Bordalba, Gino Raphael B.

M-W 5:30- 7:30

Constitutional Law 1

1. Arnault vs. Nazareno

G.R. No. L-3820. July 18, 1950

Facts:

October 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural ProgressAdministration,

bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums ofP4,500,000
and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum andP 500,000 tothe
second sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his two attorney-in-
fact inthe Philippines, as represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates respectively.
However, ErnestH. Burt was not the original owner of the estate. He bought the first
from San Juan de Dioshospital and the second from the Philippine trust company. In
both instances, Burt was not ableto pay the necessary amount of money to complete
his payments. As such, his contract with saidowners were cancelled.

On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered
theTambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an abolute deed of sale
inconsideration of the sum of P750,000. On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its
Resolution No. 8, which created a specialcommittee to investigate the transactions
surrounding the estates. The special committee createdby the resolutioncalled and
examined various witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L. Arnault.

Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were
delivered tohim on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he
opened a new account in thename of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank
in which he deposited the two checksaggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same
occasion he drew on said account two checks; onefor P500,000, which he transferred
to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with thePhilippine National Bank, and
another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.It was the desire of the
committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise
to the present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, thesenate
then approved a resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this resolution which
broughthim to jail and is being contested in this petition.

Issue:

1. ) Whether the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its
questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation.

Ruling:

It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to
conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness
who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the term of
the members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to
violate the witness’ right to due process of law.

Thus understood, this humble opinion does not conflict with the views of Judge Land
is and all other advocates of wide latitude for congressional investigations. All are
agreed, and the majority accept the proposition, that there is a limit to the legislative
power to punish for contempt. The limit is set in Anderson vs. Dunn which Judge
Land is approved — “the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.”

2. Gudani vs. Senga

G.R. No. 170165. August 15, 2006

Facts:
Senator RodolfoBiazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen.
Gudani and Col.Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee
on National Defense and Security to shed light on the “Hello Garci” controversy.
Gudani and Balutan were directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga,per instruction
of Pres. Arroyo, not testify before said Committee. On the very day of the hearing,
President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 enjoining
officials of the executive department including the military establishment from
appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval. However, the two testified
before the Senate, prompting Gen. Senga to issue an order directing Gudani and
Balutan to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) on 3
October 2005 for investigation. The following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily
retired from military service. After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the
two be charged with violation of Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior
officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo be declared unconstitutional; (2) the
charges against them bequashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their successors-in-interest
or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from
proceeding against them, as a consequence of their having testified before the Senate.

Issue:

1.) Whether the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the
AFP preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court holds that the President has constitutional authority to do so,
by her power as commander-in-chief. If the President is not inclined to compel her
subordinate to appear before congress, the President may be commanded by judicial
order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the
force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
Petitioners have presented several issues relating to the tenability or wisdom of the
President’s order on them and other military officers not to testify before Congress
without the President’s consent. Yet these issues ultimately detract from the main
point — that they testified before the Senate despite an order from their commanding
officer and their commander-in-chief for them not to do so, in contravention of the
traditions of military discipline which we affirm today.

Petitioners may have been of the honest belief that they were defying a direct order of
their Commander-in-Chief and Commanding General in obeisance to a paramount
idea formed within their consciences, which could not be lightly ignored. Still, the
Court, in turn, is guided by the superlative principle that is the Constitution, the
embodiment of the national conscience. The Constitution simply does not permit the
infraction which petitioners have allegedly committed, and moreover, provides for an
orderly manner by which the same result could have been achieved without offending
constitutional principles.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

3. ROMULO L. NERI, petitioners

vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
AND INVESTIGATIONS, et al., respondents
G.R. No. 180643. September 4, 2008. 

Facts:

In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for
the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s
Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal.  
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon.
He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which
he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for
his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President
Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri
refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. 
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC
averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the
jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for
contempt.  

Issue:
Whether the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive
privilege.

Ruling:
Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to the exacting
standards of evidence essential to arrive at accurate factual findings to which to apply
the law. Hence, Section 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation provides that “technical rules of evidence applicable to judicial
proceedings which do not affect substantive rights need not be observed by the
Committee.” Court rules which prohibit leading, hypothetical, or repetitive questions
or questions calling for a hearsay answer, to name a few, do not apply to a legislative
inquiry. Every person, from the highest public official to the most ordinary citizen,
has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in proper proceedings by a
competent court or body.
In the present case, it is respondent Committees’ contention that their determination
on the validity of executive privilege should be binding on the Executive and the
Courts. It is their assertion that their internal procedures and deliberations cannot be
inquired into by this Court supposedly in accordance with the principle of respect
between co-equal branches of government. Interestingly, it is a courtesy that they
appear to be unwilling to extend to the Executive (on the matter of executive
privilege) or this Court (on the matter of judicial review). It moves this Court to
wonder: In respondent Committees’ paradigm of checks and balances, what are the
checks to the Legislature’s all-encompassing, awesome power of investigation? It is a
power, like any other, that is susceptible to grave abuse. 
While this Court finds laudable the respondent Committees’ well-intentioned efforts
to ferret out corruption, even in the highest echelons of government, such lofty
intentions do not validate or accord to Congress powers denied to it by the
Constitution and granted instead to the other branches of government. 
There is no question that any story of government malfeasance deserves an inquiry
into its veracity. As respondent Committees contend, this is founded on the
constitutional command of transparency and public accountability. The recent clamor
for a “search for truth” by the general public, the religious community and the
academe is an indication of a concerned citizenry, a nation that demands an
accounting of an entrusted power. However, the best venue for this noble undertaking
is not in the political branches of government. The customary partisanship and the
absence of generally accepted rules on evidence are too great an obstacle in arriving
at the truth or achieving justice that meets the test of the constitutional guarantee of
due process of law. We believe the people deserve a more exacting “search for truth”
than the process here in question, if that is its objective.
WHEREFORE, respondent Committees’ Motion for Reconsideration dated April 8,
2008 is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

4. Calida v. Trillanes
G.R. No. 240873, 3 September 2019

FACTS:

This Court resolves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 1 filed by Solicitor
General Jose C. Calida (Calida), Milagros O. Calida, Josef Calida, Michelle Calida,
and Mark Jorel Calida. They pray that Antonio Trillanes IV (Trillanes), then a sitting
senator, be permanently prohibited from conducting a legislative inquiry into their
alleged conflict of interest on government contracts awarded to their security services
company. They also pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction.

Petitioners claim that Proposed Senate Resolution No. 760 3 does not contain any
intended legislation. Instead, it merely calls for an investigation on any conflict of
interest regarding the award of government contracts to Vigilant Investigative and
Security Agency, Inc., a company owned by petitioner Calida and his family. 4 They
likewise claim that respondent Trillanes acted without authority in issuing invitations
to the resource persons, as the invitations were sent out without the Senate body's
approval of the proposed resolution.

Furthermore, petitioners insist that the investigation is clearly intended merely to

target and humiliate them. 6 Thus, they pray that respondent Trillanes, as the chair of
the Senate Committee on Civil Service, Government Reorganization, and Professional
Regulation (Committee on Civil Service), be prohibited from conducting a legislative
inquiry against them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the investigation is in aid of legislation.

RULING:
Yes, although this case became moot since respondent Trillanes has reached the end
of his two-year term as senator.

The legislative power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation is conferred by

Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.

While this power is not found in the present Constitution's precursors, this Court in
Arnault v. Nazareno 25 clarified that such power did not need textual grant as it was
implied and essential to the legislative function:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it
may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of
inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information — which is not infrequently true — recourse must be had to others who
do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. 26
(Citation omitted)
Nonetheless, despite the constitutional grant, the power of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate to conduct investigations in aid of legislation is not
absolute. Citing Watkins v. United States, 27 this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee 28 emphasized that "[n]o inquiry is an end itself[.]" 29 It
explained that an investigation in aid of legislation must comply with the rules of
procedure of each House of Congress, and must not violate the individual rights
enshrined in the Bill of Rights.

In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,

31 this Court explained further that a legislative inquiry must prove to be in aid of
legislation and not for other purposes, pronouncing that "Congress is neither a law
enforcement nor a trial agency." It declared:
No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees are, they cannot
assume the power reposed upon our prosecutorial bodies and courts. The
determination of who is/are liable for a crime or illegal activity, the investigation of
the role played by each official, the determination of who should be haled to court for
prosecution and the task of coming up with conclusions and finding of facts regarding
anomalies, especially the determination of criminal guilt, are not functions of the
Senate. Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears
stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of,
a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e., legislation. Investigations conducted solely to
gather incriminatory evidence and "punish" those investigated are indefensible. There
is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure. 33 (Citation omitted)
Additionally, legislative inquiry must respect the individual rights of the persons
invited to or affected by the legislative inquiry or investigation. Hence, the power of
legislative inquiry must be carefully balanced with the private rights of those affected.
A person's right against self-incrimination and to due process cannot be swept aside in
favor of the purported public need of a legislative inquiry.

5. ARVIN R. BALAG v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.

G.R. No. 234608, 3 July 2018, EN BANC

FACTS

This is a case of petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer of an

issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
seeking to annul, set aside and enjoin implementation of the Senate P.S. Resolution
No. 504 and October 18, 2017 Order of Complaint by the Senate Committee on
Public Order and Dangerous Drugs filed by Arvin R. Balag (petitioner) against the
Senate of the Philippines, et. al. (respondent). On September 17, 2017, a first-year law
student from the University of Santo Tomas named Horacio Castillo III, allegedly
died due to hazing-related activities conducted by the Aegis Juris Fraternity. On
September 20, 2017, the senate released Senate Resolution No. 504 entitled “a
Resolution Directing the Appropriate Senate Committees to Conduct an Inquiry, In
Aid of Legislation, into the Recent Death of Horacio Castillo III Allegedly due to
Hazing-Related Activities” filed by Sen. Paolo Benigno Aquino IV.
When the petitioner attended the hearing dated on October 18, 2017, Sen.
Grace Poe asked the petitioner if he was the president of Aegis Juris Fraternity
however, the petitioner refused to answer and invoked his right to self-incrimination.
Sen. Panfilo Lacson reminded that it was just a “simple question” to invoke self-
incrimination and warned the petitioner that he may be cited in contempt, but the
petitioner still refused to answer. According to Sen. Grace Poe, the petitioner’s
signature appeared on the document for the application of the Aegis Juris Fraternity in
the organizational sheet submitted in the school administration and it was indicated
therein that the petitioner was the President, yet he still refuses to answer the simple
question asked. The petitioner was then cited in contempt and was ordered to place in
detention under the Senate Sergeant at Arms’ supervision after the senate hearing.
Sen. Panfilo Lacson gave the petitioner a chance to purge out of contempt, however,
the petitioner still refused to answer and invoked his right to self-incrimination. When
the petitioner was asked of the question of whose decision it was to bring the victim to
the hospital, the petitioner submitted a plea to lift his contempt and stated that he was
a member of the Aegis Juris Fraternity, however, he does not know who the president
was because he was enrolled at another university at the time of the incident. The
question asked before his plea was again repeated and the petitioner invoked again his
right to self-incrimination. The d

ISSUE:

Did the Senate Committee acted with grave abuse of discretion in conducting the
legislative inquiry and citing petitioner in contempt?

RULING:
 YES. However, the court denied the petition for being moot and academic. In the
present case, the Court finds that there is no more justiciable controversy to be
decided up since in its resolution dated December 12, 2017, the Court ordered in the
interim the immediate release of petitioner pending resolution of the instant petition.
Thus, petitioner was no longer detained under the Senate's authority.
However, the court still resolved the case despite being moot and academic. The court
ruled that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of the
Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of
the legislative inquiry. The court stated that the interests of the Senate and the
witnesses appearing in its legislative inquiry should be balanced. The Senate can
continuously and effectively exercise its power of contempt during the legislative
inquiry against recalcitrant witnesses, even during recess. Such power can be
exercised by the Senate immediately when the witness performs a contemptuous act,
subject to its own rules and the constitutional rights of the said witness. However,
during recess, the Senate will be prevented from effectively conducting legislative
hearings. But the Senate may still exercise its power of contempt during legislative
hearings while on recess provided that the period of imprisonment shall only last until
the termination of the legislative inquiry upon the approval or disapproval of the
Committee Report. Thus, the Senate's inherent power of contempt is still potent and
compelling even during its recess. At the same time, the rights of the persons
appearing are respected because their detention shall not be indefinite.

6. Imbong vs. Ochoa

GR No. 294819, April 8, 2014

Facts:
Congress enacted R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), to provide Filipinos, especially the
poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modern family
planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples’ right to
reproductive health be achieved. Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement
measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women’s
health and population control.

Fourteen petitions and two petitions – in – intervention were filed by the different
petitioners. The petitioners were assailing the constitutionality of the RH Law on the
grounds that it violates the right to life of the unborn, women’s right to health and the
right to protection against hazardous products, the people’s right to religious freedom
and the right to free speech. They also claim that mandatory sex education in schools
should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs. They also claim that
the law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the constitution,
and that it intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance
with their beliefs.

On the other hand, respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population
control measure, and that the concepts of “responsible parenthood” and “reproductive
health” are both interrelated as they are inseparable.

Issue:

1. ) Whether or not the RH Law violates the Freedom of Religion and the Right to
Free Speech.

Ruling:
No, the moral standards of one particular religion cannot be used as the State’s basis
in determining the morality of secular laws. The State recognizes and respects
different religions and each of their different beliefs. However, one religious sect
cannot impose upon the State to follow its standards of morality.

Health professionals, as part of their professional responsibility, must provide their

clients with full, unbiased information of different Reproductive Health methods
regardless of their own feelings about these methods. Providing their clients the full
range of information on reproductive health care services and treatment modalities
will help the public make intelligent decisions related to their health.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its
Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No.
10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.

7. Calalang vs. Williams

GR. No. 47800. December 2, 1940

Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to

recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along
Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from
7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue
extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m.
to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940,
recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed
in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which
authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and
control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, the Director of
Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation
made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that
the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the
portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga
Street. 

On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his

second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the
recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic
of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated, for a
period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The
Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused
to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his
capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme
court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio
Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio
Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of
Police of Manila.

Issue:
1. ) Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power.
Ruling:

There is no undue deleagation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not
confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred
upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out
the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, “to
promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines” and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of
traffic “whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary
or advisable in the public convenience and interest.” 

The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall
be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the
application of said law is to be predicated. 

To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine
when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience
and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the
National Assembly. 

It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is

confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the
law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.

8. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIEL

ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et all, respondents
G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997. 

Facts:

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special attention,
as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps
to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986
Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent and the main
sponsor of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the Constitution,
characterized this system as “innovative”. Indeed, it is, for both under the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the
Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all
its members and (2) by a constitutional convention. For this and the other reasons
hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this petition. 
December 6, 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative. 
Upon the filing of the Petition, the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order
directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached
Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution including the proposal, proposed
constitutional amendment, and the signature form, and the notice of hearing in three
(3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense and setting the case for
hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m. 
December 12, 1996, Senator Roco, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the
ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC. 

December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria
Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising that R.A. No. 6735
provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on
statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission
indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to
some future law. 
December 19, 1996, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition
and issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until
further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the
Petition, and private respondents conducting a signature drive for people’s initiative to
amend the Constitution. 
January 2, 1997, private respondents filed their Comment on the petition. They argue
therein that R.A No. 6735 is the enabling law implementing the power of people
initiative to propose amendments to the constitution. 

Issue:

Whether the COMELEC violated the non-delegation of legislative power. 

Ruling:

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a
Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. The recognized exceptions to the
rule are as follows:

Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution; Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of
Article VI of the Constitution;Delegation to the people at large; Delegation to local
governments; and Delegation to administrative bodies.

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial

functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative
authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there
must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is
complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative
policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
affected.
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No.
6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The
delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

9. BANAT vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

Facts:

Comelec sitting as National Board of Canvassers (NBC) promulgated NBC

Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen parties as winners in the party-list elections;
that the maximum total party-list votes is 16,723,121; that in accordance to Section 11
of RA 7941, the presumptive two percent can be pegged at 334, 462; and that the total
number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined
pursuant to Veterans Federation Party versus Comelec formula upon completion of
the canvass of the party-list results.

Comelec further issued NBC Resolution No. 07-72 declaring the additional seat
allocated to the appropriate parties in Accordance to the Veterans formula. BANAT
filed a petition to proclaim the full number of party-list representatives provided by
the Constitution. Accordingly, Comelec issued a NBC Resolution no. 07-88 which
declares the petition moot and academic as it has previously promulgated Resolutions
No. 07-60 and 07-72.

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the NBC resolution.
Other petitions from Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked NBC to reconsider
the use of Veterans formula because it violates the Constitution and Republic Act
7941.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the twenty percent allocation of party-list in the Constitution is
mandatory.
2. Whether or not the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 and the
two percent threshold of RA 7491 are unconstitutional.
3. Whether or not major political parties can participate in the party-list elections.

Ruling:
1.) No. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the
entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The
Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the
number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives
is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the
constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-
seat cap as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization
may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating
the party-list elections.
2.) Yes. In computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the
two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the
two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum
number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats
exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of
the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full

implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives."
3.) Yes Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties
from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings.
In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party
or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties
will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in
party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-
political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties
from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law. Read
together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state
that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations for electoral or political purposes.

The petition is partially granted. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC in
NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution in NBC No. 07-60. We declare
unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list
seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in
accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties
are disallowed from participating in party-list elections.

10. Atong Paglaum Inc. vs. COMELEC

GR No. 203766, April 2, 2013

Facts:

The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions
for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations
registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections. December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC
Second Division’s resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration
and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB
was denied participation in the elections because PBB does not represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

Thirteen petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court.
The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the
names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of
Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary
hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations
of intent to participate in the elections have continually complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
Thirty nine petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court,
directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing
of the official ballot for the elections. Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court issued
Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. 

Issue:

1. ) Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive for sectoral parties only.
2. ) Whether or not major political parties are prohibited from participated in party-
list elections.
3. ) Whether or not only members of the sector can be party-list nominees.

Ruling:

1. No. Section 5(1) Article VI of the Constitution expresses that the party-list system
is compose of three groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three
 groups. These groups are the 1.) national parties or organizations, 2.) regional
parties or organizations, and 3.) sectoral parties or organizations.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national
and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. To exclude them from the party-
list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as
their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system
is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and
express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

2. No. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to
participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in
extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to
those who "lack well-defined political constituencies." The participation of major
political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as
members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies,"
giving them a voice in law-making. Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a
major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must
organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional,
women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.

Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-
laws, platform or program of government, officers and members, a majority of
whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a
 coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides
that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form
part does not participate in the party-list system."

3. No. Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list

nominees. This provision prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee
from the youth sector. A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the
party or organization which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral
parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector
represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector. The nominees of
the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of
advocacy for the sector represented.

11. Sema vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 177597 July 16, 2008

Facts:

On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly,

exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first
district of Maguindanao.  MMA Act 201 provides:
   
Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities
constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11.
Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second
legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative
district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.
   
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution
No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of
the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province” under
MMA Act 201.

Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELEC’s

Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007, provides in pertinent
parts:
     Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to
adopt the recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment
of the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato
City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of
Maguindanao. 

On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these
petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in
question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District
of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).”

Issue:
1. ) Whether or not Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays, is constitutional.

Ruling:
The petitions have no merit. It is ruled that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces and cities; (2) cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.

In this case, the creation of any of the four local government units - province, city,
municipality or barangay - must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a
local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code.
Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third,
there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the

Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power
to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers,
Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any
provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards,
and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, "only x x x an Act of
Congress" can create provinces, cities or municipalities.

There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional
legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of
provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
provides, "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative" in the House of Representatives.
Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Any
province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member x x x."

Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will

violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population
of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the
power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires
also the power to create a legislative district.

12. Marcos vs. COMELEC

GR No. 119976 September 18, 1995

Facts:

Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) in the First district
of Leyte in order that she will be able to run for Congress of that district in the 1995
elections.  Her COC stated that she was a resident of Leyte for seven months.  Private
Respondent Montejo, a rival candidate filed a petition to cancel the COC and to
disqualify Marcos on the ground that she did not meet the one year residency
requirement as provided for in the Constitution.  In response, Marcos amended her
COC changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood".  Marcos claimed that
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence." She further
claimed that she is entitled to the correction of her COC on the ground that her
original entry of "seven months" was the result of an "honest misinterpretation or
honest mistake". 

The COMELEC granted the petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos.  It
held that the animus revertendi of Marcos was not Tacloban, but San Juan, Manila,
because that where she chose to live after she went back to the Philippines after her
well-publicized exile in the US.  It explained that while Petitioner grew up in
Tacloban, after her graduation, however, she moved to Manila where she became a
registered voter, became a member of the Batasang Pambansa as a representative of
Manila and eventually became Governor of Manila.  This, according to the
COMELEC debunks her claim that she was a resident of Leyte 1st District "since
childhood".

Issue:
1. ) Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to
satisfy the one-year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.
Ruling:

Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal

residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the

concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained
residences in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo
lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It
cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law
as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was
ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual)
residence, not her domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to

run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are
set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly
elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

13. AQUINO VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995

Facts:

Agapito “Butz” A. Aquino on March 20,1995 filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City.
In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of 284 Amapola
Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati for ten months, said address is within the
second legislative district. 

Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-
NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino
on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be
for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.

Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency
in his certificate of candidacy to one year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections
(Comelec) passed a resolution which dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed
Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won against Augusto Syjuco with with
38,547 votes and 35,910 votes, respectively. Move Makati filed a motion of
reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order
suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue.

On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for
the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence. Hence, this
petition of certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders. Salient features of his
petition include the following: a.) That the Comelec has no jurisdiction to determine
and adjudge the disqualification issue involving congressional candidates after the 8
May 1995 Elections because such determination is being reserved and lodged
exclusively with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET);b.) The
Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year
against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence;
and c.) The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when
it ordered the Board of Canvassers to “determine and proclaim the winner out of the
remaining qualified candidates” after the erroneous disqualification of the petitioner
in that such directive is in total disregard of the well-settled doctrine that a second
place candidate cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.

Issue:

1. ) Whether or not “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes

“domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral
district.

