(Energy, Climate and the Environment Series) Joseph Szarka, Richard Cowell, Geraint Ellis, Peter a. Strachan, Charles Warren (Eds.) - Learning From Wind Power_ Governance, Societal and Policy Perspect (1)

Energy, Climate and the Environment Series
Series Editor: David Elliott, Emeritus Professor of Technology,

Open University, UK
Titles include:
Luca Anceschi and Jonathan Symons (editors)
ENERGY SECURITY IN THE ERA OF CLIMATE CHANGE
The Asia-Pacific Experience
Ian Bailey and Hugh Compston (editors)
FEELING THE HEAT
The Politics of Climate Policy in Rapidly Industrializing Countries
Mehmet Efe Biresselioglu
EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY
Turkey’s Future Role and Impact
David Elliott (editor)
NUCLEAR OR NOT?
Does Nuclear Power Have a Place in a Sustainable Future?
David Elliott (editor)
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY
Opportunities and Limitations
Horace Herring and Steve Sorrell (editors)
ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION
The Rebound Effect
Matti Kojo and Tapio Litmanen (editors)
THE RENEWAL OF NUCLEAR POWER IN FINLAND
Antonio Marquina (editor)
GLOBAL WARMING AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Prospects and Policies in Asia and Europe
Catherine Mitchell
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUSTAINABLE ENERGY
Ivan Scrase and Gordon MacKerron (editors)
ENERGY FOR THE FUTURE
A New Agenda
Gill Seyfang
SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION, COMMUNITY ACTION AND
THE NEW ECONOMICS
Seeds of Change
Joseph Szarka
WIND POWER IN EUROPE
Politics, Business and Society
Joseph Szarka, Richard Cowell, Geraint Ellis, Peter Strachan and
Charles Warren (editors)
LEARNING FROM WIND POWER
Governance, Societal and Policy Perspectives on Sustainable Energy
David Toke
ECOLOGICAL MODERNISATION AND RENEWABLE ENERGY
Xu Yi-chong (editor)
NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA
Problems and Prospects
Xu Yi-chong
THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CHINA
Energy, Climate and the Environment

Series Standing Order ISBN 978–0–230–00800–7 (hb)
978–0–230–22150–5 (pb)
You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order.
Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with
your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBNs quoted above.
Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire RG21 6XS, England
Learning from
Wind Power
Governance, Societal and Policy
Perspectives on Sustainable Energy
Edited by
Joseph Szarka
Reader in Policy Studies, Department of Politics,
Languages and International Studies, University of Bath
Richard Cowell
Reader in Environmental Planning,
School of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University
Geraint Ellis
Senior Lecturer, School of Planning Architecture and Civil Engineering,
Queen’s University Belfast
Peter A. Strachan
Professor in Energy Policy and Management,
Aberdeen Business School, Strategy and Policy Group, Robert Gordon University
Charles Warren
Senior Lecturer, Department of Geography and Sustainable Development,
University of St Andrews
Palgrave
macmillan
Editorial matter, selection, introduction and conclusion © Joseph Szarka,
Richard Cowell, Geraint Ellis, Peter A. Strachan and Charles Warren 2012
All remaining chapters © respective authors 2012
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2012
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
publication may be made without written permission.
No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted
save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence
permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency,
Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.
Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The authors have asserted their right to be identified as the authors of this work
in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2012 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire RG21 6XS.
Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.
Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies
and has companies and representatives throughout the world.
Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries
ISBN 978-1-349-33496-4 ISBN 978-1-137-26527-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-137-26527-2
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully
managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing
processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the
country of origin.
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12
Contents
List of Illustrations vii
List of Abbreviations ix
Acknowledgements xi
Series Editor’s Preface xiii
Notes on Contributors xvi
1 Wind Power: Towards a Sustainable Energy Future? 1

Charles Warren, Richard Cowell, Geraint Ellis,
Peter A. Strachan and Joseph Szarka
Part I Governance and Policy Learning

2 Wind power: Opportunities, Limits and Challenges 17
David Elliott
3 Wind Power Policy in Germany and the UK:

Different Choices Leading to Divergent Outcomes 38
Volkmar Lauber
4 Wind Power and Spatial Planning in the UK 61

Simon Power and Richard Cowell
5 From Laggard to World Leader: The United Kingdom’s

Adoption of Marine Wind Energy 85
Stephen Jay
6 Planning with the Missing Masses: Innovative Wind

Power Planning in France 108
Alain Nadaï
Part II Societal Engagement with Wind Power

7 The Misdirected Opposition to Wind Power 133
Martin J. Pasqualetti
v
vi Contents
8 The Social Experience of Noise from Wind Farms 153

Claire Haggett
9 Navigating a Minefield? Wind Power and

Local Community Benefit Funds 174
Peter A. Strachan and David R. Jones
10 Fostering Public Engagement in Wind Energy

Development: The Role of Intermediaries and
Community Benefits 194
Patrick Devine-Wright
11 Social Acceptance of Wind Power Projects:

Learning from Trans-National Experience 215
Stefanie Huber, Robert Hobarty and Geraint Ellis
12 Drawing Lessons from Wind Power for

Future Sustainable Energy 235
Joseph Szarka, Geraint Ellis, Richard Cowell,
Peter A. Strachan and Charles Warren
Index 255
Illustrations
Tables
4.1. Methodology for the strategic assessment of

opportunities for major wind power capacity in Wales 68
6.1 Number of local planning documents (all categories)
issued by the regions, departments or other territorial
entities per year (publication dates) 112
7.1 A sample of anti-wind organisations 135
7.2 Four types of concern about wind power
(generation phase) 137
Figures
3.1 Annual installations of wind power in

Germany and the UK, 2000–2010 42
3.2 Cumulative installations of wind power in
Germany and the UK, 1997–2010 43
5.1 Offshore wind activity in United Kingdom waters 89
6.1 From behavioural to spatial representation:
birds in ‘micro-siting’ 114
6.2 Open forms of planning: excerpts from the
Narbonnaise planning process 121
7.1 Protest against wind development in France 134
7.2 Protest banner for the proposed development
on Red Oak Knob, Virginia 139
7.3 A ‘wind wall’ at Tehachapi Pass, California,
showing landscapes remoulded by wind developers 142
7.4 Objections to wind energy can largely be reduced
to considerations of quality of life, rather than
individual complaints 146
7.5 Welcoming sign by owners on what they call
‘Harmony Ridge’ 148
7.6 Billboard along Interstate-10, near Palm Springs,
California, suggesting that the community and the
wind developers, once at odds, are now in accord 149
vii
viii List of Illustrations
10.1 Contexts of the two offshore wind energy cases:

Lincs and Gwynt y Mor 201
11.1 The elements of social acceptance of
wind energy projects 217
Abbreviations
ADEME Agence de l’Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l’Energie

(French Environment and Energy Efficiency Agency)
AEP Association of Electricity Producers
ANT Actor Network Theory
BERR (UK Department of) Business, Enterprise and Regulatory
Reform
BWEA British Wind Energy Association
CCS Carbon Capture and Storage
CEC Commission of the European Communities
DDE Direction Départementale de l’Équipement (French ‘roads
and infrastructures’ administration)
DECC Department of Energy and Climate Change (UK)
Defra Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (UK)
DIREN Direction régionale de l’environnement (French Regional
Environmental Administration)
DoEHLG Department of Environment, Heritage and Local
Government (Republic of Ireland)
DTI Department of Trade and Industry (UK)
EEA European Environment Agency
EEG Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (German Renewable Energy
Sources Act of 2000)
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
ETSU Energy Technology Support Unit
EWEA European Wind Energy Association
FiT Feed-in Tariff
FOE Friends of the Earth
FTE full time equivalent
GHG greenhouse gas
GW gigawatt (1000 megawatts)
HMG Her Majesty’s Government
HVDC High Voltage Direct Current
IEA International Energy Agency
IEEP Institute of European Environmental Policy
LPO Ligue pour la Protection des Oiseaux (French Bird Protec-
tion Organisation)
MS Marine Scotland
ix
x List of Abbreviations
MW megawatt
MWh megawatt-hour
NFFO Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NIMBY not in my back yard
NWCC National Wind Coordinating Committee (USA)
ODPM Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (UK)
OFGEM Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets (UK)
PIU Performance and Innovation Unit (UK)
PNR Parc Naturel Régional (French ‘Regional Nature Park’)
PNRGC Parc Naturel Régional des Grands Causses
PNRNM Parc Naturel Régional de la Narbonnaise en Méditerranée
PV photovoltaic
RD&D Research, Development and Demonstration
RE renewable energy
REA Renewable Energy Association
RES renewable energy sources
RES-E renewable energy sourced electricity generation
RET renewable energy technology
REZ Renewable Energy Zone
RO Renewables Obligation
ROC Renewable Obligation Certificate
RSPB Royal Society for the Protection of Birds
RTE Réseau de Transport d’Electricité (French National Grid
Operator)
SEA strategic environmental assessment
SEAI Sustainable Energy Agency Ireland
SEDD Scottish Executive Development Department
SNH Scottish Natural Heritage
SPEC Species of European Conservation Concern
SSA strategic search area
SSE Scottish and Southern Energy
STW Scottish Territorial Waters
TAN8 Technical Advice Note 8 (Wales)
TCE The Crown Estate
VDMA Verband Deutscher Maschinen- und Anlagenbau (The
German Association of Equipment Producers)
WAG Welsh Assembly Government
WPDZ wind power development zones
WWF World Wildlife Fund
Acknowledgements
This book had its origins in a United Kingdom based seminar series
in 2008–2009 entitled ‘Where Next for Wind? Explaining National
Variations in Wind Power Deployment’. The series was sponsored by the
UK Economic and Social Research Council – Grant Number RES-451-
26-0386 – and the energy company Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE),
to whom we wish to express our thanks.
The additional support provided by SSE allowed us to expand the
focus of the seminar series to include a number of international experts
who might not otherwise have been able to deliver papers and share
their wealth of experience. The seminar series consisted of five events,
each of which were led by the editors of this book, with the overarching
aim of the series being to critically investigate the key political, institu-
tional, social and economic factors affecting the deployment of wind
power within Europe and North America. The series brought together
more than 150 participants, with invited speakers and participants
representing industry, NGOs, government and academic organisations.
Full details of the seminar series can be found at http://www4.rgu.ac.uk
/abs/research/page.cfm?pge=75071.
Many of the chapters in this book build on papers presented in those
seminars, and we would like to thank all of the presenters and partici-
pants for their valuable insights. In this volume, the contributors have
reflected on their findings in the light of international experience, and
recent shifts in energy policy and politics, in order to draw out key
lessons for the wider agenda of transitions to sustainable energy.
We express our gratitude to everyone involved in the seminar series
and the book, but, as with any such major undertaking, it is not possible
to name everyone. We would like to thank our own host universities
for the additional time and financial support that they provided. In
particular we would like to thank: Professor Rita Marcella, Dean of the
Aberdeen Business School, Robert Gordon University; Professor Peter
Robertson, Vice Principal of Research and Commercialisation, Robert
Gordon University; and Dr Brian Lockhart Smith, Head of Projects, SSE.
We would also like to acknowledge that Geraint Ellis received funds for
a teaching buy-out from the Irish Social Science Platform during the
preparation of the book.
xi
xii Acknowledgements
The book would not have been possible without the hard work of our
contributors, and we acknowledge their significant efforts in bringing
the book to a timely conclusion. We particularly want to thank Professor
David Elliott, the editor of the Energy, Climate and the Environment series,
for commissioning this book and contributing to it, and to the Palgrave
editorial team for bringing it to the public.
Series Editor’s Preface
Energy, Climate and the Environment
Concerns about the potential environmental, social and economic

impacts of climate change have led to a major international debate over
what could and should be done to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases,
which are claimed to be the main cause. There is still a scientific debate
over the likely scale of climate change, and the complex interactions
between human activities and climate systems, but, in the words of no
less than the (then) Governor of California, Arnold Schwarzenegger, ‘I
say the debate is over. We know the science, we see the threat, and the time
for action is now.’
Whatever we now do, there will have to be a lot of social and
economic adaptation to climate change – preparing for increased
flooding and other climate related problems. However, the more funda-
mental response is to try to reduce or avoid those human activities that
are seen as causing climate change. That means, primarily, trying to
reduce or eliminate emission of greenhouse gases from the combustion
of fossil fuels in vehicles, houses and power stations. Given that around
80 per cent of the energy used in the world at present comes from these
sources, this will be a major technological, economic and political
undertaking. It will involve reducing demand for energy (via lifestyle
choice changes), producing and using whatever energy we still need
more efficiently (getting more from less), and supplying the reduced
amount of energy from non-fossil sources (basically switching over to
renewables and/or nuclear power).
Each of these options opens up a range of social, economic and envi-
ronmental issues. Industrial society and modern consumer cultures
have been based on the ever-expanding use of fossil fuels, so the changes
required will inevitably be challenging. Perhaps equally inevitable are
disagreements and conflicts over the merits and demerits of the various
options and in relation to strategies and policies for pursuing them.
These conflicts and associated debates sometimes concern technical
issues, but there are usually also underlying political and ideological
commitments and agendas which shape, or at least colour, the ostensibly
technical debates. In particular, at times, technical assertions can be
xiii
xiv Series Editor’s Preface
used to buttress specific policy frameworks in ways which subsequently

prove to be flawed
The aim of this series is to provide texts which lay out the technical,
environmental and political issues relating to the various proposed poli-
cies for responding to climate change. The focus is not primarily on the
science of climate change, or on the technological detail, although there
will be accounts of the state of the art, to aid assessment of the viability
of the various options. However, the main focus is the policy conflicts
over which strategy to pursue. The series adopts a critical approach
and attempts to identify flaws in emerging policies, propositions and
assertions. In particular, it seeks to illuminate counter-intuitive assess-
ments, conclusions and new perspectives. The aim is not simply to map
the debates, but to explore their structure, their underlying assump-
tions and their limitations. Texts are incisive and authoritative sources
of critical analysis and commentary, indicating clearly the divergent
views that have emerged and also identifying the shortcomings of these
views.
The development of wind power has certainly provided many
examples of divergent views and conflicts. For some it is the best way
forward for dealing with climate change, while for others it is an envi-
ronmental disaster. Some wind supporters see objectors as retrogres-
sive NIMBYs, while some objectors see developers as despoilers of scenic
views and natural heritage. Aesthetic issues and landscape preservation
are important, but perhaps, more substantially, some objectors claim
the wind power cannot make a significant contribution to dealing with
climate change or energy security.
With wind power heading soon for 200GW globally, it is good time
to take stock and see how (and whether) some of these issues have
impacted on its development and how wind power might be expected
to develop in future. The technology seems basically unproblematic,
apart from the issue of intermittency, which is really just an operational
and economic problem – it costs money to provide balancing services,
and as the proportion of wind on the grid expands, more balancing has
to be arranged. Less tractable are some of the institutional issues. As this
book illustrates, in the UK, the planning permission processes and local
objections have led to major delays, and the financial support system
has arguably not been effective at creating the right investment climate,
compared to that in other countries.
Nevertheless wind power is moving ahead in the UK, offshore espe-
cially, and as I indicate in my own contribution, it is likely to remain
the dominant renewable source for some while in the UK and elsewhere.
Series Editor’s Preface xv
Focussing on the developed world, with particular emphasis on Europe

and the UK, the book looks at some of the problems that will have to be
overcome if ambitious targets for wind power are to be met. Although
the focus is mainly on wind, it argues that many of the lessons that
emerge from the wind power field are also likely to be relevant to other
renewables as they seek to move into wide scale use.
Contributors
Richard Cowell is Reader in Environmental Planning at Cardiff

University, and his research interests lie in the relationship between
land use planning and sustainable development. He has researched
the role of strategic spatial planning in delivering renewable energy in
Wales, community benefits from wind energy and the impacts of devo-
lution within the British state on renewable energy outcomes. His email
address is cowellrj@cardiff.ac.uk.
Patrick Devine-Wright holds a Chair in Human Geography at the

University of Exeter, and is an experienced leader of and contributor to
multi-disciplinary research projects. His research spans several discip-
lines including human geography, environmental planning and envi-
ronmental psychology. His research interests include the symbolic
and affective dimensions of places, particularly the concept of place
attachment, and the relevance of place attachment for environmental
issues such as climate change and the social acceptance of new energy
infrastructure such as wind farms and overhead power lines, including
issues of ‘NIMBYism’ and public engagement.
David Elliott is Emeritus Professor in Technology Policy at the Open

University, where he has carried out research and developed courses on
renewable energy policy. He has worked previously for the UK Atomic
Energy Authority and the Central Electricity Generating Board. He is
the editor of the journal Renew and writes a weekly ‘Renew Your Energy’
blog for the Institute of Physics’ Environmental Research Web.
Geraint Ellis is Senior Lecturer in the School of Planning, Architecture
and Civil Engineering at Queen’s University, Belfast. His key interests
are in environmental planning, particularly in energy and marine
issues, health and the built environment and planning pedagogy and
professionalism. His e-mail address is g.ellis@qub.ac.uk.
Claire Haggett is Lecturer in the Sociology of Sustainability at the

University of Edinburgh. She specialises in a range of energy issues,
including understanding opposition to renewable energy, and the
wider implications of its implementation on people, communities,
and landscapes. Claire has published widely on these topics, is an
xvi
Notes on Contributors xvii
invited panellist and speaker at wide range of UK and international

conferences for both academics and practitioners, and has conducted
research funded by the ESRC, NERC, the UK Energy Research Centre
and the European Union. She leads the University of Edinburgh’s MA
in Sustainable Development.
Robert Horbaty is an energy and sustainable development expert, with

over 25 years of experience. He previously worked as project manager
with the Ökozentrum Langenbruck and was an elected representative
in the Langenbruck community for six years. Since 1993 he has run
his own company, ENCO Energie-Consulting AG, which has had a
Nicaraguan subsidiary since 2004. ENCO acts as consultancy office for
energy planning, energy management and sustainable energy supply
with a focus on communal policies and wind energy. The company has
managed the Swiss energy programme, holds the management of the
Swiss national label organisation Energiestadt and runs the Swiss wind
energy association Suisse Eole. He has been the long-standing head of the
board of a Swiss wind power company which, among other successes,
has delivered Switzerland’s first citizens’ wind farm. He has participated
in several tasks of the IEA Implementing Agreement for Co-operation
in the research, development and deployment of wind energy systems
and since 2008 has acted as the operating agent for Task 28 on Social
Acceptance.
Stefanie Huber holds a Master’s in Environmental Sciences and a

certificate in teaching on environmental issues. Through traineeships
in international industrial companies, she has gathered experience
in environmental policies and their implementation. She worked as a
junior energy consultant for the Swiss and European electricity market
in 2008 where she concentrated on development of renewable ener-
gies and climate policies. She joined ENCO in 2009 to work for the IEA
Wind Task 28 on Social Acceptance where she is currently managing the
publication of the state-of-the-art report, good practice recommenda-
tions and other outputs. She has also run projects on communal energy
management systems (the European Energy Award), smart grid activities
and renewable energies. She gained additional experience on communal
views of renewable energy projects as local parliamentarian.
Stephen Jay is Lecturer in the School of Environmental Sciences at the

University of Liverpool in the UK. His field of interest is environmental
planning and management, with a particular focus on the marine envi-
ronment. He has followed the development of offshore wind energy
xviii Notes on Contributors
and also the progress of marine spatial planning throughout Europe

and published widely on these topics. He is an associate member of the
Royal Town Planning Institute.
David Jones is Lecturer in Business Strategy and the Environment,

Aberdeen Business School, Robert Gordon University, UK. His current
research is focussing on the organisational metaphors drawn from
evolutionary and environmental psychology, in the context of the tran-
sitional and trans-disciplinary challenge of ecological sustainability.
Volkmar Lauber is Professor in Comparative Politics at the University

of Salzburg, Austria. His current research is on the politics of energy
policy, especially renewable energy policy, with a focus on support
schemes and other regulation in Germany and at the European Union
level. It is based primarily on institutionalist and discursive approaches.
For further information, see http://www.uni-salzburg.at/politikwissen-
schaft/lauber. His email address is Volkmar.Lauber@sbg.ac.at.
Alain Nadaï is a socio-economist and a research director at CIRED,

the International Research Centre on Environment and Development,
which is part of the CNRS in France. His research activity has centred
on environmental controversies as well as on environmental, energy
and landscape policies. His research fields include climate policy, EU
pesticide regulation, EU product eco-labelling policies, landscape poli-
cies and, more recently, renewable energy policies and carbon capture
and storage. He coordinated an international research program on the
development of national and local wind power policies (2005–2010).
He is leading author for the IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy
Sources and Climate Change Mitigation (SRREN).
Martin J. Pasqualetti is Professor of Geography in the School of

Geographical Sciences and Urban Planning at Arizona State University
in the USA, and Associate Member of the National Wind Coordinating
Collaborative in Washington DC. He has published books and articles
on wind power, landscape evolution, public perception of risk and the
social costs of energy. His current research interests focus on the social
barriers to renewable energy, the energy-water nexus and energy secu-
rity. His email address is Pasqualetti@asu.edu.
Simon Power is Associate Director at the consultancy Arup, where he

leads on renewable energy. His commercial interests lie in the planning
and development of renewable energy – from feasibility to consent and
construction. He has undertaken a range of consultancy and spatial
Notes on Contributors xix
planning research relating to delivering renewable energy across the

UK over the past ten years, for both the private and public sector.
Commissions undertaken have been at scales ranging from the local to
the national. His email address is simon-j.power@arup.com.
Peter A. Strachan is Professor in Energy Policy and Management,

Aberdeen Business School, Robert Gordon University, UK. His research
interests cover the theoretical and business aspects of the relationship
between public policy and sustainable development, with particular
reference to energy and the environment. Since 2005 his work has
focused on international wind power deployment, community owner-
ship models and social acceptance of major energy developments. He
has published widely in international journals and his books include
Wind Power and Power Politics (2010). For further information, see http:
//www4.rgu.ac.uk/abs/staff/page.cfm?pge=5379. His email address is
p.a.strachan@rgu.ac.uk.
Joseph Szarka is Reader in Policy Studies in the Department of Politics,

Languages and International Studies, University of Bath, UK. His
research interests are in environmental, climate and energy policy. He
has published widely in international journals and his books include
The Shaping of Environmental Policy in France (2002) and Wind Power
in Europe: Politics, Business and Society (2007). His email address is
J.P.Szarka@bath.ac.uk.
Charles Warren is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Geography

and Sustainable Development at the University of St Andrews, UK. His
recent research within the field of environmental management and
policy has included projects on the validity of the concept of ‘native’ and
‘alien’ species, the impacts of post-devolution land reform in Scotland
and public attitudes to onshore wind farms. The second edition of his
book Managing Scotland’s Environment was published in 2009. His email
address is crw2@st-andrews.ac.uk.
1
Wind Power: Towards a
Sustainable Energy Future?
Charles Warren, Richard Cowell, Geraint Ellis,
Peter A. Strachan and Joseph Szarka
Context and rationale: energy challenges,

wind power and policy learning
Energy has always been important for human societies, but across the
world energy issues are now being given unprecedented priority by
governments, communities and citizens. According to Zimmerer (2011:
705), energy is ‘far and away the most significant international resource
system and political economic nexus’, not least because energy ques-
tions cross-cut so many other policy concerns. In his view, such issues
are fuelling ‘a general social-ecological crisis of now major proportions’.
Strong though this statement is, it is not an extreme or isolated assess-
ment. The European Commission (2010: 1) describes ‘the energy chal-
lenge’ as ‘one of the greatest tests which Europe has to face’. Numerous
factors have propelled energy to this position of high priority, but argu-
ably there are three which stand out. The first is the rising prices of
fossil fuels linked with concerns about ‘peak oil’ which together have
focused the attention of national governments on energy security. The
second factor is the international imperative of mitigating anthropo-
genic climate change. These first two considerations increase the impor-
tance and urgency of the third factor which is the need to modernise
systems of energy provision in the face of almost universally rising
energy demand. Additional and more positive reasons why energy is in
the spotlight include the desire to capitalise on the economic benefits
of harnessing renewable energy (Wood and Dow, 2011) and the poten-
tial (little realised thus far) for renewable technologies to contribute to
sustainable economic development in rural areas (Munday et al. 2011).
In many countries during the last two decades, such considerations
have driven the creation of policy frameworks designed to initiate a
1
2 Learning from Wind Power
transition towards a more sustainable energy system. These have been

accompanied by the development of statutory targets both for the adop-
tion of renewable energy technology (RET) and for the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions. Such targets have become ever more ambi-
tious. For example, the European Commission aims to increase the
share of renewables in total energy use to 20 per cent by 2020 (European
Commission, 2010), while the Scottish Government (2011) has adopted
the challenging target of generating the equivalent of 100 per cent
of electricity demand and 11 per cent of heat from renewable sources
by 2020. Recent world events have only served to exacerbate energy
concerns and to emphasise the urgent importance of effective energy
planning. For example, headline-making shocks during 2011 included
the major nuclear accident at Fukushima in Japan, the uncertainties for
oil and gas supplies caused by the Arab Spring, and the turmoil in world
financial markets.
Thus a century during which cheap, abundant energy supplies lulled
the global village into a sense of security has come to an abrupt end as
governments have woken up to the pressing need to transform energy
systems. The limitations of what Amory Lovins (1977) termed the
‘hard path’ of technology choice have begun to be acknowledged, and
a consensus has been growing that there is a need to adopt at least
some elements of his ‘soft path’ alternative, notably greater energy
efficiency and the harnessing of renewable energy sources. Thus, for
example, Elliott (2010) argues that if we are to respond effectively to
concerns about climate change and energy security, a major expan-
sion in renewable energy is required utilising as many sources as can
be effectively mustered. However, it is uncomfortably clear that the
political decision to adopt ambitious renewable energy targets for the
near future has profound social, economic and environmental ramifi-
cations. As the preface to this book emphasises, it is a dauntingly tall
order. Negotiating the transition from the familiar, twentieth century
status quo – a fossil-fuel-based, mostly centralised system – to one that is
more diverse, renewables-based and, inevitably, more decentralised is a
process fraught with difficulty.
The challenges permeate many interlocking spheres: technical,
economic, social, political, institutional and environmental. To make
matters more complex, these interacting challenges operate at scales
ranging from local to global. Furthermore, they raise fundamental
questions about governance, liberal democracy and decision-making in
capitalist societies (Shearman and Smith, 2007). For example, Mitchell
(2008) contends that politicians’ faith in market-orientated poli-
cies is misplaced, and that the current political-economic paradigm
Wind Power: Towards a Sustainable Energy Future? 3
is inherently unable to deliver the swift and radical changes that are
required to deliver sustainable energy systems. Starting with the oil
shocks in the 1970s, and then increasingly from the 1990s, such chal-
lenges and questions have become a major focus of research and debate
not only amongst policy-makers and academics but latterly becoming
matters of broad public concern. If the ambitious targets for renewable
energy are to be met, it is clearly important to identify from this body
of knowledge the key issues for policy learning in order to facilitate the
deployment of the next generation of RETs. This is the rationale for and
the objective of this book.
The rapidly rising profile of energy issues has led to a plethora of
publications about all aspects of energy and renewable energy, including
many with an emphasis on wind energy (see, for example, Szarka (2007),
Scrase and Mackerron (2009), Devine-Wright (2010), Elliott (2010) and
Strachan et al. (2010)). What, then, is the particular contribution of the
present volume? Its distinctiveness lies in its aim of using the interna-
tional experience of the development of wind energy as a ‘laboratory’ or
a pilot process from which wider lessons can be learned for the further
development of renewable energy and for the wider low carbon transi-
tion. This, in turn, begs the question of why wind energy is appropriate
for this purpose. It could, after all, be argued that hydropower, a much
more established form of renewable energy, would be better suited to the
task. However, while lessons can certainly be drawn from the history
of hydropower development (Pillai et al., 2005; Warren et al., 2005), in
most industrialised nations hydropower was developed many decades
ago in very different socio-political contexts and prior to the emergence
of today’s concerns about climate change and ‘peak oil’. By contrast,
the development of wind power has been the most direct, visible and
widespread consequence of those concerns. Much of the debate and
research has, in practice, revolved around wind energy, and so more
is known about the challenges of its deployment – in contemporary
economic, political and social contexts – than about any other RET. Its
dominance stemmed from the fact that, although many other so-called
new renewables were under development when the policy push for
renewables began in earnest, wind power was already at a sufficiently
advanced stage to be the primary technology of choice.
The recent growth of renewable energy has, to a considerable degree,
been the story of the expansion of wind power, because it offered the
most ‘market ready’ technology. Its growth has been dramatic, with
deployment rates accelerating exponentially worldwide. Global installed
capacity in 2000 totalled just 17 GW; by 2010 the total was approaching
200 GW and was predicted to reach 332 GW in 2013 (GWEC, 2010).
China alone may have installed as much as 150 GW of wind power

capacity by 2020 (REN21, 2010). This remarkable growth has not been
evenly spread, but across the developed world wind power has now
outgrown its provincial and agricultural origins to become a global,
high-tech industry on a scale and at a rate which has far exceeded
expectations (Szarka, 2007). Consequently, a great deal of experience
has been gained in the deployment of this particular technology in
a contemporary context. It therefore represents an arena which offers
unparalleled and pertinent insights into the economics, governance
and social acceptability of renewable energy.
Because wind power has been in the vanguard of the current energy
transition, its deployment has inevitably been experimental, with both
notable successes and signal failures. Equally inevitably, as seen when-
ever society is forced to confront major change, it has also generated
intense public controversy. Communities have not always found the
process of ‘learning to love the landscapes of carbon neutrality’ (Selman,
2010: 157) either easy or welcome, not least because of the aesthetic
impacts of wind farms and the conflicting values that planning battles
reveal (Oles and Hammarlund, 2011). The many issues thrown up by
this experimental journey have generated a large body of research
since the early 1990s, focused mostly on onshore wind but latterly also
following wind farms offshore. Consequently, the causes of success or
failure are now becoming increasingly well understood.
Looking ahead, most scenarios of the future energy mix, both at
national and international scales, envisage wind power playing a key
role for many decades to come (see Chapter 2). For all these reasons,
wind energy presents itself as a highly relevant pioneer test case of the
energy transition to come. Furthermore, this is an opportune time to
draw out such lessons because other RETs such as those derived from
marine, biomass, geothermal and solar sources are all at or approaching
the stage of large-scale deployment. In many ways, wind power has
acted as a trailblazer for these other renewables, and it is important to
avoid the pitfall of ‘reinventing the wheel’ in their implementation.
Clearly, some of the challenges of expanding wind energy are specific to
this technology and energy source. However, many aspects of the ‘wind
story’ offer scope for policy learning, such as the difficulties surrounding
the siting and social acceptance of novel technologies, and the need for
wider public and community engagement. Siting issues may thus far
have been more acute for wind than for other RETs because the large
size of turbines and the need for exposed sites gives them visual prom-
inence. But as other technologies increase in scale – and concomitantly
in capacity to disrupt existing modes of energy provision, environments

and ways of life – then the issue of how to reconcile conflicting priori-
ties is likely to become pervasively relevant. Additionally, the experience
gained in the development of wind power can throw revealing light
on the institutional, economic and political challenges of facilitating
more decentralised energy systems. This book aims to seize this oppor-
tunity for policy learning by presenting a state-of-the-art synthesis of
our current understanding of wind power development and applying
this knowledge to broader questions surrounding the achievement of
sustainable energy futures. It situates wind power within wider policy
contexts and draws out a range of lessons for other energy technologies.
It also develops comparative perspectives related to continental Europe
and beyond. These comparisons between contrasting national develop-
ment trajectories are, in part, motivated by the desire to learn from the
paradox that the greatest growth in wind power has not taken place in
those nations which have the greatest wind resource.
Governance issues are widely acknowledged to be crucial consider-
ations within the energy transition and are a central strand of this book.
As explained by Smith (2007: 6268), ‘transforming existing energy
systems into ones with greater renewable energy content require(s)
co-ordinated efforts and changes among many different actors, insti-
tutions and artefacts’. The attendant problems of transition are not
readily resolved solely by either government direction or deference to
markets, but by governance arrangements that combine these insti-
tutions in a diversity of ways. The book focuses on those dimensions
of governance that have proved most salient for wind power’s ‘labo-
ratory of learning’ – principally energy and climate policy, financial
mechanisms to support RETs, industry structures and spatial planning
systems – and emphasises the way in which these dimensions, and their
developmental consequences, intersect with civil society.
The societal engagement processes can be charted along a scale
of public responses ranging from, at one pole, laissez-faire, to token
support and sometimes heartfelt involvement, and, at the other pole,
going from scepticism to hostility and indeed aggressive rejection. This
conceptualisation of societal engagement processes is presented as a
meta-category which embraces questions of both social acceptability
and social acceptance. Issues of social acceptability relate to the norms,
principles and values which guide the cognitive processes of discovery
and evaluation. Norms are typically transversal, diverse and capable of
transformation, though not necessarily over the short-term. They define
the criteria by which particular proposals are judged, providing frames
of conditionality. They also allow us to understand why proposals and

initiatives are viewed favourably or unfavourably, and why actors engage
positively, fail to engage or oppose. Further, such explanatory analysis
can identify those changes in the frames of conditionality which may
act as the precursor to changes of mind and of behaviour.
On the other hand, issues of social acceptance (and rejection) relate
to the narrower realm of behavioural outcomes, namely actual deci-
sions taken in particular venues by identified actors (such as a plan-
ning application for a wind farm). Often, public debate on wind power
focuses on such questions. This is understandable and necessary, espe-
cially where change is experienced as imposed from the outside and
for the benefit of third parties. But analysis of pathways to renewable
energy transitions requires a broader remit than this. Because sources
of renewable energy are not spatially concentrated but widely distrib-
uted, their utilisation requires a large number of (comparatively) small
installations. In turn, this calls for a large range of market entrants and
many levels of societal engagement. This involves more than a climate
of public goodwill towards renewables: it requires active support and
hands-on involvement by a substantial cross-section of the population.
The wind power ‘laboratory’ has not only shone a revealing light on our
limited understanding of the complex processes of societal engagement,
but provided clear instances of what not to do and of ‘worst practice’
behaviour which engender community antagonism. At the very least,
we could learn to reduce the latter.
Structure and content
The book adopts a two-part structure, reflecting its twin emphasis on

governance and societal engagement. Part I focuses on issues of gover-
nance and policy learning. Systems of financial support and project
decision-making are acknowledged to be critical in shaping the
economics of renewable energy, and the experience of wind energy is
highly revealing in this regard. Using evidence from the UK, France and
Germany, Part I evaluates the efficacy of financing, support and plan-
ning mechanisms for wind and draws links with wider tensions around
democracy, subsidiarity, efficiency and contested knowledge. Part II
considers various dimensions of societal engagement with wind power
deployment. It addresses the factors which influence public engage-
ment with renewable energy, drawing on recent research from the USA,
the UK and a broad, international comparative study. It also places the
narrow objectives of energy policy (e.g. security of supply, emissions
reduction) within a wider context of community development and

social sustainability. The importance of social acceptability is one of the
crucial lessons which is emphasised by the global ‘wind story’, and it is
one which policy-makers have been slow to take on board. However,
there are indications that this message is now being heard, at least
in some corridors of power. For example, the European Commission
(2011: 10) has noted that ‘a further element of reform in some Member
States has been to develop private financing mechanisms that both
attract capital and increase local acceptance of renewable energy projects
(thus helping to overcome other barriers such as planning permis-
sion)’ (emphasis in original), while the Scottish Government (2011: 8)
acknowledges in its 2020 Routemap for Renewable Energy in Scotland that
‘renewable energy targets cannot be met in the face of public opposi-
tion but only with the support and will of the Scottish public, gained
through early and meaningful engagement’. As ever, though, the acid
test is whether the public rhetoric yields practical outcomes. Section II
focuses on these practicalities – on the ‘frontline reality’ where national
policies have kitchen-window effects.
The book is organised around three central research questions:
● What key factors have facilitated or impeded the deployment of wind

power, and how have these varied both spatially and temporally?
● How far, and by what means, have difficulties in expanding wind
power been resolved or ameliorated?
● Which lessons from wind power are potentially applicable to the
development of other RETs, particularly in relation to technology
selection, support instruments, planning and infrastructural frame-
works, societal engagement and industrial development?
The arguments are sharpened by three themes which are explored

throughout the book. Firstly, the analyses go beyond a narrow tech-
nological remit and draw on social science insights into the ways in
which the deployment of wind energy has been hampered by unantici-
pated institutional voids and social resistance. Bringing governance and
society into the frame expands our understanding of wind power devel-
opment and provides pointers for the successful future deployment of
other RETs. Two decades ago, Twidell and Brice (1992: 477) noted that
‘limits to renewable resources are not the potential in the environment,
but the institutional factors and collective personal response of the
public’, an observation which has been amply borne out by subsequent
experience. Where the sustainability challenge was once thought to
consist of ‘hard facts’ to which a soft and malleable society needed to

adjust, it would now appear that the inverse situation of ‘soft facts’ and
‘hard society’ is perhaps closer to the truth, as facts are contested and
social norms and practices prove resistant to change. The story of the
development of wind power policy seems a perfect exemplification of
this journey and is one which this volume takes to heart.
Secondly, extensive use is made of critical comparative analysis in
order to understand the constellation of institutional arrangements,
technological forms and societal conditions that have shaped patterns
of wind power development in different countries. The explanations
which emerge concerning the successes and failures in different contexts
have broad relevance for the energy transition. As well as drawing out
lessons from cross-national comparisons, the opportunity is also taken
to learn from different corporate practices, and from the contrasting
experience of onshore and offshore wind development.
Thirdly, the development of wind power has raised questions about
the scope for deploying RETs in ways that offer ‘win-win’ solutions
for environment, society and economy and the governance arrange-
ments that may facilitate such outcomes. In particular, it has revealed
the sharply distributive consequences that must be negotiated in any
energy transition, not just the familiar tensions between global benefits
and local impacts but also between the various actors who not only
have contrasting views on alternative sustainable energy pathways but
different interests in how to pursue them.
Part I: governance and policy learning

David Elliott provides in Chapter 2 an authoritative discussion of the
opportunities, limits and challenges for wind power. His chapter explores
the prospects for wind and for other renewables, and discusses the inter-
actions between them. After an overview of the renewable options, it
examines how wind power has fared in the UK under the Renewables
Obligation, comparing this with progress elsewhere in Europe under
feed-in tariffs, followed by a discussion of planning conflicts and
grid connection issues. The focus then shifts to the future, discussing
scenarios of the future energy mix, and asking whether other renewa-
bles will (and should) challenge wind power’s current dominance.
Chapter 3, by Volkmar Lauber, uses analyses of wind power policy in
Germany and the UK to explain how the latter – regularly identified as
having the best wind energy resources in Europe – has delivered so much
less wind power than the former. His chapter reviews how key actors in
each country have sought to shape the forms of financial support for
renewable energy, as well as supportive institutions in the spheres of

planning, yielding robust support for the merits of German-style feed-in
tariffs over UK-style tradable certificates. Moreover, the persistence of
particular conceptions of market competitiveness in UK policy-making
has been found culpable in restricting expansion, structural diversity
and social support for the wind energy sector. The conclusions identify
a vital ingredient for progress as locating the governance of a sustain-
able energy transition in institutions not captured by major, incumbent
energy interests and which cultivate new actors – market and societal –
that can defend and advance the case of sustainable energy in the face
of powerful resistance.
In Chapter 4, Simon Power and Richard Cowell discuss the influential
role of spatial planning in the deployment of wind power, giving partic-
ular attention to the story of onshore wind farms in the UK but then
broadening to discuss the experiences of planning for renewables in a
range of European nations. After outlining the rationale and purpose
of spatial planning, there is a discussion of the distinctive approaches
adopted in the constituent parts of the UK during the decade following
the devolution settlements of the late 1990s, evaluating the strengths
and weaknesses of the contrasting frameworks. The chapter concludes
by considering the potential role of spatial planning in facilitating the
deployment of other RETs and the transition to sustainable energy
systems more generally. Spatial planning emerges as a tool with certain
strengths but not as any kind of ‘magic bullet’. On the contrary, its
utilisation highlights fundamental dilemmas between democracy and
delivery in the governing of sustainability transitions.
The focus in Chapter 5 moves offshore as Stephen Jay considers how
the UK, after a slow start in the deployment of offshore wind power,
has leapfrogged to a globally leading position. In taking a chronological
perspective on institutional and policy development, Jay shows how
the UK has successfully begun to align the conditions under which
its substantial marine wind resource can be effectively utilised. While
acknowledging the specific circumstances and the limits of the transfer-
ability of this experience to other RETs, Jay suggests that despite major
costs and significant risks, the marine environment is relatively free of
many of the constraints faced by onshore wind in the UK. The chapter
suggests a number of helpful principles concerning policy clarity,
public-private partnership and market arrangements which could be
usefully transposed to the development of other RETs.
As discussed in Chapter 4, planning is often portrayed as a barrier to
the deployment of wind power, especially in the UK. However, Alain
Nadaï revisits these planning issues in Chapter 6 from a rather different

perspective. He presents two intriguing case studies from southern
France in which innovative planning processes have been a help rather
than a (perceived) hindrance, and, in the process, points to some lessons
from the French experience of wind farm development. Adopting an
‘Actor Network Theory’ approach, the chapter inverts the ‘planning
problem’ perspective by examining the way in which wind power plan-
ning processes have helped to renew social engagement and landscape
design in the two case study regions, and how this, in turn, has helped
to facilitate wind power deployment. It tells an interesting tale of how,
under the pressure of the issues raised by wind power deployment,
planning processes have successfully evolved from a rather adminis-
trative and normative mode of operation to embrace more open and
creative approaches.
Part II: societal engagement with wind power

Having examined the wind energy sector through the lenses of
planning, policy and governance, Part II looks at the deployment of
wind power from the perspective of the communities, companies and
individuals who are on ‘the delivery end’ of the process. Policy-makers
did not initially expect issues of social acceptability to be significant,
not only because all opinion polls indicated strong majority support for
renewable energy generally and wind power specifically, but because
wind power is environmentally benign compared to the impacts of
most other forms of power generation. While opinion polls continue to
tell the same story today, in practice many wind farm proposals have
been vociferously opposed by organised campaign groups. Hence Part
II analyses several key aspects of social acceptability.
Chapter 7 by Martin J. Pasqualetti provides a contribution written
from a North American perspective. Building on a recent analysis of
the common drivers of opposition to wind power (Pasqualetti, 2011),
he provides a critical analysis of what he brands the ‘misdirected oppo-
sition’ to wind farm proposals. Drawing both on the academic litera-
ture concerning ‘social barriers’ to wind power and on the websites of
68 anti-wind organisations from the USA, Europe and Australia, the
chapter presents a four-category typology of the principal complaints
about and critiques of wind power, together with explanations and
examples of the most frequently rehearsed arguments. It highlights
the fourth category – social and cultural concerns – as being especially
difficult to predict, avoid or resolve and illustrates these difficulties (and
their diversity) via four short case studies from three countries – the
USA, Mexico and Scotland. Despite the contrasting environmental and
cultural contexts, a common driver of opposition in all four cases is a

perception that wind farms threaten local people’s quality of life. The
conclusion advocates a series of measures which may help to reduce
public opposition to wind farms.
In media coverage of wind farm disputes, complaints about (potential)
noise from wind turbines are often given a high profile, with opponents
highlighting the risk of disturbance and supporters often being dismis-
sive of such fears. In Chapter 8, Claire Haggett presents a fresh and
revealing discussion of this contested issue, exploring the social expe-
rience of noise from wind farms. It is commonly assumed that noise
can be ‘measured’ with precision and that disturbance can be mitigated
accordingly. However, the chapter shows that noise is something that is
‘experienced’ rather than just ‘heard’. The quality, frequency and tone
of the noise, interference with daily activities and perceptions of wind
energy generally emerge as crucial factors influencing how turbine noise
is experienced and perceived. A critique of existing UK industry stand-
ards on noise levels indicates that they are simplistic and obsolete. The
chapter highlights the social complexity of this seemingly manageable
issue, and demonstrates that some impacts which are widely assumed to
be quantifiable, manageable and the preserve of physical scientists have
an inescapably social dimension.
Even the most enthusiastic of wind power advocates accept that wind
farms have socio-environmental impacts, and, in recognition of this,
many developers offer payments of various kinds to local communities.
However, there are no widely accepted ‘best practice guidelines’ to steer
this practice. This is the ‘minefield’ discussed in Chapter 9 by Peter
A. Strachan and David Jones. Their critique reveals that community
benefit funds are only playing a very small part in helping developers
to secure planning consents, and that they may actually represent an
additional source of tension or frustration in the siting process. They
recommend that national policy and local planning guidance should
be revised to incorporate a more robust and systematic consideration of
community benefit funds and high mandatory levels of payment. The
chapter concludes that by enabling local communities to have a stake in
renewable energy projects, or at least by debating how benefit streams
might best be invested in local projects, society can contribute to and
be involved in sustainability transitions more generally.
Chapter 10 by Patrick Devine-Wright develops this theme of engage-
ment between developers and the public by looking at ways in which
such engagement can be fostered via community benefits and the
use of intermediaries. It is well known that the way in which devel-
opers engage with local residents is a crucial element in shaping public
acceptance of large-scale renewable energy projects, as the author

has recently discussed elsewhere (Devine-Wright, 2011). This chapter
compares two offshore wind energy projects (one in English waters, one
in Welsh) that met with contrasting public reactions. At the English
site, where a locally-based organisation mediated between private devel-
opers and local actors at an early stage of the project, opposition was
limited, whereas the Welsh proposal, where a ‘public relations’ interme-
diary was only brought in at a late stage, was strongly opposed. Obvious
as the lesson from this appears to be, the author points out that the
positive outcomes from early engagement are by no means guaranteed,
and he questions whether either of the roles for intermediaries address
substantive issues of sustainable development.
Chapter 11, which concludes Part II, sets out to learn lessons about
the social acceptance of wind energy projects by comparing the experi-
ences of developed nations around the world. Written by Stefanie Huber,
Robert Hobarty and Geraint Ellis, the chapter describes and discusses
the work carried out by an international, interdisciplinary working group
of the International Energy Agency. Utilising the conceptual framework
presented by Wüstenhagen et al. (2007) which identifies three key dimen-
sions of social acceptance (market acceptance, socio-political acceptance
and community acceptance), they discuss the various factors which have
rendered wind farms and their associated infrastructure socially unpal-
atable. The striking contrasts not only highlight the fact that the level
and nature of opposition is socially and culturally determined, but also
emphasise the discourse-driven nature of social acceptance of wind
energy projects. The chapter’s conclusions stress the need for reflective
practice and for an improved understanding of the complex, interacting
factors which shape social acceptance in different cultural and geographic
contexts, including key issues such as scale, ownership, rhetorical framing
and the perceived distribution of costs and benefits.
Chapter 12, written by the editorial team, endeavours to throw into
sharp relief some key lessons that can be learned from the experience of
wind power development in the UK, the EU and North America, many
of which are explored and exemplified in the preceding chapters. In
addition to this synthesis, it seeks to apply these lessons more broadly
to the unfolding energy transition and questions concerning energy
futures.
The broader backdrop to all the detailed analyses in this book is the
sobering fact that the choices that we make in the near future about
energy – about how and where we generate it, how efficiently we use
it, the governance frameworks that are adopted, and the processes
by which these choices themselves are made – will have far-reaching

consequences for human societies at all scales from local to global.
Our success or failure in getting these choices ‘right’ will have a signif-
icant bearing on the extent to which a transition from unsustainable to
sustainable development can be negotiated in an effective and timely
fashion. To a greater degree than was previously the case during the
era of largely centralised power generation – characterised by large,
spatially sequestrated facilities, often tucked away in industrialised
spaces – the outcomes of energy decisions are going to impinge ever
more visibly and tangibly on people’s everyday lives and environments.
Energy generation and use have always been important driving forces
in shaping cultural landscapes and their significance in doing so is set
to increase (Selman, 2010). Now, however, the scale at which energy
use shapes landscapes and environments has leapt from the local to
the global through its link with anthropogenic climate change; our
energy choices are intimately bound up with the future health of the
global environment. This broader context lends weight and urgency to
the task of learning lessons from our initial, experimental steps down
the challenging pathways of the energy transition. Although this book
emphasises the importance of policy learning, we recognise that time is
not on our side. As Mitchell (2008: 4) puts it, ‘the flora and fauna of the
globe, not to mention its peoples and future generations, do not have
the luxury of time to allow perfect policies to develop’. Governments
and individuals need to take action now, using the best knowledge avail-
able. Our intention as editors is that, by identifying key lessons from
the development of the wind power sector, this volume will contribute
to this body of knowledge.
References
Devine-Wright, P. (ed.) (2010) Renewable Energy and the Public: From NIMBY to
Participation, London: Earthscan.
Devine-Wright, P. (2011) ‘Public engagement with large-scale renewable energy:
breaking the NIMBY cycle’, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 2,
19–26.
European Commission (2010) ‘Energy 2020: a strategy for competitive, sustain-
able and secure energy’, European Commission Publications Office.
Elliott, D. (ed.) (2010) Sustainable Energy: Opportunities and Limitations,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
GWEC (Global Wind Energy Council) (2010) ‘Data from the Global Wind
Energy Council’, http://www.gwec.net, accessed on 14 December 2010.
Lovins, A. B. (1977) Soft Energy Paths: Towards a Durable Peace, Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Balinger Publishing Company.
Mitchell, C. (2008) The Political Economy of Sustainable Energy, Basingstoke:

Palgrave Macmillan.
Munday, M., Bristow, G. and Cowell, R. (2011) ‘Wind farms in rural areas: how
far do community benefits from wind farms represent a local economic devel-
opment opportunity?’, Journal of Rural Studies, 27: 1, 1–12.
Oles, T. and Hammarlund, K. (2011) ‘The European landscape convention, wind
power, and the limits of the local: notes from Italy and Sweden’, Landscape
Research, 36: 4, 471–485.
Pasqualetti, M. J. (2011) ‘Opposing wind energy landscapes: a search for common
cause’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 101: 4, 1–11.
Pillai, A., Reid, C. T. and Black, A. R. (2005) ‘Reconciling renewable energy and
the local impacts of hydro-electric development’, Environmental Law Review,
7, 110–123.
REN21 (Renewable Energy Network 21) (2010) ‘Renewables 2010 global status
report’, Renewable Energy Network 21, July, www.ren21.net and http://www.
renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2010/07/renewable-energy-
policy-update-for-china, accessed 15 July 2011.
Scottish Government (2011) 2020 Routemap for Renewable Energy in Scotland,
Edinburgh: Scottish Government.
Scrase, J., and Mackerron, G. (eds) (2009) Energy for the Future: A New Agenda,
Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Selman, P. (2010) ‘Learning to love the landscapes of carbon-neutrality’,
Landscape Research, 35: 2, 157–171.
Shearman, D. and Smith, J. W. (2007) The Climate Change Challenge and the
Failure of Democracy, Westport: Praeger.
Smith, A. (2007) ‘Emerging in between: the multi-level governance of renewable
energy in the English regions’, Energy Policy, 35: 12, 6266–6280.
Strachan, P. A., Toke, D. and Lal, D. (eds) (2010) Wind Power and Power Politics:
International Perspectives, London: Routledge.
Szarka, J. (2007) Wind Power in Europe: Politics, Business and Society, Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Twidell, J. and Brice, R. (1992) ‘Strategies for implementing renewable energy:
lessons from Europe’, Energy Policy, 20: 5, 464–479.
Warren, C. R., Lumsden, C., O’Dowd, S. and Birnie, R. V. (2005) ‘ “Green on
green”: public perceptions of wind power in Scotland and Ireland’, Journal of
Environmental Planning and Management, 48: 6, 851–873.
Wood, G. and Dow, S. (2011) ‘What lessons have been learned in reforming the
Renewables Obligation? An analysis of internal and external failures in UK
renewable energy policy’, Energy Policy, 39: 5, 2228–2244.
Wüstenhagen, R., Wolsink, M. and Bürer, M. J. (2007) ‘Social acceptance of
renewable energy innovation – an introduction to the concept’, Energy Policy,
35: 5, 2683–2691.
Zimmerer, K. S. (2011) ‘New geographies of energy: introduction to the special
issue’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 101: 4, 705–711.
Part I
Governance and Policy Learning
2
Wind Power: Opportunities,
Limits and Challenges
David Elliott
Introduction
Wind power is the leading renewable energy option, leaving aside

existing large hydro and traditional biomass with, so far, around 200
gigawatts (GW) installed globally, including over 75 GW in the European
Union, 42 GW in China and 40 GW in the USA and rising everywhere
(GWEC 2010). That is not surprising since it is the cheapest of the main
‘new’ (i.e. non hydro) electricity generating renewable technology, apart
from those using sewage gas and landfill gas, which only offer a limited
resource. However, wind power does have its problems – local opposition
and planning disputes in the UK in particular. And also the problem
of intermittency – the wind resource varies over time. In the UK it has
also arguably been constrained by the financial support system that
the government has chosen – the Renewables Obligation (RO). That has
led to higher prices for consumers and limited capacity being installed
compared to, for example, Germany, which uses Feed-in Tariffs (FiTs).
Some have argued that wind power has been over emphasised.
Certainly, in the UK, the extra costs imposed by the RO has made it
easier for opponents of wind power to claim that it was uneconomic
and also that companies were profiteering from subsidies. The reality is
that projects in Germany can use sites with wind speeds which would
not be seen as viable in the UK under the RO. And the extra cost of wind
under the RO means that less money has been available for other renew-
able energy projects, some of which might be seen as possibly of equal
merit, at least in the longer term.
This chapter explores the prospects for wind and other renewables
and looks at the interactions between them. After an overview of the
renewable options, it looks at how wind power has fared in the UK
17
18 Governance and Policy Learning
under the RO, comparing that to progress elsewhere under FiTs, and at
planning conflicts and grid connection issues. It then moves on to the
other renewables, asking will (and should) they challenge wind power’s
current dominance?
UK renewable energy options
Faced with growing concerns about climate change and energy security,
the UK has set a target following an EU requirement of getting 15 per cent
of its primary energy from renewable resources by 2020 and, within that,
aims to obtain around 30 per cent of its electricity from renewables.
Wind is expected to supply much of this – roughly 15 GW onshore and
13 GW offshore. Smaller contributions from hydro, solar PV, wave, tidal
and biomass make up the rest of the 38 GW total (NREAP 2010).
The dominance of wind is not surprising. In the UK context, large
scale onshore and offshore wind is clearly a better bet for the moment
in terms of price, and the scale of the resource is very large – the UK
offshore wind resource has been put at over 200 GW and perhaps over
400 GW, much larger than the wave and tidal resource (PIRC 2010).
Wave and tidal power are still at a relatively early stage in their commer-
cial development, although the potential is large; they could perhaps
supply 20 per cent of UK electricity within a few decades. Some see PV
solar as expanding rapidly in the years ahead but, although prices are
falling, it is still relatively expensive. The biomass option has yet to be
seriously developed for heat or for power, mainly due to the availability
of low-cost gas, but also due to concerns about the limited scale of the
resource and potential conflicts over rival land uses.
As we shall see, while some critics, usually from an anti-wind and/or
pro-nuclear position, argue that wind has been over emphasised, others
claim that in fact its share or, (since it is not a fixed-sum game), its
overall contribution could be significantly increased, as could that from
other renewables. On this view, what is striking is not wind power’s
dominance, so much as the relatively low level of its development in the
UK, and indeed the relatively low level of renewables capacity the UK
has installed so far compared to most other EU countries.
Windpower: progress and constraints
Wind and the RO

Given that the UK has one of the best wind resources in the world, it is
perhaps surprising that it has only developed them to a limited extent
Wind Power: Opportunities, Limits and Challenges 19
so far. Offshore wind is now being exploited somewhat more success-

fully, with the UK leading the world by having installed over 1 GW
by 2010. So the situation may change. However, it seems clear that, so
far, competitive market systems like the UK RO have been much less
successful at building renewables capacity than fixed price FiTs.
Germany started later than the UK with its wind programme,
but now has around 27 GW of wind capacity in place, whereas by
2010 the UK only achieved just over 5 GW, including offshore, with
some of the latter being supported by capital grants. Perversely, the
RO has cost consumers more: in 2005/6 the UK’s RO system cost
consumers 3.2 p/kWh, whereas in 2006 the German FiT only cost
consumers 2.6 p/kWh, despite Germany having a much bigger wind
capacity in areas with generally much less wind than in the UK, and
also supporting the installation of a lot more very expensive PV solar
capacity (Ernst and Young, 2008). France which, started even later
than Germany, has now over-taken the UK’s wind capacity, using a
FiT. Most EU countries now use FiTs.
One of the additional reasons why the UK has so far been unable
to install as much wind capacity as elsewhere could be that the RO’s
competitive approach leads companies to locate wind projects in the
most profitable sites, which are usually in environmentally sensitive,
high wind speed, upland areas. This has led to a backlash against many
wind projects – many have been opposed by local people and have
been turned down by local planning authorities. By contrast, there
is much less opposition elsewhere in the EU, where FiTs have made it
viable to locate projects in low-land sites and also for many projects
to be initiated and run locally. For example in Denmark, which now
gets around 20 per cent of it electricity from wind, the FiT that was
used at one stage led to about 80 per cent of the wind projects being
owned by local community based wind co-ops or by farmers. They
often quoted the old Danish proverb ‘your own pigs don’t smell’. In the
UK, the Renewables Obligation makes it hard for co-operatives to get
investment capital for local projects. So far there are only three wind
co-operatives in existence.
The RO system also led to an overspend on projects that may in fact
no longer need support. For example the UK energy regulator Ofgem
has claimed that between 2002 and 2005 around £740 million had
been provided in excess of need, with landfill gas receiving around
£400 million excess and onshore wind about £200 million more than
it needed (Ofgem 2005). In 2005, the National Audit Office claimed
that ‘the level of support provided by the RO is greater than necessary
to ensure that most onshore windfarms and large landfill gas projects
are developed’. It calculated that, unless the RO system was changed,
by 2026–7, which is when the scheme was then set to run to, ‘around
a third of the total public support provided could be in excess of that
needed by generators to meet the higher costs of renewable generation’
(NAO 2005: 5).
The problem was that, under the RO, even though a project and
a technology may mature, so that costs fall, it will still get the same
number of Renewable Obligation Credits (ROCs) per Megawatt-hour
(MWh) as other, perhaps less developed, projects. That can make some
wind projects very profitable if developers focus on the right technol-
ogies and locations. In this situation it has been easy for opponents of
wind power to talk of profiteering and unwarranted subsidies.
The ‘banding’ of the RO by technology was expected to reduce this
problem for renewables as a whole (landfill and sewage gas have been
down-graded), but not eliminate it, since all on-land wind projects still
get the same number of ROCs/MWh, while offshore projects all get
2 ROCs/MWh.
The German FiT system avoids this overspend problem, since the
prices are ‘degressed’ in annual percentage stages at different levels for
each technology, following ‘learning curve’ projections of expected
price reductions. So far this approach has worked well for wind, as its
costs have fallen, by matching support levels to need.
The UK’s ‘Clean Energy Cashback’ FiT for small renewable projects,
introduced in 2010 after much pressure by lobby groups, does have
price degression and also sub-bands for wind at various scales, but the
scheme is relatively small (it is only for projects under 5 Megawatts, and
is only expected to lead to a 2 per cent electricity contribution from all
renewables by 2020): the RO was seen as the main support mechanism
for renewables.
The RO could, in theory, be further modified to limit the impacts of
ROC price variation on investment costs. Indeed, the UK Department
of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) proposed various ways in which
this might be done. However, in effect this would represent an attempt
to keep adjusting the RO to make it more like a FiT. But not only would
this add yet more complexity to an already complex system, it would
also seem likely to be of limited benefit, if the primary aim was still to
retain the competitive ROC trading element.
Until recently, the wind industry and the government seemed to
share the view that, although not without its faults, the RO was an
effective support mechanism, and both have been loath to make radical
changes, arguing that this would be disruptive. It is certainly true that

the UK renewables programme could do without any major disruptions,
especially since a large number of wind projects have been held up by
planning problems, but it is perhaps harder to accept the British Wind
Energy Association’s claim that, in effect, the RO wasn’t broken so we
didn’t need to fix it (EWEA 2006). Windpower Monthly, a trade magazine
that has backed the RO over the years, accepted that Britain probably
has the highest priced wind power in the world (WPM 2006).
Even Ofgem, a strong defender of market competition, called for
radical changes, including possibly a return to a contract auction
process similar to that used under the UK’s previous scheme, the Non
Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO), which operated until 2001 before being
replaced by the RO (Ofgem 2010). However, the NFFO was no more
successful than the RO in achieving capacity build-up. Indeed in some
ways it was worse: developers who submitted bids with very low prices
might win contracts, but in practice be unable to deliver (Edge 2006).
In December 2010, the coalition Conservative–Liberal Democrat
government set out extensive proposals for electricity market reform,
which included suggestions for replacing the RO with a variable price
‘Contract for Difference’ FiT, covering nuclear Carbon Capture and
Storage (CCS) as well as renewables, and possibly making use of contract
auction or tendering processes (DECC, 2010a). That would, in effect,
be a reversion to something like NFFO, and to less support being avail-
able for emergent technologies like wave and tidal stream. Recognising
this problem, the Secretary of State, Chris Huhne, suggested that addi-
tional measures might be needed to support these options. Some critics
argued against what they saw as a ‘one size fits all’ approach, attempting
to cover a range of technologies each at different levels of development
with a single FiT mechanism. They also opposed the variable FiT and
contract auctions, insisting that what was needed for renewables was a
FiT on the fixed price model as used in Germany and elsewhere, with
nuclear excluded (Toke 2010).
However in July 2011 the government decided to go ahead with the
variable price ‘Contract for a Difference’ scheme for renewables, nuclear
and CCS , including, at some stage, contract auctions (DECC 2011a) . The
new scheme is set to run from 2014, although new accreditations will
be still accepted for the RO until March 2017 (and these, and existing,
contracts will be honoured into the future), so some developers may
decide to stick with it for a while. However it seems that the RO’s days
are numbered, with the government admitting that it was an expensive
approach to supporting wind and other renewables.
Other problems for wind

