality of Section 31 of RA 6657, FARM seeks to invalidate the said
provision of the law because it allows corporations to use stock distribution as its mode of
distribution or transfer instead of an outright agricultural land transfer, which they believe impairs
the fundamental right of farmers and farmworkers envisioned under Section 4, Article XIII of the
Constitution. HLI counters this matter by saying that agrarian reform is not only about transfer of
land ownership to farmers and other qualified beneficiaries.
Accordingly, the challenge on the constitutionality of Section 31 of RA 6657 and its counterpart
provision in EO 229 failed.
The essential requisites for the exercise of its power of judicial review include the following:
(1) There is an actual case or controversy
(2) That the constitutional question is raised at the earliest possible opportunity by the
proper party or one with locus standi; and
(3) The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. [Garcia vs.
Executive Secretary, 415 SCRA 44 (2009)]
The Supreme Court reasoned that the reason it failed was because of failure of the intervenors to
question its constitutionality in the earliest opportunity, and instead, slept on their rights and
received benefits derived from the same. As early as November 21, 1989 when PARC approved
the SDP of Hacienda Luisita or at least within a reasonable time thereafter, its members received
benefits from the SDP without so much protest. It was only on December 4, 2003 or 14 years after
approval of the SDP via PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989 that said plan
and approving resolution was sought to be revoked. Furthermore, AMBALA did NOT question
the constitutionality of said provision but focused on the flaws and gaps in the subsequent
implementation of the SDP. Even the public respondent Sol. Gen. did not question it, and such
question was only raised on May 3, 2007 when it filed its Supplemental Comment with the Court.
It has been stressed by the Supreme Court that the question on constitutionality will not passed
upon by the Court unless it is raised at the first or earliest possible opportunity by the proper party.
In terms of the lis mota of the case, the invalidity of the provision was not alleged, but rather it is
the alleged application in the SDP that is flawed was raised.
The Supreme Court also noted that Section 5 of RA 9700 superseded Section 31 of RA 6657 vis-
à-vis the stock distribution component of said provision, where Section 5 of RA 9700 provides:
“That after June 30, 2009, the mode of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and
compulsory acquisition.” Thus, stock distribution is no longer an available option under existing
law. The issue has become moot and academic.
The law is clear – farmers and regular farmworkers have a right to OWN DIRECTLY OR
COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL. The basic law allows two modes of land
distribution—direct and indirect ownership. No language is found in the 1987 Constitution that
disqualifies or prohibits corporations or cooperatives of farmers from being the legal entity through
which collective ownership can be exercised. The term “collectively” is said to allow indirect
ownership of land and not just outright agricultural land transfer. This is in recognition of the fact
that land reform may become successful even if it is done through the medium of juridical entities
composed of farmers.
The SC believed that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is NOT inconsistent with the State’s commitment to
farmers and farmworkers to advance their interests under the policy of social justice. This is
believed to be the modality of the legislature for collective ownership by which the imperatives of
social justice may be approximated, if not achieved.
Also as contended by FARM that stock certificates do not equate to land ownership, still, the
Corporation Code is clear that the FWB becomes a stockholder who acquires an equitable interest
in the assets of the corporation, which includes the agricultural lands. A share of stock typifies an
aliquot part of the corporation’s property, or right to share in its proceeds to the extent when
distributed according to law and equity and that its holder is not the owner of any part of the capital
of the corporation. However, the FWBs will ultimately own the agricultural lands owned by the
corporation when the latter is eventually dissolved and liquidated.
CASE NO. 98
Topic: Judiciary Department – Is the Drugs Law prohibiting Plea bargaining a usurpation of the
rule-making power of the Supreme Court?
Title: Salvador Estipona, Jr. vs Hon. Lobrigo
Citation: G.R. No. 226679, Aug.15, 2017
Facts:
Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165. Estipona filed a
Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea-Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his
not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should
have been Section 15?) of the same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a
first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.
It was argued that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of said
law violates the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.
Ruling:
YES. The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
departments. The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal
branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches
trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or
modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court. The court’s discretion to amend,
repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive
branches of government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority to promulgate rules on pleading,
practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of our institutional independence.
CASE NO. 99
Topic: Judiciary Department – Does the Ombudsman have power over judges?
Title: Maceda vs. Vasquez
Facts:
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order
dated September 18, 1991, denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by
petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting
evidences.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's
ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance
of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme
Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
Issue:
Whether or not the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's
power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine
of separation of powers.
Ruling:
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws and
take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the
Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the
Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel,