Ruling:

The Court agreed with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, the
latter "must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice”.
The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of
Representatives should be a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a
period of not less than one (l) year prior to the elections. The framers of the
Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which
regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile. Clearly, the place "where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home," 21 where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the
purposes of election law. As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his
Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11, 1992 elections, indicated not only that he
was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of
the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. At the time, his certificate
indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate
places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and
Aurora. Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to the COMELEC at various
times during his political career, what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that
this domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate
of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

14. Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board

G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008

Facts:

This is a consolidated case with Pimentel vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 161658) and
Laserna vs. DDB and PDEA (G.R. No. 158633)
Republic Act No. 9165 known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Section 36 requires drug testing of paragraph (c) students of secondary and tertiary
schools, (d) officers and employees of public and private offices, (f) persons charged
before the prosecutor’s office with a specific criminal offense, and (g) candidates for
public office.
[G.R. No. 161658] On December 23, 2003, Aquilino Q. Pimental, a senator
and candidate for re-election seeks to nullify Sec. 36 of RA No. 9165 for being
unconstitutional because it imposes a qualification for senators which is already
provided in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the 1987. Imposition of mandatory drug testing is
obviously not included in the said provisions.
[G.R. No. 157870] SJS contends that paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g), Sec. 36
of RA No. 9615 constitute undue delegation of legislative power for random drug
testing gives unbridled discretion to schools and employers, henceforth, it is
unconstitutional. It violates the right to privacy which is recognized in this jurisdiction
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.
[G.R. No. 158533] Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. is a citizen and taxpayer who
seeks that the same paragraphs of the aforementioned RA No. 9615 must be struct
down for it infringes the right to privacy, right against unreasonable search and
seizure, and right against self-incrimination. He further alleges that it is contrary to
the due process and equal protection guarantees.
Issue:

1.) Whether or not paragraph (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9615 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator.
2.) Whether or not paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9615 constitute
undue delegation of legislative power.
Ruling:
The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid
if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the
three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Thus,
legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and
the allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are
chiefly found in the Bill of Rights and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.

The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that "subjecting
almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an
unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy," has failed to show how the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36 (c) and (d) of RA
9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search
under Art. III, Sec. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as
simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration.
Consider what he wrote without elaboration: 
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings
on the constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The
US courts have been consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a
citizen's constitutional right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and
seizure.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional
landscape. In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government and
the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative
agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and
declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R.
Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All
concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec.
36(f) and (g)of RA 9165. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

15. Dimaporo vs. Mitra

GR. No. 96859 October 15, 1991

Facts:

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second
Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15
January 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in the
immediately following elections. Upon being informed of this development by the
COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives
excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives
pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than
one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and -
President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the of his
certificate of candidacy.

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to

respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and
functions as elected Member of Congress. He maintains that he did not thereby lose
his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not
operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not
applicable to the present members of Congress.

Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when
a congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a
certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment.

Issue:

1. ) Whether or not petitioner can still be considered as member of the Congress even
after he has filed for another government position.

Ruling:

Section 1 of Article XI on "Accountability of Public Officers” in the 1987

Constitution states that “Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
” This statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term
of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby
cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy,
they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional
edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle
with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.

In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a
Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. As
succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General:

The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended

or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which
 an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by
circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may
be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will
not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs.
Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a
certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short
his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve
its unexpired portion.

The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office having been
spelled out in Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881 itself, no statutory interpretation is
needed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

16. Flores vs. Drilon

G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993

Facts:

Respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA).

The petitioners, challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227,
otherwise known as the “Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992,”. They
maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 infringes on the following
constitutional and statutory provisions:
(a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that “[n]o elective
official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
officer or position during his tenure,” because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an
elective official and the subject posts are public offices;

(b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that “[t]he President
shall . . . . appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint”, since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President
who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts; and,

(c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code, for the reason that the
appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent Executive
Secretary on 3 April 1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11
May 1992 Elections.

Issue:
1. ) Whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, “Provided,
however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the
mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive
officer of the Subic Authority,” violates the constitutional proscription against
appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.

Ruling:

Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:

  No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government
 or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions
in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with
dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation
that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public officer or employee, like the
head of an executive department described in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. v. Philip
Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, “. . . . should be allowed to attend to
his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties or
employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and
energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in
haphazardness and inefficiency . . . .”
Particularly as regards the first paragraph of Sec. 7, “the basic idea really is to prevent
a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an
executive position in government, and thus neglect his constituents . . . .”

In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective
official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of
the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the
constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination
to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the
Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most
beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment.

While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer
during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo
City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications
where only one, and no other, can qualify. Accordingly, while the conferment of the
appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid legislative act,
the proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative.

Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout
his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective
post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be
considered fit for appointment.

Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for

appointment to another public office.

17. Liban vs. Gordon

G.R. No. 175352; January 18, 2011

Facts:

Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of

Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec.
13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any
other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners cited the
case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which
held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon
automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position
of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.

Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5, held that the
office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a GOCC for
purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constotution. The
PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by
the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT
a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run
charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-
fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not
forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his
incumbency as Senator.

The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended
by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation
since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall
not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed
the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities
and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the
Decision read:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned
or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act
No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because
they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of

the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for
Partial Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision
with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality
of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.
Issue:

1.) Whether or not the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation.

2.) Whether or not the respondent’s seat in the Senate shall be forfeited.

Ruling:

The office of the PNRC is not a government office or an office in a government-

owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. PNRC is a private organization performing public
functions. The Philippine government does not own the PNRC. It does not have
government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine
congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals
and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns.

The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the
thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including students.

Moreover, the President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the
head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman.
Thus the Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his
appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly,
the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature.
This leads to the conclusion that the PNRC chairman is not an official or employee of
the Philippine Government. Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC
Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.

18. Macias vs. COMELEC

GR No. L- 18684, September 14, 1961
Facts:

Petitioners are 4 members of the House of Representatives from Negros Oriental,

Misamis Oriental and Bulacan and the provincial Governor of Negros Oriental. They
are requesting that the respondent officials be prevented to implement RA 3040, an
act that apportions representative districts in the country. They alleged that their
respective provinces were discriminated because they were given less representation.

Furthermore, they alleged that RA 3040 is unconstitutional and void because: a.) It
was passed without printed final copies which must be furnished to the members of
the HOR at least 3 calendar days prior to passage, b.) It was approved more than 3
years after the return of the last census of the population, c.) It apportioned districts
without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces.

Respondents COMELEC and Vicente Gella (National Treasurer) contend that they
1. Were merely complying with their duties under the statute which they presume and
allege to be constitutional;
2. petitioners have no personality to bring such action.

Issue:
1. ) Whether or not the apportionment of representative districts under Republic Act
3040 is in accordance with the constitution.

Ruling:

The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present set-up constitutes no
excuse for approving a transgression of constitutional limitations, because the end
does not justify the means. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt that, aware of the
existing inequality of representation, and impelled by its sense of duty, Congress will
opportunely approve remedial legislation in accord with the precepts of the
Constitution.

Needless to say, equality of representation in the Legislature being such an essential

feature of republican institutions, and affecting so many lives, the judiciary may not
with a clear conscience stand by to give free hand to the discretion of the political
departments of the Government.

Conclusion. — For all the foregoing, we hereby reiterate our resolution declaring that
Republic Act 3040 infringed the provisions of the Constitution and is therefore void.

19. Mariano, Jr. Vs. COMELEC

GR No. 118577, March 7, 1995

Facts:

The petitioners in this case are Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita
Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina
Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba; and of the petitioners,
only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The respondents being the COMELEC,
Hon. Jejomar Binay, Municipal Treasurer and the Sangguniang Bayan of Makati.

Petitions were filed assailing certain provisions of RA No. 7854 as unconstitutional.

RA 7854 converts the Municipality of Makati into the highly urbanized City of
Makati. They (petitioners) alleged that sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 are
unconstitutional on the following grounds: a.) Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not
properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code; b.)
Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term"
limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7,
Article VI of the Constitution; c.) Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional that
it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in
violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be
passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census, the
increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill and the addition
of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI
of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati
stands at only 450,000.

Issue:

1. )  Whether the proposed City of Makati’s “acquisition of new corporate existence”

and its subsequent implications therewith are unconstitutional.

Ruling:

Petitioners are arguing that the “new corporate existence” status of Makati restarts the
term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms
previously served by them. They point to Hon. Binay and the hypothetical possibility
of him running for the same position in 1996 and the chances of obtaining another 3-
year consecutive term; that “Sec 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political
ambitions of Binay.
Petitioners cite Sec 7, and 8, Art VI of the Constitution to buttress their point.
However, the petition fails to meet the requirements for challenging the
constitutionality of a statue: (1) there is no controversy because the issue is predicated
on hypothetical situations and are “premised on the occurrence of many contingent
events”; and (2) it was determined that the petitioners who are residents of Taguig are
not the proper parties to raise the issue.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.

SO ORDERED.

20. Tolentino vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 148334 January 21, 2004

Facts:

Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (“Senator
Guingona”) as Vice-President.  Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator
Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.

Following Senator Guingona’s confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed

Resolution No. 84 (“Resolution No. 84”) certifying to the existence of a vacancy in
the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a
special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001.
Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that
election. Resolution No. 84 further provided that the “Senatorial candidate garnering
the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.,” which ends on 30 June 2004.
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the
provinces but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005
provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators. On 20 July 2001,
after COMELEC had canvassed the results from all the provinces, it issued
Resolution No. 01-006 declaring "official and final" the ranking of the 13 Senators
proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005. The 13 Senators took their oaths of office on 23
July 2001.

Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica ("petitioners"), as voters and taxpayers, filed this
petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001
("Resolution No. 01-005") and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001
("Resolution No. 01-006") of respondent Commission on Elections ("COMELEC").

Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without

jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in
the special election as required under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 ("R.A. No.
6645"); (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of
candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as
allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; and, consequently,
(3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election
under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section
4, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 ("R.A. No. 6646"). Petitioners add that
because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial
candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that "there were no
two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for
thirteen seats, irrespective of term."

Issue:
1.) Whether or not a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was
validly held on May 14, 2001.

Ruling:

Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill
any vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives “in the manner
prescribed by law,” thus:
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a
special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner
prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
(Emphasis supplied)
To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6645,
which provides in pertinent parts:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen
(18) months or in the House of Representatives at least one (1) year
before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the
Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the
existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold
a special election to fill such vacancy.  If Congress is in recess, an
official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a
special election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for
such purpose.  The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
 SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the
special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days nor
later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or
communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be
voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general
election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with such general election.  (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No.
6645, as follows:
Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. – x x x In
case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term,
the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the
vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90)
days after the occurrence of the vacancy.  However, in case of such
vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously
with the next succeeding regular election. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of
the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a
special election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier
than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but
in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously
with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of,
among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.

Did COMELEC, in conducting the special senatorial election simultaneously with the
14 May 2001 regular elections, comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A.
No. 6645?
A survey of COMELEC’s resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001
elections reveals that they contain nothing which would amount to a compliance,
either strict or substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended. Thus, nowhere in its resolutions [24] or even in its press releases [25] did
COMELEC state that it would hold a special election for a single three-year term
Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Nor did
COMELEC give formal notice that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial
candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special election.

The controversy thus turns on whether COMELEC’s failure, assuming it did fail, to
comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A.  No. 6645, as amended, invalidated
the conduct of the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 and accordingly
rendered Honasan’s proclamation as the winner in that special election void. More
precisely, the question is whether the special election is invalid for lack of a “call” for
such election and for lack of notice as to the office to be filled and the manner by
which the winner in the special election is to be determined. For reasons stated below,
the Court answers in the negative.

21. Avelino vs. Cuenco

G.R. No. L-2821. March 4, 1949

Facts:

In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate

charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of
the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and
prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. Before Senator Tañada could deliver his
privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate President, the
petitioner, motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his
followers.

Senator Cabili request to made the following incidents into a record:

1.) The deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent
upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the
Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.

2.) Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz suggested that respondent be designated

to preside over the session which suggestion was carried unanimously.

3.) The respondent, Senator Mariano Cuenco, thereupon took the Chair.

Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary upon motion of Senator Arranz,
because the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the
petitioner when the latter abandoned the session.

Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver
his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said
Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was
unanimously approved.

The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court
to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco,
contending that the latter had not been validly elected because twelve members did
not constitute a quorum – the majority required of the 24-member Senate.

Issues:

1.) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?

2.) Whether or not the resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
Ruling:

1.) No, In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and
the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which
power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The Court will
not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to
intercede might lead into a crisis, even a resolution. No state of things has been
proved that might change the temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-
abiding citizens. And we should not allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash
action inconsistent with the calm that should characterized judicial deliberations. The
court will not interfere in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect
only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers,
change or reinstate them. If, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority
of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall
— not in the Supreme Court.

2.) Yes, it was validly constituted, supposing that the Court has jurisdiction. Justice
Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was the majority required by the
Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate, because, firstly, the
minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least
fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view
of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute
a majority of the Senate of twenty-three senators. When the Constitution declares that
a majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House: does not mean
“all” the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute “the House”. There
is a difference between a majority of “the House”, the latter requiring less number
than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate
less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of
a quorum.

22. Arroyo vs. De Venecia

G.R No. 127555, August 14, 1997

Facts:

A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of
the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House
which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with
certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo
made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call,
the Chairdeclared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After
Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader
Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report.
The Chair called out for objections to the motion.

Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion,

the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by
the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both
Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue:
1. ) Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules of the House. 

Ruling:

Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject
to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as
they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conformto them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular
measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a
rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented
is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case
where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the
Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with
which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum
but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of
a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already
been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of
quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present
for the purpose of delaying the business of the House

23. Osmeña vs. Pendatun

G.R No. L-17144, Oct 28, 1960

Facts:
Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the
House making serious imputations of bribery against the President of the Philippines.
Because of this, Resolution No. 59 was issued authorizing the creation of special
House Committee to investigate the truth of the charges made against the President.
The Resolution, mandates petitioner to substantiate said charges through issuance of
subpoena or subpoena decus ticum and in case petitioner fails to do so, is required to
show cause why he should not be punished by the House.

Petitioner then resorted to the Court to annul the Resolution on the ground that it
infringes his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in
the House. The Special Committee continued with its proceedings, and after giving
petitioner a chance to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously disordered
behavior. House Resolution No. 175 was issued suspending petitioner for fifteen (15)
months.

Issue:
1.) Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted
parliamentary immunity for speeches.

Ruling:
Sec. 15 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be
questioned in any other place.” This section was taken or is a copy of Sec. 6, clause 1
of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has
always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil
actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be
questioned in any other place” than Congress.

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege

cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary
that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from
the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense.” It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without
fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any
other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive

constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, We believe,
however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only
because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the
matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but
which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by
the Courts.

The petition is DISMISSED.

24. Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001

Facts:

The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID
Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
investigating panel, that took over the case from investigator Gualberto dela Llana
after having been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon upon petitioner's
request, came up with a resolution which it referred, for approval, to the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his Memorandum, dated 26 April
1991, the Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate informations against
petitioner. On 13 May 1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for
clearance; approved, forthwith, three informations were filed on even date.

In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was alleged to
have acted in evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official
functions in approving the application for legalization of the stay of several
disqualified aliens. Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and No. 91-94897.

Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice

Garchitorena suspended Miriam from her position as Senator of the Philippines and
from any gov’t position she was holding for 90 days. This is in the form of a
preventive suspension pending investigation of the case before the Sandiganbayan.

The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day

preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic
of the Philippines, from any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the
Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order.

Issue:

1.) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive
suspension against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines.

Ruling:

Yes, The order of suspension under RA 3019 is different from the power of Congress
to discipline its members under the Constitution on the ground that the constitutional
provision is a punitive measure imposed by the Senate or HOR upon an erring
member.

Indeed, it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed before it. R.A. 3019 does not
exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in
court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he
shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him.

"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from
the service, has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same
to the Government. (As amended by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982)."

The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid
information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or
permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service.
The nature of the preventive suspension is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a
result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension.” Furthermore, it was held that the use of the word "office" would
indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not
only the particular office under which he stands accused.

25. Mabanag vs. Lopez

G.R No. L-1123, July 25, 2011

Facts:

Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were

suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not
allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House
Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in
determining the required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution
(proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered as an
enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the
Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could
have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had
been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have
been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners
filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the
constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case
because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.

Issue:
1. ) Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not
the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

Ruling:
As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each
House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the
issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the
enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in
either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC
found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not
bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been
introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate,
namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the
correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy,
be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted
between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to
understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals,
disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be conclusive
proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”

Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses,
signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the
secretary of state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No.
2210, provides: “Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the
proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be
provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies
or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies
certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case
of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an
existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it
shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment
thereof.”
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by
the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over
those of the journals.

26. CASCO vs. Gimenez

GR No 17931, February 28, 1963

Facts:

 Petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon
Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959,
declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said
fee. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the
Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on
July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign
exchange transactions. Soon after the last importation of these products, petitioner
made a similar request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor.
Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the
refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve
said vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for
petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the
provisions of Section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2069. 

Issue:

1. ) Whether or not there was error in printing of bill?

Ruling:
No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a
finished product which is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioner’s
contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction “and” between
the terms “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of “urea formaldehyde” and not the latter. But this is not reflective of the
view of the Senate and the intent of the House of Representatives in passing the bill.
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was passed the only
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost against the petitioner.

27. US vs. Pons

G.R. No. L-11530 , August 12, 1916

Facts:

Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte were charged with the crime of illegal
importation of opium. Conspiring together, they willfully and fraudulently, brought
from Spain, on board the steamer Lopez y Lopez, and imported into the city of
Manila, 520 tins containing 125 kilograms of opium of the value of Php 62,400.00.

Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had not yet been
arrested.) Each were found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced accordingly, the
former to be confined in Bilibid Prison for the period of two years, to pay a fine of
P1,000 to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to the payment of one-half of the costs. The same penalties were imposed upon the
latter, except that he was sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000. Both appealed. Beliso
later withdrew his appeal and the judgment as to him has become final.
Appellee alleged that the Act 2381 (the law that is supposed to be used to prosecute
him) was passed or approved a day after (March 1, 1914) the last day of the special
session (Feb 28, 1914) as stated under the Governor Generals proclamation, therefore
rendering the said law null and void.

Appellee also stated that the public knew that the “clock was stopped” on Feb 28,
1914 midnight but the proceedings continued to finish all pending matters until March
01, 1914. His contentions shall be proved by his witness/witnesses.

Issue:

1.) Whether or not the Court can go beyond the recitals in the Journals to determine if
Act 2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914

Ruling:

NO. The Supreme Court looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment
but refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are
conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the
Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the Court has said, clear and explicit, would
be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature.

Appellee’s witnesses basing on mere memory and recollection cannot be given weight
because of uncertainty of oral evidence, loss or death of witness and undependability
of memory.
28. Astorga v. Villegas,
G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974

FACTS:
    
     House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate.
Senador Arturo Tolentino made
substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The House, without
notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding
officers of both houses certified and attested to the bill. The President also signed it
and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the
enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was the wrong version of the bill because it did
not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the
Senate President and the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065
is invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of the
Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment

ISSUE: 

     Whether or not House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid.

RULING:
     
     Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signature
therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not
become a law. The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An
importance of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the
bill due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify
such. Where the journal discloses that substantial amendments were introduced and
approved and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for
signature.The court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not
become law.

29. Morales vs. Subido

G.R. No. L-29658. November 29, 1968

Facts:
On September 24, 1968 the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo
Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for
“failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for
the said position.” Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the
post and called the attention of the mayor to section 4 of the Decentralization Act of
1967 which requires the filling of a vacancy within 30 days after its coming into
existence. Earlier, on September 5, he announced in the metropolitan newspapers that
the position of chief of police of Manila was vacant and listed the qualifications which
applicants should possess.

The petitioner’s reaction to the announcement was a demand that the respondent
includes him in a list of eligible and qualified applicants from which the mayor might
appoint one as chief of police of the city. He contended that his service alone as
captain for more than three years in the Manila Police Department qualified him for
appointment. The demand was contained in a letter which he wrote to the respondent
on October 8, 1968. The mayor endorsed the letter favorably, but the respondent
refused to reconsider his stand. Hence this petition for mandamus to compel the
respondent to include the petitioner in a list of “five next ranking eligible and
qualified persons.”

As he has served successively as captain, major and lieutenant colonel in the MPD
since 1954, the petitioner’s insistence is that he falls under the third class of persons
qualified for appointment as chief of a city police department.
In support of this proposition, he adverts to the policy of the Act “to place the local
police service on a professional level,” and contends that a bachelor’s degree does not
guarantee that one who possesses it will make a good policeman, but that, on the other
hand, one who, like the petitioner, has risen from patrolman to lieutenant colonel
“meets the test of professionalism.”
Even if we concede the correctness of the petitioner’s view still, we do not see how
the requirement of a college degree as additional qualification can run counter to the
avowed policy of the Act. On the contrary, we should think that the requirement of
such additional qualification will best carry out that policy. The fallacy of petitioner’s
argument lies in its assumption that the choice is between one who has served long
and loyally in a city police agency and another who, not having so served, has only a
bachelor’s degree. But that is not the issue in this case.

Issue:
1. ) Whether within the meaning and intendment of the law, in addition to service
qualification, one should have educational qualification as shown by the possession of
a bachelor’s degree.

Ruling:
The petitioner’s argument is fallacious in two respects. First, it fails to distinguish
between eligibility and qualification. For the statute may allow the compensation of
service for a person’s lack of eligibility but not necessarily for his lack of educational
qualification. Second, section 9 governs the appointment of members of a police
agency only.

Thus, while the Act gives credit for service and allows it to compensate for the lack of
civil service eligibility in the case of a member of a police agency, it gives no such
credit for lack of civil service eligibility in the case of a chief of police. On the
contrary, by providing that a person, who is not a civil service eligible, may be
provisionally appointed chief of police “provided, that the appointee possesses the
above educational qualification,” the Act makes it unequivocal that the possession of
a college degree or a high school diploma (in addition to service) is an indispensable
requisite.
To proceed with the history of the statute, it appears that, when the two chambers of
the legislature met in conference committee, the phrase “has served as chief of police
with exemplary record” was added, thereby accounting for its presence in section 10
of the Act.

What, then, is the significance of this? It logically means that — except for that
vagrant phrase “who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years
with the rank of captain and/or higher” — a high school graduate, no matter how long
he has served in a city police department, is not qualified for appointment as chief of
police.

Still it is insisted that “if a high school graduate who has served as captain in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines for eight years irrespective of the branch of service
where he served can be Chief of Police of Manila, why not one who holds an A.A.
degree, completed two years in Law School, and served as Chief of the Detective
Bureau for 14 years, holding the successive ranks of Captain, Major and Lt. Colonel?
Not to mention the fact that he was awarded three Presidential Awards and was given
the Congressional Commendation — the highest award ever conferred in the history
of the Manila Police Department.”

In conclusion, we hold that, under the present state of the law, the petitioner is neither
qualified nor eligible for appointment as chief of police of the city of Manila.
Consequently, the respondent has no corresponding legal duty — and therefore may
not be compelled by mandamus to certify the petitioner as qualified and eligible.
Accordingly, the petition for mandamus is denied. No pronouncements as to costs.