Not all the problems facing the deployment of wind and other renewa-
bles can be traced back to the RO system. Indeed, Gordon Edge, from the
British Wind Energy Association trade lobby, now renamed Renewable
UK, has argued that:
Any criticism that it doesn’t work is actually pointing the finger in

the wrong direction as it has been planning and grid issues that have
stopped us from building, particularly onshore wind, as fast as we
might. Since 2002, when the Renewables Obligation was introduced,
we have had in excess of 20,000 MW of offshore wind projects into
the planning system. The fact that we only have a fifth of that built
is not the fault of the Renewables Obligation. (Edge 2010)
Planning issues certainly have had very significant impacts. While, as

argued above, some of the planning problems do seem be the result of the
RO’s competitive approach, some are the result of other primary factors
such as lack of full local consultation and poor planning procedures,
without sufficient transparency, leading to increased local opposition.
It is not clear whether the activities of the new Infrastructure
Planning Commission (IPC) or rather the replacement proposed by the
Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government will improve the
situation. The IPC’s ostensible aim was to push projects like wind farms
through more efficiently, but environmental groups have claimed
that ‘steam rollering’ contentious plans against objections could
entrench and increase local opposition. The Localism Bill, introduced
in December 2010, offers local people more influence, including via
referendums and the designation of specific areas as suitable or unsuit-
able for development, but that could strengthen both support for local
projects and opposition to them (DCLG 2010).
Problems with making grid connections have also clearly been a
key issue, one that is unconnected to the RO. The high costs and long
delays in getting grid connections agreed lead to increased overall
costs and risk for developers, who therefore have to raise charges to
consumers, thus giving further ammunition to those who claim that
wind is expensive.
New Ofgem procedures will hopefully begin to address this problem
so that the backlog of projects held up by grid connection delays will
be reduced. However, some grid connection issues remain. For example,
under National Grid’s ‘locational charging’ system, aimed at encouraging
generators to locate closer to major electricity consumption centres in the

south.
There have been indications that this approach may be abandoned
or adjusted, but generators in Scotland will still face higher transmis-
sion charges than their counterparts south of the border, putting wind
projects at a disadvantage. Long distance transmission does cost more
by its nature; penalising it further seems not only unfair but also risks
undermining key new renewable resources such as wind farms in the
north of Scotland.
Grid connection issues, and the emphasis on maintaining a compet-
itive approach, also seem likely to lead to problems in the context
of providing marine cable links to offshore wind projects. There are
various ways in which these could be arranged. The apparent desire to
maintain competition between rival projects means that each offshore
project could have their own parallel (and very expensive) links back
to shore. That approach is sometimes labelled ‘radial’. In some cases it
seems likely to involve duplication of effort and a less than optimum
solution. It would arguably be more rational and cheaper overall to have,
within each area, a network of offshore links, with possibly a single link
back to shore, offering a common service for each project to use. That is
even more the case as we go further out to sea and would be vital if we
also build links across the North Sea to the continent, as part of the EU
supergrid concept (Elliott 2009a).
However, not everyone is enthusiastic about a supergrid network.
In a submission in 2009 to the Energy and Climate Change Select
Committee, the German owed utility E.ON commented:
A super grid connecting offshore wind farms to adjacent countries is

an exciting proposal, but it is unclear whether this is the most cost
effective route for connecting new offshore wind. Timely delivery
of the supergrid will be an issue. For example, round three offshore
windfarms should not be delayed because the connection of a zone
is dependent upon a wider interconnection project. (E.ON 2009,
para 3.21)
Certainly the advantages with the parallel ‘point to point’ radial

approach is that it allows generators to proceed individually and avoid
delays due to third parties, but that regime would not encourage ‘joined
up’ networks, and critics have asked whether it was reasonable to have
separate lines just to protect competition in the short term.
Beyond wind: supporting other renewables
The debate over how best to develop offshore wind, supergrid links and
associated infrastructure will no doubt continue, as will the debate over
how best to develop other renewables and their relationship to wind.
Clearly the prospects for wind power cannot be sensibly discussed in
isolation from the wider sustainable energy programme. For example,
some of the other renewable energy technologies may begin to chal-
lenge the dominance of wind power. Indeed, some critics feel that wind
has been over-emphasised, and that a broader approach should be taken
with more support being given to other renewables, which some see as
preferable for a range of reasons.
A 2008 report by Fells and Whitmill claimed that ‘the renewables
market has been distorted through unbalanced support for low-capital
renewables with least return in energy terms, such as wind’ (Fells and
Whitmill 2008: 5). The Renewable Energy Foundation has regularly
expressed similar concerns (Constable 2006), basically arguing that
support should be provided for a much broader range of low carbon
generating technologies. It made similar points to a House of Lords
review of the economics of Renewable Energy in 2008 (House of Lords
2008). Many anti-wind campaign groups have taken an even stronger
line, portraying reliance on wind as unreliable and expensive.
Certainly the overspend issue outlined above means that, arguably,
wind has had more than its fair share, although, even on poor sites,
on-land wind projects are currently more economic than most other
renewable energy projects. However, the problem is deeper than that.
The RO inevitably emphasises the most competitive options in a short-
term market framework. It was not designed to support new technol-
ogies. So arguably, it has been the focus on near-market options and
the use of the RO (and NFFO), not wind power as such, that has slowed
the development of what could turn out to be better or at least equally
viable, but longer-term, options.
FiTs have been more successful at supporting some newer, less market-
ready options like photovoltaic (PV) solar, but even then there have
been problems: the initial high price of the technology means that the
tariff levels have to be quite high and that loads up consumers with
extra cost. In theory, as the technology develops and the market builds
under the impact of the FiT, prices should fall. However in Germany,
Spain and France, this has not happened fast enough to avoid what
have been seen, or at least portrayed, as excess costs being passed on
to consumers. So the solar PV support schemes have been throttled
back. This may be short-sighted, but it does suggest that, in a climate

where consumer prices are politically sensitive, FiTs are not well suited
to progressing initially expensive technologies down the early part of
their learning curves. Other support mechanisms are needed.
The UK initially tried to use direct grants for PV, via the Low-Carbon
Building Programme, but, as consumer interest boomed, the allocations
were rapidly exhausted and the government was evidently not willing
to provide more taxpayers’ money. The UKs ‘Clean Energy Cashback’
FiT for small projects has supported PV, but as in Spain, Germany and
France, some tariff cuts have been imposed, in the UK case for projects
over 50 KW, ostensibly because of concern over the number of large
‘solar farm’ projects that had emerged. They were seen as potentially
diverting the limited support available under the feed-in scheme away
from smaller domestic schemes.
The UK government’s attempts to support novel projects like wave and
tidal energy systems has involved grant systems, coupled with the RO.
So far the UK has taken the lead with some projects reaching commer-
cial scale, notably Marine Current Turbines 1.2 MW Seagen device,
deployed in Strangford Narrows off northern Ireland and the Pelamis
‘wave snake’ system deployed initially near Portugal. In addition dozens
of other projects are under development in the UK as well as elsewhere,
at various scales. It is a major area for innovation (Elliott 2009b).
While the pioneering MCT Seagen has managed to get support under
the RO, none of the other wave or tidal current projects have yet been
eligible for support under the UK’s £50 million Marine Renewable
Deployment Fund (MRDF). To reduce this embarrassment, a new Marine
Renewables Proving Fund was then established, for projects at earlier
stages in their development, and that has now allocated £22 million
to six wave and tidal projects. So perhaps the funding system will
now begin to work, although the government’s subsequent decision to
abolish to MRDF may make this harder. As a partial compensation in
2011, it allocated up to £30 million over four years to marine energy
projects.
By contrast the government has been somewhat more generous with
the new Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI). It has allocated £860 million
to help for solar heating, biomass, biogas and other thermal options, via
a series of premium price tariffs for eligible projects, the cost being met
from public funds, rather than, as with the RO or FiTs, from consumers.
The energy potential is certainly large. For example, National Grid
claims that up to 50 per cent of residential gas demand could be met
with renewable gas, specifically bio-methane produced from wastes.
Although the carbon reduction targets have been cut back, the govern-
ment’s very ambitious ‘Zero Carbon Homes’ programme for new homes
should nevertheless also ensure that an increasing number of houses
have their heating needs met from solar thermal systems.
On a much larger scale, there are prospects for tidal barrages. In theory
an 8.6 GW Severn Tidal Barrage could generate 4.6 per cent of UK elec-
tricity, although the capital cost (initially put at around £20 billion)
would be high and there could be significant environmental impacts.
Smaller barrages and less invasive tidal lagoons have also been proposed
for estuaries around the UK, which together could generate about the
same total amount of energy, but possibly be better matched to demand
since their peak outputs would be staggered given the delayed phasing
of the twice daily tidal maxima around the coast. That of course would
be even more the case for a network of free-standing tidal current
turbines around the coast.
While as noted above, individual wave and tidal projects below
1 GW are eligible for support via the RO (and also enjoy some public
funding), the government decided to look separately at larger scale tidal
barrage and lagoon projects in the Severn estuary. In October 2010, it
concluded that the costs would be too high: the total cost of the 8.6 GW
barrage would be over £34 billion and, although costing less to build,
the generation costs for smaller barrage and lagoon projects would be
higher (DECC 2010b).
The DECC report focused just on the Severn and suggested that
different conclusions might emerge for sites elsewhere but, in a situ-
ation where public and private capital is in short supply, it is hard
to see how large barrages or lagoons will be economically attractive.
Interestingly, ‘tidal range’ options like this have also begun to be
portrayed as offering a smaller overall energy resource than other
marine options: the DECC ‘2050 Pathways’ analysis only had tidal
range projects (barrages and lagoons) delivering 40 TWh by 2050,
under their maximum trajectory, whereas wave power delivers 80 TWh
and tidal stream technology 79 TWh (DECC 2010c). Moreover the
independent PIRC study put the UK tidal stream resource even higher,
at 116 TWh/yr (PIRC 2010).
Long term, it could thus be that wave and (especially) tidal stream
could be significant options, although not on the same scale as wind.
DECC put the onshore wind potential at 132 TWh p.a. by 2050 and that
for offshore wind at 430 TWh, under a maximum programme, the latter
estimates subsequently being expanded, in an update, to 929 TWh/yr
(DECC 2011b).
DECC did however see solar PV as possibly having a similar resource

potential to UK on-land wind, assuming major support was forthcoming
over the years ahead. Biomass however was seen as more problematic,
unless large amounts of imports could be condoned.
The Renewable Heat Incentive may improve the prospects for solar
heating and other green heat suppliers, but a far as electricity suppliers
are concerned, what remains to be seen is the impact of the coalition
government’s electricity market reform exercise (DECC 2010a). Given
the variable ‘contract for difference’ FiT approach they have adopted
in order to limit excess costs to consumers, the deployment process for
marine renewables could be slower. Indeed offshore wind could also be
slowed. That would be in line with the suggestions made in mid-2011
by the government’s advisory Committee on Climate Change, which
felt that the offshore wind programme should be throttled back due to
its high cost (CCC 2011).
However, the government did not seem to take their advice on board
and has talked of having 18 GW of offshore wind capacity in place by
2020, up from the 13 GW target established earlier. It allocated £30
million to help speed up the process of cost reduction (DECC 2011a).
Renewables prospects and limits
Despite uncertainties about the impact of the new electricity market

reforms, it remains true that, given the right level and type of support,
overall, in terms of resources and technology, the UK is well placed to
obtain increasing amounts of energy from renewables. A target of 50
per cent of its electricity from renewables by 2050, plus a major contri-
bution to heating needs, no longer seems fanciful. Indeed scenarios
are now emerging with renewables supplying almost 100 per cent of
UK electricity, and possibly even 100 per cent of all energy by 2050 or
even earlier (PIRC 2010; CAT 2010). Similar ‘100 per cent renewables’
scenarios have emerged for the EU as a whole, many of them stressing
the need for supergrid links (EREC 2010; PWC 2010; ECF 2010).
In most of these scenarios, wind, especially offshore wind, plays a
major role, not just for conventional electricity needs, but also for elec-
tric vehicle battery charging and sometimes for heat supply, example
via heat pumps. For example, the Centre for Alternative Technology’s
‘Zero Carbon Britain 2030’ scenario, widely seen as very ambitious, has
offshore wind supplying 615 TWh/yr while onshore wind is at 75 TWh,
while fixed tidal is at 36 TWh and wave and tidal stream 39.5 TWh/yr
(CAT 2010). But then, as noted above, DECC’s subsequent update to
its ‘2050 Pathways’ report had offshore wind supplying 929 TWh/yr
by 2050 in its revised maximum case, so CATs scenario may not be as
ambitious as was originally thought.
Indeed, while PIRC’s ‘Offshore Valuation’ suggested that the UK
offshore wind resource for conventional fixed wind turbines was around
406 TWh, that for the new generation of novel floating wind turbines
(though harder to estimate) was put at 870 TWh/yr with 660 TWh/yr
beyond 100 nautical miles out. With wind clearly dominating, the total
offshore wind, wave and tidal resource by 2050 was put at 2131 TWh/yr,
six times current UK electricity use (PIRC 2010).
While estimates on this scale may be based on purely specula-
tive maximal cases, the deployment of wind on-land and offshore is
certainly expanding rapidly both in the UK and around the world. The
Global Wind Energy Council (GWEC) predicts that in 2013 global wind
generating capacity will stand at 332 GW, up from 120 GW at the end of
2008 and 168 GW in 2009, while the Energy Watch Group in Germany
claims that wind power net capacity additions during 1998 to 2007 have
showed a mean growth rate of 30.4 per cent per year, corresponding to a
doubling of net additions every two years (Energy Watch 2008).
Although nowhere near as radical as the CAT scenario for the UK alone,
the European Wind Energy Agency report ‘Oceans of Opportunity’
claims that offshore wind could meet up to 16.7 per cent of total EU elec-
tricity demand by 2030, with a total installed offshore wind capacity of
150,000 MW producing 563 TWh. It adds offshore wind has the tech-
nical potential to power Europe seven times over, producing 25,000
TWh by 2020 and 30,000 TWh by 2030 (EWEA 2009).
However there may be constraints on achieving anything like that,
one being the problems of intermittency and the consequent need to
balance the grid system in some way. At present it is balanced mostly
by ramping up the output from gas-fired plants. That presents few
problems up to around a 20 per cent contribution from variable wind
supplies, but, beyond that, given that the direct storage of electricity is
very expensive, other measures would be required.
It has been argued that other renewables, such as wave and tidal
power, can be used for balancing wind, since they could work together
beneficially to cope with variability. Wave energy is in effect stored/
delayed wind energy and so is less sensitive to wind variations, while
tides, though cyclic, are unrelated to wind.
A Redpoint (2009) report looked at the optimum balance between
wind, wave and tidal and in particular the extent to which wind to
wave and tidal power could help reduce grid balancing costs associated
with the uses of variable renewables, and also reduce the excess wind
‘spillage’, when there was too much wind to be used on the grid. The
study, entitled ‘the benefits of marine technologies with a diversified
renewable mix’, suggested that, to get the best from the different time
correlations of these sources, the optimum mix might be around a
70 per cent wind and 30 per cent wave/tidal current mix, or, if tidal
range projects were included along with tidal current systems, a 60/40
wind and wave/tidal mix. The former ratio could reduce the need for
fossil fuel backup plants by 2.15 GW, the later by 2.3 GW and the overall
carbon savings could be increased by up to 6 per cent with wholesale
costs reduced by up to 3.3 per cent, chiefly since wind overspill would
be reduced (BWEA 2009).
A larger scale option for grid balancing is an EU-wide High Voltage
Direct Current (HVDC) supergrid. It has been argued that the wider the
geographical coverage of a supergrid system, the easier it is to balance
local variations. A supergrid could also link in the well-established hydro
projects around the EU, some of which can be used for pumped energy
storage. Indeed some already carry out that function, with Norwegian
hydro helping to back up wind in Denmark. In addition, a supergrid
could link into the large concentrating solar power projects (CSP) being
developed in desert areas in North Africa and the Middle East. By 2020,
there could be 20 GW of CSP in operation and much more later on, 200
GW or more (Desertec 2010).
In parallel, the use of PV solar is also seen as likely to expand rapidly in
the years ahead, as markets build, cell technology improves and prices
continue to fall. Indeed, given the ease of its deployment, some see PV
as being likely to be a dominant renewable source in the longer term,
even, perhaps surprisingly, playing a key role in the UK. In the maximal
indicative trajectory explored by DECC in its ‘2050 Pathways’ analysis
of UK energy options, PV potentially expands to deliver 140 TWh by
2050. That is more than their maximum estimates for wave and tidal
stream (139 TWh) and for on-land wind (132 TWh). In addition, larger-
scale utility PV applications are possible. For example, in addition to
large ‘solar farm’ PV arrays around the EU, Concentrating PV (‘CPV’)
may also be deployed in the south of the EU, as well as increasingly in
desert areas.
All the above are electricity generating options. But the use of heat
supplying renewables is also likely to expand. There is already over 120
GW (thermal) of solar thermal capacity in use globally and that should
continue to grow rapidly as attempts are made to reduce emissions from
gas (and oil) fired heating. The more efficient use of solid biomass for
heating is also likely to expand, while, as already noted, biogas produced

from waste and other bio-sources is seen as a significant new option.
All in all, wind is likely to be joined by a range of other renewa-
bles, many of which can be mutually reinforcing rather than rivals,
as new patterns of energy supply and use develop. The energy systems
of the future are likely to look very different from those at present,
with ‘smart’ grids and supergrid systems linking renewable electricity
generators across the EU and elsewhere, helping the balance supply and
demand more effectively. That would help respond to both the inter-
mittency issue and also the potential local oversupply issue i.e. when
inputs from wind, wave, tidal and solar are larger than are required
locally or regionally.
In addition, since it is easier to store heat than electricity, in some
cases, some excess electricity from solar, wind, wave and tidal sources
may be used to feed heat stores, or be converted to hydrogen gas by
electrolysis since that can be stored and used as new fuel for a variety
of purposes.
Clearly though, the exact mix is still uncertain. Many current
scenarios rely on electricity as the main energy vector, so that wind,
along with wave, tidal and PV, are central with an HVDC supergrid
being needed to help balance variable supply and demand patterns,
and link to pumped hydro stage facilities. But green heat and/or biogas
production, transmission and storage could also be viable options, espe-
cially at the more local level.
Renewable choices and conflicts

Given the inevitably limited finance, there is perhaps inevitably some
competition between the various renewable energy options, although
strategically it is not a ‘fixed sum’ game – there should be room for them
all in trying to reduce emissions and improve security of supply, and as
we have seen, there are some potential synergies.
Clearly though there can be technical incompatibilities and also
conflicts when the funding emphasis is on least-cost projects and
market competition. Even if the latter can be avoided, some choices
may have to be made concerning the balance between and amongst the
various energy supply options, for example do we emphasise electricity
production or heat production?
In addition there may be competition from and conflicts with the
proposed expanded nuclear power programme. In early 2010, the govern-
ment’s National Policy Statement on energy identified ten potential
new nuclear sites, one of which, in Cumbria, might actually require the
removal of part or all of an existing wind farm. Fortunately that site

has been withdrawn from the list, although there are other potential
conflicts, both financial and operational. For example, the government
seems to be thinking in terms of 16 GW of new nuclear capacity, but
power companies such as EDF and E.ON have reserved grid connections
for around 24 GW of new nuclear capacity with National Grid. If even
some of these options are taken up, and the 30 GW wind programme
is also successful, then by around 2020 there could be major problems
of oversupply at times of low energy demand (e.g. at night in summer),
when the maximum needed can fall to 20 GW.
EDF evidently had this in mind when in 2008 they told the
Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform that ‘as the
amount of wind capacity increases, there will be occasions, when wind
output is high, when the output from low marginal cost plant, primarily
wind, other renewables and nuclear, will exceed electricity demand and
as a result either nuclear or wind plant will need to be curtailed, i.e.
instructed not to generate’. They added that ‘as the intermittent renew-
able capacity approaches the Government’s 32 per cent proposed target,
if wind is not to be constrained (in order to meet the renewable target),
it would be necessary to attempt to constrain nuclear’ (EDF 2008: 3).
The problem is that nuclear plants are usually run 24/7 to recoup their
high capital cost. Some can vary their output, for example to follow
the daily energy demand cycle, but not only does this make them less
economic, if they are ramped up and down from full power rapidly
and regularly (e.g. to follow wind availability) that can also cause oper-
ational and safety problems. What EDF suggest, in effect to protect
nuclear, is less emphasis on wind, but more on non-electric renewables:
for example it says ‘the heat sector could provide sufficient additional
renewable output to still meet the UK’s renewable energy target’ (EDF
2008: 7).
This conflict has yet to be resolved and may be worsened by the new
low carbon energy technology support system proposed by the govern-
ment, since, unlike the RO, it would provide a subsidy for both renew-
ables and nuclear. If both continue to expand within the electricity
sector, there would be a need to curtail outputs of one or the other regu-
larly. However, curtailing the outputs from wind and other renewables
to keep nuclear plants running economically makes no more sense than
curtailing, or varying, the output from expensive nuclear to use renew-
able inputs when available: they seem to be incompatible.
As the overall renewables component expands, similar overcapacity
conflicts may also emerge between some of the various elements,
especially in the case of large capital-intensive options like tidal barrages.

For example, what would be done with the 8.6 GW of potential output
that would occasionally be available from the Severn Barrage at times
of low energy demand, if there was also 30 GW or more of wind and
other renewables on the grid, all also delivering power? A HVDC super-
grid could perhaps export some of the excess and some could also go
to storage. That could make it possible to limit curtailment, although
storage is an expensive option. But having a further 16 GW, 24 GW or
more of nuclear capacity to deal with as well would make it very hard to
avoid large-scale and wasteful curtailment.
Conclusions
Wind energy has been a success story so far, and although some prac-
tical technical, economic and deployment problems have emerged, they
are probably inevitable in any newly emerging sector, and are likely
to impact equally on all the renewables, as they try to move towards
commercial deployment.
Certainly wind power was not the only renewable hard hit by the
economic recession and increased material costs (e.g., PV solar has also
had problems), but the rise of the cost of conventional energy, along with
supply chain constraints for components (e.g. wind turbine generators)
and services (e.g. for offshore installation), has clearly led to problems
(UKERC 2010). However UKERC predicted a possible 25 per cent price
fall by 2025 and prices do seem to be falling from their 2008 high (New
Energy Finance 2011).
In terms of new developments and capacity building, the recent
progress on offshore wind has been very encouraging, in the UK
especially. Significant investment in UK wind turbine manufacturing
facilities has been promised, for example from Mitsubishi, Clipper
Wind, Siemens, General Electric and Gamesa, with new plants being
established around the UK, many of them in the north east. With
an expanding offshore wind programme, and inward investment
supporting local manufacture as opposed to having to import the
technology, the UK could enjoy employment and economic benefits.
In which case it could be that some of the opposition to wind projects
may reduce.
Overall then the prospects for wind power look good, and wind seems
likely to play a major role in the new energy mix. However, it may not
be quite as dominant in percentage terms as at present – other renewa-
bles will also begin to play leading roles. The exact mix is obviously
impossible to predict given the ongoing nature of both the policy

debate and technological development. Generation costs are likely to
dominate choices about which to back and when, but using current
prices is no guide as to what might happen as the technologies mature.
In a 2006 review, the Carbon Trust used ‘learning curve’ analysis to try
to identify possible longer-term outcomes for wave and tidal current
technology. It suggested that the learning curve slope (with the loga-
rithmic value of the kW installed plotted against the log of kWh gener-
ated) was 10–15 per cent for wave and 5–10 per cent for tidal current
technology (Carbon Trust 2006). Wind power is usually credited with
a higher learning curve slope, perhaps 18 per cent, meaning that it will
get cheaper faster and of course it has had a major head start. But PV
solar is moving ahead rapidly and is usually seen as having an even
higher leaning curve slope. However, it is starting from a high initial
cost. Even so, a recent report from the Mott MacDonald consultancy,
produced for the UK Committee of Climate Change, saw PV prices as
falling rapidly, although by 2040 on-land wind would still be cheaper
per kWh, as probably would offshore wind, while wave and tidal would
still be relatively expensive (MML 2011).
It clearly made sense to focus on land-based wind initially, given
that it was the most technically advanced and economically viable new
renewable option, and there was an opportunity for incremental devel-
opment from small devices on-land and then on to the development
of technologies for exploiting the very large offshore wind resource.
By contrast, with wave and tidal current systems, full-scale trials at sea
are both essential and expensive (Falcão 2006). However we are now
part-way through that phase, and PV solar is much further on, as are
some of the other options. What actually emerges next will probably
depend, in the UK in particular, not just on the technology, but on
whether new types of support system, less concerned about achieving
immediate price reductions, can be developed.
More generally, the prospects for wind and the other renewables will
of course depend on wider issues – including how governments choose
to respond to the challenges of climate change, the role of nuclear power
and the degree to which reliance on fossil fuels is constrained. While
predictions of imminent ‘peak oil’ abound, natural gas (and shale gas)
is now seen as offering at least interim relief from fuel scarcity and
energy security concerns, and it has been suggested that a glut in gas
could reduce prices, so making it harder for renewables (and possibly
nuclear) to prosper (IEA 2010). Similarly, any weakening of resolve on
responding to climate change could mean that the use of coal will
continue to rise at the expense of renewables. Indeed, even in countries

that are trying to develop positive low carbon policies, like China, the
pressure of economic growth means that coal use is expanding.
In terms of defining prospects for the future, China is nevertheless
widely seen as a key country. It is interesting then that it has launched
a major renewable energy programme which, in addition to expanding
its existing large hydro capacity, has already meant that its installed
wind capacity has overtaken that in Germany and the USA. In the long-
er-term, the Chinese government’s current draft plan calls for 300 GW
of hydro, 150 GW of wind, 30 GW of biomass, and 20 GW of PV; a total
of 500 GW of renewable power capacity by 2020. That is almost a third
of China’s expected total capacity of 1600 GW by then, and dwarfs
its relatively small nuclear programme – which is aimed at expanding
from around a 2 per cent power contribution as at present to 4per cent
by 2020 (REN21 2010).
Globally, despite the constraints and the recession, it seems clear that
renewables are going to expand very rapidly with wind power playing a
major role, but other renewables are also developing rapidly. Indeed, if
there is to be a return to growth it may be that investment in renewables
will be a key area, and they will be seen increasingly as the way ahead,
not least since the cost of fossil fuels seems bound to rise. In the short
term, renewables may appear expensive investments, but longer term
their economics look very attractive, given that most have no direct
fuel costs. Wind has been the first new renewable to be developed on
a significant scale, and in some locations is already claimed to be the
cheapest source on the grid (Sourcewatch 2010). However, if we are to
respond effectively to climate change and energy security concerns, it
seems clear that we will need as many renewable sources as can be effec-
tively mustered (Elliott 2010).
References
DCLC (Department for Communities and Local Government) (2010) Localism
Bill, Department for Communities and Local Government, London, http:
//www.communities.gov.uk/news/corporate/1794946, accessed on 15 July
2011.
Carbon Trust (2006) Future Marine Energy: Results of the Marine Energy Challenge,
London: The Carbon Trust.
CAT (Centre for Alternative Technology) (2010) Zero Carbon Britain 2030, Centre
for Alternative Technology, Machynlleth: CAT.
CCC (Committee on Climate Change) (2011) ‘Renewable energy review’,
Committee on Climate Change, London, www.theccc.org.uk/reports/renew-
able-energy-review, accessed on 15 July 2011.
Constable, J. (2006) ‘Climate change and the mis-marketing of renewable

energy’, Proceedings of the World Renewable Energy Congress IX, Florence,
WREN, Brighton.
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change) (2010a) ‘Electricity market
reform; consultation document’, London: Department of Energy and Climate
Change.
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change) (2010b) ‘Severn tidal feasibility
study conclusions and summary’, Department of Energy and Climate Change,
London, Welsh Assembly Government, SW Regional Development Agency,
October, http://www.decc.gov.uk/severntidalpower, accessed on 15 July 2011.
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change) (2010c) ‘2050 pathways
analysis’, London: Department of Energy and Climate Change, July, http:
//www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/what_we_do/lc_uk/2050/2050.aspx ,
accessed on 15 July 2011.
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change) (2011a) ‘Planning our elec-
tric future: a White Paper for secure, affordable and low carbon electricity’,
London: Department of Energy and Climate Change, www.decc.gov.uk/en/
content/cms/legislation/white_papers/emr_wp_2011/emr_wp_2011.aspx,
accessed on 15 July 2011).
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change) (2011b) ‘Updates to DECC’s
2050 pathways analysis’, London: Department of Energy and Climate Change,
www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/consultations/2050pathways/2050pathwa
ys.aspx, accessed on 15 July 2011.
Desertec (2010) ‘The Desertec Concept’ Desertec Foundation, Hamburg, http:
//www.desertec.org, accessed on 15 July 2011.
ECF (European Climate Foundation) (2010) ‘Roadmap 2050: a practical guide to
a prosperous, low-carbon Europe’, Den Haag: European Climate Foundation,
http://www.roadmap2050.eu/, accessed on 15 July 2011.
EDF (2008) ‘EDF Energy submission to the Department for Business, Enterprise
& Regulatory Reform /Department of Energy and Climate Change consulta-
tion on UK Renewable Energy Strategy’, http://decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/
consultations/cons_res/cons_res.aspx Log Number 00439e, accessed on 15
July 2011.
Edge, G. (2006) ‘A harsh environment: the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation and the
UK renewables industry’, in K. Mallon (ed.) Renewable Energy Policy and Politics:
A Handbook for Decision-making, pp. 163–184, London: Earthscan.
Edge, G. (2010) quoted in ‘Wind power sets new records’, IET Engineering and
Technology magazine, 5: 18, Institution of Engineering and Technology,
London, http://kn.theiet.org/magazine/issues/1018/wind-power-records-1018.
cfm, accessed on15 July 2011.
Elliott, D. (2009a) ‘Renewables without boundaries’, International Journal of
Ambient Energy, 30: 2, 59–62.
Elliott, D. (2009b) ‘Marine renewables: an innovation frontier’, Technology
Analysis and Strategic Management, 21: 2 (February), 267–275.
Elliott, D. (ed.) (2010) Sustainable Energy: Opportunities and Limitations, Basingstoke
and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Energy Watch (2008) Renewable Energy Outlook 2030, Energy Watch Group,
Germany, http://www.energywatchgroup.org/Renewables.52+M5d637b1e38d
.0.html, accessed on 15 July 2011.
E.ON (2009)‘Submission to the Energy and Climate Change Select Committee,

by E.ON’, March (FBEN 29).
EREC (European Renewable Energy Council) (2010) ‘Rethinking 2050,’ Brussels:
European Renewable Energy Council, http://www.rethinking2050.eu/,
Ernst and Young (2008) Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Indices, Ernst
and Young Report, Quarter 1–2, 2008.
EWEA (European Wind Energy Association) (2006) ‘Maria McCafferty BWEA
CEO interview’, Wind Directions, 25: 5 (July/August), 20–22.
EWEA (European Wind Energy Association) (2009) Oceans of Opportunity,
Brussels: European Wind Energy Association.
Falcão, A. (2006) ‘The history of and progress in wave energy conversion devices’,
Proceedings of the World Renewable Energy Congress IX, Florence, WREN,
Brighton.
Fells, I. and Whitmill, C. (2008) ‘A pragmatic energy policy for the UK’, Fells
Associates report, www.fellsassociates.com, accessed on 15 July 2011.
GWEA (2010) ‘Data from the Global Wind Energy Council’, http://www.gwec.net,
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2010) World Energy Outlook 2009, Paris:
International Energy Agency.
House of Lords (2008) ‘The economics of renewable energy’, House of Lords
Select Committee on Economic Affairs, Fourth report, November.
MML (Mott MacDonald Limited)(2011) ‘Costs of low-carbon technologies’ Mott
MacDonald Ltd report for the government advisory Committee on Climate
Change, http://hmccc.s3.amazonaws.com/Renewables%20Review/MML%20
final%20report%20for%20CCC%209%20may%202011.pdf, accessed on 15
July 2011.
NAO (National Audit Office) (2005) Department of Trade and Industry: Renewable
Energy, London: National Audit Office, February.
New Energy Finance (2011) ‘Bloomberg new energy finance study’, as reported
at http://peakenergy.blogspot.com/2011/02/wind-turbine-prices-fall-to-their.
html, accessed on 15 July 2011.
NREAP (National Renewable Energy Action Plan) (2010) ‘UK National Renewable
Energy Action Plan, as submitted to the European Commission’, http:
//www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what %20we%20do/uk%20energy %20supply
/energy %20mix/renewable%20energy/ored/25-nat-ren-energy-action-plan.
pdf, accessed on 15 July 2011.
Ofgem (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets) (2005) ‘Ofgem’s response to the
preliminary consultation on the 2005–6 review of the Renewables Obligation’,
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Pages/MoreInformation.aspx?docid=127&refer=
Sustainability/Environment/Policy, accessed on 15 July 2011.
Ofgem (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets) (2010) Project Discovery, London:
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets Report.
PIRC (Public Interest Research Centre) (2010) ‘Offshore valuation’, Offshore
Valuation Group, led by the Public Interest Research Centre, Machynlleth,
www.offshorevaluation.org, accessed 15 July 2011.
PWC (PriceWaterhouseCoopers) (2010) ‘A roadmap to 2050 for Europe and
North Africa’ London: PriceWaterhouseCoopers, http://www.pwc.co.uk/eng/
publications/100_percent_renewable_electricity.html, accessed 15 July 2011.
Redpoint (2009) ‘The benefits of marine technologies with a diversified renew-

able mix’, Redpoint report for British Wind Energy Association, London.
REN21 (2010) ‘Renewables 2010 global status report’, Renewable Energy Network
21, July, www.ren21.net and http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea
/news/article/2010/07/renewable-energy-policy-update-for-china, accessed on
15 July 2011.
Sourcewatch (2010) Comparative Electrical Generation Costs, Sourcewatch website,
data from California Energy Commission, http://www.sourcewatch.org/
index.php?title=Comparative_electrical_generation_costs, accessed on 15
July 2011.
Toke, D. (2010) ‘UK government to subsidise nuclear power and limit renewa-
bles’ in Dave Toke’s green energy blog 19 December, http://realfeed-intariffs.
blogspot.com, accessed on 15 July 2011.
UKERC (UK Energy Research Centre) (2010) ‘Great expectations’, London: UK
Energy Research Centre, http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/tiki-[index.php?
page = Great+Expectations% 3A+The + cost+ of+ offshore +wind+in+UK+waters,
WPM (Wind Power Monthly) (2006) Windpower Monthly, On-Line Focus article,
October.
3
Wind Power Policy in Germany
and the UK: Different Choices
Leading to Divergent Outcomes
Volkmar Lauber
Introduction
The UK has the best wind resources in Europe, but Germany – with
only modest resources – had the largest wind power capacity worldwide
until 2010. The present chapter traces this to stronger commitment to
RE (renewable energy) and to superior sectoral governance concerning
effectiveness (deployment), efficiency (both prices and innovation),
administrative efficiency and simplicity, growth of an equipment
industry, creation of a new group of generators more committed to RE
than the incumbent power companies, and creation of acceptance and
support throughout society.
This argument shall be supported, first, by looking at the role of the
British and German governments in the area of politics and policy on
RE support in general and on wind energy in particular, beginning
with the late 1980s. Second, we will look at the results of these poli-
cies in terms of deployment, prices, profitability and windfall profits,
wind power equipment makers, the number and role of new market
entrants and the level of public support and opposition to wind power.
The evidence will be rolled out separately for the two countries and
then compared. At the end, lessons will be drawn.
Wind power policy in the United Kingdom1
Market creation by accident: the NFFO for England and Wales

For the UK, wind power support beyond Research, Development and
Demonstration (RD and D) came about by accident – as the unintended
38
Wind Power Policy in Germany and the UK 39
consequence of privatising nuclear power. In principle, the new

ideology deployed under Margaret Thatcher created a difficult envi-
ronment for developing this support; such things were now to be left
to the market. The perception of the UK resource situation may have
contributed to this. In the early 1990s, domestic oil and gas production
exceeded national demand. Environmental sensibilities also differed
from Germany. The movements against nuclear power, forest dieback
and climate change were less strong in Britain.
To Thatcher, the UK’s nationalised and highly centralised electricity
system embodied the socialist structures which had contributed to
Britain’s decline and had to be reorganised on the basis of liberalisation
and competition. But when privatisation was prepared with the 1989
Electricity Act, calculations showed that nuclear power would need to
be subsidised in order to make it attractive for private operators. The
energy minister was authorised to impose a levy for this purpose plus
an obligation on suppliers to carry a certain amount of nuclear elec-
tricity; he was free to organise all details (Helm 2004; Mitchell 2000:
290). To avoid the unfavourable image that a ‘nuclear levy’ would evoke,
the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) was invented as an obligation
on suppliers to carry a specified share of electricity that did not come
from coal. This made it possible to also include RE among the benefi-
ciaries of the NFFO, something that was basically the work of a civil
servant named Godfrey Bevan, assisted by requests from the European
Commission (Uhlir 2011: 67; Agnolucci 2007: 477).
Contrary to the rent-like subsidies for nuclear power (granted on the
basis of installed capacity), support for the RE sector was designed as a
model of competition (Mitchell 2000: 294). Irregular auctions – a total
of five rounds – organised tenders for specific technologies; one of those
was wind power. Successful bidders received government guaranteed
purchase contracts – differentiated by technology – for electricity for
certain time periods plus a guaranteed bonus whose level resulted from
the bidding process (Dinica 2003: 500–513).
The NFFO did create a first market for wind, albeit a very limited one –
too small to encourage turbine producers to set up production facilities
in Britain. It also created a strong movement hostile to wind power.
The intensely competitive nature of the process intensified the search
for the best locations, disregarding considerations of landscape protec-
tion and neighbourhood acceptance, and prevented timely contacts
with local communities affected by wind power projects (Stenzel and
Frenzel 2008: 2648). Thus wind turbines were often associated with
intrusive action by foreign agents attempting to extract profits from
local resources, while placing the burden on the local population who
were not informed until after the event. This favoured the early rise
of an opposition movement to wind power which haunted British
developments for years to come. Finally, the intensity of competition
and the design of the NFFO – the fact that tenders could be submitted
without a serious commitment to build (as with a down payment) – led
to very low bids from the third round onwards (NFFO3 to NFFO5), so
that many projects were never built because they were uneconomic or
borderline (ibid.). It also meant that large companies dominated the
bids; local ownership was exceedingly rare, reinforcing opposition
(Toke 2002). But all this was not apparent immediately, and the idea
that competition could radically bring down the price of wind power
made its way into the European Commission’s 1997 White Paper on
renewable energy which praised the impressive decline of wind energy
prices under the NFFO as the result of superior policy, contrasting it
with a German feed-in tariff for wind that had brought little change in
prices over half a decade (CEC 1997). The UK government also strongly
supported European Commission efforts to harmonise support for RE
electricity by volume-based market instruments, in particular by quotas
and tradable certificates – the system it itself adopted later on (Lauber
and Schenner 2011).
Stepping up market creation: New Labour and

the introduction of the RO
Before coming to power in 1997, New Labour had announced that it
would do something more substantial than the NFFO to advance RE;
it also questioned the economics of new nuclear build. But in govern-
ment it was not prepared to diverge from the path of liberalisation;
for the renewable energy sector, competition was even intensified, and
the market was empowered to make basic technology choices (Rutledge
2007). Presumably the fossil resource situation was still viewed as satis-
factory, while carbon emissions had come down as a result of the dash
for gas in the 1990s – the newly privatised generators had opted for gas
due to its low prices and shorter payback periods. The government did
not want to ‘pick winners’, and the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) now in charge of RE was adamant that there would be no feed-in
tariff (Hartnell interview with Uhlir 2011: 86).
The RE constituency in Britain contrasted markedly with that of
Germany where a large number of small investors and developers
pushed for a remuneration which was both favourable to them and
supportive of rapid deployment, even with relatively low prices for
renewable electricity. The British wind power scene – itself a legacy

from the NFFO – was clearly dominated by large operators whose
main business was conventional electricity; the NFFO with its irreg-
ular rounds and other elements of uncertainty had favoured the
large electric utilities and squeezed out smaller developers (Mitchell
2000; Stenzel and Frenzel 2008). The British Wind Energy Association
favoured tradable certificates and had been able to enrol the support
of the Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and WWF (Madlener and
Fouquet 1999). Smaller developers may have favoured feed-in tariffs
but met with stiff refusal at DTI.
The Labour government had three main concerns when replacing the
NFFO. First, the perception that it had led to insufficient deployment.
Second, it viewed guaranteed off-take of renewable electricity as incom-
patible with New Labour’s neoliberal principles. Third, it considered
technology banding – differentiating between technologies according
to level of development, cost structure and so on –as ‘picking winners’
and thus unacceptable (DTI 2000: 25–26; Mitchell and Connor 2004;
Uhlir 2011: 85–86).
Labour’s new scheme – the Renewables Obligation (RO) – was first
outlined in the Utilities Act of 2000. The chief purpose of this act was
to intensify competition to bring down prices. While the government
rejected banding, it was prepared to admit capital grants for a small
number of early projects in offshore wind and energy crops, sources
which had great potential but were still at an early stage of development
(DTI 2000: 26). The details of the RO were published at the end of 2001
and the scheme entered into force in April 2002.
Functioning of the RO
The RO puts an obligation on suppliers to carry a minimum quota of
renewable electricity that increases continuously over time according
to a pre-set schedule. Originally it was set at 3 per cent for 2002/2003,
rising by around 1 per cent every year to 10.4 per cent in 2010/2011
(Lipp 2007). Renewable electricity generators receive a renewable obliga-
tion certificate (ROC) for every MWh of electricity which they produce.
ROCs can be traded on a market separate from that of electricity. If a
supply company is unable to meet its obligation by own generation or
by certificates bought from elsewhere, it must pay a buy-out price for
the shortfall. This buy-out price also sets a ceiling for the certificate
price (Stenzel and Frenzel 2008). To encourage compliance, buy-out
funds are recycled to suppliers according to the degree to which they
comply with the obligation.
At the time of its adoption, many policy-makers expected that the

RO would prove a superior instrument by reducing the cost of renew-
able generation, as evidenced by the Working Paper of the European
Commission (CEC 1999). Through competition, certificate prices
would gradually fall and eventually prepare wind power to survive on
the market without support. But ROC values (including ROC recyc-
ling) stayed rather high and actually increased by 19 per cent between
2002–2003 and 2009–2010, from £45.94 to £54.37 (Woodman and
Mitchell 2011: 3915). Despite the excellent resource, support levels and
expected levels of profitability of wind power generation were among
the highest in the EU, while deployment remained modest (CEC 2005
and 2008), something that was usually attributed to problems in the
planning system but continued after planning procedures were made
more favourable to developers (ODPM 2004).
Over time though, the RO came under criticism. Many problems could
be traced to its design, in particular to the insecure situation of gener-
ators facing multiple risks: of not finding a buyer, of unstable whole-
sale electricity prices and of potentially volatile certificate prices due to
collective overshooting of the targets leading to a price collapse. As a
result, generators received mostly short-term contracts from suppliers.
If the suppliers granted longer term contracts, they retained most of the
value of the certificates (Toke 2005; Mitchell et al. 2006). These condi-
tions disadvantaged independent developers and favoured incumbents.
3500
3000
Capacity (MW)
2500
2000
1500 Germany
UK
1000
500
0
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Year
Figure 3.1 Annual installations of wind power in Germany and the UK,
2000–2010. Graph produced by author
Sources: DEWI (2010: 12); DEWI (2011: 1); EWEA (2009: 72); EWEA (2011: 4).
30000
Capacity (MW)
25000
20000
15000
10000 Germany
5000 UK
0
01
00
97
03
04
98
02
07
10
05
06
08
09
99
20
20
19
20
20
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
19
Year
Figure 3.2 Cumulative installations of wind power in Germany and the UK,
1997–2010 Graph produced by author
Sources: DEWI (2010: 12); DEWI (2011: 1); EWEA (2009: 71); EWEA (2011: 4); Anon.
(no date).
Over the years, deployment kept falling short by about one third
of the target – a rational reaction to the fact that fulfilling the target
would lead to lower certificate prices and that a two thirds fulfilment
ratio seemed optimal for maximising incumbents’ revenue (Woodman
and Mitchell 2011). A fully competitive market with a large number of
participants might not have been capable of such a restrictive response
which demanded a certain amount of coordinated understanding. But
the RO, like the NFFO, acted to limit the number of participants essen-
tially to incumbents: fluctuating revenues and uncertain government
policy after 2010 meant that banks were reluctant to grant project
finance for new developments. Thus the RO continued to favour large
development companies with deep pockets able to finance projects on
their own – vertically integrated companies that could trade electricity
and ROCs between their subsidiaries (Stenzel and Frenzel 2008).
Statistics show the limited place for new entrants. In 2005, 1108 MW
of wind power out of a total installed capacity of 1353 MW – that is
82 per cent – were in the hands of the six biggest utilities, the rest
owned by a few smaller independent developers (Stenzel and Frenzel
2008: 2649). Insecure revenues also led banks to demand higher interest
rates which put upward pressure on internal rates of return and mili-
tated in favour of shorter amortisation periods (Mitchell et al. 2006).
This led to the paradoxical result that wind projects in the UK, taken in
the EU context, combine lower than average costs (due to the excellent
resource) with some of the most expensive support for wind power;
this feature is shared with the quota/tradable certificate schemes in
Italy and Belgium, whereas Germany had higher costs but much lower
support (CEC 2008: 23–24). At the same time, effectiveness (deploy-

ment of the available resource) was highest in Germany (as well as most
other feed-in tariff countries) and about four times as high in Germany
as in the UK. The quota/certificate countries by contrast showed much
higher expectations of profits – more than ten times as high in the UK
as in Germany (CEC 2008: 10; all data are for the year 2006).
Lack of support for innovative technologies became another point of
criticism as the years went by. The RO did not offer nearly enough for
offshore wind, wave and tidal energy (Lipp 2007: 5489). For offshore
wind, capital grants – already considered back in 2001 – by the third
round of the capital programme payments amounted to a little over 100
million pounds, four times as much as the support envisioned in 2001
(DTI/NOF, no year). Still, this was widely considered as insufficient.
The technology that did best during the first half decade of the RO (in
terms of GWh) was landfill gas – a mature technology that needed little
support – with onshore wind coming in second. With no diffusion,
there was little innovation in offshore wind despite its huge potential
for the UK.
Reform and possible replacement of the RO

Criticism of the RO intensified after 2004, with reports from the National
Audit Office, the Public Accounts Committee and the Environmental
Audit Committee of the House of Commons, the Carbon Trust, the
Scottish government (Uhlir 2011) and implicitly from the European
Commission in its reports on the performance of RE support schemes
which pointed out that TGC schemes were generally less effective and
efficient than FIT schemes (CEC 2005 and 2008). At the same time,
the need to reduce carbon emissions became more pressing, with a
reduction goal of 60 per cent for 2050 recognised by the government in
2003. When consultations on changing the RO started in 2005, tech-
nology banding returned. The 2007 Energy White Paper explained that
banding was now useful and necessary to move forward with offshore
wind and biomass (DTI 2007: 147). Reform of the RO was enacted in the
2008 Energy Act, with implementation in 2009. Whereas landfill gas
was reduced to 0.25 ROC per MWh, onshore wind was assigned 1 ROC
whilst offshore wind was first granted 1.5 ROCs in 2008 then 2 ROCs
in 2009, but only temporarily for early projects (Toke 2011: 528). Also
‘headroom’ under the RO was now guaranteed: should the annual
target be achieved, it would automatically be raised so that ROCs would
keep their value. The target itself was increased regularly, first to 20 per
cent by 2020, then to 30 per cent and still higher. While the reform
was presented by the government as a mere extension to new renewable

sources that were now needed, it highlighted the problem of relying on
‘technology neutral competition’ which favoured mature technologies
(windfall profits to landfill gas and co-firing) while neglecting techno-
logical development.
Parallel to this reform some critics were pursuing a more radical
agenda: to replace, or for a transitional period to supplement, the RO
by introducing feed-in tariffs on the German example. Parliamentary
committees praised feed-in tariffs beginning in 2006, arguing for
example that for households feed-in tariffs for micro-generation would
be more reliable and less unwieldy than the combination of grants and
ROCs (EFRAC 2007: 3). By 2007, this movement gained momentum
supported by a World Future Council report which advocated a feed-in
tariff for small renewables (Toke 2007; Uhlir 2011: 109). This led to
a realignment of political support. While the major environmental
organisations had supported the RO around 2000, now the Renewable
Energy Association (REA) led by Gaynor Hartnell mobilised a new alli-
ance of those organisations (FOE, WWF, Greenpeace, RSPB) around the
principle of a feed-in tariff with an unlimited purchasing obligation on
the part of electricity companies. REA warned though that attempting
to replace the RO in one single step might destabilise the renewable
energy sector and induce resistance.
When the 2008 Energy Bill was debated in Parliament, a group of
Labour, Conservative and Liberal-democratic MPs prepared an amend-
ment authorising the minister to introduce feed-in tariffs by decree. The
amendment failed narrowly in the Commons. At this time the govern-
ment was also arguing in favour of an EU-wide, harmonised quota/trad-
able certificates support scheme – but it gave up this position before the
end of the year (Lauber and Schenner 2011). In parallel, the govern-
ment in the House of Lords debate changed its position to supporting
a feed-in tariff for installations under 3 MW. Despite attempts by the
Association of Electricity Producers (AEP) to drastically reduce this limit
to 50 kW, and by the British Wind Energy Association (BWEA) to reduce
it to 500 kW, it was actually increased to 5 MW (Uhlir 2011; Seager
2008). In 2010, the first feed-in tariffs were implemented.
Persisting ambiguity of support for RE

Despite these developments, UK governments have remained ambiv-
alent in their commitment to RE. In May 2010, New Labour was
replaced by a coalition of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats which
announced that it would do away with the RO altogether and propose
a system of comprehensive feed-in tariffs for renewable energy – later

specified as intended for ‘low-carbon’ generation (which left the door
open for the inclusion of carbon capture and storage (CCS) and nuclear).
The new government continued Labour’s withdrawal from earlier
rhetoric of ‘no subsidies for nuclear’ (which had been paralleled by a
quite different practice) (Thomas 2009). In 2011, the new government
introduced a fixed carbon price which the nuclear power industry had
been demanding for some time as a precondition for new nuclear build,
producing a windfall for nuclear estimated at £7billion for the period
between 2013 and 2020 (McCabe 2011).
Other developments showed that the UK was hedging its bets on
renewables. The new activism on energy had its institutional centre
in the newly created Department of Energy and Climate Change (the
Energy Department that existed prior to 1992 was abolished during
liberalisation). It was partly a response to a resource situation which
looked increasingly problematic: with the decline of North Sea oil
and gas production, the UK had become a net importer of gas, whilst
prices for energy imports had been rising since 2005. The new activism
included support for all forms of low-carbon generation, including
nuclear and CCS (a law promoting CCS was adopted in 2008). At the
same time, the government was criticised for not really drawing the
appropriate lessons regarding the shortcomings of the RO with the
reforms of 2008 to 2010 (Wood and Dow 2011; Woodman and Mitchell
2011). The ambivalence of the Conservative–Liberal Democratic coali-
tion on feed-in tariffs added to this (discussed by Elliott in Chapter 2
of this volume).
Despite all that, offshore wind has gained an impressive momentum
(see also Chapter 5 by Jay in this volume). By 2010, offshore leases for
nearly 50 GW were concluded. If built, this would be far bigger than
anything envisioned by other European countries (but then no other
country has the offshore wind resources of the UK). These plans enjoyed
considerable support from the main electricity companies, renewable
energy associations and the big environmental organisations; among
the rare opponents were, not surprisingly, two big prospective nuclear
operators in the UK – EDF and E.ON – who feared for their markets if
offshore wind was not restrained (Woodman 2009; Ristau 2009).
Even if offshore wind is built up in a grand style, it is doubtful
whether this will lead to a manufacturing base for wind power compa-
rable to that of Denmark, Germany and Spain, the early movers. At
the time when these countries built up their wind power industries,
they did not have to face the intense, global competition on the turbine
market that prevails today. Despite rapid growth over the past few years,
UK employment in the wind power sector still stands at only 9,200
FTE employees (Renewable Energy Focus 2011) – less than one tenth of
current German employment in this sector. The employment expected
from UK leadership in offshore wind by 2020 is put around 50,000
(Windpower Monthly 2008; Windpower Monthly 2010a), about half of
German wind industry employment in 2010 (see below).
Wind power policy in Germany
The political accident of the 1990 German Feed-in Law

A lack of commitment – or indeed aversion – to market support for
wind power was evident in the Conservative–Liberal German govern-
ment well into the 1990s, despite very different demands from German
society. At the end of the 1980s, the German government (with a Liberal
minister of economic affairs in charge of energy policy and in partic-
ular of electric utilities) insisted that most renewables – in particular
wind and solar power – were merely candidates for perpetual subsidy.
The German parliament however saw things differently, and so did
German society. The sudden growth of coal and nuclear generation
after the oil crises of the 1970s had given rise to a strong anti-nuclear
movement – with opposition to nuclear becoming the majority view
after the Chernobyl accident (Jahn 1992) – the acid rain controversy
and concern with climate change.
In the late 1980s, Conservative backbenchers started two members’
bills featuring a feed-in tariff in a clear challenge to their Conservative
and Liberal leaders. Given the popularity of those proposals, the govern-
ment offered to swap the withdrawal of the first bill against a demon-
stration programme for 100 MW of wind power (plus a programme
for 1000 solar roofs), an offer which was taken up by the bill’s spon-
sors. A year later, another Conservative MP secured such broad support
among MPs for a similar bill that the leadership this time decided that
trying to stop this bill just before general elections would be unwise.
The big electricity incumbents were then more concerned with taking
over the East German electricity sector (subsequent to German unifi-
cation) than with a bill they thought insignificant, as in their view
renewable energy was bound to fail (Jacobsson and Lauber 2005). In
fact, the feed-in law of 1990 inaugurated a new era of market creation
for RES-E.
This law was shaped by the existing system of regulated territorial

monopolies. It provided for an obligation on the part of public electric
utilities to accept all renewable electricity from specified sources gener-
ated in their territory (later limited to 5 per cent of a company’s total
supply, and another 5 per cent for its next grid operator) and to pay for
it with rates differentiated by technology and defined as a percentage
of household electricity prices. The law also excluded utilities from
applying feed-in tariff to their own installations unless they were
outside their own territory; they were expected – but largely failed – to
develop renewable energy installations on their own.
The feed-in tariff introduced by the 1990 feed-in law for wind power
amounted to at least 90 per cent of the average household rate. For
several years, it could be combined with support from the 100 MW
wind programme (later augmented to 250 MW); this created signifi-
cant extra income and almost doubled the feed-in tariff. In addition,
government banks granted long-term, low-interest loans for wind
power plants. Some state governments added special investment subsi-
dies (Bruns et al. 2011: 275–276). All this led to a first dramatic expan-
sion of wind power deployment, from 20 MW installed in 1989 to
about 500 MW of new installations in 1995. This was accompanied by a
substantial number of new entrants to the electricity sector (generators
and producers of equipment) which were highly motivated to deploy
wind power, while the big incumbents fought RES-E deployment tooth
and claw. The diffusion of wind power also stimulated learning and
innovation, leading to the development of a German industrial base
for wind turbines and associated goods and services. Employment in
the wind power sector reached 10,000 in 1995 (Bruns et al. 2011: 279).
These developments increased the political system’s support for renew-
able energy and secured new allies, including industrial associations
(in particular, the VDMA – the German Association of Equipment
Producers), as well as the metal workers’ union and farmer associations
(farmers were the most frequent owners of wind turbines).
With the law’s impact mounting rapidly year by year, the elec-
tricity incumbents attempted to put a halt to it by legal challenges
in various courts, by (illegally) refusing to pay out feed-in tariffs to
renewable generators and by pushing for the law’s repeal. Eventually
all court challenges failed, but for several years they led to considerable
uncertainty which compounded the problems of an emergent sector.
Rapid up-scaling of turbines involved high development costs which,
combined with a near-stagnant market, meant shrinking revenues
and a drastic shrinking of the workforce for turbine producers. Several
went bankrupt including Tacke, the second biggest. Planning became

a problem when a high court in 1994 held that wind turbines had no
privileged status. For some time this encouraged opposition to wind
power. The problem was resolved by a new planning law in 1997 which
greatly improved the predictability of administrative procedures (Bruns
et al. 2011: 283–93).
Complaints by the electricity incumbents to DG Competition led
at first only to exhortations by the Competition Commissioner to the
German government to reduce rates, especially for wind power. These
were eventually taken up by the Economic Affairs Ministry which, in
1997–98, proposed to amend the law. However, after a broad pro-wind
alliance demonstrated in favour of wind energy, the government and
its amendment was deserted by some of its own MPs. Once the 1998
amendment was rejected, installations resumed their upward develop-
ment (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006). The 1998 elections led to a new
majority in parliament formed by Social Democrats and Greens, who
were determined to take renewable energy a big step forward while
phasing out nuclear power. A new law – the EEG or Renewable Energy
Sources Act – was voted in April 2000 and opened a new era of growth
for RES-E, including wind power. The new government also fought a
Commission proposal to introduce certificate harmonisation at the EU
level (Lauber and Schenner 2011).
Stepping up market creation: the German Renewable

Energy Sources Act of 20002
For the red-green coalition, transition to renewable energy was a central
goal. The stated purpose of the law was to overcome the traditional
barriers inhibiting renewable energy by industrialising technologies
through setting a fair return for RES-E installations. This would initiate
a virtuous circle of innovations, mass production and price reductions,
while creating new industrial employment and exports. It would also
reduce the competitive advantages drawn by fossil and nuclear genera-
tion from not paying for their external costs, yet still being subsidised.
Another law provided for the gradual phase-out of nuclear energy over
about two decades.
As in 1990, the initiative came essentially from Parliament (the
Bundestag) and had to bypass the resistance of the new Minister of
Economic Affairs, a former electric utility executive who attempted
to sabotage these efforts but was eventually ignored by the red-green
Bundestag majority. Further, after the 2002 general election, compe-
tence for renewable energy was shifted from Economic Affairs to the
Environment Ministry, which was then held by the Greens (reflecting

their newly increased share of the vote).
The law strengthened the position of renewable generators by
providing for fixed feed-in payments differentiated by technology, size
of installation and other criteria. An unlimited purchasing obligation
on the part of grid companies ensuring priority dispatch for renew-
able generation meant that RE generators did not need to worry about
finding a buyer for their electricity or negotiating a contract (a point
only clarified in 2004), and knew exactly what price they would be
paid, since fixed feed-in rates are payable for 20 years (without adjust-
ment for inflation). This was intended to bring investment security
and do away with the unstable feed-in rates created by liberalisation.
For each year’s cohort or ‘vintage’ of new wind power installations,
an annual degression of 1.5 per cent was introduced to reflect tech-
nological learning. Feed-in rates for wind vary with the quality of the
resource in order to encourage deployment even outside the windiest
areas. In the best areas, the high initial tariff of 9.1 eurocents/kWh
went down to 6.2 cents after five years (after nine years in the case of
offshore wind); in other areas, the higher tariff was paid for a propor-
tionally longer period. Annual deployment of turbines saw a veritable
boom, reaching a peak of 3.2 GW in 2002, but declined thereafter
mostly due to a lack of good sites. Deployment was pushed ahead by
many small and medium-sized investors (farmers, joined increasingly
by small investors holding shares in wind farms). Municipal utilities
also played an important role. Loans from banks were easy to obtain
as guaranteed feed-in rates made projects easily bankable, and special
loans from a publicly owned bank – the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau –
helped to keep total interest payments down. Ownership in wind farms
spread to a large public. When domestic orders for the turbine industry
declined after 2002, the shortfall in demand was more than made up
by exports. In this respect, German turbine makers are still highly
successful (see below).
The Renewable Energy Sources Act no longer excluded utilities from
benefiting from the feed-in tariff in order to encourage them to become
involved, particularly in offshore wind which was thought to be
beyond the reach of small investors or even municipal energy compa-
nies. However, the big incumbent utilities – now reduced to four (E.ON,
RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall) – have so far hardly made use of this provi-
sion. In 2009, their share of new renewable generation (excluding large
hydro) was still below 1 per cent – at a time when the total RES-E share
was already around 13 per cent nationally (Hirschl et al. 2011).
The Renewable Energy Sources Act Amendments

of 2004 and 2008
The first comprehensive amendment of the EEG Act was enacted
in 2004 by the same governing red–green coalition but again in a
climate of strong antagonism. As in 2000, the Conservatives and
Liberals generally opposed the law and argued for a tradable certifi-
cates scheme. For onshore wind power, the amendment did not bring
major change, even though it briefly became the subject of contro-
versy when the new Economic Affairs Minister attacked the ‘exces-
sive rates’ it supposedly enjoyed. In the end, degression was slightly
increased (2 per cent annually instead of 1.5 per cent) and the lower
rate following the first five or more years of operation was lowered
further still. For offshore wind, the duration of the initial rate was
extended to at least 12 years, and longer if the distance from the
coast exceeded 12 nautical miles or if water depth exceeded 20 metres
(Lauber and Mez 2006). This stimulated interest in offshore sites but
did not lead to actual projects. The law also made clear that a renew-
able generator did not need a contract with a grid company because
the law governed off-take directly. This greatly reduced uncertainty
and paperwork.
In 2005, the red-green coalition was replaced by a Conservative–
Social Democratic coalition. Even though the Conservatives were the
stronger partner and had refused to support the Renewable Energy
Sources Act in 2004 (they had demanded that the act expire within
a few years), they now accepted its continuation – despite a renewed
attack on it by the big utilities – due to the even balance of forces
within the coalition. As a result and with the Social Democrats in
charge of the Environment Ministry, the 2008 amendment was not
a matter of great controversy but rather of adjustment in the details.
Also in 2008, the government played an important role in derailing
Commission efforts at harmonisation via tradable certificates (Lauber
and Schenner 2011). In the 2008 amendment, wind power was treated
more favourably again. The initial rate for onshore wind (which due to
degression was already down to 8.03 cents) was increased to 9.2 cents
to reflect increased turbine costs in a context of rising copper and steel
prices (Bruns et al. 2011: 300), but the lower rate was reduced later to
5.02 cents. For offshore wind, the initial rate was increased to 13 cents
(and temporarily to 15 cents for installations going on stream by 2015).
The rate of degression for onshore wind tariffs was reduced to 1 per
cent, whilst for offshore wind it was set at 5 per cent beginning in 2015
(EEG 2008: section 20).
However, the outlook for onshore wind darkened considerably soon

after the enactment of the EEG in 2000. By 2002, new installations
reached their highest point – 3.200 MW in one year. But thereafter they
declined and soon settled around annual additions of 1.500 MW to
2.000 MW. This was primarily due to the perception in the leading wind
states of Schleswig Holstein and Lower Saxony that further growth was
no longer desirable, given the impact on the landscape. Some potential
was seen in repowering, but so far has played only a minor role (Bruns
et al. 2011: 298–308). Onshore wind seemed condemned to stagnation,
but turbine exports flourished nonetheless. German employment in the
wind power sector was estimated at about 102,000 for 2009, shrinking
to 96,000 in 2010 (BMU 2011: 42). The export share of wind power
equipment rose from 12 per cent in 2000 to 83 per cent in 2008 (Bruns
et al. 2011: 306). Despite steady growth in output, Germany’s world
market share declined from 60 per cent in 2003 to about 28 per cent in
the period 2007–2010 (Umwelt 2011: 31).
Conservative–Liberal U-turns in 2010 and 2011

A new impulse for onshore wind came from an unexpected direction.
In 2009, a Conservative–Liberal government – the first since 1998 – had
the opportunity to develop its own energy policy. It was likely to be
much less favourable to renewable energy and particularly to distrib-
uted renewables. The government knew it was going against strong
public opinion since, for many years, clear majorities had existed in
favour of renewable energy and opposed to nuclear power, even among
Conservative and Liberal voters (Forsa 2009). In a 2008 poll, support
for a 100 per cent shift to renewable electricity ranged from 91 per cent
among Green voters to 71 per cent among Conservative voters (Forsa
2008). Nonetheless, the Conservative–Liberal government reversed
the nuclear phase-out decided by the red–green coalition, or rather
postponed it by at least a decade (to beyond 2030). Nuclear was now
dubbed a ‘bridging technology’ until renewable energy would become
fully ready and affordable, implying that this was not the case yet. The
government’s technology of choice was offshore wind with a massive
expansion based on additional subsidies scheduled during the decade
up to 2020. Project DESERTEC (the build-up of concentrated solar
power and wind energy in North Africa and the Middle East, linked
to the EU by high voltage direct current underwater cables) involved
an even longer time horizon. Both projects were pushed by big elec-
tricity incumbents and a few other large corporations. For incumbents,
they had the advantage of fitting their model of big, centralised and
extremely capital-intensive generation, long-distance transmission,

supposed economies of scale and lack of transparency. They also gave
conventional generators breathing-time during which old, amortised
nuclear and coal plants could generate substantial profits. By contrast,
the growth of distributed renewables was to be scaled back according
to a government commissioned report, although explicit targets for this
were never endorsed (ewi-gws-prognos 2010). In any case, plans existed
to step up degression for onshore wind and to reduce its privileges in
planning whilst biogas and PV were to be dealt with more harshly.
The nuclear accident at Fukushima (Japan) in March 2011 upset
these plans, at least in part. But rather than a return to the earlier EEG
philosophy of encouraging distributed generation, it signalled a reori-
entation of energy policy towards serving the interests of the four big
electricity incumbents (E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall). Shortly
after the accident, Chancellor Angela Merkel made a second U-turn on
energy policy and announced the temporary closure of the seven oldest
nuclear reactors. This was soon followed by the announcement of a
bill on a nuclear phase-out, with the intention to ‘accelerate the transi-
tion to renewables even more strongly’. In June, a phase-out bill and an
EEG amendment (plus other energy legislation) was whipped through
parliament. All this was supposed to stem the tide of voters that were
deserting the government coalition after Fukushima, as evidenced
by a number of regional (Länder) elections that produced opposition
landslides. Several Länder announced new plans to accelerate the tran-
sition to renewables and emphasised wind, a resource that had been
constrained politically by some Länder governments, especially in
Southern Germany. Thus onshore wind is likely to enter a new growth
phase in Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and
elsewhere. The federal government, however, only moderated its plans
to curtail distributed renewables somewhat (it stepped up degression
for onshore wind from 1 to 1.5 per cent and further constrained PV
despite strongly falling prices) and substantially improved tariff rates
for offshore wind (to 19 cents for 12 years). Meanwhile, it also discussed
subsidies for fossil generation and large extensions of the high-voltage
grid, again favouring centralised generation and thus incumbents.
German offshore wind policy

Deployment of offshore wind turbines in Germany is faced with
greater problems than in most North Sea countries, at least with
current technology. Envisioned distances to the coast are 30–100 km,
with water depths up to 40 metres. There is little experience with
offshore oil and gas (unlike Britain and Denmark). According to a 2002
government strategy paper, the target for installed offshore capacity
by 2010 was 2,000–3,000 MW, reaching 25,000 MW by 2030 (Bruns
et al. 2011). Despite substantial improvements of offshore remunera-
tion in the 2004 and 2008 EEG amendments, deployment stagnated.
By mid-2010, operating offshore capacity amounted to 72 MW in
Germany, compared to 1341 MW in the UK (Windpower Monthly
2010b). German incumbents preferred to build in the UK and other
places where projects are technically easier and – as under the RO –
also more lucrative. Within a few years, offshore wind may also have
difficulties competing with PV on prices. EEG (Renewable Energy Act)
2011–12 raised the tariff for offshore wind temporarily to 19 cents per
kWh for installations going on stream before the end of 2017.
Summary and outlook

After a decade of strong though not always unanimous support, German
commitment to renewable energy faltered in 2009–2010 with the
Conservative–Liberal government. But the 2011 Fukushima disaster, by
sealing the future of nuclear, opened new possibilities for renewables.
But it remains to be seen whether these events opened a phase of ‘renew-
ables for incumbents’. In another development, the Conservative–Social
Democratic government in 2009 had to withdraw a bill favouring CCS
due to strong resistance to this technology in northern Germany. Even
a new, more restrictive bill is being held up by the upper chamber, so
that there will be little CCS for some years. Germany must now succeed
with renewable electricity since it has curtailed other options.
Comparison of British and German wind power policies
In 1990, Germany and the UK had a similarly small share of renewable

electricity (about 3 per cent from hydropower). Support for wind power
was at first modest in both countries and came about more or less acci-
dentally. But in Germany, the political system developed substantially
greater commitment to renewable energy and much more effective
legislation.
In the UK, market creation via NFFO was a neo-liberal exercise and
a by-product of nuclear power privatisation, creatively used by a moti-
vated bureaucrat. In Germany, the first law on a renewable energy
feed-in tariff was invented by parliament in 1990 but for eight years had
only grudging support from the Conservative–Liberal government and
its parliamentary leadership. After 2000, the New Labour government
was initially sceptical about nuclear and wanted to promote renewables

more effectively. Yet it placed market ideology above other consider-
ations. The RO was based largely on faith in neo-classical economics
and did not work as it was supposed to. Oligopoly governed instead of
competition, RES-E prices and profits were unexpectedly high (among
the highest in Europe) and stayed that way while deployment remained
very modest (also due to long neglected planning problems). New RES-E
technologies and equipment industries could not flourish. After a few
years of operation, this scheme came under criticism and was some-
what improved, but the problems do not seem to have been resolved.
Equipment producers are still rare today and RES-E employment stands
at about 9,000, roughly the number achieved in Germany in 1995. In
2011, renewable power is still only one of several options for the UK
government, next to CCS and nuclear, with all three options subsidised.
Essential choices are still left to the ‘market’.
With a red–green government, Germany took a very different
approach. The ‘Act on Granting Priority to Renewable Energy Sources’
envisioned a progressive displacement of fossil and nuclear generation
as a major project for German society, including changes in industry,
employment, innovation and even foreign policy. Rather than rewarding
electricity suppliers for deploying mature technologies with high wind-
fall profits, it fostered the participation of new entrants to challenge
the electricity incumbents who, in turn, were subjected to such obli-
gations as unlimited off-take of renewable energy, free connection
and priority dispatch. Despite remunerations which were considerably
more modest than in the UK and profits which were a fraction of their
counterpart in Britain, this set off a boom in wind energy deployment
which led to about 27 GW of installed capacity in 2011 (more than five
times that of the UK). However, deployment has been confronted with
a growing scarcity of favourable sites for some years now. Even so, it
created a world-class wind power equipment industry, providing about
100,000 jobs. Although the future remains uncertain, with onshore
wind encountering spatial limits and offshore wind not getting off the
ground, Germany has a strong motive to make a success out of renewa-
bles, as it has all but eliminated nuclear and CCS as alternatives.
In terms of transaction costs, British wind power investors have to
overcome substantial planning problems, negotiate a contract and
obtain a bank loan for an enterprise viewed as risky. By contrast German
investors can rely on guaranteed off-take by a grid company and on
fixed prices guaranteed for 20 years which generally make it easy to
secure a bank loan. No wonder that in the UK new entrants are rare,
with wind power being mostly the domain of incumbents. In contrast,

in Germany incumbents did not bother with the slim pickings offered
by feed-in tariffs whilst new entrants have been numerous, including
farmers, co-ops, shareholders, with about one million individuals for all
RES-E installations.
Conclusion: lessons from wind power
The most important lesson of this comparison may be that a shift to

wind power, and to renewable energy generally, is more likely to moti-
vate support if it is conceived as a major societal project capable of
enrolling citizen support in one of the key challenges of our age.
Another lesson is that most incumbents of the conventional power
industry are prone to fight rearguard battles to slow down distributed RE
by supporting a regulatory regime designed for this purpose. From the
1990s to the present day, they have tried to do away with effective and
efficient renewable electricity support schemes – particularly feed-in
tariffs – and supported quantity-based mechanisms (such as the RO)
which can secure high windfall profits for deploying mature technolo-
gies whilst holding back ‘disruptive’ innovations – that is, disruptive of
the incumbents’ comfort zone (Lauber 2011). Usually they could secure
the support of economic affairs ministries in this effort. It is true that
since about 2005, this opposition has subdued considerably, with the
exception of the period of Conservative–Liberal government preceding
Fukushima.
This shows how important it is to locate governance of renewable
energy within institutions not captured by electricity incumbents and
to foster, by appropriate regulation, the growth of groups not exclu-
sively motivated by profit and who support renewable energy against
attempts at roll-back (citizens, cooperatives, municipal utilities). The
facilitation of new entrants is essential in this process. Well-designed
feed-in tariffs allow for this. In due course, the economic success of the
new technologies will also broaden its support across government and
interest groups (Buschmann 2011).
Ideally, RES-E regulation will encourage diffusion of promising new
technologies and thus advance innovation; reduce risks for investors in
RES-E technologies and then limit support to what is really necessary to
motivate renewable generators and producers of equipment; encourage
innovation by channelling monetary flows to innovators rather than to
routine operators eager for windfall profits by giving priority to mature
technologies; keep down transaction costs and support new entrants.
The feed-in tariffs for wind power have proven that they can be designed
to achieve all those goals. Tradable green certificate schemes have not
done so up to now. The outcomes are clear. The RO produced some of
the highest prices (despite lower costs) and biggest profits for onshore
wind in Europe, combined with one of the lower levels of effectiveness,
whilst German feed-in tariffs achieved better deployment with lower
prices despite an inferior resource. The neo-classical economic narrative
about tradable certificates seems largely refuted (Lauber 2011).
Notes
1. Many policies described here apply only to England and Wales, such as the
NFFO and the RO (whereas Scottish has its own variant of the RO).
2. The discussion of Germany until 2004 relies heavily on Jacobsson and
Lauber (2006).
References
Agnolucci, P. (2007) ‘The importance and policy impact of post-contractual
opportunism and competition in the English and Welsh non-fossil fuel obli-
gation’, Energy Policy, 35: 1, 475–486.
BMU (Bundesministerium für Umwelt [German Environment Ministry]) (2011)
Entwicklung der erneuerbaren Energien in Deutschland im Jahr 2010, Grafiken und
Tabellen, March 2011, Berlin: BMU.
Bruns, E., Ohlhorst, D., Wenzel, B. and Köppl, J. (2011) Renewable Energies in
Germany’s Electricity Market. A Biography of the Innovation Process, Heidelberg:
Springer.
Buschmann, M. (2011) Erneuerbare Energien und das politische System – Der
Ausbau von Wind- und Solarenergie als Resultat einer Interaktion von Politik und
Technologie, PhD dissertation, University of Salzburg, Austria.
CEC (Commission of the European Communities) (1997) Energy for the Future:
Renewable Sources of Energy. White Paper for a Community Strategy and Action
Plan, COM(97)599 final.
CEC (Commission of the European Communities) (1999) Working Paper: Electricity
from Renewable Energy Sources and the Internal Electricity Market, SEC(99)470 of
13 April.
CEC (Commission of the European Communities) (2005) Communication from
the Commission: The Support of Electricity from Renewable Sources, COM(2005)627
of 7 December.
CEC (Commission of the European Communities) (2008) Commission Staff
Working Document. The Support of Electricity from Renewable Sources, SEC(2008)57
of 23 January. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/climate _ actions/doc/2008 _ res _wor
king _document _en.pdf, accessed on 22 July 2011.
DEWI (German Wind Energy Institute) (2010) ‘Status der windenergienutzung
in Deutschland stand 30.06.2010’, http://www.wind-energie.de/fileadmin/
dokumente/statistiken/WE%20Deutschland/D_2010_1HJ_ Statistik.pdf,
accessed on 8 February 2011.
DEWI (German Wind Energy Institute) (2011) ‘Windenergie in Deutschland.