but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this
Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case
load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot
compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow
its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-
complaint.
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to
this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of
their administrative duties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to
dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same
to this Court for appropriate action.
CASE NO. 100
Topic: Judiciary Department – Can the Supreme Court review the action of the JBC?
Title: Jardeliza vs Sereno
Facts:
The present case begins from the compulsory retirement of Associate Justice Roberto Abad
(Associate Justice Abad) last May 22, 2014. Before his retirement, on March 6, 2014, in
accordance with its rules, the JBC announced the opening for application or recommendation for
the said vacated position.
On March 14, 2014, the JBC received a letter from Dean Danilo Concepcion of the University of
the Philippines nominating petitioner Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor
General of the Republic, for the said position. Upon acceptance of the nomination, Jardeleza was
included in the names of candidates, as well as in the schedule of public interviews.
It appears from the averments in the petition that on June 16 and 17, 2014, Jardeleza received
telephone calls from former Court of Appeals Associate Justice and incumbent JBC member,
Aurora Santiago Lagman (Justice Lagman), who informed him that during the meetings held on
June 5 and 16, 2014, Chief Justice and JBC ex-officio Chairperson, Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
(Chief Justice Sereno),manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-0094
against him. Jardeleza was then directed to "make himself available" before the JBC on June 30,
2014, during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity.
Consequently, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition (letter-petition)5 praying that the Court, in the
exercise of its constitutional power of supervision over the JBC, issue an order: 1) directing the
JBC to give him at least five (5) working days written notice of any hearing of the JBC to which
he would be summoned; and the said notice to contain the sworn specifications of the charges
against him by his oppositors, the sworn statements of supporting witnesses, if any, and copies of
documents in support of the charges; and notice and sworn statements shall be made part of the
public record of the JBC; 2) allowing him to cross-examine his oppositors and supporting
witnesses, if any, and the cross-examination to be conducted in public, under the same conditions
that attend the public interviews held for all applicants; 3) directing the JBC to reset the hearing
scheduled on June 30, 2014 to another date; and 4) directing the JBC to disallow Chief Justice
Sereno from participating in the voting on June 30,2014 or at any adjournment thereof where such
vote would be taken for the nominees for the position vacated by Associate Justice Abad.
During the June 30, 2014, meeting of the JBC, sans Jardeleza, incumbent Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio (Associate Justice Carpio) appeared as a resource person to shed light on a
classified legal memorandum (legal memorandum) that would clarify the objection to Jardeleza’s
integrity as posed by Chief Justice Sereno. According to the JBC, Chief Justice Sereno questioned
Jardeleza’s ability to discharge the duties of his office as shown in a confidential legal
memorandum over his handling of an international arbitration case for the government. Later,
Jardeleza was directed to one of the Court’s ante-rooms where Department of Justice Secretary
Leila M. De Lima (Secretary De Lima) informed him that Associate Justice Carpio appeared
before the JBC and disclosed confidential information which, to Chief Justice Sereno,
characterized his integrity as dubious.
Perceptibly based on the aforementioned resolution’s declaration as to his availment of a remedy

in law, Jardeleza filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), seeking to compel
the JBC to include him in the list of nominees for Supreme Court Associate Justice vice Associate
Justice Abad, on the grounds that the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno acted in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in excluding him, despite having garnered a
sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
Issue:
Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in cases
where an objection or opposition to an application is raised.
Ruling:
YES. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically denigrate
an applicant’s entitlement to due process.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding
being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain oneself is availing. In cases where
an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither
contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment
on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process
supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies
the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer
understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and
capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply
the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear
the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that
an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness. Consequently, the Court is compelled
to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the
vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose from the violation by the JBC
of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process.
True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that
the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.

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FINAL REQUIREMENT

Submitted by: Raddy Christer Padayao

Submitted to: Atty. Gonzalo Malig-on, Jr.

Thank you, Atty., And God Bless!

• Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government.

• On 27 June 2002, Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency

1. The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential

Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive

• The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to

And the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 which states:

Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the

Perceptibly based on the aforementioned resolution’s declaration as to his availment of a remedy

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