30. Arroyo vs. De Venecia

G.R No. 127555, August 14, 1997

Facts:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of
the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House
which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with
certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo
made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call,
the Chairdeclared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After
Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader
Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report.
The Chair called out for objections to the motion.

Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion,

the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by
the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both
Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue:
2. ) Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules of the House. 

Ruling:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject
to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as
they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conformto them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular
measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a
rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented
is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case
where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the
Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with
which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum
but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of
a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already
been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of
quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present
for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. 

31. Bondoc v. Pineda,

G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991

FACTS:

Marciano Pineda of LDP won against his rival Dr. Emigdio Bondoc of NP causing the
latter to file a protest in the HRET. A decision had been reached in which Bondoc won
over Pineda by a margin of 23 votes. Hence, the LDP members in the tribunal
insisterd on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts resulting
to the increase of Bondoc’s lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura
coted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc as the
winner of the contest. Camasura later on revealed to his chief, notified the Chairman
of the Tribunal to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the election of Camasura to
the HRET and seeks to cancel the promulgation of the tribunal’s decision in Bondoc v.
Pineda.  
ISSUE:Whether or not the House of Representatives could change its representatives
in the HRET at the request of the dominant party. 

RULING:
NO. If the HRET would reserve the interest of the party in power, the independence
of the Electoral Tribunal, as embodied in the Constitution, will no longer be protected.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura
from the HRET for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in the favor of NP’s
candidate, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the HRET to the
sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. 

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the

HRET would reduce the Tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in
power (LDP) which the 3 Justices of the SC and the lone NP member would be
powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the
threshold of the tribunal. 

As judges, the members of the Tribunal must be nonpartisan. They must discharge
their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence – even
independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, “disloyalty to a
party” and “breach of party discipline” are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
member of the Tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for
having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the
examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the
Tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against
Congressman Camasura is therefore null and void.

32 . Abbas vs. Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No. 83767. October 27, 1988

Facts:
On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election
contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN
coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional
elections by the Commission on Elections.
On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Senator Estrada but
including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had been designated Member of the
Tribunal replacing Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the Liberal Party
and resigned as the Opposition’s representative in the Tribunal) filed with the
respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-
Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 00287 on the
ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as respondents therein.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited himself from
participating in the hearings and deliberations of the respondent tribunal and the 5
senators were disqualified to be part of the tribunal leaving only the 3 justices to be
part of the Tribunal.

Petitioners argue that the SET cannot make a judgement because there are no-senator
members.

Issue:
1.) Whether or not it is constitutional to inhibit all involved senators, six of which are
sitting in the tribunal.

Ruling:
Petition dismissed for lack of merit. The Constitution provides no scheme or mode for
settling such unusual situations of for the substitution of senators designated to the
Tribunal. Litigants must simply place their trust and hopes for the vindication in the
fairness and sense of justice of the Tribunal.

We do not agree with petitioners’ thesis that the suggested device is neither unfeasible
nor repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that in fact the most fundamental
objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself
which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its
composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate

Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any
case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels
that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution,
the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three
Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election
contest.

The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition
of the incidents referred to must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well
within law and principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or inhibition
filed by herein petitioners. The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.

33. Codilla vs. De Venecia

GR. No. 150605 Dec 10, 2002

Facts:
Eufrocino Codilla, petitioner, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Ma. Victoria
Locsin, respondent, the incumbent Representative of the 4th Legislative District of
Leyte, were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th Legislative
District of Leyte. A petition for disqualification was filed against Codilla for violating
Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he used the equipment and
vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul, and distribute
gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of
inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.

At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still
pending so Codilla’s name remained in the list of candidates and was voted for. In
fact, he garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation as winner
was suspended by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his disqualification case, he
was found guilty and ordered disqualified.

Codilla’s votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected
Representative and subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely
Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the annulment of
Locsin’s proclamation.

Issue:
1.) Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a
Representative
2.) Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as the
legally elected Representative

Ruling:

The respondent’s proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner
had not yet been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the
disqualification of the petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process
and for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second placer,
could not take the seat in office since he did not represent the electorate’s choice.
Since the validity of respondent’s proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before
the Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order
disqualifying petitioner had become final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise
jurisdiction over the case pending finality. The House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the Comelec.
A petition for quo warranto must also fail since respondent’s eligibility was not the
issue.

34. Guingona vs. Gonzales

GR. No. 106971 Oct 10, 1992

Facts:

The national elections held last May 11, 1992 resulted to the following composition of
the Senate members or Senators representing the respective political affiliations: LDP
with 15 senators, NPC with 5 senators, LAKAS-NUCD with 3 senators, and LP-PDP-
LABAN with 1 senator.

Section 18 Article VI of the Constitution of 1987 provides for the creation of a

Commission on Appointments and the allocation of its membership, as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the
President of the Senate as ex-officio Chairman, twelve members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each house on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties or organizations registered under the
party list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not
vote except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within the session days of the Congress from their submission of
all the members.

To suffice the requirements for membership on the Commission on Audit, the

mathematical formula were agreed upon by the parties:
No. Of senators of a political party x 12 seats
Total no. of senators elected

On its organization meeting of the Senate held on August 27, 1992, Senator Romulo
in his capacity as Majority Floor Leader nominated, for and in his behalf of the LDP,
eight (8) senators for membership in the Commission on Appointments, namely
Senators Angara, Herrera, Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto and Romulo.

In view thereof, petitioner Senator Guingona as the Minority Floor Leader and
Senator John Osmeña, in representation of the NPC objected such nomination.

Issue:
1) Whether the election of Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto E. Tañada as
members of the Commission on Appointments is in accordance with the provision of
Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling:

Respondents' claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by

nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with
Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the same
because it is not in compliance with the requirements that twelve senators shall be
elected on the basis of proportional representation of the resulting fractional
membership of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting
fractional membership of the political parties in the Commission on Appointments by
adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional
representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by
utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of
half a representation.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character
and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or
disregard the rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majority
representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by sheer force of
number impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional
representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a
check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power.
No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect
more than its proportional share of members is to confer upon such a party a greater
share in the membership in the Commission on Appointments and more power to
impose its will on the minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its
rightful membership in the Commission.

The election of senator Romulo and Senator Tañada as members of the Commission
on Appointments by the LDP majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section
18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Their nomination and election by the LDP
majority by sheer force of superiority in numbers during the Senate organization
meeting of August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of discretion. Where power is
exercised in a manner inconsistent with the command of the Constitution, and by
reason of numerical strength, knowingly and not merely inadvertently, said exercise
amounts to abuse of authority granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly
found to exist.

In the light of the foregoing and on the basis of the applicable rules and jurisprudence
on the matter before the court, the election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator
Wigberto Tañada as members of the Commission on Appointments is rendered null
and void for being in violation of the rule on proportional representation under
Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. Accordingly, a
writ of prohibition were issued ordering the said respondents Senator Romulo and
Senator Tañada to desist from assuming, occupying and discharging the functions of
members of the Commission on Appointments; and ordering the respondents Senate
President Neptali Gonzales, in his capacity as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission
on Appointments, to desist from recognizing the membership of the respondent
Senators and from allowing and permitting them from sitting and participating as
members of said Commission.

35. Daza vs. Singson

G.R No. 86344, December 21, 1989

Facts:

On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized,

resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four
members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP,
thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to
only 17 members.

Due to this, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the

Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and
giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a
new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner
Raul A. Daza and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional
member from the LDP.

The petitioner questioned his replacement in the Commission on Appointments,

insisting that his designation thereto as a representative of the Liberal Party was
permanent and could not be withdrawn. His claim is that the reorganization of the
House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political
realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet
attained political stability.

For his part, the respondent argues that he could be validly named in the petitioner’s
place in view of the political realignment in the House of Representatives following
the organization of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), to which he
belonged.

Both the petitioner and the respondent are invoking the case of Cunanan v. Tan, where
the Supreme Court had held that the political affiliations in the two Houses of
Congress should be reflected in their respective representations in the Commission on
Appointments, to support their respective positions.

The petitioner claimed that the formation of the LDP was merely temporary
development whereas the respondent maintained that it had permanently altered the
political composition of the House of Representatives.

Issue:

1.) Whether or not the replacement in the Commission on Appointments was

constitutional

Ruling:

Yes, The petitioner bases his argument heavily on the non-registration of the LDP
which, he claims has not provided the permanent political realignment to justify the
questioned reorganization.

On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged against the petitioner.
On that date, the Commission on Elections in an en banc resolution affirmed the
resolution of its First Division dated August 28, 1989, granting the petition of the LDP
for registration as a political party. This has taken the wind out of the sails of the
petitioner, so to speak, and he must now limp to shore as best he can.

The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of
time to prove its permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party
obtaining the majority of the seats in the House of Representatives (or the Senate)
would still not be entitled to representation in the Commission on Appointments as
long as it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged." The Liberal Party itself
would fall in such a category. That party was created in December 1945 by a faction
of the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for
the Presidency of the Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946. 12 The
Liberal Party won. At that time it was only four months old. Yet no question was
raised as to its right to be represented in the Commission on Appointments and in the
Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority party in both chambers of the
Congress.

If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the
House of Representatives would have to be denied representation in the Commission
on Appointments and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the same token,
the KBL, which the petitioner says is now "history only," should also be written off.
The independents also cannot be represented because they belong to no political party.
That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of its seventeen members to
claim all the twelve seats of the House of Representatives in the Commission on
Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.

36. People vs. Jalosjos

G.R. No. 132875, Feb 31, 2001
Facts:

The regional trial court convicted Representative Jalosjos of two counts of statutory
rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
decision and so Jalosjos was confined in the national penitentiary.

Jalosjos filed a motion that he be allowed to fully discharge his duties as

Congressman, including his attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings.

Issue:

1.) Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and
rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general.

Ruling:

No, Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in

criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and
restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the

Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was
subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose
convictions were pending appeal.

The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

37. AGUINALDO vs. SANTOS,

G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992

Pertinent provision of the Local Government Code: Section 60 – Grounds for

Disciplinary Actions
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction
and/or restraining order, petitioner Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo assails the decision of
respondent Secretary of Local Government dated March 19,1990 in Adm. Case No. P-
10437-89 dismissing him as Governor of Cagayan.

Facts:

Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan, having been
elected to said position during the local elections held on January 17, 1988, to serve a
term of four (4) years therefrom. On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for
disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by
Veronico Agatep, Manuel Mamba and Orlino Agatep, respectively the mayors of the
municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and Lasam, all in Cagayan, against petitioner for acts
the latter committed during the coup. Petitioner was required to file a verified answer
to the complaint. In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup
or actively participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic
to the cause of the rebel soldiers.
Respondent Secretary considered petitioner's reply letter as his answer to the
complaint of Mayor Veronico Agatep and others. On the basis thereof, respondent
Secretary suspended petitioner from office for sixty (60) days from notice, pending
the outcome of the formal investigation into the charges against him. During the
hearing conducted on the charges against petitioner, complainants presented
testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the charges. Petitioner neither
presented evidence nor even cross-examined the complainant's witnesses, choosing
instead to move that respondent Secretary inhibit himself from deciding the case,
which motion was denied. Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered the questioned
decision finding petitioner guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office.
While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992 elections. As
petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for
his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.
One of the three grounds petitioner relies on for this petition is that: the alleged act of
disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of evidence, because it is an act punishable as
rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner should be removed from office on the ground of disloyalty
to the Republic.

Ruling:

NO. Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the
administration case pending before the Court moot and academic. It appears that after
the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the
candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a public official can not
be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his
re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however,
finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have
committed during the failed coup.
Equally without merit is petitioner's claim that before he could be suspended or
removed from office, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required inasmuch as he is
charged with a penal offense of disloyalty to the Republic which is defined and
penalized under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is not being
prosecuted criminally under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, but
administratively with the end in view of removing petitioner as the duly elected
Governor of Cagayan Province for acts of disloyalty to the Republic where the
quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby GRANTED and the decision of public respondent
Secretary of Local Government dated March 19, 1990 in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89,
dismissing petitioner as Governor of Cagayan, is hereby REVERSED.

38 . Pobre vs. Santiago

G.R. No. 132875 February 31, 2001

Facts:

Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed the instant petition before the Court,
contending that the lady senator's utterances amounted to a total disrespect towards
then Chief Justice Panganiban and a direct contempt of Court. Accordingly, he wanted
disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions to be taken against Sen. Miriam
D. Santiago.

This case is the aftermath of Sen. Miriam Santiago’s delivered privilege speech before
the Senate with the following remarks: “I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in
the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I
am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of
this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and
his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief
Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in a different
environment than in a Supreme Court of idiots.”

Her speech came as a response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
declaring that only sitting members of the Supreme Court can be nominated for the
impending vacancy of the CJ post. Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent
members of the Court, including Sen. Santiago, were automatically disqualified. 

Issue:
1.) Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Miriam D. Santiago to be disbarred or
subjected to disciplinary action by the Court for her questioned speech?

Ruling:
No, the Court concurred with Sen. Santiago's defense that she should be afforded
parliamentary immunity from suit pursuant to Section 11, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, which section states in part that "no Senator shall be questioned nor be
held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof." Its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be
protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of
that liberty may occasion offense."
Although there was no express admission on the part of the lady senator that she did
indeed say those words, there was no categorical denial either, which the Court
ultimately regarded as an implied admission. 

Despite the dismissal of the letter-complaint, the Court heavily chastised the lady
senator for indulging in "insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities." In fact, her
excuse that her questioned speech was a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the
JBC struck the Court as being a mere afterthought in light of the controversy her
utterances had managed to stir. 

Still, the Court held that parliamentary immunity is
parliament or its equivalent would "degenerate into
However, it should be noted that "Legislators are
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not
for the public good."
essential because without it, the
a polite and ineffective forum."
immune from deterrents to the
for their private indulgence, but

39. Trillanes vs. Pimentel

G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008

Facts:
On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President
and key national officials. After a series of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered
that evening. In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident,
petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat
in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion
for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests.
Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as
senator. The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari
with the Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC.

Issue:
1. ) Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case

Ruling:

No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case.

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in
Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement.
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no “prior term”
to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of
condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-
election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral victory
only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, “they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action with the knowledge
that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within
the confines of prison.
Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves. Emergency or
compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely
abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed
petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in
February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and
take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the
hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner
largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and
blanket authorizations.

40. Adaza vs. Pacana

135 SCRA 431 March 18, 1985

Facts:

Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental. He

took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on
March 3, 1980.  Elected vice-governor for said province was respondent Fernando
Pacana, Jr., who likewise qualified for and assumed said office on March 3, 1980.
Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986.

March 27, 1984, respondent Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14,
1984 Batasang Pambansa elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984.
In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while
respondent lost. July 19, 1984, petitioner took his oath of office as Mambabatas
Pambansa and since then he has discharged the functions of said office.

July 23, 1984, respondent took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental
before President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor
on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office,
petitioner has brought this petition to exclude respondent therefrom. He argues that he
was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of
the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that
within the context of the parliamentary system.
Petitioner further contends that respondent Pacana should be considered to have
abandoned or resigned from the position of vice-governor when he filed his certificate
of candidacy for the 1984 Batas Pambansa elections; and since respondent had
reverted to the status of a mere private citizen after he lost in the Batas Pambansa
elections, he could no longer continue to serve as vice-governor, much less assume
the office of governor.

Issue:
1. ) Whether or not a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a
Mambabatas Pambansa can exercise and discharge the functions of both offices
simultaneously.

Ruling:

No, a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas
Pambansa cannot exercise and discharge the functions of both offices simultaneously.
The constitutional prohibition against a member of the Batasan Pambansa from
holding any other office or employment in the government during his tenure is clear
and unambiguous. Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as
follows: Sec 10. “A member of the National Assembly [Batasan Pambansa] shall not
hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .” The
language used in the above-cited section is plain, certain and free from ambiguity. The
only exceptions mentioned therein are the offices of prime minister and cabinet
member. The wisdom or expediency of the said provision is a matter which is not
within the province of the Court to determine.

41. Puyat vs. De Guzman

113 scra 31

Facts:

There are two groups involved in this case, the Acero group and Puyat Group. The
Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo
warranto proceedings questioning the election for the Directors for International Pipe
Industries Corporation (IPI). Justice Estanilao Fernandez, a member of batas
pambansa entered as a counsel for the aceros. Now, the Puyat group, petitioners
assailed that no administrative body shall appear as council in any administrative
body. They also allege that Securities and Exchange commission is an “administrative
body.” Now in this court, the petition in the supreme court arised. The aceros
contended that Assemblyman Fernandez can intervene for he has shared with IPI and
he was a certified stock holder.

Issue:
1.) Whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in
effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in
contravention of the Constitutional provision.

Ruling:

Yes, Assembly man Fernandez intervened in an administrative body. General rule, a

batas pambansa member cannot be a council against administrative body. However,
one of the exception is when the said batas pambansa member has direct interest not
as batas pambansa member. However in the case at bar, it was found out that the
shared hold by Fernandez only acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI,
representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the
fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14,
1979. There has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative
body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition.
The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the
proceedings in some other capacity. It must be proven that Assembly man had been a
stockholder even before the said issue regarding about the election, the ruling of the
supreme court would have been different. Thus, Assemblyman Fernandez intervened
in an administrative body.

42. League of Cities vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 176951. November 18, 2008

Facts:

11th Congress- Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into
cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into
cities. 

12th Congress- Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which
took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government
Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality
into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to
restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities
to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment
despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.

13th Congress-  the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as

Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the
Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors,
individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision
exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA
9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The
Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu
which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood
Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether
the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their
municipality into a city. 

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional
for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of
the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal
Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal
revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue:

1. ) Whether the Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional.

Ruling:

We grant the petitions. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the
Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. 

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is
a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001
while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. 
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the
creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including
the Cityhood Laws. 

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because
they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government
units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities

from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section
450 of the Local Government Code. 

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or

resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. 

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause. In the same vein, the exemption provision in
the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an
arbitrary date − the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress –
as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity
of RA 9009. 

Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the

requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities
with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities,
while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption
provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause. 

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the

Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394,
9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491. 

SO ORDERED.

43. U.S. Ang Tang Ho,

43 Phil 1

Facts:

The Philippine Legislatire passed Act No 2869. “An Act penalizing and holding of
palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances. Regulating the distribution
and sales thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General to issue the necessary rules
and regulations thereof”.

The Governor-General issued EO53 fixing the price at which rice should be sold. Ang
Tang Ho found guilty of violating EO53 by selling rice at a price higher than what is
set by EO EO53. He contested the validity of the EO.

Issue:

Whether Act 2868 invalidly delegate legislative power to the Gov-Gen

Ruling:

Yes.

When Act 2868 left the legislative branch , it should have been completed in all its
terms and provision and nothing is left to the judgment of the delegate of the
legislative.

By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power
to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by
a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved,
the authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice
and corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of the organic law.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the defendant is discharged.

44. Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA

G.R. No. 76633. October 19, 1988

Facts:

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V EasternPolaris when he was killed in
anaccident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages
underExecutive OrderNo. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The
petitioner, as owner of the vessel,argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the
POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State
Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering
the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award
consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.

The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her
husband. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the
POEA had no jurisdiction over thecase as the husband was not an overseas worker.

The petitioner immediately came to the Supreme Court, prompting the Solicitor
General to move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an
opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its subordinates. This case comes under one
of the exceptions,however, as the questions the petitioner is raising are essentially
questions of law. Moreover, the private respondent himself has not objected to the
petitioner's direct resort to this Court,observing that the usual procedure would delay
the disposition of the case to her prejudice.

Issue:
1. ) Whether the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself is violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

Ruling:

Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas

employment is defined as “employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including
employment on board vessels plying international waters, covered by a valid
contract. A contract worker is described as “any person working or who has worked
overseas under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen” or “any person
working overseas or who has been employed by another which may be a local
employer, foreign employer, principal or partner under a valid employment contract
and shall include seamen.” These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is
not disputed that he died while under a contract of employment with the petitioner and
alongside the petitioner’s vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign
country.

Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the
private respondent’s signature, described the subject of the burial benefits as
“overseas contract worker Vitaliano Saco.” While this receipt is certainly not
controlling, it does indicate, in the light of the petitioner’s own previous acts, that the
petitioner and the Fund to which it had made contributions considered Saco to be an
overseas employee.

Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are
resolved in favor of the private respondent, in line with the express mandate of the
Labor Code and the principle that those with less in life should have more in law. 

When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social
justice, the heavier influence of the latter must be counter-balanced by the sympathy
and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker. This is only fair if
he is to be given the opportunity and the right to assert and defend his cause not as a
subordinate but as a peer of management, with which he can negotiate on even plane.
Labor is not a mere employee of capital but its active and equal partner. 

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The
temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so
ordered.

45. Pelaez vs Auditor-General,

15 SCRA 569

FACTS: 

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the
Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-
three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Soon after the date last
mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President
of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ
of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain
him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure
of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement
by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that
said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective
January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third
paragraph of 

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:

Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed
except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.

Respondent herein relies upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of

Binañgonan

ISSUE: 

W/N the President, who under this new law cannot even create a barrio, can create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities

RULING:

On Cardona vs Municipality of Binangonan, such claim is untenable, for said case

involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory —
from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality
(Binañgonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer. It is obvious,
however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or
settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an
administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to
carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create
municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other
courts, it is “strictly a legislative function” or “solely and exclusively the exercise of
legislative power”

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to
fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
(a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the
delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every
law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond
the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power,
not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting
measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus
nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican
system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement
of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the
President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects
above referred to.

If the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its
officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the
official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by
merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without
actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby,
in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.

Also, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law,
and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

Basing from the above provision, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does
not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of
giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over
the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the
exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than
that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.

WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab
initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any
disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.

46. Kilusang Mayo Uno vs.

Garcia, Jr. 239 SCRA 386 (1994)
FACTS: The instant petition for certiorari assails the constitutionality and validity of
certain memoranda, circulars and/or orders of the Department of Transportation and
Communications and the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
which, among others, authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or
decrease the prescribed transportation fares without application therefor with the
LTFRB and without hearing and approval thereof by said agency in violation of Sec.
16 (c) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the Public
Service Act, and in derogation of LTFRB's duty to fix and determine just and
reasonable fares by delegating that function to bus operators.

ISSUE: Whether or not the authority given by the LTFRB to provincial bus operators
to set a fare range over and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a
petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal as it constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power

RULING: Yes. In the case at bench, the authority given by the LTFRB to the
provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing
fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative
authority. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be
delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.
A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in
violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. The
policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change and increase their fares at
will would result not only to a chaotic situation but to an anarchic state of affairs. This
would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who may increase
fares every hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases them or
whenever they deem it "necessary" to do so.