Aufstellungszahlen für das Jahr 2010’, http://www.wind-energie.de/fileadmin/
dokumente/statistiken/WE%20Deutschland/110126_PM_Dateien/Statistik_
Kurzversion_2010.pdf, accessed on 8 February 2011.
Dinica, V. (2003) Sustainable Diffusion of Renewable Energy, Twente: Twente
University Press.
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) (2000) New and Renewable Energy –
Prospects for the 21st Century: Preliminary Consultation, London: DTI.
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) (2007) Meeting the Energy Challenge – A
White Paper on Energy, London: HMSO.
DTI/NOF (Department of Trade and Industry/New Opportunities Fund) (no date)
Offshore Wind Capital Grant Scheme http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov
.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file23956.pdf, accessed on 10 May 2011.
EEG (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz [Renewable Energy Act]) (2008) Translation
of the Act Revising the Legislation on Renewable Energy Sources in the Electricity
Sector and Amending Related Provisions, http://www.bmu.de/files/english/pdf
/application/pdf/eeg_2009_en_bf.pdf, accessed on 30 June 2011.
EFRAC (House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee)
(2007) Climate Change: The Citizen’s Agenda, Eight report of Session 2006–07,
vol. 1, London: HMSO.
EWEA (European Wind Energy Association) (2009) Pure Power. Wind Energy
Targets for 2020 and 2030, http://www.ewea.org/fileadmin/ewea_documents
/documents/publications/reports/Pure_Power_Full_Report.pdf, accessed on 8
February 2011.
EWEA (European Wind Energy Association) (2011) Wind in Power. 2010 European
Statistics, February 2011, http://ewea.org/fileadmin/ewea_documents/documents
/statistics/EWEA_Annual_Statistics_2010.pdf, accessed on 8 February 2011.
Ewi-gws-prognos (2010) Studie Energieszenarien für ein Energiekonzept der
Bundesregierung für das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, http:
//www.bmu.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/energieszenarien_2010.
pdf, accessed on June 30.
Forsa (2008) ‘Mehrheit wünscht Stromversorgung vollständig aus erneuerbaren
Energien’, http://www.unendlich-viel-energie.de/de/detailansicht/article/4
/forsa-umfrage-mehrheit-wuenscht-stromversorgung-vollstaendig-aus-
erneuerbaren-energien.html, accessed on 14 March 2012.
Forsa (2009) Mehrheit lehnt Atomkraft ab, survey conducted 20–22 April, http:
//www.bmu.de/pressearchiv/16_legislaturperiode/pm/43813.php. accessed on
14 March 2012.
Helm, D. (2004) Energy, The State and The Market: British Energy Policy since 1979,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hirschl, B., Neumann, A. and Vogelpohl, T. (2011) Investitionen der vier großen
Energiekonzerne in erneuerbare Energien, Berlin: Institut für ökologische
Wirtschaftsforschung.
Jacobsson, S. and Lauber, V. (2005) ‘Germany: from a modest feed-in law to
a framework for transition’, in V. Lauber (ed.) Shifting to Renewable Power,
London: Earthscan.
Jacobsson, S. and Lauber, V. (2006) ‘The politics and policy of energy system
transformation – explaining the German diffusion of renewable energy tech-
nology’, Energy Policy, 34: 3, 256–276.
Jahn, D. (1992) ‘Nuclear power, energy policy and new politics in Sweden and
Germany’, Environmental Politics, 1: 3, 383–417.
Lauber, V. (2011) ‘The European experience with renewable energy support
schemes and their adoption: potential lessons for other countries’, Renewable
Energy Law and Policy Review, 2, 121–133.
Lauber, V. and Mez, L. (2006) ‘Renewable energy policy in Germany, 1974–2005’,
Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society, 26: 2, 105–120.
Lauber, V. and Schenner, E. (2011) ‘The struggle over support schemes for renew-
able electricity in the European Union: a discursive-institutionalist analysis’,
Environmental Politics, 20: 4, 508–527.
Lipp, J. (2007) ‘Lessons for effective renewable electricity policy from Denmark,
Germany and the United Kingdom’, Energy Policy, 35, 5481–5495.
McCabe, J. (2011) ‘£7bn windfall for UK utilities from carbon price’, Environmental
Finance, 28 June, http://www.environmental-finance.com/news/view/1808,
Madlener, R. and Fouquet, R. (1999) ‘Markets for tradable renewable electricity
certificates: Dutch experience and British prospects’, Paper, British Institute of
Electrical Engineers Conference, Oxford, September 21–22.
Mitchell, C. (2000) ‘The England and Wales Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation: history
and lessons’, Annual Review of Energy and the Environment, 25, 285–312.
Mitchell, C. and Connor, P. (2004) ‘Renewable energy policy in the UK,
1990–2003’, Energy Policy, 32: 17, 1935–1947.
Mitchell, C., Bauknecht, D. and Connor, P. (2006) ‘Effectiveness through risk
reduction: a comparison of the renewable obligation in England and Wales
and the feed-in system in Germany’, Energy Policy, 34: 3, 297–305.
ODPM (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister) (2004) Planning Policy Statement 22:
Renewable Energy, London: HMSO.
Renewable Energy Focus (2011) ‘UK wind energy employment rises 91 per
cent’, 2 February (referring to a study commissioned by RenewableUK and
EU Skills).
Ristau, O. (2009) ‘E.ON will Deckelung für erneuerbare Energien’, Solarthemen,
301 (9 April), 2.
Rutledge, I. (2007) ‘New labour, energy policy and “competitive markets”’,
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 31: 6, 901–925.
Seager, A. (2008) ‘PM survives backbench revolt over renewable energy policy’,
The Guardian, May 1, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/may/01
/renewableenergy.carbonemissions, accessed 1 Feb. 2011.
Stenzel, T. and Frenzel, A. (2008) ‘Regulating technological change – the stra-
tegic reactions of utility companies towards subsidy policies in the German,
Spanish and UK electricity markets’, Energy Policy, 36, 2645–2657.
Anon. (no date) The Wind Power, Wind turbines and Wind farms database (N.N):
Wind Energy Data for the UK, http://www.thewindpower.net/country-
datasheet-8-united-kingdom.php, accessed on 8 February 2011.
Thomas, S. (2009) ’Nuclear power in Britain’, in L. Mez, M. Schneider and
S. Thomas (eds) International Perspectives on Energy Policy and the Role of Nuclear
Power, Brentwood, Essex: Multi-Science Publishers.
Toke, D. (2002) ‘Wind power in the UK and Denmark: can rational choice help
explain different outcomes?’, Environmental Politics, 11, 83–100.
Toke, D. (2005) ‘Are green certificates the way forward for renewable energy?’,
Environment and Planning C, 23: 3, 361–74.
Toke, D. (2007) Making the UK Renewables Program FITTER, London: World Future
Council.
Toke, D. (2011) ‘The UK offshore wind power programme: a sea change in UK
energy policy?’, Energy Policy, 39: 2, 526–534.
Uhlir, M. (2011) Politische Unterstützung für Erneuerbare Energien Technologien
zur Elektrizitätsbereitstellung in Deutschland und Großbritannien. Motivationen,
Widerstände und Förderstrategien. MA thesis, University of Salzburg, Austria.
Umwelt (2011), Magazine Published by the Swiss Environment Agency –
Bundesamt für Umwelt BAFU, 2, 31.
Windpower Monthly (2008) ‘Strong British signals on renewables’, 24: 11, 48.
Windpower Monthly (2010a) ‘Developing the UK’s offshore wind sector’,
Supplement to June issue, 26: 6, 5.
Windpower Monthly (2010b) ‘Europe offshore’, Supplement to August issue, 26:
8, 6.
Wood, G. and Dow, S. (2011) ‘What lessons have been learned in reforming the
Renewables obligation? An analysis of internal and external failures in UK
renewable energy policy’, Energy Policy, 39: 5, 2228–2244.
Woodman, B. (2009) ‘Time to come clean’, Windpower Monthly, 25: 5, 6.
Woodman, B. and Mitchell, C. (2011) ‘Learning from experience? The develop-
ment of the renewables obligation in England and Wales, 2002–2010’, Energy
Policy, 39, 3914–3921.
4
Wind Power and Spatial
Planning in the UK
Simon Power and Richard Cowell
(S)mart and resourceful land use policies can help accelerate

the growth of clean renewable energy ... and still protect trea-
sured public lands and wildlife.
(Kenworthy 2010: 2)
Introduction
For many commentators, a key lesson from 20 years of promoting

on-shore wind energy is that ‘the planning system’ is an impediment
to expansion of the sector. This claim has been voiced in a number
of European countries (Bruns et al. 2011; Khan 2003; Wolsink 1996)
but has become something of a mantra in the UK, where the conflict
surrounding planning processes has attracted complaints from industry
and government (Cowell 2007).
For all its stridency, this discourse of ‘planning barriers to delivery’
is simplistic in its analysis of deployment problems (see Toke 2005a)
but also somewhat paradoxical, or at least incomplete, in its view of
planning. It is paradoxical because important social concerns about
wind power – including impacts on landscape, visual amenity, wildlife
and noise – vary across space. This suggests that some form of plan-
ning, to steer development away from sensitive locations and towards
more acceptable sites, ought to reduce conflict and lead to more positive
consent decisions. Indeed, it is precisely for these kinds of reasons that
numerous commentators have called for better locational guidance,
including Kenworthy, quoted above (see also Hindmarsh 2010; IEEP
2009; Warren and Birnie 2009). Spatial planning approaches may offer
a preferable strategy to market-fuelled ‘wind rushes’, where developers
dash to exploit the most commercially attractive locations, leading to
61
spontaneous spatial concentrations of applications with cumulative

environmental consequences and heightened public anxiety.
Despite the frequency of these calls, this wider spatial steering role
of planning has been neglected in wind energy research, perhaps
because of the rather partial interpretations given to ‘planning’. Many
critics conflate ‘planning’ with ‘consent decision-making’ for specific
projects, rather than looking at the wider institutional arrangements
for reconciling competing uses of land. Academics may unwittingly
have reinforced this narrow view (Bergek 2010), with much of the
analysis of ‘social acceptability’ of wind energy drawing evidence from
public responses to specific projects. This methodological framing risks
neglecting the ways in which project-specific decisions are shaped by
deeply institutionalised judgements as to the social acceptability of
certain categories of development in particular areas, such as protec-
tive policies for National Parks (see Aitken et al. 2008). Despite this, we
know relatively little about the extent to which some of the ‘political
work’ of reconciling renewable energy development with other social
priorities might be better undertaken at a wider spatial scale, a priori to
individual projects coming forward.
This chapter responds to this knowledge deficit by reviewing the
recent experience of ‘spatial planning’ approaches for on-shore wind.
Attention is given first to the United Kingdom case, where persistent
siting difficulties for wind farms have prompted experimentation with
various forms of spatial planning. The impacts of these approaches are
evaluated, and then comparisons are drawn with experiences in other
European countries. The concluding section considers the role of spatial
planning in fostering wider transitions to sustainable energy systems.
For many critics of ‘planning’, the main evaluative question would
be whether spatial planning approaches have had any positive effect
on the volume of wind energy development. However, to adopt uncrit-
ically such a narrow emphasis on delivering capacity would itself be
problematic. It assumes that the effectiveness of planning could or
should be judged against the delivery of a singular goal rather than its
capacity to reconcile multiple demands on the land resource (Owens
and Cowell 2010). It also neglects the ways in which planning processes
allow public engagement with decision-making, and thus affect the
legitimacy of actions taken. There are real questions, therefore, about
whether ‘resourceful land use policies’ could, or should, accelerate
delivery as Kenworthy suggests. The analysis thus considers the relation-
ships between delivery, democratic engagement, and impact mediation
in spatial planning approaches. To guide the analysis, the next section
Wind Power and Spatial Planning in the UK 63
provides a brief conceptual framework for interpreting the diverse

governance roles that spatial planning mechanisms can perform.
Spatial planning, renewable energy and

modes of governance
The basic concept of a ‘spatial planning approach’ being analysed here

is intuitively simple – some form of analytical exercise, often centred
on the construction of maps, which assesses an area’s potential for wind
energy against an array of environmental, social and resource criteria,
and uses this to guide future actions (see also Nadaï 2007).1 Look closer
at this intuitively simple idea, however, and it becomes clear that spatial
planning approaches can be implicated in very different ‘modes of
governing’ (Bulkeley et al. 2005: 2). This refers to the arrangements
between rules, actors and decision-making methods through which
particular objects are governed. Here we are concerned mainly with
governance as a state-centred activity although, as will become clear,
the capacity of the state effectively to steer the actions of governmental,
market and civil society actors through spatial planning devices is often
contested.
State power is not monolithic, which requires us to understand how
responsibility for creating and applying spatial planning exercises is
distributed across multiple tiers of government, and between different
bodies. Modes of governance might be essentially hierarchical, in which
spatial mapping exercises are undertaken by ‘higher’ levels of govern-
ment, and then used to channel the decisions of ‘lower tiers’ and devel-
opers to ensure that particular patterns of development are achieved.
Alternatively, autonomy may be conferred on local governments to
assess what they see as acceptable wind power sites within their area.
In practice, we see more hybrid institutions at work, involving various
forms of inter-governmental coordination (Smith 2007). Central
government may exercise ‘meta-governance’ (Jessop 1997) over actions
in sub-national arenas: perhaps by prescribing the mapping method-
ology which others must adopt, or requiring that the space identified
as acceptable for on-shore wind development is sufficient to achieve
capacity targets. Arrangements are likely to reflect the norms of nation-
al-to-local relations in different countries.
These scalar dimensions of the modes of governance are bound up
with two dimensions of inclusion. The first dimension is who gets to
participate directly in planning processes and how? As the spatial scale
increases, from specific sites towards more extensive areas, so the scope
for direct public participation tends to decrease. Very occasionally,

strenuous efforts are made to engage publics in strategic energy deci-
sion-making (MacKerron 2009), but it has always proved very difficult
to ‘up-scale’ highly inclusive, participatory planning processes to the
regional and national level. Democratic practice at these wider scales
tends to become the province of selective, stakeholder-based engage-
ment, based on representatives of key interests. Because of this, there is
always the risk that the policy outputs from strategic planning arenas
will fail to achieve widespread public awareness and support ‘on the
ground’. For many members of the public, the creation and mobilisa-
tion of spatial planning policies may replicate the kind of ‘decide-an-
nounce-defend’ mode of governance for which individual wind farm
developers are often criticised.
Scale is also bound up with inclusion in a second sense, in terms
of the entities represented in these spatial planning exercises. As one
expands the spatial focus from projects to wider areas, so certain issues
become more visible – such as cumulative effects from multiple wind
farm developments – but the nuances of territory fade from view. As
researchers have shown (see Chapter 8 by Haggett and Chapter 6 by
Nadaï in this volume), there are difficulties in reducing what is socially
acceptable to a standard quantifiable measure (such as a noise impact
guideline) that can be mapped. Thus, a frequent complaint of the
industry is that government attempts to zone on-shore wind energy
tend to exclude areas in which development could be made accept-
able and include areas which, on closer inspection, prove to be unsuit-
able. This ‘resolution gap’ may also blind spatial mapping exercises to
the nuances of place attachment that matter most to local publics (see
Chapter 10 by Devine-Wright in this volume). One should therefore be
keenly interested in which characteristics of territory become incorpo-
rated into these mappings and which get excluded, and the extent to
which these spatial representations are accepted or resisted by different
actors (Cowell 2010).
Clearly there are tensions running through spatial planning
approaches which are not readily designed away. On the one hand, a
degree of selectivity is integral to their very functioning, as it is only
by extracting characteristics from complex situations, and combining
them into a new picture, that government is then able to ‘see’ issues at
a wider spatial scale (Murdoch 2000: 513; Cowell 2010). Yet by doing
so, they are invariably reductionist in their treatment of the territory
that they cover. Indeed, one might accuse spatial mapping approaches
of a naive positivism, for the assumption that what is of value in a
territory – whether that be wind energy resources or environmental

qualities – have a defined, measurable existence ex ante of the inter-
vention of a specific wind farm proposal (Mackenzie 1998; see also
Chapter 6 by Nadaï in this volume).
Despite these tensions, spatial planning approaches occupy a nodal but
under-examined position within transitions towards sustainable energy
by allowing critical questions to be confronted. Spatial mapping exer-
cises could inform discussions about the extent to which wind energy
can be expanded without adversely affecting valued environments.
If a region or country has sufficient ‘space’ to meet renewable energy
targets, then fine. But if not, what should be done? Should the chal-
lenge of climate change force a re-examination of the priority given to
protecting existing landscapes (Warren and Birnie 2009)? Or should the
targets themselves be reassessed – such as the balance between on-shore
wind, other sustainable energy technologies and energy conservation?
While spatial planning exercises may produce more simplistic represen-
tations of territory than is available through the exploration of specific
sites, this simplification may help land-based environmental qualities
to ‘travel upwards’ into strategic energy policy debates, to sit alongside
economic and engineering judgements of feasibility and inform delib-
erations around future energy scenarios.
Seen in this way, planning can provide a mechanism for ‘reflexivity’,
in the sense that it enables modern societies to confront, criticise and
potentially transform those institutions, values and systems of produc-
tion implicated in environmental crisis (Beck 1992; Owens and Cowell
2010). A capacity for reflexivity is seen as an essential component of
governing for sustainability transitions (Kemp et al. 2005). In prac-
tice, whether spatial planning approaches are utilised reflexively is an
empirical question. Where powerful state actors perceive themselves to
be struggling to ‘ensure’ the delivery of renewable energy and climate
change targets, which are themselves viewed as immutable, then spatial
planning approaches may be used solely to direct the siting decisions
of local planning bodies (and developers). In such cases, it becomes
possible to observe whether such governmental orchestration of siting
actually offers an effective policy mechanism, compared to strategies
which incentivise communities to make sites available for renewable
energy (Wolsink 1996).
This section has identified key questions for the construction and
deployment of spatial planning strategies for on-shore wind and has
shown that one needs to look closely at the governing roles they may
be used to perform. In the next section, these questions are used to
interrogate strategic spatial planning practices, beginning with the

UK case.
Strategic spatial planning in practice
The UK experience
Some maps have cast a long shadow over wind energy discourse in the
UK. Early maps of average wind speeds (Troen and Petersen 1989) have
been used repeatedly to assert that the UK ‘has the best wind energy
resource in Europe’, and provide a taken-for-granted departure point
for criticising the slow speed at which this potential has been captured.
Equally, it has long been recognised that other land-based constraints
affect resource availability. Back in the 1990s, wind resource poten-
tial was being assessed against environmental constraints, especially
protected landscapes (Cornwall County Council and ETSU 1996;
Devon County Council et al. 1993). However, there was little artic-
ulation between these early mapping exercises and decision-making
processes, and they played little role in the mounting siting conflicts of
the 1990s. For example, although analysts identified in 1993 that the
county of Devon had a ‘practicable resource’2 of 100MW of on-shore
wind, 12 years elapsed before a sizeable wind farm was completed
there. 3
During the 1990s, successive UK governments failed to prioritise
renewable energy targets and were disinclined to intervene in siting
decisions. This hands-off approach can be attributed to a pervasive pro-
market stance within central government (see Chapter 3 by Lauber in
this volume) and the stern opposition of the industry to spatial planning
approaches (Cowell 2007). Generally speaking, wind energy companies
have viewed any kind of zoning as an obstruction, and presented them-
selves as the best judge of which sites should be developed (for example,
Scotland 2010).
By the early twenty-first century however, the context shifted, as
mounting pressure on the UK government to address climate change
pushed the deployment of renewable energy up the political agenda.
Conflicts and delays over wind farms were no longer a tolerable ‘local
problem’ but a situation that needed resolving. However, rather than
improving policy by seeking to better understand the social context
of technological adoption (after Shove 1998), governments tended to
frame the problem as the excessive responsiveness of planning decisions
to local opposition and insufficient weight being given to national
objectives (PIU 2002). It is at this juncture that planning policy began
to acquire an important role in the delivery of renewable energy but –

because political devolution in 1998 had given powers over planning
policy to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland – the role given to
spatial planning approaches varied significantly across the UK.
Wales
Through the 1990s, Welsh planning policy for renewable energy
followed UK norms in which local planning authorities simply adjudi-
cated on individual wind farms proposals as they received them, against
a series of criteria-based policies for landscape protection, noise and so
on. This approach gave considerable locational flexibility to developers,
but also significant license to local planning authorities in how they
weighed up the criteria. Public opposition, driven especially by visual
impacts, fed through into falling consent rates, a situation exacerbated
by the tendency for wind farm applications to concentrate in the open,
windy uplands in mid- and west- Wales. The reactive planning approach
also had difficulty ‘seeing’ cumulative effects on landscape, and ad hoc
efforts to address this led to the further refusal of projects where clus-
tering occurred. Viewing this situation with mounting dismay, wind
energy commentators famously claimed that Wales was becoming
‘closed for business’.
The growing political salience of the renewable energy targets
prompted the Welsh Government to revise its national planning
policy guidance for the sector. In the British planning system, plan-
ning policy guidance is a powerful administrative device for steering
the decisions of local planning authorities. The agenda for the revi-
sion process was dominated by on-shore wind power and the need to
reconcile capacity expansion with various environmental constraints.
Importantly, the process began with a multi-stakeholder group drawn
from government, the renewable energy industry and the environ-
mental sector. However, the working group experienced interminable
disagreements and this, coupled with increased political pressure
to ‘deliver’ more wind power, saw the task transfer to a more closed
exercise, with consultancies working to the Welsh Government and
only limited participation from other stakeholders (Cowell 2007). The
resulting policy – Technical Advice Note 8 (WAG 2005), or ‘TAN8’ as
it is widely known – set out a centrally directed spatial strategy, which
instituted seven ‘strategic search areas’ (SSAs), within which there
would be a presumption in favour of large-scale wind farm develop-
ment. ‘Large-scale’ was defined as 25MW of installed capacity and
above.
The methodology used for assessing opportunities for major wind

energy development is summarised in Table 4.1. The limited time
and resources available to the planning consultants, coupled with a
desire to be consistent across the country, militated in favour of using
extant, policy-based constraints, and those which could be mapped ‘at
a distance’ using existing databases, at an all-Wales scale. Thus, interna-
tional wildlife designations and key protected landscapes were treated
as absolute constraints; other qualities which lacked these character-
istics – such as ‘wild lands’ – were not included in the mapping exer-
cises (Cowell 2010). Despite its selectiveness, this assessment of Wales’s
Table 4.1 Methodology for the strategic assessment of opportunities for major
wind power capacity in Wales
Absolute constraints Landscape designations: National Parks: Areas of

Outstanding Natural Beauty
National and International Wildlife Protection
Designations: Natura 2000 sites (SPAs, SACs);
Ramsar Sites; National Nature Reserves; Dyfi Valley
Biosphere site; World Heritage Sites
Residential areas: land within 500 m of cities, towns
and villages
Wind speed above 6 m/sec
Ministry of Defence Tactical Training Areas and other
installations
Lakes and reservoirs
Localised constraints Civil airports and airfields

(within wind farm site) Meteorological Office radar
Sites of Special Scientific Interest, Scheduled Ancient
Monuments, registered historic parks and gardens
and their settings
Country Parks and Heritage Coastlines
Electricity Availability of spare grid capacity

distribution issues Likelihood of additional capacity coming forward
Additional criteria Each area should have capacity for at least 100 MW of
for area selection on-shore wind
Contains at least two separate prospective wind farm
sites; encompasses and/or is close to an existing
wind farm
‘Positive siting factors’ – in single ownership, open
access land
Avoids National Park boundaries by 4 km or more
Significant areas with few, isolated dwellings
Source: Information obtained from WAG 2004, figure redrawn by the authors.
‘environmental capacity’ for on-shore wind has helped inform renew-

able energy targets. TAN8 set down the Welsh Government’s goal of
achieving 800MW from new onshore wind capacity by 2010, a figure
driven partly by the essentially arbitrary national target of obtaining
10 per cent of electricity from renewable sources by 2010, but also
by iteration with the assessment of how much ‘unconstrained/least
constrained’ land was available for wind power. Each of the SSAs was
allocated a share of the capacity target.
TAN8 has been described as ‘the most extensive effort in the UK to
map centrally and allocate potential locations for wind farms, with
the intention of proactively supporting the delivery of specific targets’
(IEEP 2009: 26), but the power of this approach cannot be assumed
from the mere existence of the SSAs – one needs to look at the extent
to which these representations become translated into the decisions of
others (Cowell 2007). In their consultation responses, the wind energy
industry expressed deep unhappiness at having their locational discre-
tion fettered in this way. Local planning authority reactions were more
mixed: some resented the imposition of Welsh Government direction,
but some were mollified by the fact that TAN8 also allowed them to
take a restrictive stance towards major wind farm development outside
the SSAs. We return to the issue of impacts below.
England
While the Welsh Government introduced firm spatial zoning, govern-
ment in England has been ambivalent towards such practices. However,
following wider moves towards political decentralisation within
England, regional planning bodies were enrolled to help accelerate
the delivery of national targets for renewable energy (Smith 2007) – a
role which entailed spatial mapping exercises. These bodies were asked
to develop regional targets for obtaining electricity from renewable
sources, for 2010 and 2020, which were to be:
derived from assessments of the region’s energy resource potential,

and taking into account the regional environmental, economic and
social impacts. (ODPM 2004a: para 2)
The governance role of these assessments has been rather ambiguous.

The regions were advised to set down criteria for assessing renewable
energy projects and use them, alongside the resource assessments, to
identify ‘broad areas at the regional or sub-regional level where devel-
opment of particular types of renewable energy may be considered
appropriate’ (ODPM 2004b: 23, emphasis added). Moreover, ‘where

appropriate’, the regional targets could be ‘disaggregated into sub-
regional targets’, including giving ‘a broad indication of how different
technologies could contribute towards regional targets’ (ODPM 2004a:
para 5). Nevertheless, central government advice was vague on whether
there should be a firm, strategic line between renewable energy targets,
‘broad areas’, and decisions on individual projects. Indeed both regional
and local planning authorities were warned against taking a spatially
restrictive approach:
Planning policies that rule out or place constraints on the develop-

ment of renewable energy technologies should not be included in
regional spatial strategies or local development documents without
sufficient reasoned justification. (ODPM 2004a: para 1(ii))4
Despite the equivocal status of what they were producing, English

regional planning bodies spent considerable time examining the poten-
tial for different renewable energy technologies, including on-shore
wind, often bringing together an array of stakeholders to discuss supply
scenarios. This work generated important insights about the relation-
ship between energy targets and landscape protection producing, in
some cases, spatial demarcations of areas deemed to be ‘less constrained’
or ‘more constrained’ for wind energy development. The outcomes of
this regional working are discussed below. In May 2010, however, the
Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government announced the
abolition of the entire regional tier of governance in England, curtailing
this activity. In other respects too, national and market control over
energy planning decisions has been reinforced (Owens and Cowell
2010). Power stations over 50MW have become subject to new ‘stream-
lined’ consent procedures, on strict timetables, which applies in Wales
as well as in England. Although decisions are informed by ‘National
Policy Statements’, only for nuclear power do these statements provide
spatial steering on siting; indeed, a key tenor of the reforms has been to
ensure that technological and locational choices are deferred primarily
to market actors.
Scotland
In Scotland the dramatic expansion of on-shore wind power observed
from the late 1990s unfolded in the context of strongly supportive,
criteria-based planning policy guidance (Szarka and Blühdorn 2006).
Here too the industry resisted the introduction of spatial guidance, and
so too had the Scottish Government, fearing that it could only make
targets harder to achieve (Warren and Birnie 2009). Given the lower
population densities in Scotland, and the existence of large areas of
open land outside protective designations, developers found it more
straightforward to gain consent for projects than in Wales and England
(Toke 2005b) and to achieve larger-scale schemes. Consent for schemes
of more than 50MW installed capacity are determined by a special
unit in the Scottish Executive rather than local planning authorities,
enabling a tight coupling between national policy and consent deci-
sions. Thus, although ‘a substantial minority of all proposed schemes
have been vociferously opposed’ (Warren and Birnie 2009: 106), fewer
in the industry would claim that the planning process was ‘broken’ in
Scotland.
Nevertheless, there was still concern that planners were operating
without any ‘strategic locational guidance’, leading to uncertainty and
inconsistency in decision-making (Warren and Birnie 2009: 108). The
accumulation of wind farms in particular areas was also creating prob-
lems: Scotland was seeing the unintended emergence of ‘wind energy
landscapes’, defined as ‘landscapes ... characterised wholly or partly by
the presence of turbines’ (Arup 2008: 46). As in Wales, dealing with
cumulative effects was also seen to be affecting approval rates. Thus
the Scottish Government revised its planning guidance (SEDD 2007)
to require local authorities to identify broad areas in which wind farm
proposals over 20MW capacity would be supported, as well as areas
where they would be inappropriate. This localised ‘catch-up’ approach
to spatial steering still left some calling for national-scale intervention
(Warren and Birnie 2009).
To date, the only national spatial perspective on wind energy has been
produced by the government’s conservation advisors, Scottish Natural
Heritage (SNH), both through the production of strategic locational
guidance (SNH 2009a) and efforts to map Scottish territory according
to three zones of ‘Natural Heritage Sensitivity’ (high, medium and low).
SNH has also sought to visualise the spontaneously emerging clusters of
wind farm development though its wind farm footprint maps,5 prompt
local planning authorities to consider where the creation of wind energy
landscapes might be acceptable, and encourage thinking about ‘what
the critical factors might be that will define an eventual limit to devel-
opment’ (SNH 2009b: 43). Overt contemplation of limits to on-shore
wind sits awkwardly with a Scottish political environment dominated
by a concern to deliver ever-escalating renewable energy targets, and
SNH’s guidance is non-statutory.
Evaluating the UK experience
Establishing causal linkages between specific planning policies and

development outcomes has always been problematic, given the enor-
mous number of intervening variables (see McLaren Loring 2007).
What is being evaluated here is also rather subtle: it is not simply the
effects of environmental siting criteria on wind farm development –
such criteria already exist – but the additional effect of strategies that
draw upon those criteria but often also go beyond them, to create new
representations of development opportunities. Moreover, as noted in
the introduction, spatial planning approaches have implications for
multiple goals: delivering capacity, allowing democratic input, and
environmental protection. One is left judging how these goals have
been reconciled, on which different interests are likely to disagree.
Starting with Wales, TAN8 failed in its immediate goal of facilitating
the delivery of 800MW of new on-shore wind capacity by 2010; between
2005 and 2010 only about 95MW was installed. Because the introduc-
tion of the Strategic Search Areas (SSAs) massively re-cast the geography
of economic opportunity, schemes that were coming forward outside
the SSAs came unstuck, while time elapsed as developers worked up
new proposals for larger schemes within them. However, by 2010 Wales
had experienced a remarkable upsurge of development interest, with
about 1950MW of on-shore capacity under active consideration within
the SSAs (Arup 2010). One might conclude that TAN8 has helped to
construct a stable and therefore attractive policy environment for large-
scale wind energy investment in Wales, but not an acceleration of deci-
sion times. Indeed, by late 2011 most of this 1950MW was still in the
planning process. Two additional factors have contributed to delays.
Many of the wind farm sites within the SSAs were owned by a govern-
ment agency, Forestry Commission Wales, which required potential
developers to go through an additional tendering exercise. Coincident
with the rolling out of TAN8 there has been a significant reorganisa-
tion of decision-making procedures for major power stations in England
and Wales, as noted above, with developers taking projects through
the new procedures being required to undertake time-consuming pre-
application consultations.
In theory, many would have hoped that the firm presumption in
favour of developing large-scale wind farms within the SSAs would
confer greater certainty of outcome, but even this has yet to be fully
demonstrated. While location within a Strategic Search Area has
weighed in support of consent for some wind farms (at Blaen Gwen,
Carmarthenshire), at Mynydd-y-Gwair, Swansea, a proposal for a 45 MW

wind farm within one of the SSAs was refused by the planning authority
(a decision upheld by the Welsh Assembly Government) because the
effects on peat bog habitat were judged to be unacceptable. This is a
valued habitat but the precise site affected was not subject to European
habitats designations and thus invisible to the TAN8 strategic planning
processes. One can see how the power of the Welsh Government’s policy
guidance is moderated by the discretionary culture of British planning,
which means that decision-makers are always entitled to address ‘other
material considerations’ that apply to individual projects. TAN8 offers
no guarantees.
The Scottish Government’s advice on spatial planning approaches
will only have an effect once local planning authorities have incorpo-
rated it into their local development plans: a slow process, making it too
soon to judge the consequences for wind farm development. Likewise,
SNH’s guidance – though considered helpful by other stakeholders (IEEP
2009) – will exert most influence to the extent that it is adopted by
local authorities, and this has yet to be seen. In England, Smith’s review
(2007) concluded that most of the regions were falling short of their
self-identified targets by the period 2004–2006, but tracing the actual
effects of regional-scale spatial mapping activities is problematised by
the near-constant institutional flux and equivocation surrounding the
status of the targets and ‘broad areas’ identified for renewable energy
development. Anecdotal evidence suggests that within some local plan-
ning authorities, professional planning officers have sought to use the
regional analyses to guide decisions on individual projects, but this
has not prevented their elected councillors – the final decision-takers –
from continuing to refuse wind farm proposals without reference to the
regional-level work. This demonstrates a common theme across British
planning practice. While national planning policy, including spatial
planning approaches, may not always be given weight by local planning
authorities, it exerts more consistent influence where developers appeal
against refusal and decisions are made by government inspectors, as
they give greater weight to compliance with national advice (Aitken
et al. 2008).
If the instrumental outcomes for delivery are equivocal, to what
extent have spatial planning processes prompted reflexivity around
the goals or direction of renewable energy policy? As noted above,
the process of drawing up TAN8 in Wales shows some evidence of
iteration between the spatial assessment of wind energy development
potential and national targets, with the upsurge of development
interest within the SSAs also inspiring the Welsh Government to set
an aspirational target of delivering 2GW of on-shore wind power by
2015–2017 (WAG 2010).
In England, the processes of spatial planning and resource assess-
ment did stimulate deliberation between regional stakeholders about
the weighting of different environmental values against renewable
energy targets. Indeed, the construction and operationalisation of the
mapping methodologies reveal them to be sites of struggle, as stake-
holders discuss which environmental factors should help to define the
available resource, and which could be left to be negotiated as projects
come forward. One consequence has been that the various assessment
methodologies employed have tended to reinforce the protected status
of the ‘highest level’ sites, such as National Parks and European wild-
life sites, which then become ‘absolute constraints’ (though see SQW
and Land Use Consultants 2010). Other environmental values tended
to be excluded, partly because the information available makes it diffi-
cult to map them in ways that could be aggregated with other quali-
ties (Cowell 2010), but also where parties to the mapping exercise saw
potential threats to meeting increasing renewable energy targets. One
can see another tension here. On the one hand, mapping in ever greater
detail potential environmental factors make the prospect of accommo-
dating capacity increases look more challenging (see SQW and Land
Use Consultants 2010; Arup 2008) – in Nadaï’s terms (Chapter 6 in this
volume), the unconstrained ‘holes’ get smaller. On the other, excluding
constraints from the picture makes the ‘unconstrained resources’
look larger, but only by ignoring environmental issues that will need
addressing as sites come forward.
Interesting reflections have emerged from these various spatial
planning approaches, especially on cumulative impacts. A traditional
assumption of British planning had been that it is desirable to main-
tain separation distances between wind farms, to prevent them domi-
nating entire landscapes. This stance, and the case-by-case approach
to adjudicating planning applications, could not ‘see’ whether spatial
separation was compatible with achieving ever-higher volumes of
on-shore wind energy. In Wales, the TAN8 assessment exercises forced
the Assembly to confront a choice between dispersing wind farms
evenly across the country or concentrating development into specific
areas – it went for the latter. In the east of England, the analysis showed
that if one avoided settlements, and persisted with separation distances
between wind farms of 10km and 15km then, given the few large sites
available, this would be incompatible with wind playing a major part
in even the least ambitious renewable energy supply scenarios for 2020
(Arup 2008).
In England, however, the knowledge created by regional working
rarely travelled far beyond the stakeholders most directly involved,
and there is little evidence that the spatial planning and assessment
activity greatly influenced the direction of central government policy
(Smith 2007). Indeed, one might interpret many of the post-2004 plan-
ning reforms as efforts to reinforce a top-down delivery of major infra-
structure, including renewable energy (Owens and Cowell 2010), which
drowned out the scope for learning from below. This may also reflect
the realpolitik of reflexivity: that key advocates of spatial planning solu-
tions – the major, professional conservation bodies – are weakly repre-
sented in the core policy communities compared to industry bodies
that oppose such approaches (IEEP 2009; Toke 2010). This is unfortu-
nate, since the mapping work illustrates why it might be much harder
for England to achieve renewable energy targets through large-scale
on-shore wind than Scotland. England has a dense but dispersed rural
settlement pattern, coupled with very strong social presumptions
towards the protection of the remaining open areas. A development
strategy predicated on promoting large, visible renewable energy facili-
ties, which require significant separation distances from settlements, is
always likely to encounter difficulties, suggesting a need to give more
emphasis to other technologies and modes of development. From the
end of the last decade, scenario analysis produced for central govern-
ment began to stress precisely this point: that the availability of accept-
able sites may have strategic rather than contingent implications for
wind energy expansion – affecting ‘how much wind?’ rather than just
‘where?’ (Arup 2011; see also Mackay 2008).
There is relatively little evidence that the potential difficulties in
finding ‘sufficient acceptable spaces’ for wind energy, as represented
through spatial planning and assessment exercises, has prompted
serious attention to be directed ‘downwards’, to consider how one might
incentivise local communities to make more sites available. Indeed, the
Welsh government’s mobilisation of a nationally-directed spatial plan-
ning strategy was predicated partly on the assumption that few places
would volunteer sites on the scale required. Avoiding the most sensitive
sites may well reduce objections from major conservation bodies (to the
extent that their concerns are represented in the environmental criteria
of the mapping exercise), but it has clearly not obviated local objec-
tions, even if the policy presumption in favour of large scale wind in the
SSAs may, ultimately, prevent those objections from blocking projects.
Governments in all parts of the UK have been interested in promoting

community benefits as a way of addressing social acceptability issues
(see Chapter 9 by Strachan and Jones in this volume), but such practices
are led by the developers of individual projects, not integrated with the
spatial planning exercises.
On a final note, one might expect spatial planning to help coordi-
nate generating capacity investment with grid improvement, by giving
advance indication of where wind power development will be concen-
trated. Analysis for TAN8 in Wales back in 2003–2004 showed that if
the full capacity of some of the mid-Wales SSAs was to be achieved, then
grid reinforcement would be required. However, it was not until 2010
that potential grid connections began the formal planning process and
entered the public domain. Moreover, the routes being put forward –
crossing new areas of land far beyond the SSAs themselves – and size of
the pylons fuelled massive public opposition, which threatened to push
the Welsh Government into abandoning TAN8 entirely. This is perhaps
a further illustration of the partial vision of strategic-level spatial plan-
ning, in that assessment focused on land availability for electricity
generation facilities, but neglected the wider technological networks in
which they are embedded.
Spatial planning in other countries
A brief review of experiences with spatial planning approaches in other

countries helps to corroborate the risks of adopting certain modes of
governance, but also to identify approaches that might ameliorate the
problems encountered in the UK.
There is strong evidence that where spatial planning tools have been
used to reinforce the ‘top down’ delivery of renewable energy targets
it runs the risk that conflicts in implementation will stymie progress.
In the Netherlands, the Economic Ministry drew up an administra-
tive covenant with the planning ministry and seven coastal provinces
to identify spaces for wind energy development. However, it failed to
include the key decision-making tier – municipalities – in this spatial
planning exercise, and municipalities largely failed to translate those
spaces into their own, legally binding land use plans (Breukers and
Wolsink 2007a, 2007b). A similar fate fell Valencia’s 2001 Wind Energy
Plan (Moragues-Faus and Ortiz-Miranda 2010), which designated 15
areas for the installation of wind farms, soliciting significant investor
interest, but again without the involvement of local government. The
plan attracted major organised protest as individual wind farm projects
came forward such that, by 2010, less than half of the 1650MW of wind
energy capacity envisaged by 2007 had been installed.
The spatial planning approaches adopted in the Netherlands and
Valencia have commonalities with the TAN8 approach in Wales, and
they all share some problematic characteristics. Firstly, the national
or regional assessments of development potential tended to be domi-
nated by ‘low resolution’ dimensions of spatial knowledge, such as wind
resource yield, which inevitably omit some impacts of public concern.
Secondly, there is the assumption that using spatial planning can by
itself align local decision-making with national goals, neglecting the
underlying causes of social opposition (Wolsink 1996; Breukers and
Wolsink 2007a).
Some commentators have recommended radically different modes
of governance, in which local communities lead the process of identi-
fying suitable sites for wind farm development (Hindmarsh 2010). The
key question here is how such decentralised approaches articulate with
wider targets? Evidence from Sweden suggests that where localities feel
little inclination to accommodate wind energy, then devolving spatial
planning may institutionalise spatial exclusion (Bergek 2010). Swedish
national government introduced a national planning target for wind
power, which was broken down into county-level targets, to inform
the identification of areas of national interest for wind power develop-
ment. By allowing municipality-level government to draw up detailed
zonings, and adopt ‘the method of elimination’ (Bergek 2010: 2367), the
net result was that areas with a competing public interest land use were
often sieved out, resulting in insufficient areas of national interest for
wind power being identified. The same fate might have befallen wind
power in France, when the 2005 Energy Act introduced a requirement
for wind power development zones (WPDZ) to be drawn up. However, in
a close coupling of spatial steering and financial incentives, the system
of wind power development zones is coordinated with the provision of
market support to developers, by making receipt of benefits conditional
on location within a wind power development zone, along with a new
‘wind power tax’ for communes (the lowest level of local government),
to incentivise local political acceptance. Wind energy capacity has
continued to increase, albeit with many proposals still encountering
local objections (see Chapter 6 by Nadaï in this volume).
Rather than a complete centralisation or decentralisation of spatial
planning approaches, there is evidence that collaborative modes of
working between governmental tiers can address some of the prob-
lems. Within the Netherlands’s hierarchical approach, Breukers and
Wolsink (2007a) observed that provinces achieved greatest implemen-

tation of wind power capacity where they worked more interactively
with the lower, municipal tier of government. Germany has negotiated
the governance dilemmas by exercising forms of metagovernance over
local planning processes. In 1997, federal planning law made planning
for wind power mandatory, meaning that if local municipalities ‘do not
designate areas for wind power development in the local development
plan, developers are, in principle, free to develop projects’ outside built
up areas, provided they meet certain required standards (Breukers and
Wolsink 2007b: 2744). Municipalities that took an unduly restrictive
approach to identifying wind power zones were subject to legal chal-
lenge, while regional bodies helped guide the process by putting forward
‘appropriate areas’ within which municipalities could identify concen-
tration zones (Bruns et al. 2011). In the Land of Schleswig-Holstein,
‘ambitious plans for wind-power expansion were accompanied by a
broad-based consultative process over the period 1997–98’, that led ‘to
the identification of 166 ... “special wind areas”’ (Szarka and Blühdorn
2006: 27).
Demarcating development areas for wind energy gives an institution-
alised solidity to the social limits to growth (Hirsch 1977). The question,
from a reflexive governance point of view, is what should happen as
these areas ‘fill up’, as is actually happening in Germany (Bruns et al.
2011) and Denmark, contributing to decelerating wind energy deploy-
ment rates in those countries. One response has been to look closely
at the scope for re-powering of existing wind farm sites with higher
capacity turbines. Another, which is happening in Denmark (IEEP
2009), is to re-evaluate the environmental constraints that informed the
initial designation of development areas. Danish national government
has required municipalities to revise their spatial plans for on-shore
wind to provide additional space. The overall outcome of this approach
is unclear but, in the municipality of Ringkøbing-Skjern, the proposed
plan suggested a demonstration project within a European Natura 2000
site. Currently wind farms in Denmark are banned from such sites,
but the Institute of European Environmental Policy (IEEP) (2009: 36)
consider that such ‘structured approaches to planning ... provide an
opportunity to hold a transparent debate around hard choices, and
identify the best compromise solutions’.
One final pattern warrants comment here. The introduction of spatial
zoning seems to favour larger, commercial wind power schemes over
smaller, perhaps locally-owned initiatives. This connection is almost
explicit in France, in that to benefit from financial support, wind farms
in WPDZ also need to meet a minimum level of capacity (Nadaï 2007).

In Wales, too, only for schemes of 25MW or more is there a presump-
tion in favour of development within the SSAs. The relationship has
emerged unintentionally elsewhere, such as in Germany, Denmark
and Sweden (Breukers and Wolsink 2007b; IEEP 2009; Khan 2003).
Encouraging larger projects inevitably advantages resource-rich compa-
nies because increased scale increases cost, and the sites selected tend to
be further away from settlements. Paradoxically, it appears that the use
of spatial planning to steer expansion towards more acceptable locations
reinforces modes of development which are less likely to enjoy other
dimensions of local, social support, such as community ownership.
Conclusions
This final section offers some conclusions about the role of spatial plan-
ning approaches and lessons for wider transitions to renewable energy.
Before doing so, however, one should reflect on whether the governance
problems that spatial planning is called upon to resolve are peculiar to
on-shore wind. Certainly, it is widely acknowledged that the low energy
output per unit area of wind power, and the requirement for exposed
sites, creates great potential for extensive disruption of existing land-
scapes and the values attached to them (Mackay 2008). The need there-
fore to consider how conflicting land uses are reconciled appears greater
than, say, landfill gas, where the generating facilities are compact and
more readily secreted within the existing urban fabric. Nevertheless,
one might expect that increasing scale strengthens the case for spatial
planning approaches across a range of technologies. For example, the
emergence of ‘utility-scale’ solar projects in the deserts of the south-
western USA has significant potential for visual intrusion and wildlife
impacts – the Desert Sunlight scheme, for example, occupies 7040 acres
for a capacity of 350MW – which have prompted calls for more delib-
eration, evaluation and steering in site selection (Kenworthy 2010: 6).
Similarly, pro-active development zoning has been seen as helpful in
facilitating the expansion of off-shore wind in UK waters, by identifying
environmental risks early in the process and allowing coordination of
grid and port investment (see Chapter 5 by Jay in this volume).
If spatial planning approaches have relevance to other technologies,
what lessons should we take from the experience with on-shore wind?
We would certainly question Kenworthy’s opening claim that spatial
planning approaches can accelerate the delivery of renewable energy
targets. In Wales, the Netherlands and Valencia, spatial planning tools
have been harnessed to modes of governance that sought to expedite

the identification of development zones by excluding – by design or
neglect – the engagement of those communities and tiers of govern-
ment on the front line of implementation, and then to use the zones to
‘funnel’ decision-making for individual projects. The outcomes show
that you cannot easily circumvent the scope for conflict where major
changes to infrastructure systems and landscapes arise, on which people
may legitimately disagree: conflicts simply erupt in other arenas (Owens
and Cowell 2010), especially in consent processes as individual genera-
tion or grid projects come forward. One might argue that hierarchical
spatial planning approaches will ‘work’ eventually because the policy
presumptions attached to development zones render most objections
ineffective – i.e. they will achieve certainty of outcome, if not speedy
consent. To do this, however, the policies will need to retain consis-
tency over time, and this can mean riding out significant resistance.
Arguably, there are merits to taking a more open, deliberative
approach to spatial planning, in which ‘technical’ analysis is linked
to more thoroughgoing discussion across the relevant tiers of govern-
ment. Such deliberations may sometimes be tense and conflictual, but
there remain potential advantages to addressing problems at a stra-
tegic spatial scale: in enabling thinking at a landscape-scale about
the consequences of transition to more sustainable forms of energy;
in eliminating the least acceptable, most environmentally sensitive
sites (and thus avoiding wasted effort by developers); in considering
generation facilities alongside other supportive infrastructure; and in
developing focused measures that might help to incentivise or prepare
populations for the scale of development that might be necessary.
Deliberative approaches to spatial planning are unlikely to be speedy,
and it would be unwise to believe that even zoning policies that are
widely agreed upon by different stakeholders will (or should) avoid the
need for careful evaluation, public engagement and creativity as indi-
vidual projects come forward (see Chapter 6 by Nadaï in this volume).
Nevertheless, it is hard to see how such questions could ever be mean-
ingfully addressed, in democracies, without some form of planning
with a spatial dimension, which operates at a wider scale than indi-
vidual development projects.
If claims that spatial planning approaches can expedite the delivery
of development goals need tempering, then the potential they offer for
learning within the wider policy system seems under-exploited. As we
have shown, in the UK to date there has been only limited reflexivity
between spatial planning approaches and the overall targets and mode
of development proposed for renewable energy expansion. In England,

central government demonstrates a sustained resistance to believing
that planning processes – whether that be spatial planning or consent
decisions for individual projects – can say anything useful about the
feasibility and desirability of the underlying renewable energy policies.
This is despite the fact that in other countries – notably Denmark and
Germany – the advance intelligence that spatial planning gives on the
availability of wind power sites has helped to prompt discussion and
action on how to sustain the renewable energy transition as scope for
on-shore wind expansion slows down. However, if we are more easily
to see the reflexive role of spatial planning approaches then perhaps
researchers need to adjust their focus beyond a single plan-making
exercise, or particular consent decisions, to trace how spatial planning
interventions, over longer periods of time, facilitate wider and more
fundamental processes of adjustment and change (Hajer 2005).
Notes
1. This is much more specific than ‘spatial planning’ as it might be under-
stood in a number of European countries, which refers to a process of
coordinating the actions of all sectors that have spatial consequences
(transport, economic development, etc.). For a discussion, see Dühr et al.
2010.
2. Wind speed above 6.5 m/s, outside designated landscape areas, and
excluding towns and woodlands (Devon County Council et al. 1993: 36).
3. The three turbine project at Forestmoor, completed in March 2005.
4. Regional Spatial Strategies and Local Development Documents were the
statutory land use plans in England from 2004 to 2011 (at the time of
writing – July 2011).
5. See http://www.snh.gov.uk/docs/B814517.pdf, accessed on 23 September
2011.
References
Aitken, M., McDonald, S. and Strachan, P. (2008) ‘Locating “power” in wind
power planning processes: the (not so) influential role of local objectors’,
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 51: 6, 777–799.
Arup (2008) ‘Placing renewables in the East of England’, Final report,
February, prepared for the East of England Regional Assembly by Ove Arup,
Cardiff.
Arup (2010) ‘Strategic Search Area (SSA) reassessment and validation, research
report to the Welsh Assembly Government’, Cardiff: Welsh Assembly
Government Planning Division.
Arup (2011) ‘Review of the generation costs and deployment potential of renew-
able energy technologies in the UK’, Study report for DECC, London: Arup.
Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity, London: Sage.

Bergek, A. (2010) ‘Levelling the playing field? The influence of national wind
power planning instruments on conflicts of interest in a Swedish county’,
Energy Policy, 38, 2357–2369.
Breukers, S. and Wolsink, M. (2007a) ‘Wind energy policies in the Netherlands:
institutional capacity-building for ecological modernisation’, Environmental
Politics, 16: 1, 92–112.
Breukers, S. and Wolsink, M. (2007b) ‘Wind power implementation in chan-
ging institutional landscapes: an international comparison’, Energy Policy, 35,
2737–2750.
Bruns, E., Ohlhorst, D., Wenzel, B. and Köppel, J. (2011) Renewable Energies in
Germany’s Electricity Market. A Biography of the Innovation Process, English trans-
lated and updated text, Dordrecht: Springer.
Bulkeley, H., Watson, M., Hudson, R. and Weaver, P. (2005) ‘Governing munic-
ipal waste: towards a new analytical framework’, Journal of Environmental Policy
and Planning, 7: 1, 1–23.
Cornwall County Council and ETSU (1996) ‘Land-use planning and renewable
energy in Cornwall’, report compiled by Terence O’Rourke plc, ETSU, Harwell,
Oxon.
Cowell, R. (2007) ‘Wind power and “the planning problem”: the experience of
Wales’, European Environment, 17: 5, 291–306.
Cowell, R. (2010) ‘Wind power, landscape and strategic, spatial planning –
the construction of “acceptable locations” in Wales’, Land Use Policy, 27,
222–232.
Devon County Council, West Devon Borough Council, and ETSU (1993)
‘Planning for renewable energy in Devon’, ETSU, Harwell, Oxon.
Dühr, S., Columb, C. and Nadin, V. (2010) European Spatial Planning and Territorial
Cooperation, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
Hajer, M. (2005) ‘Setting the stage: a dramaturgy of policy deliberation’,
Administration and Society, 36: 6, 624–647.
Hindmarsh, R. (2010) ‘Wind farms and community engagement in Australia: a
critical analysis for policy learning’, East Asian Science, Technology and Society:
An International Journal, 4, 541–563.
Hirsch, F. (1977) The Social Limits to Growth, London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul.
IEEP (Institute of European Environmental Policy) (2009) ‘Positive planning for
onshore wind. Expanding onshore wind energy capacity while conserving
nature’, a report for the RSPB, Sandy, Beds.
Jessop, B. (1997) ‘Governance of complexity and the complexity of governance:
preliminary remarks’ in A. Amin and J. Hausner (eds) Beyond Market and
Hierarchy: Interactive Governance and Social Complexity ’, Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar.
Kemp, R., Parto, S. and Gibson, R. (2005) ‘Governance for sustainable devel-
opment: moving from theory to practice’, International Journal of Sustainable
Development, 8: 1/2, 12–30.
Kenworthy, T. (2010) ‘Big land, big opportunity. Smart land use in the fight
against climate change’, Washington DC: Center for American Progress
Khan, J. (2003) ‘Wind power planning in three Swedish municipalities’, Journal
of Environmental Planning and Management, 46: 4, 563–581.
MacKay, D. (2008) Sustainable Energy Without the Hot Air, Cambridge: UIT
Cambridge Ltd.
MacKenzie, A. (1998) ‘ “The cheviot, the stag ... and the white, white rock?”
Community, identity and environmental threat on the Isle of Harris’,
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 16, 509–532.
MacKerron, G. (2009) ‘Lessons from the UK on urgency and legitimacy in energy
policymaking’, in I. Scrase and G. MacKerron (eds) Energy for the Future: A New
Agenda, pp. 76–88, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
McLaren Loring, J. (2007) ‘Wind energy planning in England, Wales and
Denmark: factors influencing project success’, Energy Policy, 35, 2648–2660.
Moragues-Faus, A. and Ortiz-Miranda, D. (2010) ‘Local mobilisation against
windfarm development in Spanish rural areas: new actors in the regulation
arena’, Energy Policy, 38: 8, 4232–4240.
Murdoch, J. (2000) ‘Space against time: competing rationalities in planning for
housing’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 25, 503–519.
Nadaï, A. (2007) ‘ “Planning”, “siting” and the local acceptance of wind power:
some lessons from the French case’, Energy Policy, 35, 2715–2726.
ODPM (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister) (2004a) ‘Planning policy statement
22: renewable energy’, London: The Stationery Office.
ODPM (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister) (2004b) ‘Planning for renewable
energy: a companion guide to PPS22’, London: The Stationery Office.
Owens, S. and Cowell, R. (2010) Land and Limits: Interpreting Sustainability in the
Planning Process, 2nd edition, London: Routledge.
PIU (Performance and Innovation Unit) (2002) ‘The energy review’, February,
London: Cabinet Office.
Scotland, M. (2010) ‘Wind bodies reject spatial policy merit’, Planning Resource,
29 January, www.planningresource.co.uk/bulletins/Environment-Bulletin,
SEDD (Scottish Executive Development Department) (2007) ‘Scottish planning
policy 6: renewable energy’, Scottish Executive: Edinburgh.
Shove, E. (1998) ‘Gaps, barriers and conceptual chasms: theories of technology
transfer and energy in buildings’, Energy Policy, 26: 15, 1105–1112.
Smith, A. (2007) ‘Emerging in between: the multi-level governance of renewable
energy in the English regions’, Energy Policy, 35, 6266–6280.
SNH (Scottish Natural Heritage) (2009a) ‘Strategic locational guidance for
onshore wind farms in respect of the natural heritage’, Policy Statement No.
02/02 update March 2009, http://www.snh.gov.uk/docs/A247182.pdf, accessed
on 14 July 2011.
SNH (Scottish Natural Heritage) (2009b) Siting and Designing Windfarms in the
Landscape, SNH: Inverness.
SQW and Land Use Consultants (2010) ‘Renewable and low-carbon energy
capacity methodology. Methodology for the English Regions’, January, SQW
Energy.
Szarka, J. and Blühdorn, I. (2006) ‘Wind power in Britain and Germany: explaining
contrasting development paths’, London: Anglo-German Foundation for the
Study of Industrial Society.
Toke, D. (2005a) ‘Explaining wind power planning outcomes, some findings
from a study in England and Wales’, Energy Policy, 33: 12, 1527–1539.
Toke, D. (2005b) ‘Will the government catch the wind?’ The Political Quarterly,
76: 1, 48–56.
Toke, D. (2010) ‘Politics by heuristics: policy networks with a focus on actor
resources, as illustrated by the case of renewable energy policy under New
Labour’, Public Administration, 88: 3, 764–781.
Troen, I. and Petersen, E. L. (1989) European Wind Atlas, Roskilde: Risø National
Laboratory.
Warren, C. R. and Birnie, R. V. (2009) ‘Re-powering Scotland: wind farms and
the “energy or environment?” debate’, Scottish Geographical Journal, 125: 2,
97–126.
WAG (Welsh Assembly Government) (2004) ‘Draft technical advice note 8
renewable energy’, Consultation Draft, July, Cardiff: WAG.
WAG (Welsh Assembly Government) (2005) ‘Technical advice note 8: planning
for renewable energy’, July, Cardiff: WAG.
WAG (Welsh Assembly Government) (2010) ‘A low carbon revolution: the Welsh
assembly government energy policy statement’, March, Cardiff: WAG.
Wolsink, M. (1996) ‘Dutch wind power policy: stagnating implementation of
renewables’, Energy Policy, 24: 12, 1079–1088.
5
From Laggard to World Leader:
The United Kingdom’s Adoption
of Marine Wind Energy
Stephen Jay
Introduction
The idea of extending the capture of wind energy beyond the shoreline
into the marine environment is not new, having been mooted since at
least the 1970s (Musgrove 1978), and pilot projects date back to the
1990s, beginning with Denmark’s Vindeby scheme in 1991. However,
in 2002 significant energy production from ‘offshore wind’ became a
more promising prospect with the development of Horns Rev, again
in Danish waters, consisting of 80 turbines 14–20 km from the coast.
Some other north European countries have also contributed to growth
or set out development plans, and are now being joined by nations else-
where, notably the USA (Offshore Center Danmark 2011; Snyder and
Kaiser 2009a, 2009b).
Most surprising has been the UK’s enthusiastic uptake of offshore
wind. The UK stepped in with a small scheme in 2000 (Still 2001), then
started a programme of over a dozen projects, most of which are now
completed. This was followed by more ambitious plans now coming
to fruition, so that by 2009 the UK was boasting that it was the world
leader in offshore wind energy (HMG 2009b) and declaring its inten-
tion to expand production massively, including in waters far from land
(Toke 2011). In 2010, it accounted for more than half of the world’s
offshore wind capacity (WWEA 2011). This stands in contrast to the UK’s
slowness in exploiting onshore wind. Despite its favourable climate and
topography, the UK has been judged a poor performer when compared
to the likes of Germany and the Netherlands (Breukers and Wolsink
2006). So the UK’s emergence as the rising star of offshore wind energy
85
comes as a surprise and inevitably raises questions about the reasons for
this transformation from laggard to world leader (Toke 2011).
Initially however, questions of language arise. Extending wind
energy production to the sea has been expressed in terms of onshore
and offshore, making the shoreline the point of reference for distinct
domains of wind energy; crossing the shoreline has the connotation of
breaking through a barrier. It is, perhaps, time to adjust the terminology
in recognition of the expanses into which wind energy production is
passing. Although the early schemes maintained their relationship
with the shoreline by virtue of proximity (hence some describe them as
nearshore, for example Wolsink 2010), the emerging future is the open
sea, beyond sight from the coast, production plants whose ‘land-fall’ is
simply via hidden, long-distance connections – which may yet straddle
entire seas. So ‘marine’ rather than ‘offshore’ wind energy is perhaps a
more fitting term, as for other renewables at sea. The rural associations
of wind ‘farms’ could also be left behind in favour of the more techno-
logically-fitting term ‘arrays’.
So how might the UK’s trajectory of marine wind energy produc-
tion be explained? Is this due to the absence of difficulties that have
beset wind energy on land, such as localised opposition (e.g. Ellis et al.
2007)? The notion that public hostility and associated planning diffi-
culties would not be significant at sea has indeed been an argument in
favour of marine wind energy (DTI 2002: 14; Henderson 2002). This
is an over-simplification, as evidence is already mounting that marine
projects are not immune from opposition (Haggett 2011; Jay 2008), but
the weakness of public involvement remains a possible explanation for
the success of marine wind energy in the UK. Nonetheless, other factors
are also at work differentiating the marine and land experiences.
In this chapter, the features that have contributed to the UK’s adop-
tion of marine wind energy production are explored. A policy-centred
approach is taken, on the assumption that government intervention
has been crucial, and aspects of development are placed within the
framework of strategic governance as revealed during sequential phases
of development. This is informed by various studies that have investi-
gated marine wind energy, usually with a view to identifying obstacles
to be overcome and applying positive approaches more widely. Snyder
and Kaiser (2009b) note that implementation depends on a combina-
tion of events, including government involvement through regulatory
programmes and economic incentives, an attractive revenue potential
and public acceptance; they also highlight the importance of geograph-
ical features, such as the available wind resource and proximity to
markets. Toke (2011), whilst stressing the importance of policy context
From Laggard to World Leader 87
and financial support, points to the role of stakeholder support and

the need for strategic and project-level planning, including consider-
ation of environmental concerns and other interests. Similarly, the
Carbon Trust (2008) stresses strategic planning of suitable areas for
development, including consideration of grid issues; they also under-
line economic, technological and supply chain issues. Other studies
have emphasised economic support mechanisms (Green and Vasilakos
2011) and organisational structure (Markard and Petersen 2009). Many
of these themes are iterated in the evolution of policy (DECC 2009a).
Combining these insights, the UK’s marine wind energy status might
usefully be considered against:
● policy direction;
● economic framework;
● geographical and environmental context;
● planning and consenting regime;
● industry structure and state-of-play;
● public attitudes and stakeholder interests.
It is not possible to address all these aspects in detail here, but consider-
ation will be given to each of them and reference made to other work.
Following the description of the stages of development, general features
contributing to the UK’s current marine wind energy status are drawn
out. Implicit in this account is the conviction that taking advantage of
wind energy at sea is a positive move towards a more sustainable future.
Phases of development
The rollout of marine wind energy in the UK has been conducted

via overlapping phases of development, each with distinct features,
although relatively constant factors are also present.
Round 1
Round 1 could be characterised as a pilot phase. It went ahead without
any major policy initiative, though reflecting growing government
commitment to renewable energy (Mitchell and Connor 2004) in line
with European Union policy (EC 1997: 29). In 2000, developers were
invited to nominate sites for arrays of 30 turbines within territorial
waters. The Crown Estate (TCE) immediately took on a central role,
assessing the applicants and allowing them to seek authorisation. The
developers were renewable energy specialists or subsidiaries of larger
energy companies. The consents regime was cumbersome, as a range
of consents not designed for marine renewables had to be gained from

government departments, and environmental assessment and consulta-
tion carried out (Jay 2008: 20ff). Stakeholder and public reactions were
inevitably mixed, ranging from strong support to vociferous opposi-
tion, especially regarding visual and socio-economic effects (Ellis et al.
2007; Jay 2008).
Most applications were eventually successful. The first array, North
Hoyle in north Wales, was completed in 2003, marking the beginning
of a new renewables era. About ten projects are now finalised, distrib-
uted mostly along the coasts of east and northwest England and north
Wales (Figure 5.1), with a combined capacity of over 1,000 MW. The
projects benefited from government capital grants and receive continued
support from the Renewables Obligation scheme (Carbon Trust 2008:
77; Green and Vasilakos 2011). Overall, Round 1 boosted confidence in
the viability of marine wind energy and the industry began to promote
itself through its trade organisation (BWEA 2007; Renewable UK 2011).
Round 2
Plans were emerging for Round 2 before any Round 1 schemes were
operating. This phase might be described as marine wind energy coming
of age. It was announced in Future Offshore, with the designation of three
large ‘strategic areas’ that had the greatest suitability for development,
hosting much larger arrays further out to sea than in Round 1 (DTI
2002). The areas were fine-tuned through environmental assessment,
which recommended exclusion from the coastal strip for visual and
ecological reasons (BMT Cordah 2003). Future Offshore was reinforced in
a wider energy policy review (DTI 2003), which looked to marine wind
energy as a major contributor to achieving 20 per cent of electricity
from renewable sources by 2020 (in response to European obligations,
for example EPC 2001). Even more ambitious goals were set in Scotland
(Scottish Executive 2003).
To realise these aspirations, wind energy production would need to
extend beyond territorial waters, so in 2004 the UK established the
right to exploit renewable energy on the continental shelf by declaring
a Renewable Energy Zone (REZ) (Scott 2006). These rights were vested
in TCE. In addition, slight improvements to the consenting regime
were introduced (Jay 2008: 29ff) and assistance provided for gaining
authorisation (CEFAS 2004; DTI 2004). A slightly stronger role in the
consultation process was also given to coastal planning authorities (DTI
2005). However, implementation of Round 2 has still been slowed by
the complexity of consenting (Gibson and Howsam 2010).
´
60°0'0"N
60°0'0"N
57°0'0"N
57°0'0"N
54°0'0"N
54°0'0"N
51°0'0"N
51°0'0"N
8°0'0"W 4°0'0"W 0°0'0" 4°0'0"E

0 100 200
km
Offshore Wind Activity Base Map
1:5,750,000 Size : A4 Author : SR QA : JM 18 Nov 2010
Round 1 Site Territorial Waters Limit
Positions shown relative to WGS84.
Round 2 Site UK Continental Shelf © Crown Copyright 18 Novemeber 2010. Reproduction in whole
Limit or part is not permitted without prior consent of The Crown Estate.
Round 3 Zone United Kingdom © British Crown and SeaZone Solutions Limited. All rigths
resolved. Product Licence No. 012009.017.
Demonstration Site Europe 16 New Burlington 6 Bell’s Brae
Round 1 & 2 Extension Site Place London W1S2HX Edinburgh EH4 3BJ
Tel: 0.20 7851 5080 Tel:0131 260 6070
Scottish Exclusivity Site www.thecownestate.co.uk
Figure 5.1 Offshore wind activity in United Kingdom waters