RATIO: Basis of Doctrine of Non-Delegation of Powers. - A further delegation of

such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust
reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly.

47. ABAKADA vs. Purisima

G. R. No. 166715. August 14, 2008

Facts:

The petitioners seek to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing

Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition
challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend
that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law “transforms the
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters” as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the
system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the
constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. There is no valid basis for
classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies.

In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue
targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. Finally,
petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground
that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is
deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the
creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in
the implementation and enforcement of the law.

Issue:

1.) Whether there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the
President.

Ruling:

RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing
revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the
law. Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected
respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC
and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, the
determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also
undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.

Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an
employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided
by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. In the case of RA 9335,
it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls
short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors
affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action
under civil service laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws,
rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, except for its motion/prayer for intervention,

which the Court has now granted, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion for
Reconsideration-in-Intervention of the Judicial and Bar Council are DENIED for lack
of merit.

Nota bene: The Court has agreed not to issue a ruling herein on the separate short lists
of nominees submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council to President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte for the present vacancies in the Supreme Court resulting from the compulsory
retirements of Associate Justices Jose P. Perez and Arturo D. Brion because these
were not in issue nor deliberated upon in this case, and in order not to preempt the
decision the President may take on the said separate short lists in the exercise of his
power to appoint members of the Judiciary under the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.
48. Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty
GR. No. 164987. April 24, 2012

Facts:

Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who

have banded together with amission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or
social monopoly in the country,also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining orderto enjoin respondent Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management(DBM) from making, and, thereafter,
releasing budgetary allocations to individual members of Congress as"pork barrel"
funds out of PDAF. It aimed to stop the National Treasurer and the Commission on
Audit from enforcing the questined provision.

According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an

automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen
for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to
propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF. For
their part, the respondents contend that the petition miserably lacks legal and factual
grounds. Although they admit that PDAF traced its roots to CDF,they argue that the
former should not beequated with "pork barrel," which has gained a derogatory
meaning referring "to government projects affording political opportunism."

Issue:
1.) Whether the respondents urge the Court to dismiss the petition for its failure to
establish factual and legal basis to support its claims, thereby lacking an essential
requisite of judicial review—an actual case or controversy.
Ruling:

Under the Constitution, the power of appropriation is vested in the Legislature,

subject to the requirement that appropriation bills originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives with the option of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments. While the budgetary process commences from the proposal submitted
by the President to Congress, it is the latter which concludes the exercise by crafting
an appropriation act it may deem beneficial to the nation, based on its own judgment,
wisdom and purposes. Like any other piece of legislation, the appropriation act may
then be susceptible to objection from the branch tasked to implement it, by way of a
Presidential veto. Thereafter, budget execution comes under the domain of the
Executive branch which deals with the operational aspects of the cycle including the
allocation and release of funds earmarked for various projects. Simply put, from the
regulation of fund releases, the implementation of payment schedules and up to the
actual spending of the funds specified in the law, the Executive takes the wheel. “The
DBM lays down the guidelines for the disbursement of the fund. The Members of
Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs
which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress
is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which
reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the
guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive.” This demonstrates the power given
to the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending
per se of the budget.

While the Court is not unaware of the yoke caused by graft and corruption, the evils
propagated by a piece of valid legislation cannot be used as a tool to overstep
constitutional limits and arbitrarily annul acts of Congress. Again, “all presumptions
are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law
may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis
may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger
must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the
constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.” 

There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of the petitioner in
filing this petition. Unfortunately, the petition must fail based on the foregoing
reasons.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

49 . Belgica vs Exec. Secretary,

GR. No. 208566, Nov. 19, 2013

Facts:

Petitioners filed an Urgent Petition forCertiorariand Prohibition with Prayer for the
ImmediateIssuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction datedAugust 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of theRules of Court
(Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual"Pork Barrel System," presently embodied
in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which providedfor the 2013 PDAF, and the
Executive's lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the MalampayaFunds and the
Presidential Social Fund,be declared unconstitutional and null and void for beingacts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO
against respondent in their respective capacities as theincumbent Executive Secretary,
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM),and National
Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately cease any expenditure under the
aforesaid funds.
Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA
and tothe public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of
their PDAF and VILPfrom the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of thefunds, the
project or activity and the recipiententities or individuals, and all pertinent data
thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executive's [lump-sum, discretionary] funds,
including the proceeds from the . . . Malampaya Fund[s] [and]remittances fromthe
[PAGCOR] . . . from 2003 to 2013, specifying the . . . project or activity andthe
recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto."

Issue:
1. ) Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws similarthereto areunconstitutionalconsidering that theyviolate the principles
of/constitutionalprovisions onnon-delegability of legislative power.

Ruling:

Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869, which

respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as
invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the “primary and specific” purpose
of authorizing the release of public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners
submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law since the “primary and
specific‖ purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and
Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund incidental thereto. In similar regard,
petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law
since the allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the
“primary and specific” purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise
and Powers of PAGCOR. In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that such
funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their proper appropriation in
violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The Court disagrees.

There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular

form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by
Congress shall be made, except that it be “made by law,” such as precisely the
authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other
words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly as well as
expressly for the current fiscal year, just as said appropriation may be made in general
as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in
annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of
general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public
purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the
legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed,
whether in the past or in the present.

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the
appropriation must be the “primary and specific” purpose of the law in order for a
valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a
determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a particular
public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence,
already sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an “appropriation made by law” under
contemplation of the Constitution.

Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to,
within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all
government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related
to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under
the Pork Barrel System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.

SO ORDERED.

50. Araullo vs Exe. Secretary,

GR. No. 209287, July 1, 2014

Facts:

On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in
the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had
been allotted an additional ₱50 Million each as “incentive” for voting in favor of the
impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.

Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a public statement entitled Abad:
Releases to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration Program, explaining that the
funds released to the Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the
DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. He clarified that the
funds had been released to the Senators based on their letters of request for funding;
and that it was not the first time that releases from the DAP had been made because
the DAP had already been instituted in 2011 to ramp up spending after sluggish
disbursements had caused the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) to slow
down. He explained that the funds under the DAP were usually taken from (1)
unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services; (2) unprogrammed funds; (3)
carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and (4) budgets for
slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to support faster-disbursing
projects.

The DBM soon came out to claim in its website that the DAP releases had been
sourced from savings generated by the Government, and from unprogrammed funds;
and that the savings had been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased
appropriations, like unreleased Personnel Services4 appropriations that would lapse at
the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow-moving projects and
discontinued projects per zero based budgeting findings; and (2) the withdrawal of
unobligated allotments also for slow-moving programs and projects that had been
earlier released to the agencies of the National Government.

The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAP’s use of
savings, namely: (1) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which granted
to the President the authority to augment an item for his office in the general
appropriations law; (2) Section 49 (Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes)
and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI of
Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987); and (3) the General
Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on
the (a) use of savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in
the use of savings.

In G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), the petitioners brought to the Court’s attention NBC
No. 541 alleging that NBC No. 541, which was issued to implement the DAP,
directed the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of government
agencies and offices with low levels of obligations, both for continuing and current
allotments.

Issue:

1.) Whether the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.”

Ruling:

No. the OSG posits, however, that no law was necessary for the adoption and
implementation of the DAP because of being neither a fund nor an appropriation, but
a program or an administrative system of prioritizing spending; and that the adoption
of DAP was by virtue of the authority of the President as the Chief Executive to
ensure that laws were faithfully executive.

We agree with the OSG’s position.

The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy
through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAP’s adoption and
implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during
the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the
laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement
the DAP. Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to do during the
Budget Execution Stage.

The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient
discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the
country’s economic situation.127 He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose.
He could pool the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The
pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be
funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the
money had been already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the
GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress
under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.

51. Demetria vs. Alba

G.R. No. 71977. February 27, 1987

Facts:

This petition for prohibition assails the first paragraph of the Budget Reform Decree
of 1977, which provides:
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 or The Budget Reform Decree of 1977,
paragraph 1:

“The president shall have authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive
Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment”.

Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as
members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of
constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the people of the
Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of
the reliefs prayed for.
The petition additionally argues that:

 The provision infringes upon fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of

public funds;
 It is repugnant to the Constitution as it fails to specify objectives and
purposes for which proposed transfer of funds are to be made;
 It allows the President to override safeguards, form and procedure prescribed
by the Constitution in approving appropriations;
 It amounts to an undue delegation of legislative powers to the executive;
 The threatened, continuing transfer of funds by the President and the
implementation thereof by the Budget Minister and the Treasurer of the
Philippines are without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction.

The defendants assert that:

 Petitioners do not have legal standing;

  The petition asks for an advisory opinion of the Court since there was no
justiciable controversy.
 Abrogation of Section 16(5) of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom
Constitution of March 26, 1986, allegedly rendering instant petition moot and
academic.

Issue:

1.) Whether paragraph 1 of The Budget Reform Decree of 1977 is unconstitutional in

light of Section 16(5) of the 1973 Constitution.

2.) Whether prohibition can lie from one branch of government against a coordinate
branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter’s sphere of responsibility.

Ruling :

Yes. The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit
and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the
different branches of the government and those of the constitutional commissions
considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution
allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of
augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus
limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred were
specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such
transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation
of the government branch or constitutional body.

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted
under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds
from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which
the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely
disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed,
such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

The Constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not make it so that
one branch is subordinate to another. In other words, all the branches are created
equal. When the legislative or executive branch is acting within the limits of authority,
the judiciary cannot interfere with the former. But the when former acts beyond the
scope of its constitutional powers, it is the duty of the judiciary to declare what the
other branches had assumed to do as void. Respondents are not acting within their
sphere of responsibility and are hence, enjoined form acting under the
unconstitutional provision in question.

52. Guingona vs. Carague

G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991

Facts:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation and P155.3
Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81,
entitled “Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand
Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended,” by P.D. No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget
Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,”
and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment
Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out
of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.

There can be no question that petitioners as Senators of the Republic of the

Philippines may bring this suit where a constitutional issue is raised. Indeed, even a
taxpayer has personality to restrain unlawful expenditure of public funds.

Respondents contend that the petition involves a pure political question which is the
repeal or amendment of said laws addressed to the judgment, wisdom and patriotism
of the legislative body and not this Court.

Issue:

1. ) Whether the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being

higher than the budget for education.
Ruling:

No, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; APPROPRIATION ACT OF 1990; HIGHEST

BUDGETARYPRIORITY TO EDUCATION; ALLOCATION OF P86 BILLION TO
EDUCATION,NOTUNCONSTITUTIONALEVEN IF CONGRESS
APPROPRIATED AN AMOUNT FOR DEBTSERVICE BIGGER THAN THE
SHARE ALLOCATED TO EDUCATION.—Since 1985, the budget for education has
tripled to upgrade and improve the facility of the public school system.The
compensation of teachers has been doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set
aside forthe Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the General
Appropriations Act (R.A. No.6831), is the highest budgetary allocation among all
department budgets. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional
mandateaccording highest priority to education. Having faithfully complied therewith,
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its goodjudgment, to
provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt, the
greaterportion of which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only
a matter of honorand to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the
very survival of our economyis at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated
an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court
finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as
unconstitutional.

There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of petitioners in filing
this petition. Unfortunately, the petition must fail on the constitutional and legal issues
raised. As to whether or not the country should honor its international debt, more
especially the enormous amount that had been incurred by the past administration,
which appears to be the ultimate objective of the petition, is not an issue that is
presented or proposed to be addressed by the Court. Indeed, it is more of a political
decision for Congress and the Executive to determine in the exercise of their wisdom
and sound discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

53. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG),

petitioner
vs.
COCOFED, et al., respondents
G.R. No. 147063. December 14, 2001. 

Facts:

The very roots of this case are anchored on the historic events that transpired during
the change of government in 1986. Immediately after the 1986 EDSA Revolution,
then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (EO) Nos. 1, 2 and 14.
Pursuant to these laws, the PCGG issued and implemented numerous sequestrations,
freeze orders and provisional takeovers of allegedly ill-gotten companies, assets and
properties, real or personal.
The victory of the registered shareholders was fleeting because the Court, acting on
the solicitor general’s Motion for Clarification/Manifestation, issued a Resolution on
February 16, 1993, declaring that “the right of petitioners [herein private respondents]
to vote stock in their names at the meetings of the UCPB cannot be conceded at this
time. That right still has to be established by them before the Sandiganbayan. Until
that is done, they cannot be deemed legitimate owners of UCPB stock and cannot be
accorded the right to vote them.”
The case had initially been raffled to this Court’s Third Division which, by a vote of
3-2, issued a Resolution requiring the parties to maintain the status quo existing
before the issuance of the questioned Sandiganbayan Order dated February 28, 2001.
On March 7, 2001, Respondent COCOFED et al. moved that the instant Petition be
heard by the Court en banc. The Motion was unanimously granted by the Third
Division.

Issue:
Whether the Coconut Levy Funds raised through the State’s police and taxing power.

Ruling:
This Court holds that the government should be allowed to continue voting those
shares inasmuch as they were purchased with coconut levy funds – that are prima
facie public in character or, at the very least, are “clearly affected with public
interest.”
The registered owner of the shares of a corporation exercises the right and the
privilege of voting. This principle applies even to shares that are sequestered by the
government, over which the PCGG as a mere conservator cannot, as a general rule,
exercise acts of dominion. On the other hand, it is authorized to vote these
sequestered shares registered in the names of private persons and acquired with
allegedly ill-gotten wealth, if it is able to satisfy the two-tiered test devised by the
Court in Cojuangco v. Calpo and PCGG v. Cojuangco Jr. Two clear “public character”
exceptions under which the government is granted the authority to vote the shares
exist (1) Where government shares are taken over by private persons or entities
who/which registered them in their own names, and (2) Where the capitalization or
shares that were acquired with public funds somehow landed in private hands. The
exceptions are based on the common-sense principle that legal fiction must yield to
truth; that public property registered in the names of non-owners is affected with trust
relations; and that the prima facie beneficial owner should be given the privilege of
enjoying the rights flowing from the prima facie fact of ownership. In short, when
sequestered shares registered in the names of private individuals or entities are alleged
to have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth, then the two-tiered test is applied.
However, when the sequestered shares in the name of private individuals or entities
are shown, prima facie, to have been (1) originally government shares, or (2)
purchased with public funds or those affected with public interest, then the two-tiered
test does not apply. Rather, the public character exceptions in Baseco v. PCGG and
Cojuangco Jr. v. Roxas prevail; that is, the government shall vote the shares. Herein,
the money used to purchase the sequestered UCPB shares came from the Coconut
Consumer Stabilization Fund (CCSF), otherwise known as the coconut levy funds.
The sequestered UCPB shares are confirmed to have been acquired with coco levies,
not with alleged ill-gotten wealth. As the coconut levy funds are not only affected
with public interest, but are in fact prima facie public funds, the Court believes that
the government should be allowed to vote the questioned shares, because they belong
to it as the prima facie beneficial and true owner. The Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion in grossly contradicting and effectively reversing existing
jurisprudence, and in depriving the government of its right to vote the sequestered
UCPB shares which are prima facie public in character.

54. WENCESLAO PASCUAL, petitioner

vs.
SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, et al.,
respondents
G.R. No. L-10405. December 29, 1960. 

Facts:

Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with
injunction, upon the ground that RA No. 920, which appropriates funds for public
works particularly for the construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road
terminals. Some of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in the
tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision
roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private
respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not
connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway.
The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose because people living in
the subdivision will directly be benefitted from the construction of the roads, and the
government also gains from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the
streets, made by its owner to the government.

Issue:

Whether the incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the
purpose of justifying an expenditure of the government.

Ruling:

The first proposition must be rejected most emphatically, it being inconsistent with the
nature of the Government established under the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and the system of checks and balances underlying our political structure.
Moreover, it is refuted by the decisions of this Court invalidating legislative
enactments deemed violative of the Constitution or organic laws.
Needless to say, this Court is fully in accord with the foregoing views which, apart
from being patently sound, are a necessary corollary to our democratic system of
government, which, as such, exists primarily for the promotion of the general welfare.
Besides, reflecting as they do, the established jurisprudence in the United States, after
whose constitutional system ours has been patterned, said views and jurisprudence
are, likewise, part and parcel of our own constitutional law.
The relation between the people of the Philippines and its taxpayers, on the other
hand, and the Republic of the Philippines, on the other, is not identical to that
obtaining between the people and taxpayers of the U.S. and its Federal Government.
It is closer, from a domestic viewpoint, to that existing between the people and
taxpayers of each state and the government thereof, except that the authority of the
Republic of the Philippines over the people of the Philippines is more fully direct than
that of the states of the Union, insofar as the simple and unitary type of our national
government is not subject to limitations analogous to those imposed by the Federal
Constitution upon the states of the Union, and those imposed upon the Federal
Government in the interest of the Union. For this reason, the rule recognizing the right
of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a legislation appropriating local or state
public funds has greater application in the Philippines than that adopted with respect
to acts of Congress of the United States appropriating federal funds.
Hence, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances surrounding this case
sufficiently justify petitioners’ action in contesting the appropriation and donation in
question; that this action should not have been dismissed by the lower court; and that
the writ of preliminary injunction should have been maintained.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the records are
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
decision, with the costs of this instance against respondent Jose C. Zulueta. It is so
ordered.

55. Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board

G.R. No. L-75697. June 18, 1987

Facts:

Petitioner, in his own behalf and on behalf of other videogram operators adversely
affected. They assail the constitutionality of PD No. 1987 entitiled “An Act Creating
the Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the
videogram industry. A month after the promulgation of PD 1987, PD 1994 amended
the National internal Revenue Code which states that video tapes shall be subjected to
an annual tax of five pesos. The Greater Manila Theaters Association, Integrated
Movie Producers, Importers and Distributors Association of the Philippines and
Philippine Motion Pictures Producers Association were permitted by the Court to
intervene, over petitioners opposition that the intervention was necessary for the
complete protection of their rights and that their “survival and very existence is
threatened by the unregulated proliferation of film piracy”.

Issue:

1. ) Whether or not there is undue delegation of power and authority?

Ruling:

“The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to “solicit the
direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a
fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform
enforcement functions for the Board” is not a delegation of the power to legislate but
merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and
implementation. “The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be and conferring
authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made.”
Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit
such assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized agencies
concerned being “subject to the direction and control of the BOARD.” That the grant
of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the
DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will
not be without adequate remedy in law.

In fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to a
challenged statute. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify
us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

56. ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents
G.R. No. 115455. October 30, 1995. 

Facts:
The petitioners seek reconsideration of the Court’s previous ruling dismissing the
petitions filed for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716 otherwise
known as the “Expanded Value-Added Tax Law”. They contend that RA 7716 did not
“originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives as required by Article 6,
Section 24 of the Constitution. The Senate allegedly did not pass it on second and
third readings, instead passing its own version. Petitioners contend that it should have
amended the House bill by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the
text of its own bill, so as to conform with the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether RA 7716 is unconstitutional for it having been originated from the Senate
and not in the House of Representatives. 

Ruling:

The court held the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality and the
temporary restraining order previously issued is hereby lifted. The constitutional
provision states that bills must “originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives” it also adds, “but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.” The Senate may then propose an entirely new bill as a substitute
measure. Petitioners erred in assuming the Senate version to be an independent and
distinct bill. Without the House bill, Senate could not have enacted the Senate bill, as
the latter was a mere amendment of the former. As such, it did not have to pass the
Senate on second and third readings. 
We have carefully read the various arguments raised against the constitutional validity
of R.A. No. 7716. We have in fact taken the extraordinary step of enjoining its
enforcement pending resolution of these cases. We have now come to the conclusion
that the law suffers from none of the infirmities attributed to it by petitioners and that
its enactment by the other branches of the government does not constitute a grave
abuse of discretion. Any question as to its necessity, desirability or expediency must
be addressed to Congress as the body which is electorally responsible, remembering
that, as Justice Holmes has said, “legislators are the ultimate guardians of the liberties
and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as are the courts.” It is not right, as
petitioner in G.R. No. 115543 does in arguing that we should enforce the public
accountability of legislators, that those who took part in passing the law in question
by voting for it in Congress should later thrust to the courts the burden of reviewing
measures in the flush of enactment. This Court does not sit as a third branch of the
legislature, much less exercise a veto power over legislation.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality and the
temporary restraining order previously issued is hereby lifted.
SO ORDERED.

57 . Tobias vs. Abalos

GR No. L-114783 -December 8, 1994

Facts:

The petitioners contended that the Republic Act No. 7675 otherwise known as "An
Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Mandaluyong.", is unconstitutional for violation of three
provisions of the constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill
provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of
congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate district.
Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that
the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and
Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts increased the members of the
House of Representative beyond that provided by the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of
Article VI also provides that within three years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made
pursuant to any census showing that the minimum population requirement was
attained.

Issue:

1. ) Whether or not it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the

limit of number of representative.

Ruling:

The provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The
Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law”. Therefore, the
increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not
unconstitutional.

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

58. Bolinao Electronics Corporation vs. Valencia

G.R. No. L-20740. June 30, 1964

Facts:

This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with preliminary

injunction filed by the petitioners against respondents. Later the Republic of the
Philippines, as operator of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, sought and was
allowed to intervene in this case, said intervenor having been granted a construction
permit to install and operate a television station in Manila. The Petitioners’
applications for renewal of their station licenses were denied because it should be
filed two months before the expiration of the license. According to Section 3 of Act
3846, as amended by Republic Act 584, he may approve or disapprove any
application for renewal of station or operator license, provided, however, that no
application for renewal shall be disapproved without giving the licensee a hearing.
The intention of the investigation is to find out whether there is ground to disapprove
the applications for renewal.

Issue:

1.) Whether or not theveto is correctly executed and valid.

Ruling:

Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any particular item or
items of an appropriation bill. However, when a provision of an appropriation bill
affects one or moreitems of the same, the President cannot veto the provision without
at the same time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates.

It may be observed from the wordings of the Appropriations Act that the amount
appropriated for the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service was made
subject to the condition that the same shall not be used or expended for operation of
television stations in Luzon where there are already existing commercial television
stations. This gives rise to the question of whether the President may legally veto a
condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill. But this is not
a novel question. A little effort to research on the subject would have yielded enough
authority to guide action on the matter. For, in the leading case of State vs. Holderit
was already declared that such action by the Chief Executive was illegal. This ruling,
that the executive's veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions orrestrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases.If the veto is
unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever, and the
restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains. Any expenditure
made by the intervenor PBS, for the purpose of installing or operating a television
station in Manila, where there are already television stationsin operation, would be in
violation of the express condition for the release of the appropriation and,
consequently, null and void. It is not difficult to seethat even if it were able to prove
its right to operate on Channel 9, said intervenor would not have been entitled to
reimbursement ofits illegal expenditures.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the writ prayed for by

petitioners is hereby granted. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by
this Court is made permanent.

59. Gonzales vs. Macaraig

G.R. No. 87636. November 19, 1990

Facts:

President Corazon Aquino vetoed Section 55 of the GAA for the fiscal year 1989 and
Section 16 of the GAA for the fiscal year 1990. The reason cited by President Aquino
was thatboth of these sections restrict or prevent the President, the Senate
President,the Speaker of the House, the heads of the constitutional commisions and
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from restoring or increasing items of
appropriation recommended by the President, which recommendations have already
been reduced or disapproved by Congress through the assailed GAAs. In effect,these
sections nullify the statutory and constitutional authority of the aforesaid officials
toaugment any item in the GAA for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their appropriation.

Issue:

1. ) Whether or not the veto made by the president is constitutional.

Ruling:

The court held the vetoed provisions by the President is unconstitutional. Article 6
Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution stating that the President generally can veto the
entire bill as exercise of her power and president shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue of tariff bill but the veto shall not
affect the item or items to which he does not object. General provisions made in an
appropriations bill shall ultimately refer to a specific appropriation for it to take
effect; Section 55 did not refer to any appropriations involved in the entire bill.
Similarly, the contents of this section are concerned on Appropriation Disapproved
and/or reduced by Congress that is not included on the face of the bill.

WHEREFORE. the constitutionality of the assailed Presidential veto is UPHELD, and

this Petition is hereby DISMISSED.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

60. Gonzales vs. Macaraig

G.R. No. 87636. November 19, 1990

Facts:

President Corazon Aquino vetoed Section 55 of the GAA for the fiscal year 1989 and
Section 16 of the GAA for the fiscal year 1990. The reason cited by President Aquino
was thatboth of these sections restrict or prevent the President, the Senate
President,the Speaker of the House, the heads of the constitutional commisions and
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from restoring or increasing items of
appropriation recommended by the President, which recommendations have already
been reduced or disapproved by Congress through the assailed GAAs. In effect,these
sections nullify the statutory and constitutional authority of the aforesaid officials
toaugment any item in the GAA for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their appropriation.

Issue:

2. ) Whether or not the veto made by the president is constitutional.

Ruling:

The court held the vetoed provisions by the President is unconstitutional. Article 6
Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution stating that the President generally can veto the
entire bill as exercise of her power and president shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue of tariff bill but the veto shall not
affect the item or items to which he does not object. General provisions made in an
appropriations bill shall ultimately refer to a specific appropriation for it to take
effect; Section 55 did not refer to any appropriations involved in the entire bill.
Similarly, the contents of this section are concerned on Appropriation Disapproved
and/or reduced by Congress that is not included on the face of the bill.

WHEREFORE. the constitutionality of the assailed Presidential veto is UPHELD, and

this Petition is hereby DISMISSED.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

61. PHILCONSA v. Enriquez,

G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994
FACTS:
           
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or the General Appropriations Act of
1994.
GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of Congress the
REalignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said
allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives are the ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not
the individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain
provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to
augment the pension funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987
Constitution.

RULING:

No.

It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI,
Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy, however, is available only when the presidential veto is
based on policy or political considerations but not when the veto is claimed to be ultra
vires.

Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely
parts thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general
veto power is the power given to the President to veto any particular item or items in a
general appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the
President must veto the entire item.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited
to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit
(Beckman, The Item Veto Power of the Executive, 31 Temple Law Quarterly 27
[1957]).

62. LORENZO M. TAÑADA, et al., petitioners

vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, et al., respondents
G.R. No. L – 63915. April 24, 1985. 

Facts:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number
of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law.
The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was “otherwise provided,” as when the decrees themselves declared that they
we to become effective and immediately upon their approval. 
The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not, that publication means complete publication;
and that the publication must be made forthwith the Official Gazette. 
Issue:

Whether the Presidential decrees are covered by the provisions of Article 2 of the
New Civil Code, on the necessity of publication for its effectivity. 

Ruling:

The clause “unless otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be
shortened or extended. The term “laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those
of general application, for strictly speaking all laws related to the people in general
albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. 
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are
presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. 
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be published.
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive,
have not been so published. Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can
be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter
may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been
implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, the Court,
through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that “publication is necessary to apprise the
public of the contents of regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby. “ The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by
respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that “the
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal
laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other
publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect
immediately. 
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.

63. PVB Employees vs. Judge Vera,

G.R.No.105364 June 2001

Facts:

The Congress enacted R.A. 7169 on the 2nd of January 1992 providing for the
rehabilitation of Philippine Veterans Bank. It was published in the Official Gazette in
February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual
claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening the bank.

In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to
reopen despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, Judge Vega
continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169
became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the
Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.

Issue:

1.) Whether RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.

Ruling:

EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS; WHEN LAWS SHALL TAKE EFFECT; SECTION

10OFR.A. NO. 7169SHALL TAKE EFFECT UPON ITS APPROVAL.—While as a
rule, lawstake effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions, as indicated in
the clause "unless otherwise provided."In the case at bar,Section 10 of R.A. No.
7169provides: Sec. 10. Effectivity.—This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law effective immediately
upon its approval. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law by
President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992. Therefore, said law became
effective on said date.

64. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., petitioners

vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, respondent
G.R. No. 169777. April 20, 2006. 

Facts:

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as
well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing
to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The
investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and
military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted
that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to
pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise
sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they
were sent belatedly, and arrangements were already made and scheduled.  
Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464 basically
prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals
and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who
in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher
and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by
the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other
officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings
conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s approval.  
EO 464 was invoked by the department heads and the military officers who were
invited by the Senate committee to except themselves 
EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights
and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct
oversight functions in the implementation of laws.  
Issue:

Whether Executive Order No. 464 is constitutional.

Ruling:

The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. The Congress’ power of inquiry is
expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is
no provision in the Constitution expressly vesting either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the
legislative function as to be implied.   
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is
closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a
supplement of the Legislative Inquiry.  
The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in
the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section
22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to
inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be
summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. While
attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same
power of Congress.   
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials
under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of
separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to
comply with its demands for information.  When Congress exercises its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a
valid claim of privilege.  They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads.  Only one executive official may be exempted from this power —
the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
Congress except through the power of impeachment 
 Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head
to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made,
either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. When Congress merely
seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it
has issued, its right to such information. 
65. Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon
G.R. No. 89914. November 20, 1991

Facts:

Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the government with the
Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of several
government corporations to the group of Lopa,a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino. By
virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look into the
transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it
and testify on "what they know" regarding the"sale of thirty-six (36) corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify
onthe ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendantsin civil case
before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive reliefclaiming
that the inquiry was beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative
purpose. One of the defendants in the case before the Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed
with the Court of motion for intervention. The Court granted it and required the
respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in
intervention.

Issue:

1. ) Whether the inquiry sought by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee be granted.

Ruling:

No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no
suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into
a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.”

We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not
be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence
before it, it is only because we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of
legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of powers
between the legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the
Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the facts,
including the circumstance that petitioners are presently impleaded as defendants in a
case before the Sandiganbayan, which involves issues intimately related to the subject
of contemplated inquiry before the respondent Committee, the respondent Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby enjoined from compelling the petitioners and
intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry.

SO ORDERED.

66. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, et al., petitioners

vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, respondent
G.R. No. 167173. December 27, 2007. 

Facts:
Senator Enrile delivered a privilege speech denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling
unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (RA
8799) and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation,
to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Upon motion of
Senator Pangilinan, the speech was referred to respondent, which through its
Chairperson Senator Angara, set an initial hearing and invited petitioners herein to
attend the hearing. Petitioners via letter stressed that there were pending cases in court
allegedly involving the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a
challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent committee to proceed with the inquiry. 
Legislative investigation commenced but with the invited resource persons not being
all present, Senator Enrile moved for the issuance of subpoena and an HDO or to
include such absentees to the Bureau of Immigrations’ Watch List. During the
hearing, it was apparent that petitioners lack proper authorizations to make
disclosures and lack the copies of the accusing documents being mentioned by
Senator Enrile. Thus, when hearing adjourned, petitioners were later served with
subpoenas by respondent. 
Petitioner now seeks that respondent committee be enjoined from proceeding, citing
Bengzon Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, claiming that since the issue is already
preempted by the courts, the legislative investigation is an encroachment upon the
judicial powers vested solely in the courts.

Issue:

Whether the investigation in aid of legislation by respondent committee encroaches

upon the judicial power of the courts.

Ruling:

The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said resolution,
exposes the error in petitioners’ allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a privilege
speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply “to denounce the illegal practice
committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities x x x.” This
fallacy is made more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege
speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate “to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of
legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the
future.” 
Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a
quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative
investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry
by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative
complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power
of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a
criminal or an administrative investigation. 
Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the respondent
Committee. The Court notes that among those invited as resource persons were
officials of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas (BSP). These officials were subjected to the same critical scrutiny by the
respondent relative to their separate findings on the illegal sale of unregistered foreign
securities by SCB-Philippines. It is obvious that the objective of the investigation was
the quest for remedies, in terms of legislation, to prevent the recurrence of the
allegedly fraudulent activity. Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is DENIED for
lack of merit.
Finally, petitioners sought anew, in their Manifestation and Motion21 dated June 21,
2006, the issuance by this Court of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
prevent respondent from submitting its Committee Report No. 75 to the Senate in
plenary for approval. However, 16 days prior to the filing of the Manifestation and
Motion, or on June 5, 2006, respondent had already submitted the report to the Senate
in plenary. While there is no showing that the said report has been approved by the
Senate, the subject of the Manifestation and Motion has inescapably become moot
and academic.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Manifestation and Motion dated June 21, 2006 is, likewise, DENIED for being moot
and academic.
SO ORDERED.

67. Negros Oriental II Electric Corp vs. SP

G.R. No. 72492, November 5, 1987

Facts:

Petitioner Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac were both invited to an investigation to be
conducted by the respondent’s Committee in connection with the operations of public
utilities specifically the Negros Orriental Electric Cooperative II. Due their failure to
appear at the said investigation, petitioners were reproving for legislative contempt.

Issue:
1. ) Whether the Sanguniang Panlungsod has the power to mandate the testimony of
witnesses and order arrests who fail to observe the subpoena.

Ruling:

NO. The Constitution and the Local Government Code do not express its provision
the granting of power to subpoena and punish contempt for witnesses.
The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation
as that branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of
the judicial branch,asserts its authority and punishes contempt thereof. The contempt
power of the legislature is,therefore,sui generis,and local legislative bodies cannot
correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons that the national legislature does.
The power attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to the
character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of
government. The same thing cannot be said of local legislative bodies which are
creations of law.

WHEREFORE, the requiring of attendance and testimony of the petitioners at an

investigation should not be punished for legislative contempt for their disobedience of
said subpoena, is declared null and void for being ultra vire.

68. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS 

G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

DOCTRINE:
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm
of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by
the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and
void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and
contract. 

FACTS:
1. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. 

0. In a close bidding, only two (2) bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
 P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. 

0.  Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidderand the

execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner MPHC in a letter to respondent
GSIS matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.
In a subsequent letter, petitioner sent a manager’s check as Bid Security to
match the bid of the Renong Berhad, which respondent GSIS refused to
accept. 

0. Alarmed that GSIS refused the tender of matching bid and that GSIS may
speed up the sale of the 51% of the MHC and be consummated with Renong
Berhad, petitioner came to the court for prohibition and mandamus. The Court
then issued a restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.

0. Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and
submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and
has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of
Philippine heritage and culture. 

0.  Respondents assert that: (1) Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-
executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s); (2) granting that
this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term
national patrimony; and (3) granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the
national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable
since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of
the national patrimony.

 ISSUE:
1. Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10,
are self-executing. 
2. Whether or not Manila Hotel falls upon the term “national patrimony”
3. Whether or not the constitutional provision is addressed to the State and not
the GSIS which by itself possesses a personality of its own separate and
distinct from the State 

RULING:
 1. Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se
judicially enforceable. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. 

0. Yes. Manila Hotel falls upon the term “national patrimony”. The patrimony of
the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich
natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. In the case at
hand, Manila Hotel has become a land mark - a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy
and patrimony. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of
the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10,
second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies. Hence, pursuant to the Sec.
10, par. 2 of the Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, MPHC is preferred over the
Malaysian Firm and GSIS shall accept the matching bid of the MPHC to
purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at
P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such
other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose. 

0. No. When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people
but also to the government as elements of the State. It is undeniable that in this
case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the
Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality
deriving its authority from the State. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts
of persons distinct from the government are considered “state action” covered
by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a “public function;”
(2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as
to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under
the second and third categories of “state action.” Without doubt therefore the
transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction
of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.

69. OPOSA VS FACTORAN 

224 SCRA 792
Juan Antonio Oposa, Anna Rosario Oposa, Jose Alfonso Oposa, et al. and the
Philippine Ecological Network vs. Fulgencio Factoran, in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources 

DOCTRINE: 
The personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is concerned.

FACTS: 
1. The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network,
Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the
purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. 

2. The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
continued approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous
commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the
country. 

3. Petitioners request the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to: a) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
b) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. 4. Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental
consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. 

5. This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the

natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations. 

6. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office. 
7. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all
logging permits in the country. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the
existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs. 

ISSUE: 
Whether or the petitioners have a cause of action to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment” of Philippine rainforests and “arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
country’s vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.”
RULING: 
Yes. They can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Every generation
has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony of nature for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The minors’ assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. In
addition, while the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does
not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated
in the latter. Furthermore, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment and as stated by law,
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources “shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and
proper use of the county’s environment and natural resources.” Thus, the right of the
petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR’s duty – under its mandate and by virtue of its power and functions
under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 – to protect and advance the
said right. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty
or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.

70. KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO 

G.R. No. 118910. July 17, 1995

FACTS:
This suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is
substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in the first case [decision in
G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994))
invalidating the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC)]. Petitioners
maintain (1) that the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is a different lease contract
with none of the vestiges of a joint venture which were found in the Contract of Lease
nullified in the prior case; (2) that the ELA did not have to be submitted to a public
bidding because it fell within the exception provided in E.O. No. 301, §1 (e); (3) that
the power to determine whether the ELA is advantageous to the government is vested
in the Board of Directors of the PCSO; (4) that for lack of funds the PCSO cannot
purchase its own on-line lottery equipment and has had to enter into a lease contract;
(5) that what petitioners are actually seeking in this suit is to further their moral
crusade and political agenda, using the Court as their forum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ELA between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the
Philippine Gaming Management Corp. is invalid.

HELD:
NO. Petition for prohibition, review and/or injunction was dismissed. Pertinent to the
issue, the SC held:

(3) that the ELA is valid as a lease contract under the Civil Code and is not contrary to
the charter of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office;

(4) that under §1(A) of its charter (R.A. 1169), the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office has authority to enter into a contract for the holding of an on-line lottery,
whether alone or in association, collaboration or joint venture with another party, so
long as it itself holds or conducts such lottery; and

(5) That the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) in question did not have to be
submitted to public bidding as a condition for its validity.

RATIO:
E.O. No. 301, §1 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials, and
equipment. It does not refer to contracts of lease of equipment like the ELA. The
provisions on lease are found in §§ 6 and 7 but they refer to the lease of privately-
owned buildings or spaces for government use or of government-owned buildings or
spaces for private use, and these provisions do not require public bidding. It is thus
difficult to see how E.O. No. 301 can be applied to the ELA when the only feature of
the ELA that may be thought of as close to a contract of purchase and sale is the
option to buy given to the PCSO. An option to buy is not of course a contract of
purchase and sale.

Indeed, the question is not whether compared with the former joint venture agreement
the present lease contract is “more advantageous to the government.” The question is
whether under the circumstances, the ELA is the most advantageous contract that
could be obtained compared with similar lease agreements which the PCSO could
have made with other parties. Petitioners have not shown that more favorable terms
could have been obtained by the PCSO or that at any rate the ELA, which the PCSO
concluded with the PGMC, is disadvantageous to the government.

71. FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

(GR NO. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003)

FACTS: 
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed
the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph
E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for
“culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Suplico, Zamora and
Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. 

The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment complaint was
“sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same for being insufficient in substance. 

On October 23, 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by the above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution
of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members
of the House of Representatives. 

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of
which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.” 

ISSUE: 
Whether or Not Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the
coverage of judicial review. 

RULING: 
No. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ, which
can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. 

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the

nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates
to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed “judicial
supremacy” which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution
but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government. 

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this “moderating power” to “determine the proper
allocation of powers” of the different branches of government and “to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels” is inherent in all courts as a
necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is “the power of the court to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.” 

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must
necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of
constitutional construction. 

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. 

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do
not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words
in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of
law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language
as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance
and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers
and the people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum. 

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. 

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the

provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition
and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain
the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular
provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that
purpose. 

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. 

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the

Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all
the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be
so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing
on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate
the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together. 

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor
of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may
make the words idle and nugatory. 

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids
is available. While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and
purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution
when the meaning is clear. 

Debates in the constitutional convention “are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no
light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of
our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears
upon its face.” The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers’ understanding thereof.

72. SANTIAGO VS GUINGONA

134577, Nov. 18, 1998

FACTS:
On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session
of the 11th Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Senator
Francisco S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were nominated for the position of
Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was duly elected President of
the Senate.
 
Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those
who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority while those who voted for
him, belonged to the minority. During the discussion, Senator Juan M. Flavier also
manifested that the senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP -- numbering 7,
and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority
leader. No consensus was arrived at during the following days of session.
 
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a letter from
the 7 members of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected Senator
Guingona as minority leader. The Senated President then recognized Senator
Guingona as minority leader of the Senate.
 
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a
petition for quo warranto alleging that Senator Guingona has been usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minorit leader, a position
that, according to them, rightfully belongs to Senator Tatad.
 
ISSUES:

1. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?

RULING:
First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction
In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader.
They also invoke the Court’s judicial power “to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the
part of respondents.
 
The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that  It is well within the power
and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the
exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
 
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution
Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the Constitution when the Senate
President recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader.
 
The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that the Charter says is that
"[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The court
held that, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision.  Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate
itself, not by this Court.
 
Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of
majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically
for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the
holders thereof.  However, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually
extant.  But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules,
this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of
the Senate relative thereto.  On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation
of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature.
 
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office
For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear
right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly
usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present no
sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate
minority leader. The specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who
may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the
Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested.
Without any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity
tainted Respondent Guingona’s assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of
Senate minority leader.  Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to
characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
 
Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona

Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as
Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.  The
latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. 
By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader,
he was recognized as such by the Senate President.  Such formal recognition by
Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein
both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints. 
 
Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the Senate President cannot be
accused of “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment” or of “an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.”  Where no provision of the
Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have
been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed
to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
  
The Petition is DISMISSED.

73. JAVELLANA VS EXEC SECRETARY

GR No. 36142, March 31, 1973

FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of
plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from
implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the
present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a
qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all
citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had
announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet,
respondents including.

Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said

proposed constitution upon ground the that the President as Commander-in-Chief of
the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to
approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the
Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the
proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.

Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and
any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and objective

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a
justiciable or political question, and therefore non-justiciable.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the applicable
constitutional and statutory provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or
without valid ratification) by the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention in force.

RULING:
First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon
whether or not the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the
requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification
of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the
constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution. The
issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the
provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here
and in the US (from whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.
 
Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those
lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the
Constitution the right of suffrage. 
 
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s
assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fund
amentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And,
since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age
can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in
the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void.
 
Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935
Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots  –
not orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but
natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted
the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official
ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the
advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry,  when necessary, into the
accuracy of the election returns.
 
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of
COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took
place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the
provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No.
73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means
of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said
plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution
which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as
amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will. For
this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the
same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution.
 
Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935
Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the
Executive. But there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the
alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No.1102. Also,
on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or
City Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments had certified to the
President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. The
citizen’s assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution. It is to my mind a matter
of judicial knowledge that there have been no such citizen’s assemblies in many parts
of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines.
 
Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts of the officers and offices
of the Executive Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition
of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.
 
A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition
normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual
acts of recognition by members of Congress do not constitute congressional
recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in session duly assembled.
This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public
Officers. The compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government
does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court
prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and
their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions,
some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects, issued subsequently
thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102.
The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these
conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence. 
 
As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to
remember that the same refers to a document certified to the President for his action
under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Reps,
and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative
measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the
President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act
which Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive department of the
Government.
 
In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions
therein should be given due course, there being more than prima facie showing that
the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the
1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the
people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect;
and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without
prejudice to the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite
for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935
Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of
such plebiscite.
 
Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4
members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee
cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they
could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not
accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and
myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is
not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new
Constitution is not in force.

74. ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION 

63 Phil 136

DOCTRINE:
Separation of powers
The Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
 
FACTS:
This is a petition for Prohibition filed by Jose Angara (petitioner) as the winner of the
1935 congressional election for the first district of the Province of Tayabas Against
the Electoral Commission on the election protest against him.
 
During the 1935 election, the petitioner received the most number of votes and was
proclaimed winner thus became member-elect of the National Assembly for the said
district. He took his oath of office thereafter.
 
On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled passed a
resolution setting the deadline of filing election protest.
 
On Dec. 8, 1935, one of the losing candidate Pedro Ynsua(respondent) filed an
election protest against the petitioner and praying him to be declared winner, or that
the election be nullified.
 
On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission (of the House) adopted a resolution for
deadline of filing of protest.
 
On Dec. 20, 1935, Jose Angara (petitioner), one of the respondents of the election
protest, filed a “Motion to Dismiss the Protest”, alleging that
0. The Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which
protests against the election of its members should be presented;
 a. that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period;
 

ISSUE:
W/N the Electoral Commission has constitutional mandate to decide election protest,
and not the National Assembly?
 
RULING:
Yes. the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the
respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara,
and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any
manner toll the time for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such
time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
 
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby
denied.
 
There was thus no law nor constitutional provision which authorized the National
Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the
filing of contests against the election of its members. And what the National Assembly
could not do directly, it could not do by
indirection through the medium of confirmation.
 
Summarizing, we conclude:
0. That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the
theory of separation of powers into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
a. That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and
duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
b. That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies
thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only
constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
constitutional boundaries.
c. That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and
appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one
branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the
source of all authority.
d. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with
specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of
classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the
government.
 e. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
f. That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into
effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members. That the present
Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature
with respect to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its
members, to the Electoral Commission.
g. That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was
full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necessitate rei the implied power
inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing
protests.
h. That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an
independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of
partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the
National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations
regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
i. That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member,
irrespective of whether his election is contested or not, is not essential before
such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
member of the National Assembly.
j. That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member
against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and
cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the
time within which protest against the election of any member of the National
Assembly should be filed.
 