Round 2 got underway via competitive tendering overseen by TCE

(2003), leading to 15 projects with a capacity of about 7,000 MW
(Figure 5.1). Thanet in the Thames Estuary was the first to be completed,
with 100 turbines 12–20 km from the coastline and a capacity of
300 MW. About half of the projects are now operating or near comple-
tion, though some have experienced planning difficulties. Round
2 projects have provoked similar responses to Round 1, with strong local
opposition in at least one case and stakeholder concerns raised about
ecological and cumulative effects (Haggett 2008, Devine-Wright 2009a,
2009b and Chapter 10 in this volume; Devine-Wright and Howes 2010).
In one scheme, the grid connection proved contentious (Westwood
2007). Yet neither objections nor hurdles proved fatal to the projects.
Larger energy companies have generally driven Round 2 projects
with smaller organisations being left out (Markard and Petersen 2009).
The industry is optimistic about its completion (BWEA and Gerard
Hassan 2010b: 7) though progress has been slower than expected due
to supply chain and construction delays as well as consenting and plan-
ning issues. No grants were given for Round 2, though market support
has been improved by a proportionally higher level of the Renewables
Obligation Certificates being given to marine renewables. Overall,
Round 2 demonstrated a growing awareness of the UK’s marine wind
resource (DECC 2011c; DTI 2002), the largest in Europe (Boyle 2006;
EEA 2009). Turning to the seas is now leading to far greater aspirations,
where even energy export becomes conceivable (OVG 2010).
Round 3
The next phase might be described as ambitious (or even imperial ) expan-
sion, as wind energy moves into vast new regions and production takes
on a new dimension. This continues to be driven by restructuring
energy supply in the interests of carbon reduction and energy secu-
rity (DTI 2007; HMG 2009a). Following EU targets (EPC 2009), the UK
intends to supply about 30 per cent of electricity from renewables by
2020, a fivefold increase from 2009 levels, and marine wind is crucial
to this (CEC 2008). The current provision in Rounds 1 and 2 (about
8,000 MW) should be supplemented by 25,000 MW (HMG 2009b), as
set out in A Prevailing Wind (DECC 2009a). This momentum has been
maintained since the 2010 change of government (DECC 2011b; HM
Treasury and Infrastructure UK 2010).
This plan was first announced in 2007 and subject to a strategic envi-
ronmental assessment (SEA) as in Round 2. This looked at all UK waters
(except devolved territorial waters) rather than pre-determined areas and
recommended certain restrictions, especially that coastal zones should

be avoided (DECC 2009b). TCE carried out its own studies for Round 3,
identifying suitable areas using a Geospatial Information System (Burgess
2009). Nine development zones were subsequently defined (Figure 5.1)
with the intention that there may be more than one array in each zone.
Round 3 formally began in 2008 when TCE invited bids for the devel-
opment rights for each zone, which were subsequently given to energy
consortia. TCE then started to work with the consortia in order to push
forward implementation (TCE 2008), aiming ‘to de-risk and accelerate
development’ (TCE 2011), more than in the previous rounds.
Round 3 should also benefit from planning and consenting reforms
(Gibson and Howsam 2010). Firstly, a new national infrastructure
system, that will cover most marine arrays, is intended to overcome
delays (HMG 2007); this includes national policy guidance and a
specialised planning unit (CLG 2011). Secondly, a new marine plan-
ning system should integrate wind energy with other marine activities
(Defra 2007, 2009b); an overarching policy statement reiterates commit-
ment to marine wind energy (HMG 2011) and marine plans will make
provision for wind energy. An equivalent system has been set up for
Scotland (MS 2010a). The industry sees these initiatives as advantageous
to Round 3 (RenewableUK 2010), though the introduction of a marine
planning system may arouse suspicion because of the obstruction to
wind energy sometimes experienced via the planning system on land
(Toke 2011). Thirdly, there has been further simplification of consenting,
with a single marine licence replacing the consents previously needed
and with strengthened links to strategic planning (Defra 2009a).
Round 3 should also be facilitated by a change to the transmission
regime, whereby grid connections will be run not by the developers of
arrays but independently, with a coordinated system for each zone. This
should encourage new entrants and technical innovation (DECC and
Ofgem 2009). Also, the system operator for Great Britain will be respon-
sible for running the marine grid and reinforcing the land-based system
to accommodate it (National Grid 2008). Finally, the development of a
transnational ‘supergrid’ is being promoted at a European level (EWEA
2009; Friends of the Supergrid 2011).
Efforts are also being made to improve the delivery of technology,
the supply chain and construction capacity (BWEA and Gerard Hassan
2010b; Gibson and Howsam 2010). Government has encouraged innova-
tion via demonstration projects and by drawing in regional investment
(DECC 2009a; HMG 2009a; Narec 2011). TCE is also making test sites
available (TCE 2010). The UK and Scottish governments are investing in
ports to increase their capacity to serve the industry (HM Treasury and
Infrastructure UK 2010; Smulian 2010), and some ports and regions are
positioning themselves as marine renewables hubs (Williamson 2010).
Equally, the industry is optimistic about Round 3 (RenewableUK
2010), claiming, for instance, that the supply chain will keep pace
with demand (BWEA 2008; BWEA and Gerard Hassan 2010a). There
is growing interest in establishing a manufacturing base in the UK
(Boettcher et al. 2009; Starling 2010), and economic spin-offs are being
highlighted (Bird 2009). Industry is investing in new technologies
and is scaling-up equipment (Aldcock 2008; BVG Associates 2010); for
example, a prototype turbine has a capacity five times greater than in
the earliest projects (Clipper 2011) and tests are being carried out in deep
water (Talisman Energy 2011). So although the difficulties facing Round
3 should not be underestimated, the industry appears to be rising to the
challenge with a sense of marine wind energy set to become a major
new sector and the seas to play host to massive energy production sites
on a scale that dwarfs on-land arrays (BWEA 2009; Larsen 2010).
There have not yet been any applications for Round 3 projects to test
public and stakeholder attitudes. However, the programme seems to
have background support, not least from environmental organisations
who have actively promoted marine wind energy (Greenpeace 2008;
Toke 2011).
Scottish territorial waters

Under devolution arrangements, the Scottish government has jurisdic-
tion over its territorial waters for renewable energy purposes. Given its
massive marine wind resource (which, including its share of the REZ,
is estimated to be 25 per cent of Europe’s total), Scotland has set more
challenging renewable energy targets than the rest of the UK, intending
to produce a significant proportion from Scottish Territorial Waters
(STW) (OWIG 2010; Scottish Government 2009).
The STW programme began in 2008 in a similar way to Round 1, with
TCE inviting parties to nominate sites, which led in 2009 to agreements
for ten projects. They are comparable in scale to the Round 2 arrays,
with a possible capacity of nearly 6,500 MW. These schemes are now
going through project planning, though face challenging conditions,
such as deeper water locations (Pritchard 2009); applications are being
dealt with by the new marine agency (MS 2010b, 2010c). However, the
Scottish government has already decided to take things further, with a
sectoral plan that proposes 25 new wind energy areas within STW (MS
2010a, 2010d). There are considerable challenges facing implementation,
such as inadequate infrastructure, uncertainty about the supply chain

and upgrading of the grid. But there is also a government-led drive to
overcome these obstacles and achieve the energy targets and economic
benefits for Scotland, with comparisons being drawn with the growth
of the oil and gas industry in the 1970s (OWIG 2010).
Round 1 and 2 extensions and the future

In 2009, TCE invited the Round 1 and 2 developers, or other parties
with their consent, to enlarge their arrays. Four extensions were agreed
with a total capacity of about 1,500 MW, greater than that of the orig-
inal Round 1 projects (Figure 5.1). These projects should help to main-
tain momentum in the industry in the lead-up to Round 3 (TCE 2011).
Taking into account all of these programmes, the UK could have
over 40,000 MW of marine wind energy capacity by 2020. The extent
to which this is realised remains to be seen, though even achieving
a significant proportion of this would be an astonishing shift in the
energy mix. Moreover, sights are set on greater things, with talk of
Round 4 in the air, and a vision forming of progression to deeper waters
using floating turbine arrangements and of transnational integration of
systems (Breton and Moe 2009; OVG 2010).
Contributing to success
The above account focuses on the elements that have contributed in the
UK to the implementation of marine wind energy to date and its prom-
ising future. This is not to underestimate the obstacles that have made
progress slower than anticipated and may compromise future growth,
but relative to the level of development in other nations interested in
marine wind energy, the UK’s dynamism is impressive and suggests that
certain factors have worked in its favour. These are now explored using
the categories set out in the introduction to this chapter.
Policy direction
The UK and Scottish governments have set increasingly ambitious
goals for renewable energy, including the contribution of marine wind.
Government commitment has laid the foundation for sectoral develop-
ment, and institutional responsibilities have been created to drive policy
forward. It is true that policy statements are insufficient in themselves
to achieve results; for example, Germany has made similar commit-
ments to marine wind power, but has a poor implementation record
(Jay 2009; Lange et al. 2010). However, progress is unlikely without
government impetus; for instance, the USA finds itself at a disadvantage

compared to EU countries because of the absence of any overarching
carbon reduction obligation (Snyder and Kaiser 2009b).
Specific features of the UK policy approach are, firstly, that policy has
been geared to controlled industrial growth. The process began with
modest Round 1 projects on shallow, nearshore sites that were easier
(albeit controversial in some locations) to develop, before progressing
to more challenging locations. This allowed regulatory reforms to be
made in the light of experience and business confidence and indus-
trial capacity to become established. A comparison can be made with
the similarly incremental approach of Denmark, contrasting with
Germany’s much less successful attempt to rush into large-scale devel-
opment (Jay,2009; Snyder and Kaiser 2009b).
Secondly, room has been given to the market to bring about efficien-
cies of competition whilst maintaining strategic oversight. This balance
has taken different forms throughout the rounds, from the freedom to
propose sites and careful selection of developers in Round 1 to tendering
for the right to develop within predetermined zones in Round 3. This
evolution has reflected a desire to ensure the ability of developers to
move ahead whilst only releasing areas that ensure environmental stand-
ards and equitable use of the seas. Arguably, these objectives have not
always been met, but the UK has avoided the difficulties encountered,
for example, in the Netherlands, where a more liberalised approach to
expanding marine wind energy resulted in clashes of interest and a
failure of implementation (Jay 2010; Snyder and Kaiser 2009b). In the
UK, government strategic oversight became stronger with each round,
expressed through development and environmental criteria and spatial
zoning (see below). This approach has been looked upon favourably
from a US perspective (Santora et al. 2004).
Thirdly, government has established a working relationship with
industry. Institutional points of contact have been set up, helping poli-
cymakers to respond to industry concerns, allowing, for instance, some
projects to be modified. TCE has increasingly liaised with developers
and even, as far as Round 3 is concerned, entered into partnership with
them. All this is in line with a collaborative style of governance for the
deployment of renewable energy (HMG 2009b).
Economic framework
For years, any suggestion to exploit wind energy at sea was dismissed
because of the excessive costs involved. It remains a more expensive
option than most other forms of electricity production and has only
become a reality thanks to financial assistance. Various forms of support

are being used in different countries and debate continues about their
effectiveness (Green and Vasilakos 2011; Portman et al. 2009; Chapter 2
by Elliot in this volume). The UK’s main policy mechanism, a form
of tradable certificates, has proved adequate, but only by the intro-
duction of differentiation, by which more costly renewables receive
a proportionally higher level of support. Questions have been raised
about the ability of the certificate system to facilitate growth because of
inherent uncertainties about future income from the scheme (Carbon
Trust 2008; DECC 2011a; Green and Vasilakos 2011). The essential prin-
ciple, however, is government assurance of a level of support that makes
projects financially viable, which appears to be in place for the UK and
is a common feature for all countries that have moved ahead signif-
icantly with marine wind energy; elsewhere, this guarantee remains
in doubt, such as in the USA (Snyder and Kaiser 2009b) and Sweden
(Söderholm and Pettersson 2011).
In the UK, other forms of support have been used, particularly at
the crucial start-up stages, such as capital grants for the early arrays
and assistance for innovative technology and infrastructure. Again,
this illustrates government intent to pursue its goals through a degree
of intervention (DECC 2009a). However, it is possible that the large-
scale adoption of marine wind energy will ultimately lead to higher
electricity prices; Toke (2011) suggests that consumer sensitivity to
increases will become a significant barrier.
Geographical and environmental context

Appreciation of the scale of the natural resource available to the UK
underlies the marine wind energy agenda, especially since the limits
of territorial waters were breached. It is difficult to imagine a better
geographical setting for marine wind energy than an island nation,
largely surrounded by shallow, windy waters, with centres of high
demand relatively close to the coast, a well-developed grid system
and ports infrastructure and the wealth to invest in this new form of
energy. The UK’s historic use of the seas, not least for oil and gas produc-
tion, might also predispose it to turn to this resource. Although there
are growing pressures on the seas from other uses and conservation
demands, it has still been possible to identify massive areas with rela-
tively few constraints for wind energy. The UK therefore finds itself in
a more fortunate position than other nations attracted to marine wind
energy where geographical limits and use conflicts tend to be more
acute (Jay 2009; Snyder and Kaiser 2009b).
Awareness of this potential owes much to strategic-level technical

studies, spatial analyses and environmental assessments. The marine
planning system should also contribute to knowledge about the integra-
tion of wind energy into the marine environment. In this regard, it may
be that the UK is benefiting from both a greater physical resource and a
more discretionary approach to strategic planning. Whereas some other
European countries are excluding arrays from large areas for ecological
or visual reasons (Jay 2010), the UK is establishing more general criteria
that allow a more subtle interplay of interests and the siting of arrays
in places possibly regarded as inappropriate under other systems (Toke
2011). This flexibility may allow a more economic development of wind
energy. However, the extent to which constraints should be ‘relaxed’
in the interests of bringing down costs (Carbon Trust 2008) could be a
source of growing tension.
Planning and consenting regime

On land in the UK, local government determines or has a strong voice
on wind applications, whereas marine arrays are handled by central
government. This has been a practical advantage to a few projects that
have been pushed through despite local opposition. But this degree
of centralised control differs, for instance, to Sweden and Denmark,
where consensus between local and national government has been an
important feature of authorisation (Jay 2009). The UK approach places
development goals above locally-expressed opinion and knowledge
(Gray et al. 2005), arguably raising questions about the longer-term
public acceptance of the programme. In one case in the Netherlands, a
top-down approach to siting evoked such opposition that the scheme
was eventually withdrawn (Wolsink 2010).
Moreover, the centralised system of consents has been complex and
slow, partly because several government bodies are involved. This has
delayed but not stopped some projects. The difficulties that the UK has
experienced with its consents process are not exceptional and seem
to be outweighed by more positive factors, such as economic support
(Portman et al. 2009; Snyder and Kaiser 2009a).
Some improvements to procedures have been made in the light of
experience, and more substantial reform is under way with the marine
licence system and a more unified process of decision-making. These
are part of wider changes taking place, firstly to marine governance
and secondly to major infrastructure planning. The intention is that
the administration of these overlapping spheres will become more
integrative and streamlined. It is possible that marine planning will
also address the poor incorporation of localised opinion. The expec-

tations being placed on these new systems will be tested by the large
number of wind array proposals anticipated over the coming years.
Marine planning is also being introduced in some of the other leading
marine wind energy countries, notably Germany and the Netherlands
(Douvere and Ehler 2009), and are being followed with interest
elsewhere (Colander 2010).
A unique aspect of the UK’s regulatory framework is the role of TCE.
It does not grant consents but issues commercial leases and licences for
the use of the seabed for foundations and cables, and this has allowed
it to exert a strong influence over the marine wind energy programme.
TCE historically manages land and property belonging to the sover-
eign, including the seabed as far as the limits of territorial waters, and
now also acts as a landlord for the seabed of the REZ. This introduces
a form of marine property rights and interests generally lacking for
other nations. TCE is under duties to obtain a return for the state from
its holding, so has a direct interest in putting the seabed to commercial
use (and maintaining environmental quality) and has welcomed the
opportunities provided by marine wind energy. From a business point
of view, TCE has an absolute monopoly on the vast assets of the seabed
which it is now in the fortunate position of renting out to the compet-
itive players of an emergent industry. Moreover, as a quasi-public body,
it is beholden to cooperate with the government of the day, which has
given it the effective function of an executive agency for delivering
marine wind energy. Hence the leading role that TCE has taken in
identifying suitable areas for wind energy, initiating successive rounds
of development, assessing and negotiating with developers, ensuring
the implementation of projects and helping to keep the momentum of
the industry going. Whilst questions might be asked about TCE’s grip
on the use of the seabed (interestingly, the Scottish government is now
asserting greater control over the STW programme), the obligations
on developers exerted through the leasing system can be viewed as a
driver for project implementation that is lacking elsewhere (Santora
et al. 2004).
Industry structure and state-of-play

Energy supply throughout the EU and beyond is now firmly established
as a liberalised activity in which competing bodies have a right of access
to the market, so UK marine wind energy production is in the hands
of private companies and is open to new entrants. There has been a
change in the makeup of developers throughout the successive rounds,
with specialist renewable energy companies giving way to larger, more

established companies, which are now joining forces for the Round 3
consortia and the new transmission regime, and are bringing in wider
marine experience. This reflects the increasing scale, complexity and
risks of operations, which larger organisations are better placed to
handle. There has also been a shift towards companies with long-term
commitment, rather than bodies that have sold projects, sometimes
even before construction.
The dominance of larger companies is now typical of the wider
European picture, though for the other marine wind energy nations,
this represents a more radical change in industry structure than it does
for the UK. For them, smaller independents have had a significant
share of the on-land market and have been credited with the success
of wind energy. In contrast, the UK industry has been dominated
by larger companies often criticised for their failure to engage with
communities (Devine-Wright, 2005). Ironically, this may have put the
UK in a stronger starting position for moving offshore (Markard and
Petersen 2009).
In terms of the industry’s capacity to deliver, difficulties have been
encountered throughout the programme because of the lack of a
domestic manufacturing base, inability of the supply chain to keep up
with demand, a shortage of construction vessels and the knock-on effect
of rising costs. These issues continue to be of concern, though there is
confidence that the industry will meet the forthcoming demands as
significant growth of manufacturing capacity is anticipated, geared
towards a scaling-up of output and equipment. The UK itself should
also have a greater share of manufacturing and construction, due partly
to government encouragement and support.
Public attitudes and stakeholder interests

The views of stakeholders and the wider public in the UK have been
solicited at various points, including during SEAs for expanding the
programme and authorisation of individual projects. A number of
studies suggest that there is a broad level of support for the principle of
marine wind energy, in line with the expectations of policy makers and
the industry. Notably, some environmental organisations have backed
marine wind energy as an agent for reducing carbon emissions. But
localised opinion is more diverse, with support expressed and concerns
raised about impacts on local environments and economies. Some
coastal communities have been vociferous in their opposition, as in
the USA and Netherlands (Firestone and Kempton 2007; Wolsink 2010).
Certain marine interests have also been critical about possible conse-
quences, upon fishing and shipping for instance, leading to some modi-
fication of projects (Gibson and Howsam 2010; Toke 2011).
Although standard consultation has been undertaken at various
stages of development (except that TCE has not been obliged to carry
out public consultation for its strategies), it does not appear that wider
views have been canvassed. The relative remoteness of marine wind
arrays, especially those sited further from the coast, might be thought
to reduce the imperative to engage with public (and even some stake-
holder) opinion. But the case can be made for public scrutiny of plans
for marine wind energy that is just as intense as on land (Haggett 2011;
Wolsink 2010), in order to garner localised knowledge and gain greater
legitimacy and long-tem acceptance of the strategy.
So the question remains open of the influence of public and stake-
holder attitudes on the UK’s marine wind energy programme. A low
level of public opposition might be thought to be one reason for its
success, though the evidence is rather that where opposition has been
expressed, it has been marginalised due to the centralisation of decision-
making and has not been allowed to derail projects but has influenced
some design changes. Stakeholders have perhaps had more influence by
bringing about some changes to projects.
Conclusions
Taking the lead at sea

The presumption that marine wind energy development in the UK is
benefiting from the lack of some of the constraints to wind energy on
land seems to be supported by the evidence. This may be partly because
of the weaker position of objectors raising questions about longer-term
public acceptability, but more significant are the greater resource poten-
tial than on land, the vast territorial scope for wind energy at sea and
the astonishingly privileged position in which TCE finds itself, being
able to dispense sites for development in line with its own interests.
In addition, there are features not exclusive to marine wind energy
that have contributed to success. For example, it has not, on the whole,
been too challenging to connect to the existing grid system and to serve
major centres of demand. Perhaps more importantly, there has been
government encouragement for renewables, expressed through policy
and economic support, benefiting wind energy universally. However,
commitment to marine wind energy has been particularly striking over

the last decade. Working with TCE, government has given a strong stra-
tegic lead, taking the industry through well-defined phases of devel-
opment and controlling its growth. It has responded to some of the
sector’s difficulties and given support for new technology and infra-
structure. The industry has responded with confidence and commit-
ment, gaining experience and positioning itself for massive expansion.
So much so that the constraints which are particular to the marine
setting such as higher costs, technical challenges, manufacturing and
construction bottlenecks and the complexity of consenting, appear to
be outmatched by the drivers in favour of marine wind energy and are
gradually being alleviated.
Part of the discourse about the emergence of marine wind energy is
the idea that it is ‘behind’ wind energy on land by as much as 20 years
(Larsen 2010). This may be valid in terms of the maturity of the industry,
but the scale of current development suggests that the gap is rapidly
narrowing, or even that the metaphor of catch-up is no longer mean-
ingful. Looking at advances in the scale and type of equipment and the
intended spatial reach of marine wind energy, as exemplified by the
UK, it is more fitting to say that we are creating not simply a ‘marinised’
version of land-based wind energy but a new form of energy production
in its own right.
Messages for renewable energy

The expansion of marine wind energy provides a potentially useful
example of how the large-scale exploitation of a renewable energy
source can be marshalled with state guidance and market acceptance.
However, the conditions and context are so markedly different from
that of most other renewables that one must be cautious in seeking to
draw lessons from the success of marine wind for the prospects for other,
especially on-land, renewables. The UK experience of marine wind
energy is particularly useful in what it suggests about the broad princi-
ples for governance, which may serve the wider adoption of systems of
a lower-carbon energy supply. These can be summarised as follows
1. A firm energy policy framework, cascaded from international and EU

agreements and expressed in national targets, policy statements and
institutional capacity, with specific policy initiatives for the renewa-
bles sector in question.
2. Assessment of the renewable energy resource, leading to an
understanding of its scale, distribution and accessibility, technical,
environmental and other use constraints, grid requirements and

proximity to points of demand.
3. Public funding, via guaranteed financial support proportional to the
costs involved, start-up assistance and support for innovation and
infrastructure development.
4. Clear central government steer for the sector, giving controlled
growth through such things as gradual release of territory and devel-
opment rights, assessment and selection of developers and estab-
lishing clear development criteria.
5. A strategic spatial planning framework that gives a strong lead and
flexible scope for development.
6. Encouragement of competitive behaviour within the context of
liberalised energy markets, via such things as competitive tendering
for development rights and allowing freedom of site selection within
certain parameters.
7. Collaboration between government and industry, via govern-
ment-led institutional points of contact, industry-led organisation
and government agency involvement in project implementation,
leading to responsiveness to difficulties encountered, such as regula-
tory reforms and modification of development agreements.
8. Nurturing industry confidence, expressed in responsiveness to
trajectories of growth, organisation at the scale demanded, project
commitment and longer-term investment in manufacturing and
construction capacity.
In addition to these features, the development of marine wind energy

has benefited from a centrally-administered consents system and from
the relative weakness of public involvement. It would be problematic
to extend these principles more generally, given the tensions that this
would create for legitimising the expansion of renewables, especially in
local settings.
Also, there remain features that are unique to the marine setting
and are unlikely to find any equivalence on land, such as the vastness
and general availability of the resource and the monopolistic inter-
ests of TCE. These may favour other marine renewables, namely tidal,
current and wave power, though these remain at a much earlier stage
of development than wind energy (Elliott 2009 and Chapter 2 in this
volume). But adding the astonishing potential of these resources to
those of wind, it may be that for certain nations such as the UK, the
seas will hold far more of the future of renewable energy than hitherto
imagined.
References
Aldcock, S. (2008) ‘Is the offshore wind market poised for scale?’, Renewable
Energy Focus, May–June, 46–50.
Bird, J. (2009) Green Jobs: Prospects for Creating Jobs from Offshore Wind in the UK,
London: Institute for Public Policy Research.
BMT Cordah (2003) Offshore Wind Energy Generation: Phase 1 Proposals and
Environmental Report, Penicuik: BMT Cordah Limited.
Boettcher, M., Nielsen, N. and Petrick, K. (2009) Employment Opportunities and
Challenges in the Context of Rapid Industry Growth, London: Bain and Company,
www.bwea.com/pdf/publications/Bain%20Brief_Wind%20Energy%202008_
FINAL.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011.
Boyle, G. (2006) ‘UK offshore wind potential’, Refocus, July/August, 26–29.
Breton, S. and Moe, G. (2009) ‘Status, plans and technologies for offshore wind
turbines in Europe and North America’, Renewable Energy, 34, 646–654.
Breukers, S. and Wolsink, M. (2006) ‘Wind power implementation in chan-
ging institutional landscapes: an international comparison’, Energy Policy, 35,
2737–2750.
BWEA (British Wind Energy Association) (2007) UK Offshore Wind: Moving up a
Gear, London: BWEA.
BWEA (British Wind Energy Association) (2008) Actions for 33 GW: Actions
to Facilitate the Delivery of Government’s Offshore Wind Ambition of 33 GW,
London: BWEA.
BWEA (British Wind Energy Association) (2009) What does the Round 3
Announcement Mean? Briefing Note on Offshore Wind Energy, London: BWEA.
BWEA (British Wind Energy Association) and Gerard Hassan (2010a) UK Offshore
Wind: Charting the Right Course, London: BWEA.
BWEA (British Wind Energy Association) and Gerard Hassan (2010b) UK Offshore
Wind: Staying on Track, London: BWEA.
Burgess, O. (2009) ‘MaRS landing’, Marine News, Spring, 4–5
BVG Associates (2010) A Guide to an Offshore Wind Farm, London: TCE.
Carbon Trust (2008) Offshore Wind Power: Big Challenge, Big Opportunity,
Maximising The Environmental, Economic and Security Benefits, London: Carbon
Trust, www.carbontrust.co.uk/publications/publicationdetail.htm?print=1&p
roductid=CTC743&print=1, accessed on 12 July 2011.
CEFAS (Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science) (2004)
Offshore Wind Farms: Guidance Note for Environmental Impact Assessment in
Respect of FEPA and CPA Requirements, London: Defra, www.cefas.co.uk/publi-
cations/files/windfarm-guidance.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011.
Clipper (2011) Clipper Awarded £4.4 Million DECC Grant for Development of Offshore
Wind Turbine Blades, www.clipperwind.com/pr_091609.html, accessed on
12 July 2011.
Colander, B. (2010) ‘Where the wind blows: navigating offshore wind develop-
ment, domestically and abroad’, The Electricity Journal, 23: 3, 61–70.
CEC (Commission of the European Communities) (2008) Offshore Wind Energy:
Action Needed to Deliver on the Energy Policy Objectives for 2020 and Beyond,
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament etc., COM
(2008) 768, Brussels: CEC, eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=C
OM:2008:0768:FIN:EN:PDF, accessed on 12 July 2011.
CLG (Communities and Local Government) (2011) Department for Communities

and Local Government, www.communities.gov.uk, accessed 12 July 2011.
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change) (2009a) A Prevailing Wind:
Advancing UK Offshore Wind Deployment, London: DECC, www.berr.gov.uk
/files/file51989.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011.
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change) (2009b) UK Offshore Energy
Strategic Environmental Assessment: Future Leasing for Offshore Wind Farms and
Licensing for Offshore Oil & Gas and Gas Storage, Environmental Report, London:
DECC, www.offshore-sea.org.uk/consultations/Offshore_Energy_SEA/OES_
Environmental_Report.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011.
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change) (2011a) Planning our Electric
Future: A White Paper for Secure, Affordable and Low carbon Electricity, CM
8099, Norwich: The Stationary Office, http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11
/policy-legislation/EMR/2176-emr-white-paper.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011.
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change) (20011b) UK Renewable Energy
Roadmap, London: DECC, http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/meeting-
energy-demand/renewable-energy/2167-uk-renewable-energy-roadmap.pdf,
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change) (2011c) Renewable Energy Atlas,
www.offshore-sea.org.uk/site/scripts/documents_info.php?documentID=25,
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change) and Ofgem (Office of Gas
and Electricity Markets) (2009) Overview of Great Britain’s Offshore Electricity
Transmission Regulatory Regime, London: DECC, http://webarchive.nation-
alarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file51868.pdf, accessed on
12 July 2011.
DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) (2007) A Sea
Change: A Marine Bill White Paper, Cm 7047, London: Defra, http://www.
official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm70/7047/7047.pdf, accessed on
12 July 2011.
DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) (2009a)
Consultation on Secondary Legislation for England and Wales under the Marine and
Coastal Access Bill: Part 4 Marine Licensing, London: Defra.
DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) (2009b) Managing
our Marine Resources: The Marine Management Organisation, London: Defra,
http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/marine/documents/legislation
/mmo-brochure.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011.
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) (2002) Future Offshore: A Strategic
Framework for the Offshore Wind Energy, London: DTI, www.berr.gov.uk/files
/file22791.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011.
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) (2003) Our Energy Future: Creating a Low
Carbon Economy, Cm 5761, London: HMSO, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.
gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file10719.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011.
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) (2004) Guidance Notes: Offshore Wind
Farm Consents Process, London: DTI, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.
uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file22990.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011.
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) (2005) Offshore Wind Farm: Consultation
on Regulations Relating to Applications for Consent under Section 36 of the Electricity
Act 1989 for Offshore Generating Stations, London: DTI.
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) (2007) Meeting the Energy Challenge,
Cm 7124, Norwich: Stationary Office, www.berr.gov.uk/files/file39387.pdf,
Devine-Wright, P. (2005) ‘Beyond NIMBYism: towards an integrated frame-
work for understanding public perceptions of wind energy’, Wind Energy,
8, 125–139.
Devine-Wright, P. (2009a) ‘Beyond Nimbyism case study summary: Gwynt
y Mor offshore wind farm, North Wales’, http://geography.exeter.ac.uk
/beyond_nimbyism/deliverables/reports_GYM_Final.pdf, accessed on 12 July
2011.
Devine-Wright, P. (2009b) ‘Beyond Nimbyism case study summary: Lincs
offshore wind farm, Greater Wash, England’, http://geography.exeter.ac.uk
/beyond_nimbyism/deliverables/reports_Lincs_Final.pdf, accessed on 12 July
2011.
Devine-Wright, P. and Howes, Y. (2010) ‘Disruption to place attachment and the
protection of restorative environments: a wind energy case study’, Journal of
Environmental Psychology, 30, 271–280.
Douvere, F. and Ehler, C. (2009) ‘New perspectives on sea use management:
initial findings from European experience with marine spatial planning’,
Journal of Environmental Management, 90: 1, 77–88.
Elliott, D. (2009) ‘Marine renewables: a new innovation frontier’, Technology
Analysis and Strategic Management, 21: 2, 267–275.
Ellis, G., Barry, J. and Robinson, C. (2007) ‘Many ways to say “no” – different
ways to say “yes”: applying Q-methodology to understand public accep-
tance of wind farm proposals’, Journal of Journal of Environmental Planning &
Management, 50: 4, 517–51.
EC (European Commission) (1997) Energy for the Future: Renewable Sources of
Energy, COM(97) 599, Brussels: European Commission, 26 November, http:
//ec.europa.eu/energy/library/599fi_en.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011.
EEA (European Environment Agency) (2009) Europe’s Onshore and Offshore Wind
Energy Potential: An Assessment of Environmental and Economic Constraints,
Copenhagen: EEA, www.eea.europa.eu/publications/europes-onshore-and-
offshore-wind-energy-potential, accessed on 12 July 2011.
EPC (European Parliament and Council) (2001) ‘Directive 2001/77/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the
promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the
internal electricity market’, Official Journal of the European Communities L283,
33–40, eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2001/l_283/l_28320011027
en00330040.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011.
EPC (European Parliament and Council) (2009) ‘Directive 2009/28/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion
of the use of energy from renewable sources’, Official Journal of the European
Union, L140, 5 June 2009, 16–62, eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do
?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0016:0062:EN:PDF, accessed on 12 July 2011.
EWEA (European Wind Energy Association) (2009) Oceans of Opportunity:
Harnessing Europe’s Largest Domestic Energy Resource, EWEA, Brussels, http:
//w w w.ewea.org/fileadmin/ewea_documents/documents/publications
/reports/Offshore_Report_2009.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011.
Firestone, J. and Kempton, W. (2007) ‘Public opinion about large offshore wind
power: underlying factors’, Energy Policy, 35: 3, 1584–1598.
Friends of the Supergrid (2011) Friends of the Supergrid, www.friendsofthesuper-
grid.eu, accessed on 12 July 2011.
Gibson, E. and Howsam, P. (2010) ‘The legal framework for offshore wind farms:
a critical analysis of the consents process’, Energy Policy, 38, 4692–4702.
Gray, T., Haggett, C. and Bell, D. (2005) ‘Offshore wind farms and commer-
cial fisheries in the UK: a study in stakeholder consultation’, Ethics, Place and
Environment, 8: 2, 127–140.
Green, R. and Vasilakos, N. (2011) ‘The economics of offshore wind’, Energy
Policy, 39, 496–502.
Greenpeace (2008) A North Sea Electricity Grid [R]evolution, Brussels: Greenpeace,
www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/eu-unit/press-centre/reports/A-North-Sea-
electricity-grid-(r)evolution.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011.
Haggett, C. (2008) ‘Over the sea and far away? A consideration of the planning,
politics and public perception of offshore wind farms,’ Journal of Environmental
Policy and Planning, 10: 3, 289–306.
Haggett, C. (2011) ‘Understanding public responses to offshore wind power’,
Henderson, A. (2002) ‘Offshore wind in Europe’, Refocus, March/April, 14–17.
HMG (HM Government) (2007) Planning for a Sustainable Future, Cm 7120,
Norwich: HMSO, www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm71/7120/7120
.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011.
HMG (HM Government) (2009a) The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan: National
Strategy for Climate and Energy, Norwich: HMSO, http://www.decc.gov.uk
/publications/basket.aspx?FilePath=White+Papers%2fUK+Low+Carbon+Tran
sition+Plan+WP09%2f1_20090724153238_e_%40%40_lowcarbontransition-
plan.pdf&filetype=4#basket, accessed on 12 July 2011.
HMG (HM Government) (2009b) The UK Renewable Energy Strategy, Cm 7686,
Norwich: HMSO, www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/what_we_do/uk_supply
/energy_mix/renewable/res/res.aspx, accessed on 12 July 2011.
HMG (HM Government) (2011) UK Marine Policy Statement, Norwich: HMSO,
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/marine/, accessed on 12 July 2011.
HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK (2010) National Infrastructure Plan 2010,
London: HM Treasury, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/nationalinfrastructure-
plan251010.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011
Jay, S. (2008) At the Margins of Planning: Offshore Wind Farms in the UK, Aldershot:
Ashgate.
Jay, S. (2009) ‘Planning for offshore wind energy in Northern Europe’, in
S. Davoudi, J. Crawford, and A. Mehmood (eds) Planning for Climate Change:
Strategies for Mitigation and Adaptation, pp. 167–180, London: Earthscan.
Jay, S. (2010) ‘Planners to the rescue: spatial planning facilitating the develop-
ment of offshore wind energy’, Marine Pollution Bulletin, 60, 493–499.
Lange, M., Burkhard, B., Stefan Garthe, Gee, K., Kannen, A., Lenhart, H. and
Windhorst, W. (2010) Analyzing Coastal and Marine Changes: Offshore Wind
Farming as A Case Study, Geesthacht: GKSS Research Centre, www.loicz.org
/imperia/md/content/loicz/print/rsreports/loiczrs36_final-300810_online.
Larsen, K. (2010) ‘Offshore wind: do we have what it takes?’, Renewable Energy

Focus, January/February, 24–29.
Markard, J. and Petersen, R. (2009) ‘The offshore trend: structural changes in
the wind power sector’, Energy Policy, 37, 3545–3556.
MS (Marine Scotland) (2010a) Draft Plan for Offshore Wind Energy in Scottish
Territorial Waters, Edinburgh: MS, www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource
/Doc/312147/0098586.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011.
MS (Marine Scotland ) (2010b) Marine Planning, Edinburgh: Scottish Government,
www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/295194/0103895.pdf, accessed on 12 July
2011.
MS (Marine Scotland ) (2010c) Marine Renewables Licensing in Scotland, Edinburgh:
Scottish Government, www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/295194/0105823.
MS (Marine Scotland ) (2010d) Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of Draft
Plan for Offshore Wind Energy in Scottish Territorial Waters, Edinburgh: Scottish
Government, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/312161/0098588.
Mitchell, C. and Connor, P. (2004) ‘Renewable energy policy in the UK
1990–2003’ Energy Policy, 32,1935–1947.
Musgrove, P. (1978) ‘Offshore wind energy systems’, Physics Education, 13, 211–214.
NAREC (National Renewable Energy Centre) (2011) Narec, www.narec.co.uk,
Offshore Center Danmark (2011) Offshore Wind Farms, www.offshorecenter.dk
/offshorewindfarms.asp, accessed on 12 July 2011.
OVG (Offshore Valuation Group) (2010) Valuing the UK Offshore Renewable
Energy Resource, Machynlleth: Public Interest Research Centre, www.offshor-
evaluation.org/downloads/offshore_vaulation_full.pdf, accessed on 12 July
2011.
OWIG (Offshore Wind Industry Group) (2010) Scotland’s Offshore Wind Route
Map: Developing Scotland’s Offshore Wind Industry to 2020, Edinburgh: Scottish
Portman, M., Duff, J., Köppel, J., Reisert, J. and Higgins, M. (2009) ‘Offshore
wind energy development in the exclusive economic zone: legal and policy
supports and impediments in Germany and the US’, Energy Policy, 37,
3596–3607.
Pritchard, I. (2009) ‘Offshore wind within Scottish territorial waters’, Marine
News, Spring, 7.
RenewableUK (2010) State of the Industry Report: Onshore and Offshore Wind: A
Progress Update, London: RenewableUK, www.bwea.com/pdf/publications/
SOI-Oct_2010_report.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011.
RenewableUK (2011) ‘RenewableUK: the voice of wind and marine energy’,
www.bwea.com, accessed on 12 July 2011.
Santora, C., Hade, N. and Odell, J. (2004) ‘Managing offshore wind developments
in the United States: legal, environmental and social considerations using a
case study in Nantucket Sound’, Ocean and Coastal Management, 47, 141–164
Scott, K. (2006) ‘Tilting at offshore windmills: regulating wind farm develop-
ment within the renewable energy zone?’, Journal of Environmental Law, 18:
1, 89–118.
Scottish Executive (2003) Securing a Renewable Future: Scotland’s Renewable

Energy, Edinburgh: Scottish Executive, www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource
/Doc/47034/0014765.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011.
Scottish Government (2009) Renewables Action Plan, Edinburgh: Scottish
Smulian, M. (2010) ‘Offshore options’, Planning, November, 12–13.
Snyder, B. and Kaiser, M. (2009a) ‘Offshore wind power in the US: regulatory
issues and models for regulation, Energy Policy, 37, 4442–4453.
Snyder, B. and Kaiser, M. (2009b) ‘A comparison of offshore wind power devel-
opment in Europe and the US: patterns and drivers of development’, Applied
Energy, 86, 1845–1856.
Söderholm, P. and Pettersson, M. (2011) ‘Offshore wind power policy and plan-
ning in Sweden’, Energy Policy, 39, 518–525.
Starling, M. (2010) ‘Are we ready to transform UK waters?’, Renewable Energy
Focus, May/June, 12–17.
Still, D. (2001) ‘Offshore wind at Blyth’, Renewable Energy, 24, 545–551.
Talisman Energy (2011) Beatrice Wind Farm Demonstration Project, www.beat-
ricewind.co.uk, accessed on 12 July 2011.
TCE (The Crown Estate) (2003) Tender Procedures and Criteria for Round 2 UK
Offshore Windfarm Developments, www.thecrownestate.co.uk/87_round_2_
tender_procedures_criteria_04_02_08.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011.
TCE (The Crown Estate) (2008) Supporting Information Relating to the Announcement
of Round 3, www.thecrownestate.co.uk/round3_briefing_note.pdf, accessed
on 12 July 2011.
TCE (The Crown Estate) (2010) UK Offshore Wind Report, London: TCE.
TCE (The Crown Estate) (2011) Offshore Wind Energy, www.thecrownestate.co.uk
/offshore_wind_energy, accessed on 12 July 2011.
Toke, D. (2011) ‘The UK offshore wind power programme: a sea-change in UK
energy policy?’, Energy Policy, 39, 526–534.
Westwood, A. (2007) ‘Array of hope’, Refocus, January/February, 20–21.
Williamson, K. (2010) ‘Which comes first: the developer or the supply chain?’,
Renewable Energy Focus, September/October, 20–23.
Wolsink, M. (2010) ‘Near-shore wind power: protected seascapes, environmen-
talists’ attitudes, and the technocratic planning perspective’, Land Use Policy,
27, 195–203.
WWEA (World Wind Energy Association) (2011) World Wind Energy Report
2010, Bonn: WWEA, http://www.wwindea.org/home/images/stories/pdfs/
worldwindenergyreport2010_s.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2011
6
Planning with the Missing
Masses: Innovative Wind
Power Planning in France
Alain Nadaï
According to some physicists, there is not enough mass in

the universe to balance the accounts that cosmologists make
of it. They are looking everywhere for the ‘missing mass’
that could add up to the nice expected total. It is the same
with sociologists. ... When adding up social ties, all does not
balance ... the society they try to recompose with bodies and
norms constantly crumbles. Something is missing ... Where can
they find it? Everywhere, but they too often refuse to see it in
spite of much new work in the sociology of artefacts.
(Latour 1992: 227)
Introduction
In a recent review of lessons learned about wind power planning, Ellis

et al. (2009) pointed out an emphasis on procedural efficiency, on
barriers occurring from planning practices, and a downplaying of the
qualitative understanding of planning processes. Planning is often seen
as the origin or the carrier of the wind power problem (for example,
CEC (Commission of European Communities) 2005; Wolsink 2009).
This chapter argues that it is worth reversing this perspective. While
the ‘planning problem’ results from a widely shared perspective of
procedural efficiency, this is often framed in a perspective of ‘techno-
logical potential’ – that is, the potential (installed capacity) of a tech-
nology that could be achieved in the absence of social obstacles to its
deployment. Definitions of technological potentials have been debated
(Verbruggen et al. 2010). But beyond these debates, technological
potential indicates the potential of an a-social technology, in the sense
of a technology, which when deployed, fails to induce friction and
108
Planning with the Missing Masses 109
leaves the social realm unchanged – in other words, a technological

nirvana. The problem, as developments in Actor Network Theory
(ANT) have made clear, is that technologies would not exist in such a
nirvana. Technologies are assemblages made up of heterogeneous elem-
ents: human beings, non-humans, technical artefacts and so on. They
are heterogeneous networks and exist only by being embedded in the
social realm (Law 1987 and 1992). ‘Shaping technology’ is the same as
‘building the social’ (Bijker and Law 1992).
One consequence of this is that the authoritative notion of technolog-
ical potential, defined as a potential associated with a generic technology,
has its limitations. What I shall call here ‘generic technology’ is abstract
technology (such as ‘wind power’ or ‘solar energy’) which, for the sake
of the argument,1 I temporarily distinguish from situated technology,
technology that is embedded in heterogeneous networks at the local
level (for example, ‘wind farms’, ‘solar farms’). It is because technolog-
ical potential is conceived and approached as being ‘technological’ in
a non-social sense that social interactions end up being posited as a
barrier to its realisation, saddling planning with the impossible mission
of matching social processes with non-social targets.
Reversing the ‘planning problem’ and looking at the innovative
dimension of planning processes requires us fully to acknowledge that
technology is always situated. Gigawatt figures (technological poten-
tial) certainly sustain visions of the future that are part of steering the
energy transition. But they should not be regarded as realistic represen-
tations of this transition. They are ‘plans’, both frame and resource for
action. Suchman proposes a revealing analogy:
In contemplating the descent of a problematic series of rapids in a

canoe, for example, one is very likely to sit for a while above the falls
and plan one’s descent [ ... ] But in no case – and this is the crucial
point – do such plans control action in any strict sense of the word
‘control’. [ ... ] When it really comes down to the details of getting
the actions done, in situ, you rely not on the plan but on whatever
embodied skills of handling a canoe, responding to currents and the
like, [that] are available to you. The purpose of the plan, in other
words, is not literally to get you through the rapids, but rather to
position you in such a way that you have the best possible conditions
under which to use those embodied skills on which, in the final
analysis, your success depends. (Suchman 1988: 314)
Planning processes are like canoeing: success is not determined by

an ex-ante target or representation, but rather depends on planning
practice in the face of project development. In other words, technolog-

ical potential, in the sense of ‘success’ in installing wind power capacity,
can only emerge from planning processes. It does not exist before or
outside these processes. Consequently, there is no predefined quantita-
tive benchmark against which to measure success. This does not mean
that metrics, graphic forms or other types of representations have no
role to play in planning, or even that there is no criterion by which to
assess the quality of a planning process. On the contrary, it points to a
decisive quality of innovative planning processes, namely their ability
to relate to the site and situations in a way similar to that of the canoeist
‘responding to currents and the like’. Metrics, forms and representa-
tions can ‘position’ planning practice in such a way that it is more apt
to relate to the situation and succeed, but they cannot dictate the path
to take or the end point.
Academic research on wind power has highlighted important dimen-
sions of planning processes, such as the role of civil society and social
networks during the implementation phase (Agterbosch et al. 2009).
Yet what these analyses have suggested, but not made sufficiently clear,
is that implementation goes beyond (merely) applying a pre-given and
stable framework. As Waterton (2003) has shown, even implementing
a mere botanical classification entails performance and innovation:
depending on whether you are a dancer or a social scientist, you will
not end up with the same categorisation. In other words, implemen-
tation leads to innovation in the sense of a transformation of existing
norms and institutions in accordance with a situated experience. Such
innovation underlies technological development because it is the social
process of assembling heterogeneous networks.
This chapter elaborates this argument and contextualises it by
looking at the way in which wind power planning processes helped
innovate social representations and practices of landscape in two parts
of France – Aveyron and Narbonnaise. The case studies examine the
ways in which the potential of wind power technology is constructed
through the situated process of planning wind power in these different
places. They illustrate the capacity of planning to evolve from a rather
administrative and normative approach to more open and innovative
approaches so as to address issues raised by wind power deployment.
These cases are then used to discuss lessons for the analysis of the
energy transition and the role of planning. The chapter concludes by
briefly considering the extent to which the lessons learned from wind
power deployment might be relevant for the governance of the broader
energy transition.
Innovative planning and the development

of wind power in France
France is an exemplary case of the mismatch between policy instru-

ment and installed capacity. After ten years of one of the highest feed-in
tariffs in Europe, the installed capacity is still low (4.6 GW, that is to
say, one quarter of the 2020 national objective) compared with other
countries that have relied on the same type of tariffs: Spain (19.1 GW),
Germany (25.8 GW).
Landscape is among the principal reasons that local administration has
invoked for rejecting projects (Nadaï and Labussière 2009 and 2010b).
On average, about 30 per cent (2 out of 7) of wind power applications
were denied construction permits in 2009 (Observ’er 2010) compared
with 20 per cent in 2005 (Minefi 2006). A succinct qualitative inquiry
(by the author) carried out with the 22 regional environmental admin-
istrations during the autumn of 2006 suggested that the few gigawatts
(GW) in the pipeline (about 8GW, according to RTE 2007) were already
starting to saturate the non-protected landscape areas. This proves, if
proof is needed, that if France is to achieve its official 23GW target,
‘effective’ implementation of existing norms is not enough. Innovative
planning must be adopted in order to support the emergence of new
landscapes. Such a situation can easily be portrayed as a result of the
‘planning problem’, with the planning system being blamed for failure
to reach the national target.
Current experience, however, also invites us to read the situation
‘upside down’ and emphasise the innovative role of local planning
processes in such a difficult context. Between 2000 and 2007, local
authorities and actors lacking a planning framework were faced with
private wind power developers: fixed tariffs were adopted in 2000; the
institutional framework for wind power development zones (WPDZ) was
adopted in 2005 and implemented in 2007 (Nadaï 2007). Many depart-
ments or regions reacted by devising their own local planning schemes,
many of which took the form of standard sieve mapping exercises,
although a significant proportion took more innovative approaches.
In what follows, three of these local planning processes are consid-
ered, located in two French departments (Aveyron and Aude), in order
to examine their potential to depart from sieve mapping and sustain
the emergence of new landscapes. The case studies are based on written
and graphic documents, observation in public meetings and face-to-
face qualitative interviews (about 25 to 30 interviews in each case) with
the different actors engaged in the development of wind power projects
Table 6.1 Number of local planning documents (all categories)

issued by the regions, departments or other territorial entities per
year (publication dates)
Before 2000 2000 2001–2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

2 3 3 11 10 12 7
Source: ADEME (France), http://www2.ademe.fr/servlet/KBaseShow?sort
=-1&cid=96&m=3&catid=15129.
(for example, state ministerial fields, local mayors, pro- or anti- ‘wind’
NGOs, territorial organisations, wind power developers, private land-
scape firms, environmental experts, etc.). Two or three field studies
were undertaken annually between the years 2005 and 2009.
With variations of focus depending on the case under consideration,
the object of the inquiries was to emphasise the innovative dimension
of policy and planning processes in order to describe the ways in which
these processes sustain (or fail to sustain) the emergence of new (wind
power) landscapes. In each case, we analysed the making of wind power
landscapes from a specific perspective such as bird protection, local
governance or the graphic language of planning documents. Attention
was given to planning and network practices, to the ways in which land-
scape representations can emerge in planning documents, to the role
of these representations (for example, graphic forms, written language)
and to the practices associated with them (for example, networking,
field work practices, dissemination of information, etc.). In this way,
we approached technology development and planning processes as
processes assembling human beings and non-humans, including tech-
nological artefacts.2
Following birds (Narbonnaise)

In the Regional Natural Park of Narbonnaise, the analysis focused on
the involvement of the local bird protection organisation (LPO) in
wind power planning and the way in which it innovated planning and
landscape approaches so as to contribute to the composition of new
landscapes (Nadaï and Labussière 2010a). Narbonnaise is a parc naturel
régional (PNR – ‘regional nature park’) located at the frontier between
France and Spain, on the east side of the Pyrenean mountains. The small
littoral plain, which is part of Narbonnaise, is one of two migratory
routes for birds on their way from Africa to Eastern Europe and back.
As one of the windiest places in France, it has attracted especial interest
and pressure from wind power developers since 2000. Consequently,
the PNR adopted a local planning scheme very early on (in 2005).
Following birds, birdwatchers and wind power developers in their

attempt to compose new landscapes with wind turbines, the case
study shows how LPO developed a new method for observing birds
and connected it with its national strategy in the area of wind power
planning. ‘Micro-siting’, as this method is called, focuses on the way
in which birds use a site, including the wind and the (eventual) pres-
ence of wind turbines. Unlike usual bird watching methods in the
Narbonnaise area, micro-siting is not a census nor is it primarily about
counting the size of the migrating species populations. It is about
following individual birds so as to understand the way in which they
develop strategies in relation to the presence of wind turbines. It is
about individual stories, individual or small group successes, difficul-
ties or failures in passing through, beside or over a wind farm (see
Figure 6.1). It is about bird strategy in finding thermals and updrafts,
about soaring and gliding. By focusing on individual stories so as to
capture birds’ intelligence in some type of textual or graphic represen-
tations, micro-siting multiplies observations and expands statistical
reach. This allows it to translate birds’ strategies into indices that are
congruent with planning and siting practice. In particular, spatiality
is constructed by the means of two ideas: ‘specific composition’ and
‘micro-flying paths’. ‘Specific composition’ is the proportion of species
in each sector. It is a static translation of bird movements, empha-
sising the presence of species and endowing space with the values
already attached to the species (for example, protected species, Species
of European Conservation Concern). It allows for a spatial differenti-
ation of the site. ‘Micro-flying paths’ are a fine-grained and spatially
differentiated representation of the migration flow at the level of the
site (see Figure 6.1). They are an index of movement endowing space
with density of use at a level that is relevant for a wind power devel-
oper. What is gained in this step is an exploration of the intensity
of spatial relations through quantification. These representations are
used in collaboration with wind power developers in order to design
a new siting for re-powering3 of an existing wind farm, a siting that
is compatible with bird migration. Its negotiation is the occasion for
the parties to agree on a follow-up on the impact of the future wind
farm on birds.
Two important conclusions arise from this case study. The first conclu-
sion regards the process by which a new potential for wind power devel-
opment emerges. Compatibilities between wind power and migrating
birds are composed by engaging birds in successive representations.
‘Bird’ is successively a protected species, a lively strategic/affected entity,
Flying over
Breaching
Flying through
Route to east
Driving in
Route to West
(a)
Wind turbines
Black Kite (1)
Wood Pigeon (2)
Rock kestrel (3)
Black Kite (4)
Realisation: LPO Aude - Abies, 2001
Fond de carte: IGN 1/25 000
(b)
Figure 6.1 From behavioural to spatial representation: birds in ‘micro-siting’

(a) Birds’ strategy vis-à-vis the park.
(b) Individual flights.
(c) Micro-flying ways per sector.
Source: LPO 2001.
808 Birds
23,5 %
858 Birds 1767 Birds

25 % 51,5 %
(c)
Figure 6.1 Continued
a statistical class and a geographical datum. These are better referred to

as translations rather than representations of birds – in the sense of
the sociology of translation (Callon 1986). Capturing bird strategy in
the face of turbines is a way of converting relations (between birds and
the wind) into other relations (between wind power developers and the
wind) so as to assemble entities4 (birds, bird protectors, wind turbines
and wind power developer) and explore the compatibility between
turbines and migrating birds.
The second conclusion is that bird protection norms would never by
themselves have allowed these new compatibilities to emerge and find
a spatial translation. All this is possible because the process suspends
the normative power of (bird) classification. Protected species are not
approached as classified species, but by following birds in the face of
turbines. A bird of prey might reveal surprising agility and share more
in this regard with a passerine than with its nearest classificatory neigh-
bour. In so doing, it might suggest compatibilities with wind turbines
that would never had been expected had the existing norms been
applied in the conventional manner.
The outcome of this process is reflected in the first project for
‘repowering’ a wind farm in France (Plateau de Haute Garrigue,
Narbonnaise) and in the engagement of LPO in wind power planning
at the local, national and international levels. Indeed, the innovation

of micro-siting has been taken into account in other local planning
projects in France and at the European level by bird protection NGOs
(BirdLife International 2005). The landscape that emerges from this
process may legitimately be described as a ‘wind power landscape’,
since it is composed by a sharing of the wind by migrating birds
and wind power developers, both on a technical level (that of the
coexistence between the turbines and migratory birds) and at a polit-
ical level (that of the compatibility between our energy policy and
our politics of birds). Last but not least, the LPO has recently changed
strategy in the Narbonnaise and opposes the development of new
wind farms because developers’ pressure for additional wind power
development in this area was felt to be no longer compatible with
bird migration.
Planning with the landscape (Aveyron)

Aveyron is a department located in the south-west of France. It is a
rural area, one of the windiest in France, with major tourist attractions.
The case of Aveyron illustrates both the risks of an exclusively admin-
istrative planning of wind power and the role that WPDZ might play
in opening and innovating planning. The analysis was conducted by
tracing landscape representations and their development during the
planning process (Nadaï and Labussière 2009). Wind power develop-
ment started quite early in France, with the Merdelou project (1999).
Immediately after this first project, the adoption of the French tariffs
in 2000 was followed by a wind dash. By the end of 2006, 502 MW had
been submitted for construction permits.5
In 2000, there was no planning framework or doctrine for wind
power planning and approval at the national level. In order to cope
with the increasing number of wind power projects submitted for
administrative approval, the Aveyron administration started to
develop a local planning scheme as did many other French regions.
The work started in 2000 and the final document was issued in 2005
(Préfecture de l’Aveyron 2005). The work was initiated by setting up
an ad hoc commission consisting of various ministerial field services
(including the DDE which is the ‘roads and infrastructures’ admin-
istration and Parc Naturel Régional des Grands Causses). The working
process was steered by the DDE. At first it was open to the various
viewpoints, but became progressively very hierarchical. As the
commission was narrowed down to the core ministerial field services
(that is, roads, environment, industry and heritage), the approach
ended up proceeding in the usual way for local wind power planning
in France at the time. It converted wind power issues (for example,
co-visibilities with protected landscapes or historical landmarks, prox-
imity to housing) into terms of zoning through several operations,
such as the definition of landscape ‘types’ based on morphology and
heritage value, the mapping of regulatory constraints and the compi-
lation of layers (sieve mapping), and the addition of buffer zones
so as to compensate for regulatory insufficiencies in the face of the
exceptionally far-reaching co-visibilities imposed by industrial wind
turbines. This gradual shift from a qualitative landscape approach to
a logic of zoning (favourable, unfavourable or negative) converted the
‘what’ into a ‘where’: the question of ‘what type of landscape’ was
intended for Aveyron’s future was answered by the question ‘where’
to locate wind farms so as to limit their impact on the existing land-
scapes. While this certainly answered the administrators’ quest for
rationality and objectivity in the face of pressure from wind devel-
opers, the first wind power developments quickly indicated the limits
of the approach. Wind power development inside the favourable zones
was left unplanned. Co-visibilities between the projects sited in these
zones and the zones deemed to be protected for wind power visual
impact could not be avoided. The rapid technological development
of wind energy (increase in size, power and economic profitability in
wind areas deemed unprofitable a few years ago) soon made landscape
choices obsolete. The local opposition grew stronger as it was given
no other choice other than that of reacting to projects and planning
which had already been decided upon. In 2006, WPDZ started to be
developed and the Aveyron prefect was replaced. As part of a national
policy, WPDZ provided the new administration with the authority to
revise its approach to wind power planning. The new prefect imposed
a temporary moratorium on wind power permits until all WPDZ had
been provided to the authorities.
The design of WPDZ started under a double umbrella. On the one
hand, the Aveyron administration decided on WPDZ perimeters, within
which local councillors were asked to coordinate wind power devel-
opments. Notwithstanding the unchanged administrative and hierar-
chical style, WPDZ clearly induced a shift in scale, if not a change in
approach. Actual landscapes were taken into account as the administra-
tion followed the contours of the existing massifs (mountain ridges) in
order to outline ‘massifs WPDZ’. But WPDZ perimeters still followed the
outline of the wind power scheme and the ministerial field services saw
the result as a ‘complementing the Aveyron planning scheme’.6
The second umbrella was the Parc Naturel Régional des Grands Causses
(PNRGC), a non-state actor initially involved in the first commission.
In 2007, the PNRGC took actions to support the designing of these
WPDZ by the local communities. Since 2000, the PNRGC had suggested
approaching wind power planning on the scale of the ‘massifs’. It
defined ‘massifs’ as ‘sets of ridges forming entities that are both natural
and human’. The PNRGC thought that massif entities offered a framing
that was more compatible with collective action. Instead of having indi-
vidual communities competing for revenues and projects, local mayors
could collaborate in putting wind power developers in competition
according to their ability to relate to the local context. In the end, this
made it possible to take issues of landscape (far-reaching co-visibilities)
and proximity better into account. In 2000, the idea was discarded by
the prefecture as being too complicated, because massifs overlapped
administrative divides.
The design of WPDZ was the occasion for the PNRGC to recover
a role in wind power planning in accordance with its philosophy.
A major step was the issuing of a PNRGC guidance document for
WPDZ development (PNRGC 2007), intended to complement offi-
cial texts and emphasising dimensions such as relevant landscape
scale, a multi-communal dimension, concerted decision-making,
non- classified and non-visual landscape. As the PNR stated, the goal
was ‘to take account of non-classified landscapes such as the paths
that local inhabitants love and, above all, to keep them informed so
that they are not caught off guard at the end of the process’.7 Most
important, funding was offered to inter-communalities that agreed to
follow these recommendations. The regional environmental adminis-
tration (DIREN) decided to cooperate with the PNRGC in fund raising.
Yet uncertainties remained, notably with regard to the difficulty of
again including in the discussion wind power projects that had been
submitted for authorisation and held out promises of income for rural
communities.
This process is still going on. The analysis undertaken in 2008,
however, already suggested that WPDZ were allowing the administra-
tion to depart from landscape administrative categories and zoning so
as to take into account the value of landscapes for the local popula-
tion as well as for a new landscape scale. By so doing, planning was
becoming congruent with both the natural entities and wind power
co-visibilities. The WPDZ process also provided political representatives
with the occasion to acknowledge, if not to take into account, the rising
local opposition to wind power.
Planning with graphic forms (Narbonnaise)

Contrasting these first two case studies, the LPO in the Narbonnaise
and administrative planning in the Aveyron, suggested an opposition
reminiscent of positive versus negative planning opposition (Nadaï and
Labussière 2010b). The first type, called ‘project planning’, relied on a
project approach and aimed at defining favourable wind power areas.
The second type, called ‘constraint planning’, proceeded through the
inventory of regulatory constraints and aimed at delineating exclusion
zones. The first type of planning relied on collective decision-making,
while the second type mainly worked top down. The first was open to
innovation; it contributed to the emergence of new landscape repre-
sentations (in the sense of shared representations and norms) and of
new landscapes. The second implemented current (protective) land-
scape representations. Beyond this apparent opposition, however, a
more detailed look at the role of cartographic forms in the Narbonnaise
planning process (Labussière and Nadaï 2011) indicates ways in which
(innovative) planning can process constraint maps in a non-normative
manner so that they contribute to the emergence of new landscapes.
In 2002, the Parc Naturel Régional de la Narbonnaise en Méditerranée
(PNRNM), faced with growing pressure to develop wind power, decided
to commission a landscape company to devise a plan: the PNRNM
wind power Charter. This Charter, adopted in 2003, sets the bound-
aries for favourable and non-favourable zones for wind power devel-
opments – so-called wind power envelopes – together with specific
landscape recommendations for each envelope (‘re-powering’, densifi-
cation, dismantling). This was the only local planning process to bring
together mayors, wind power developers, NGOs and ministerial field
services in a consultation. Our analysis followed the development of
this Charter from its beginning in 2002 until the autumn of 2007,
when it was already used by the local administration in order to autho-
rise wind power projects.
From the outset, wind power confronted the landscape company
with a disconcerting experience. The presence of wind turbines in the
landscape created a scale that was unfamiliar to landscape architects,
both because of the size of the machines (impact on proximity) and
the far-reaching co-visibilities they produced. Thus wind power called
for the company to elaborate new ways of perceiving and representing
the landscape in order to embrace at the same time the scale of the
site (in which the turbines were set) and that of the larger landscape
units (in which far-reaching visual relations were affected). The team of
landscape architects responded to this ‘trans-scalar’ issue with a mix of
graphic modes, bringing maps and 3D block diagrams (drawn by hand

early in the process of field work) into the dialogue and making these
landscape representations available for sharing with local actors (elected
representatives, NGOs, developers) throughout the planning process.
A first step consisted in analysing territorial representations. It under-
took an inventory of state-declared areas and regulatory constraints.
The analysis led to devising what were called ‘data maps’ (instead of
‘constraint maps’) and to the conclusion that ‘strict bans [on wind
power developments] [were] very limited in the PNRNM territory’. A
questionnaire survey asking for prioritisation of various regulatory
criteria was then addressed to the members of the PNRNM steering
committee, mainly local mayors. It yielded modest results, from which
the landscape company was unable to infer any exclusion zone for wind
power. These results suggested that the planning of wind power was
open to negotiation. That, in turn, postponed the actual treatment of
regulatory constraints until the next step – a three-day long consulta-
tion workshop with local actors to explore the issue and decide, through
concerted decision-making, on the design of wind power envelopes in
which it was felt acceptable to set wind farms.
If this process seems reminiscent of the usual wind power zoning,
it nonetheless stood out dramatically in one decisive and qualita-
tive aspect: the envelopes emerged during this planning process without a
territorial contour ever being assigned to them. A territorial contour is a
perimeter giving the graphic representation a territorial significance
(in/out of an area, in/out of a communal territory) and allowing wind
power developers to claim authorisation for their project on the basis
of its in/exclusion from these envelopes. This was a strategy that the
PNRNM representatives (local mayors) were keen to avoid allowing.
The ‘territorial order’, as the landscape architects named it, was felt to
promote political divisions and to exempt divisions from a qualitative
definition of what they divided. Thus the issue of keeping the wind
power envelopes somewhat non-territorial and open was central to this
planning process.8
The landscape company drew a key distinction between the order of
the ‘territory’ and the order of the ‘landscape’. The ‘landscape’ approach
was characterised by its focus on relationships, scale relations and
modes of assembling rather than by Euclidean coordinates or locations.
It aimed at qualitatively defining the way in which turbines could be
made part of a landscape and the type of compatibilities that should be
composed. Analysis of the Narbonnaise planning process proved that
its graphic work was almost entirely structured round this distinction.
In practice, the landscape architects had recourse to a variety of graphic
(a)
(b)
Figure 6.2 Open forms of planning: excerpts from the Narbonnaise planning
process.
(a) Sketch-like drawing.
(b) Figure-background dissonance.
Source: PNRN, 2003. Design: Agence Urbane on behalf of the Parc Naturel Regional de la
Narbonnaise.
tricks in order to avoid giving graphic lines a territorial significance.

They used sketch-like drawing rather than contours or administrative
borders; they avoided metric scales in maps; they superimposed figures
with map background on a different scale (scale dissonance), etc. As a
result, graphic forms could not be interpreted as prescribing exact loca-

tions or implantation. They conveyed a relational approach, which put
wind power developers in a position to argue that their project related
to the specific landscape in which they decided to site it. They thus
made landscape into a driving force for project development.
The Narbonnaise Charter process followed a moratorium on wind
power development imposed by the Aude Prefect because of excessive
pressure exerted by wind power developers in this department. The
Charter process, since it paved the way for a compromise on wind power
development in the PNRNM area, allowed for the reconsideration of the
moratorium. It led to the definition of several wind power envelopes,
within which five projects were submitted. Three of them were denied
authorisation because of lack of attention to the Charter guidelines, and
two of them were rated positively, including one that was approved at
the time of writing (the project of the Plateau de Haute Garrigue).
Innovative planning, emerging potential
The previous case studies show that planning processes, if opened

beyond existing norms and landscape categories, can sustain the emer-
gence of an unforeseen potential for wind power development. In the
Narbonnaise this happens on two scales. On a project by project level,
the work of the LPO contributes to exploring new compatibilities, leading
to the (conditional) deployment of wind power projects in a migratory
corridor. On a territorial level, the shift from a normative approach
(‘territory’) to a more qualitative and relational one (‘landscape’) allows
planning to re-open territorial data (regulatory constraints) and explore
ways in which wind power can become part of new landscapes. In
Aveyron, the turn from administrative and normative planning to a
more open planning, taking account of existing massifs and landscape
uses, also permits the exploration of ways in which new wind power
landscapes can emerge.
In both cases, uncertainties remain as regards the course of the process
and prove that there is no guarantee of success or mechanistic increase
in wind power capacity as a result of a change in planning approach.
But in both cases wind power development was offered a new opportu-
nity because entities (such as birds, landscape or graphic forms), which
were excluded or made passive because of some normative representa-
tion dominating the process, are suddenly made part of the process in
a more active manner and endowed with the power to influence the
course of the process – that is, endowed with ‘agency’.
This is the case with birds in the Narbonnaise: micro-siting opens

up the possibility of accounting for birds’ intelligence. Bird flight and
strategies become a resource that is used to explore new compatibilities,
which can then be translated into unforeseen spatial arrangements
(siting). Had bird strategies towards the Haute Garrigue turbines been
different, the LPO and the developers might have failed in finding a
consensual siting for this wind farm. ‘Micro-siting’ might have missed
a chance to emerge as an innovative bird-watching method.
The same may be said of the landscape. In both case studies, land-
scape protection norms and zoning were freezing landscape into catego-
ries that translated qualitative issues (for example, which future for the
landscape?) into a Boolean algorithm (inside/outside protected areas),
making it easier for the administration to rule (yes/no) on wind power
projects. Yet these categories offered no way out when tensions and local
opposition emerged because allegedly less qualified landscapes became
saturated with wind turbines. Only when norms were opened to nego-
tiation could planning rely on existing landscapes to explore new ways
of assembling wind farms with the landscape. In the Aveyron, defining
massifs as ‘sets of ridges forming entities that are both natural and
human’ is not so much a PNRGC strategy for debating the substantial
definition of these entities as it is one for turning massifs into a perfor-
mative entity, because the future of the Aveyron process depends on the
way in which massifs cut through the Aveyron landscape and assemble
the parties.9
This is even the case with graphic forms in the Narbonnaise. The
specific way in which these forms are designed and used in this process
gives them an active part in planning. Graphic forms are not a passive
recipient of predefined siting prescriptions to be copied by developers.
Developers are steered towards definite areas by graphic forms, but they
have to explain how the siting of their wind farms relates to the existing
landscapes in these areas. So these graphic forms act as a mediator in
a broader relational approach. They become a kind of hieroglyph to be
deciphered in situations (that is, with the landscape) by the developers.
They make landscape and wind power developers into active parties of
project development.
This highlights two lessons. The first is that there is no division such
as a technology on the one hand and a social dimension on the other.
There are technical artefacts, such as wind turbines. Wind power as a
technology which is used to transform wind into electricity, however,
emerges when turbines are assembled in and with a situation so as to
be sited and connected to a grid.10 Thus technology exists only as a
type of heterogeneous network, assembling humans and non-humans

(including technical artefacts) so as to get wind through and electricity
out. The flow of transformation and displacements that planning
induces is at the core of the technology; as part of the assembling and
the deployment of technology.
The second lesson is that the outcome of the planning processes
analysed here could not have emerged before or outside them. It
completely relies on the agency of entities that had to be made active
in order to be assembled in the way they end up being assembled. In
this sense, it may be said that the technological potential was not there
beforehand, not even as a possibility: it is emergent.
Planning ‘with’, not planning ‘through’
Missing masses and the energy transition

About 20 years ago, Bruno Latour made us aware of the ‘missing masses’
in sociological analysis – that is, of the impossibility of understanding
social relations without accounting for the role of artefacts and non-hu-
mans (Latour 1992). This chapter has drawn on Actor Network Theory
to follow the role played by a few non-human entities (birds, landscape
and graphic forms) in innovative planning processes. It has shown that,
when they are endowed with agency, these entities can contribute to
the emergence of unforeseen solutions and compatibilities which can
sustain the deployment of wind power. In other words, the point is to
learn how to plan with these missing masses rather than through them,
because the answer to our planning problems lies in part in their active
contribution.
Much recent literature about wind power planning has addressed
the issue of public participation, discussing the modalities and role
played by local ‘actors’ (human beings) with respect to social accep-
tance (for example, Gross 2007; Aitken et al. 2008; Nadaï and Van der
Horst, 2010a). These analyses have drawn lessons for the ways in which
public participation should be undertaken, but a gap seems to remain
in our understanding of opposition to wind power (Aitken 2010b). The
previous case studies suggest that the limited presence of non-human
entities in these analyses may be a reason for our limited understanding
of the issues.
Which theory of technology?

In recent decades, theories of technology and innovation have explored
the challenge of technological development, much of which relates to
its systemic dimension. The process of technological innovation and/or
deployment has been represented as a system or a network. Many

candidate concepts and frameworks have been proposed; for example,
‘innovation system’ (Bergek et al. 2008; Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993),
‘technological trajectories’ (Dosi 1982), ‘socio-technical systems’ (Hughes
1983), and ‘heterogeneous network’ (Bijker and Law, 1992). This is not
the place to discuss these developments and concepts in detail.
If we want to explore further which theory would best allow us to grasp
the innovative dimension of planning processes, however, the discus-
sion should be structured round two important dimensions. The first
dimension concerns the way in which the social realm is conceived and
approached. Is it a segment or dimension of society? Or is it a force, a flow
assembling the technology and working its way to its core? The second
dimension concerns how agency is reflected upon and distributed. Is
agency encapsulated as a property and an attribute of certain agents or
segments of society (such as social representation, power, institution)? Or
is it a pervasive activity that assembles the technology and can be followed
through the transformations it induces? The second option is evidently
the one taken in this chapter, allowing theory to grasp the social process
at work in innovative planning and technological development.
These lessons are not really new. Yet they seem not to have been
sufficiently emphasised in the analysis of wind power development and
the energy transition. With few exceptions, the literature in the social
sciences addressing the deployment of renewable energy has framed
it under the heading of ‘social acceptance’, a term which, if not care-
fully reformulated, suggests a stabilised and delineated technology to
be accepted (or not) by society. In such a context, it is of strategic impor-
tance to turn upside-down the commonly accepted, but not unchal-
lenged (for instance, Shove 1998), view of (energy) policy analysts that
there is a pre-existent technological potential prior to the development
of a technology. This reversal proves that social relations are not a barrier
to the development of technologies but are rather part of it. The same
applies to planning, which is often represented as a barrier to the devel-
opment of new energy technologies (for example, CEC (Commission of
European Communities) 2005: 13).
Conclusion
This chapter draws together evidence from a set of French case studies
in wind power development in order to show that planning should not
be regarded as a process aimed at aligning social relations with the real-
isation of a pre-defined technological potential. Rather, taking the ANT
view that technology is a heterogeneous network, it has argued that the
technological potential, if any, emerges from social processes, including

planning processes. Such emergence occurs when these processes
endow entities (human or not) with a power to contribute in an active
way (agency) to the composition of technology. Agency has been char-
acterised in two ways. First, by following the work of some entities and
the collective transformations underlying wind power development to
which they contribute, even if some of these entities do not act in the
way we would expect a self-conscious agent to act. Second, by showing
that, had their action or contribution been different, the outcome of the
process would not have been the same. Thus what this chapter terms
‘innovative’ planning is a type of planning that sets conditions for enti-
ties to become active, even if through collective agency.
While this agency is a pre-condition for innovative planning, there
are no guarantees of success or of mechanistic increase in wind power
capacity as a result of such planning. It seems difficult even to gauge the
current extent of innovative (wind power) planning, since this would
require analyses attentive to the distribution and circulation of agency
in planning processes. Yet innovative planning offers the opportu-
nity for the emergence of unexpected compatibilities and potential as
compared with the straightforward implementation of existing norms.
This opportunity is very valuable when issues touch upon shared values
such as the way in which we share, experience and appreciate our
familiar landscapes. As has been argued elsewhere (Selman 2010; Nadaï
and Van der Horst 2010b; Nadaï et al. 2010), if we want to develop new
energies on a scale relevant for the energy transition, new landscapes of
energy will have to emerge. Yet the issue of landscape in relation to wind
power should be regarded as only one instance of the many controver-
sial issues that new technologies of energy might raise in the course
of their deployment. Innovative experiences in wind power planning
therefore suggest that we will be better equipped for sustaining these
processes if we take account of the role played by the non-human in our
sociological analysis of the energy transition.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the MEDDAD (the French Environment
Ministry) and its Landscape and Sustainable Development Program
(PPD), the Conseil Français de l’Energie, the ADEME (the French Agency for
the Environment and Energy Efficiency) (Convention 07 10 C 0019), the
Region Ile-de-France and the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
(CNRS – Programme Interdisciplinaire pour l’Energie) for their financial

support of this research.
Notes
1. In fact, as illustrated by the debates on potentials (e.g. Verbruggen et al.
2010), ‘generic’ technology is not a-social. It also triggers tensions in order
to be assembled as a heterogeneous network. But it is situated in different
arenas and sites than those I consider in this paper. Relevant for my purpose
here is that the rhetoric underlying the notion of ‘potential’ sustains a
distinction between technology and a social dimension.
2. The view adopted in this chapter draws upon Actor Network Theory (ANT),
notably Callon (1986); Law (1987; 1992) and Latour (2005).
3. ‘Re-powering’ consists in dismantling an existing wind farm and in
increasing its capacity by installing new, bigger and more powerful wind
turbines.
4. The term ‘entities’ refers to human or non-human actors.
5. Source: DDE 12, Fall 2006
6. Interview by the author
7. Interview by the author
8. For more on the role of forms in planning, see Labussière and Nadaï 2011
and Labussière 2007.
9. For a discussion of the configuration of players and issues at the end of the
year 2007, see Nadaï and Labussière (2009: 750–751).
10. I therefore explore only a small portion of the process in this paper.
References
Bergek, A., Jacobsson, S., Carlsson, B., Lindmark, S. and Rickne A. (2008)
‘Analysing the functional dynamics of technological F. innovation systems: a
scheme of analysis’, Research Policy, 37, 407–429.
Agterbosch, S., Meertens, R. M. and Vermeulen, W. J. V. (2009) ‘The relative
importance of social and institutional conditions in the planning of wind
power projects’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 13, 393–405.
Aitken, M. (2010b) ‘Why we still don’t understand the social aspects of wind
power: a critique of key assumptions within the literature’, Energy Policy, 38: 4
(April), 1834–1841.
Bijker, W. E. and Law, J. (1992), Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in
Sociotechnical Change, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
BirdLife International (2005) Position Statement on Wind Farms and Birds, Adopted
by the BirdLife Birds and Habitats Directive Task Force on 9 December 2005, http:
//www.birdlife.org/eu/pdfs/Nature_Directives_material/BHDTF_Position_
Wind_farms_and_birds_2005_12_09.pdf, accessed on 15 August 2011.
Callon, M. (1986) ‘Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of

the scallops and the fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay’, in J. Law (ed.) Power, Action
and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge, pp-196–233, London: Routledge.
CEC (Commission of European Communities) (2005) ‘The support of electricity
from renewable energy sources’, Communication from the Commission,
SEC (2005) 157, COM(2005) 627 final, 7 December 2005, Brussels.
Cowell, R. (2010) ‘Wind power, landscape and strategic, spatial planning – the
construction of “acceptable locations” in Wales’, Land Use Policy, 27, 222–232.
Dosi, G. (1982), ‘Technological paradigms and technological trajectories:
a suggested interpretation of the determinants of technological change’,
Research Policy, 11, 147–162.
Ellis, G., Cowell, R., Warren, C., Strachan, P. and Szarka, J. (2009) ‘Expanding
wind power: a problem of planning, or of perception?’ Planning Theory and
Practice, 10: 4, 523–532
Gross, C. (2007) ‘Community perspectives of wind energy in Australia: the
application of a justice and community fairness framework to increase social
acceptance’, Energy Policy, 35: 5, 2727–2736.
Hughes, T. (1983) Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880–1930,
Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
Labussière, O. (2007) Le défi esthétique en aménagement: vers une prospective du
milieu. Le cas des lignes très haute tension (Lot) et des parcs éoliens (Aveyron et
Aude), Thèse de doctorat en géographie et aménagement (dir. de Vincent
Berdoulay), Université de Pau et des Pays de l’Adour.
Labussière, O. and Nadaï, A. (2011) ‘Expérimentations cartographiques et deve-
nirs paysagers: la planification éolienne de la Narbonnaise (France, Aude)’,
Espaces et Sociétés, 146: 3, 71–92.
Latour, B. (1992) ‘Where are the missing masses? The sociology of a few mundane
artefacts’, in W. E. Bijker and J. Law (eds) Shaping Technology/Building Society:
Studies in Sociotechnical Change, pp. 225–258, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT
Press.
Latour, B. (2005) Reassembling the Social – An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory,
Law, J. (1987) ‘Technology, closure and heterogeneous engineering: the case of
the Portuguese expansion’, in Bijker, W. E., Hughes, T. P. and Pinch T. J. (eds)
The Social Construction of Technological Systems, New Directions in the Sociology
and History of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press,
Law, J. (1992) ‘Notes on the theory of the actor network: ordering, strategy and
heterogeneity’, Lancaster: Lancaster University, Centre for Science Studies.
LPO (2001) Suivi ornithologique des Parcs éoliens du plateau de Garrigue Haute (Aude),
Rapport Final, Etude réalisée par LPO et ABIES, financée par l’ADEME.
Lundvall, B-Å. (ed.) (1992). National Innovation Systems: Towards a Theory of
Innovation and Interactive Learning, London: Pinter.
Minefi (2006) L’éolien français a le vent en poupe. Les résultats de l’enquête 2006 sur
l’instruction des demandes de permis de construire, Paris: DGEMP.
Nadaï, A. (2007) ‘“Planning”, “siting” and the local acceptance of wind power:
some lessons from the French case’, Energy Policy, 35: 5 (May), 2715–2726.
Nadaï, A. and Labussière, O. (2009) ‘Wind power planning in France (Aveyron):
from state regulation to local experimentation’, Land Use Policy, 26, 3 (July),
744–754.
Nadaï, A. and Labussière, O. (2010a) ‘Birds, turbines and the making of wind
power landscape in South France (Aude)’, Landscape Research, 35: 2 (April),
209–233.
Nadaï, A. and Labussière, O. (2010b) ‘Acceptabilité sociale et planification terri-
toriale: éléments de réflexion à partir de l’éolien et du stockage du CO2’, in
N. Chaabane and M. Haduong (eds) Le Captage et le stockage du CO2: enjeux
techniques et sociaux en France, 45–60, Paris: Quae.
Nadaï, A. and Van der Horst, D. (2010a) ‘Wind power planning, landscapes and
publics’ (Guest editorial), Land Use Policy, 27: 2 (April), 181–184.
Nadaï, A. and Van der Horst, D. (2010b) ‘Landscapes of energies’ (Guest edito-
rial), Special Issue of Landscape Research, 35: 2 (April), 143–155.
Nadaï, A., Krauss W., Afonso, A. I., Dracklé, D., Hinkelbein, O., Labussière, O.
and Mendes, C. (2010) ‘El paisaje y la transición energética: comparando
la aparición de paisajes de energía eólica en Francia, Alemania y Portugal’,
Nymbus, 25–26, 155–173.
Nelson, R. (ed.) (1993) National Innovation Systems. A Comparative Analysis,
Observ’er (2010) Le Baromètre 2010 des énergies renouvelables électriques en France,
Observ’er: Paris, 8, at http.www.energies-renouvelables.org.
PNRGC (2007) Zone de Développement de l’éolien dans le PNR des Grands Causses,
Cahier des charges précisant les modalités du chapitre relatif à l’étude patrimoniale
et paysagère du dossier de Z.D.E., Parc Naturel régional des Grands Causses:
Millau.
Préfecture de l’Aveyron (2005) Réflexion cadre pour un développement de l’énergie
éolienne en Aveyron, Avril.
PNRNM (2003) Charte du Développement Eolien – Projet de Parc Naturel Régional de la
Narbonnaise en Méditerranée (3 cahiers), Parc Naturel Régional de la Narbonnaise,
en Méditerranée, November, at http://www.parc-naturel-narbonnaise.fr/en_
actions/maitrise_de_l_energie_et_energies_renouvelables/charte_eolienne.
RTE (2007) Bilan prévisionnel de l’équilibre de l’offre et de la demande d’électricité
en France – Edition 2007, Gestionnaire du Réseau de Transport d’Electricité, Paris,
118.
Selman, P. (2010) ‘Learning to love the landscapes of carbon-neutrality’,
Landscape Research, 35: 2, 157–171.
Shove, E. (1998) ‘Gaps, barriers and conceptual chasms: theories of technology
Suchman, L. A. (1988) ‘Representing practice in cognitive science’, Human
Studies, 11, 305–325.
Verbruggen, A., Fischedick, M., Moomaw, M., Weir, T., Nadaï, A., Nilsson, L. J.,
Nyboer, J., and Sathaye, J. (2010) ‘Renewable energy costs, potentials, barriers:
conceptual issues’, Energy Policy, 38: 2 (February), 850–861.
Waterton, C. (2003) ‘Performing the classification of nature’, Sociological Review,
52, 111–29.
Wolsink, M. (2009) ‘Planning: problem “carrier” or problem “source”?’, Planning
Theory and Practice, 10: 4, 539–543.
Part II
Societal Engagement
with Wind Power
7
The Misdirected Opposition
to Wind Power
Martin J. Pasqualetti
Introduction
Our way of life mirrors the energy we use and the impacts we create.
Examining this reflection, we see a high living standard that depends
on a portfolio of energy resources of which each carries its own burden.
Our use of fossil fuels pollutes the skies, stains the seas and tortures
the land; nuclear power poses insidious risks to people now living and
people yet to be born; and hydro-power floods canyons and displaces
residents, sometimes by the millions. Looking at the reflection more
carefully, we see a long commercial supply chain fraught with inequi-
ties and insecurities that are difficult to predict and challenging to
control. In response, we are lately starting to manoeuvre toward a new
energy transition, one that promises both sustainable supplies and
gentler impacts. It is a future that must rely to a large degree on renew-
able energy.1
For many reasons, such a transition will take time to accomplish, in
large part because there is a wide assortment of social costs that must
also be addressed, and they can be particularly thorny (Abramsky
2010). Still, even though one might abstractly accept that social barriers
are often formidable obstacles, many people had assumed that a shift
toward renewable energy would be smoother and quicker. It is not
turning out that way, and for no renewable resource has this surprise
been more apparent than with wind power (Etherington 2009; and see
Figure 7.1).
The stridency and ubiquity of the opposition to many projects may
surprise some observers given that wind power has so many appealing
characteristics; not only is it renewable but turbines generate electricity
without the need for cooling water, and they emit no greenhouse gases
133
134 Societal Engagement with Wind Power
Figure 7.1 Protest against wind development in France

Source: Photo by Paul Gipe. Used with permission.
or other pollutants. Recent research suggests that wind has no down-

ward effect on property values, at least in the USA (Hoen 2006; Hoen
et al. 2009), although our understanding of this impact is still evolving
(Sims and Dent 2007; Sims et al. 2008). In addition, upon decommis-
sioning, most of the impacts on the soil and the landscape are revers-
ible. Overall, particularly when compared to the air, water, and land
impacts of other means of electrical generation, wind power is envi-
ronmentally benign.
Given its advantages, it would be reasonable to be genuinely puzzled
as to why objections to wind power are so numerous, widespread and
growing, and why there are so many organised groups actively working
to thwart wind development all over the world (see Table 7.1).
Questions abound: What is there to complain about? Are the
complaints justified? What adjustments can be made to mollify critics?
What does all this suggest about the potential for a renewable energy
future? This chapter addresses such questions by summarising the prin-
cipal complaints about wind power and identifying possible resolutions.
This is done in the context of three areas of particular interest: the UK,
Mexico, and the USA. The UK is a country smaller than Arizona, but
with ten times the population. Such density of population means that
wind development there is a sensitive matter wherever it is proposed.
The Misdirected Opposition to Wind Power 135
Table 7.1 A sample of anti-wind organisations
1. Acoustic Ecology Institute (headquarted in New Mexico)

2. Betws Mountain Preservation Guide (Wales)
3. Blue Highlands Citizens Coalition (Ontario)
4. BOLT – Birdsedge Opposition to Large Turbines (England)
5. Carrajung and Blackwarry Residents Against Windfarms (Victoria, Australia)
6. Cefn Croes (Wales)
7. Citizens For Responsible Wind Energy (Bourne, Massachusetts)
8. Citizens for Responsible Windpower (Backbone ridge, West Virginia)
9. Citizens for the Preservation of Georgia Mountain (Milton, Georgia,
and Fairfax, Vermont)
10. Coalición Pro Bosque Seco Ventanas Verraco (Puerto Rico)
11. Coalition to Protect Amherst Island (Ontario)
12. CORT – Coalition of Residents – Tiny (Ontario)
13. Cynon Valley Protection Group (Wales)
14. Fairwind (Ardnamurchan, Morvern, and Mull, Scotland)
15. Flint Hills Tallgrass Prairie Heritage Foundation (Kansas)
16. FORCE – Friends of Rural Cumbria’s Environment (England)
17. Friends of Beautiful Pendleton County (West Virginia)
18. Friends of Lāna’i (Hawaii)
19. Friends of Lincoln Lakes (Maine)
20. Friends of the Boundary Mountains (Maine)
21. Friends of the Highland Mountains (Maine)
22. Georgia Mountain Community Wind (Vermont)
23. Glebe Mountain Group (Londonderry, Vermont)
24. Groupe d’information sur les éoliennes (La Roche-en-Ardenne) (Belgium)
25. Habitat 21 (England)
26. Healing the Earth (Ontario)
27. Ill Wind Rhode Island (Rhode Island)
28. Industrial Wind Action Group (UK)
29. Industrial Wind Energy Opposition (US)
30. Ira Wind (Ira, Vermont)
31. Jackson Wind Power Subcommittee (Maine)
32. Jackson Wind Project (Maine)
33. John R. Sweet (Virginia)
34. Kingdom Commons Group (northeastern Vermont)
35. Large wind projects in Vermont (Vermont)
36. Molonglo Landscape Guardians (New South Wales, Australia)
37. Mountain Communities for Responsible Energy (West Virginia)
38. Mountain Preservation Association (Virginia)
Continued
Table 7.1 Continued
39. National Wind Watch

40. No Wind Farms (Illinois)
41. North Texas Wind Resistance
42. Ontario Wind Performance Windfarm Action Group (Ontario)
43. Partnership for the Preservation of the Downeast Lakes Watershed (Maine)
44. People’s Task Force on Wind Power (Maine)
45. Protect Pendleton (West Virginia)
46. Protect the Flint Hills (Kansas)
47. Rassemblement Jura Crêtes (Switzerland)
48. RATS of Tooboroc (Residents Against Wind Turbines in Tooboroc)
(Victoria, Australia)
49. Real Wind Info For Maine (Maine)
50. Ridge Protectors (Vermont)
51. Ridge Protectors (Sheffield and Sutton, Vermont)
52. Save Crystal Lake (Pennsylvania)
53. Save our Sound (Massachusetts)
54. Save Spurlens Rig (Scotland)
55. Save Vermont Ridgelines (Searsburg, Readsboro, and Wilmington, Vermont)
56. Save Western New York
57. Searsburg VT Turbine Failure
58. STILE – Stop Turbines in Lunesdale Environment (England)
59. STINC – Stop Turbines in North Cornwall (England)
60. Stop ill Wind (Maryland)
61. Szélerőművek Hárskúton? (Hungary)
62. Town of Milton (Vermont)
63. Vent du Bocage (France)
64. Vermont Agency of Agriculture
65. Vermont Governor’s Office
66. Vermont Public Service Board
67. Vermonters with Vision Views of Scotland (Scotland)
68. WINDCOWS – Wisconsin Independent Citizens Opposing Windturbine
Sites Summit Ridge (Wisconsin)
Source: author generated.
Mexico is a much larger country in size and population than the UK,
and it has arguably the finest single area for wind development in the
world. However, this resource is co-located with strongly independent
indigenous people who have a history of rebellious behaviour against
outside interference. The USA has the greatest wind resource, the widest
variety of settings, and the longest history of opposition to wind energy

development. Each location has its own group of objections. This
chapter seeks to identify these objections, identify which are the most
intractable, what ways are most appropriate to address these concerns,
and which objections pose the greatest threat to expanded wind energy
development.
Four types of concern about wind power
The first step was to extract the principal objections about wind power
from two sources: first, a sampling of anti-wind organisations listed in
Table 7.1; and second, the growing scientific literature on social barriers
to wind developments that are cited through this chapter. The identi-
fied objections were grouped subjectively into four types, T1 through
T4 in Table 7.2.
Type 1 (T1) – aesthetic concerns

Aesthetic concerns about wind power are primarily visual in character.
At their most fundamental level, wind turbines are unavoidably visible.
There is nothing that can be done to overcome this fact, although there
are some things one can do to reduce their intrusion, as will be discussed
later. Apart from such physical presence, aesthetic concerns come in three
forms, the first being in reaction to motion. As we all know, the human
brain is attracted by motion, and wind machines move in various ways
by necessity and design; a static machine is of no value. Aggravating
this problem, the motion of wind turbines varies with changes in wind
speed, direction, and operational decisions such as cut-in speed.
Table 7.2 Four types of concern about wind power (generation phase)
T3-Health/Safety/ T4-Social/
T1-Aesthetic T2-Environmental Technical Cultural
Physical Biota Danger Radar And Navigation Changed Way

Presence Interference Of Life
Movement Scarring & Erosion Stray Voltage Changed Land
Use
Shadow Flicker Water Contamination Oil Leaks Property Value
Night Lights Habitat Loss Fires Social Justice
Safety (Collapse/ Property Rights
Blade/Ice Toss)
Noise
Source: Compiled by the author.

The second form of aesthetic intrusion can be grouped as a pair: glint

and flicker. The former can be substantially reduced with the use of
non-glinting surfacing materials, a remediation that is standard in most
places. Shadow flicker (or strobe effect), is an annoyance that is partic-
ularly noticeable at close proximity. To avoid this problem, homes and
turbines should be separated by at least ten blade diameters.
The third form of aesthetic intrusion is the necessity for warning
lights. These are required for purposes of aviation safety on structures
taller than 200 feet, including wind turbines (FAA 2007). The lights are
usually red or white. As standard practice, they flash or vary in inten-
sity to enhance their visibility. This is a particular problem in areas of
dark skies because such skies are a rare and cherished environmental
amenity that is easily disrupted.
One of the purest examples of how such warning lights can affect
wind development comes from a proposal that has been festering in
Highlands County, Virginia. Hard on the border with West Virginia,
a proposed wind development for Red Oak Knob has attracted vocal
opposition for years (Highland New Wind 2008). Referring to rural
people’s passion for defending their land rights, Tom Brody, owner of
the proximate eco-B&B Bear Mountain Farm and Retreat, said ‘If this
were West Virginia, [the developer] would be afraid to come up here’
(Brody 2007). Brody and others opposed to the project object not just
because of the changes visible during the day, but because the blinking
lights on top of the wind machines ruin the darkness that he and his
patrons covet (see Figure 7.2).2
Opposition to wind development on aesthetic grounds is not uniform
from place to place or person to person. Much depends on subjective
preference, existing and historical land use, cultural sensitivities, and
whether those nearby perceive (or receive) personal benefits. There are
many instances of acceptance: some people have literally asked that
wind turbines be installed in their backyards, photographs of wind
turbines have been displayed in art exhibits, and they have often been
used as background in advertisements and films. These actions belie
a negative image. In the final analysis, however, public reactions to
aesthetic changes from wind developments are difficult to predict, hard
to avoid and impossible to eliminate. The question often comes down
to this: are these changes worth it?
Type 2 (T2) – environmental concerns

The development of commercial wind power is said to produce many
environmental impacts. Among the most controversial are the impacts
No
400-foot
turbines
On
Highland
County
Ridges
Figure 7.2 Protest banner for the proposed development on Red Oak Knob,
Virginia
Source: Photo by author.
on wildlife, particularly birds and bats. Spinning blades and other parts
of the wind turbine machinery can increase the risk of harm to birds, as
has been illustrated in the substantial and growing literature on the topic
(example, De Lucas et al. 2007). Not agreed, however, is how many birds
are being killed, how many killed birds are too many, how such deaths
might be avoided and whether such avoidance is worth the effort.
Whether one believes that wind power threatens creatures any more
than any other technology, we can all agree that killing birds is not a
salubrious image for wind power. The wind industry is fond of citing
research that shows that buildings and cats kill orders of magnitude
more birds than wind turbines.3 Overall, several studies have shown
that the impact of wind development on birds has so far been rela-
tively small (NYSERDA 2009). A recent study of bird deaths in the USA
estimated that collisions with wind turbines killed 20,000 to 37,000
birds per year in 2003, with all but 9,200 of those deaths occurring in
California. To put that into perspective, toxic chemicals kill more than
72 million birds each year (NRC 2007).
However, because data for individual sites reveal substantial variation
from site to site, this figure must be taken as a homogenised version of
the truth; there is no doubt that in some locations – notably Altamont
Pass in California – the incidence of bird kills is unacceptably high,
especially of ‘charismatic birds’, such as falcons and eagles.
Responses have taken several forms, some directly targeted and some
coincidental. For example, the well-established shift from lattice works
to taller, monopoles reduces roosting places, resulting in fewer deaths.
Continuing study has revealed several other common-sense measures
that can reduce avian mortality (Smallwood and Neher 2004; Thayer
2007). For example: avoid known raptor migration and foraging
concentrations by conducting a thorough baseline avian study prior to
planning for a wind project; with golden eagles being killed more often
by wind turbines near canyons, avoid siting turbines near canyons;
because faster tip speeds kill more birds, choose turbines with slower
tip speed in sensitive areas. With disproportionately more birds killed
at the end of arrays than by those in the middle, design continuous
arrays rather than isolated turbines.
Two additional approaches are being evaluated. Along bird migration
routes in south Texas and the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in Mexico, opera-
tors are considering radar monitoring of the movement of flocks for real-
time bird mortality risk mitigation. The ‘early warning radar’ system
detects approaching bird activity, assesses mortality risk conditions,
and automatically activates mitigation responses, including the idling
of all turbines when appropriate (Pattern 2010). Another approach has
been to adjust the ‘cut-in’ speed of the turbines.4
Wind operators understandably have reservations about such opera-
tional adjustments because they can affect the capacity factors of their
turbines. Acceptance into the realm of normal operating procedures
will be predicated on identifying the proper blend of economic anal-
ysis, scientific appraisal of efficacy and public responses (TCU/Oxford/
NextEra 2011).
Of course, as the number of turbines increases, more birds will
presumably be killed. For this reason, a better way to assess avian
mortality is to estimate it based on fatalities per unit of power. Sovacool
(2009) calculates that wind farms and nuclear power stations are
responsible each for between 0.3 and 0.4 fatalities per gigawatt-hour
(GWh) of electricity while fossil-fuelled power stations are responsible
for about 5.2 fatalities per GWh. The estimate means that ‘wind farms
killed approximately seven thousand birds in the United States in 2006
but nuclear plants killed about 327,000 and fossil-fuelled power plants
14.5 million’ (Sovacool 2009: 1).
Birds are not the only type of animal affected by wind develop-
ment. Bats began attracting substantial interest when fatalities in
Tucker County, West Virginia, rose sharply after wind turbines were
installed there. Subsequently, there has been an explosion of research
and the formation of several new organisations such as the Bats and
Wind Energy Cooperative and its various working groups. The BWEC
are trying to establish baseline data for bat populations at possible wind
development sites (BWEC 2011).
As studies have continued, the prevailing question has become
what is it about wind turbines that increases bat mortality, especially
considering the echo-location capabilities of the animal (Kunz et al.
2007). Recent theories have included changes in barometric pressure.
The ability of bats to echo-locate keeps them from colliding with
stationary objects, but the pressure drop at wind-turbine blades is an
undetectable – and potentially unforeseeable – hazard for bats. With
bats more susceptible to barotraumas than birds, wildlife fatalities
are becoming more of a bat issue than a bird issue (Baerwald et al.
2008).
Research continues but – in much the same vein as with the mitigation
of bird deaths – reducing bat deaths may be best accomplished through
relatively small changes to wind-turbine operation. For example, it has
been estimated that increasing the cut-in speed will result in nightly
reductions in bat mortality ranging from 44 per cent to 93 per cent,
with marginal annual power loss (< 1 per cent of total annual output).
‘[I]ncreasing turbine cut-in speeds at wind facilities in areas of conser-
vation concern during times when active bats may be at particular risk
from turbines could mitigate this detrimental aspect of wind-energy
generation’ (Arnett et al. 2010: 1).
It would be an overstatement to suggest that the environmental
impacts of wind developments are restricted to animals. For example,
soil erosion can be a concern at any construction site, and the instal-
lation of wind projects is no exception. It can be particularly notice-
able during site preparation, especially when turbines are erected on
slopes. Scraping, filling, and over-steepening can all produce acceler-
ated erosion, gullying, sediment transfer and land slippage. A 2008
court decision in Derrybrien, Ireland, held wind developers account-
able for causing a 2003 landslide that killed 50,000 fish (EU 2008).
Similar impacts result in other environments as well. For example,
arid areas are notoriously slow to recover from these insults, so
scars produced in these locations can be long-lived (Gipe 2002; see
Figure 7.3).
The question is whether such impacts are unique or any more likely
from wind development than from any other type of energy project in
a similar environment. To date, the disturbance per MWh generated is
less, both in terms of scale and permanence. Moreover, such impacts
can be minimised with proper guidelines and monitoring, and can
more easily be remediated that other landscape changes.
Figure 7.3 A ‘wind wall’ at Tehachapi Pass, California, showing landscapes

remoulded by wind developers
Source: Photo by Paul Gipe. Used with permission.
Type 3 (T3) – health, safety and technical concerns

Various branches of aviation, but particularly the military branch, have
raised safety issues about wind developments. Some of these concerns
focus on the erection of equipment in terrain that is not currently encum-
bered with tall structures, whether that is in the corn farms of Illinois
or the creosote deserts of Arizona. Warning lights are less effective with
military aircraft moving at high speeds and low altitudes.
Moreover, it is not just obvious obstacles that have the military
worried. Another form of problem – the impacts of wind turbines on
radar operation – has also been attracting attention (Ciardi and Crum
2009). As a case in point, the military has recently been intervening in
siting proposals because of potential disruption by wind developments
to the safe and effective operation of air-security radars located within
some tens of miles of a turbine farm (Levitan 2010).
At this point, interference of wind turbines with radar naviga-
tion seems a solvable problem. A recent study conducted for the US
Department of Homeland Security recommended ‘that the Government
move beyond a policy of unilaterally blocking turbine farms on the
basis of any observable impact on existing radars, and move to a
technically based rule system for determining the severity of the inter-
ference ... .[W]e see no scientific hurdle for constructing regulations
that are simple to understand and simple to implement, with a single
government entity taking responsibility for overseeing the process’
(Brenner et al. 2008: 11).
For obvious reasons, public attention is always going to be attracted to
spectacular failures, regardless of their source or their technology. Such
is also the case with wind power. Several types of events are notable.
These include oil leaks, fires, icing and ice toss, blade failure and total
collapse of the wind turbine. One wind expert has expressed the special
safety factors of wind turbines this way: ‘The capture and concentration
of energy – in any form – is inherently dangerous. Wind energy exposes
those who work with it to hazards similar to those in other industries.
Of course, there are the hazards which, taken together, are unique to
wind energy: high winds, heights, rotating machinery and the large
spinning mass of the wind turbine rotor. Wind energy’s hazards, like its
appearance on the landscape, are readily apparent. Wind energy hides
no latent killers; no black lung, for example. When wind kills, it does so
directly, and with gruesome effect’ (Gipe 2000: 1). While some say that
more people have died from wind power than nuclear power (Markey
2011), the frequency of deaths per terawatt-hour – regrettable as it is – is
a very low 0.006 (Gipe 2010; 2011). This is to be compared to coal at 161,
worldwide (Next Big Future 2011).
For some people, the noise produced by wind turbines is an annoy-
ance. For others, it is primarily a health issue. Human perception of
these noises depends on topography, atmospheric conditions, distance,
competing noises, and whether the listener is indoors or outdoors. The
noise of wind operations can be of several sorts, including the whoos-
hing sound of the blades, the drone of the generator, intermittency, or
low-frequency sound.
Personal reactions to the noise from wind turbines have taken many
forms. Some have used the cathartic release of poetry (Atkinson-Mair
2009). Others have taken a medical perspective. Dr. Nina Pierpont, a
New York physician, has termed the symptoms of human reaction to
wind noise as the ‘wind turbine syndrome’. She has concluded that its
primary cause is the effect of low-frequency wind turbine noise on the
organs of the inner ear, and that the best response is greater separation
(Pierpont 2009). Where siting options are limited, some preliminary
results suggest that noise annoyance can be mitigated by active opera-
tional adjustments by limiting the turbines’ maximum revolutions per
minute and power output (Hoen, Eckholdt and Wiser 2010).
Overall, turbine noise should not be a major impediment to the

expansion of wind power in most locations. Indeed, some trade organ-
isations categorically deny that the ‘wind turbine syndrome’ actually
exists (Renewable UK 2010). Thayer (2007) has put the matter into
perspective, reporting that wind power is acceptable closer to homes
than any other electrical generating system. The minimum distance
at which 50 per cent or more of the public would accept a partic-
ular type of power plant from their homes is: wind farm: 2 miles;
biomass plant: 5 miles; fossil fuel plant: 11 miles; nuclear power plant:
75 miles. (For further discussion on noise, see Chapter 8 by Haggett,
this volume.)
Type 4 (T4) – social and cultural concerns

From the summary presented so far, it is reasonable to suggest that most
of the T1, T2 and T3 problems can be substantially mitigated or largely
avoided. The T4 problems – social and cultural – are another matter. They
are notoriously difficult to predict, challenging to resolve and difficult
to avoid. This is true in part because the cause of the complaints varies
greatly by time, place, land tenure, history and culture, and in part
because this variety makes technical fixes problematic.
Most social and cultural concerns orbit around the potential of wind
development to change the uses and perceptions of landscapes. The most
common of these changes are those that would alter landscapes consid-
ered valuable for recreation, farming and solitude.5 While examples of
altered landscapes are numerous, many of the common issues can be
illustrated at four sites that represent wide environmental and cultural
differences: Isle of Lewis, Scotland; Cape Cod, Massachusetts; Palm
Springs, California; and the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, Mexico.
Virtually the only thing these sites have in common is that they
are each the location of contested wind projects (Pasqualetti 2011).
The local people on the Isle of Lewis contend that the massive wind
development proposed for their island will completely and unalterably
change the landscape and their relationship to it, that it will threaten
the legally-protected bog lands and that it will compromise the integ-
rity of the Callanish Stones, a series of prehistoric megalithic relics.
Those objecting to the Cape Wind project worry that the installation of
a large project in the shallow waters of Nantucket Sound will diminish
shoreline property values, interfere with ocean navigation, disrupt
fishing and diminish the experience of visitors to the Cape and nearby
islands. In Palm Springs, the primary complaint has been that the wind
turbines will threaten the integrity of the desert landscapes and the
recreational opportunities that are the principal attractions for visitors

who are so important to local economic development. In the Isthmus of
Tehuantepec, local farmers are objecting to the insignificant economic
benefits they will receive and the continued exploitation from outside
forces they feel will subvert their farming heritage by introducing an
incompatible industrial economy. That none of these impacts can be
completely mitigated is a continuing stumbling block for wind devel-
opment. However, they also lead us to some conclusions about how we
must view the future, a topic discussed below.
Discussion
Of the four types of impacts listed in Table 7.2, the first three are substan-
tively different from the impacts listed in the fourth. The summary
above identifies how the first three types of concerns can be mitigated.
For example, most aesthetic and health concerns are allayed by distance.
Bird and bat deaths – where they are found to be significant – can be
reduced by a variety of responses, including siting avoidance, turbine
size and arrangement, as well as by early environmental assessments.
Radar interference is also avoidable by proper siting consideration.
Health and safety issues so far seem infrequent and manageable, espe-
cially as compared with other forms of electrical generation. Scarring
and habitat impacts can be minimised with proper rules and effective
policing.
The impacts of column four (i.e. T4) are another story; these types
of objections are more personal, subjective and cultural. Nevertheless,
looking at them one at a time, we find that the final three listed issues –
social justice, property rights and feelings of exploitation from without –
can be addressed through timely, sensitive and repeated interaction
and advance planning. Even property values have been little affected.
The first three – physical presence (including flashing lights), impacts
on local ways of life, changed land use – are inherently less reconcil-
able and can be especially troublesome in quiet, isolated locations with
deep historical and cultural roots, such as on the Isle of Lewis and in
Oaxaca.
Addressing these latter obstacles takes more time, greater sensitivity
and a different perspective. Specifically, it takes a fundamental refocusing
from the specific to the general. When we do that, we see that all public
concerns are satellite issues to the principal, underlying, central issue
that wind developers always face, namely that the inherent characteris-
tics of the technology threaten the way people at wind sites have come
Recreation
& Tourism
Visibility Size
Cultural Quality Aesthetics

Values of Life
Property
Quiet
Values
Dark
Nights
Figure 7.4 Objections to wind energy can largely be reduced to considerations

of quality of life, rather than individual complaints
Source: Created by the author.
to prefer living. In other words, wind developments threaten the local

quality of life (see Figure 7.4). It is this that is the common denominator
of wind opposition. Only when every objection is considered as integral
to the local quality of life will developers begin to appreciate local sensi-
tivities to changes that their projects threaten to produce. It is only then
that there will be any reasonable chance to placate residents and other
interested parties in some of the more contentious areas.
What is different about wind power is that siting options are severely
limited. That is, without some technological breakthrough, there is no
way to exploit the wind resources that are available without actually
erecting wind turbines, with all the attendant problems people perceive
them to have. While this site specificity can have pedagogic benefits
(Pasqualetti 2000), for the immediate future minimising the impacts
to quality of life involves a binary decision: either the project must
be abandoned or there must be thorough, early, frequent and accom-
modating interaction with those affected. Such interaction is the first
step to reducing issues of social justice, property rights and the sense
of exploitation. As simple as this might seem, the lack of its universal

application has resulted in more resistance to wind power than early
developers might have anticipated.
That said, such interaction cannot or will not erase all objections in
all locations. For example, while it could have reduced opposition in
Palm Springs and even in Oaxaca, it would have not likely created a
locally acceptable solution at Cape Cod or Lewis. Even a smaller scale of
development might not have helped.
Simply put, there are some places where wind turbines are less appro-
priate, places we should protect. My advice to the wind development
community is to leave the most sensitive places alone and concentrate
on those areas where fewest obstacles are likely.
The question is how to tell one area from another. The first step, at
least for the foreseeable future, is for developers to accept that blatant
resource availability should not be considered equivalent to manda-
tory resource exploitation. This principle has been at work in keeping
oil developers from entering the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge,
geothermal developers out of Yellowstone and uranium developers
away from the Grand Canyon.
The second step is to evaluate each area of potential development
thoroughly, not only in terms of the physical environment and local
biota, but also in terms of the socio-cultural environment. It is this last-
named category that is the most important. Understanding it requires
consultation not just with technical experts, but with those having
long-standing understanding of the mix of factors at work. This group
includes geographers, anthropologists, historians, sociologists and
psychologists. One must plan in advance for early and frequent visits,
discussions, public interactions and well-controlled scientific assess-
ments of potential sites.
The third step is to continue generic scientific research that will yield
findings that have wide applicability. For example, find out if wind
turbines really are threatening to biota, whether property values in view
of the turbines actually are lower, if wind technology really does pose
increasing risk to workers and the public, if the noise produced by wind
turbines actually does cause physiological distress in humans. Compare
the results for wind power with the results from other types of power
generation. Base opinions on science and experience, dispel shibbo-
leths, accept the impacts you cannot change, mitigate those you can
and avoid the areas where existing environmental qualities are particu-
larly rare or sacrosanct. If we do all this, we will find that much of the
opposition to wind power is explainable as the normal early anxiety

that accompanies the introduction of any new technology.
For their part, the wind energy industry must initiate its evaluation
of potential sites based on the impact of any proposed development
on the quality of life of the people who would be affected. If they
would agree on this fundamental approach, it would streamline its
strategy, save money and accelerate development in the most appro-
priate places.
In the final analysis, wind power is a type of renewable energy that
offers electrical generation that is as benign as it is likely to get, at least
until the various other forms such as solar energy grow to maturity.
In that manner, it will help prepare us for the inevitable conversion
to renewable energy. Until this time, however, wind power seems the
cleanest of the sustainable options for the future. We are going to have
to learn to not only accept this fact, but embrace it. Years from now,
we will look back and note that much of the early opposition to wind
power was an understandable, and even ordinary, accompaniment to
the emergence of any new technology. We will also realize, however,
that it was misdirected (see Figures 7.5 and 7.6).
Figure 7.5 Welcoming sign by owners on what they call ‘Harmony Ridge’. This
is a departure from the early days of wind development when people in the
same area were protesting wind power.
Source: Photo by the author, February 2002
Figure 7.6 Billboard along Interstate-10, near Palm Springs, California, suggesting
that the community and the wind developers, once at odds, are now in accord.
Source: Photo by author, April 2002.
Notes
1. For a concise treatment of past and future energy transitions, see Smil (2010).
2. In the case of Red Oak Knob and the vast majority of wind proposals
nowadays, computer simulations have been playing an increasing role.
The techniques have evolved to such a degree that everyone can visualize
the aesthetic impacts. This has had repercussions for both sides in the
wind energy debate. Those in favor of the development can illustrate how
little the impact will be (as has been done for the Cape Wind project in
Massachusetts), while in other areas, neighbors can see how substantial the
impact will be (as at Red Oak Knob). A useful overview of these techniques
is available at NRC 2007, appendix D. The most complete and current infor-
mation related to the impact of wind power on wildlife is available on the
internet site for the Conference on Wind Energy and Wildlife Impacts,
held 2–5 May 2011 in Trondheim, Norway ( http://cww2011.nina.no/Home.
aspx).
3. These data were first presented at the Third International Partners in Flight
Conference, March 20–24, 2002, Asilomar Conference Grounds, California.
The oral presentation was revised in Erickson, Johnson, and Young 2005.
4. The cut-in speed is the minimum wind speed necessary to produce elec-
tricity. Operators can adjust this speed.
5. For a sampling of robust comments, the reader is referred to the 838
contained in a recent hearing on the social and economic impacts of wind
developments in rural regions (Australia Senate 2011).
References
Abramsky, K. (2010) Sparking a Worldwide Energy Revolution: Social Struggles in the
Transition to a Post-Petrol World, Oakland, California: AK Press.
Arnett, E. B., Huso, M. M. P., Schirmacher M. R. and Hayes J. P. (2010) ‘Altering
turbine speed reduces bat mortality at wind-energy facilities’, Front Ecol
Environ, www.frontiersinecology.org, accessed on 20 April 2010.
Atkinson-Mair, G. (2009) ‘Wind turbine noise: a themed sequence of sonnets’,
http://www.aweo.org/mair-sonnets.html, accessed on 20 April 2010.
Australia Senate (2011) ‘The social and economic impact of rural wind farms.
Australia Community Affairs Committees. Submissions received by the
Committee’, http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/clac_ctte/impact_rural
_wind_farms/submissions.htm, accessed on 10 July 2010.
Baerwald, E. F., D’Amours, G. H., Klug B. J. and Barclay R. M. R. (2008)
‘Barotrauma is a significant cause of bat fatalities at wind turbines’, Current
Biolology, 18, R695-R696.
Brenner, M., Cazares, S., Cornwall, M. J., Dyson, F., Eardley, D., Horowitz, P.,
Long, D., Sullivan, J., Vesecky, J., and Weinberger P. J. (2008) Wind Farms and
Radar, The Mitre Corporation, Report JSR-08–125.
Brody, T. (2007) Personal interview.
BWEC (Bats and Wind Energy Cooperative) (2011) http://www.batsandwind.
org/, accessed on 20 April 2010.
Ciardi, E. J. and Crum, T. (2009) ‘Wind farm – weather radar issues, current initi-
atives, and research results’, Paper prepared for the State of the Art in Wind
Siting Conference, Washington, DC., http://www.nationalwind.org/assets
/blog/Ciardi_NWCC_WashDC_Oct21_Final.pdf, accessed on 21 February
2010.
De Lucas, M., Janss, G. F. E. and Ferrer M. (eds) (2007) Birds and Wind Farms: Risk
Assessment and Mitigation, London: Quercus Books.
EU (European Union) (2008) ‘EU court rules against Ireland on Derrybrien’,
http://www.rte.ie/news/2008/0703/derrybrien.html, accessed on 10 July 2010.
Erickson, W. P., Johnson G. D. and Young Jr, D. P. (2005) ‘A summary and
comparison of bird mortality from anthropogenic causes with an emphasis
on collisions’, USDA Forest Service General Technical Report. PSW-GTR-191.
Etherington, J. (2009) The Wind Farm Scam, London: Stacey International.
FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) (2007) Obstruction Marking and Lighting,
Advisory Circular, AC 70/7460–1K, Chapter 13.
Gipe, P. (2000) ‘A summary of fatal accidents in wind energy’, Wind-Works.org, http:
//www.wind-works.org/articles/ASummaryofFatalAccidentsinWindEnergy.
html, accessed on 20 April 2010.
Gipe, P. (2002) ‘Design as if people matter: aesthetic guidelines for a wind
power future’, in Wind Energy in View: Energy Landscapes in a Crowded World,
pp. 173–212. San Diego: Academic Press.
Gipe, P. (2010) ‘Wind energy – the breath of life or the kiss of death: contem-
porary wind mortality rates’, http://www.wind-works.org/articles/BreathLife.
html, accessed on 20 April 2010.
Gipe, P. (2011) Personal communication, 19 April 2011.
Highland New Wind (2008) ‘Highland New Wind’, http://www.macalester.edu
/windvisual/HighlandNewWind2p.pdf, accessed on 20 April 2010.
Hoen, B. (2006) Impacts of Windmill Visibility on Properties Values in Madison

County, New York. Unpublished Master of Science thesis, Bard College,
Annandale on Hudson, New York, 30 April 2006.
Hoen, B., Wiser, R., Cappers, P., Thayer, M. and Sethi, G. (2009) The Impact of
Wind Power Projects on Residential Property Values in the United States: A Multi-
Site Hedonic Analysis. LBNL-2829E, December.
Hoen, B., Eckholdt, H. and Wiser, R. (2010) Assessing the Impacts of Reduced Noise
Operations of Wind Turbines on Neighbor Annoyance: A Preliminary Analysis in
Vinalhaven, Maine, LBNL-LBNL-3562E, June.
James, R. and Kamperman, G. (2008) ‘Simple guidelines for siting wind turbines
to prevent health risks’, NOISECON 2008 Proceedings, http://docs.wind-
watch.org/simple-guidelines-for-siting-wind-turbines-to-prevent-health-risks.
pdf, accessed on 20 April 2010.
Kunz, T. H., Arnett, E. B., Erickson, W. P., Hoar, A. R., Johnson, G. D., Larkin,
R. P., Strickland, M. D., Thresher, R. W. and Tuttle, M. D. (2007) ‘Ecological
impacts of wind energy development on bats: questions, research needs, and
hypotheses’, Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 5: 6 (August), 315–324.
Levitan, D. (2010) ‘Fears of radar interference threaten Oregon wind farm,
but solutions exist’, Inside Climate News, http://insideclimatenews.org/
news/2010 0419/fears-radar-interference-threaten- oregon-w ind-farm-
solutions-exist, accessed on 17 April 2010.
Markay, L. (2011) ‘Inconvenient truth: wind energy has killed more Americans
than nuclear’, News Busters, March 17, http://newsbusters.org/blogs/lachlan-
markay/2011/03/17/inconvenient-truth-wind-energy-has-killed-more-ameri-
cans-nuclear, accessed on 20 April 2010.
Next Big Future (2011) http://nextbigfuture.com/2011/03/deaths-per-twh-by-
energy-source.html, accessed on 20 April 2010.
NRC (National Research Council) (2007) Environmental Impacts of Wind-Energy
Projects, Washington: The National Academies Press.
NYSNRDA (New York State Energy Research and Development Authority) (2009)
‘Comparison of reported effects and risks to vertebrate wildlife from six elec-
tricity generation types in the New York/New England region’, Final report,
prepared by Environmental Bioindicators Foundation, Inc. Fort Pierce, Fl.,
and Pandion Systems, Inc. Gainesville, FL, http://www.nyserda.org/publica-
tions/Report%2009–02%20Wildlife%20report%20-%20web.pdf, accessed on
20 April 2010.
Pasqualetti, M. J. (2000) ‘Morality, space, and the power of wind-energy land-
scapes’, The Geographical Review, 90: 3, 381–394.
Pasqualetti, M. J. (2011) ‘Opposing wind energy landscapes: a search for common
cause’, Annals of Association of American Geographers, 101: 4, 907–917.
Pattern Energy (2010) ‘Pattern Energy acquires 283 MW Gulf wind project.
Project uses ground-breaking radar system for protection of wildlife’. http:
//www.patternenergy.com/media/news/announcements/gulf_wind, accessed
on 20 April 2010.
Pierpoint, N. (2009) Wind Turbine Syndrome, Santa Fe: K-Selected Books.
Renewable UK (2010) Wind Turbine Syndrome (WTS), http://www.bwea.com/pdf
/publications/HS_WTS_review.pdf, accessed on 10 July 2010 .
Sims, S. and Dent, P. (2007) ‘Property stigma: wind farms are just the latest
fashion’, Journal of Property Investment and Finance, 25: 6, 626–651.
Sims, S., Dent, P. and Reza Oskrochi, G. (2008) ‘Modeling the impact of wind
farms on house prices in the UK’, International Journal of Strategic Property
Management, 12: 4, 251–269.
Smallwood, K. S. and Neher, L. (2004) ‘Repowering the Altamont Pass wind
resource area: forecasting and minimizing avian mortality without loss of
power generation’, California Energy Commission Public Interest Energy
Research Program, December.
Smil, V. (2010) Energy Transitions: History, Requirement, Prospects, New York:
Praeger.
Society for Wind Vigilance (2010) Proceedings, First International Symposium.
The Global Wind Industry and Adverse Health Effects: Loss of Social Justice?, The
Waring House Inn and Conference Center, Picton, Prince Edward County,
Ontario, October 29–31, http://www.windvigilance.com/symp_2010_proceed-
ings.aspx, accessed on 20 April 2010.
Society for Wind Vigilance (2010) ‘A primer on adverse health effects and indus-
trial wind turbines’, http://windvigilance.com/primer_ahe.aspx, accessed on
20 April 2010.
Sovacool, B. (2009) ‘Contextualizing avian mortality: a preliminary appraisal
of bird and bat fatalities from wind, fossil-fuel, and nuclear electricity’, Energy
Policy, 37: 2241–2248.
TCU/Oxford (Texas Christian University/Oxford University/NextEra) (2011)
http://www.wind.tcu.edu/default.asp, accessed on 20 April 2010.
Thayer, R. (2007) ‘Twenty five points about wind energy for landscape archi-
tects’, Paper delivered in the session ‘Wind: The New Energy Landscape’ at
the annual meeting of the American Society of Landscape Architects, San
Francisco, October.
8
The Social Experience of
Noise from Wind Farms
Claire Haggett
Introduction
Research on wind power from around the world has demonstrated the
importance of a disjuncture between the global benefits of renewable
energy production and the direct and tangible disbenefits felt by host
communities. One such potential impact is explored here – noise from
wind turbines. It is commonly assumed that noise can be simply and
accurately ‘measured’, and that account can be taken of the level of
disturbance. However, noise measurement and annoyance are much
more complicated issues. Whilst developers state that noise levels are
within industry standards, and that it is possible to have a conversa-
tion standing underneath a turbine, this fails to: (1) appreciate that the
industry guidelines are problematic and controversial in themselves;
and (2) understand that noise is something that is ‘experienced’ rather
than just ‘heard’.
This chapter explores this notion of ‘experience’, and how issues such
as ‘annoyance’ (rather than just noise level), quality, frequency and tone
of the noise, interference with daily activities and perceptions of wind
energy generally are all crucial. The chapter therefore moves beyond
simple acoustic measurements (and indeed, discusses the difficulties
and decisions involved with those measurements themselves), and
attempts to more fully understand how people differently perceive and
accommodate noise. It demonstrates that environmental issues associ-
ated with wind farms have social significance and that understanding
them and their impact should not solely be the work of environmental
scientists. The chapter therefore concludes with some suggestions for
more fully understanding this aspect of the impact of wind turbines
153
and the wider resonance that it has for the development of renewable
energy more generally.
Conflicting understandings of noise from wind farms
As this book demonstrates, the implementation of wind farms has not

been without controversy. In the midst of the debates about the devel-
opment of wind energy however, one aspect seems relatively straight-
forward – noise from wind turbines. There are enforceable government
regulations about permissible noise levels, and noise assessments are
conducted before and after wind farms are built. While other issues,
such as visual impact, often have a subjective and interpretative quality
to them, intuitively, this noise can be objectively measured: it either
reaches a certain level or it does not.
But even this most simple of questions – are wind turbines noisy? –
is fraught with difficulty and disagreement. On one hand there are
complaints about wind farm noise from around the world; in fact
wherever there are wind turbines there are protests about the noise.
For example, across Europe there have been ‘numerous instances’ of
problems arising from noise in the Netherlands (Wolsink 1991: 747)
and in Sweden, 85 per cent of respondents living near a wind farm
reported that they could hear the sound, with 20 per cent being ‘very
annoyed’ by it (Pedersen and Persson-Waye 2004). In France, Chouard
(2006) says that wind turbine noise constitutes a permanent health
risk for people nearby.
Noise problems from wind turbines have also been documented
from further afield. In New Zealand, Phipps (2007) notes the numerous
complaints that have been received. In America, Pierpoint (2007)
describes the health problems of wind farm neighbours. The Acoustic
Ecology Institute (2009) states that noise can be a significant issue in
at least some situations when turbines are within about half a mile of
homes, also occasionally occurring up to a mile away.
Such cases have also been noted much closer to home across the
UK. The Welsh Affairs Select Committee has stated that: ‘we are satis-
fied that there are cases of individuals being subject to near-contin-
uous noise during the operation of the turbines, at levels which do
not constitute a statutory nuisance or exceed planning conditions,
but which are clearly disturbing and unpleasant and may have some
psychological effects’ (cited by the UK Noise Association 2006). Barnard
(2007: 3) describes the harmful effects on the health of people living
near to wind turbines, with symptoms similar to those associated with
The Social Experience of Noise from Wind Farms 155
vibroacoustic disease being reported. In her study of people living near

wind farms in Cornwall, Harry (2007: 21) says that it is:
... clearly evident from these cases that there are people living near
turbines who are genuinely suffering from health effects from the
noise produced. These neighbours of turbines state that at times the
noise from the turbines is unbearable. The developers are usually
heard to say that noise is not a problem. Clearly this cannot be
the case.
The significance of these claims is highlighted by Frey and Hadden

(2006), who posit the discussion of noise from turbines within the
framework of human rights. As they say, Article 8 of the European
Court of Human Rights Act states that environmental noise pollu-
tion destroys a person’s effective enjoyment of right to respect
for home and private life. Claims about wind farm noise are not
just about annoyance then, but have health, wellbeing, and legal
implications.
While this research and case study evidence seems to be a clear
indication that wind turbines cause noise problems, on the other
hand both the existence – and problematic nature – of wind turbine
noise is hotly disputed. For example, the British Wind Energy
Association categorically states that wind turbines are not noisy:
‘the evolution of wind turbines over the past decade has rendered
mechanical noise from turbines almost undetectable’ (BWEA 2009).
Similarly, pro-wind campaign group ‘Yes To Wind’ (2011: no page)
explains away the issue as being due to ‘exaggerated claims’ in the
press about noise. The Sustainable Development Commission (2005)
state that turbines make negligible levels of noise. Their report argues
that ‘sound emitted from a wind turbine will blend into background
noise ... it has been shown that the noise emitted from wind develop-
ments is generally very low’ (Sustainable Development Commission
2005: 75).
Indeed, two rebuttals are often made about noise claims. The first
is to point to a lack of evidence. For example, a group of doctors from
the Canadian Association of Physicians for the Environment state that
there is no rigorous, peer reviewed, scientific evidence, only ‘anecdotal
evidence from studies with non-representative samples, [not] binding
and thorough research’ (Howard et al. 2009: no page). Indeed, Polter
says that noise is often ‘perceived as a problem’ due to ‘misperceptions
by uninformed third parties’ and ‘the difficulties in communicating
scientific information to consultees’. (Polter 1991: 921, emphasis added).

This point is echoed by the Sustainable Development Commission,
when they state that ‘the public’s concern about noise from turbines is
often related to perceptions rather than actual experience’ (Sustainable
Development Commission 2005: 75), and that since ‘noise levels can
be measured and predicted’, simply visiting an operational turbine will
‘allay any fears’ that wind farms are noisy (Sustainable Development
Commission 2005: 79).
The second rebuttal is to point to the guidelines about noise, and to
reiterate that wind farms meet these criteria – and therefore that the
noise cannot be problematic. For example, the BWEA state that ‘there
are strict guidelines on wind turbines to ensure the protection of resi-
dential amenity’ (BWEA 2009), and campaign group ‘Yes to Wind’
describe these guidelines as ‘perfectly reliable’ (2011: no page). The
Sustainable Development Commission (2005: 75) state that ‘for modern
wind farm developments noise concerns need not be a serious issue if
the relevant guidance is followed’.
Moreover, developers often point to the guidelines on noise, state
that they have met them, and therefore that noise is not nor will not
be an issue. For example, the summary of the Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) findings for the Clachan Flats wind farm states that
‘predicted noise levels for the wind farm indicate that there will be
no loss of amenity in the local area due to noise in accordance with
the assessment method ETSU-R-97’ (Scottish Power Renewables 2002).
Similarly, the developers for the Grange wind farm state that ‘the back-
ground noise data collected at The Grange has been analyzed as recom-
mended by ETSU-R-97 to determine the relevant noise limits ... The
Grange Wind Farm proposal therefore complies with the relevant guid-
ance on wind farm noise and the impact on the amenity of all nearby
properties would be regarded as acceptable’ (Renewable Energy Systems
2009: 7).
How can this apparent contradiction be understood? How can wind
turbine noise be both ‘unbearable’ and ‘undetectable’? To try to under-
stand this, there are four key issues to take into account:
1. difficulties with capturing and measuring the noise;

2. disagreement about the type of noise that turbines produce;
3. problems with the official measurement guidelines;
4. the subjective assessment and receipt of noise.
Each of these will be considered in turn.