74. INFOTECH FOUNDATION, ET AL VS COMELEC 
GR No. 159139, Jan. 13, 2004

FACTS: 
Petitioners were participating bidders questioning the identity and eligibility of the
awarded contractor Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) where the competing bidder is
Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI) as signed by Mr. Willy Yu of the latter. Private
respondent claims that MPEI is the lead partner tied up with other companies like SK
C&C, WeSolv, Election.com and ePLDT. Respondent COMELEC obtained copies of
Memorandum of Agreements and Teaming Agreements. 

ISSUE: 
Whether or not there was an existence of a consortium. 

RULING: 
NO. There was no documentary or other basis for Comelec to conclude that a
consortium had actually been formed amongst MPEI, SK C&C and WeSolv, along
with Election.com and ePLDT. The president of MPEI signing for allegedly on behalf
of MPC without any further proof, did not by itself prove the existence of the
consortium.  It did not show that MPEI or its president have been duly pre-authorized
by the other members of the putative consortium to represent them, to bid on their
collective behalf and, more important, to commit them jointly and severally to the bid
undertakings.  The letter is purely self-serving and uncorroborated.

75. MAGALLONA, ET AL VS ERMITA, ET AL 

GR No. 187167, August 16, 2011 

SUMMARY:
This original action for the writ of certiorari and prohibition assails constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 9522 adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and
classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
 
DOCTRINE:
1987 Constitution Section 2 - The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations.
 
FACTS:
1. R.A. 3046 which was passed in 1961 provides among others the demarcation
lines of the Philippine baselines as an Archipelagic State in compliance with
the UNCLOS I. 
2. In 1968, R.A. 5446 amended R.A 3046 in terms of typographical errors and
included Section 2 in which the government reserved the drawing of baselines
in Sabah in North Borneo.
3. In 2009, R.A 9522 took effect amending R.A. 5446 to be compliant with the
1984 UNCLOS III in which Philippines is one of the signatories. Among
others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of
baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for
the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. Complying with
these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of
some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent
territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough
Shoal, as "regimes of islands” whose islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones.
 
ISSUES: 
1. WoN the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit
2. WoN the writ of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality of RA 9552
3. WoN RA 9522 is unconstitutional
 
RULING:
1. Yes, the SC ruled that as a “citizen suit” and not a taxpayer or legislator suit,
the citizens who will be directly injured and benefitted in affording relief over
the remedy sought. 
2. Yes, the SC by tradition viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as
proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes and acts of
other branches of government.
3. The SC upheld the constitutionality of R.A 9522.
 
RATIO:
1. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or losing a
territory as provided under the laws of nations as it is just a codified norm that
regulates conduct of States. The contention of the petitioner that RA 9522
resulted in the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The
truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base points, increased the
Philippines total maritime space of 145,216 square nautical miles.
2. With the passage issue, the political branches of the government can enact
legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate
innocent and sea lanes passages in the absence of international law norms. 
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA
3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, it
itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over
KIG.
4. Petitioner’s invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II
(Declaration of Principles and State Policies) also failed. Provisions in Article
II are mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, “do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights. It also serves as a guide in
formulating and interpreting implementing legislation.

76. TECSON VS. COMELEC 

G.R. NO. 161434 Mar. 3, 2004

 
FACTS:
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify
FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis
that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming
to be a natural-bornFilipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents
were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father,
Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe
was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ,
the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation
of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted
a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and,
second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly
only a year after the birth of respondent.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.

HELD:
It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F.
Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not
the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino
citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at
84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime
in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo
Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill
had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby
extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,
during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of 
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made
a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78,
in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.

77. MOY YA LIM YAO VS COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION

41 SCRA 292
 
FACTS:
On February 08, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant.
 
In the interview for the application of the said passport visa, Lau Yuen Yeung stated
that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she plans to visit her
great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping in the Philippines.
 
She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one
month. After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to 13 February 1962.
 
On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen.
 
Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate
her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her
authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction.
 
At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted
that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a
few words. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except
one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
 
As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary
injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a filipino citizen.
 
 
 
RULING:
It was held that Lau Yuen Yeung have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of
her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on
25 January 1962.
 
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino,
native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
78. VALLES VS. COMELEC 
337 SCRA 543 

DOCTRINE:
The principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood
relationship. A child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of
the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines
nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

FACTS:
Rosalinda Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father
and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of 15, she left Australia and settled in the
Philippines. Then she later married a Filipino. Ever since, she participated in the
electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate as well. In the May 1998
elections, she ran for Governor. Valles, an opposing candidate, filed a petition for her
disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an australian.

ISSUE:
Whether Rosalinda Ybasco is a Filipino citizen?

RULING:
Yes, The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of
the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines
nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Rosalinda Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect
and at that time what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal
organic acts by which the US governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of
July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 29, 1916, also known as the Jones
Law.

79. BENGSON III VS. HRET

G.R. No.142840, May 7, 2001

FACTS:
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
applicable was the 1935 Constitution. 
 
He enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic
of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence,
he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."
 
Respondent Cruz then reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630 entitled as “An Act Providing For Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship By Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or
Accepting Commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States.” He ran for and
was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11,
1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner
Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
 
Petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not
qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Cruz can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon
his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
 
RULING:
Yes. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same
in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates
the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. 
 
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost
their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces
of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United
States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political
economic necessity.
 
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in
the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States,
or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired
 United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same
with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any
other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance
with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son
of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover,
or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
 
SO ORDERED.

80. CO VS. HRET 

199 SCRA 692

FACTS:
This case arose when the petitioner, Antonio Y, Co filed an election protest on the
grounds that Jose Ong, Jr is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a
resident of the second district of Northern Samar. Prior to this, the Electoral Tribunal
of the House of Representatives declared that respondent JoseOng, Jr. is a natural
born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
The congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:
Yes. In the year 1895, the respondent’s grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines
from China and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The
father of the respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought
by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed with the court an application for
naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen. In 1984, the private respondent
married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong,
Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those
elections. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born
of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both
considered as natural born citizens. Besides, the respondent did more than merely
exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. On
the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in order to
establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the
municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. To require him to
own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be the same as to a
property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age,
citizenship, voting and residence requirements.

81. BALGAMELO CABILING, ET AL VS COMMISSIONER

GR No. 183133, July 26, 2010

DOCTRINE:
The purpose of registration of a contract of partnership is to give notice to third
parties, and failure to do so does not affect the liability of the partnership and of the
partners to third persons. By analogy, registration is the confirmation of the election
of Philippine citizenship.

FACTS:
Petitioners Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr., and Valeriano Cabiling
Ma are children of Felix Yao Kong Ma, a Taiwanese, and Dolores Silona Cabiling, a
Filipina. They were born during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, and have
been raised in the Philippines. Upon reaching the age of majority (21), they elected
Philippine citizenship in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. As such, Balgamelo
executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took his oath of
allegiance to the Philippines. Felix Jr. and Valeriano performed the same acts.
Nevertheless, they failed to register the documents in the local civil registry in
accordance with Commonwealth Act. 625. They were only able to do so thirty years
after their election.

In February 2004, the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) received a complaint-affidavit

from a certain Mat Catral, alleging that Felix Sr. and his children were overstaying
aliens. The Ma family considered the complaint as politically motivated because they
were supporting a certain candidate in the then upcoming elections. Notwithstanding,
the BOI charged them with violation of the Philippine Immigration Act (PIA) for
failing to present any valid document showing their status in the Philippines, and
produce documents related to their election of Philippine citizenship. Thereafter, the
Board of BOI rendered its decision finding that Felix Sr. and his children violated the
PIA, rendering them undocumented and/or improperly documented aliens.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the Petition of the Petitioners for
failing to comply with the requirements of the law for their continued stay in the
Philippines. It ruled that it is required of the elector to execute an affidavit of election
of Philippine citizenship, and thereafter file the same with the nearest civil registry.
These procedures concerning citizenship are a constitutional mandate which must be
adhered to strictly.

Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioners are Filipino citizens despite their failure to comply with
registration requirements under the law.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The Court held that registration refers to
any entry made in the books of the registry which records solemnly and permanently
the right of ownership and other real rights. Simply stated, registration is made for the
purpose of notification. In contracts of partnership for example, the purpose of
registration is to give notice to third persons whereby failure to register said contracts
do not affect the liability of the partnership and of the partners to third persons.
Neither does such failure affect the partnership’s juridical personality. Thus,
registration is not a requirement for the validity of the contract as between the parties
for the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. It is a confirmation
for the existence of fact.

In the present case, registration is the confirmation of the election of the Petitioners on
their Philippine citizenship. Having performed the necessary obligations under the
Constitution, their failure to register their election in the civil registry should not
defeat the election and negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother.
Thus, they are Filipino citizens, and the lacking requirements thereof may still be
complied subject to administrative penalties, if any.

82. AZNAR VS COMELEC 

GR No. 83820, May 25, 1990

FACTS:
On Nov 12 1987, private respondent Emilio Osmena filed his COC with the
COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu in the January 18 1988
elections. 

On Jan 22 1988, Cebu-PDP Laban as represented by petitioner Jose Aznar filed a

petition at COMELEC for the disqualification of P.R. on the ground that he is not a Fil
citizen but a US citizen. On Jan 27 1988 petitioner filed a formal manifestation
certifying that P.R. s an American under the Alien Cert of Registration No. 21448 and
Immigrant Certificate of residence no. 133911 issued in Manila. The petitioner also
filed for an Ex-Parte motion. Thus, on Jan 28 1988 the COMELEC resolved to order
the Board to continue canvassing but to suspend proclamation.

However, P.R. states that he is a Filipino Citizen on the grounds that he is the
legitimate son of Dr. Emilio Osmena, the Filipino son of the late Pres. Sergio
Osmenia Sr. ; that he has a Philippine Passport; has been residing in the PH since birth
and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a
registered voter since 1965.

On March 3 1988, COMELEC (first Division) proclaimed P.R. as the winning

candidate as he obtained the highest number of votes

ISSUE: 
Whether or not P.R. is a Filipino citizen?

RULING:
On June 11 1988, COMELEC(first division) dismissed the petition for
disqualification for not having sufficient and lack of proof that P.R. is not a Filipino
Citizen. Petitioner failed to present direct proof that P.R. had lost his Fil Citizenship
by any modes provided for under C.A. No. 63 these are:
1. by naturalization in a foreign country;
2. by express renunciation of citizenship; and
3. by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a
foreign country.

From evidence, it is clear that P.R. Osmena did not lose his PH citizenship by any of
the three mentioned herein above.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the resolution of the
COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.

83. LLAMANZARES VS COMELEC, ET AL. 

G.R. No. 221677-22116700, March 11, 2016

FACTS:
In her COC for Presidency in the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9,
2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.
 
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as a newborn infant in Jaro, Iloilo and was legally
adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE
(SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to
Theodore Llamanzares who was then based in the US. Grace Poe then became a
naturalized American citizen in 2001.
 
In December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating
medical condition, who then eventually died on February 3,2005. She then quitted her
job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the
Philippines on May 24, 2005.
 
On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her
Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new
Philippine Passport.
 
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointed Chairperson of the MTRCB , she
renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her
American passport.
 
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the
ground particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born
Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her biological parents cannot
be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc canceled her candidacy on the ground
that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed
misrepresentation in her COC.
 
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6
that POE is qualified as a candidate for Presidency.
 
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen
2. Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
 
HELD:
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she
satisfied the constitutional requirement that only natural-born Filipinos may run for
Presidency.
1. there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her
physical features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she
was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99%
probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99%
chance that Poe’s biological parents are Filipinos. Said probability and
circumstantial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on
 Evidence.
2. The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens
as based on the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein
though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.
3. Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to
the country where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN
Convention Law.
 
As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she
satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently)
coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in
acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to
the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and
intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy
for Presidency was granted by the SC.
 
84. REPUBLIC VS. DELA ROSA 
G.R. NO. 104654 June 1994

FACTS:
September 20, 1991 - Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization under the
Commonwealth Act No. 63 before the RTC Manila.

October 7, 1991 - Judge Dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992,
and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a
newspaper of general circulation, for 3 consecutive weeks, the last publication of
which should be at least 6 months before the date of the said hearing.

January 14, 1992 - Frivaldo asked the Judge to cancel the March 16 hearing and move
it to January 24, 1992, citing his intention to run for public office in the May 1992
elections. Judge granted the motion and the hearing was moved to February 21. No
publication or copy was issued about the order.

February 21, 1992 - the hearing proceeded.

February 27, 1992 - Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held that Frivaldo is
readmitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization.

Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, to
annul the decision made on February 27, 1992 and to nullify the oath of allegiance
taken by Frivaldo on the same date.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino.

RULING:
No. The supreme court ruled that the Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of
the Philippines and therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the
Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office and to surrender the same to
the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and
executory. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following
irregularities:
1. the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing,
without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the
petition itself;
2. the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the
petition;
3. petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the
judgment; and
4. petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting
period.

85. FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC 

257 SCRA 731

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed
office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition
for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having
been naturalized in the United States.

Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that
he was naturalized as an American citizen only to protect himself against President
Marcos during the Martial Law era.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must
be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation.

He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically
forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The
Court stated that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really
wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No.
63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired
by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

86. MERCADO VS. MANZANO 

307 SCRA 630

FACTS:
Petition for disqualification was filed against Edu Manzano to hold elective office on
the ground that he is both an American citizen and a Filipino citizen, having been born
in the United States of Filipino parents. COMELEC granted the petition and
disqualified Manzano for being a dual citizen pursuant to the Local Government Code
RA 7160, that those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public
position.

ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to hold or run office in
the local position.

RULING:
No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual
citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship”
in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance”. Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

87. GRJACOT VS DAL AND COMELEC

No. 179848, November 27, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot filed a request for the administration of his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General
(PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PC issued on 19 June 2006 an
Order of Approval of petitioner's request, and on the same day, petitioner took his
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C.
Yulo. On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued an Identification
Certificate, recognizing the petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines. Six months later,
on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of
Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin.

In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor. On 12 June
2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution 11 disqualifying
the petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin,
for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship.

Petitioner assails the Resolution dated 28 September 2007 of the , affirming the
Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division, disqualifying him
from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in the 14 May
2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal
renouncement of his US citizenship. Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989.
Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act and
by invoking the doctrine of Mercado vs. Manzano.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Oath of Allegiance in filing the Certificate of Candidacy is enough
to revoke the petitioner's American citizenship and allegiance.

RULING:
No. Petitioner erroneously invokes the doctrine Mercado, wherein the filing by a
person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of
allegiance, was already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship. The ruling of
the Court in Valles and Mercado is not applicable to the present case, which is now
specially governed by Republic Act No. 9225, promulgated on 29 August 2003.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No 19225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who
have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained
their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the
Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections.

88. AASJS MEMBER CALILANG VS DATUMANONG

GR no. 160869, May 11, 2007

DOCTRINE: 
Dual allegiance refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to 2 or more states.

FACTS:
Petitioner filed an action for prohibition against respondent who was the official
assigned to implement laws regarding citizenship. Petitioner prays that a writ of
prohibition be granted to stop respondent from implementing RA 9225 or "An Act
Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship
Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act 63, as Amended, and for
Other Purposes." Petitioner assails the constitutionality of said law as it violates Sec. 5
of Art. IV of the 1987 Constitution that states: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical
to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Herein petitioner contends that RA 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship.

ISSUE:
W/N RA 9225 is unconstitutional.

RULING:
No. RA 9225 is constitutional. The Court ruled with reference to the deliberations of
Congress to determine the intent of the law-making body in drafting the assailed law.
The Court said that the legislative intent is clear that is to do away with the provision
in CA 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country and that it does not recognize dual allegiance since by the
person's swearing to the authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his
foreign citizenship.

In addition, the Court said that Sec. 5, Art. IV of the Constitution is a declaration of
policy and is not a self-executing provision and that the legislature still has to enact a
law dealing with dual allegiance.

The petition filed by Calilung was dismissed for lack of merit.

89. LAWYER’S LEAGUE FOR BETTER PHILS. VS. AQUINO

GR No. 73748, 73972, May 22, 1986

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986 President Corazon C. Aquino formally issued Proclamation No.
1 which states that she and Vice President Salvador H. Laurel are to take power.
Subsequently on March 25, 1986, President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 which
provides for the basis of the Aquino government’s assumption of power, it states that;
“The new government was installed by a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people with the assistance from the members of 
the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of President Aquino is a legitimate government.

RULING:
Yes, the government of President Aquino is legitimate. The petitioners have no
personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For it is decided that the
legitimacy of the government is not a justiciable matter but simply belongs to the
realm of politics wherein the people itself are the judge. The Court also points out that
the people have accepted the government of President Aquino which is in effective
control of the country. It is therefore not just a de facto government but, it is
considered as a de jure government. Lastly, the community of nations have recognized
the legitimacy of the said government

 
90. SORIANO VS. LA GUARDIA
G.R. NO. 164785. April 29, 2009

FACTS:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang
Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after,
before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by
Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent
Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in the petitioner's remark, was then
a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Soriano‘s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan”
part of the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.

HELD:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the
adverse effect of petitioner‘s utterances on the viewers‘ fundamental rights as well as
petitioner‘s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly
suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it
cannot be properly asserted that petitioner‘s suspension was an undue curtailment of
his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside
from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public
trusteeship character of a broadcaster‘s role and the power of the State to regulate
broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary
effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if
any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language. 

The SC ruled that “Soriano‘s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect
to the average child,” and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected
speech. Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said that the
analysis should be “context based” and found the utterances to be obscene after
considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and
the “G” rating of the show, which are all factors that made the utterances susceptible
to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily
understood by a child literally rather than in the context that they were used.”
 
The SC also said “that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a “form of
permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment.” In affirming the
power of the MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority said that “it is
a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running
afoul of the free speech clause.” The Court said that the suspension “is not
 a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang
Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB,” rather, it was a
sanction for ―the indecent contents of his utterances in a “G” rated TV program.

91. TAÑADA VA ANGARA

GR No. 118295, May 2, 1997

FACTS:
Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence
of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity)
and for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and
utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well
as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various
executive offices concerned therewith.
They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to
“develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential
use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods” as (1) the WTO
requires the Philippines “to place nationals and products of member-countries on the
same footing as Filipinos and local products” and (2) that the WTO “intrudes, limits
and/or impairs” the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative
power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is ‘vested in the
Congress of the Philippines.

HELD:
No, the WTO agreement does not unduly limit, restrict, and impair the Philippine
sovereignty, particularly the legislative power granted by the Philippine Constitution.
The Senate was acting in the proper manner when it concurred with the President’s
ratification of the agreement.

While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on

the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily
agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of
nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of
the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations.” By the doctrine of incorporation,
the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are
considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most
fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda — international
agreements must be performed in good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a mere
moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which
has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislation such
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken.”

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of

sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state
power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or
pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequalities, and in pursuit of
mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the
exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record
agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example,
the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the
regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of
commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing
conduct in peace and the establishment of international organizations. The sovereignty
of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain
restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of
membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty
stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, “Today, no nation can build its destiny
alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is
here.”
The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without
discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of
equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a
trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages
industries that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby
demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one
in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the
best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have
shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade
environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated
the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of
laissez faire.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit

92. THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GRP PEACE PANEL 

GR. No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement of the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 (MOA) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. This public
document would reach a consensus between both parties and the aspirations of the
MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland. However, the Executive Department did not
sign the document. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the
petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and
official copies of the MOA-AD and pray for the Court to enjoin the Executive
Department to enter into agreements similar to MOA in the future.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the MOA-AD is constitutional insofar as provisions on Articles XII of
the Constitution is concerned.

RULING:
No. The MOA-AD is unconstitutional. The Executive branch would amend the
Constitution to conform to the MOA-AD as it violates (1) Section 2, Article XII on
State ownership of all lands of the public domain and of all natural resources in the
Philippines. Under the MOA-AD, the ancestral domain does not form part of the
public domain. The ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro refers to the entire
Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan land which they or their ancestors continuously
possessed since time immemorial. This negates the Regalian doctrine of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, since Bangsamoro people include indigenous minorities,
MOA-AD would violate Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997) which provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of
ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and
prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government
agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement or compromise; (2) Section 9, Article XII under the Constitution which
provides that the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) may head
an independent economic and planning agency for the country. Under the MOA-AD,
however, the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) will have its own economic planning
agency; (3) Section 20, Article XII which establishes the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP) as an independent monetary authority. Under the MOA-AD, however, the BJE
will have its own financial and banking authority. In sum, if the Court did not stop the
signing of the MOA-AD, this country would have been dismembered because the
Executive branch would have committed to amend the Constitution to conform to the
MOA-AD.

93. REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR 

54 SCRA 83

FACTS:
The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, filed the petition for certiorari challenging
an order issued by Judge Guilllermo Villasor of the CFI of Cebu which made final and
executory its earlier decision and Alias Writ of Execution against the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.

The writ of execution stemmed from a decision rendered on July 3, 1961 in Special
Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino
Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, confirming the arbitration
award in the amount of P1,712,396.40.

On June 24, 1969, Judge Villasor made the decision final and executory and directed
the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City and Manila to execute the said decision
and the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution. This prompted the Provincial Sheriff
of Rizal to subsequently serve notices of garnishment with several Banks, especially
on the `monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits,
sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution’. The funds
sought to be garnished are public funds specifically for the payment of pensions,
allowances, and for the maintenance and operations of the AFP.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Alias Writ of Execution against the public funds of the AFP is
valid.
RULING:
No. The writ of Execution is invalid following the Constitutional postulate that the
state may not be sued without its consent. The Court held that from the concept,
public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent
to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged.Quoting its
decision in Director of Commerce and Industry vs. Concepcion, the Court held said
the “State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by
express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment
would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly.”

94. REPUBLIC VS. FELICIANO

48 SCRA 424

FACTS: 
Respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land
Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The claim
of ownership by Feliciano was derived from deed of sale of the property traced from
informacion posesoria. However, the said property was subject of Proclamation No.
90 by President Magsaysay for resettlement purposes.The Proclamation contained the
reservation clause” subject to private rights, if any there be. “Feliciano asserts that the
subject property must be excluded from the coverage of the resettlement project. The
trial court dismissed the case on the ground of non-suability of the State.
 
ISSUE:
1. Would the doctrine of non-suability of the State find application in an action
for recovery and possession of parcel of land?
2. Would the invocation of Proclamation No. 90 be considered as a waiver of
State Immunity?

HELD: 
1. YES. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this
case. The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant
in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land,
bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be
usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an
action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an action directed against a
specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or
parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is
directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land
Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.
By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit
 against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except
upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by
implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be
misinterpreted.There is no such showing in the instant case. Worse, the
complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent. This is a fatal
defect, and on this basis alone, the complaint should have been dismissed.

0.  NO. No such consent can be drawn from the language of the Proclamation.
The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation established by
Proclamation No. 90 can not be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the
State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will
not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris. Moreover,
the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued
must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be
made by an act of the legislative body.

95. TAN VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

125 SCRA 302 

FACTS:
Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for public
bidding on a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales
consisting of 6,420 hectares, within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising
7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the US Government to the
Philippine Government. Wenceslao Tan with nine others submitted their application in
due form.

The area was granted to the petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary Gozon of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a general memorandum order authorizing
Dir. Of Forestry to grant new Ordinary Timber Licenses (OTL) subject to some
conditions stated therein (not exceeding 3000 hectares for new OTL and not
exceeding 5000 hectares for extension)

Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Feliciano

(replacing Gozon) promulgated on December 19, 1963 a memorandum revoking the
authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses. On
the same date, OTL in the name of Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of
Forestry, without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
On January 6, 1964, the license was released by the Director
of Forestry. Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of ANR
praying that the OTL of Tan be revoked. On March 9, 1964, The Secretary of ANR
declared Tan’s OTL null and void (but the same was not granted to Ravago).
Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s timber license is valid (No)
2. Whether or not petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies available
(No)
RULING:
1. Petitioner’s timber license was signed and released without authority and is
therefore void ab initio. In the first place, in the general memorandum dated
May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new ordinary
timber license only where the area covered thereby was not more than 3,000
hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420
hectares In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the
Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any license. (The
license was released to the petitioner on January 6, 1964 while on the other
hand, the authority of the Director of Forestry to issue the license was revoked
on December 19, 1963). In view thereof, the Director of Forestry had no
longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964, and said license
is therefore void ab initio. What is of greatest importance is the date of the
release or issuance. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee.

Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still

respondents-appellees can validly revoke his timber license. "A license is
merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is
not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it
and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right,
nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation The welfare of the people is
the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the
proper exercise of police power.

0. Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedy in this case. He did not
appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to the President of the Philippines. Considering that the President
has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents, the
failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to
exhaust his administrative remedies.

96. MOBILE PHIL INC. VS CUSTOMS  ARRASTRE SERVICE 

18 SCRA 1120
FACTS:
The Bureau of Customs (the Bureau) is an unincorporated government agency. Its
primary function is to assess and collect lawful revenues from imported articles and
all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines, and penalties. Respondent
Customs Arrastre Service (the Service) is the unit of the Bureau handling arrastre
operations.

Petitioner Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. (Mobil Phils.) is the consignee of four
(4) cases of rotary drill parts shipped from abroad.  When the cases arrived at the Port
of Manila, they were discharged to the Service. The Service, however, delivered to the
consignee only 3 cases.  Mobil Phils. filed a complaint against respondents Customs
Arrastre and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case. 
Respondents invoke nonsuability averring it has no juridical personality. Mobil Phils.
aver that the Bureau as operator of the Service, is discharging proprietary functions
and as such, is suable.

ISSUE: 
Is the Bureau immune from suit?

HELD: 
Yes. The fact that a non-corporate govt entity performs a function proprietary in
nature does not necessarily result in its being suable.  If said non-governmental
function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental functions, there is no waiver
thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such a government entity.
The Bureau has no personality of its own apart from that of the national govt. The
primary function of the Bureau is governmental, and the arrastre service is a necessary
incident thereof.

97. NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORP VS TEODORO 

91 Phil 203

FACTS:
The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act No. 224, which
expressly made the provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to the said
corporation. It was abolished by Executive Order No. 365 and to take its place the
Civil Aeronautics Administration was created.

Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airports
Corporation P65,245 as fees for landing and parking for the period up to and
including July 31, 1948. These fees are said to have been due and payable to the
Capitol Subdivision, Inc., who owned the land used by the National Airports
Corporation as airport. The owner commenced an action in the court against the
Philippine Airlines, Inc.
The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party complaint against the
National Airports Corporation, which by that time had been dissolved, and served
summons on the Civil Aeronautics Administration. The third party plaintiff alleged
that it had paid to the National Airports Corporation the fees claimed by the Capitol
Subdivision, Inc. "on the belief and assumption that the third party defendant was the
lessee of the lands subject of the complaint and that the third party defendant and its
predecessors in interest were the operators and maintainers of said airport and, further,
that the third party defendant would pay to the landowners, particularly the Capitol
Subdivision, Inc., the reasonable rentals for the use of their lands."

The Solicitor General, after answering the third party complaint, filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the third- party
complaint, first, because the National Airports Corporation "has lost its juridical
personality," and, second, because agency of the Republic of the Philippines,
unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of
suing and being sued.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the Civil Aeronautics Administration should be regarded as engaged
in private functions and therefore subject to suit

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under
the category of a private entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the
National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government,
but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues are not its prime objective
but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the traveling public. It is
engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of the state,
may, more than the construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns.

In the light of a well-established precedents, and as a matter of simple justice to the

parties who dealt with the National Airports Corporation on the faith of equality in the
enforcement of their mutual commitments, the Civil Aeronautics Administration may
not, and should not, claim for itself the privileges and immunities of the sovereign
state.

98. PNB VS CIR

81 SCRA 314

FACTS:
A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had
previously been issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United
Homesite Employees and Laborers Association. The validity of the order assailed is
challenged on two grounds:

1. That the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy

sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and
2. That the funds subject of the garnishment "may be public in character." In thus
denying the motion to quash, petitioner contended that there was on the part of
respondent Court a failure to abide by authoritative doctrines amounting to a
grave abuse of discretion.

The Philippine National Bank (PNB) moves to quash the notice of garnishment is
denied for the lack of merit. PNB is therefore ordered to comply within five days from
receipt with the 'notice of Garnishment' dated May 6, 1970."
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this
certiorari petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the order denying motion to quash a notice of garnishment can be
stigmatized as a grave abuse of discretion.

RULING:
No. Supreme Court ruled that there has not been a grave abuse of discretion. The
premise that the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in
the sense that the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-
owned entity It does not follow though that they were exempt from garnishment.

As stated in "National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial

Relations", a government owned and controlled corporation has a personality of its
own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. It may sue and be sued and
may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation.

Justice Ozaeta held that it is well settled that when the government enters into
commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any
other corporation. By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a
corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as
to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations

99. CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT VS STA. MARIA 

GR No. 185572, April 24, 2012

FACTS:
On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp.
(Group) (CNMEG), represented by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding with the North Luzon Railways Corporation
(Northrail), represented by its president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for the conduct of a
feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila to San Fernando, La Union
(the Northrail Project).

On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the
Department of Finance of the Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (Aug 30MOU), wherein China agreed to extend Preferential Buyer's
Credit to the Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project. The Chinese
government designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while the Philippine government
named the DOF as the borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to
extend an amount not exceeding USD 400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20
years, with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate of 3% per annum. On 1 October
2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Wang Chungui (Amb. Wang), wrote
a letter to DOF Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) informing him of
CNMEG's designation as the Prime Contractor for the Northrail Project. On 30
December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the
construction of Section I, Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan
to Malolos on a turnkey basis (the Contract Agreement). The contract price for the
Northrail Project was pegged at USD 421,050,000. On 26 February 2004, the
Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into a counterpart financial
agreement-Buyer Credit Loan Agreement No. BLA 04055 (the Loan Agreement).

In the Loan Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to extend Preferential Buyer's Credit in
the amount of USD 400,000,000 in favor of the Philippine government in order to
finance the construction of Phase I of the Northrail Project. On 13 February 2006,
respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction with Urgent
Motion for Summary Hearing to Determine the Existence of Facts and Circumstances
Justifying the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction
and/or TRO against CNMEG, the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the
Department of Budget and Management, the National Economic Development
Authority and Northrail.

The case was filed before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Makati City, Branch 145 (RTC Br. 145). In the Complaint, respondents alleged that
the Contract Agreement and the Loan Agreement were void for being contrary to (a)
the Constitution; (b) Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A. No. 9184), otherwise known as the
Government Procurement Reform Act; (c) Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise
known as the Government Auditing Code; and (d) Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code. On 15 May 2007, RTC Br. 145 issued
an Omnibus Order denying CNMEG's Motion to Dismiss and setting the case for
summary hearing to determine whether the injunctive reliefs prayed for should be
issued.
CNMEG then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court
in an Order dated 10 March 2008. Thus, CNMEG filed before the CA a Petition for
Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
dated 4 April 2008. The appellate court dismissed the Petition for Certiorari.

Subsequently, CNMEG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the
CA in a Resolution dated 5 December 2008

Petitioners Argument:
Petitioner claims that the EXIM Bank extended financial assistance to Northrail
because the bank was mandated by the Chinese government, and not because of any
motivation to do business in the Philippines, it is clear from the foregoing provisions
that the Northrail Project was a purely commercial transaction

Respondents Argument:
respondents alleged that the Contract Agreement and the Loan Agreement were void
for being contrary to (a) the Constitution; (b) Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A No.
9184),otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act: (c) Presidential
Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code; and (d)
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner CNMEG is an agent of the Sovereign People's Republic of
China.
Whether or not the Northrail contracts are products of an executive agreement
between two sovereign states.

RULING:
The instant Petition is DENIED. Petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment
Corp. (Group) is not entitled to immunity from suit, and the Contract Agreement is
not an executive agreement. CNMEG's prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction is DENIED for being moot and academic. The Court
explained the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Holy See v. Rosario, to wit: There
are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established.

According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent,
be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or
restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to
public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts
jure gestionis. As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit
has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle
of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts
(jure gestionis),

Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the
legal nature of the act involved-whether the entity claiming immunity performs
governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. As held in United States of
America v. Ruiz

Admittedly, the Loan Agreement was entered into between EXIM Bank and the
Philippine government, while the Contract Agreement was between North rail and
CNMEG. Although the Contract Agreement is silent on the classification of the legal
nature of the transaction, the foregoing provisions of the Loan Agreement, which is an
inextricable part of the entire undertaking, nonetheless reveal the intention of the
parties to the North rail Project to classify the whole venture as commercial or
proprietary in character. Thus, piecing together the content and tenor of the Contract
Agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding dated 14 September 2002, Amb.
Wang's letter dated 1 October 2003, and the Loan Agreement would reveal the desire
of CNMEG to construct the Luzon Railways in pursuit of a purely commercial
activity performed in the ordinary course of its business.

100. PROFESSIONAL VIDEO, INC., VS. TESDA

GR No. 155504, June 26, 2009

FACTS:
In 1999. TESDA, an instrumentality of the government established under R.A. No.
7796 (the TESDA Act of 1994) and attached to the DOLE to develop and establish a
national system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country.

To fulfill this mandate, it sought to issue security-printed certification and/or

identification polyvinyl ( PVC cards to trainees who have passed the certification
process.

Professional Video Inc. (PROVI) signed and executed the "Contract Agreement
Project PVC ID Card issuance" for the provision of goods and services in the printing
and encoding of the PVC cards. PROVI was to provide TESDA with the system and
equipment compliant with the specifications defined in the proposal. In return,
TESDA would pay PROVI a specified sum of money after TESDA's acceptance of
the contracted goods and services. PPOVI alleged that TESDA has still an outstanding
balance and still remains unpaid.

TESDA claims that it entered the Contract Agreement and Addendum in the
performance of its governmental function to develop and establish a national system
of skills standardization, testing, and certification; in the performance of this
governmental function, TESDA is immune from suit
ISSUE:
Can TESDA be sued without its consent?

RULING:
TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its consent. The rule that a
state may not be sued without its consent is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the
1987 Constitution and has been an established principle that antedates this
Constitution. It is as well a universally recognized principle of international law that
exempts a state and its organs from the jurisdiction of another state.

The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy. That public service would
be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected
to lawsuits at the instance of every citizen and, consequently. controlled in the uses
and dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the
government.

The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms,
namely: a suit against the Republic by name; a suit against an unincorporated
government agency; a suit against a government agency covered by a charter with
respect to the agency's performance of governmental functions; and a suit that on its
face is against a government officer, but where the ultimate liability will fall on the
government. In the present case, the writ of attachment was issued against a
government agency covered by its own charter.

As discussed above, TESDA performs governmental functions, and the issuance of

certifications is a task within its function of developing and establishing a system of
skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country. From the perspective of
this function, the core reason for the existence of' state immunity' applies i.e The
public policy reason is that the performance of governmental function cannot be
hindered or delayed by suits, nor can these suits control the use and disposition of the
means for the performance of governmental functions.

101. GTZ V. CA
GR No. 152318, April 16, 2009

FACTS:
The Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the Philippines ratified an
agreement which led to the Social Health Insurance Networking and Empowerment
(SHINE program wherein the program seeks to provide health care to Filipino
families, especially the poor. The Republic of Germany assigned the GTZ as the
implementing corporation for the program, while the Philippines designated the
Department of Health and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation. Private
respondents, as employed by GTZ for the implementation of the SHINE, had a
misunderstanding with the Project Manager of SHINE. This led to an exchange of
letters which was interpreted to be the resignation of the private respondents. Private
respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal to the labor arbiter. GTZ
contends that it is immune from suit as it is the accredited agency of the Federal
Republic of Germany.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the GTZ is immune from suit.

HELD:
A state may waive its immunity through a general or specific law. The special law can
take the form of the original charter of the incorporated government agency. In this
case however, GTZ presented any evidence to support their claim that they are
immune from suit, and has failed to obtain a certification of immunity from suit from
the Department of Foreign Affairs. If GTZ has done so, then there would be no
ambiguity in their claim that they are immune from suit.

102. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO VS JUDGE FIRME

195 SCRA 692

FACTS: 
A dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando was allegedly on its way to get a
load of sand and gravel for the repair of the municipal streets when it collided with a
passenger jeepney. Due to the impact, several passengers died and 4 others suffered
physical injuries. The victims, private respondents herein, sued for damages against
the Municipality and the driver of the dump truck. The Municipality invokes non-
suability.

ISSUE:
Is the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union immune from suit?

HELD:
No. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when
they engage in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of
such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued. [While
municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to
sue and be sued) they are generally not liable" for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be
shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity; and We rule that the driver of
the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office [as he was on
his way to get materials for the repair of the municipal streets].

103. MERRITT VS. GPI 

34 Phil. 311

FACTS:
Petitioner Meritt was riding on a motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura when the
General Hospital ambulance struck the plaintiff. The chauffeur of the ambulance was
employed by the Hospital. Meritt suffered severe injuries. The Legislature passed Act
No. 2457 authorizing Merritt to bring suit against the Govt of the Phils. The CFI
found Meritt. In this appeal to the judgment rendered, the Govt claims that the CFI
erred in holding that the State is liable for the damages sustained by Meritt even if it
be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur.

ISSUE:
Is the State not liable for the damages notwithstanding that it was due
to the negligence of the chauffeur employed by the State?

HELD:
Yes. By consenting to be sued, a State simply waived its immunity from suit. It does
not thereby concede its liability. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing
liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense. The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it
contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission
to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the
claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public
official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the
proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. The
negligent chauffer of the ambulance was not such a special agent.

104. USA VS. GUINTO 

182 SCRA 644

FACTS: 
The cases brought before the Supreme Court are consolidated for they are issues on
immunity of the state from being sued.

In G.R. No. 76607 (U.S.A et. al vs. Guinto et. al. Feb. 26, 1990), the private
respondents sued several officers of the US Air Force regarding a bidding for
barbering services contract. A bid from Okinawa Area Exchange was solicited through
James Shaw, a contracting officer. Private respondents and concessionaires inside the
Clark Air Base, Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao and Pablo C. del Pilar,
were among the bidders, however, Ramon Dizon won the bidding. The private
respondents complained with the contention that Dizon also bid for the Civil
Engineering (CE) area which was not included in the bidding invitation. PHAX or the
Philippine Area Exchange, to whom the respondents complained to, represented by
petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederick Smouse clarified that the CE area is yet to
be awarded to Dizon because of a previous solicitation. Dizon was already operating
the NCO club concession, however, and the contract expiry of the CE barbershop was
extended only until the end of June 1986. Hence, the respondents filed a petition, with
a prayer to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to revoke the award to Dizon,
and conduct a rebidding to allow the private respondents to continue operating their
concessions by a writ of preliminary injunction pending litigation. To maintain status
quo, the Respondent court issued an ex parte order to the petitioners. Petitioners filed
a motion for dismissal and petition to oppose the preliminary injunction. They
contended that the action was in effect a suit against the US Force. Both were denied
by the trial court. A petition for certiorari and prohibition for preliminary injunction
were filed before the Supreme Court and a TRO was issued.

In G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Crtalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal
as a cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center. Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion
testified that Genova poured urine into the soup stock that was served to customers.
Lamachia suspended him and referred the case to a board of arbitrators who found
Genove guilty and recommended his dismissal. Genove then filed an MS complaint in
the RTC of Baguio against the individual petitioners, who moved to dismiss the case
in the basis that Lamachia was immune from suit as per acts done in his official
capacity as an officer of the US Air Force. The motion was denied by the RTC, so the
petitioners filed a petition for Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
before the Supreme Court.

In G.R. No. 80018, the respondent, Louis Bautista, was arrested pursuant to RA 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act) in a buy-bust operation conducted by the petitioners, Tomi J.
King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, who were officers and special agents of
the US Air Force and Air Force Office of Special Investigators. He was charged
before the RTC which caused his dismissal as a barracks boy in Camp O’Donnell, an
extension of Clark Air base. Bautista then filed a complaint against the petitioners.
The petitioners, in defense, filed a motion to dismiss the case with the contention that
they were acting in official capacity when the acts were committed, hence the suit
against them is, in effect, a suit against the US. The motion was denied by the judge,
with the contention that the immunity covers only civil cases that are not criminal
under the Military Bases Agreement. Ergo, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition for preliminary injunction. A TRO was issued.

In G.R. No. 80258, the private respondents, Ricky Sanchez, et. al., filed a complaint
for damages against the respondents, Major General Michael Carns, et. al., for the
extensive injuries allegedly sustained by the petitioners, who beat them up,
handcuffed and unleashed dogs on them who bit them. The petitioners denied the
accusation and instead said that the respondents were bitten by dogs because they
resisted arrest when they committed theft, and they were brought to the medical center
for treatment thereafter. The petitioners, USA together with Carns et. al., contended
that they are immune against this suit, invoking their right under the RP-US Bases
Treaty, as they acted in the performance of their official functions. The matter was
brought before the Supreme Court after their motion was denied, wherein they filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. A TRO was issued.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the petitioners can use State Immunity (Art. XVI, Sec. 3, 1987
Constitution) as defense.

RULING: 
The Supreme Court rendered judgment as follows:
1. In the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to proceed
with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary
restraining order was LIFTED.
2. In G.R. No.79470, the petition is GRANTED and the Civil Case No.0829-
R(298) is DISMISSED.
3. In G.R. No80018, the petition is GRANTED and the Civil Case No. 115-C-87
is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order is made permanent.
4. In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is
directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4996. The
temporary restraining order was LIFTED.

REASON:
Under Art. XVI, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution, "The State may not be sued without its
consent." However, this does not mean that at all times, the State may not be sued.
There needs to be a consideration on if they were indeed acting within the capacity of
their duties, or if they entered into a contract with a private party.

In G.R. No. 76607, the barbershops, subject of the bidding awarded were commercial
enterprises, operated by private persons, therefore they are not agencies of the US
Armed Forces nor part of their facilities. Although the barbershops provide service to
the military, they were for a fee. State Immunity cannot be invoked by the petitioners
for the fact that they entered into a contract with a private party, commercial in nature.
In G.R. No. 79470, it is in the same principle as in the first case. The petitioner,
Lamachia, is a manager of a privately operated service which generates income. The
court assumed that they are an individual entity, and the service they offer partakes in
the nature of a business entered by the US in its proprietary capacity. Despite this, the
court ruled in favor of the petitioners as the claim for damages cannot be allowed on
the strength of evidence before the court. It ruled that the dismissal of the private
respondent was justifiable under the circumstance. Further, the Supreme Court
declared that the petitioners in the other cases above, stating that they acted in
performance of their duties, need evidence. The SC was able to make certain that the
petitioners in G.R. No. 80018 were indeed acting in their official capacity, as the state
they represent, USA, has not given its consent to be sued. As such, they cannot be
sued for acts imputable to their state.  However in G.R. No. 80258, more evidence is
needed as the factual allegations were contradictory. There needs to be clear, and
sufficient evidence that they were in the vestige of their duty, and did not exceed it. In
the foregoing, the Supreme Court had decided to make the case be investigated further
by the lower court before proceeding and the final judgment can be rendered.
 

105. ABLE VS CUENCAMIGA

43 SCRA 360      

FACTS:
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the
Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18060,
which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T-3435) issued to her by
the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the
government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the
certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a
portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the
Mango and Gorordo Avenues. It appears that said avenues were already existing in
1921 although “they were in bad condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and
beautiful avenues that they are now,” and “that the tracing of said roads was begun in
1924, and the formal construction in 1925”. Amigable's counsel wrote the President of
the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been
appropriated by the government. The claim was endorsed to the Auditor General, who
disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement. A copy of said indorsement was transmitted to
Amigable's counsel by the Office of the President. Amigable filed in the court a quo a
complaint, which was later amended on upon motion of the defendants, against the
Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of
Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 square
meters of land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the
payment of compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal
occupation of her land, moral damages in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the
sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Within the reglementary period the
defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and
interposing the following affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was
premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor
General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery of any amount which might be
due the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against
the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid
basis since as to these items the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and
(4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area
involved in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against
the defendants.

During the scheduled hearings nobody appeared for the defendants notwithstanding
due notice, so the trial court proceeded to receive the plaintiff's evidence ex parte. The
said court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot
in question on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent; that
it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff's claim
for compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00, the same being a money claim
against the government; and that the claim for moral damages had long prescribed,
nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its
consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure a
reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently
certified the case to Us, there being no question of fact involved. 

ISSUE:
Whether the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case. 

RULING:
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her
certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any
portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot.
As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of
land in question at any time because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither
convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road
purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation
which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation
for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. As
regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal
interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment
is made by the government. In addition, the government should pay for attorney's
fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing. 