Difficulties with capturing and measuring the noise

While the occurrence of sound may seem to be straightforward, it is not
something that can be simply and unambiguously measured; rather,
it can be very difficult to capture and assess. Laboratory conditions
for noise calculations do not exist on wind farm locations – idealised
models of the spread of the noise may not take into account the terrain,
vegetation or atmospheric effects, and the Acoustic Ecology Institute
(2009: 4) says that ‘atmospheric conditions can wreak havoc with
nice, clean sound propagation models’. Scientific acoustic measure-
ments do not necessarily equate to the nature of the sound and the
situation in which it is heard (Van den Berg 2003). Indeed, Frey and
Hadden (2006: 4) say that ‘precision in predicting noise levels in homes
neighbouring wind turbines has so far eluded the wind industry’. This
is because measuring wind turbine noise is extremely difficult – and
there are considerable local variables that need to be taken into account
(Barnard 2007; Leishman 2002). These include:
Landscape
The topography of the particular location will affect how noise is gener-
ated, dispersed and heard (Herbrandson and Messing 2009; Leishman
2002). This includes ground effects, such as the reflection and absorp-
tion of sound on the ground (dependent on source height, terrain
cover and frequency of the noise) (Rogers and Manwell 2004: 12); the
terrain orography (any elements that are elevated and their formation);
and the ground properties and characteristics (Pothou et al. 1999). In
certain topographical conditions, where the terrain masks wind noise,
the turbine noise will be more clearly heard than in other locations or
at greater distances (Herbrandson and Messing 2009; Acoustic Ecology
Institute 2009; Walker 1993).
Atmosphere
Atmospheric effects are crucial in determining noise levels (Pothou
et al. 1999). These include atmospheric turbulence and the movement
of incoming air; weather effects; wind speed and changes in wind speed
or temperature; and the prevailing wind direction, which can cause
considerable differences in sound pressure levels between upwind and
downwind positions (Rogers and Manwell 2004: 12; Leishman 2002).
These atmospheric factors mean that noise can spread over a greater
distance than predicted. During the day when warming air rises, this
both carries sound with it and creates extra turbulence which has a
masking effect on the turbine noise. At night, when the air stabilises,
the turbine noise can carry much further than expected.
Layout
The layout of the wind farm will be significant in terms of any noise
generated. Important aspects include the spacing between turbines and
the geometry of the blades (Pothou et al. 1999; Leishman 2002). Also
important are source characteristics (such as the height of the turbine
blades) and the distance of the source (the turbine) from the observer
(Rogers and Manwell 2004: 12). As Walker (1993: 2) notes, even step-
ping a few metres one way or the other from a house near a wind farm
will affect the volume that is heard.
Measurement location
Following from this, both where and how the measurements are taken
is important. It has been noted – counter-intuitively perhaps – that
noise from turbines will often be louder further away than when
standing underneath the tower. This can be the effect of particular
atmospheric conditions, temperature inversions or wind layers, and is
more common with larger turbines. The site of the actual turbines may
therefore not be the most appropriate place to measure the noise level,
and the distance from the turbine, wind speed and wind direction can
mean that the noise can be audible several miles away (Elliott 1994).
The height at which the measurements are taken is also significant.
Measurements are often taken at ten metres from the ground; but this
can underestimate the speed of the wind (especially at night) at the
top of the turbine (up to 100m high). Indeed, van den Berg (2003)
describes how noise at a wind farm in the Netherlands was much louder
at night than expected; and that this was caused by strong winds at
hub height, alongside little wind at ground level – a common meteoro-
logical effect.
Averages
When assessing noise levels, averages are commonly used. Day long or
12 hour averages, most often used by industry noise consultants, can
lead to noise assessments that do not represent the quietest or loudest
turbine conditions (the latter of course are precisely when noise becomes
a problem). Indeed, the Acoustic Ecology Institute (2009) documents
case studies where the intermittent noise was not present when a devel-
oper or regulator came to measure it. Background noise – against which
wind turbine noise is assessed – is also commonly measured using
averages, which can also overestimate the masking effect it can have at
quieter times of day.
Measurement scale
Finally there is also a debate about the most valid scale on which to
measure noise. Current measurement standards are based on sound
pressure levels of wind turbines compared to background noise,
measured as A-weighted decibels, dB(A) (DTI 2006). ‘A-weighting’ is
commonly used in a wide range of environmental and industrial noise
studies. These measurements, in theory, equate to loudness of the wind
turbine noise, as perceived by the human ear, compared to the loud-
ness of the ambient sound at the site, but they often fail to capture
the effects of low frequency noise. This makes the use of A-weighting
sometimes controversial, and it is often deemed insufficient alone. The
World Health Organisation says that ‘when prominent low frequency
noises are present, measures based on A-weighting are inappropriate’
(WHO 1999). The Acoustic Ecology Institute (2009) and the UK Noise
Association (2006) argue that a different measure should be used:
‘turbine noise can be a particular problem in rural areas, with low levels
of background noise; and low frequency noise may be underestimated
because of the use of A-weighting rather than C-weighting’ (UK Noise
Association 2006). Indeed, Pedersen and Persson-Waye (2004) found
significant levels of turbine noise, but only a weak relation between
when A-weighted sound level was correlated with noise annoyance. An
A-weighting scale does not take into account such qualities as frequency,
timbre, tonality, rhythm and modulation, despite recognition that these
factors are important in noise perception (ETSU 1999), and local reac-
tions to noise ‘indicate that other parameters are also relevant, such as
low frequency noise, modulation, traditional descriptors such as sharp-
ness and roughness’ (Sondergaard 2004: 33). Fegeant (1999: 184) argues
that ‘the community response cannot be predicted on the knowledge
of the A-level alone, and detectability of low level noises yields a much
better indicator to their intrusiveness.’
All of these issues make both predicting and assessing wind turbine
noise a complicated feat. While it may be possible to envisage the impact
of some of these factors, such as turbine layout, others are much more
variable, such as the effects of seasons and different weather conditions
(Miediema et al. 2005; Herbrandson and Messing 2009). In terms of
predictions, it is usually on the basis of these that decisions about wind
farm locations and permissions are made. As Barnard (2007: 11) argues,
‘it is possible that the predicted noise emission from a wind farm could
be significantly different to the reality. There is no way of verifying

this until the wind farm is built by which time no remedial action can
be taken and local residents are exposed to loss of amenity.’ Problems
later are too late for residents – who may feel ‘conned’ and ‘deceived’
by developers, and not taken seriously (Walker 1993), exacerbating
any antagonism. Even after a wind farm has been built, the location
of the regulator assessing the noise, the atmosphere, weather, height of
measurement and scale used can all mean that the measurement differs
from that heard by local residents.
Disagreement about the type of noise that turbines produce

As well as the complexity of the factors that need to be taken into
account to measure wind turbine noise, there is also disagreement about
the type of noise generated by wind turbines. For example, a variety
of reports have discussed and debated the relevance of low frequency
noise from wind farms. Styles et al. (2005: 43) state that ‘we have clearly
shown that wind turbines generate low frequency sound (also known as
infrasound) and acoustic signals which can be detected at considerable
distances (many kilometres) from wind farms on infrasound detectors
and on low-frequency microphones.’ The Acoustic Ecology Institute
(2009) also state equally unequivocally that this low frequency noise is
a problem with wind turbines. This is both because it can travel easily
(French Academy of Medicine 2006), and because although it some-
times cannot be heard directly, it can be experienced through vibra-
tions in walls, windows and furniture (Hubbard and Shepherd 1995).
Herbrandson and Messing (2009) and Leventhall (2004) argue that
many of the reported characteristics of wind farm noise annoyance are
correlated with the propagation of low frequency noise – such as the
noise being close to inaudibility, audible indoors and not outdoors, more
audible at night than day and having throb or rumble characteristics.
However the Sustainable Development Commission (2005: 78) is much
more dismissive of the significance of low frequency noise because,
they say, good planning has largely eliminated it: ‘Low frequency noise
generation is generally confined to turbines whose rotors operate down-
wind of the support tower – a downwind machine. With the excep-
tion of a very few single turbine installations, all current turbines with
rotors are upstream of the tower. These do not usually generate low
frequency noise.’ Howe (2007) is even more adamant that infrasound
is not important, arguing that levels are not perceptible to the human
ear and that infrasound generated by wind turbines is not known to be
harmful to human health. Similarly, Jakobson (2005: 154) found that
while turbines produce infrasound, it was at negligible levels, and hence

unimportant for the evaluation of the environmental effects of wind
turbines.
There is further disagreement about whether wind turbines produce
noise known as ‘amplitude modulation’ (AM). Hayes-McKenzie
conducted a study for the Department of Trade and Industry (2006),
and states that AM noise is a problem from wind turbines, especially at
night. The report says that the risk of AM is greatest at sites with stable
atmospheric conditions, with tall wind turbines, where high levels of
wind shear exist, or in hillier terrain. However, a report conducted by
Salford University for DEFRA (2007) concluded that the incidence of
AM at wind farms is very limited in terms of the number of people
affected and essentially dismissed it as an issue. So while wind turbine
noise is difficult to capture, there are also disagreements about what
elements of noise should be captured or even exist.
Problems with the official measurement guidelines

A third complicating factor concerns the principles that are used
to determine the noise from wind farms. As mentioned previously,
there are enforceable regulations in place about turbine noise, to
which developers are obliged to demonstrate that they adhere in
environmental impact assessments. Planning Policy Statement 22 on
Renewable Energy (PPS22) accepts that small increases in noise levels
may occur with the development of renewable energy technologies,
and instructs local planning authorities to ensure that developments
have been located and designed in such a way to minimise this impact.
To do so, PPS22 requires that a specific methodology be used, entitled
‘The assessment and rating of noise from wind farms by the Working
Group on Noise from Wind Turbines’, published in 1996 and more
commonly referred to as ‘ETSU-R-97’. Since its publication, this report
has been used to evaluate the noise from wind farms in the UK. The
issue here is not that developers are not using these regulations or that
they are not being enforced; rather that the regulations themselves
are inadequate to predict and assess noise and to mitigate any noise
annoyance problems.
The ETSU-R-97 document was specifically designed to balance the
promotion of onshore wind turbines with the protection of local resi-
dents. Indeed, the ethos behind the guidelines is made very clear on the
first page: ‘this document describes a framework for the measurement
of wind farm noise and gives indicative noise levels thought to offer
a reasonable degree of protection to wind farm neighbours, without
placing unreasonable restrictions on wind farm development or adding unduly

to the costs or administrative burdens on wind farm developers and local
councils’ (ETSU-R-97 1996: iii, emphasis added). This is not just a docu-
ment about noise measurement then, but also one with an implicit
political agenda.
There are a number of issues with the ETSU-R-97 guidance. Perhaps
the most fundamental of these it that it is out of date. The guidance was
based on the first wind turbines built in the mid-1990s, which typically
were 30–40 m high, with rotor width of 15–25 m. Typical turbines today
are 80 m or 100m high, with a rotor width of 45 m. It was acknowledged
that the report was written ‘in light of the best information available
and in the circumstances prevailing at the time’ (ETSU-R-97 1996: iv),
and that a revised report would be required in two years time. No such
review has ever taken place.
ETSU-R-97 applies noise limits at the properties closest to a wind
farm site, and assumes that if there are no noise problems here, then
there will be none further away. It specifies a limit on turbine noise of
five decibels – 5dB(A) – above background noise for both daytime and
night time, except in low noise environments where absolute limits are
applied: 35–40dB(A) for daytime, and 43dB(A) for night time. As has
already been mentioned, the use of A-weighting is not uncontroversial
and means that any low frequency noise may be inadequately measured
and underestimated. Further, the use of fixed noise limits contradicts
the normal industrial noise planning policies and procedures and sets
‘less stringent noise requirements than for other industrial develop-
ments’ (Barnard 2007: 11). In rural areas, particularly at night, back-
ground noise levels can easily drop to 20–25dB(A), so the margin up to
the ETSU-R-97 fixed limit of 43dB(A) could mean turbine noise levels
of up to 20dB or more (Barnard 2007: 10). Similarly, when ETSU-R-97
states that an average of the background noise should be taken, this is
also inconsistent with normal practice. The usual procedure (outlined
in BS4142, the UK Government’s ‘Method for rating industrial noise
affecting mixed residential and industrial areas’) requires local author-
ities to use measurements at the quietest part of the period in ques-
tion. Using an average overestimates the background noise, and means
that turbine noise may be less easily masked. Equally, if the frequencies
generated by wind turbines are different to those present in the back-
ground noise, then the turbines may be audible even if they are less
loud than the background noise.
Furthermore, the guidelines state that there should be separate noise
limits for day and night time, and that the permitted noise level from
turbines can be higher at night than during the day; yet many noise
complaints made about wind turbines relate to sleep disturbance.
ETSU-R-97 is the only UK or international noise guidance in existence
that permits higher levels of noise during the night than the day (Colby
et al. 2009). Further, Van den Berg (2003) states that any measurements
at night are underestimated and that turbines will be therefore be
producing more noise precisely when background noise levels are low.
Atmospheric conditions at night mean higher pulse levels (producing
‘thumping’ noises), but investigations generally take place during the
day. Likewise, the guidelines state that measurements should be taken
outside properties, whereas complainants are usually more troubled by
noise penetrating inside their homes.
So while developers will rightly say that they measure noise in accor-
dance with the government guidelines ETSU-R-97, there are significant
questions about the appropriateness of those guidelines: ‘the assump-
tions and methodology used raise serious concerns over whether it is
a credible instrument to ensure that local residents do not suffer an
unacceptable reduction in their amenity and quality of life’ (Barnard
2007: 11). Indeed, Bowdler (2005: 1) argues that the conclusions of
ETSU-R-97 are so badly argued as to be ‘laughable’, that it is a ‘thor-
oughly flawed document’, and in fact ‘nonsense’. The focus throughout
on not restricting wind farm development provides a particular slant,
and the document is ‘so full of unfounded assertions and so badly
thought out and argued that it comes up with standards for wind
farm noise that are quite unlike any other noise standards’ (2005: 2).
Consequently, a wind farm being permitted because it conforms to
ETSU-R-97 is no guarantee that there will not be noise problems for
local residents once it is built.
The subjective assessment and receipt of noise

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the issue of how people ‘hear’
this noise which is so hard to assess, capture and regulate. Herbrandson
and Messing (2009: 15) suggest that ‘human sensitivity to sound, espe-
cially to low frequency sound, is variable. Individuals have different
thresholds of frequency to audible sound; different thresholds for each
frequency of audible sound; different vestibular sensitivities and reac-
tions to vestibular activation; and different sensitivity to vibration.’ But
this is not the whole story. Beyond an individual’s aural ability and
particular sensitivities are a range of acoustical and non-acoustical
factors which will directly contribute to the level and annoyance of the
sound.
Wolsink et al. (1993: 276) argue that noise ‘incorporates a subjective

component’, and that ‘the amount of annoyance is hardly related to
the objective sound level ... a reduction in the emissions and a decrease
in the noise levels will not result in a disappearance of annoyance and
complaints about the noise’. Bishop (2002) reiterates this point, arguing
that noise is not an objective criterion, and how noisy something is not
necessarily the determinant of any opposition. The process by which
certain sounds are experienced as ‘noise’, and certain noises are judged
to be acceptable or unacceptable in certain contexts, is informed by a
complex web of social, cultural, economic and historical factors. This
subjective quality does not diminish this experience of hearing the
noise or render it invalid; it means that it is important to understand
what contributes to this experience and why people hear the noise
differently (or indeed, not at all). There are three main aspects to how
the sound is heard, which will be considered in turn.
The quality of the sound

Broer (2004) argues that while annoyance is commonly and simply
associated with loudness, this only represents a statistical correlation
and not an explanation or a direct causation. Similarly, Herbrandson
and Messing (2009: 15) argue that ‘stress and annoyance from noise
often do not correlate with loudness’. It becomes clear therefore that
there is something significant about the quality and characteristics
of noise that wind turbines make, and that this is as (or even more)
important than actual loudness. As Harry argues about wind turbines,
‘absolute noise level is less important than the character of the noise
produced’ (2007: 22, emphasis added). Similarly, Pedersen and Persson-
Waye (2004) suggest that wind turbine noise has special characteris-
tics which are easily perceived, even as low sound pressure levels. This
is also something that noise measurements do not take into account.
Rather than noise being simply related to volume, perception of a noise
as unpleasant, neutral or pleasing is much more complicated.
This is because different sounds, such as repetitive but low intensity
noises, can evoke different responses from people. For example, Barnard
(2007: 2) argues that ‘there is evidence that the noise output from wind
turbines that creates a nuisance to people are lower sound levels than
other background noise. This appears to be due to the quality of the
sound which contains both an impulsive, repetitive quality, and a low
frequency element that can be perceived below the audible threshold.’
Wolsink et al. (1993: 273) describe how annoyance relates to the occur-
rence of certain characteristics of the noise emitted from wind turbines:
loudness, duration, the ratios between high and low, and strong and
weak, and intensity. Persson-Waye and Ohrstrom (2002) found that
annoyance levels were significantly higher for turbine sounds described
by subjects as ‘lapping’ and ‘whistling’, and in further work found
similar strong correlations between annoyance and wind turbine
sounds described as ‘swishing, whistling, resounding and pulsating/
throbbing’ (Pedersen and Persson-Waye 2007: 480). Herbrandson and
Messing (2009) state that the throb or rumble characteristics of wind
farm noise in particular add to its annoyance.
These points about different sound qualities from wind turbines
relate to a broader issue about receipt of sound. Some sounds will be
perceived as more noisy, and therefore more intrusive, than others.
For example, the sound of a blackbird singing at 60dB(A) may well be
perceived as pleasant and restful by people who would find the noise
of a wind turbine at 50dB(A) – less than half as loud – to be unpleasant
and disruptive. So noise annoyance is not just related to loudness, but
also to the type of noise and its source.
The appropriateness of the sound

There is also something important about when and where a sound is
heard. The time of day that a sound is heard will influence its annoy-
ance, as will being able to hear it indoors (Herbrandson and Messing
2009; Leventhall 2004; Van den Berg 2003). The location of a sound is
also important. For example, particular sounds are often perceived as
less appropriate, and therefore more annoying, in rural areas. Anderson
et al. (1993) studied the influence of different sounds on evaluations
of countryside settings and found that while some sounds enhanced
the experience (such as natural and animal sounds), others degraded
the same setting. They show that the interaction of a setting’s visual
and acoustic characteristics significantly influences evaluations of that
place, and this is directly applicable to wind turbine noise. Being able
to hear a noise caused by something that has been added to a setting
and which is not necessarily a natural or expected component of it will
both detract from that setting and make the noise itself more noticeable
and annoying.
The evaluation of appropriateness will therefore depend on the partic-
ular noise, the setting and the individual who hears it. Tarrant et al.
(1994) found that evaluations of noise nuisance in country parks and
wilderness areas are multidimensional and dependant on characteristics
of visitors – such as their recreation motives, past experiences in coun-
tryside settings and expectations about a countryside experience – as
well as the frequency, source, proximity, type of noise and perceived

noise level. The same sound can be heard very differently by different
people, dependent on how (in)appropriate they deem it to be.
The context in which the sound is heard

Beyond variables such as the time and location of hearing a noise,
broader contextual factors will also influence perceptions and annoy-
ance. The different experience of hearing wind turbine noise may
therefore be because, as Wolsink et al. (1993) point out, other negative
feelings towards turbines will interfere in the relationship between the
level of noise and the amount of annoyance. This includes factors such
as the general attitude towards wind energy, visual impact, resident
satisfaction, other sources of general dissatisfaction, the estimated pros
and cons of large scale application of wind power, as well as interference
with daily activities. Indeed, Pederson and Persson-Waye (2001) suggest
that different sound properties, not fully described in technical meas-
urements, are of importance for perception and annoyance; including
respondents’ opinions of the impact of the turbines on the landscape
and attitude towards wind power in general.
The points are illuminated by Walker’s (1993) study of a village in
mid-Wales, which is an example of the fact that ‘modes of perception are
inextricably tied to aspects of “local context”’ (Bickerstaff and Walker
2001: 133). In this village there had been a huge dispute between the
developers and local people, and a number of vociferous complaints
about the noise from a wind farm two miles away. As Walker (1993: 9)
argues, ‘different people have different susceptibilities to noise – once
the noise affects you, you become hyper-aware of it.’ This is a point
echoed by Elliott: ‘certainly once a noise starts to be annoying it can be
detected, even at very low levels’ (1997: 161). Walker goes on to point
out that the noise of a wind turbine may be like the hum of a fridge in
the room next door – but ‘it’s worth noting that most people own and
control and benefit from their fridges’ (1993: 2); in stark contrast to the
nearby wind farm.
This relates directly to what Broer describes as the ‘political nature of
noise annoyance’ (2004: 6), with noise annoyance being an evaluation of
the relationship between the person and practice generating the sound
and the person who is adversely affected by the practice. In his study
of aircraft noise, Broer (2004: 6) argues that ‘humans give meaning to
the sound. And in this case, the field of institutional regulations, defini-
tions, and the struggle over it – politics, in short – is of crucial impor-
tance in the making of meaning. The way that aircraft noise is dealt
with in institutional practices influences the everyday perception of

the sound.’ The meaning that is given by residents to wind farm noise
would then be dependent on factors such as the regulations for devel-
oping wind farms, and the way that this process had been enacted. This
would explain why the same sound level will be experienced differently
depending on its source (Schick 1997), and substantiates Pedersen and
Perrson-Waye’s (2003) findings of reported levels of annoyance of wind
farm noise (at the same level as noise from traffic and other sources
which were not reported as annoying) because of responses towards the
development of the wind farm more generally.
These other, non-acoustical factors, which correlate with nuisance,
include fear or perception of control (Miedema and Vos 1998; Guski
1999). Broer (2004) discusses how citizens who feel threatened by future
plans (for example for a new runway, or indeed, a new wind farm) expe-
rience the same sound as more annoying than people who do not feel
threatened. The relationship to the local authorities is important too:
‘if one assumes that those in charge do everything possible to mini-
mize the nuisance, it is significantly easier to bear. If one distrusts the
authorities, the annoyance is actually higher before the actual changes’
(2004: 6).
Of course, this relationship between noise, and trust in devel-
oper, development, and process can be a positive relationship too.
Herbrandson and Messing (2009: 15) argue that factors such as whether
individuals have an interest in a project, or the fact that, because they
perceive themselves to have some control over an environmental noise,
they are less likely to find it annoying or stressful, are important. Just
as Wolsink (2007) states that general attitude to wind energy deter-
mined perceptions of its impact, so ‘people are more willing to accept
a noise impact if they view the development in a positive light’ (Walker
1993: 10).
The wider resonance for renewable energy
So where does all this lead? This chapter has so far discussed the argu-
ments that noise from wind turbines both is and isn’t a problem, and
explored a number of factors that may explain this apparent diffe-
rence – that noise is difficult to assess and measure; that there are disa-
greements about the type of noise that turbines produce; and problems
with the official measurement guidelines. The situation has been exac-
erbated by bad siting, poor measurement, and inadequate, arbitrary and
out of date regulations.
All of these factors can lead to differing views about the existence of
noise problems. If analysts are measuring for one type of noise, on a
particular scale, but what is being heard is not recognised by this scale,
this will underestimate any problems. Similarly, if measurements are
calculated using averages, and an analyst visits a wind farm on a low
wind speed day, making recommendations about bearable conditions
based on debatable standards, then problems are likely to arise.
What becomes clear is that noise measurement, like so many other
aspects of apparently objective, scientific calculations, is based on
human decisions – about what, where, when, and how to measure
something. Of course, more can be done to try to ‘improve’ measure-
ment techniques – from collecting a wide range of data across different
weather and atmospheric conditions, to using different scales of measure-
ment to fully capture the range of features that any particular sort of
noise has. But beyond this, however much measurement techniques or
guidelines might improve, lie deeper questions about the legitimacy of
wind turbines and the decision making processes that permit them.
When people ‘experience’ a noise from a wind turbine, they are not
just ‘hearing it’. A noise is being evaluated in the context of the source
from which it arises and the situation in which it is being heard, and
this assessment and receipt of noise (which means that the experience
of noise will be vary) is not accounted for in official measurements or
methodologies.
There is the need therefore to move beyond purely technical assess-
ments of noise, to explore much more fully how noise is defined, heard
and felt by people, examining the contextual factors – social, economic,
cultural, spatial, temporal, individual – that mediate the experience of
wind turbine noise. While this may not necessarily fully encompass the
calls by the UK Noise Association (2006) for there to be clear and public
recognition by the wind power industry that turbines cause significant
noise problems, leading to constructive discussion, it certainly means
more than dismissing out of hand complaints and fears about noise, as
is so often the case. A major report carried out for the Department of
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform by the University of Salford
(2007) suggests that people complain about noise as a proxy for some
other grievance. This is not helpful, and is just likely to exacerbate
tensions, mistrust and annoyance from all the impacts of a wind farm.
Current regulations on wind farms do not acknowledge or take into
account these factors that shape meaning and experience. PPS22 accepts
increases in noise levels from the development of renewable energy tech-
nologies, but when it instructs local planning authorities to ensure that
developments have been located and designed in such a way to mini-

mise this impact, it does not provide the means for them to fully do so.
The Companion Guide to PPS22 compares the likely noise levels from
a wind turbine to those from a car or an office environment, missing
the critical points that the quality of the sound, the appropriateness
of the noise and the source from which it arises are just as important
as the level. Indeed, as Fegeant (1999: 184) says, while ‘noise annoy-
ance involves both a physical and cognitive dimension’, noise legisla-
tion focuses on the physical levels – an ‘over-simplified approach’ – and
one which is unsatisfying both for the community and the industry.
A greater understanding of the factors that mediate the relationship
between sound level and annoyance – such as opinions about turbines,
relationships with the developer and the implementation process – is
therefore required.
All of these points have wider resonance for the development of
renewable energy more generally. Firstly, the example of noise demon-
strates that scientific measurement is not sufficient alone to fully
capture the nature and extent of an impact. If this is the case for some-
thing as seemingly objective as noise levels, then it is certainly also
the case for other impacts including visual influence, fit with existing
landscape, and effect on local flora and fauna and wildlife. Decisions
about how, when and where to try and assess such impacts and the
appropriate tools, methods and scales to try and do so will necessarily
include human judgements and perceptions – and those made by
scientists or designated experts may not accord with the experience of
local people.
Secondly, it is not the case that ‘better science’ in renewable energy
development can somehow overcome this, because perceptions of impact
will depend on the context in which that impact is experienced. Hearing
and being annoyed by wind farm noise is (at least in part) a product of
perceptions of a wind farm and of the development of wind energy. If
people are opposed to a project they are more likely to experience the
impacts it entails. Conversely, this can also mean that support for a
renewable energy project, or meaningful involvement in the decision-
making processes, may lead to a decreased likelihood of experiencing
negative impacts. If people feel that they have been involved in deci-
sion making about developments that will affect them, if they feel that
they have been listened to and their points taken into account, they are
much less likely to oppose that development (see Haggett 2009; 2010).
Not only responses to the development generally, but the ‘meaning’ of
any impacts more specifically, will be dependent on these processes.
Improved planning for renewable energy developments – including

local people in meaningful engagement, fully assessing and acknowl-
edging the impacts, and building trust between developers, regulators
and local people – can lead to impacts being understood and appropri-
ately addressed; and has the potential to lead to less opposition and the
experience of negative impacts.
In summary therefore, the lessons from the case of noise from wind
farms are that apparently objective impacts are deceptively difficult to
measure and are experienced differentially by different people. It also
suggests that the experiences of the local community will differ from
outside experts and universal models of measurement, with percep-
tions of impacts based on perceptions of the source. Finally, it suggests
that increasing local engagement and improving the design of a wind
project can lessen the experience of the impact. Noise from wind farms
exemplifies these issues, but they are no less relevant for a wide range of
renewable energy developments.
References
Acoustic Ecology Institute (2009) ‘Wind energy noise impacts – AEI special
report’, available from: http: //www.AcousticEcology.org, accessed on 10
January 2011.
Anderson, L. M., Mulligan, B. E., Goodman, L. S., and Regen, Z. (1993) ‘Effects
of sounds on preferences for outdoor settings’, Environment and Behaviour, 15:
5, 539–566.
Barnard, M. (2007) ‘Wind turbines and noise – a review of the current situation’,
Available at: http://www.stoplintonwindfarm.org.uk, accessed on 24 January
2011.
Bickerstaff, K. and Walker, G. (2001) ‘Public understandings of air pollution:
the “localisation” of environmental risk’, Global Environmental Change,
11, 133–145.
Bishop, I. (2002) ‘Determination of thresholds of visual impact: the case of wind
turbines’, Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, 29: 5, 707–718.
Bowdler, D. (2005) ETSU-R-97: Why it is Wrong, Available at: http: //www.view-
sofscotland.org/library/docs/ETSU-R97_%20Why_%20it_%20is_%20Wrong.
Broer, C. (2004) ‘Sound, meaning, and politics: how aircraft sound is turned
into nuisance’, Paper for the British Sociological Association conference, York,
22–25 March 2004.
BWEA (British Wind Energy Association) (2000) ‘Noise from wind turbines –
the facts’, Available at: http: //www.bwea.com/pdf/noise.pdf, accessed on
20 November 2010.
Chouard, C-H. (2006) ‘Le retentissement du fonctionnement des éoliennes sur
la santé de l’homme’ (Repercussions of wind turbine operations on human
health), The French Academy of Medicine, available from http: //ventdubocage.
net/documentsoriginaux/sante/eoliennes.pdf, accessed on 31 January 2011.
Dean, W. D. (2008) ‘Wind turbine mechanical vibrations: potential environ-

mental threat’, Energy and Environment, 19: 2, 303–307.
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) (2006) Energy Review: The Energy
Challenge, London: HMSO Publications
Elliott, D. (1994) ‘Public reactions to windfarms: the dynamics of opinion forma-
tion’, Energy and Environment, 5: 4, 343–362.
Elliott, D. (1997) Energy, Society and Environment, London, Routledge.
ETSU (Energy Technology Support Unit) (1999) An Assessment of Renewable
Energy for the UK, London: HMSO Publications.
Fegeant, O. (1999) ‘On the masking of wind turbine noise by ambient noise’,
Proceedings of the European Wind Energy Association Conference, Nice, 1–5
March 1999, 184–188
Frey, B. J. and Hadden, P. J. (2006) ‘Noise radiation from wind turbines installed
near homes: effects on health’, Available from http: //www.ukplanning.com,
accessed on 20 January 2011.
Guski, R. (2004) ‘How to forecast community annoyance in planning noisy
facilities’, Noise and Health, 6: 22, 59–64.
Haggett, C. (2010) ‘Understanding public responses to offshore wind power’,
Energy Policy, 39: 2, 503–510
Haggett, C. (2009) ‘Public engagement in planning for renewable energy’, in
S. Davoudi and J. Crawford (eds) Planning for Climate Change: Strategies for
Mitigation and Adaptation for Spatial Planners, London: Earthscan.
Harry, A. (2007) ‘Wind turbines, noise and health’, Available at: http: //www.
wind-watch.org/, accessed on 20 November 2010.
Hayes-MacKenzie for the DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) (2006) The
Measurement of Low Frequency Noise at Three UK Wind Farms, London: HMSO
Publications.
Herbrandson, C. and Messing, R. B. (2009) ‘Public health impacts of wind
turbines’, prepared for the Minnesota Department of Health, Minnesota
Department of Commerce, and Office of Energy Security, Available from:
http: //energyfacilities.puc.state.mn.us/ accessed on 20 November 2010.
Hubbard, H. H. and Shepherd, K. P. (1995) ‘Aeracoustics of large wind turbines’,
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 89: 6, 2496–2508.
Howard, J., Bell, W., Abelsohn, A. and Vakil, C. (2009) ‘Why so much noise
about wind?’, The Globe, 13 July 2009, available from http: //www.theglobe-
andmail.com/news/opinions/why-so-much-noise-about-wind/article1216749
/accessed on 20 November 2010.
Howe, B. (2007) ‘Wind turbines and sound: review and best practice guidelines’,
Report for the Canadian Wind Energy Association, Ottowa, CWEA Available
at: http: //www.canwea.ca/, accessed on 11 February 2010.
Jakobson, J. (2005) ‘Infrasound emission from wind turbines’, Journal of Low
Frequency Noise, Vibration and Active Control, 24, 145–155.
Leventhall, G. (2004) ‘Low frequency noise and annoyance’, Noise Health, 6: 23,
59–72.
Leishman, J. G. (2002) ‘Challenges in modeling the unsteady aerodynamics of
wind turbines’, Proceedings of the 21st ASME Wind Energy Symposium and
the 40th AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting , 14–17 January, 2002.
Miedema, H. M. E. and Vos, H. (1998) ‘Exposure-response relationships for
transportation noise’, Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 104: 6,
3432–3445.
Miedema, H. M. E., Fields, J. M. and Vos, H. (2005) ‘Effect of season and meteoro-
logical conditions on community noise annoyance’, Journal of the Acoustical
Society of America, 117, 2853–2865.
Pederson, E. and Persson-Waye, K. P. (2004) ‘Perception and annoyance due to
wind turbine noise – a dose-response relationship’, Journal of the Acoustical
Society of America, 116, 3460–3470.
Pedersen, E. and Persson-Waye, K. P. (2007) ‘Wind turbine noise, annoyance
and self-reported health and well-being in different living environments’,
Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 64, 480–486.
Persson-Waye, K.P. and Öhrström E. (2002) ‘Psycho-acoustic characters of
relevance for annoyance of wind turbine noise’, Journal of Sound Vibrations,
250: 1, 65–73.
Phipps, R. (2007) ‘In the matter of the motorium wind farm application, evidence
to the joint commissioners, Palmeston North, 8–26 March, 2007’, Available
at: http: //www.ohariupreservationsociety.org.nz/ , accessed on 10 September
2010.
Pierpoint, N. (2009) Wind Turbine Syndrome: A Report on a Natural Experiment,
Santa Fe: K-Selected Books.
PPS (Planning Policy Statement) 22 – Renewable Energy, Available at: http: //www.
communities.gov.uk/, accessed on 24 May 2010.
Polter, K. (1991) ‘Planning and communication strategy for the development of
windfarming’, in P. T. Smulders, and J. B. Dragt (eds) Wind Energy: Technology
and Implementation, pp. 919–923, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Pothou, K., Voustinas, S. G., Huberson, S., Kuhlmann, M., and Rawlinson-Smith,
R. (1999) ‘Investigation of noise emissions from wind parks and their impact
on the design of the park by means of the noisepark software’, Proceedings
of the European Wind Energy Association Conference, Nice, 1–5 March,
pp. 97–100.
Renewable Energy Systems group (2009) ‘The grange wind farm, volume I non
technical summary’, available from http: //www.grangewindfarm.co.uk/,
Rogers, A. L. and Manwell, J. F. (2004) ‘Wind turbine noise issues. A white paper
prepared for the Renewable Energy Research Laboratory’, Centre for Energy
Efficiency and Renewable Energy, University of Massachusetts.
Schick, A. (1997) Das Konzept der Belastigung in der Larmforschung, Lengerich:
Pabst.
Scottish Power Renewables (2002) ‘Environmental impact assessment for the
Clachan Flats wind farm, Cairndow’, Scottish Executive Library, Edinburgh.
Sondergaard, B. (2004) ‘Problems relating to the use of the existing noise
measurement standards when predicting noise from wind turbines and
wind farms’, Proceedings of the International Energy Agency Topical Expert
Meeting on the Acceptability in implementation of wind turbines in social
landscapes, Stockholm, 16–17 March 2004.
Styles, P., Stimpson, I., Toon, S., England, R., and Wright, M. (2005) ‘Microseismic
and infrasound monitoring of low freqency noise and vibrations from wind-
farms’, Report for the Ministry of Defence, London: HMSO Publications.
Sustainable Development Commission Report (2005) ‘Wind power in the UK – a
guide to the key issues surrounding onshore wind development in the UK’,
Available at: http: //www.mng.org.uk/, accessed on 20 January 2010.
Tarrant, M. A., Haas, G. E., and Manfredo, M. J. (1994) ‘Factors affecting visitor
evaluations of aircraft overflights of wilderness areas’, Society and Natural
Resources, 8, 351–360.
The UK Noise Association (2006) ‘Location, location, location: an investigation
into wind farms and noise by the UK Noise Association’, London: UKNA.
University of Salford (2007) ‘Research into aerodynamic modulation of wind
turbine noise, Final report for the Department of Business Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform’, London: HMSO Publications.
Van den Berg, G. P. (2003) ‘Effects of the wind profile at night on wind turbine
sound’, Journal of Sound and Vibration, 277: 4–5, 955–970.
Welsh Affairs Committee, Wind Energy, 13 July 1994, HC 336-I 1993–94, xxv,
para 65 (cited by the UK Noise Association, 2006).
Walker, S. (1993) Down on the Windfarm Milton Keynes, Network for Alternative
Technology and Technology Assessment (NATTA).
The Working Group on Noise from Wind Turbines (1996) The Assessment and
Rating of Noise from Wind Farms (ETSU-R-97), Available at: http: //www.
semantise.com/~lewiswindfarms/, accessed on 13 February 2010.
Wolsink, M. (1991) ‘The noise issue in siting decision’, in F. J. L Van Hulle, P. T.
Smulders, and J. B. Dragt (eds) Wind Energy: Technology and Implementation,
pp. 747–751, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Wolsink, M. (2007) ‘Planning of renewable schemes: deliberate and fair
decision-making on landscape issues instead of reproachful accusations of
non-cooperation’, Energy Policy, 35, 2692–2704.
Wolsink, M., Sprengers, M., Keuper, A., Pedersen, T. H. and Westra, C. A. (1993)
‘Annoyance from windturbine noise: on sixteen sites in three countries’,
Proceedings of the European Community Wind Energy Conference, pp. 273–276,
Lubeck-Travenmunde, Germany.
WHO (World Health Organisation) (1999) Guidelines for Community Noise,
Available at: http: //www.who.int/docstore/peh/noise/Comnoise-1.pdf,
accessed on 26 May 2010.
Yes to Wind (2011) ‘Are wind farms noisy?’, Available from http: //www.yes2wind.
com/, accessed on 31 January 2011.
9
Navigating a Minefield?
Wind Power and Local
Community Benefit Funds
Peter A. Strachan and David R. Jones
Introduction
When critically reflecting on the UK wind power programme during the

past 20 years it is clear that renewable energy policy has played to the
preferences of large corporate players, at the expense of local commu-
nities (Stenzel and Frenzel 2008). In light of the absence of widespread
UK community ownership models around individual, farmer and coop-
erative arrangements, a number of local tensions have arisen in wind
power deployment (Ellis et al. 2009). In the UK there is now an estab-
lished literature which highlights that local communities often feel
powerless when new projects are proposed by commercial developers
(Devine-Wright 2010) during their dealings with government planning
officials and in the appeals process, often over an extended period of
time (Cowell et al. 2011).
An important challenge continues to be how national and local
governments, as well as corporate players, can better foster more positive
relationships and participation with local communities in delivering
national renewable energy targets (Strachan and Lal 2005; 2004). In
recognising this challenge, there have been attempts at various levels of
UK government to legitimise the provision of community benefit pack-
ages (Cowell et al. 2011) with many companies now regularly offering
affected local communities a benefits fund (Munday et al. 2011). In
general terms, such community benefit funds can be defined as follows:
‘(the) developer offers a fund, per annum, per megawatt of installed
capacity, to community organisations, for spending on local projects’
(Cowell et al. 2011: 540).
174
Navigating a Minefield? 175
As wind power expands more rapidly in the UK, such funds are seen
to be increasingly important by developers in helping to foster support
for their projects, and from a government policy perspective can help
to correct past policy failings. Unfortunately, as we discuss later in
the chapter such packages are not without their own problems, and
can be contentious from developer, local community, and planning
perspectives.
It is against this backdrop that the aim of the present chapter is to
navigate the emerging minefield that is the provision by developers of
community benefit packages in the UK, and update the reader on recent
developments in this field. The principal question that this chapter
addresses is this. In the absence of widespread UK community owner-
ship, to what extent might corporate community benefit provision,
particularly community funds, make a difference in helping to reduce
tensions in planning consents and in fostering community acceptance?
To address this question, the chapter is divided into four main sections:
(1) the UK renewable energy policy context; (2) critical reflections on
international wind power experience; (3) community benefit provision
in the UK; and (4) concluding policy lessons and recommendation.
The UK renewable energy policy context
This section briefly reviews the UK renewable policy context,

highlighting past policy failings including the reliance on large elec-
tricity companies ‘remote’ from local communities (Stenzel and Frenzel
2008; Toke 2002). The UK is considered a country with significant
potential for renewable power when compared to many other European
countries. At the end of 2010, RenewableUK (2011a) outlined that the
UK wind power programme had achieved the following:
1. 5,203 megawatts (MW) of wind power has been installed;

2. a further 2,518 MW were under construction;
3. a further 6,523 MW had been consented; and,
4. 8,735 MW of projects were in planning.
In the UK there have been incentives for wind power since 1990, with the
first scheme a competitive tendering mechanism called the Non-Fossil
Fuel Obligation (NFFO). Five auctions took place between 1990 and
1998, with long-term contracts awarded to the lowest cost bidder. The
scheme resulted in very little new capacity being generated, with only
17 per cent of successful projects becoming operational (Stenzel and
Frenzel 2008). It is clear that the NFFO favoured participation mostly by

large energy companies such as Powergen (now part of E.ON), National
Wind Power (now part of RWE npower) and Scottish Power (now part
of Iberdrola) who made bids in all five NFFO rounds. This was at the
expense of independent wind farm developers such as individuals,
farmer, cooperatives and small companies who were largely priced out
of the market by the requirements of the auction process itself. Even
when some independent wind farm developers were successful many
could not secure backing from financial institutions to underwrite their
risks, as most of the larger companies financed their projects from their
existing balance sheets. For those smaller companies that were able
to underwrite their projects, many of these were later bought over by
larger market players (Stenzel and Frenzel 2008). One consequence of
the NFFO was to consolidate and reinforce the dominance by Powergen,
National Wind Power and Scottish Power, with little prospect for new
entrants to the market.
In order to increase installed capacity, changes to financial support
mechanisms have been necessary. The first major change occurred
with the introduction of the Renewables Obligation (RO) in 2002,
which effectively allowed the UK wind power programme to take off
(Mitchell and Connor 2004). The RO gave electricity suppliers a target
of providing 15.4 per cent of UK electricity from renewables by 2015,
with an aspiration for 20 per cent by 2020. Since its introduction, the
RO has been subject to a number of adjustments, almost on an annual
basis, in order to enhance the administrative and operational effective-
ness of the scheme. Perhaps the most significant of these changes was
‘banding’ in 2009 (see Chapter 2 by Elliott, this volume).
Banding was introduced to encourage a larger contribution from
emerging renewable technologies, with differentiated levels of support
for such technologies. This was to address the criticism that the scheme
had been technology blind, supporting only near market technologies
(particularly onshore wind), at the expense of new emerging technolo-
gies such as marine renewables. While banding has seen the emergence
of some small companies in the sector, very much like its predecessor
the RO has continued to favour development by larger companies and
to date most installed capacity has been delivered and owned by the
country’s six major electricity generators – British Gas/Centrica, EDF
Energy, E.ON, npower (bought by German ‘major’ RWE in 2002),
Scottish Power, and Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE).
Furthermore, the UK has failed thus far to deliver on its potential,
with its wind power programme being dwarfed when compared to
other leading countries such as Germany and Spain (Stenzel and Frenzel
2008; Szarka 2007). Mitchell (2007) has suggested that the UK should
adopt the financial support mechanisms (i.e. feed-in tariffs) and associ-
ated policies that have been adopted by pioneering wind power coun-
tries such as Spain, Germany and Denmark. Yet it was not until 2010
that a new UK national level feed-in tariff was introduced for small-
scale generation up to a 5 MW limit. Until its introduction, few sites
were developed by individuals, farmers or cooperatives. This has exac-
erbated tensions with the public, who are often very suspicious of large
developers and wary of the impact that a wind farm will have on their
community and landscape (Ellis et al. 2009; Strachan and Lal 2004).
However, there is an increasing recognition that if the UK is to foster a
low carbon economy, all of UK society must participate in this transi-
tion and have a stake in doing so. Interestingly, the May 2010 Coalition
Agreement (HM Government 2010: 17), set out by the Conservative and
Liberal Democrat parties, recognised the need for local communities to
have a stake in renewable energy projects:
We will encourage community-owned renewable energy schemes

where local people benefit from the power produced. We will also
allow communities that host renewable energy projects to keep the
additional business rates they generate.
However, the conclusions of the Electricity Market Reform consulta-

tion (DECC 2010) once again plays to the agenda of some of the larger
corporate players, such as EDF Energy. A close reading of the recent
Energy White Paper (2011) reveal proposals to introduce a new financial
support mechanism called ‘Contracts for Difference’ for ‘green energy’
(i.e. renewables and nuclear power). Surprisingly, this appears to be a
return to an auction-style system characteristic of the previous NFFO
which generated very little installed capacity, as previously outlined.
As Toke (2011) has argued, this mechanism is likely to threaten the
existing renewables market by also putting in place a funding mech-
anism to provide subsidies for nuclear power. So it would seem that
government preferences for large corporate players, at the expense of
smaller developers, are set to continue for the foreseeable future.
Drawing on 20 years of hindsight and cross-national comparison
(Strachan et al. 2010; Szarka 2010; Stenzel and Frenzel 2008; Toke and
Strachan 2006) the next section will show how community owner-
ship models and other local benefits have come to play an important
role in wind power programmes in countries such as Germany, the
Netherlands and Denmark. It will outline important conditions which

have largely been absent in the UK market and reflect on international
experience to date.
Critical reflections on international

wind power experience
When evaluating the international literature on wind power owner-

ship most commentators present a continuum from corporate owner-
ship through to local ownership. Strachan et al. (2010) outline that
local ownership is presented by many commentators as being favoured
over corporate ownership, with smaller scale, community or locally
owned wind turbines being the most effective approach to expand
wind power. This analysis has been extrapolated from the experi-
ences of Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, where individual,
farmer or community ownership has been a critical component of
their wind power programmes, and along with favourable financial
support mechanisms, are presented as the most important success
factors (Szarka 2007).
Strachan et al. (2010) further outline that the vast bulk of installed
onshore wind power capacity in Germany and Denmark is owned by
cooperatives and individuals. In Germany, nearly half of all installed
capacity is owned by ‘Burgerwindparks’ often involving collections
of farmers. In the Netherlands, farmers own approximately 30 per
cent of installed capacity with a further 20 per cent owned by local
investors (see Breukers 2010 and Agterbosch 2010 for further details
on ownership structures in Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands).
When comparing Dutch, Danish and German wind power expansion
Agterbosch (2010: 80) states:
the driving force behind the Dutch wind cooperatives was, and
still is idealism. Although idealism played a role in the emergence
of cooperative ownership in Denmark and Germany, monetary
returns became a more important driving force. Wind cooperatives
in Denmark and Germany primarily aim at generating sources of
income by supplying and selling wind capacity.
The sort of community ownership that exists in Germany, Denmark and

the Netherlands is very different to the reliance on corporate-led owner-
ship which dominates in the UK and the United States of America (USA).
In the UK and the USA, large corporations own the vast bulk of installed
capacity providing the finance and know-how to integrate wind power

into the energy mix. Corporate ownership remote of local communities
has been associated with less successful wind power programmes. There
are, of course, examples of local ownership in both the UK and the USA
as in Minnesota (Tanzler 2010), but these are not the norm.
However, with its highly acclaimed wind power programme, Spain
challenges the established view on corporate ownership being associ-
ated with less successful wind power programmes around the world.
Furthermore, Spain has even fewer farmer or community owned wind
farms than the UK (Dinica 2010), yet has witnessed rapid expansion of
the sector in recent years. The Spanish wind power programme repre-
sents an interesting case with strong regional governments supporting
wind power deployment, supportive planning regimes and economic
provision in the form of taxes and royalties in poor, depopulated munic-
ipalities in interior locations. When local opposition has emerged,
often related to sites of historical interest, significant financial commu-
nity benefits have helped to minimise such opposition. Dinica (2010:
107–108) illustrates this point:
The contextual factor of low income in rural areas played an impor-

tant role in making such mechanisms work, as some involved highly
appreciated financial compensations for the negative (perceived)
impacts of wind power: (additionally) royalties to local municipali-
ties, higher land rent fees, or social welfare investments.
Both corporate interests and municipalities have adopted a range of

other approaches as Dinica (2010: 108) further points out:
Towards the end of the 1990s, communication and information

campaigns for all sorts of stakeholders were implemented by devel-
opers and subnational authorities.
It also helps that most wind farms are situated away from cities and
the coast, with minimal impact on Spain’s vibrant tourism industry. In
addition, and unlike the UK, landscape protection organisations are not
common and when they do exist, they lack the finance and coordina-
tion to influence decision-making (though see Moragues-Faus and Ortiz-
Miranda 2010). Furthermore, in comparison to the UK and many other
European countries, Spain’s landscape protection legislation would
appear somewhat less demanding (Dinica 2010: 107). So far, onshore
wind developments have gone from strength to strength in Spain.
Of course, international experience also reveals that in addition to

community ownership and feed-in tariffs, other factors also have an
important role to play in stimulating wind power deployment. These
include:
1. access to finance and favourable taxation schemes (Dinica 2010);

2. low cost market entry in the form of access to grid connection
(Strachan et al. 2010);
3. favourable planning environments (Ellis et al. 2009); and,
4. strong manufacturing and research and development hubs (Kamp
2010).
Market conditions in the UK are such that many of these enabling

conditions have been absent to date, resulting in very high entry
costs for investors, especially smaller investors at the local level.
Thus, as outlined in the previous section, the UK wind power sector
is dominated by large electricity generating companies, and local
or community ownership has failed to flourish to any great extent.
Of course this situation might soon start to change, with the recent
introduction of the new UK feed-in tariff for smaller-scale generation
but as yet it is too early to assess the impact of the scheme, bearing
in mind that the scheme is now effectively capped. Evaluating the
effectiveness of this scheme will certainly prove to be a rich arena for
academic research in the near future.
Community benefits provision in the UK
Defining ‘The Community’ and ‘Community Benefits’

In the absence of community ownership in the UK, community benefits
provision has been receiving attention for some time from developers
and local communities, with an academic literature also emerging (see
for example Cowell et al. 2011; Munday et al. 2011; Cass et al. 2010;
Walker et al. 2010; Walker 2008). The question of course arises: what do
we mean by ‘community benefits’? However, defining what we mean by
‘the community’ is a precursor to defining what we mean by ‘commu-
nity benefits’.
Defining what we mean by ‘the community’ is much more diffi-
cult than it first appears. A report for the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI), Community Benefits from Wind Power (CES 2005),
introduces the terms ‘communities of locality’ and ‘communities of
interest’. Communities of locality are simply defined as areas close to
and affected by a wind farm, and this is the way that most developers
define ‘the community’ at the moment. Of course certain ‘communi-
ties of interest’, such as for example a recreational user of the land in
the Scottish Highlands, might also lay claim to a community benefits
package, if the siting of the wind farm interfered with the user’s access
to and enjoyment of the land. However, in UK onshore wind farm
developments such interests are usually ignored if they live outwith the
locality. While offshore wind farm developments are not dealt with in
this chapter, ‘communities of interest’ such as fishermen whose fish-
eries are affected by new facility developments – yet could conceivably
even reside in another nation state – would clearly be an important
stakeholder in such a context.
In the absence of a strict definition of ‘community benefits provi-
sion’ CES (2005) outlines a range of benefits that might be offered and
indeed some of these have been accruing to local communities for a
number of years. Key options include: community fund contributions;
community compensation; and pre-approval contributions. While
Cowell et al. (2008) outline similar categories to that of CES (2005), they
begin their examination of community benefits more widely to include
more conventional economic benefits of wind power deployment. This
might include, for example, ‘locally manufactured content and local
contractors for construction, operation and maintenance’ (Cowell et al.
2008: 4). Interestingly, the use of local companies when developing a
new site is a common approach adopted by many of the large devel-
opers in Spain (Strachan et al. 2010), where they may be asked to sign
pre-approval agreement that guarantees minimal investment in local
companies (CES 2005).
We can conclude from the above discussion that it is difficult to be
prescriptive either about the community, or the range of benefits that
might be available to a local community. Both concepts are somewhat
nebulous and contestable, and this can introduce a degree of confu-
sion both for the developer and local community when considering the
provision of community benefits in the planning process. For example,
on occasions where a wind farm crosses local boundaries, more than one
community benefits fund has been created – one for each community.
There have also been attempts in some national contexts such as the
Netherlands for developers to build a hierarchy of community interests
in facilitating the flow of community benefits. For example, those living
nearest to the development receive discounted electricity, free home
insulation, and financial participation in the project via the issue of
bonds, as well as securing a community fund (van Dortmont 2011).
UK community benefit provision: a case for industry

protocols or government regulation?
Most developers in the UK attempting to foster more positive relation-
ships with local stakeholders now offer community benefit packages,
comprising a range of options echoing those previously outlined by CES
(2005). When analysing the extant published evidence, Cowell et al.
(2008) revealed that the majority of onshore wind farms do provide
some form of community benefits provision, mostly in the form of a
community benefit fund. Their research was undertaken in the national
context of Wales, with limited comparisons across the rest of the UK.
Cowell et al. (2008) outline that community funds are most often in
the form of a financial sum per MW on installed capacity, usually in the
range of £1,000–2,000 per MW, paid on an annual basis by the developer.
The Scottish Government (2010) outlined that the average payment is
actually in the region of £1,700 per annum, with this approximate level
of support also being confirmed by Miner (2009), E.ON (2011a) and
RenewableUK (2011b). Other local actors have been more ambitious,
with the Highland Council aiming to achieve between £4,000–5,000
per annum and Powys County Council £5,000 per annum (Scottish
Borders Council 2010). The Highland Council (2011) states:
Taking current profitability into account, we consider that the level

of community benefit contribution should rise to at least £4,000–
£5,000 per megawatt per annum. The Council has commissioned a
report on the balance between profit and investment associated with
renewable energy development.
Funds typically support a wide range of activities including sporting

and other events, as well as sustainable energy initiatives including
energy conservation and local education. Funds are often managed by
local groups who solicit applications from local interested parties, but
SSE have utilised a charity, the Scottish Community Foundation, to
manage such funds on the behalf of some communities across Scotland
(Mason 2011). In order to off-set or mitigate landscape and habitat
impacts, Cowell et al. (2008) outline that developers can also imple-
ment a range of local measures, from enhancing visitor facilities to
habitat restoration, as well as improving local road networks. These are
also common practices in the Netherlands (van Dortmont 2011), as well
as in Germany, where planning policy demands such ‘environmental
compensation’ (Wilding and Raemaekers 2001).
Unfortunately, the current evidence base beyond studies by

Cowell et al. (2008) and Miner (2009) on wind farm developer prac-
tice is somewhat limited, and there is certainly the need for further
academic research in this area. When preparing this chapter, the
authors contacted a number of leading wind farm developers to
assess further the community provision benefits on offer. All of the
companies approached directed the researchers to their websites and
corporate communication departments. An overview was duly ascer-
tained around the likely community benefits provision on offer by
key developers. Reflecting on the extent to which corporate practice
varies across the wind farm industry, the researchers certainly appre-
ciated the major challenge and difficulty for local communities to
build a transparent picture of what industry practice is across different
projects. This is a problem that the Scottish Government (2010: 16)
has also identified: ‘it is often very difficult for an individual group to
gain a clear understanding of what benefits others may have secured’.
Such asymmetries of information in turn beg questions about the
balance of power.
However, in searching for a common theme, corporate practice typi-
cally follows the approach adopted by major companies like SSE. At
SSE, an established wind farm developer, community benefits provision
packages comprise of three core and important elements:
1. an annual agreed payment, inflation indexed;

2. a bonus paid on the wind farm’s output; and,
3. a further one-off payment, usually paid while the wind farm is being
constructed.
The approach adopted by SSE is a uniform model utilised for each

planned wind farm development. What is clear from the available
evidence around such voluntary models is that the developer, based on
their own internal assessment of likely financial gain, is the principal
agent in shaping the community benefits provision (see also Cowell
et al 2008), rather than any external regulation in the public interest.
Illustrating this point, the Head of Corporate Relations at SSE recently
stated:
The value and condition attached to community benefit funds is

a matter for each developer and is entirely voluntary. It takes into
account the cost of developing and constructing the wind farm, and
the return on this investment. (Mason 2011)
As with any entrepreneurial activity, an additional range of factors

comes into play for developers. Agterbosch (2010) provides an expo-
sition of such factors in the national context of the Netherlands. Such
factors include: (1) the size and structure of the company; (2) risk; and
(3) the firm’s knowledge and record in community wind projects. For
companies such as the big six electricity generators in the UK, the
impact on corporate reputation will also be a major consideration.
On a case-by-case basis, and especially with smaller developers, they
will also undoubtedly have different objectives, with varying degrees
of commitment, to support local communities over a given period.
Some will invest in positive community relations for the long term and
others will have shorter-term ambitions, with all of the aforementioned
factors influencing the overall community benefits package on offer.
So community benefits provision is mainly subject to the discretion of
the developer.
Recognising the controversy surrounding community benefits
provision, and in an attempt to address this across the industry on a
self-regulatory basis, an industry protocol has recently been published
by RenewableUK (2011b). When announcing the launch of protocol
on 16 February 2011, the Chief Executive of Renewable UK, Maria
McCaffery, said:
The wind industry has voluntarily and with the full backing of key
stakeholders and Government, adopted a Protocol setting out what
cash benefits should accrue to communities living near onshore
wind farms. There are a number of ways communities across the UK
benefit economically from onshore wind, both in terms of business
and employment, but community benefits have a special role to play,
as they are distributed according to the wishes of the local commu-
nity itself.
Highlighting again the importance of community provision benefits,

and further the growing importance of the wind industry more gener-
ally, she continues:
Our on-going study of the economic benefits of onshore wind clearly

indicates that the local and regional economy gains over £1 million
per MW during the development and operational cycle of a wind
farm. We also know that our unparalleled wind resource is the best in
Europe and already supplies over 10 per cent of electricity in Scotland
and more than 4 per cent in the UK as a whole. The Protocol, in line
with Government proposals, clearly sets out what every wind farm
in the UK could bring to the local community’s table.
The protocol sets out a minimum payment of £1,000 per MW per annum
during the lifetime of the operation of the wind farm. Unfortunately,
this protocol – and more precisely the level of payment outlined – is
likely to add fuel to the existing community benefits debate. There
have been claims by many local communities that benefits provision is
‘miserly’. For example, in the construction of Gordonbush wind farm
development in Strath Brora, the following quotation from Helmsdale’s
development officer and community council member illustrates the
negative perception of the low £1000 level, considering the potential
profits that could be generated over the lifetime of the wind farm:
The output of the Gordonbush Wind Farm is 72 MW and we can

assume that the revenue will be between £21 and £28 million a year.
That means that the level of community benefit they are offering is
just 0.5 per cent of the profit and that just does not seem fair to me,
particularly when it is being split between four communities. So, yes,
I do think SSE are being miserly. (Mason 2011)
Whilst this chapter was written, SSE rejected an appeal by the local
community to increase the amount of benefit that had been offered. In
response to the criticism, SSE’s Head of Corporate Relations stated:
I have met with representatives from Brora, Golspie and Rogart on

two occasions and with Helmsdale on one occasion, to discuss the
community benefit package that we offer to communities hosting
our wind farms.
At both meetings, the response from most of those present was
very favourable so I was very surprised by the article that appeared in
the 16th December (2010) edition of The Northern Times.
In SSE’s case, community benefit is calculated on exactly the same
basis for each development and comprises an annual guaranteed
payment, a bonus based on the wind farm’s output, and an addi-
tional one-off payment usually paid whilst the wind farm is being
built.
Based on this model, the communities eligible to apply for funding
linked to the Gordonbush Wind Farm are due to benefit from
over £400,000 of funding in the first year alone and from annual
payments estimated to be equivalent to in the region of £180,000
every year for the following 24 years. In total, the community should
receive almost £5 million. (Mason 2011)
At the moment this voluntary industry protocol only applies in

England, with the Welsh and Irish versions of the protocol to be
launched later in 2011. In contrast, the Scottish Government is
currently consulting on its own proposals, and as part of the consul-
tation document the Scottish Government has indicated that it is
committed to maximising community benefit provision, and creating
a register of community ‘benefits’ and considering wherever or not to
place this on a statutory basis (Scottish Government 2010). In light of
the recently published responses (May 2011) to the aforementioned
Scottish Government consultation document there is some support
for the development of a community register. Helmsdale District
Development Group (2011) said:
Yes and this should include a definite rate of benefit. Currently

in Highlands Region the recommendation by Highland Regional
Council (HRC) is £5,000 per MW while developers are offering a
mere £1000 to £2000. If this was part of the planning stage we might
get a fairer more honest figure.
The consistency issue appears to be of some concern, with the Scottish

Government (2010: 16) outlining the problem as follows:
Some communities are perceived to have benefited handsomely.

Others are perceived to have accrued lower levels of benefit. Yet it
is often very difficult for an individual group to gain a clear under-
standing of what benefits others may have secured.
UK community benefit provision and the planning process

The existing national policy guidance and local planning structure on
renewable energy is not helpful to the community in at least negoti-
ating a ‘fair’ outcome, as community benefits have an awkward status
within the British planning system. As the Scottish Borders Council
(2010: 4) state:
Community benefits are voluntary contributions (either of cash or

in-kind) donated by wind farm developers/operators to communities
usually within the vicinity of wind farm developments. There is no
legal or planning requirement for developers to provide community

benefits associated with wind farm development, it is purely a good-
will gesture.
The offer or availability of a community benefit must not influ-
ence the determination of a planning application which must be
determined on its planning merits and against prevailing policy. The
provision of community benefits will not be a relevant matter for
inclusion in a planning condition or legal agreement associated with
the granting of planning permission.
Planning Officers and Elected Members involved in the determi-
nation of wind farm planning applications are not involved in any
aspect of the negotiation of community benefits.
Cowell et al. (2008) as well as Miner (2009) outline that what is of

legitimate concern to planning is the locational, design and environ-
mental impact criteria under which the proposed development might
be acceptable, balanced against national renewable energy targets. In
theory, community benefits ought not to be considered as part of the
planning decision, although it is difficult to expunge such factors from
the minds of local decision-makers. Although central government has
intervened to give some endorsement to the provision of community
benefits, it also generally seeks to police the line that such benefits must
be considered separately from planning matters (see, for example, WAG
2005). The risk of bringing planning into disrepute has not gone away.
Miner (2009: 537), for example, has stated:
A growing number of rural communities are being offered ‘good-

will payments’ by wind energy developers, particularly large multi-
nationals such as E.ON and npower. These payments could easily be
seen as akin to ‘buying’ planning permission. The practice threatens
to bring the planning system into disrepute.
This presents a certain irony, given that the intended purpose of the
provision of community benefit funds is to build trust and fairness –
and thereby improve the general acceptability of developer proposals –
rather than to act as an additional source of tension. As well as being
contentious from a developer and local community perspective,
providing benefit packages can also be contentious where they are seen
to influence unduly the decision-making process. Published responses
to the aforementioned Scottish Government consultation document of
May 2011 indicate that there would be some support by major developers
to include community benefits provision in the planning process. For

example, Scottish Power Renewables (2011) said:
We support the principle of community benefit being considered as

a ‘material consideration’ within the planning process. This would
make the potentially difficult discussions that are made during the
development process more transparent and engaged with the local
community. We feel that this would be an inevitable consequence of
any move towards compulsion by the Scottish Government for the
delivery of community benefit.
E.ON (2011b) also stated:
We support a policy that would enable community benefits to play

a role in the process for determining a planning application. This
will enable a more informed decision to be taken, by including all
relevant costs and benefits within the normal planning equation.
Clashing time frames can also be a problem. While developer and local
community interaction commences early in the project management
process (often comprising of a series of public meetings, exhibitions,
and a range of other similar display related activities), the commu-
nity benefits package is often not considered until later in the process.
Having conducted extensive research in this area during the last six
years, it is has emerged that this situation has often resulted in claims
by local communities that ‘developers are buying consent’, or claims by
developers that they are ‘being held to ransom’ by some ‘unreasonable’
sections of the local community.
In our extensive interactions with the planning process in recent
years, the modus operandi of planning officials varies considerably
across the UK, with some council planning officers actively engaging in
discussions regarding community benefits, while planning officers in
other councils refuse to discuss the issue, at least in public. This can add
further confusion to local community–developer interaction, and this
of course can be unhelpful, especially for developers operating across
the UK. It is perhaps interesting to note that in those local authorities
that have more formal processes for considering community benefit
provision tend to result in more favourable financial outcomes for the
local community. Miner (2009: 537) states:
Local authorities that use more formal processes of negotiation

with developers, such as Argyll and Bute and Highland Councils in
Scotland, are typically securing at least £2,000 per MW of installed

capacity in their respective areas.
The current picture as outlined above is confusing to both the local

community and the developer. Assuming that we see no great upswing
in community ownership of wind power facilities in the UK, there
remains a need to address the ‘legitimacy’ of existing community
benefit funds. This is very important, given that community benefits
provision is not a small issue – certainly in terms of the monetary value
of the benefit paid to the local community – and is likely to increase as
the scale of onshore wind farms grows. For example:
SSE is also committed to a community fund to enable local commu-

nities to benefit from the development of the wind farm. Discussions
with regard to the provision and management of these funds, which
are expected to be around £1m a year and centre on a long-term
education and skills programme, are currently taking place with
South Lanarkshire Council and other representatives of the local
community. (SSE 2011)
It may be of interest to the reader that the wind farm in question – a

456 MW project when consented in 2008 – was named ‘Clyde’, and on
full completion it will be the largest onshore wind farm in Europe.
Conclusion: lessons and policy recommendation
Specific and important lessons that can be drawn from the interna-
tional experience of wind power deployment around the world over the
last four decades relate to the role of financial support mechanisms and
to the role that local or community ownership can play in enhancing
the delivery and social acceptability of wind power. But in the absence
of such ownership in the UK, there has been an increasing focus on
community benefit funds, as one device for fostering more positive rela-
tionships between local communities and developers.
In the current planning process, however, one can conclude that
community benefit funds are only playing a very small part in winning
wider community acceptance of wind farm developments and helping
developers secure planning consents. Indeed, the current system within
which community benefits provision is agreed might be an additional
source of tension or frustration for both the developer and local commu-
nity alike, and this is likely to continue until a more radical approach
is taken. Thus one very important policy recommendation arising from
this chapter is that current national policy and local planning guid-
ance should be revised to incorporate a more robust and systematic
consideration of community benefits packages and high mandatory
levels of payment offered by wind farm developers, and indeed by those
proposing other forms of large-scale renewable energy facility. While
the policy recommendation outlined above would raise significant
issues for planning law – and this would also need to be addressed –
an important effect of such a change in current policy and practice
could be to foster better relationships between local communities and
developers in securing national renewable power targets.
Finally, in addition to fostering better relationships between local
communities and developers, such a change to planning would also
ensure that UK society more widely participates in the transition
towards a low carbon economy. By owning or sharing a stake in renew-
able energy projects, or debating how community benefit streams
might best be invested, society can contribute to and be involved in
setting sustainability goals more generally. Such an approach would
align well with the Conservative and Liberal Democratic Coalition
Agreement to empower local communities on ‘localism’ and building
the ‘Big Society’ and could be rolled out across a range of other renew-
able energy technologies in meeting UK 2020 targets.
References
Agterbosch, S. (2010) ‘The wind-power market in the Netherlands: assessing the
performance of wind cooperatives’, in P. A. Strachan, D. Toke and D. Lal (eds)
Wind Power and Power Politics: International Perspectives, pp. 59–85, Routledge:
New York.
Breukers, S. and Wolsink, M. (2007) ‘Wind power implementation in changing
institutional landscapes: an international comparison’, Energy Policy, 35: 5,
2737–2750.
Cass, N., Walker, G. and Devine-Wright, P. (2010) ‘Good neighbours, public rela-
tions and bribes: the politics and perceptions of community benefit provision
in renewable energy development in the UK’, Journal of Environmental Policy
and Planning, 12: 3, 255–275.
CES (Centre for Sustainable Energy) (2005) Community Benefits From Wind
Power: A Study of UK Practice and Comparison with Leading European Countries,
report to the Renewables Advisory Board and the DTI, 05/1322, Crown
Copyright.
Cowell, R., Bristow, G. and Munday, M. (2011) ‘Acceptance, acceptability
and environmental justice: the role of community benefits in wind energy
development’, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management , 54: 4,
539–557.
Cowell, R., Bristow, G., Munday, M., Strachan, P. (2008) Wind Farm Development
in Wales: Assessing the Community Benefits, A Research Project for the Welsh
Assembly Government (WAG) Cardiff: WAG.
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change) (2010) Electricity Market
Reform Consultation Document,
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/Consultations/emr/1041-electricity-market
-reform-condoc.pdf, accessed on 1 July 2011.
Devine-Wright, P. (2010) Renewable Energy and the Public: From NIMBY to
Participation, London: EarthScan.
Dinica, V. (2010) ‘Corporate interests and Spanish wind-power deployment’,
in P. A., Strachan, D., Toke and D. Lal (eds) Wind Power and Power Politics:
International Perspectives, pp. 86–111, New York: Routledge.
Ellis, G., Cowell, R., Warren, R., Strachan, P. A. and, Szarka, J. (2009) ‘Expanding
wind power: a problem of planning or of perception?’, Planning Theory and
Practice, 10: 4, 523–532.
E.ON (2011a) ‘Community benefits fund’, http://www.eon-uk.com/generation
/2233.aspx, accessed on 1 July 2011.
E.ON (2011b) Securing the Benefits of Scotland’s Next Energy Revolution: Consultation
Reponses, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/05/09115138/1, accessed
1 July 2011.
Helmsdale District Development Group (2011) Securing the Benefits of Scotland’s
Next Energy Revolution: Consultation Reponses, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/
Publications/2011/05/09115138/1, accessed on 1 July 2011.
Highland Council (2011) ‘The council’s policy on community benefit’, http:
//www.highland.gov.uk/livinghere/communityplanning/communitybenefit/,
HM Government (2010) The Coalition: Our Programme for Government, London:
Cabinet Office.
Kamp, L. M, (2010) ‘The development of wind power in the Netherlands and
Denmark: the impact of different innovation strategies’, in P. A. Strachan,
D. Toke and D. Lal (eds) Wind Power and Power Politics: International Perspectives,
pp. 168–182, New York: Routledge.
Mason, D. (2011) ‘Scottish and Southern has rejected an appeal’, http://www.
helmsdale.org/news/2011/01/21/092959.html, accessed on 1 July 2011.
Palgrave.
Mitchell, C. and P. Connor (2004) ‘Renewable energy policy in the UK,
1990–2003’, Energy Policy, 32: 17, 1935–1947.
Miner, P. (2009) ‘Wind farms: more respectful and open debate needed, not less’,
Planning Theory and Practice, 10: 4, 535–538.
Moragues-Faus, A. and Ortiz-Miranda, D. (2010) ‘Local mobilisation against
wind farm developments in Spanish rural areas: new actors in the regulation
arena’, Energy Policy, 38: 8, 4232–4240.
Munday, M., Bristow, G. and Cowell R. (2011) ‘Wind farms in rural areas: how
far do community benefits from wind farms represent a local economic devel-
opment opportunity?’, Journal of Rural Studies, 27: 1, 1–12.
RenewableUK (2011a) ‘Wind farms in the UK’, http://www.bwea.com/, accessed
on 1 February 2011.
RenewableUK (2011b) ‘‘Windfall from wind farms’ – protocol agreed by industry’,

http://www.bwea.com/media/news/articles/pr20110216.html, accessed on
1 July 2011.
Scottish Borders Council (2010) Achieving Community Benefits from Commercial
Windfarms in the Scottish Borders: A Toolkit for Communities and Local Windfarm
Developers, http://www.scotborders.gov.uk/pdf/20890.pdf, accessed on 1 July
2011.
Scottish Government (2010) Securing the Benefits of Scotland’s Next Energy
Revolution, Crown Copyright.
Scottish Power Renewables (2011) Securing the Benefits of Scotland’s Next
Energy Revolution: Consultation Reponses, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/
Publications/2011/05/09115138/1, accessed on 1 July 2011.
SSE (Scottish and Southern Energy) (2011) ‘Consent secured for largest onshore
wind farm in Europe’, http://www.scottishsouthern.co.uk/SSEInternet
/index.aspx?id=14666&TierSlicer1_TSMenuTargetID=1364&TierSlicer1_
TSMenuTargetType=1&TierSlicer1_TSMenuID=6, accessed on 1 July 2011.
Stenzel, T. and Frenzel, A. (2008) ‘Regulating technological change – the stra-
tegic reactions of utility companies towards subsidy policies in German,
Spanish and UK electricity markets’, Energy Policy, 36: 7, 2645–2657.
Strachan, P. A. and Lal, D. (2004) ‘Wind energy policy, planning and manage-
ment practice in the UK: hot air or a gathering storm?’, Regional Studies, 38:
5, 551–571.
Strachan, P. A. and Lal, D. (2005) ‘UK wind energy policy: blowing away public
opposition’, Scottish Planning and Environmental Law (SPEL), 112, 28–32.
Strachan, P. A., Toke, D. and Lal, D. (2010) ‘Assessing national patterns of wind
ownership’, in P. A. Strachan, D. Toke and D. Lal (eds) Wind Power and Power
Politics: International Perspectives, pp. 1–17, New York: Routledge.
Palgrave.
Szarka, J. (2010) ‘Bringing interests back in: using coalition theories to explain
European wind power policies’, Journal of European Public Policy, 17: 6,
836–853.
Tanzler, D. (2010) ‘Gone with the wind? Prospects of community-owned wind
energy in the United States’, in P. A. Strachan, D. Toke and D. Lal (eds) Wind
Power and Power Politics: International Perspectives, pp. 168–182, New York:
Routledge.
Toke, D. (2002) ‘Wind power in the UK: can rational choice help explain different
outcomes?’, Environmental Politics, 11: 4, 83–100.
Toke, D. (2011) ‘UK EMR – nuclear funding from thin air?’, Renewable Energy
Focus, March/April, 24–25.
Toke, D. and Strachan, P. A. (2006) ‘Ecological modernisation and wind power
in the UK’, European Environment, 16: 3, 155– 166.
Van Dortmont, T. (2011) ‘Social acceptance in the Wieringermer project: a devel-
oper’s view’, Nuon (a Vattenfall Company) Presentation.
WAG (Welsh Assembly Government) (2005) Technical Advice Note 8: Planning for
Renewable Energy, July, Cardiff: WAG.
Walker, G. (2008) ‘What are the barriers and incentives for community owned
means of energy production and use?’, Energy Policy, 36: 12, 4401–4405.
Walker, G., Devine-Wright, P., Hunter, S., High, H. and Evans, B. (2010) ‘Trust
and community: exploring the meanings, contexts, and dynamics of commu-
nity renewable’, Energy Policy, 38: 6, 2655–2666.
Wilding, S. and Raemaekers, J. (2000) ‘Environmental compensation: can the
British planning regime learn from Germany?’, Planning Theory and Practice,
1: 2, 187–201.
10
Fostering Public Engagement
in Wind Energy Development:
The Role of Intermediaries and
Community Benefits
Patrick Devine-Wright
Introduction
In land-use planning, how developers engage with local residents is

a crucial element in shaping public acceptance of large-scale renew-
able energy projects (Devine-Wright 2011). This chapter compares two
UK offshore wind energy projects (Lincs and Gwynt y Mor) that were
associated with contrasting levels of public acceptance. Data from
in-depth interviews with key stakeholders were analysed to inves-
tigate how mechanisms and strategies of community engagement
were constructed and practiced. These reveal the contrasting ways
that development organisations with weak local ties seek to embed
themselves in places affected by development proposals, through the
strategic use of intermediaries and the provision of community bene-
fits. In the Lincs case, which had low levels of public objection, the
developer employed an intermediary early in the consultation process
who can be characterised as playing a locally-based, education-oriented,
‘info-mediary’ (Fischer and Guy 2009) role. By contrast, in the Gwynt y
Mor case that was associated with high levels of public objection,
the developer employed an intermediary following the consultation
process who can be characterised as playing a regionally based, passive,
‘PR’, representative role.
The results suggest that locally based organisations that mediate
between private developers and local actors may lead to wider accep-
tance of project proposals, increasing trust and awareness of project
194
Fostering Public Engagement in Wind Energy Development 195
outcomes. However, such outcomes are by no means guaranteed and it

is questionable whether either of the roles for intermediaries revealed in
this study address substantive issues of sustainable development, notably
common presumptions of information deficits held by publics and
power inequalities between actors. It is concluded that further research
is required to better understand the roles played by intermediaries in
public engagement with renewable energy projects, and particularly in
cases where an intermediary is employed by local residents to negotiate
with development organisations.
Offshore wind and community engagement
The rapid expansion of offshore wind energy is a crucial element of UK

government aims to increase the proportion of energy derived from
renewable sources to 30 per cent by 2020. This ambitious goal is part
of a wider programme of transition to ensure that carbon emissions for
the year 2050 are at least 80 per cent lower than in 1990, the baseline
year set by the Climate Change Act 2008 (Department of Energy and
Climate Change 2009). Since the seabed out to a distance of 12 nautical
miles is under the control of the Crown Estate, this organisation has
engaged in three rounds of leasing to development companies since
2000, in three ‘strategic areas’ identified by the Government. This has,
in effect, led to the ‘emergence of a new industry’ (Crown Estate 2012)
in which the UK has potentially the largest global market (British Wind
Energy Association 2009). Yet the emergence of offshore wind energy is
by no means occurring only in the UK – wind farms are already planned
or operational off the shores of the US, Spain, Denmark, Norway and
the Netherlands.
Offshore wind energy is notable for the common assumption that
has been made regarding increased social acceptance in comparison to
onshore wind. For example, Farrier commented ‘offshore sites should
suffer much less from the NIMBY (not in my back yard) attitude which
can affect onshore sites’ (1997: 86) and Soderholm, Ek and Pettersen
(2007: 384) presumed a ‘lower risk of public opposition’. Despite such
assumptions, it is by no means clear why deploying wind turbines
offshore will be any less controversial than onshore projects. Arising
from the NIMBY concept, there seems to be an expectation that the
offshore environment will be more socially acceptable due to increased
spatial distance from residential ‘backyards’. Yet empirical studies of
spatial proximity to onshore wind farms have not supported the NIMBY
assumption that the closer you live to a proposed wind farm, the more
you are likely to object (Jones and Eiser 2009). So it is not at all clear as
to why this should be any different in an onshore environment.
In fact, physical proximity may be a particularly unhelpful way of
thinking about the determinants of public acceptance towards offshore
developments. Coastal locations are where many people choose to
live (50 per cent of the world’s population, according to Glaeser 2004).
The view from the coast out towards the horizon is as much a part
of experiencing the coast as any physical characteristics of the shore-
line itself, and an attractive aspect of living or visiting there. This is a
point often overlooked – coastal places do not cease at the water’s edge,
but also comprise the view out to sea, and the sea and its meanings
can contribute an important element to the sense of place in many
coastal towns. Indeed, the presumption of a horizontal vista of sea to
horizon with the absence of vertical objects is recorded in works of
fiction – ‘at the seaside all is narrow horizontals, the world reduced to a
few long straight lines pressed between earth and sky’ (Banville 2005).
More telling is the point made by Henderson and colleagues that the
key to judging the acceptability of offshore projects is to examine how
turbines might be interpreted to ‘fit’ into an ‘otherwise structureless
landscape’ (2002: 17).
Up until very recently, little research had been conducted on public
acceptance of offshore wind energy (Henderson 2002). That situation is
beginning to change, although the research literature is still far smaller
in comparison to that for onshore wind. Ellis and colleagues investi-
gated responses to a project proposed off the coast of Northern Ireland
using q-methodology, involving participants sorting a series of state-
ments in relation to each other (Ellis, Barry and Robinson 2007). Their
study has two important findings. First, levels of objection were strong,
clearly indicating that offshore wind energy is not necessarily any less
controversial than onshore. Second, their results revealed the heteroge-
neous nature of both supporting and objecting arguments. Their results
revealed four different ‘idealised discourses’ of support (rationalising
globally/sacrificing locally; local pastoralist/developer sceptic; embrace
wind; and site-specific supporter/energy pragmatist) and four ‘idealised
discourses’ of objection (anti-wind/local resister; wind supporter/siting
sheriff; anti-developer/local pragmatist; and economic sceptic/siting
compromiser). These discourses are founded upon three key themes
that underlie both supporting and objecting positions: (1) local/global:
how ‘local’ impacts of a project are interpreted and valued (reflected in
discourses of local sacrifice, siting sheriff and local pragmatist), both in
isolation and in relation to the ‘global’; (2) levels of trust or scepticism
towards the developer (e.g. ‘developer sceptic’ and ‘anti-developer’);