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded
to the court a quofor the determination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to
which the appellant is entitled as above indicated. No pronouncement as to costs

106. U.P VS DIZON

GR No. 171182
FACTS:
The UP, through its then President Jose V. Abueva, entered into a General
Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders),
for the construction of the extension building and the renovation of the College of
Arts and Sciences Building in the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los
Baños (UPLB). In the course of the implementation of the contract, Stern Builders
submitted three progress billings corresponding to the work accomplished, but the UP
paid only two of the billings. The third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to
its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Despite the lifting of the
disallowance, the UP failed to pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders and dela Cruz
to sue the UP and its co-respondent officials to collect the unpaid billing and to
recover various damages (actual and moral) and attorney’s fees. After trial, the RTC
rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs. Following the RTC’s denial of its
motion for reconsideration, UP filed a notice of appeal. The RTC denied due course to
the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time and granted the private
respondents’ motion for execution. The RTC issued the writ of execution and the
sheriff of the RTC served the writ of execution and notice of demand upon the UP.
The UP filed an urgent motion to reconsider the order, to quash the writ of execution
and to restrain the proceedings. However, the RTC denied the urgent motion. UP
assailed the denial of due course to its appeal through a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals but the latter dismissed the petition for certiorari upon finding that
the UP’s notice of appeal had been filed late. The UP sought a reconsideration, but the
CA denied the UP’s motion for reconsideration. The UP appealed to the Court by
petition for review on certiorari. The Court denied the petition for review. The UP
moved for the reconsideration of the denial of its petition for review but the Court
denied the motion which denial became final and executory. In the meanwhile that the
UP was exhausting the available remedies to overturn the denial of due course to the
appeal and the issuance of the writ of execution, Stern Builders and dela Cruz filed in
the RTC their motions for execution despite their previous motion having already
been granted and despite the writ of execution having already issued. The RTC
granted another motion for execution. The sheriff served notices of garnishment on
the UP’s depository banks. The UP assailed the garnishment through an urgent motion
to quash the notices of garnishment; and a motion to quash the writ of execution but
was denied by the RTC. UP moved for the reconsideration of the order but was denied
by the same court. On their part, Stern Builders and dela Cruz filed their ex parte
motion for issuance of a release order which the RTC granted and authorized the
release of the garnished funds of the UP. The UP brought a petition for certiorari in
the CA to challenge the jurisdiction of the RTC in issuing the order of December 21,
2004. While pending resolution, CA issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) upon
application by the UP. In its decision CA dismissed the UP’s petition for certiorari,
ruling that the UP had been given ample opportunity to contest the motion to direct
the DBP to deposit the check in the name of Stern Builders and dela Cruz; and that the
garnished funds could be the proper subject of garnishment because they had been
already earmarked for the project, with the UP holding the funds only in a fiduciary
capacity. After the CA denied their motion for reconsideration on December 23, 2005,
the petitioners appealed by petition for review.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the funds of the UP were the proper subject of garnishment in order
to satisfy the judgment award.
2. Whether the UP’s prayer for the deletion of the awards of actual damages,
moral damages and attorney’s fees could be granted despite the finality of the
judgment of the RTC.

RULING:
I.UP’s funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment.Despite its
establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered institution"
performing a legitimate government function. It is an institution of higher learning,
not a corporation established for profit and declaring any dividends. In enacting
Republic Act No. 9500 (The University of the Philippines Charter of 2008), Congress
has declared the UP as the national university 67 "dedicated to the search for truth and
knowledge as well as the development of future leaders."  UP is a government
instrumentality, performing the State’s constitutional mandate of promoting quality
and accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the UP administers special
funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section
1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the
purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500.
All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from
the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund,"
the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UP’s mission and
purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA.

"Trust fund" as a fund that officially comes in the possession of an agency of the
government or of a public officer as trustee, agent or administrator, or that is received
for the fulfillment of some obligation.75 A trust fund may be utilized only for the
"specific purpose for which the trust was created or the funds received."
The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. Hence, the
funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s writ of
execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to
which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution
against the UP, because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.

A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends
on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean
that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent
to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself
to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. (Municipality of
San Fernando, La Union v. Firme)

The UP correctly submits here that the garnishment of its funds to satisfy the
judgment awards of actual and moral damages (including attorney’s fees) was not
validly made if there was no special appropriation by Congress to cover the liability.
The Constitution strictly mandated that "(n)o money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."

107. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE VS NLRC

 G.R. No. 104269

FACTS:
Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a
contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental
entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security
Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a
complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform
allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for
damages before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of CDOC against the DA and the
security agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with
the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security
guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the
decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to
enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security
agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.
 
DA filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
preliminary injunction with NLRC alleging that the writ issued was effected without
the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and therefore,
the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void. The NLRC promulgated its
assailed resolution.  1.) that The enforcement and execution of the judgments against
petitioner in NLRC are temporarily suspended for a period of two months. 2.) ,
petitioner is ordered and directed to source for funds within the period above-stated
and to deposit the sums of money equivalent to the aggregate amount. 3.) petitioner is
likewise directed to put up and post sufficient surety and supersedeas bond equivalent
to at least to fifty (50%) percent of the total monetary award. 4) City Sheriff is
ordered to immediately release the properties of the petitioner. 5.) . The right of any of
the judgment debtors to claim reimbursement against each other for any payments
made.
 
Finally, the petition for injunction is dismissed for lack of basis. The writ of
preliminary injunction previously issued is Lifted and Set Aside and in lieu thereof, a
Temporary Stay of Execution is issued for a period of two (2) months but not
extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year 1991, conditioned upon the posting
of a surety or supersedeas bond by petitioner within ten (10) days from notice
pursuant to paragraph 3 of this disposition. The motion to admit the complaint in
intervention is Denied for lack of merit while the motion to dismiss the petition filed
by Duty Sheriff is Note.

The petitioner filed to the Supreme Court a case charging the NLRC with grave abuse
of discretion for refusing to quash or reject the writ of execution. The petitioner fault
the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department,
which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule
on the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly
waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security
Agency.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case

RULING:
The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that “the State may not be sued
without its consent” reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character
of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it
from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A
sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.

The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under
any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The State’s consent may be given
expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a
special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself
commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a
contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of
the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.

But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-
suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise
of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State
may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to
have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts.
It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being
a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could
have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.

But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute
money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any
moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant,
however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must
first be brought to the Commission on Audit.

The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition of the petitioner. The resolution, dated 27
November 1991, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution
directed against the property of the Department of Agriculture is nullified, and the
public respondents are hereby enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and
implementing any and all writs of execution issued pursuant to the decision rendered
by the Labor Arbiter against said petitioner.
 
NOTES:
Petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus - When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
 
ACT NO. 3083 - AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED
Section 1. Complaint against Government. — Subject to the provisions of this Act, the
Government of the Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon
any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, expressed or implied,
which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.
 
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 327 - AN ACT FIXING THE TIME WITHIN
WHICH THE AUDITOR GENERAL SHALL RENDER HIS DECISIONS AND
PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF APPEAL THEREFROM
SECTION 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than
those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same
within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. If said
accounts or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a party
interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last comment
necessary to a proper decision is received by him. With respect to the accounts of
accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act on the same within one hundred
days after their submission, Sundays and holidays excepted.
 
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1445 - ORDAINING AND INSTITUTING A
GOVERNMENT AUDITING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Section 49. Period for rendering decisions of the Commission. The Commission shall
decide any case brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
resolution. If the account or claim involved in the case needs reference to other
persons or offices, or to a party interested, the period shall be counted from the time
the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by it.

Section 50. Appeal from decisions of the Commission. The party aggrieved by any
decision, order or ruling of the Commission may within thirty days from his receipt of
a copy thereof appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court in the manner provided by
law and the Rules of Court. When the decision, order, or ruling adversely affects the
interest of any government agency, the appeal may be taken by the proper head of that
agency.

 
108. BASCO VS. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 91649

FACTS:
A TV ad proudly announces: “The New PAGCOR – Responding Through
Responsible Gaming.” But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the
instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR charter – PD 1869, because it is
allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because:
0. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law. It waived the Manila city government’s right to impose
taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;
a. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceeding paragraph, the law
has intruded into the local government’s right to impose local taxes and license
fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local
autonomy;
b. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes
PAGCOR – conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are
outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;
c. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from the
monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the city of Manila may levy taxes on PAGCOR.

RULING: 
No. The city of Manila, being a mere municipal corporation, has no inherent right to
impose taxes. Thus, the charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that
power or the municipality cannot assume it. Its power to tax therefore must always
yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself
which has the inherent power to tax.

The city of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling has long been
revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling
through the grant of “franchise, licenses or permits” was withdrawn by PD no. 771
and was vested exclusively on the national government.

Therefore, only the national government has the power to issue “license or permits”
for the operation of gambling. Necessarily the power to demand or collect license fees
which is a consequence of the issuance of “licenses or permits” is no longer vested in
the City of Manila.

Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National

Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the national
government.

The power of the local government to “impose taxes and fees” is always subject to
“limitations” which congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an
operative law until amended, repealed or revoked, its exemption clause remains as an
exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees.
It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local
autonomy.

Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 constitution simply means
“decentralization.” It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or
an “imperium in imperio.”

What is settled is that the matter of regulating; taxing or otherwise dealing with
gambling is a state concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the state to retain it
or delegate it to local governments.

109. TOLENTINO ET. AL. VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 148334
FACTS:
After becoming president in January 2001, Gloria Arroyo nominated Senator Teofista
Guingona as vice-president. After confirmation as VP, Resolution 84 was passed by
the Senate calling the COMELEC to fill the vacancy with a special election to be held
simultaneously with the 2001 May regular election. It also provided that the candidate
garnering the 13th highest vote will serve for the unexpired term of Guingona.
Petitioners, Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica sought to enjoin COMELEC from
proclaiming the winner. They contend that it is without jurisdiction because it failed to
notify the electorate of the position to be filled in (special election) due to this the
people voted without distinction in one election for 13 seats irrespective of term.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not petitioner’s have standing to maintain a suit?

RULING: 
In questioning the validity of the special election, petitioners assert harm classified as
“generalized grievance.”  They failed to establish direct injury they suffered from the
said governmental act. However, the Court relaxed the requirement on standing and
exercised its discretion to give due course to the voter's suit involving the right of
suffrage.
 

110. KURODA VS JALANDONI

1 83 Phil 171

FACTS:
Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and
commanding general of the Japanese forces during WWII in the country. He was tried
before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities
committed against military and civilians. The military commission was established
under Executive Order 68. Petitioner assailed the validity of EO 68 arguing it is
unconstitutional and hence the military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try
him on the following grounds: The Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague
Convention (War Crimes) Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of
interest in the case hence the 2 US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines. 

ISSUE:
1. Whether or Not EO 68 is constitutional?
2. Whether or Not American lawyers may participate in a case under a military
commission when they are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines 
RULING:
EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was
enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution
which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. It is in accordance with
generally accepted principles of international law including the Hague Convention
and Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence established by the UN,
including the principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing,
waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of
war. Although the Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time,
the rules and regulations of both are based on the generally accepted principles of
international law. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is
a party of interest because its country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes
which petitioner was being charged. 
Moreover, Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to
parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of
this special law.

111. PHILIP-MORRIS VS. CA 

G.R. No. 91332

FACTS:
Petitioners are foreign corporations organized under US laws not doing business in
the Philippines and registered owners of symbols ‘MARK VII,’ ‘MARK TEN,’ and
‘LARK’ used in their cigarette products. Petitioners moved to enjoin respondent
Fortune Tobacco from manufacturing and selling cigarettes bearing the symbol
‘MARK’ asserting that it is identical or confusingly similar with their trademarks.
Petitioners relied on Section 21-A of the Trademark Law to bring their suit and the
Paris Convention to protect their trademarks. The court denied the prayer for
injunction stating that since petitioners are not doing business in the Philippines,
respondent’s cigarettes would not cause irreparable damage to petitioner. CA granted
the injunction but on a subsequent motion, dissolved the writ.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s mark may be afforded protection under said laws;
2. Whether or not petitioner may be granted injunctive relief.

RULING:
1. NO. Yet, insofar as this discourse is concerned, there is no necessity to treat
the matter with an extensive response because adherence of the Philippines to
the 1965 international covenant due to pact sunt servanda had been
acknowledged in La Chemise. Given these confluence of existing laws amidst
 the cases involving trademarks, there can be no disagreement to the guiding
principle in commercial law that foreign corporations not engaged in business
in the Philippines may maintain a cause of action for infringement primarily
because of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law when the legal standing to sue
is alleged, which petitioners have done in the case at hand.

Petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack
of business activity in the Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the
Trademark Law but the question whether they have an exclusive right over
their symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend on
actual use of their trademarks in the Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-
A of the same law. It is thus incongruous for petitioners to claim that when a
foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines files a
complaint for infringement, the entity need not be actually using its trademark
in commerce in the Philippines. Such a foreign corporation may have the
personality to file a suit for infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled
to protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the local market.

0. NO.  More telling are the allegations of petitioners in their complaint as well
as in the very petition filed with this Court indicating that they are not doing
business in the Philippines, for these frank representations are inconsistent and
incongruent with any pretense of a right which can be breached. Indeed, to be
entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must show that there exists a right to
be protected and that the facts against which injunction is directed are
violative of said right. On the economic repercussion of this case, we are
extremely bothered by the thought of having to participate in throwing into the
streets Filipino workers engaged in the manufacture and sale of private
respondent’s “MARK” cigarettes who might be retrenched and forced to join
the ranks of the many unemployed and unproductive as a result of the issuance
of a simple writ of preliminary injunction and this, during the pendency of the
case before the trial court, not to mention the diminution of tax revenues
represented to be close to a quarter million pesos annually. On the other hand,
if the status quo is maintained, there will be no damage that would be suffered
by petitioners inasmuch as they are not doing business in the Philippines. In
view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are
not engaged in business in the Philippines, it inevitably follows that no
conceivable damage can be suffered by them not to mention the foremost
consideration heretofore discussed in the absence of their “right” to be
protected.

112. SEC. JUSTICE VS. LANTION

G.R. No. 139465

FACTS:
On January 13, 1977, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1069 “Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed
Crimes in a Foreign Country.” On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice
Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
signed in Manila the “Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America” (RP-US
Extradition Treaty) which was ratified by the Senate. On June 18, 1999, the
Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for
the extradition of Mark Jimenez who had a warrant of arrest for: conspiracy to
commit offense or to defraud the United States; attempt to evade or defeat tax; fraud
by wire, radio, or television; false statement or entries; and election contributions in
name of another. Jimenez, through counsel, requested copies of the official extradition
request, ample time to comment on the request, and to hold the proceedings in
abeyance for the meantime. Petitioner denied the requests. Thus, Jimenez filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region against
the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation for mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The trial
court granted the petition.

ISSUE:
Can the guarantees mentioned in the Bill of Rights be disregarded if the
contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations?

RULING:
No. The Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the
enforcement of a law or treaty. No paramount consideration should be given to
petitioner’s fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections to the Requested
State’s non-performance of its commitments under the Extradition Treaty. Thus, the
petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

113. GOVT. OF U.S. VS. PURGANAN

G.R. No. 148571 

FACTS:
In accordance with the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States
Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note
Verbale an extradition request of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan
Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs
(SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action,
pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the
Extradition Law. Govt. of the United States v. Purganan

Jimenez then sought and was granted a TRO to prohibit the DOJ from filing with the
RTC a petition for his extradition which was later on assailed by the SOJ. The Court
initially dismissed the petition, but later on reverse its decision when it filed its
Motion for Reconsideration and held that private respondent was bereft of the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

On May 18, 2001,  the Government of the United States of America, represented by
the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC, the appropriate Petition for Extradition. In
order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order
for his immediate arrest pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069. Govt. of the United
States v. Purganan
Respondent Jimenez then filed an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, praying for
an arrest warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set a
date for hearing. When the arrest warrant was issued, he was granted bail for his
temporary liberty in the amount of one million pesos in cash. 

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent is entitled to notice and hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
2. Whether or not the respondent is entitled to bail.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of due process of law. 
RULING:
1. No. On the basis of the Extradition Law, the  word immediate was used to
qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered
nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing
entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments
from them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and
arguments. 

When it requires a speedy action on the petition, the trial court is not expected
to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation,
immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the
material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first
impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused. Govt. of the
United States v. Purganan

On the basis also of the Constitution, Section 2 Article III does not require a
notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The Constitution
only requires examination under oath or affirmation of complaints and the
witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the
accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.  The judges merely
 determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused.

0. No, he's not entitled to post bail. Extradition case is different from ordinary
criminal proceedings. Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well as
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does
not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal. Jimenez should apply for bail before the
courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
Govt. of the United States v. Purganan
1. There is no violation of his right to due process. Potential extraditees are
entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due process
does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent
opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available
during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be
heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary
nature of extradition.

To sum all up, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed
to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while
safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and
technicalities that may negate that purpose. 

114. ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ

101 Phil 1155

FACTS:
Petitioner is a Chinese merchant who questions the constitutionality of RA 1180 “An
Act to Regulate the Retail Business” on the following grounds: 
0. It is a violation of the Equal Protection of the Law Clause, denies them of their
liberty, property and due process of law 
a. It is a violation of the constitutional requirement that a bill’s title must reflect
the subject matter of the same because “regulate” does not really mean
“nationalize” and “prohibit” 
b. the Act violates International treaties and Laws

ISSUE:
Whether or Not RA 1180 is constitutional.

RULING:
RA 1180 is constitutional. In the above mentioned case, what has been pointed out is
the constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one subject as expressed
in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to
apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that
particular law. The Constitution precludes the encroaching of one department to the
responsibilities of the other departments. The legislature is primarily the judge of
necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of the law, and the
courts have no jurisdiction to question this.

     
115. GONZALES VS HECHANOVA
9 SCRA 230

FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of foreign rice to be purchased
from private sources. Ramon Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said
implementation because RA No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic
Act No. 2207, prohibits the importation of rice and corn “by the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency.”

Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in Republic Act 2207 is to be

authorized by the President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government
of the Philippines. They add that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and
any other government agency from importing rice and corn, Section 10 of Republic
Act 3542 indicates that only private parties may import rice under its provisions. They
contended that the government has already constitute valid executive agreements with
Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict between Republic Act Nos. 2207 and
3542, the latter should prevail and the conflict be resolved under the American
jurisprudence.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts. From a
constitutional viewpoint, the said international agreement was inconsistent with the
provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under
the American constitutional system enter into executive agreements without previous
legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction
which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.

RULING:
Yes. The Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
conflicts with the fundamental law, but also, when it runs counter to an act of
Congress. Section 2 Article 8 states that judicial review is vested with the Supreme
Court. The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and
Burma does not render this case academic. Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our
government not from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from
entering rice, except under the conditions prescribed in said Act. 
A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our
Government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may have
contracted with the sellers of rice in question because aside from the fact that said
obligations may be complied without importing the said commodity into the
Philippines, the proposed importation may still be legalized by complying with the
provisions of the aforementioned laws.

Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted
by Congress. He may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the
latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative
enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same
through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws.
 
 
 
 

116. EBRALINAG VS DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF

CEBU
251 SCRA 569          
 
FACTS:
The petitioners (Ebralinag, et al.) are elementary and high school students who were
expelled from their classes by public school authorities for refusing to salute the flag,
sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 and
Department Order No. 8 of the DepEd.

Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of
worship" or "religious devotion” which they "cannot conscientiously give  to anyone
or anything except God". They feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard
ourselves from idols — 1 John 5:21". 

They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State (p. 10, Rollo). They
think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge
transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of
the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control
ISSUE:
Whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah's
Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on
account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes
playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine
flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.

RULING:
No, they cannot be expelled for this reason. We hold that a similar exemption may be
accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag
ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs
may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony
does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the
warning cited by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the
highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, "this
should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them"
if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities,
both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during
the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly
disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the
State has a right (and duty) to prevent (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).
117. PANTRANCO vs. Public Service Commission (PSC)

G.R. No. 47065 June 26, 1940

FACTS: 

PANTRANCO, a holder of an existing Certificate of Public Convenience is applying

to operate additional buses with the Public Service Commission (PSC) has been

engaged in transporting passengers in certain provinces by means of public

transportation utility. Patranc applied for authorization to operate 10 additional trucks.

The PSC granted the application but added several conditions for PANTRANCO’s

compliance. One is that the service can be acquired by government upon payment of

the cost price less depreciation, and that the certificate shall be valid only for a

definite period of time.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not PSC can impose said conditions. If so, wouldn’t this power of the PSC

constitute undue delegation of powers?

RULING:  

The Supreme Court held that there was valid delegation of powers.

The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action

at the same time forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue

concentration of powers and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent deposition. But due

to the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of subjects of

governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering laws, there is a

constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the

legislature, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of

“subordinate legislation.”

All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function,
involving the use of discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly having
in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner.

118 . Bagabuyo v. COMELEC

G. R. No. 176970. December 8, 2008

Facts:

On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula

filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: "An Act Providing for the Apportionment
of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro." This law eventually
became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371. It increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative
district from one to two. For the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters
would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on
their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own
representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC on
March 27, 2007. On 10 April 2008, the petitioner amended the petition to include the
following as respondents: Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita; the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management; the Chairman of the Commission on Audit;
the Mayor and the members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cagayan de Oro
City; and its Board of Canvassers.
In asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on
constitutional grounds, the petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot implement
R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the
conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local
government unit. He prayed for the issuance of an order directing the respondents to
cease and desist from implementing R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Resolution No.
7837, and to revert instead to COMELEC Resolution No. 7801 which provided for a
single legislative district for Cagayan de Oro.
Issue:

1. ) Whether R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of

Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a local
government unit.

Ruling:

R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed
in accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5 (4)
of the Constitution.
Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate
entity takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single
unit and its administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory remains
completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of another legislative district
and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation in the
House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not
come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro
City into two districts.
Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries effects beyond the creation of
another congressional district in the city by providing, as reflected in COMELEC 
Resolution No. 7837, for additional Sangguniang Panglunsod seats to be voted for
along the lines of the congressional apportionment made. The
effect on the Sangguniang Panglunsod, however, is not directly traceable to R.A. No.
9371 but to another law —R.A. No. 6636.
However, neither does this law have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro
into two political and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the city either
territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect is merely to enhance voter
representation by giving each city voter more and greater say, both in Congress and in
the Sangguniang Panglunsod.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

case needs reference to other persons or offices, or to a party interested, the period
shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is
received by it.

Section 50. Appeal from decisions of the Commission. The party aggrieved by any
decision, order or ruling of the Commission may within thirty days from his receipt of
a copy thereof appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court in the manner provided by
law and the Rules of Court. When the decision, order, or ruling adversely affects the
interest of any government agency, the appeal may be taken by the proper head of that
agency.