(3) beliefs about the technology (anti-wind or embrace wind). In sum,
these three underlying themes, as well as the eight observed discourses,
demonstrate the complexity and multiplicity of arguments that featured
in the course of the debate, and in doing so provide further evidence of
the shortcomings of ‘NIMBY’ presumptions about objection.
The importance of ‘the local’ in explaining public acceptance of
offshore wind energy has also been shown by Gee (2010) who revealed
how the concept of heimat, that is a sense of home or rootedness, played
a role in shaping local residents opinions of offshore wind projects
in Germany. Similar findings were produced by Devine-Wright and
Howes (2010) in their study of disruption to place attachment caused
by offshore wind project proposals in North Wales, and in a series of
studies in the US by Kempton and colleagues (e.g. Kempton et al. 2005;
Firestone and Kempton 2007; 2009). Firestone (2011: 236–237), for
example, noted that ‘individuals appear to feel differently about, and
have greater attachment to, semi-enclosed seas (bays and sounds) than
they do to the open ocean’, as well as how opposition was linked to
whether an offshore site was represented as a ‘special place that should
be kept natural and free from human intrusion’ (Kempton et al. 2005:
119). The local/global relation is also suggested by findings concerning
how public acceptance can be contingent upon the scale of develop-
ment proposed. Kempton et al. (2005) found that support for an offshore
wind energy project increased if it was viewed as the first of many to be
constructed in the area. This indicates how local responses to a specific
project are embedded in beliefs about wider technical systems of energy
generation and supply that stretch across local, regional and sometimes
national boundaries, and have impacts at the global level in relation to
climate change.
Wolsink (2010) used a questionnaire survey to study the acceptability
of offshore wind power in the Netherlands amongst members of the
Wadden Society – a civic organisation set up in 1995 to campaign for
the protection of the Wadden Sea from development. Corroborating
previous research on place, the findings indicated that acceptance was
location specific – group members were not opposed to all wind energy
development offshore. In fact, great variability existed in relation to 19
different types of location surveyed in the research, with more ‘natural’
ones (e.g. ‘island dunes’, ‘nature area’) being most strongly rejected whilst
more developed ones (e.g. ‘military area’ and ‘industry and harbour’)
were more acceptable. The study usefully distinguishes four ‘types’ of
coastal landscape, which suggest the underlying structure to social
representations of Dutch coastal places, with dimensions of acceptability

(from high to low), developed/natural (what Wolsink called ‘spoilt or
unspoilt’) and proximity to places of residence. Identification of how
coastal places are represented (with associated diversity in acceptability)
could form a valuable element in the early stages of wind farm planning
as it can help industry and environmental groups to reach consensus
about suitable places for future development. Yet as Wolsink makes clear,
‘in the EIA [environmental impact assessment] process, no investigation
was included on the complexities of landscape perceptions’ (Wolsink
2010: 201); as a consequence, a development of 278 MW – what would
have been the largest wind project ever proposed in the Netherlands –
became mired in controversy and was eventually abandoned.
These studies affirm the importance of place, considered multi-dimen-
sionally in terms of topography, symbolic meanings and relationality
(i.e. local/national/global interconnections), in shaping how proposals
for wind energy projects are accepted or objected to. Yet procedural
aspects, such as how decisions are taken and how affected communities
are consulted, are also important factors influencing levels of public
acceptance.
In relation to decision-making for onshore wind, Gross (2007) made
a convincing case that acceptance was contingent not just on local
impacts, but on issues of fairness and equity in decision-making. She
suggested that local residents would be prepared to accept a project that
was considered to have negative local impacts, if the decision was taken
in a way that was just, fair and transparent. Procedural aspects have also
been emphasised in relation to engagement with the public by private
sector instigators of offshore wind projects. Haggett (2008) called for
early engagement, while noting three principal challenges facing the
spatial planning of offshore wind energy. The first concerns the diverse
motives (pragmatic, normative and substantive, Yearley et al. 2003)
that can underlie public engagement activities, indicating how such
engagement may be undertaken for purely strategic reasons, rather than
arising from any ethical commitments towards empowering local citi-
zens. The second concerns the extent, efficacy and equality of public
involvement in wind farm planning, since processes of involvement
may not be as open and influential as they seem or were intended to be.
The third relates to the involvement of ‘local’ people in the planning
process. For offshore projects, designating who and where is precisely
‘local’ is less straightforward than it may be for onshore projects.
As the work of Ellis et al. (2007) revealed, public trust in develop-
ment organisations and decision-making institutions is a factor that
can influence public acceptance of wind energy projects. This accords

with recent research on community based energy. Walker et al. (2010)
argued that trust has a necessary part to play in the contingencies and
dynamics of community renewable energy projects and in the outcomes
they may achieve, pointing to levels of trust amongst local residents
and between local residents and groups that take projects forward. Trust
seems even more likely to play a role in shaping the social acceptance of
private sector led projects, particularly in cases where the developer is a
multi-national company with few local ties.
Intermediaries
In locations where a development company may have weak local
ties, the role of an ‘intermediary’ (or go-between) may be important.
Nooteboom (2007) has suggested that intermediaries can play a role
in fostering public trust in conditions of uncertain outcomes. Van
Lente et al. (2003: 249) argue that ‘traditional’ intermediaries ‘tend
to focus on bilateral relations (knowledge transfer) and the support of
individual organisations’. Recent research has argued for a plurality of
roles that intermediaries can play, including that of bridge-builders,
‘info-mediaries’, advocates, commercial pioneers and regulatory inter-
preters (Fischer and Guy 2009). Hodson and Marvin (2011) described
how intermediaries can play an important role in reconfiguring energy
systems, re-shaping relations between social actors with different
interests. However, the role of intermediaries in public engagement
with renewable energy has received little research attention to date.
Situations of conflict over development projects are often characterised
by the perception of rigid boundaries between ‘the community’ and
an ‘other’ (typically the developer). For example, Dalby and McKenzie
(1997) note how an external threat can be rhetorically deployed to
reinforce the necessity of ‘community’ and to render it homogenous,
despite the presence of disparate and multiple agendas and networks
within ‘the community’. It is therefore an issue of importance for the
literature, yet comparatively neglected to date, to reveal how developers
that are transnational corporations without an obvious local attach-
ment or loyalty, seek to position themselves towards or embed them-
selves within a place of proposed development.
Community benefits
An aspect of public engagement that has become more normative in
wind energy developments in recent years is the provision by devel-
opers of community benefits packages (Cass et al. 2010; Chapter 9 by
Strachan in this volume). While this provision is typically driven by

an instrumental rationale that presumes greater levels of social accep-
tance to flow from benefit provision, there is little evidence to suggest
that this is the case (Cass et al. 2010; Cowell et al. 2011). Drawing on
data collected from interviews with a diverse array of actors (including
developers, local publics, politicians, activists and consultants) and
case studies of renewable energy projects across onshore wind, offshore
wind, bioenergy and marine sectors, Cass et al. (2010) note consider-
able variation in the extent and type of benefits on offer, with the most
common in the onshore wind sector and least common in less mature
sectors such as marine. The study also indicated that benefit provision
was associated by publics with a high degree of ambivalence (reflecting
concerns about perceptions of bribery) and that mechanisms for provi-
sion were problematic in practice. Cowell et al. (2011: 553) also note
that developers have been reluctant to accept regulatory obligations
to distribute benefits to communities, instead preferring to negotiate,
bilaterally, with local ‘affected communities’.
Although the literature on offshore wind is less extensive then
onshore, research to date makes clear that public acceptance is multiply
determined by a range of factors that are likely to vary from case to
case, encompassing beliefs about local impacts, specific technologies,
development organisations (including levels of trust) and procedures
of engagement. Since these factors are stressed to different degrees
by studies adopting a single case research design, with each striving
to capture the particular issues of most importance in each specific
context, there is value in undertaking comparative research that looks
across the particularities of different cases to investigate common
themes. It is also important to emphasise the inter-relatedness of these
multiple factors shaping public acceptance. This was emphasised by
Walker et al. (2011) who advocated a bi-directional, dynamic and inter-
active framework for understanding public engagement with renewable
energy, encompassing on the one hand the methods used by developers
to engage with affected communities (and the conceptions and assump-
tions these are based upon) and the beliefs and responses, including
levels of trust, that ensue from public actors and other stakeholders.
Such a framework suggests that to better understand public acceptance,
research should focus upon the actions and conceptions of developers
instigating renewable energy projects, not just the attitudes or responses
of local residents.
Research has revealed common conceptions held by renewable energy
developers about public actors, particularly objectors. Drawing on a
Race Bark
(consent applied for)
Lincs
(consented)
Inner
Dowing
(operating) Docking Shoal
Skegness (consent applied for)
Lynn
(operating)
h
Wa s
The
Hunstanton
The
10 km Wash
Kings Lynn
Liverpool
Bay
Gwynt y Mor
(conserted) Burbo Bank
(operating)
North Hoyle a y
(operating) o l B
Rhyl Flats r po
ve Liverpool
(consented) Li
Llandudno
R
iv
er
Rhyl
D
ee
Colwyn Bay
10 km
Figure 10.1 Contexts of the two offshore wind energy cases: Lincs and Gwynt y
Mor
Source: Originated by author.
series of interviews, Cass and Walker (2009) indicated how developers

typically viewed objectors as highly emotive actors, and conceived affect
as an unwelcome intrusion in rational planning processes. Research has
also revealed an expectation of an ever present, latent but conditional
hostility by publics towards technologies such as wind turbines, which
was seen to shape the material forms of energy technologies, siting deci-
sions (such as the prevalent move of wind energy offshore) and engage-
ment practices (Walker and Cass 2010).
This literature suggests the benefits to be gained from understanding
public acceptance not solely by investigating psychological processes,
but also by investigating the conceptions and practices of develop-
ment organisations. To further this line of inquiry, this chapter aims
to focus upon some of the ways that UK wind energy developers prac-
tice public engagement in contexts of offshore projects. In terms of
scope and method, the chapter undertakes a comparative analysis of
two cases, contrasting one that was strongly opposed with another that
was predominantly supported. In each case, the wider background of
the project is described before drawing on interview data with project
developers, and associated intermediary actors, to critically assess the
methods used to engage with local residents and what rationales these
were based upon. The research was conducted in the summer of 2008,
prior to each project receiving planning consent.
Case studies
Gwynt y Mor offshore wind farm

The location of this energy project is 13 km off the North Wales coast at
the nearest point to shore, 16 km from the seaside town of Llandudno
(see Figure 10.1). This lies within the north west strategic area iden-
tified by the UK Government for offshore wind farm development.
Prior to this project, the developer had secured planning consent for
two other offshore projects in the same area: North Hoyle, operational
since 2003, was the first large-scale offshore wind farm in the UK, and
Rhyl Flats. Although situated further away from the shoreline, Gwynt
y Mor differs from these in terms of scale. Whilst North Hoyle consists
of thirty 2 MW turbines and Rhyl Flats consists of twenty-five 3.6 MW
turbines, Gwynt y Mor will consist of an estimated one hundred and
sixty 3.6 MW turbines that is expected to produce 576 MW of power
(RWE npower renewables 2011). The project proposal was submitted
in 2005 and immediately met with opposition, both from statutory
consultees such as local authorities and from a civic group (Save our
Scenery) set up by residents of the town of Llandudno (a town reliant
upon tourist income for the local economy) to oppose the project.
As a result, the developer submitted supplementary environmental
assessment information in July 2007, which included findings of new
research into environmental impacts and a revised layout. Despite a
continuation of local objection, the project was granted consent by the
Department of Energy and Climate Change in December 2008 and is
due to become operational by 2014 (RWE npower renewables 2011).
Lincs offshore wind farm

The Lincs project is located in the Greater Wash area, 8 kms off the
coast of Skegness, Lincolnshire, which is another of the three strategic
areas designated by the UK Government in 2002 for offshore wind
farm development (see Figure 10.1). Similarly to Gwynt y Mor, the
company that proposed the Lincs project has already developed two
other wind farms in the area – Lynn and Inner Dowsing (consisting
of a total of 194 MW, involving fifty-four 3.6MW turbines), which
became operational in 2009, located between 5 and 9 kms from the
shore. In addition to these and to the Lincs project, the developer has
proposed two further projects in the same area but further out to sea –
Docking Shoal (approx. 540 MW) and Race Bank (approx. 620 MW).
An application for consent for Lincs offshore wind farm was submitted
to the Government in January 2007 and consented in October 2008.
The Lincs offshore wind farm consists of seventy five 3.6 MW turbines
expected to produce 270 MW (Centrica 2011). Although the proposal
met with some local concern (e.g. Norfolk County Council submitted
a report recommending opposition to the scheme on the ground of
uncertain cumulative adverse effects), and despite the fact that the
nearby town of Skegness is reliant upon tourist income for the local
economy, there has been no major public opposition to the wind
farm and no local action group was set up to campaign against the
proposal.
Data was collected regarding both projects in 2008, involving
multiple methods including interviews with key stakeholders (e.g.
the developer, representatives of the local authority and a local action
group, if present), group discussions with local residents and a survey
questionnaire of residents in each location. Data from the stakeholder
interviews are primarily drawn on here. For findings derived from other
data sources, see Devine-Wright and Howes (2010).
Strategies of engagement with the public

employed by each developer
Both developers employed similar mechanisms to consult local resi-

dents about the projects, including a project website, distributing
leaflets to local libraries and town halls, putting on public exhibi-
tions, placing advertisements in local papers, issuing press releases and
commissioning survey research to capture local/tourist opinions about
the proposal. In this sense, engagement, at least in terms of information
provision to local residents, was extensive and similar across the cases.
It was also undertaken early in the development process in each case –
the exhibitions were held prior to the submission of planning applica-
tions. Thus with a focus on information provision at least, the actions
of the developers accords with Haggett’s (2008) call for early and exten-
sive public engagement. However, despite these similarities, differences
were apparent in how they employed local individuals in each locality,
and in their provision of financial benefits.
The use of intermediaries

In the case of Gwynt y Mor, the developer was a German company with
a UK headquarters in the south east of England. During the consultation
process, it employed a public relations company based in the Liverpool
area to run the public exhibitions on their behalf, and following this
phase of engagement retained one of the staff ‘in that area’:
She is now working out of the Wirral [an area near Liverpool], she’s
obviously very much in that area and the advice that she’s on the
ground to help us with things. And she picks up all of our, we have
media subscriptions to lots of the local papers, so she does all our
media answering for us, and sends through articles so that we’re
constantly aware of the issues and what’s going on up there, and
keeping a track of it.
This suggests a predominantly monitoring or listening role played by

this individual in the locality of the proposed wind farm, observing
local media reports and feeding back information to the company
about local opinion and activities. The person was regionally rather
than locally based – she did not live in either of the two coastal towns
directly affected by the proposed wind farm (Llandudno and Colwyn
Bay, see Devine-Wright and Howes 2010), and there is little suggestion
that she was encouraged by the development company to play active
‘bridge-builder’ or ‘advocate’ roles (Fishcher and Guy 2009) with local

actors. By contrast, the developer of the Lincs project, a UK company
based in the south east of England, revealed a different approach,
arising from a strong emphasis upon education as an element of public
engagement:
We recruited a local teacher to go into schools, initially just to talk

about wind so that the youngsters knew exactly what was happening
off their coastlines ... But we’ve now rolled that out with a series of
workshops this year, which is a little bit about wind, but it’s picking
up the wider issues of renewables, sustainability, what you can do in
your own home, you know, how youngsters can change the way they
live ... And the idea was to sort of promote that sort of ... you know,
we’re not going in there with heavily branded messages, we’re going
in there saying, well, this is what’s happening in your community.
It’s part of a broader picture.
The individual in the Lincs case played a more active role in the commu-
nity in comparison to Gwynt y Mor. This active role was framed as an
‘educational’ intervention, targeted at children, delivered by a locally
resident ex-school teacher and designed to complement the national
curriculum. However, aside from these broader aims, it was also clearly
intended to increase awareness of the specific wind farms due to be
constructed by the developer offshore, and the materials produced by
the intermediary were branded with both the logos of the interme-
diary and the developer. For this reason, the Lincs intermediary seems
closest to the ‘info-mediary’ role outlined by Fischer and Guy (2009).
When interviewed, the individual attempted to position herself at some
distance from the developer:
I sit on the fence when it comes to wind turbines and I have always
agreed with the developer that [I do not work for them, but] on
behalf of them, that I’m not necessarily pro wind farms. So I keep a
very open view and I think that people appreciate that.
By distinguishing between working ‘for’ and ‘on behalf of’ the developer,
and by adopting a ‘neutral’ stance in relation to the wind farm proposals,
the local teacher effectively distinguished between two contrasting
intermediary roles: as a representative of the developer to the commu-
nity and as an intermediary between the developer and the community.
This distinction was made with the aim of avoiding accusations of bias
from local people, and seeking to preserve some professional integrity

as an educationalist. As someone who may be personally encountered
in Skegness, not just visiting schools but living in the town, the teacher
was in a very different position from the intermediary employed by the
developer of Gwynt y Mor. She was in a stronger position to act as a
local advocate of the technology type, the project and the development
organisation, fostering positive general attitudes towards wind energy,
one of the determinants of positive attitudes towards specific proposals
(Jones and Eiser 2009). That said, her positioning was towards the
community on behalf of the developer; there is no sense that she also
sought to mediate on behalf of the community towards the developer.
Her role was also spatially restricted – she did not seek to engage with
schools in the Norfolk towns also engaged with by the developer, specif-
ically Kings Lynn and Hunstanton (see Figure 10.1); indeed as a whole,
the company engaged more directly with Lincolnshire based residents
and stakeholders in comparison to those in Norfolk, suggesting that
their engagement was cumulative – continuing earlier forms of engage-
ment put into place concerning the Lynn and Inner Dowsing projects
rather than seeking to modify this strategy in a spatial sense.
Similar to the Gwynt y Mor case, the intermediary for the Lincs
project also played a monitoring role for the developer. Having taught
the children in local schools, she was frequently greeted by them in
places such as local supermarkets, alongside their parents. Furthermore,
she walked her dog each day on the beach opposite where construc-
tion of the Lynn and Inner Dowsing offshore wind farms was taking
place. Since her association with the developer was well known, she was
able to interact with local people face-to-face, answering their questions
about the offshore wind farms, or forwarding them to the developer.
Aside from seeking to distance herself from the developer, the Lincs’
intermediary also attempted to clarify her educational role:
It’s about trying to change attitudes ... it wasn’t a publicity stunt, in

my opinion. It was a genuine thing of trying to get people to under-
stand renewables and sustainability. Whereas there’s some compa-
nies I wouldn’t work for, because I know it’s just a PR stunt ... . The
people they employ are not educators. They’re often PR people.
This is an attempt to bolster her integrity as an educationalist by

rhetorically contrasting diverse forms of engagement (public relations
involving ‘stunts’ and educators that attempt to increase public under-
standings) and presenting them as mutually exclusive. However, even the
educator intermediary role suggests a predominant ‘information deficit’

(Owens 2000) approach to public engagement, offering education as a
de facto public good and therefore overlooking other aspects of sustain-
able development such as local empowerment and environmental justice
(Blake, 1999) as well as political inequities between developers and local
residents that might be challenged by intermediaries playing more of a
‘bridge-builder’ role or even acting purely on behalf of local residents.
The provision of financial benefits

A second aspect of engagement with the public to be examined concerns
the provision of financial benefits. For Gwynt y Mor, the developer
positioned itself as an industry leader, employing a member of staff
within the PR team solely responsible for community benefits across
the company:
We do actually have, as of April last year, a dedicated community

benefits officer now working for us, which wouldn’t surprise me if
she’s actually the only one in the industry perhaps.
However, supporting Haggett’s remarks about the ambiguous ‘locality’

of offshore wind energy (2008), providing benefits proved difficult for
the developer due to the size of this project, which greatly increased the
numbers of communities potentially affected by the development:
Even internally we were quite challenged to think about how we

were going to do it, because, the nature of our consultation area was
the whole of North Wales, that’s obviously a very big area. And we
were thinking how can we deliver a benefit which is meaningful
across such a large area?
The issue of timing was also a challenge – details could not be easily
communicated to local residents, since these would not be known
with any certainty until the project became operational, and because
of the status of community benefit packages outside of UK planning
procedures:
People say, what are you going to offer us? And we’re like, well, we
want to offer you something, but we’re not quite sure what it’s going
to be, so it’s proving to be quite a challenge, so really it’s, it’s a stage
of us having discussions with key stakeholders locally to just ask
them, give, give us some ideas, because we’re a little bit stuck.
Being unable to provide the level of detail residents sought on benefits

raised the prospect of local perceptions of bribery, a main reason for
ambivalence identified by Cass et al. (2010):
It’s tricky because we don’t, partly because we don’t have the

information, partly because we don’t want it to be seen as being some
kind of bribe or something to go in because it’s not part of the plan-
ning considerations so on the one hand you’re trying to tell people
there’s something in it for them at the local level, on the other hand
you’re saying but you’re not supposed to consider this as part of any
of your decisions so try not to.
By contrast, the developer of the Lincs project did not offer a formal bene-
fits package, recognising the same challenges in identifying communi-
ties affected by an offshore development. Instead, the approach taken
was to proactively identify stakeholders in Lincolnshire generally and
Skegness particularly that they wished to engage with, and find related
activities or facilities that might require funding support:
When you get offshore, it’s a lot more difficult to that, just to work
out, in a sense, which communities, or to an extent you may be
having an impact on communities. So with the offshore works we’ve
been a lot more proactive in going into those communities prior to
the consenting process, or during the consenting process, and we’ve
identified various key stakeholders, various projects in those areas,
which are supported.
This approach had the benefit of early timing – it was implementable

before the Lincs project became operational (something that was clearly
delaying the developer of Gwynt y Mor) – and therefore could demon-
strate tangible local benefit earlier in the consents process. Since the
Lincs project involved engagement with the same Skegness residents
whom the developer had previously engaged with for the Lynn and
Inner Dowsing projects, it could build upon previous engagement
activities in a more continuous, less project specific manner. Although
the Gwynt y Mor developer also had a previous history of develop-
ment and engagement in the general area of North Wales, these activ-
ities had not focused upon the town of Llandudno specifically where
civic opposition emerged, and therefore could not draw upon previous
benefit provision in a similar manner.
The Lincs developer’s approach to benefit provision involved

identifying suitable local organisations to give funds to:
Lincolnshire Wildlife Trust is one of our important stakeholders,

local stakeholders. They’re not one of the statutory stakeholders, not
one of the bodies that BERR [Government department for Energy]
or the Government will come back to and say, what do you think of
Centrica’s plans? But nevertheless they work very closely with some of
the statutory stakeholders, with people like Natural England, and so
on. So we don’t just concentrate in those statutory areas. We concen-
trate on those sort of stakeholders who matter on the ground.
Funding a project with stakeholders who ‘matter on the ground’

suggests a similar process of positioning the company in the locality
that was observed in the previous section concerning intermediaries. It
suggests that the main criterion for stakeholder identification was the
strategic one of developing good relations with organisations who were
likely to have an influence upon local support for the project proposal.
That this relationship building required strategic action was indicated
by contrasting offshore and onshore energy projects:
We’re going to be ten miles, 12 miles, and even further offshore ... It’s
trying to find some way of reflecting what ... as I say, partly impact,
but it’s really about sort of building those relationships ... With wind
farms, because you’re offshore, we’ve got to maybe look at a bit more
of a structured approach to how we do that. We’ve done it through
the education and the environment links [unclear] and then the
marine links.
The environmental links are provided by the Lincolnshire Wildlife

Trust’s operation of local nature reserve:
To the south of Skegness town centre, there’s a nature reserve, called

Gibraltar point. The area is protected. It’s run by Lincolnshire Wildlife
Trust ... They have a visitors’ centre there, a study centre, which is a
residential study centre, visited by something like 180,000 people
each year ... . I saw it was a synergy there, in the sense that we wanted
to talk about climate change, the importance of addressing that, the
importance of being able to build these projects in an environmen-
tally sensitive way that wouldn’t damage the local environment, and
it just seemed an ideal way of tying up with them. So to date we’ve

probably put something like about £150,000 into there, and we’ve
helped with matched funding.
Since Gibraltar point is a centre for birdwatching, providing support

also linked with one of the chief ecological concerns raised by a statu-
tory consultee, Natural England, about the cumulative impacts of the
offshore wind farms upon migrating pink-footed geese. By funding
the visitor centre, the developer provided a tangible local benefit
that would be observed by those same individuals who may be most
concerned about avian impacts of the Lincs wind farm, since these
birds will likely use the nature reserve as a stopping point before
embarking eastwards.
Concluding remarks
The development of wind energy in the UK is at least in part contin-

gent upon public acceptance. This chapter has made the case that
researching how development organisations engage with the public can
usefully inform our understanding of the determinants of public accep-
tance, which in the past have principally been studied in terms of social
and psychological processes (Devine-Wright 2005). Several studies to
date have affirmed the importance of early public engagement and
identified some of the challenges involved in the provision of financial
benefits (Haggett 2008; Cass and Walker 2009; Walker and Cass 2010;
Cass et al. 2010; Cowell et al. 2011). This chapter sought to extend this
literature by investigating the conceptions and practices of developers
in the specific context of offshore wind energy projects, a compara-
tively under-researched area, comparing two large scale projects, one
controversial, the other not.
The analysis revealed that both offshore wind farms were instigated
by organisations that were large-scale private companies with weak
local ties. Going beyond conventional mechanisms employed to engage
with publics affected by the wind farms, both developers attempted
to locate themselves in the places where the development was to be
constructed, yet in contrasting ways. For Gwynt y Mor, the developer
chose a predominantly passive role, employing an individual, who
had already worked on the public exhibitions about the wind farm, to
monitor local media across a broad regional area. This can be summarily
described as a regionally-embedded, passive ‘PR’, developer-representative
role. By contrast, for Lincs the developer chose to consult an individual
living in Skegness to conduct educational interventions in the town’s

schools. This can be described as a locally-embedded, active ‘education-
alist’, info-mediary role. There is little reason to conclude that the actions
taken for Lincs were anything other than based on a fundamentally
strategic rationale (Yearley et al. 2003) for public engagement. Although
the practice of children’s education may be represented as a normative
act, there is little sense that the actions of this developer, whether in
relation to sponsoring education programmes or funding local wild-
life centres, was anything other than a pragmatic attempt to act the
role of ‘good neighbour’ (Cass et al. 2010) in that place and to that
community.
Future research is required to deepen understanding of the roles
intermediaries play in public engagement with renewable energy,
the spaces they occupy between community and developer and
other stakeholder organisations, and their spatiality in relation to
specific places, towns and regional areas affected by development
proposals. It would be particularly interesting to study the impacts
of intermediaries employed by local residents to act on behalf of ‘the
community’ as a broker in negotiation with energy developers. Given
the degree of controversy associated with the Gwynt y Mor case in
contrast to Lincs, there is at least prima facie evidence that employing
a locally-situated intermediary to play an active role in community
affairs, and distributing benefits to specific stakeholders rather than
to ‘the community’ at large, would seem to represent a strategy more
likely to foster public acceptance of energy project proposals. However,
given the ‘information deficit’ viewpoint (Blake 1999) suggested by
the Lincs educational intervention and the extent of controversies
surrounding large-scale energy generation projects, it is also possible
that such actions could be counter-productive and further entrench
hostility towards particular technologies and development organisa-
tions (as with benefit offers, Cass et al. 2010). To achieve a better
understanding of the conditions that lead to these varied outcomes,
future research is required, not just into the role of intermediaries in
public engagement with offshore wind energy, but with a variety of
renewable energy technologies.
Acknowledgements
To the ‘Beyond Nimbyism’ research project team, survey distributors

and all participants; to the funding agency: Research Councils’ Energy
Programme/Economic and Social Research Council (ref: RES-125–25).
References
Banville, J. (2005) The Sea, London: Picador.
Blake, J. (1999) ‘Overcoming the ‘value-action gap’ in environmental policy:
tensions between national policy and local experience’, Local Environment, 4,
257–278.
British Wind Energy Association (2011) ‘Offshore wind energy: introduction’,
http://www.bwea.com/offshore/info.html, accessed on 20 June 2011.
Cass, N. and Walker, G. (2009) ‘Emotion and rationality: the characterisation
and evaluation of opposition to renewable energy projects’, Emotion, Space and
Society, 2, 62–69.
Centrica (2011) ‘Lincs Offshore Wind Farm’, http://www.centrica.com/index.
asp?pageid=923&project=project5&projectstatus=construction#project5,
accessed on 20 June 2011.
and environmental justice: the role of community benefits in wind power
development’, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management , 54,
539–557.
Crown Estate (2012) ‘Our portfolio’, http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/energy
/offshore-wind-energy/our-portfolio/, accessed on 20 March 2012.
Dalby, S., and Mackenzie, F. (1997) ‘Reconceptualising local community: envi-
ronment, identity and threat’, Area, 29, 99–108.
DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change) (2009) UK Offshore Energy
SEA Environmental Report, London: DECC.
Devine-Wright, P. (2011) ‘Public engagement with large-scale renewable energy:
breaking the NIMBY cycle’, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 2,
19–26.
Devine-Wright, P. and Howes, Y. (2010) ‘Disruption to place attachment and the
protection of restorative environments: a wind energy case study’, Journal of
Environmental Psychology, 30, 271–280.
Ellis, G., Barry, J. and Robinson, C. (2007) ‘Many ways to say ‘no’, different
ways to say ‘yes’: applying Q-methodology to understand public acceptance
of windfarm proposals’, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 50,
517–551
Farrier, D. (1997) ‘Wind energy in the coastal environment – prospects for a
nearshore wind farm off East Anglia’, Marine Environmental Management Review
of 1996 and Future Trends, 4, 85–88.
Firestone, J. (2011) ‘Perceptions and preferences regarding offshore wind–power
in the United States: the leading edge of a new energy source for the Americas’,
in P. Devine-Wright (ed.) Renewable Energy and the Public: From NIMBY to
Participation, pp. 233–244, London: Earthscan.
Firestone, J. and Kempton, W. (2007) ‘Public opinion about large offshore wind
power: underlying factors’, Energy Policy, 35, 1584–1598.
Firestone, J., Kempton, W. and Krueger, A. (2009) ‘Public acceptance of offshore
wind power projects in the United States’, Wind Energy, 12, 183–202.
Fischer, J. and Guy, S. (2009) ‘Re-interpreting Regulations: architects as
intermediaries for low-carbon buildings’, Urban Studies, 46, 2577–2594.
Gee, K. (2010) ‘Offshore wind power development as affected by seascape values
on the German North Sea coast’, Land Use Policy, 27, 185–194.
Glaeser, B. (2004) ‘Social science responses to new challenges for the coast’, in
G. Schernewski and T. Dolch (eds) Geographie der Meere und Kusten Coastal
Futures I, London and Berlin: Springer.
Gonzalez, M. I. and B. Estevez (2005) ‘Participation, communication and nego-
tiation in environmental conflicts: offshore wind energy in the Trafalgar Sea
area’, Arbor-Ciencia Pensamiento Y Cultura, 181, 377–392.
acceptance’, Energy Policy, 35, 2727–2736.
politics and public perception of offshore wind farms’, Journal of Environmental
Policy and Planning, 10, 289–306.
Henderson, A. R., Morgan, C., Smith, B., Sorensen, H., Barthelmie, R. and
Boesmans, B. (2002) ‘Offshore windpower: a major new source of energy for
Europe’, International Journal of Environment and Sustainable Development, 1,
356–369.
Henderson, A. R. (2002) ‘Offshore wind in Europe: the current state of the art’,
Renewable Energy Focus, March/April, 14–17.
Hodson, M. and Marvin, S. (2011) ‘Governing the reconfiguration of energy
in Greater London: practical public engagement as “delivery”’, in P. Devine-
Wright (ed.) Renewable Energy and the Public: From NIMBY to Participation,
pp. 89–100, London: Earthscan.
Jones, C. and Eiser, J. R. (2009) ‘Understanding “local” opposition to wind devel-
opment in the UK: how big is a backyard?’, Energy Policy, 37, 4604–4614.
Kempton, W., Firestone, J., Lilley, J., Rouleau, T. and Whitaker, P. (2005) ‘The
offshore wind power debate: views from Cape Cod’, Coastal Management, 33,
119–149.
Lente, H. van, Hekkert, M., Smits, R. and Waveren, B. van (2003) ‘Roles of
systemic intermediaries in transition processes’, International Journal of
Innovation Management, 7, 247–279.
Nooteboom, B. (2007) ‘Social capital, institutions and trust’, Review of Social
Economy, 65, 29–53.
The Guardian (2009) ‘Offshore wind farms could meet a quarter of the UK’s
electricity needs’, 25 June, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009
/jun/25/offshore-wind-uk-homes, accessed on 20 June 2011.
RWE npower renewables (2011) Gwynt y Mor Offshore Wind Farm, Project
Components, http://www.rwe.com/web/cms/en/306636/rwe-npower-renew-
ables/sites/projects-in-construction/wind/gwynt-y-mr-offshore-wind-farm
/project-components/, accessed on 17 June 2011.
Soderholm, P., Ek, K. and Pettersen, M. (2007) ‘Wind power deployment in
Sweden: global policies and local obstacles’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy
Reviews, 11, 365–400.
Tong, K. C. (1998) ‘Technical and economic aspects of a floating offshore
wind farm’, Journal of Wind Engineering and Industrial Aerodynamics, 74–76,
399–410.
Webb, T. (2006) ‘Offshore wind farms blown off schedule by two years’, The
Independent, 16 April 2007, accessed from http://www.independent.co.uk
/news/business/news/offshore-wind-farms-blown-off-schedule-by-two-years-
474271.html, accessed on 20 June 2011.
Walker G., Cass, N., Burningham, K. and Barnett, J. (2010) ‘Renewable energy
and sociotechnical change: imagined subjectivities of “the public” and their
implications’, Environment and Planning A, 42, 931–947.
Walker, G., Cass, N. and Devine-Wright, P. (2010) ‘Good neighbours, public
relations and bribes: the politics and perceptions of community benefit provi-
sion in renewable energy development’, Journal of Environmental Planning and
Management, 12, 255–275.
Walker, G., Devine-Wright, P., Hunter, S., High, H. and Evans, B. (2010) ‘Trust
and community: exploring the meanings, contexts and dynamics of commu-
nity renewable energy’, Energy Policy, 38, 2655–2633.
Walker, G. Devine-Wright, P., Barnett, J., Burningham, K., Cass, N., Devine-
Wright, H., Speller, G., Barton, J., Evans, B., Heath, Y., Infield, D., Parks, J.
and Theobald, K. (2011) ‘Symmetries, expectations, dynamics and contexts:
a framework for understanding public engagement with renewable energy
projects’, in P. Devine-Wright (ed.) Renewable Energy and the Public: From
NIMBY to Participation, pp. 1–14, London: Earthscan.
Wolsink, M. (2010) ‘Near-shore wind power – protected seascapes, environmen-
talists’ attitudes, and the technocratic planning perspective’, Land Use Policy,
27, 195–203.
Yearley, S., Cinderby, S., Forrester, J., Bailey, P. and Rosen, P. (2003) ‘Participatory
modelling and the local governance of the politics of UK air pollution: a three-
city case study’, Environmental Values, 12, 247–262.
11
Social Acceptance of Wind
Power Projects: Learning from
Trans-National Experience
Stefanie Huber, Robert Horbaty and Geraint Ellis
Introduction
Travelling through the countryside in Denmark, North Germany,

Spain or even certain parts of North America, one cannot help but
notice the thousands of wind turbines dominating the landscape.
Yet in other countries, such as the UK, Ireland or Switzerland, wind
projects are still relatively isolated features. This reflects the fact that
different countries have very different wind resources and have adopted
a variety of institutional, policy and direct support regimes for their
exploitation (Toke et al. 2008). Wind power projects have also been
confronted with very different responses from local communities in
each region of the world. This means that there are major opportunities
for learning from different countries’ experiences and for exchanging
good practice in many aspects of wind deployment. This is particu-
larly true for the factors that may influence social acceptance of wind
energy, whose increasing significance has stimulated varied and some-
times innovative responses. For this reason, the International Energy
Agency (IEA) has established an interdisciplinary working group of
its Wind Implementing Agreement for Co-operation in the Research,
Development and Deployment of Wind Energy Systems (IEA Wind) to
address social acceptance under ‘Task 28’. This has established an inter-
national network of experts to consolidate and review the research and
practical experience on the social acceptance of wind power (Huber and
Hobarty 2010).
This chapter draws on the findings of the Task 28 working group; it
briefly describes the functions of the group and the main conceptual
215
approach adopted. It then provides a range of examples of international

good practice drawn on the key topics seen as being constituent of social
acceptance. The chapter concludes by attempting to distil a number of
key insights from this for the development of other renewable energy
technologies (RETs).
IEA Task 28 working group
As global wind generating capacity has grown, it has become an

increasingly topical debate in the mass media (e.g. Der Spiegel 2004;
The Economist 2010; Rudd 2011), often focussing on ‘wicked’ issues of
deployment, while opposition groups have become more vociferous and
better organised at a variety of geographic scales.1 In 2008, in the light
of growing anti-wind discourses, the IEA established Task 28 to tackle
social acceptance under its Wind Implementing Agreement, with the
aim of reducing implementation risks, overcoming misinterpretations
and improving communication between different stakeholders in the
deployment of wind. This has involved the participation of the USA,
Canada, Japan and seven European countries (Norway, Finland, Ireland,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland), each of whom have
been represented by high-level policy officers, experts or researchers
from a wide range of disciplinary backgrounds. Unfortunately, partici-
pation – like academic research – has focussed on Europe, North America
and Australia, so, apart from some isolated studies (for example, Mallett
2007 in the case of Mexico or Han et al. 2009, for China), little is known
about acceptance issues in the global south. Given the critical position
of China, India, Russia or Brazil for the global outlook of renewables,
this omission needs to be addressed.
The working group has developed a series of country-specific reports,
a synthesising ‘state of the art’ report (Huber and Hobarty 2010) and
a project database that brings together the experience of a wide range
of countries – most of which is publicly available.2 The results of the
working group are being disseminated broadly – at international
conferences and by country representatives engaging with different
audiences in their home countries – and have formed the basis of this
chapter.
Social acceptance of wind power
The understanding of the social acceptance of wind power projects

as discussed in this chapter is based on the conceptual framework
Social Acceptance of Wind Power Projects 217
Regional and federal authorities Decision & opinion makers
Media Planners Associations & organizations
Business groups
Socio-political
acceptance “Public opinion”
Local associations Community Market Manufacturers

acceptance acceptance
Land owners Operators
Population Developers
Municipal utilities Associations etc.
Electricity suppliers
Local business Grid operators
Local authorities Investors
Figure 11.1 The elements of social acceptance of wind power projects

Source: Adapted with permission from Wüstenhagen et al. 2007.
presented by Wüstenhagen et al. (2007), who suggest it has three key

dimensions (see Figure 11.1):
● Market acceptance concerns the investors and project developers,

energy suppliers, utilities and grid owners, but also electricity
consumers.
● Socio-political acceptance concerns public opinion of wind power as
an acceptable and useful technology and the tone of debate in the
media, politics and national institutions.
● Community acceptance concerns the opinion of the people living
in the surroundings of specific wind power projects and therefore
bearing most of the direct external impacts of wind energy.
All these dimensions contribute to the overall acceptance of a project,

but are influenced by different impacts concerning time, scale or
stakeholders. Wind power as a technology is now relatively mature
and as such appears to have been accepted in market terms, i.e. it
routinely attracts significant investment from financial institutions
(e.g. IEA Wind Energy 2011). Attitude survey and opinion polls suggest
that in most, if not all, countries the public recognise wind energy as
a welcome and valued element of the energy mix (Musall and Kuik
2011) and most countries have wind power targets with accompa-
nying incentive and research programmes (e.g. Szarka 2007). However,
experience suggests that it is often community acceptance that remains
the key obstacle to higher levels of social acceptance and where the
need for cross-learning remains most critical. For this purpose, one
could regard a specific wind power project as achieving social accep-
tance when there is consensus (or at least an absence of debilitating
dispute) between all stakeholders and at all scales of governance over
its construction and operation.
Core issues in social acceptance
Every wind energy project has to be negotiated through a complex mix

of statutory, political, economic and social stakeholders – each with
varying degrees of power and significance to different communities.
This can make the goal of acceptance difficult to achieve and makes the
identification of a single strategy for achieving social acceptance prob-
lematic. However, while acknowledging the role of local political and
cultural sensitivities, it is possible to identify a number of core issues that
successful social acceptance strategies need to address. These are grouped
into two main categories; the first deals with the potential impacts of
wind projects, while the second relates to more procedural aspects.
Scale and character of wind power projects

The scale of wind power projects has evolved dramatically in the
last three decades. In the 1980s, the wind sector was typified by
single turbines of only a few hundred kilowatts capacity, scattered in
the landscape. Today, a typical project comprises dozens of turbines,
each having several megawatts of capacity. This increasing scale
clearly influences the visibility of wind power in the landscape (Möller
2010), the economic impact on a region (Lantz and Tegen 2008) and
the ownership profile of the industry (Nielsen 2010). These trends all
entail specific dimensions of social acceptance. For example, increased
scale means that wind power can now offer a credible contribution to
achieving a sustainable energy system. However, smaller-scale projects
still have their niches, at least in terms of their contribution to social
acceptance. Solitary wind turbines, or clusters of small turbines, often
enjoy a much greater level of acceptance than their larger cousins. They
can provide entry opportunities for small-scale developers, and can

lead to broader benefits by stimulating more localised familiarity with
wind as a viable technology which may actually enhance acceptance
for larger-scale projects (Barry and Chapman 2009). Indeed, a thriving
small-scale and community sector can make an important contribution
to acceptance of the whole industry, yet they do face specific barriers
(Heagle et al. 2011; Hübner and Pohl 2010). In recognition of this, some
regions, such as the Canadian province of Quebec, have established
specific support schemes for small community projects (Audet 2009)
and a number of wind energy associations have been formed specifi-
cally for small-scale developers (e.g. in Germany, BVKW 2011).
An emerging issue related to the scale of development is that of ‘repow-
ering’, where existing wind projects are either redeveloped or expanded
to provide greater generating capacities (e.g. Ohla and Eichhorn 2010).
This is now emerging because those sites developed early in the take-up
of wind energy tended to be those with greatest wind resource, yet were
first developed when available turbine technology was much smaller
in scale. As these projects reach their expected life span or the initial
generating agreements come to an end, it becomes logical for the
scheme to be replaced by one of greater generating capacity. This raises
some interesting issues for social acceptance; local communities have
generally become more accepting of established projects and the key
trade-offs of repowering often relate to better designed arrays, but of
much larger scale. One can imagine that as the wind industry matures
and landscape saturation occurs (e.g. in Denmark, see Möller 2010), the
key social acceptance challenges will lie with repowering. This is not a
cause for complacency for the wind industry, as it still requires sensitive
community involvement (Nedermann et al. 2009), and still faces signif-
icant financial, logistic and procedural barriers (del Rio et al. 2011).
Another issue that has become more significant for social acceptance is
the perceived impact not of the wind project itself, but of the supporting
infrastructure. This is particularly the case for transmission lines as the
richest wind resources are often located far from the actual load centres
of urban and commercial uses (Lantz and Flowers 2010). Indeed, while
wind turbines can be portrayed with a green image and can be accom-
panied by community benefits, acceptance of transmission lines poses
far greater challenges (Koskinen and Laitinen 2010; McCarthy 2010).
Transmission infrastructure requires substantial investment, traverses
many different communities, can impact on military and transport
infrastructure, reduces property prices and often offers little economic
benefit to those affected (Lantz and Flowers 2010).
Finally, as the offshore sector continues to expand, core differences

in the acceptance profiles of offshore and onshore are becoming more
apparent (see Chapter 10 by Devine-Wright and Chapter 5 by Jay in this
volume). Although it was assumed that greater degrees of separation
from local communities would drastically reduce acceptance issues,
concern exists, albeit taking a slightly different manifestation (Haggett
2008; Firestone et al. 2009), including issues related to the seascape (Gee
2010), fishing and tourism (Blaydes Lilley et al. 2010).
Impacts on landscape and ecosystems

In terms of onshore wind schemes, landscape issues continue to be the
main concern in most countries. Rather than being labelled simply as
‘NIMBY’ and thus side-lined, it is being increasingly recognised that
such emotive issues reflect a close connection between local identity and
the landscape, which cannot be simply wished away. An illustration is
seen in Spain, where opposition groups have attempted to highlight the
artistic, historical or natural value of the landscape earmarked for wind
development that may be overlooked by more ‘rational’ assessments of
landscape impacts (Zografos and Martinez-Alier 2009). Indeed, such
perspectives can offer additional ways of framing acceptance issues.
For example, while the conventional approach to landscape issues is to
attempt to design wind farms so that they can best fit into the topog-
raphy (e.g. Schöbel et al. 2008), it has been suggested that in some cases
we should invert this and begin to create new landscapes around wind
power. Indeed, landscapes in all but wilderness areas have been shaped
through thousands of years of human activity. Some see wind power
as representing a new phase through which new sustainable forms
of landscape representation can be developed (Nadaï and Labussière
2009). This may be particularly true in areas of dense, historic human
habitation and in places like the Netherlands where landscape is largely
anthropogenic and where innovative ideas for wind energy landscapes
have been developed (e.g. van Beek et al. 2006).
In conservation areas and other sites of special environmental interest,
concern is motivated by the potential wildlife impacts of wind projects,
rather than visual intrusion (Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley 2002). While
some early wind farms resulted in high rates of mortality for some bird
or bat species, modern turbine design and more careful siting have
significantly reduced such impacts (Lantz and Flowers 2010). Critical
to this has been a better understanding of how wildlife reacts to wind
turbines, identifying specific threats through Environmental Impact
Assessment and the adoption of new technologies such as radars that
allow turbines to be stopped during high risk periods like bird migra-
tion seasons (Huber and Horbaty 2010). Although the understanding of
how wind projects can minimise their impact on wildlife has advanced
greatly since the beginning of today’s wind era (NWCC 2010), there are
still areas that need greater exploration, such as the on-going debate
over whether we face a trade-off between renewable energy targets and
nature conservation (e.g. NABU 2004).
Quality of life
While issues over landscape impacts tend to heavily influence debates
over wind energy policy in most countries in the global north, a cluster
of other issues also influences community acceptance of specific
projects. This includes debates over potential impacts from audible
and low-frequency noise, lighting, shadow flicker and concerns over
long-term consequences of wind energy-induced annoyance and
stress. Indeed there is a protracted list of such quality life issues and,
as noted by Haggett (Chapter 8 in this volume), concerns around them
are not easily addressed through objective assessment, even if scien-
tific understanding has increased significantly (e.g. Institut national de
santé publique de Québec 2009). Experience from Japan suggests that
while pre-commissioning concerns over low frequency noise appears to
have increased dramatically in the last few years – these are usually not
pursued after construction (Maruyama 2010). Such issues can be driven
by the age, form and context of technology and how they are subjec-
tively received by individuals in the host communities (e.g. Pedersen
and Persson Waye 2004). Whilst recent studies suggest that some of
these issues can be addressed by improved design (e.g. Hübner et al.
2010; Delta 2010), quality of life concerns may continue to be contro-
versial (Eltham et al. 2008).
Policy support and capacity building

Although community acceptance has sometimes been seen as driven by
the awkwardness of local residents, experience increasingly tells us that
we should try to develop a more holistic appreciation of disputes. This
involves understanding factors that encourage support as well as oppo-
sition (Ellis et al. 2007), as well as reflecting on the role and actions of
public policy and agencies in encouraging or dissipating acceptance.
This can focus on issues of justice and transparency (see below) as well
as on the broader policy structures that set the ‘rules’ for decision-
making for wind power projects. This may relate to perceived unfair-
ness or inadequacy in the financial support for wind power or poorly
developed site assessment processes. Indeed, more clarity in decision-

making criteria can help foster general acceptance and reduce investor
risks, particularly when it comes to specific project consents. Therefore,
in the view of many governments and wind developers, clear spatial
guidance in terms of a wind atlas or definitive spatial planning policies/
zoning may allow the ground rules for project decisions to be set in a
more rational a priori context, rather than in the intense heat of dispute
when site proposals are announced (see the discussion in Chapter 4 by
Power and Cowell in this volume).
Regulatory clarity can be diminished when projects fall under more
than one administrative body, which is common with larger schemes,
or where bodies with statutory duties for energy, environmental
impacts, economic development, traffic, telecommunications and mili-
tary installations may have different views of, and conditions for, wind
power projects. In most countries, local authorities have decisive roles
in wind power proposals and, as the lead planning authorities, are
the focus of civic representation. Despite years of growth in the wind
sector, as developers seek opportunities in increasingly marginal loca-
tions, consent decisions are still made by planning authorities where
such applications are still something of a novelty. This raises questions
over whether the necessary knowledge, resources, procedures and polit-
ical will are always in place to deliver well-informed, professional deci-
sions and encourage acceptance. International experience suggests that
several strategies can be adopted to enhance clarity and support local
decision making, including:
1. The development of a national competence centre for wind energy, to

help support and guide less experienced local authorities. An example
of this is from Denmark, where the Ministry of the Environment has
established a ‘Wind Turbine Secretariat’ to assist municipalities with
the identification of potential development areas, provide advice
on process, best practice information and for promotion of cross-
sectorial dialogue (VIND 2011).
2. Capacity building through workshops and training courses. For
example in Ireland, public representatives, planning officials and key
stakeholders are regularly invited to national and regional workshops
run by the Sustainable Energy Agency Ireland (SEAI) that provide
opportunities to share experiences and to generate ideas about how
wind policy could be more effectively implemented (SEAI 2010).
3. Many nations have also developed toolkits, guidelines and checklists
to support local decisions. These have included: planning guidelines,
for example in Ireland (DoEHLG 2006) and Norway (Solli 2010);

guidance for enhancing social acceptance, for example in Canada
(Feurtey et al. 2008) and guides to decision-making, for example in
the USA (NWCC 2002).
Similarly, community acceptance may be increased by general educa-

tion and awareness-raising on renewable energy technologies (Meyer
and Steinbiss 2008). A range of innovative experience exists within the
countries participating in IEA Wind Task 28. This includes a landscape
drawing contest, which has been run jointly between government, an
electric power company and a newspaper in Japan (Maruyama 2010), and
a museum ship that has toured the Baltic Sea with an interactive exhi-
bition on offshore wind schemes (Offshore Wind Energy Foundation
2011). In the USA, the ‘Wind for Schools’ project is installing small
wind turbines at rural schools to allow hands-on experience by the
community; in parallel, higher education students gain experience as
consultants by assisting with implementation (Wind for Schools 2010).
Despite these efforts, no robust evaluation of the guidelines and
checklists prepared by government and regulatory agencies has been
conducted. Consequently, their impact on overall levels of community
acceptance – and assessments of what will work in different contexts –
remains unclear (Maruyama 2010). It is also unclear whether some of
the awareness-raising initiatives actually improve community views of
wind power. Indeed, important questions arise as to whether efforts
directed at increasing community acceptance are too closely guided by
the understanding of acceptance held by the wind power industry or by
regulatory institutions, which may be very different from how the host
communities perceive the issue.
Media and social networks

Debates over wind projects are played out in a variety of contexts and
through different forms of discourse (Barry et al. 2008). As noted by
Haggett and Smith (2004: 14) ‘claims-making and counter claim-making
constitutes the debate itself. In this way the claims are the conflict;
there is no other means to access or study it.’ Therefore, understanding
how wind projects are projected in different forms of media and how
host communities come to make sense of local proposals is an impor-
tant dimension to understanding how community acceptance can be
increased. For example, Maruyama (2011) has evaluated how different
issues (aesthetics, health impacts, etc.) have varied in their prominence
in Japanese newspapers. This analysis suggests that while safety and
noise appear to be consistent concerns, issues such as bird strikes or

landscape issues tend to be superseded by questions such as whether
the wind industry has been able to make technical improvements (e.g.
better visualisation techniques), or whether opposition groups become
more successful in their claim-making. It is highly probable that similar
patterns would be found in other countries, given that the prominence
of particular topics varies according to the cultural, economic and phys-
ical contexts of wind power development. For example, landscape issues
are prominent in the UK and Switzerland, but in Denmark and Japan
concerns about low frequency sound have been more important. In
Ireland and parts of the USA, the development of infrastructure (such
as transmission lines) has been the focus of opposition. In contrast,
impacts on birds and bats have tended to drive the debate in Norway
and Switzerland (Huber and Horbaty 2010).
In evaluating media reports, we must be aware that conflicts are
inherently more newsworthy than smooth project implementation
(Jegen 2008). Furthermore, the relationship between the media and
public opinion is based on reciprocity; while the media are able to influ-
ence public opinion, journalists are affected by what they perceive to be
the public’s opinion. Thus as part of project delivery many developers
have prepared media strategies, such as identifying and supporting
‘champions’ from within local communities with the view to building
acceptance through more organic social interaction (Lantz and Flowers
2010; see also Chapter 10 by Devine-Wright in this volume). However,
with the increasing universality and ease of access to different types of
social media (the internet, Facebook, etc.), anti-wind campaigners can
also become highly effective communicators.
Distribution of costs and benefits

Despite their efforts at improved communication and public relations,
most developers and investors base their site selection process primarily
on maximising the available wind resource, and usually approach
potential host communities as ‘outsiders’ (Haggett and Vigar 2004). In
consequence, local residents can perceive them as strangers coming to
exploit local resources, while they bear the resulting costs. Therefore
initiatives that help redistribute the costs and benefits arising from
wind development can be important drivers of acceptance.
A key area is a greater appreciation of the overall economic contri-
bution of the wind industry (Renewables UK 2010) or the adoption of
strategies that maximise economic development and job growth in
rural areas (Taub 2010; Deloitte and IWEA 2009). This can be done by
enhancing local ownership (or part-ownership) of wind projects and the

payment of community benefits, or by ensuring local employment in
support services (e.g. construction and maintenance). Several countries
have adopted measures that ensure wind projects adequately contribute
to the local tax base. For example, in Germany the 2009 federal tax law
guarantees that 70 per cent of the excise tax remains in the munici-
pality where the wind farm is located, while only 30 per cent goes to the
municipality where the investor is based (Hübner et al. 2010).
However, developers do have to approach local communities with
caution when offering payments and monetary benefits to avoid the
accusation of bribery (Cass et al. 2010; Chapter 9 by Strachan and Jones
in this volume); as happened in Switzerland where the adoption of
a feed-in-tariff caused a ‘wind rush’ to the best sites with competing
payments offered to local communities (Geissmann 2010). While some
of the community benefit schemes in the UK help redistribute the
benefits of wind power projects, they still represent only a small propor-
tion of profits, with local ownership offering far better returns to host
communities (Cowell et al. 2011).
‘Community wind’ refers to a wide range of ownership models,
including locally-based private or co-operative schemes or those initi-
ated by outside parties but with investment offers made to the local
population (Toke 2005; Walker 2008). These can be an attractive
investment opportunity that provides relatively safe long-term invest-
ments (Renewable Energy Partnership 2004). In Japan this has included
expanding the scope of possible investors from all over the country
(Maruyama 2010), which has additional benefits of attracting investors
into the hosting area to visit ‘their’ project, stimulated through inau-
guration ceremonies where all investors are invited to sign their names
at the base of the turbine towers. This can enhance investors’ connec-
tion to the projects, attract additional economic benefits through
tourism and stimulate broader levels of social acceptance (Nishikido
and Maruyama 2006). Some governments have tried to stimulate
local ownership. For example, Denmark’s 2008 Renewable Energy Act
provides an option-to-purchase of 20 per cent of the ownership for
the host community as well as financial support for local cooperatives
(Nielsen 2010), whilst in Spain municipal investment in wind projects
through public-private-partnership has been one of the main factors
behind successful wind deployment (Dinica 2008).
The other side of the coin to maximisation of local benefits is the
reduction of local dis-benefits. A variety of strategies can be used to
minimise the perceived impact of visual intrusion, such as good project
design, the identification of optimal locations through planning

(Drechsler et al. 2011) and the use of GIS (Allen 2009). Another cause
of community concern is the fear that a local scheme will depress real
estate values (Shumaker 2011). Although the research findings are not
conclusive and have given mixed results (Huber and Horbaty 2010), a
particularly extensive study in the US covering 7,000 dwellings provided
no evidence to support claims of decreases in property value within a
five mile radius of a wind project (Hoen et al. 2009). Nevertheless, if a
worry about property prices drives opposition, it may be worthwhile
providing guarantees to local communities, such as in Denmark where
the 2008 Renewable Energy Act makes provision for compensation
payments if owners of properties lying within a distance of six times
the total turbine height can show a loss in value of at least one per cent
(Nielsen 2010).
Transparent and open processes

Although public debates on wind power projects tend to focus on more
tangible issues such as landscape impacts or community benefits,
a lack of trust in regulatory bodies or a failure to establish transpar-
ency in decision-making processes can also act as critical influences on
community acceptance. Gross (2007) suggests that the perceived fair-
ness of the decision making process influences whether the outcome is
seen as legitimate. Numerous authors have called for an inclusive and
participative approach to improve the quality of decision-making and
increase community acceptance (e.g. Barry et al. 2008). The experi-
ence of dealing with one project may shape responses to future projects
(EWEA 2009). An open and fair process can make consenting processes
more efficient, with evidence from Switzerland suggesting that good
participatory processes helps avoid the legal challenges that can lead to
substantial procedural delays (Schmid and Schuppli 2009).
Countries such as the Netherlands and Canada have recognised that
statutory agencies may be seen as being essentially ‘pro-wind’, leading
to the promotion of neutral intermediaries and process facilitators (e.g.
Feurtey et al. 2008) or the creation of a specific community contact
point to aid negotiation (Jegen 2008). In other countries, the need for
on-going dialogue between key stakeholders has led to the creation of
standing forums to ensure that issues can be addressed as they emerge.
In Switzerland the principal wind energy association, Suisse Eole, regu-
larly meets with the main environmental organisations to discuss issues
facing wind power projects, although overall there does seem to be a
lack of coherence in strategies for knowledge exchange.
Indeed, we should recognise that collaborative approaches have their

limits (e.g. Toke et al. 2008). Where there is value-based, fundamental
opposition to the very principle of development, attempts at achieving
a consensual solution may have very limited success. Absolute accep-
tance will, of course, never be possible, but an aspiration of full public
engagement must be at the core of each project. Even a well-designed
process may not always result in absolute consensus, but it can leave
stakeholders satisfied about the opportunities they have had to voice
their opinions and achieve some form of settlement or closure to a
debate (Barry and Ellis 2011).
This section has reviewed many of the most commonly occurring
issues for social acceptance around the world and given examples
of how they are being addressed. Clearly, a rich pool of experience
now exists, but dissemination across international borders is in its
infancy. In the concluding section, consideration will be given to
how analysis of the social acceptance of wind power can be extended
to a range of RETs.
Conclusions
This chapter has highlighted that while deployment of wind power

projects appears to face broadly similar problems of acceptance across
the world, there is much variation in the form these issues can take
and in the response to them. This underlines the value of exchanging
experience on issues facing the deployment of RETs, which has led to
the identification of a number of core themes that may guide future
practice both for wind and other renewables.
The first theme relates to the need for reflective practice. By this we
mean an ability of all stakeholders involved in the deployment of RETs
to think critically about policy and practice, and thereby evolve a more
progressive approach to problem solving. While this may involve signif-
icant cultural, professional and capacity challenges, trans-national
exchange of experience can provide particularly useful insights. It is also
important to consider these issues in a more comprehensive way, not
only to foster multi-disciplinary engagement around acceptance issues,
but also to consider the most appropriate subject of study. In the case
of wind, analysis of acceptance initially focussed on host communities
as being the key issue or ‘problem’. But with improved understanding,
we now see communities as part of a wider web of stakeholders, which
puts the nature of the dispute into a wider context and helps improve
the quality of the projects. This also helps foster a greater appreciation
of the dynamic of support or objection and stimulates a reflection on

policies and procedures of regulatory agencies. A particularly important
insight has been to see objection not as NIMBYism but as a rational
response to a set of threats or costs – an insight which brings more
appropriate ameliorating responses.
Secondly, issues of acceptance are influenced by a large number of
complex and interacting factors. As shown above, they are not only
subject to significant geographic and cultural variation, but depend on
dimensions such as the scale, ownership and perceived distribution of
cost and benefits related to the particular project or technology. It is also
important to understand that acceptance issues are inevitably dynamic –
not only can the technology change over time (e.g. as turbines have
become quieter or larger), but also affected by familiarity (or indeed
over-familiarity) as the technology becomes more widespread.
Thirdly, irrespective of the evidence-base and scientific rationality
surrounding the potential impact of a wind energy project, community
acceptance will be strongly influenced by how the project is framed in
media discourses and the faith that the community has in the messenger.
Communication therefore becomes central to the development of good
relations with local residents. A wide range of good practice exists in
this area, which underlines the fact that developers of energy projects
would be advised to concentrate as much on community relations as
the technical assessment required by regulatory agencies.
Fourthly, as noted in other chapters in this volume (e.g. Strachan
and Jones), host communities are aware of the distribution of costs and
benefits that arise from wind power projects, and this is likely to be
similar for other RETs. While each technology is likely to have its own
bundle of impacts, the industrial profile of developers seems to have
a strong influence, with more locally-based ownership proving to be
more acceptable, and tending to result in greater economic benefits for
the host communities. While some other RETs, such as off-shore wind,
necessarily require large-scale investment and multi-national ownership
(see Chapter 5 by Jay in this volume), there is no reason why commu-
nity-based strategies for many other RETs – such as solar, biomass and
anaerobic digesters – should not play a significant part in their wider
adoption, with community support schemes offering tangible benefits
in terms of acceptance and local economic development.
Finally, we must remember that community acceptance is not just
heavily influenced by the real and perceived impacts of a project, but
that any response will be mediated by how host communities view the
decision-making process, their experience of how past decisions were
made and the level of trust they have in the developer, local politicians
and regulatory agencies. This is an essentially procedural issue and
draws on the normative ideals of participatory planning. Consequently,
while issues such as climate change, ‘peak oil’ and energy security
add urgency to the development of renewables, pursuing them at the
expense of public engagement and good governance may prove counter-
productive in the long-term.
Notes
1. For example, see National Wind Watch in the US (www.wind-watch.
org), Countryside Guardian in the UK (www.countryguardian.net),
Windkraftgegner in Germany (trans. Fighters Against Wind Energy, www.
windkraftgegner.de) and the European Platform Against Windfarms (www.
epaw.org).
2. see www.socialacceptance.ch.
References
Álvarez-Farizo, B. and Hanley, N. (2002) ‘Using conjoint analysis to quantify
public preferences over the environmental impacts of wind farms. An example
from Spain’, Energy Policy, 30: 2, 107–116.
Allen, M. (2009) ‘Use of GIS technology and landscape visualization software to
predict visual impact’, Presentation to the Annual Conference of the Upstate
New York Chapter of the American Planning Association, http://www.plan-
ningconference.org/presentations/allen.pdf, accessed on 9 August 2011.
Audet, G. (2009) Energie éolienne au Québec: làspect de làcceptabilité sociale lié au
choix de modèle de développement, Québec: Université du Québec, http://www.
archipel.uqam.ca/2610/1/M11223.pdf, accessed on 25 July 2011.
Barry, M. and Chapman, R. (2009) ‘Distributed small-scale wind in New
Zealand: advantages, barriers and policy support instruments’, Energy Policy,
37: 9, 3358–3369.
Barry, J. and Ellis, G. (2011) ‘Beyond consensus? Agonism, republicanism and a
low carbon future’, in Devine-Wright, P. (ed.) Renewable Energy and the Public:
From NIMBY to Participation, pp. 29–42, London: Earthscan.
Barry, J., Ellis, G. and Robinson, C. (2008) ‘Cool rationalities and hot air: a
rhetorical approach to understanding debates on renewable energy’, Global
Environmental Politics, 8: 2, 67–98.
Blaydes Lilley, M., Firestone, J. and Kempton, W. (2010) ‘The effect of wind
power installations on coastal tourism’, Energies 2010, 3, 1–22.
BVKW (2011) Bundesverband Kleinwindanlagen, www.bundesverband-klein-
windanlagen.de, accessed on 26 July 2011.
Cass, N., Walker, G. and Devine-Wright, P. (2011) ‘Good neighbours, public rela-
tions and bribes: the politics and perceptions of community benefit provision
in renewable energy development in the UK’, Journal of Environmental Planning
and Management, 12: 3, 255–275.

and environmental justice: the role of community benefits in wind energy
development’, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management , 54: 4,
539–557
Deloitte and Irish Wind Energy Association (2009) Jobs and Investment in Irish
Wind Energy Powering Ireland’s Economy, http://www.iwea.com/content-
Files/Documents%20for%20Download/Publications/IWEA%20Policy%20
Documents/20 09_06_ Deloitte_ IWEA _ Employment_in_Wind_ Energ y_
Report.pdf?uid=1245768156894, accessed on 1 August 2011.
del Río, P., Silvosa, A. C. and Gómez, G. I. (2011) ‘Policies and design elements
for the repowering of wind farms: a qualitative analysis of different options’,
Energy Policy, 39: 4, 1897–1908.
Delta (2010) Low Frequency Noise from Large Wind Turbines, http://www.wind-
power.org/download/947/LF-noise-from-large-wind-turbines.pdf, accessed on
3 August 2011.
Der Spiegel (2004) ‘Der Windmühlen Wahn. Vom Traum umweltfreundli-
cher Energie zur hochsubventionierten Landschaftszerstörung’, 14/2004,
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-30346813.html, accessed on 25 July
2011.
Devine-Wright, P. (2007) ‘Reconsidering public acceptance of renewable energy
technologies: a critical review’, Working Paper No. 1.4 of the Beyond Nimbyism:
A Multidisciplinary Investigation of Public Engagement with Renewable Energy
Technologies Project Http://geography.exeter.ac.uk/beyond_nimbyism/deliv-
erables/bn_wp1_4.pdf, accessed on 11 August 2011.
Dinica, V. (2008) ‘Initiating a sustained diffusion of wind power: the role of
public– private partnerships in Spain’, Energy Policy, 36: 9, 3562–3571.
DoEHLG (Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government,
Republic of Ireland) (2006) Planning Guidelines for Local Authorities on
Wind Energy Development, http://www.environ.ie/en/Publications/
DevelopmentandHousing/Planning/FileDownLoad,1633,en.pdf, accessed on
26 July 2011.
Drechsler, M., Ohl, C., Meyerhoff, J., Eichhorn, M. and Monsees, J. (2011)
‘Combining spatial modeling and choice experiments for the optimal spatial
allocation of wind turbines’, Energy Policy, 39: 6, 3845–3854.
Ellis, G., Barry, J. and Robinson, C. (2007) ‘Many ways to say “no”, different
ways to say “yes”: applying Q-Methodology to understand public acceptance
of wind farm proposals’, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management,
50: 4, 517–551.
Eltham, D. C., Harrison, G. P. and Allen, S. J. (2008) ‘Change in public attitudes
towards a Cornish wind farm: implications for planning’, Energy Policy, 36: 1,
23–33.
European Wind Energy Association (2009) Social Acceptance of Wind Energy and
Wind Farms. Wind energy – The Facts: A Guide to the Technology, Economics and
Future of Wind Power, London: European Wind Energy Association.
Feurtey, E. (ed.) (2008) Energie éolienne et acceptabilité sociale: guide à lìntention
des élus municipaux du Québec: Guide à l’intention des élus municipaux du
Québec, Cap-Saint-Ignace: CRÉ de la Chaudière-Appalaches.
Firestone, J., Kempton, W. and Kreuger, A. (2009) ‘Public acceptance of offshore
wind power projects in the USA’, Wind Energy, 12: 2, 183–202.
Gee, K. (2010) ‘Offshore wind power development as affected by seascape values

on the German North Sea coast’, Land Use Policy, 27: 2, 185–194.
Geissmann, M. (2010) Social Acceptance of Wind Energy Projects: State-of-the-Art in
Switzerland, www.socialacceptance.ch/Results, accessed on 25 July 2011.
acceptance’, Energy Policy, 35: 5, 2683–2691.
politics and public perception of offshore wind farms’, Journal of Environmental
Policy and Planning, 10: 3, 289–306.
Haggett, C. and Smith, J. L. (2004) ‘Tilting at windmills? Using discourse anal-
ysis to understand the attitude behaviour gap in renewable energy conflicts’,
Paper presented at the British Sociological Association Conference, York,
22–24 March.
Haggett, C. and Vigar, G. (2004) Tilting at Windmills? The Attitude-Behaviour Gap
in Renewable Energy Conflicts, http://www.psi.org.uk/ehb/docs/finalreport-
Haggett.pdf, accessed on 1 August 2011.
Han, J., Mol, A. P. J., Lu, Y. and Zhang, L. (2009) ‘Onshore wind power devel-
opment in China: challenges behind a successful story’, Energy Policy, 37: 8,
2941–2951.
Heagle, A. L. B., Naterer, G. F. and Pope, K. (2011) ‘Small wind turbine energy
policies for residential and small business usage in Ontario, Canada’, Energy
Policy, 39: 4, 1988–1999.
Hoen, B., Wiser, R., Cappers, P., Thayer, M. and Sethi, G. (2009) The Impact of
Wind Power Projects on Residential Property Values in the United States: A Multi-Site
Hedonic Analysis, http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/lbnl-2829e.pdf, accessed
on 12 August 2011.
Huber, S. and Hobarty, R. (2010) IEA Wind Task 28 State of the Art Report on
Social Acceptance of Wind Energy, http://www.socialacceptance.ch/images/IEA_
Wind_Task_28_technical_report_final_20110208.pdf, accessed on 9 August
2011.
Hübner, G. and Pohl, J. (ed.) (2010) Pilotstudie zur Akzeptanz vertikaler
Windenergieanlagen: Kurzfassung des Abschlussberichts zum BMU-EE-Querschnitts-
Forschungsvorhaben, http://mmvr-des.burg-halle.de/~schikora/workshop/docu-
ments/VWEA-Abschlussbericht.pdf, accessed on 26 July 2011.
Hübner, G., Zoellner, J. and Meyer, A. (2010) Social Acceptance of Wind Energy
Projects: State-of-the-Art in Germany, www.socialacceptance.ch/Results, accessed
on 25 July 2011.
Institut national de santé publique de Québec (2009) Eoliennes et santé publique:
synthèse des connaissances, http://www.inspq.qc.ca/pdf/publications/1015_
EoliennesSantePublique.pdf, accessed on 3 August 2011.
IEA Wind Energy 2011: IEA Wind. Annual Report 2010. Available at http:
//www.ieawind.org, accessed on 31 January 2012.
Jegen, M. (2008) Social acceptance of wind energy projects in Québec, Montréal:
Université du Québec à Montréal, Department of Political Science, Natural
Resources Canada.
Koskinen, A. and Laitinen, O. (2010) Social Acceptance of Wind Energy Projects:
State-of-the-Art in Finland, www.socialacceptance.ch/Results, accessed on 25
July 2011.
Lantz, E. and Flowers, L. (eds) (2010) Social Acceptance of Wind Energy Projects:
State-of-the-Art in the US www.socialacceptance.ch/Results, accessed on 25 July
2011.
Lantz, E. and Tegen, S. (2008) ‘Variables affecting economic development of
wind energy’, Conference Paper presented at Windpower 2008, http://www.
nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/43506.pdf, accessed on 25 July 2011.
Mallett, A. (2007) ‘Social acceptance of renewable energy innovations:
the role of technology cooperation in urban Mexico’, Energy Policy, 35: 5,
2790–2798.
Maruyama, Y. (2010) Social Acceptance of Wind Energy Projects: State-of-the-Art in
Japan. University of Tokyo, Japan, www.socialacceptance.ch/Results, accessed
on 25 July 2011.
Maruyama, Y. (2011) Personal Communication, August 2011.
McCarthy, M. (2010) Social Acceptance of Wind Energy Projects: State-of-the-Art in
Ireland, www.socialacceptance.ch/Results, accessed on 25 July 2011.
Meyer, A. and Steinbiss, S. (2008) Acceptance of Renewable Energies in the USA,
Report to the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation,
and Nuclear Safety, http://erneuerbare-energien.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/appli-
cation/pdf/final_report_acceptance_windenergy.pdf, accessed on 3 August
2011.
Möller, B. (2010) ‘Spatial analyses of emerging and fading wind energy land-
scapes in Denmark’, Land Use Policy, 27, 233–241.
Musall, F. D. and Kuik, O. (2011) ‘Local acceptance of renewable energy – a case
study from southeast Germany’, Energy Policy, 39: 6, 3252–3260.
NABU (2004) Naturschutz kontra erneuerbare Energien? Konfliktlösungsstrategien
für die Praxis, http://www.naturschutzstandards-erneuerbarer-energien.de/
images/literatur/NABU_erneuerbare%5B1%5D.pdf, accessed on 3 August
2011.
Nadaï, A. and Labussière, O. (2009) ‘Wind power planning in France (Aveyron),
from state regulation to local planning’, Land Use Policy, 26: 3, 744–754.
Neddermann, B. (ed.) (2009) Repowering von Windenergieanlagen – Kommunale
Handlungsmöglichkeiten, ttp://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/files/pdfs/allge-
mein/application/pdf/leitfaden_repowering.pdf, accessed on 1 August 2011.
Nielsen, L. (2010) Social Acceptance of Wind Energy Projects: State-of-the-Art in
Denmark, www.socialacceptance.ch/Results, accessed on 25 July 2011.
Nishikido, M. and Maruyama, Y. (2006) ‘Who invests in “community wind”?
Comparative research of investing in community wind in Japan’, Bulletin of
Kyoto University of Education, 108, 115–132.
NWCC (National Wind Coordinating Committee) (2002) Permitting of Wind
Energy Facilities – A Handbook, http://www.nationalwind.org/assets/publica-
tions/permitting2002.pdf, accessed on 26 July 2011.
NWCC (National Wind Coordinating Committee) (2010) Wind Turbine
Interactions with Birds, Bats, and Their Habitats: A Summary of Research Results
and Priority Questions, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/pdfs/
birds_and_bats_fact_sheet.pdf, accessed on 12 August 2011.
Offshore Wind Energy Foundation (2011) Travelling Exhibition ‘Fascination
Offshore’, http://www.offshore-stiftung.com/Offshore/aktivitaeten-und-pro-
jekte/wanderausstellung/65,143,60005,liste9.html, accessed on 12 August
2011.
Ohla, C. and Eichhorn, M. (2010) ‘The mismatch between regional spatial

planning for wind power development in Germany and national eligibility
criteria for feed-in tariffs – a case study in West Saxony’, Land Use Policy, 27:
2, 243–254.
Pedersen, E. and Persson-Waye, K. (2004) ‘Perception and annoyance due to
wind turbine noise – a dose–response relationship’, Journal of the Acoustical
Society of America, 116: 6, 3460–3470.
Renewable Energy Partnership (2004) To Catch the Wind: The Potential for
Community Ownership of Wind Farms in Ireland, http://www.feasta.org/docu-
ments/energy/ToCatchTheWind.htm, accessed on 3 May 2011.
Renewables UK (2010) The Economic Value of Wind to Wales: A Survey, http:
//w w w.bwea.com/pdf/publications/Wales _economic_ report2010.pdf,
Rudd, M. (2011) ‘Blades of fury’, The Sunday Times, 17 July, 48–55.
Schmid, J. and Schuppli, F. (2009) ‘Akzeptanz durch Kooperation? Eine
vergleichende Fallstudie zum Einfluss kooperativer Planungsprozesse auf
die lokale Akzeptanz und die ihr zu Grunde liegenden Voraussetzungen’, am
Beispiel von Windenergieprojekten in der Schweiz’, Lizentiatsarbeit am Insitut
für Politikwissenschaften, Universität Bern.
Schöbel, S., Lösse, J., Schneegans, J., and Ziegler, S. (eds) (2008) WindKULTUREN:
Windenergie und Kulturlandschaft, Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Berlin.
SEAI (Sustainable Energy Authority Ireland) (2010), Good Practice Wind Energy
Planning Workshops, http://www.seai.ie/Renewables/Wind_Energy/Regional_
Wind_Workshops/, accessed on 3 May 2011.
Shumaker, D. (2011) Field Guide to Wind Farms and Their Effect on Property Values,
http://www.realtor.org/library/library/fg509#topicb, accessed on 3 August 2011.
Solli, J. (2010) Social Acceptance of Wind Energy Projects: State-of-the-Art in Norway,
www.socialacceptance.ch/Results, accessed on 25 July 2011.
Szarka J. (2007) Wind Power in Europe: Politics, Business and Society, New York:
Palgrave.
Taub, S. (2010) Canada’s ecoENERGY Investment in Renewables Pays Off for
Taxpayers. GE Energy Financial Services Study, http://www.geenergyfinancial-
services.com/press_room/press_releases/2010/ecoENERGYStudyFINAL.pdf,
The Economist (2010) ‘Wind energy and politics – not on my beach, please’,
19 August, http://www.economist.com/node/16846774/print, accessed on
9 August 2011.
Toke, D. (2005) ‘Community wind power in Europe and in the UK’, Wind
Engineering, 29: 3, 301–308, http://www.wind-works.org/articles/Wind%20
29–3-Toke.pdf, accessed on 1 August 2008.
Toke, D., Breukers, S. and Wolsink, M. (2008) ‘Wind power deployment outcomes:
how can we account for the differences?’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy
Reviews, 12: 4, 1124–1147.
van Beek, P., Vermaas, Ch. and Rietveld, F. (2006) Wind Turbines in the Dutch
landscape. Research on the Placing of the Newest Generation of Wind Turbines in
the Dutch Landscape, http://www.paulvanbeek.nl/engels/windenergieplan-
thenetherlands-english.html, accessed on 3 May 2011.
VIND (2011) ‘Vindmøllesekretariatet’, www.vind.mim.dk, accessed on 3 May
2011.
Walker, G. (2008) ‘What are the barriers and incentives for community-owned
means of energy production and use?’, Energy Policy, 36: 12, 4401–4405.
Wind for Schools (2010) http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/schools_wfs_
project.asp, accessed on 3 August 2011.
35: 5, 2683–2691.
Zografos, C. and Martínez-Alier, J. (2009) ‘The politics of landscape value: a case
study of wind farm conflict in rural Catalonia’, Environment and Planning A,
41: 7, 1726–1744.
12
Drawing Lessons from
Wind Power for Future
Sustainable Energy
Joseph Szarka, Geraint Ellis, Richard Cowell,
Peter A. Strachan and Charles Warren
Introduction
The medium to long term outlook for global energy supply is extremely
challenging, as Chapter 1 emphasised. In recognition of this, many
countries are strongly promoting renewable energy, and much progress
has been made. However, fossil fuels still meet the vast majority of
global energy needs, and in consequence atmospheric concentrations
of greenhouse gases continue to rise towards unsustainable levels. A
dramatic increase in wind capacity has been seen worldwide (WWEA
2011), but a swift transition to renewables is beyond reach without major
changes at the political and policymaking levels. Even within the EU –
which has sought to position itself as a pioneer in climate and energy
policy (Wurzel and Connelly 2011) – it has been acknowledged that ‘the
existing strategy is currently unlikely to achieve all the 2020 targets,
and it is wholly inadequate to the longer term challenges’ (European
Commission 2010: 3). Therefore, the need and the urgency to further
accelerate renewables deployment is clear. This requires diversification
of renewable sources, as well as wide diffusion of existing and emer-
gent renewable energy technologies (RETs). Yet it also requires clearer
understanding of a range of challenges going beyond the technolog-
ical dimensions, embracing the political, institutional, economic and
social domains. Social science perspectives have therefore a crucial role
to play in understanding and enabling the nascent energy transition.
This volume has been constructed on the premises that wind power
is not only the most developed example of the implementation of
‘new’ renewables (as defined by David Elliott in Chapter 2), but also
235
constitutes a ‘laboratory of learning’ from which path-finding knowl-

edge can be drawn in relation to emergent RETs. This chapter aims to
synthesise some key lessons by drawing on insights from the preceding
contributions, by reflecting upon our collective research trajectory and
by extrapolating potentially fruitful directions for future work. The
intention is not to provide readymade recipes, but to probe the experi-
ence gained from wind power in order to assess its wider applicability.
However, caveats need to be voiced in relation to the transferability
of these lessons. Firstly, the institutional, political and environmental
conditions obtaining in different countries and in different regions of
our planet vary considerably. One size will not fit all and attention must
be paid to national and regional differentiation. Secondly, RETs vary
considerably in terms of end use, level of technological development
and scale. To understand the challenges to deployment, it may be useful
to categorise them by scale. The first group is formed by small scale
renewables comprising different forms of micro-generation, photovol-
taic, wood burners, heat pumps, solar water heating and passive solar
heating in general. A second group is formed by intermediate to large-
scale renewables, including hydro, marine and tidal sources, concen-
trating solar power, geothermal, as well as some biomass and biogas
plants. Unlike most other renewables, wind power is currently deployed
at both scales. Since the shift from the former category to the latter is
unusual, it offers a distinctive source of experience. Over a mere two
decades, wind turbines have not only increased in height and power
rating, but gone from solitary installations to multi-megawatt arrays,
from household and community initiatives to corporate deployment,
and migrated from onshore to offshore (as discussed by Stephen Jay
in Chapter 5). This comprehensive development pattern creates the
potential for rich and multiple veins of learning, but also invites a
note of caution since no other RET is likely to follow exactly the same
trajectory.
Nevertheless, experience shows that generic lessons can, and indeed
must, be learned from wind power’s successes and failures. The chal-
lenge is to pitch the level of analysis such that transferable lessons can
be identified, without losing sight of the specificity of not only the
technologies themselves, but also the political, economic and social
contexts which enable their emergence. Here we recall the insight
offered by Alain Nadaï in Chapter 6 that technological potential
‘emerges from social processes’ – rather than existing prior to and outside
of society (as is sometimes imagined). Our strategy in this volume has
been to concentrate on the institutional and socio-political lessons to
Drawing Lessons from Wind Power for Future Sustainable Energy 237
be gained from wind power rather than those related to technological

development. This chapter likewise adopts the twinned emphasis on
governance and societal engagement. In the synthesis that follows,
we do not claim to resolve the many intricate questions related to the
governance of renewable energy and to the social processes that inter-
sect with it. But we do aim to present a number of guiding propositions
that summarise key findings and insights from the preceding chapters
and our collective research.
1. Perspectives on governance and

policy learning: key lessons
Effective renewables deployment requires consistently

high levels of political support
Energy policy is increasingly being understood in terms of energy
politics. This is because energy policy has a number of transversal
dimensions that intersect with both the economy and society.
The first is negative externalities. A prime example of this is the unpaid
environmental and social costs associated with fossil fuel extraction
and combustion. Whilst costing of externalities is notoriously problem-
atic (Sundqvist 2004), growing recognition of those costs has informed
environment and climate policymaking. Despite this, the persistence of
serious negative externalities contributes to the public’s belief that fossil
fuels are cheap, whilst renewables are expensive. Communicating that
the reverse is true remains an up-hill task.
The second is the question of subsidies to the fossil fuel and nuclear
energy sectors. The European Commission (2011: 9) reported that in the
EU alone fossil fuel subsidies stood at €21 billion in 2004 as compared to
€5.3 billion for RET. In combination with negative externalities, subsi-
dies to conventional energy sources severely distort economic costs
(Moltke et al. 2004). The correction of these distortions and mistaken
cost perceptions requires a level of political capacity which, to date, has
been lacking.
The third dimension is the functioning of energy markets. A series
of political interventions have been necessary to design energy markets
that function in a coherent and desirable manner. Whilst considerable
literature has arisen on the reality of the institutional norms that govern
energy market design (e.g. Helm 2007; Mitchell 2008) the terminology
of ‘market liberalisation’, and the neoliberal ideology that surrounds
it, perpetuates the illusion that markets are guided by a hand that is
invisible, yet benign. In practice, the liberalisation of energy markets
requires constant effort not just to dismantle national monopolies,

but prevent or minimise cross-border oligopolies, and reduce abuse of
market power. A principal cause of the underdevelopment of RET is
precisely the functioning of existing energy markets, which have been
designed to favour conventional energy sources and incumbents, in no
small part due to the influence of vested interests.
The fourth dimension is the problem of temporal transfers of costs,
with future generations having to pay for the decisions and behaviour
of current generations. The most severe problem arises from increased
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, leading to climate
impacts worldwide but with significant variations at regional levels.
Further, the millennial safekeeping of nuclear waste and indeed of
carbon – should carbon capture and storage (CCS) systems proliferate –
also passes burdens to future generations. These developments will lead
to major liabilities and spatial inequalities in the future. Despite the
influence of the Brundtland report (1987), with its insistence on inter-
generational equity, the principles of sustainable development have yet
to be translated into effective political practice in the energy sector.
The combination of long-standing externalities, subsidies to conven-
tional energy sources, market failures and temporal transfers of costs
produces a poisoned cocktail that politicians prefer to avoid. Rather
than address the root causes of dysfunction in energy supply, they
choose to treat the symptoms. Support programmes for renewables are
an example of that orientation. For reasons of expediency, policy makers
have preferred to implement financial support schemes for RETs, rather
than abolish subsidies and other preferential treatment to conventional
energy. Accordingly, a substantial part of the renewables policy liter-
ature is concerned with support schemes, and the present endeavour
to draw lessons is no exception. But it does mean that renewables are
systematically viewed through ‘the wrong end of the telescope’. Such
misperception has consequences for the social acceptability of RETs,
which we return to in Section 2 below.
For the moment, we explore the problematic consequences of this
policy frame as identified in this volume by David Elliott, Volkmar
Lauber, Peter A. Strachan and David Jones. A fundamental lesson
is that only consistent and steady political will can enable the large-
scale deployment of renewables. Yet because the ‘playing field’ is far
from level, political support must constantly be renewed to maintain
economic support. In practice, policy frameworks have often been weak
and inconsistent, leading to stop/start deployment even in countries
considered as wind pioneers, such as Denmark and the USA (Mendonça
et al. 2009; Meyer 2007). The problem is that political support for
renewables comes under repeated attack, often by the corporations
who profit from conventional sources (Sovacool 2008). An important
point made by Volkmar Lauber in Chapter 3 is that mutual reinforce-
ment occurs between hidden support to incumbents and the failure to
cultivate actors that sustain RETs. Invisible externalities and temporal
transfers not only benefit conventional energy providers in economic
terms but also provide them with political cover. This, in turn, contrib-
utes to the undermining of stakeholders in renewables. Wind power
deployment has provided a stark demonstration that the visible nature
of financial support schemes makes them an easy political target, both
for incumbents and parts of civil society hostile to it. This can lead to
a vicious cycle of seepage of political will, inconsistent policy support
and stop/start deployment. This cycle can, moreover, be exploited by
opponents as ‘evidence’ of the incapacity of renewables to deliver. On
a more positive note, experience gained with wind power deployment
has also allowed the identification of ways to sustain political will and
develop supportive socio-economic constituencies, to which we return
below.
Feed-in tariffs have been more effective than tradable

certificate systems in accelerating deployment and
promoting development modes with wide benefits
The early 2000s witnessed what Ringel (2006) called ‘the race between
feed-in tariffs and green certificates’, with a sizeable literature devel-
oping on the relative merits of each (e.g. Lauber 2004; Hvelplund 2005;
Meyer 2007; Lipp 2007; Szarka 2007; Campoccia et al. 2009). But by
the end of the 2000s the race had, to most intents and purposes, been
won by feed-in tariffs (FiTs). Further, the experience of wind power
clearly demonstrates this outcome, as Chapters 2 and 3 have shown.
Their conclusions are in line with a wide range of studies revealing the
capacity of FiTs to foster deployment at greater speed and lower cost
than other instruments (Mendonça 2007: 17–18). Indeed, the European
Commission (2008: 3) found that ‘well-adapted feed-in tariff regimes
are generally the most efficient and effective support schemes for
promoting renewable electricity’.
In relation to wind power, FiTs have proved more successful than
tradable certificates in terms of effectiveness (measured in terms of
scale of deployment), efficiency (in terms of cost levels) and equity
(understood as inclusiveness and the capacity to benefit a wide range
of stakeholders). Germany and Spain are the key examples, with record
levels of deployment (27,215 MW and 20,676 MW respectively in 2010),

relatively low costs, the development of an indigenous wind turbine
industry with major job creations, diversity of wind farm ownership
with significant numbers of new market entrants – including local
people – and hence relatively high levels of social acceptance.
Further, German and Spanish FiTs have given the lie to the belief that
FiTs involve an inflexible ‘fixed price’. In practice, well-designed price
mechanisms have been tailored to the ‘learning curves’ of individual
technologies and to evolving electricity market conditions (Couture
and Gagnon 2010). Thus FiTs avoid the danger of ‘one size fits all’.
Learning how to ‘tailor’ FiTs to individual technologies has involved
a discovery process stretching over two decades. It effectively started
with wind power, and has gradually been extended to other RETS,
such as PV, with the potential to embrace marine and tidal sources in
the future. However, FiTs are not presented as a panacea. Novel tech-
nologies usually require R&D and ‘start-up’ capital grants, rather than
the ‘drip-feed’ of FiT income, whilst wider political and institutional
frameworks also have to be taken into account when policy decisions
are taken.
On the other hand, tradable certificate systems have fared less well,
with the UK Renewables Obligation (RO) being the key case in point.
The UK has consistently failed to meet its targets for electricity gener-
ation from renewables, as set out in the RO itself and in the 2001 EU
directive. As late as 2009, renewable sources generated only 6.6 per cent
of electricity supply, against a target of 9.1 per cent. A core explanation
of its shortcomings is the disincentive to investment caused by high
levels of risk in relation to prices, volume and balancing (Mitchell et al.
2006), whereas a well-designed FiT offers guarantees in relation to each.
Further, as demonstrated by Wood and Dow (2011) and Woodman and
Mitchell (2011), revision of the RO has done too little to address the
short-falls. The RO remains a high risk/high price mechanism, char-
acterised by excessive complexity and high transaction costs, which
favours incumbents, pushes up prices, fails to stimulate innovation and
industrial diffusion, and works against societal engagement by its lack
of incentives for investment by local people or creation of local jobs. As
discussed in Chapter 2, the UK Conservative–Liberal coalition govern-
ment was developing a new batch of proposals during 2011, whose
impacts and value had yet to be tested at the time of writing.
Important conclusions flow from this. Whilst it is important to iden-
tify policy lessons regarding relative success and failure on the basis
of cross-national comparisons, mere identification is not enough. The
acceptability of particular reform proposals to stakeholders and policy-

makers inevitably varies. Current beneficiaries fear instability because
they have vested interests to protect and will lobby for the status quo.
Policymakers have more at risk than simply losing face: they also fear
losing political direction, if their underlying agenda is threatened. A
change of government can be the high road to reform, but the new
administration may implement a fundamental change in priorities, for
example, by putting nuclear or CCS ahead of RETs. Crucially, experi-
ence from wind power has shown that the deployment of RETs requires
stable advocacy coalitions over the long-term (Szarka 2010). This is a
recurrent theme in contributor chapters and a point which we stress
below.
Renewables policies have helped kick-start

the ‘green economy’
A number of socio-economic arguments relating to economic stimula-
tion, industrial development and employment creation have been put
forward to promote wind power that are also crucial for other forms
of renewable energy. Employment creation in the wind sector has
been significant, with some 104,350 new jobs across the EU in 2008
(Blanco and Rodrigues 2009). However, job creation was mostly in the
three leading wind countries, Denmark, Germany and Spain. In other
words, a pioneering role in deployment was crucial for the formation
of a national manufacturing base in wind turbines, as demonstrated in
Chapter 3. Lund (2009) showed that promotion of the renewable energy
industries of Denmark and Germany has produced a clear net benefit,
with public gains exceeding public expenditure. Similar patterns can be
expected for other RETs: innovation, technology diffusion and indus-
trial development will combine to produce jobs and create wealth.
However, countries which do not promote a specific technology, or
which take a laggard role, cannot expect to develop a national produc-
tion platform. Not all countries will be able to reap the benefits of ‘green’
(or just ‘greener’) growth because competitive effects have distribu-
tional consequences at European and global levels. This means that
‘win-win’ outcomes are not a foregone conclusion. The UK experience
with onshore wind power – with its total dependence on imported tech-
nologies – has clearly demonstrated this point (Wood and Dow 2011:
2240), although offshore deployment now offers cause for optimism for
the UK, as argued in Chapter 5.
Conscious of the need to retain European leadership in renewables
in the face of competition from the USA and China, the European
Commission (2011: 8) noted that ‘the challenge facing Europe is

to stay at the forefront of this industry, to ensure it grows at a time
when governments are simultaneously faced with the need to curtail
spending.’ By the start of the 2010s, the major difficulty was that an
‘investment gap’ opened up due to the financial crisis, the precarious
position of many leading banks, and ensuing ‘credit crunch’. However,
for the longer term, the wind sector has demonstrated that the socio-
economic arguments in favour of RETs are valid. This adds weight to
the proposals of pro-RETs advocacy coalitions. The challenge for the
coming decades is to convert these generic arguments and options into
well-focused industrial policies that foster science and technology,
build up engineering skills and capacity, and stimulate industrial
entrepreneurship.
Spatial planning can serve as a proactive and mediating

institution for the delivery of renewable energy projects
For many commentators, particularly from the wind industry and
governments, it is the planning system that is seen as the pre-eminent
barrier to a more rapid deployment of renewables. This arises from both
the perceived delays caused by the consenting process and the risks
to projects once they are opened up to broader public participation.
Indeed, the majority of the public also sees the planning system as the
main regulatory mechanism governing the development of renewa-
bles, because of the opportunities it provides for engaging with projects
proposed in their local area. Therefore, the performance of the plan-
ning system for delivering wind has been strongly socially mediated
and as such has generated multiple and often conflicting indicators of
success, which have been difficult to reconcile. There is evidence that
these issues will be transposed on to some of the ‘new’ renewables in a
very similar way (e.g. Butler 2010).
In Chapter 4, Simon Power and Richard Cowell have provided a
number of important insights into the nature of planning for wind,
both in the UK and internationally, and pointed to the spatiality of
wind energy that has given rise to particular challenges to deploy-
ment. Their chapter identified several reasons why the planning system
should continue to play an important role in guiding the deployment
of renewables, rather than leaving locational issues to market mecha-
nisms. Furthermore, Chapter 5 showed how a strong system of guid-
ance facilitated a dramatic increase in marine wind energy in the UK.
While investors and developers are attracted into sectors like renew-
ables for a variety of reasons, issues of risk minimisation have been
shown to be most critical to facilitating specific projects (e.g. Lüthi and

Prässler 2011). We should therefore view the provision of a robust spatial
framework and clear guidance for project design as crucial rubrics for
indicating the viability of a scheme at a very early stage and as such,
providing an important process in risk reduction.
However in setting such criteria, it is important to recognise that
the planning process is ‘practically the only mechanism for mediating
environmental disputes in a democratic arena’ (Ellis et al. 2009: 530).
This point is often neglected in planning debates, which are often led
by issues of procedural performance. It is the planning system’s contri-
bution to both securing a more rational spatial distribution of renew-
able projects and channelling public debate on the nature of the energy
transition that is often overlooked, yet achieving an appropriate balance
between these two roles is something of a challenge. When effective,
the planning system is capable of setting locational criteria and then
evaluating those by mediating the technical assessment of a scheme
with deliberative debate that gives voice to alternative views. Chapters
8 (Claire Haggett) and 10 (Patrick Devine-Wright) provide illuminating
studies of how this process unfolds. Furthermore, as shown by Martin
J. Pasqualetti in Chapter 7, more effective locational guidance can help
reduce conflict in the first place by ensuring emotive issues such as
impacts on wildlife, property rights or valued landscapes are minimised
and the consequences of cumulative development can be anticipated
(Jones et al. 2011). We would therefore argue that a robust, deliberative
planning process is central to any institutional design for promoting
renewables. Indeed, if there were no planning system, we would have to
invent one for this purpose.
This does not, however, mean that we should be complacent about
the role and performance of planning systems. A key shortcoming iden-
tified by Simon Power and Richard Cowell in Chapter 4 is the ‘limited
reflexivity between spatial planning approaches and the overall targets
and mode of development proposed for renewable energy expansion’.
Much greater reflection and ‘reflexivity’ are needed on how planning
systems can better mediate the changes required for the long-term
energy transition. In particular we must be aware of the danger of
conflating the aims of future renewable deployment with those of the
current wind industry or other organised stakeholders. Therefore, rather
than seeing planning as a limiting factor to a more rapid deployment
of RETs, we should regard it as one of the key democratic mechanisms
for establishing the rules for implementing the transition to sustainable
energy systems.
In summary, the governance dimensions of political will, policy

support, ‘green growth’ and planning institutions provide the founda-
tion for the energy transition. But building on this foundation requires
proactive societal engagement.
2. Societal engagement with renewable

energy technologies: key lessons
The success of wind power arises from the conjunction of a long-

standing but significantly updated technology, the need to address
impending climate and energy crises, and a set of institutional factors
including supportive government policy, market reform and spatial
planning innovations (Jacobsson and Bergek 2004). Such a view points
to the inter-related nature of technology and society. Drawing on the
seminal work of Shove (1998), Alain Nadaï in Chapter 6 stressed that
the technical and economic feasibilities of wind power – and indeed
of other RETs – are purely notional concepts until translated into real
social contexts. In the case of wind power, two of the three dimensions
of social acceptance suggested by Wüstenhagen et al. (2007) have been
substantially met (namely, market and socio-political acceptance), yet
specific wind projects have encountered problems in relation to the
third, which is acceptance by local communities. Because other RETs
also face acceptance challenges, a key insight from this book is the
importance of addressing the social contexts of engagement. In other
words, public acceptance of wind power – and of other RETs – has to
be negotiated in ‘real world’ decision-making contexts. This perspec-
tive accords with the social sciences view that understanding the
social appropriation of energy technologies is vital if we are to meet
climate and energy challenges (Webler and Tuler 2010). Several of the
contributory chapters, and numerous research projects, have focussed
on the community acceptance of wind power. Our commentary aims
to extrapolate the implications of these social acceptance debates for
future sustainable energy systems.
Adoption of new forms of energy sourcing

is socially mediated
The recent deployment of wind projects has highlighted that our rela-
tionship with energy is strongly mediated by social factors (Agterbosch
et al. 2009). The wind experience has influenced how we conceptualise
such interactions more broadly, but it has, at times, led to some regret-
table distortions. One tendency has been to adopt an over-simplified
and narrow concept of social acceptance, arising from particular prac-

tices. A large number of host communities have been asked to ‘accept’
a wind farm proposed by distant third parties, who often turn out to
be large, profit-seeking corporations. In itself, this is a counter-intuitive
usage of the notion of ‘acceptance’, which implies freedom of choice.
Moreover, when communities, or perhaps just particularly vocal constit-
uents, have contested a project, developers have deployed a range of
strategies running from the ‘soft’– public relations campaigns, celeb-
rity endorsements, use of opinion-leading intermediaries – to ‘hard’
measures, such as denigration of opponents as ‘NIMBYist’ or appealing
against local planning decisions. Thus the theme of social acceptability
has frequently been converted into the identification and pursuit of
means to attain ‘acceptance’ – in other words, ensure compliance. The
influence of such interactions and the need to go beyond a simplistic
understanding of social acceptance are recurrent themes in this book.
One of the clearest messages to emerge from wind power deployment
is that administrative rationality (as embedded in government policies
and developers’ proposals) will not be unquestioningly accepted by all
local communities. However, the consequences of contestation need to
be qualified by at least two other important insights from the ‘labora-
tory of wind’.
The first is that while local opposition can cause delays and create
discomfort for some politicians by forcing a trade-off between their
national and constituency interests, evidence exists that the ultimate
impacts on delivery of wind projects are not as great as sometimes
claimed (Aitken et al. 2008), nor indeed as important to individual
developers as are other factors (Lüthi and Prässler 2011). Despite this,
a powerful lobby led by industry interests has repeatedly stigmatised
local objectors, and their interaction with the planning system, as a
major causal factor in frustrating the completion of wind projects (e.g.
BWEA 2008; RenewableUK 2010). This view has been readily accepted
by governments of different political shades (in the UK case, see DTI
2007 and HM Treasury 2011), and then used as part of the justifica-
tion for broader, ideologically-driven strategies to reform regulatory
systems along more pro-market lines, as well as seeking to exert greater
control over, or bypass, local decision-making (see Chapter 4). This is
an important point because a narrow focus on the procedural perfor-
mance of the planning system, especially where supported by a ques-
tionable evidence base, will tend to over-emphasise the concerns of
some categories of stakeholders in the governance of renewables at the
expense of others. Ultimately, the vicious cycle of misinterpretation
and distrust risks undermining the broad public consensus in favour

of renewables and preventing the emergence of genuine community
engagement.
The second issue is that the increased deployment of wind power is
altering our understanding of broader social relationships with energy
supply. Until quite recently, electricity was thought of as clean and
convenient, no doubt because the pollution caused by centralised
power stations was not fully recognised (Owens and Driffill 2008).
This model of electricity supply held for much of the last century.
Yet with the diffusion of more decentralised generation, exemplified
by wind turbines, former assumptions about energy are now being
confronted. Because wind power is helping to change how society
views energy provision, we need to anticipate the ways in which an
expansion of biogas, solar and other technologies may also challenge
hidden assumptions, norms and conventional practices. In partic-
ular, the ‘decentralised’ model of energy supply required by most RETs
entails closer proximity between producer and user, and potentially
remodels ownership and control structures of energy governance. This
now questions some dominant concepts, including the very notions
of ‘providers’ and ‘consumers’ of energy. Such trends imply a move
from a low to a high level of societal engagement. The significance of this
move for the broader energy transition should not be underestimated.
On the one hand, it reminds us that energy issues were traditionally
framed solely in terms of ‘resource availability’ and ‘technology matu-
rity’, a tendency which can still limit energy debates. On the other, the
socio-economic implications are immense. Depending on the owner-
ship models and mix of RETs adopted, the role of corporate interests
could go from major to minor.
However, while there are a range of good examples from the wind
sector where these opportunities have been grasped by social actors, the
vast majority of generating capacity lies with existing corporate inter-
ests. Hence the industrial profile of electricity generation has not altered
radically so far. The irony is that incumbents appear to have acquired
a much better understanding of the challenges ahead than the general
public, but may use this knowledge to stifle opportunities for societal
engagement, when these are inimical to their business interests.
The development of wind power has helped clarify our awareness
that, as noted by Foxon et al. (2010), there are multiple pathways to a
low carbon energy system. The key insight here is that the dynamics
of corporate dominance versus societal engagement will be a powerful
factor shaping the nature of the energy transition.
The experience of wind power has nuanced

our understanding of community acceptance
The discussion above implies a critical approach to how regulatory agen-
cies, government, developers and some researchers have conceptualised
the ‘problem’ of community acceptance. The emergence of the stereo-
type of NIMBYism – specifically its use, predominantly by industrial
interests, as the organising principle of how to understand opposition –
has been misconceived and counter-productive (Wolsink 2000, 2006;
Devine-Wright 2005; Ellis et al. 2007). The NIMBY portrayal of objec-
tors – as irrational, selfish and/or misguided – contrasts with the findings
of social scientists. Chapters 8, 10 and 11 revealed an alternative ratio-
nality – uncovered by a better understanding of the ways in which wind
projects are perceived and encountered – which is articulated in terms
of place-attachment, health concerns and the distribution of costs and
benefits. Reliance on technocratic reasoning can lead to one-dimensional
assessment, so we should recognise that some communities may be quite
justified in raising concerns about the projects that arrive on their door-
step. This is not, of course, to advocate the abandonment of wind power
or other RETs, but to encourage better project design and enhanced
technological innovation (e.g. quieter operation), and reflect on ways to
encourage greater ‘ownership’ (in both the financial and extended usages
of the term) by local communities. This also involves greater attention to
process and institutional design (see Chapter 4). All these issues can make
a fundamental contribution to fostering greater levels of acceptance.
However, as stressed by Stefanie Huber, Robert Hobarty and Geraint
Ellis in Chapter 11, there are no fail safe approaches to achieve this:
strategy needs to be geared to specific cultural and political contexts,
as well as taking into account past experiences affecting local attitudes.
The research undertaken on wind farm disputes has also indicated
the need to shift the gaze away from just those expressing concerns
with wind energy projects. The actions, skills and capacity of regula-
tory agencies or developers themselves may frustrate higher levels of
acceptance. Other dimensions include appreciating the ways in which
positive support can be fostered for wind power projects (see chapters 9
and 10) and building institutional capacity to achieve effective public
participation. Thus an important lesson from wind power is that a range
of strategies can help reduce unnecessary antagonism – provided that
the stakeholders are willing to engage in social learning.
This offers a crucial insight for other renewables, allowing potential
acceptance issues to be anticipated and suitable approaches adopted.
Despite growing interest in increasing energy from biomass, social
concerns around the hosting of bio-energy plants appear to be barriers

to deployment (Adams et al. 2011; Upham and Shackley 2007), with
community responses and their consequences having close parallels
with that witnessed in the case of wind energy (Butler 2010). A transfer
of learning appears possible and worth pursuing.
Social acceptability depends on fairness and trust

The acknowledgment that community acceptance represents an impor-
tant dimension of the successful deployment of wind energy not only
has implications for project design, local benefit packages and spatial
distribution of wind farms, but also has a strong procedural dimension.
Wind energy research tends to confirm the wider point that fair and
open processes of decision-making can make people more accepting
of development projects and, up to a point, tolerant of negative conse-
quences (for example, Devine-Wright in Chapter 10; Hindmarsh 2010;
Wolsink 2007). Indeed, Ellis et al. (2007) noted a specific group of indi-
viduals whose position of opposition was guided primarily by their
perception of injustice in the authorisation process. Many developers
of wind projects are realising this and are putting greater efforts into
community liaison, as illustrated in Chapter 10.
However, this is not just a matter of communication and public rela-
tions but reflects more fundamental issues of ‘trust’. We can view ‘trust’
not just in terms of the ‘micro-politics’ of local planning decisions (Tait
2011) but as having a broader resonance deriving from institutional
relations (Rayner 2010). Although the micro-politics of trust can be
actively addressed through more participatory processes and the use of
credible intermediaries, this should not mask more fundamental crises
in our patterns of governance. While the experience of wind power
projects can tell us much about the instrumental value of openness and
deliberative decision-making, so can it remind us that the transition to
a more sustainable society may also require more profound changes to
energy governance. A key issue is that wind power has emerged at a time
when traditional forms of social and political engagement have been
undermined by declining trust in public institutions and business. This
undoubtedly poses a problem for wider energy and sustainability transi-
tions, in that more fundamental adjustments to underlying governance
regimes are required.
Industrial structure and ownership profile influence

both delivery and acceptance
As the scale and capacity of the wind sector have grown and support
systems evolved, the profile of the industry has changed (Szarka 2007;
Toke 2011). Rapid increases in wind generating capacity have occurred

through the establishment of ‘big scale producers’ (Kaldellis and
Zafirakis 2011). At the same time, increased corporate dominance of the
wind sector has led to growing suspicion and a willingness to challenge
developer motives when local schemes are announced, as well as to the
emergence of more supportive approaches to community involvement.
This appears to be partly due to resentment of a quasi-colonial exploi-
tation of local resources (and thus echoes developments seen in water,
forestry, mining and other globalised commodities), but it is also related
to the perceived loss of local economic opportunities. One means to
address the latter issue is through a more generous approach to commu-
nity benefits and compensatory measures. However, the evidence to date
suggests that these have a rather limited impact on levels of local accep-
tance, as exemplified in Chapters 9 and 10. Other means include more
locally engaged procedures for supply of maintenance and construction
contracts or explicit additions to local tax revenues.
The core issue, however, is not simply to squeeze more generous
community contributions out of the large, international wind devel-
opers, but relates to the governance structures that pre-dispose the
wind sector to be dominated by such interests. Indeed, as argued in
Chapter 11, there is a need to maintain diversity in the ownership of
wind projects, not just to increase opportunities for community accep-
tance, but also to ensure that different niche opportunities for renewa-
bles can be fully exploited. This underlines the importance not just of
recognising the causal factors of community opposition, but relating
these to the broader governance of the renewables sector, particularly
the dimensions of regulatory demands, financial instruments and
entry thresholds. Cross-national comparison shows that these dimen-
sions variously favour or preclude the emergence of the full range of
ownership structures that help address acceptance issues. As shown in
the chapter by Lauber, the facilitation of ownership structures – and not
the natural wind resource – explains why Germany has led in onshore
wind, and the UK has lagged. Here the key lesson is the need for posi-
tive feedback loops between governance arrangements and societal
engagement in order to build cross-constituency coalitions supportive
of renewables.
Conclusions
Our review of the lessons from wind power for governance and society
is necessarily over-arching. This has mostly meant highlighting generic
lessons, but we have also identified specific insights in relation to
contexts and technologies. The book has made a case for viewing the
expansion of wind power over recent decades as a powerful allegory
for the development of a more varied and expanded renewables sector
which can form the core of a sustainable energy system. In seeking to
rise to the energy challenges facing society, the experience of wind power
has taught us much about the need for institutional, technological and
policy innovation. It has pointed to valuable opportunities for learning
from transnational experiences in attempting to facilitate the shift to
renewable energy sources. While each RET will face unique and unfore-
seen barriers, stakeholders should draw courage from the fact that wind
power has overcome very substantial challenges to become a credible
part of the energy system. In its journey from the margins to the main-
stream, wind power has revealed a range of hidden and unacknowledged
attributes of energy markets, infrastructure and regulation. It has also
taught us much about the processes of technological diffusion, the role
of industrial structures and the influence of different ownership models.
It has even provided useful insights into the interactions between the
state, the private sector, spatial planners and society.
Furthermore, the ‘laboratory of wind’ highlights the importance
of governance structures, including the unintended consequences of
particular forms of regulation and decision-making processes. Indeed,
the variety of perspectives included in this book suggest that a more
rapid deployment of RETs is hindered not just by policies, financial
instruments and perceptions of host communities, but by the current
approach to the ‘governmentality’ of energy. By this we mean that
measures implemented to promote RETs have largely failed to grasp
either the fundamental ways in which use of energy shapes societies,
or the enormity of the multiple energy crises we now face. This book
has also shown that the need for urgent action in facing climate and
energy challenges should not deflect from the need for careful consider-
ation of policy choices. Reflection is as urgent and as central to finding
solutions as the need for action. Inevitably, the ‘laboratory of wind’
has proved insufficiently comprehensive to provide all the answers to
managing the future growth of the renewables sector, or enabling the
energy transition. But we still need to grasp the opportunity to learn
from experience, at the least by avoidance of previous mistakes.
References
Adams, P. W., Hammond, G. P., Mcmanus, M.C. and Mezzullo, W.G. (2011)
‘Barriers to and drivers for UK bioenergy development’, Renewable and
Sustainable Energy Reviews, 15, 1217–1227.
Agterbosch, S., Meertens, R. M. and Vermeulen, W. J. V. (2009) ‘The relative

importance of social and institutional conditions in the planning of wind
power projects’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 13, 393–405.
Blanco, M. I. and Rodrigues, G. (2009) ‘Direct employment in the wind energy
sector: an EU study’, Energy Policy, 37, 2847–2857.
Brundlandt Report (1987) Our Common Future, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Butler, A. (2010) ‘The good, the bad and the ugly: lessons from biogas plant
planning applications’, ROOTS 2010, Plumpton College, East Sussex, 13–14
April 2010.
BWEA (British Wind Energy Association) (2008) Wind Energy in the UK: A BWEA
State of the Industry Report, London, BWEA.
Campoccia, A., Dusonchet, L., Telaretti, E. and Zizzo, G. (2009) ‘Comparative
analysis of different supporting measures for the production of electrical
energy by solar PV and wind systems: four representative European cases’,
Solar Energy, 83, 287–297.
Couture, T. and Gagnon, Y. (2010) ‘An analysis of feed-in tariff remuneration
models: implications for renewable energy investment’, Energy Policy, 38,
955–965.
Devine-Wright, P. (2005) ‘Beyond NIMBYism: towards an integrated frame-
work for understanding public perceptions of wind energy’, Wind Energy, 8,
125–139.
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) (2007) Meeting the Energy Challenge: A
White Paper on Energy, London: The Stationery Office.
Ellis, G., Barry, J. and Robinson, C. (2007) ‘Many ways to say “no”, different
ways to say “yes”: applying Q-methodology to understand public acceptance
of wind farm proposals’, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 50:
4 (July), 517–551.
Ellis, G., Cowell, R., Warren, C., Strachan, P. and Szarka, J. (2009) ‘Wind power:
a problem of planning, or of perception?’, Planning Theory and Practice, 10: 4,
523–532
European Commission (2008) ‘Commission staff working document: the support
of electricity from renewable energy sources’, SEC(2008)57, 23 January 2008
European Commission (2010) ‘Energy 2020: a strategy for competitive, sustain-
able and secure energy’, COM(2010) 639 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu
/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0639:FIN:EN:PDF, accessed on 4
July 2011.
European Commission (2011) ‘Renewable energy: progressing towards the 2020
target’, COM(2011) 31 final.
Foxon, T. J., Hammond, G. P. and Pearson, P. J. G. (2010) ‘Developing transi-
tion pathways for a low carbon electricity system in the UK’, Technological
Forecasting and Social Change, 77: 8, 1203–1213.
Helm, D. (ed.) (2007) The New Energy Paradigm, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Hindmarsh, R. (2010) ‘Wind farms and community engagement in Australia: a
critical analysis for policy learning’, East Asian Science, Technology and Society:
An International Journal, 4, 541–563.
HM Treasury (2011) 2011 Budget, London: The Stationery Office
Hvelplund, F. (2005) ‘Renewable energy: political prices or political quantities’,

in Lauber, V. (ed.) Switching to Renewable Power: A Framework for the 21st Century,
pp. 228–245, London: Earthscan.
Jacobsson, S. and Bergek, A (2004) ‘Transforming the energy sector: the evolu-
tion of technological systems in renewable energy technology’, in Jacob, K.,
Binder, M. and Wieczorek, A. (eds) Governance for Industrial Transformation:
Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference On the Human Dimensions of Global
Environmental Change, pp. 208–236, Berlin: Environmental Policy Research
Centre.
Jones, C. R., Orr, B. J. and Eiser, J. R. (2001) ‘When is enough, enough? Identifying
predictors of capacity estimates for onshore wind-power development in a
region of the UK, Energy Policy, 39, 4563–4577.
Kaldellis, J. K. and Zafirakis, D. (2011) ‘The wind energy (r)evolution: a short
review of a long history’, Renewable Energy, 36, 1887–1901.
Lauber, V. (2004) ‘REFIT and RPS: options for a harmonised community frame-
work’, Energy Policy, 32, 1405–1414.
Lipp, J. (2007) ‘Lessons for effective renewable electricity policy from Denmark,
Germany and the United Kingdom’, Energy Policy, 35, 5481–5495.
Lund, P. D. (2009) ‘Effects of energy policies on industry expansion in renewable
energy’, Renewable Energy, 34, 53–64.
Lüthi, S. and Prässler, T. (2011) ‘Analysing policy support instruments and regu-
latory risk factors for wind energy development – a developers’ perspective’,
Mendonça, M. (2007) Feed-In Tariffs: Accelerating the Deployment of Renewable
Energy, London: Earthscan.
Mendonça, M., Lacey, S. and Hvelplund, F. (2009) ‘Stability, participation and
transparency in renewable energy policy: lessons from Denmark and the
United States’, Policy and Society, 27, 379–39.
Meyer, N. I. (2007) ‘Learning from wind energy policy in the EU: lessons from
Denmark, Sweden and Spain’, European Environment, 17: 5, 347–362.
Palgrave Macmillan.
Mitchell, C., Bauknecht, D. and Connor, P. M. (2006) ‘Effectiveness through risk
reduction: a comparison of the Renewable Obligation in England and Wales
and the feed-in system in Germany’, Energy Policy, 34, 297–305.
Moltke, A. von, McKee, C. and Morgan, T. (eds) (2004) Energy Subsidies: Lessons
Learned in Assessing Their Impact and Designing Policy Reform¸ Sheffield:
Greenleaf.
Owens, S. and Driffill, L. (2008) ‘How to change attitudes and behaviours in the
context of energy’, Energy Policy, 36, 4412–4418.
Rayner, S. (2010) ‘Trust and the transformation of energy systems’, Energy Policy,
38, 2617–2623.
RenewableUK (2010) ‘Memorandum from RenewableUK (LOCO 087)’, Evidence
provided to Communities and Local Government Committee inquiry into
Localism, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect
/cmcomloc/writev/localism/loco087.htm, accessed on 24 September 2011.
Ringel, M. (2006) ‘Fostering the use of renewable energies in the European
Union: the race between feed-in tariffs and green certificates’, Renewable
Energy, 31, 1–17.
Shove, E (1998) ‘Gaps, barriers and conceptual chasms: theories of technology

Sovacool, B. (2008) ‘Renewable energy: economically sound, politically diffi-
cult’, The Electricity Journal, 21: 5, 18–29.
Sundqvist, T. (2004) ‘What causes the disparity of electricity externality esti-
mates?’, Energy Policy, 32: 15, 1753–1766.
Palgrave Macmillan.
Szarka, J. (2010) ‘Bringing interests back in: using coalition theories to explain
European wind power policies’, Journal of European Public Policy, 17: 6,
838–855.
Tait, M. (2011) ‘Trust and the public interest in the micropolitics of planning
practice’, Journal of Planning Education and Research, 31: 2, 157–171.
Toke, D. (2011) ‘Ecological modernisation, social movements and renewable
energy’, Environmental Politics, 20: 1, (February) 60–77.
Upham, P. and Shackley, S. (2007) ‘Local public opinion of a proposed 21.5 MWe
biomass gasifier in Devon: questionnaire survey results’, Biomass Bioenergy, 31,
433–441.
Webler, T. and Tuler, S. P. (2010) ‘Getting the engineering right is not always
enough: researching the human dimensions of the new energy technologies’,
Energy Policy, 38, 2690–2691
Wolsink, M. (2000) ‘Wind power and the NIMBY-myth: institutional capacity
and the limited significant of public support’, Renewable Energy, 21, 49–64.
Wolsink, M. (2006) ‘Invalid theory impedes our understanding; a critique on
the persistence of the language of NIMBY’, Transactions of the Institute of
British Geographers (New Series), 31, 85–91.
Wolsink, M. (2007) ‘Planning of renewables schemes: deliberative and fair
decision-making on landscape issues instead of reproachful accusations of
non-cooperation’, Energy Policy, 35, 2692–2704.
Wood, G. and Dow, S. (2011) ‘What lessons have been learnt in reforming the
renewables obligation? An analysis of internal and external failures in UK
renewable energy policy’, Energy Policy, 39, 2228–2244.
Woodman, B. and Mitchell, C. (2011) ‘Learning from experience? The develop-
ment of the renewables obligation in England and Wales 2002–2010’, Energy
Policy, 39, 3914–3921.
Wurzel, R. K. W. and Connelly, J. (eds) (2011) The European Union as a Leader in
International Climate Change Politics, London: Routledge.
35, 2683–2691.
WWEA (World Wind Energy Report)(2011) World Wind Energy Report 2010, http:
//www.wwindea.org/home/images/stories/pdfs/worldwindenergyreport2010_s.
pdf, accessed on 9 May 2011.
Index
acid rain, 47 competition, 42, 49

Actor Network Theory (ANT), 10, cultural concerns, 144–5
109, 124–6
aesthetic concerns, 137–8 decision-making processes, 6, 62,
agency, 126 71–2, 96, 118, 226–7
anti-nuclear movement, 47 Denmark, 78, 81, 178, 224, 226
anti-wind organisations, 135–6 Department of Energy and Climate
see also opposition Change, 46
Arab Spring, 2 DESERTEC, 51
atmosphere, 157–8 Desert Sunlight scheme, 79
Aveyron, 116–18 developers
aviation safety, 138, 142–3 community benefit packages by,
174–90, 199–202, 207–10
bats, 140–1, 145, 224 intermediaries for, 194–5, 199,
biomass, 18, 29–30 204–7, 211
birds, 112–16, 123, 139–40, 145, 221 local communities and, 174–90
Brundtland report, 238 societal engagement by, 11–12,
194–211
Canada, 226
capacity building, 221–2 economic development, 1, 224–6
Cape Cod, Massachusetts, 144 ecosystem impacts, 220–1
carbon capture and storage (CCS), Electricity Act, 39
21, 46, 238 electricity, 29, 30, 246
cartographic forms, 119–23 employment
Chernobyl accident, 47 in renewable energy sector, 55
China in wind power industry, 47, 241
coal use in, 34 energy challenges, 1–6
renewable energy programs in, 34 energy companies, 97–8, 175–6,
wind power in, 4, 34 178–9
civil society, 5 see also developers
climate change, 1–3, 33, 47, 229, 238 energy costs, 32
climate policy, 5 energy demand, 1
coal, 33–4, 47 energy efficiency, 2
coastal locations, 196–8 energy markets, 237–8
community acceptance energy policy, 1–2, 5, 8–9, 235
see also social acceptability in England, 69–70, 74–5
of wind power, 217, 223, 228–9, in Scotland, 70–1, 73
244–9 in UK, 38–47, 93–4, 174, 175–8
community benefits, 11–12, 174–90, in Wales, 67–9, 72–4, 79–80
199–202, 207–10, 225–6 energy security, 1, 2, 229
community engagement, 194–211 energy supply, 246
community wind, 225 energy transition, 124
255
256 Index
England, renewable energy policy in, Infrastructure Planning

69–70, 74–5 Commission (IPC), 22
environmental concerns, with wind innovation system, 125
power, 138–41 intermediaries, 194–5, 199,
European Commission, 7, 241–2 204–7, 211
intermittency, 17, 28
feed-in tariffs (FiTs), 8, 9, 17, 19, 20, International Energy Agency
24, 25, 45–50, 56–7, 111, 239–41 (IEA), 215–16
financing, 8–9, 176 Ireland, 224
flicker, 138 Isle of Lewis, Scotland, 144
fossil fuels, 1, 235, 237 Isthmus of Tehuantepec,
France, 77–9 Mexico, 144–5
Aveyron, 116–18
Narbonnaise, 112–16, 119–22, 123 Japan, 2, 224
wind power development zones
(WPDZs), 77, 79, 111, 117–18 landfill gas projects, 19–20, 44
wind power planning in, 108–27 landscapes, 111, 116–21, 144–5, 157,
Fukushima nuclear accident, 2, 52 197–8, 220–1, 224
large-scale projects, 218–20, 248–9
generic technology, 109 Lincs wind farm, 201, 203, 205–10
Germany, 85 local communities, 174–90, 244–9
FiT system, 20, 47–50 financial benefits for, 174–90,
public acceptance of wind projects 199–202, 207–10
in, 197 intermediaries with, 194–5, 199,
Renewable Energy Sources Act 204–7, 211
(2000), 49–52 local decision making, 222–3
spatial planning in, 78, 81
wind power in, 19, 42, 43, marine cables, 23
47–56, 177 Marine Current Turbines, 25
glint, 138 Marine Renewable Deployment
governance issues, 5, 8–10, 63–6, 77, Fund (MRDF), 25
237–44 marine wind energy, 9
graphic forms, 119–22, 123 see also offshore wind power
green certificates, 239–41 in UK, 85–101
green economy, 241–2 market acceptance, of wind
greenhouse gas emissions, 2, 44, power, 217
235, 238 market creation, 40–1, 47–50, 54–5
grid balancing, 29 market-oriented policies, 2–3
grid connections, 22–3 measurement, of wind turbine noise,
Gwynt y Mor wind farm, 201–10 158–9, 161–3, 168
media, 11, 223–4
health concerns, 142–4 meta-governance, 63
heat, 29–30 Mexico, 136
High Voltage Direct Current ‘missing masses’, 124
(HVDC) supergrid, 29
hydropower, 3 Narbonnaise, 112–16, 119–22, 123
Netherlands, 76–80, 85, 178,
industry structure, 97–8, 248–9 197, 226
info-mediary, 194 New Labour, 40–1, 54–5
Index 257
NIMBY (not in my backyard) attitude, public attitudes, toward offshore

195–7, 220, 228 wind power, 98–9
noise, from wind farms, 11, 143–4, public engagement, 194–211, 244–9
153–70, 221 public relations, 194
Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO), public trust, 198–9, 248
39–40, 41, 54–5, 175–6, 177
norms, 5–6 quality of life, 146, 221
Norway, 224
nuclear power, 30–1, 33, 39, 46, 47, reflexivity, 65, 78
51, 52, 237 regulatory authority, 222
renewable energy
offshore wind power, 9, 18–19, 23, challenges of, 7–8
27–8, 46–7 competition among, 30–1
acceptance of, 220 deployment of, 237–9
community engagement and, economic benefits of, 1
195–9 future of, 32–4, 235–50
economic framework, 94–5 market creation for, 40–1,
geographical and environmental 47–50, 54–5
context, 95–6 options, 18
in Germany, 53–4 policy, 174, 175–8
industry structure, 97–8 prospects and limits for, 27–32
lessons from, 100–1 public acceptance of, 7
phases of development, 87–92 public engagement with,
planning and consent for, 96–7, 101 194–211, 244–9
policy direction for, 93–4 spatial planning, 63–81
public attitudes toward, 98–9 support for, 24–7, 45–7, 51, 94–5,
in Scottish territorial waters, 92–3 176, 237–9
in UK, 85–101 targets for, 2, 3
Ofgem, 21, 22 transitioning to, 5
oil prices, 1 wind turbine noise and, 167–70
oil shocks, 3, 47 Renewable Energy Association
onshore wind projects, 4, 8, 51–2, 61 (REA), 45
opposition, to wind power, 10–11, Renewable Energy Sources Act
39–40, 49, 133–49 (2000), 49–50
oversupply issues, 30–2 amendments, 51–2
ownership models, 225, 248–9 renewable energy technology (RET),
2, 3, 216, 227–8, 235–50
Palm Springs, California, 144–5, 149 Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI),
peak oil, 1, 3, 33, 229 25, 27
photovoltaic (PV) solar, 24–5, 27, Renewable Obligation Credits
29, 33 (ROCs), 20
planning issues, 9–10, 96–7 Renewables Obligation (RO), 8, 17–24,
see also spatial planning 55, 176, 240
community benefit programs and, functioning of, 41–4
186–90 introduction of, 40–1
in France, 108–27 reform and replacement of, 44–5
policy learning, 8–10
privatisation, in UK, 39 safety concerns, 142–4
property values, 145, 146, 226 scale, 64
258 Index
Scotland, 23 tidal energy, 25, 26, 28–9, 33

offshore wind power, 92–3 tradable certificate systems, 239–41
renewable energy policy in, transaction costs, 55–6
70–1, 73 transparency, 226–7
Scottish and Southern Energy
(SSE), 183, 185–6, 189 United Kingdom (UK)
Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH), 71 energy policy, 93–4, 174–8
sea views, 196 geographical and environmental
Severn Barrage, 32 context, 95–6
situated technology, 109 marine wind energy in, 85–101
social acceptability, 7, 10, 12, 124, opposition to wind power in, 134
215–29, 248–9 spatial planning in, 61–76
social concerns, 144–5 wind power in, 17–23, 38–47, 54–6,
social experience, of noise, 153–70 61–76, 178–80
social justice, 145, 146 United States, 79, 94, 224
social networks, 223–4 corporate ownership in, 178–9
societal engagement, 5–6, 10–13, opposition to wind power in, 136–7
194–211, 244–9 utility-scale solar projects, 79
socio-cultural environment, 147
socio-environmental impacts, 11 Valencia, 76–7, 79–80
socio-political acceptance, of wind
power, 217 Wadden Society, 197
soil erosions, 141 Wales, renewable energy policy in,
solar power, 18, 24–7, 29, 33, 79 67–9, 72–4, 79–80
Spain, 177, 179, 220 warning lights, 138, 142
spatial planning, 9, 61–81, wave energy, 25, 26, 28–9, 33
222, 242–4 wildlife impacts, 139–41, 145, 220–1
cross-country comparison, 76–9 wind farms, 4, 10
evaluating, 72–6 case studies, 201–10
modes of governance and, 63–6, 77 community benefit programs from,
in practice, 66–79 180–90
in UK, 66–76 community owned, 178–9
stakeholders, 98–9, 182, 226, 227–8 layout of, 158
Strategic Search Areas (SSAs), 72–6 noise from, 11, 153–70, 221
subsidies, 237 scale and character of, 218–20
supergrids, 23, 29, 30 wind power, 3, 17–18
Sweden, 77 annual installations of, 42
Switzerland, 224, 226 benefits of, 224–6
challenges of, 4–5, 17
Task 28 working group, 215–16 community benefit funds and,
TCE, 97, 99, 100, 101 174–90
Technical Advice Note 8 (TAN8), 67, concerns with, 137–45
69, 72–4, 76, 77 constraints on, 18–23
technical concerns, 142–4 costs of, 32, 33, 224–6
technologies, 108–9 cross-country comparison, 178–80
theories of, 124–5 cumulative installations of, 43
technology neutral competition, 45 debates over, 223–4
Thatcher, Margaret, 39 deployment of, 4, 9, 10
tidal barrages, 32 development of, 7–8
Index 259
wind power – continued planning, in France, 108–27

energy generated from, 27–8 policy, 8–9
future of, 32–4 public debate on, 6
in Germany, 47–56, 177 social acceptance of, 215–29
growth of, 3–4 societal engagement with, 10–13,
impacts of, 133–4, 138–41, 194–211
219–21, 228 spatial planning, 61–81, 222
lessons from, 235–50 support for, 44, 56–7
methodology for capacity trans-national experiences of,
assessment, 68–9 215–29
offshore, 9, 18–19, 23, 27–8, 46–7, in UK, 38–47, 54–6, 61–76, 180
53–4, 85–101 wind power development zones
onshore, 51–2, 61 (WPDZs), 77, 79, 111, 117–18
opposition to, 10–11, 39–40, 49, wind spillage, 29
133–49, 223–4 wind turbines, 143–4, 153–70, 236

(Energy, Climate and the Environment Series) Joseph Szarka, Richard Cowell, Geraint Ellis, Peter a. Strachan, Charles Warren (Eds.) - Learning From Wind Power_ Governance, Societal and Policy Perspect (1)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

(Energy, Climate and the Environment Series) Joseph Szarka, Richard Cowell, Geraint Ellis, Peter a. Strachan, Charles Warren (Eds.) - Learning From Wind Power_ Governance, Societal and Policy Perspect (1)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Energy, Climate and the Environment Series

Series Editor: David Elliott, Emeritus Professor of Technology,

Energy, Climate and the Environment

List of Illustrations vii

Series Editor’s Preface xiii

Notes on Contributors xvi

1 Wind Power: Towards a Sustainable Energy Future? 1

Part I Governance and Policy Learning

3 Wind Power Policy in Germany and the UK:

4 Wind Power and Spatial Planning in the UK 61

5 From Laggard to World Leader: The United Kingdom’s

6 Planning with the Missing Masses: Innovative Wind

Part II Societal Engagement with Wind Power

8 The Social Experience of Noise from Wind Farms 153

9 Navigating a Minefield? Wind Power and

10 Fostering Public Engagement in Wind Energy

11 Social Acceptance of Wind Power Projects:

12 Drawing Lessons from Wind Power for

4.1. Methodology for the strategic assessment of

3.1 Annual installations of wind power in

10.1 Contexts of the two offshore wind energy cases:

ADEME Agence de l’Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l’Energie

Energy, Climate and the Environment

Concerns about the potential environmental, social and economic

used to buttress specific policy frameworks in ways which subsequently

Focussing on the developed world, with particular emphasis on Europe

Richard Cowell is Reader in Environmental Planning at Cardiff

Patrick Devine-Wright holds a Chair in Human Geography at the

David Elliott is Emeritus Professor in Technology Policy at the Open

Claire Haggett is Lecturer in the Sociology of Sustainability at the

invited panellist and speaker at wide range of UK and international

Robert Horbaty is an energy and sustainable development expert, with

Stefanie Huber holds a Master’s in Environmental Sciences and a

Stephen Jay is Lecturer in the School of Environmental Sciences at the

and also the progress of marine spatial planning throughout Europe

David Jones is Lecturer in Business Strategy and the Environment,

Volkmar Lauber is Professor in Comparative Politics at the University

Alain Nadaï is a socio-economist and a research director at CIRED,

Martin J. Pasqualetti is Professor of Geography in the School of

Simon Power is Associate Director at the consultancy Arup, where he

planning research relating to delivering renewable energy across the

Peter A. Strachan is Professor in Energy Policy and Management,

Joseph Szarka is Reader in Policy Studies in the Department of Politics,

Charles Warren is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Geography

Context and rationale: energy challenges,

transition towards a more sustainable energy system. These have been

China alone may have installed as much as 150 GW of wind power

in capacity to disrupt existing modes of energy provision, environments

of conditionality. They also allow us to understand why proposals and

Structure and content

The book adopts a two-part structure, reflecting its twin emphasis on

reduction) within a wider context of community development and

● What key factors have facilitated or impeded the deployment of wind

The arguments are sharpened by three themes which are explored

consist of ‘hard facts’ to which a soft and malleable society needed to

Part I: governance and policy learning

renewable energy, as well as supportive institutions in the spheres of

Nadaï revisits these planning issues in Chapter 6 from a rather different

Part II: societal engagement with wind power

cultural contexts, a common driver of opposition in all four cases is a

acceptance of large-scale renewable energy projects, as the author

by which these choices themselves are made – will have far-reaching

Mitchell, C. (2008) The Political Economy of Sustainable Energy, Basingstoke:

Wind power is the leading renewable energy option, leaving aside