EV Battery Thermal Runaway

Final Report

540:594 Risk Analysis

Group D—Farhad Angizeh, Nevin Hotson, Chintan Shah, Darshan Shah
27 Nov 2020

Introduction
We considered several scenarios in which barrier failure within an electric vehicle (EV) could lead to
catastrophic thermal runaway (TR) of the battery. We understood the explosion to be a potential
consequence of any battery thermal runaway (Sun, et al. 2020), so we focused on scenarios that could
create the thermal runaway as any of them could result in an explosion. We also focused on lithium-ion
batteries, rather than other battery chemistries like nickel-metal hydride, as the former are used in
almost all EVs operated in the United States (Coffin and Horowitz 2018).

Background
Thermal runaway is a significant hazard for lithium batteries because the typical battery chemistry
(lithium anodes, metal-oxide cathodes, and an alkyl carbonate electrolyte) permits exothermic reactions
at or above an internal temperature of 160 °C (Hewson and Domino 2015). Because an EV battery
typically comprises many cells that are closely packed in the battery casing, thermal runaway within one
cell can quickly cascade throughout the battery, resulting in a rapid release of a dangerous amount of
energy stored as both the electrical potential of the battery and the enthalpy of combustion of the
battery electrolyte (Hewson and Domino 2015). Other than the obvious possibility of initiation due to
high operating temperature or high external temperatures such as a fire, thermal runaway may also be
initiated by heating produced by an internal or external short circuit; since the battery electrolyte is a
liquid, any failure of the cell’s internal separator or external casing can create a short circuit between
the cell’s electrodes (Naguib, et al. 2018).

Qualitative Assessment of Hazards

Our previous report presented a qualitative assessment of the hazards, included below as Appendix A.
This assessment includes a brief description of the barrier failures that contribute to each kind of hazard.

Quantitative Assessment of Hazards

We constructed fault trees to decompose our identified hazards into base events. We estimated
probabilities of occurrence for the base events. All hazards were assessed in terms of the hazard per EV
per year, in order to keep them in the same units. We used several methods to estimate these
probabilities:

1. The probability of being involved in a collision was calculated from data for the number of
collisions annually in the USA (Insurance Information Institute 2020) and the total number of
vehicles on the road (Federal Highway Administration 2018). This estimation assumed that the
collision hazard for EVs is the same as for other kinds of light vehicles.
 2. We assumed that the EV is designed for collision protection such that only the 1% most severe
collisions overcome the structural measures protecting the battery.
3. Hazards related to manufacturing defects were assumed to be at the rate that would be
expected from a facility operating under effective six-sigma quality control, i.e. about one defect
per million products. We treated the battery assembly as the product in this case, rather than
the individual cells, since this would be the appropriate way for the EV manufacturer to do
quality control on the batteries.
4. EV components were assumed to be properly maintained and replaced on a maintenance
schedule that ensures components stay out of the increasing-failure-rate portion of the bathtub
curve.
5. In-service failures were assumed to be at a rate of one failure per million EVs per year.
6. We assumed that 1% of drivers would disregard safety warnings and procedures in situations
where this might lead to a TR event.
7. The hazard for external fires was calculated using the rate of house fires in the USA (National
Fire Protection Association 2020) as a proxy for all types of fire, and assuming that 1% of fires
are severe enough to spread throughout the structure and endanger the EV.

We used the Rare Event Approximation for most of the elements in the fault trees, since the
probabilities involved were generally very low.

Fault Trees
The fault trees we developed are shown below. We have five trees for the major classes of hazard
contributing to TR, each of which is then combined with the conditional probability of inadequate
firefighting response to that class of hazard, to give the total hazard of a TR and explosion.
Calculation of hazard probability
The calculations we used to determine the top-level hazard are included as a separate spreadsheet. The
first-level hazards (𝐵 through 𝐹) have the cut-sets:

Hazard Code Cut-set

Collision 𝐵 𝐵1 𝐵2 + 𝐵1 𝐵3 + 𝐵1 𝐵4 − 𝐵1 𝐵2 𝐵3 − 𝐵1 𝐵2 𝐵4 − 𝐵1 𝐵3 𝐵4 + 𝐵1 𝐵2 𝐵3 𝐵4
Mechanical 𝐶 𝐶12 𝐶111 + 𝐶12 𝐶112 + 𝐶12 𝐶113 + 𝐶2 𝐶221 + 𝐶2 𝐶222
Overcharge 𝐷 𝐷11 𝐷21 + 𝐷12 𝐷21 + 𝐷13 𝐷21 + 𝐷11 𝐷22 + 𝐷12 𝐷22 + 𝐷13 𝐷22
Overtemp 𝐸 3 4

𝐸1 + ∑ ∑ 𝐸2𝑖 𝐸3𝑗
𝑖=1 𝑗=1
ISC 𝐹 𝐹11 + 𝐹12 + 𝐹21 + 𝐹22

Each of these is then multiplied by the probability of ineffective firefighting given that a TR has occurred
due to that hazard, to get the hazard probability of the TR developing to the point of explosion. The
assumptions we used for this were:

1. The TR is likely to be too rapid to stop an explosion if the TR is due to a collision (𝐴1 = 0.9│𝐵).
Other kinds of TR are gradual and cascade from a single cell (𝐴1 = 0|𝐵̅).
2. Collision and overtemperature TRs may occur while the EV is on a highway outside of a city,
where firefighters can’t arrive fast enough (𝐴2 = 0.5 │𝐵 ∪ 𝐸2 ∪ 𝐸3 ). Other kinds of TR could
happen at any time, so are likely to occur while the vehicle is parked at home (𝐴2 = 0|𝐵 ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
∪ 𝐸 ).
3. TRs that can occur at any time will probably occur when no-one is paying attention to the EV, so
would only be noticed once the EV has already caught fire, making it unlikely that firefighters
can arrive fast enough to save the EV (𝐴3 = 0.9│𝐶 ∪ 𝐷 ∪ 𝐹). If the TR occurs while driving, the
driver is assumed to immediately call for help (𝐴3 = 0│𝐵 ∪ 𝐸2 ∪ 𝐸3 ).
4. We assumed that only some external fires are able to spread to the area where the EV is parked
before the EV is enveloped (𝐴3 = 0.1, 𝐴1 = 𝐴2 = 0│𝐸1 ).

The hazard rates for catastrophic TR were found to be:

Hazard Code TR hazard per EV per year Catastrophic TR hazard per EV per
year
Collision 𝐵 9.86 × 10−4 9.37 × 10−4
Mechanical 𝐶 3 × 10−6 2.7 × 10−6
Overcharge 𝐷 2.02 × 10−8 1.82 × 10−8
Overtemp 𝐸 2.92 × 10−4 2.92 × 10−5
ISC 𝐹 3.12 × 10−6 2.81 × 10−6
Total 𝑇 9.72 × 10−4
Conclusions
Our assessment estimates the hazard of catastrophic TR and explosion as about one per thousand EVs
per year. This rate of catastrophic events would be totally unacceptable for a vehicle. The available data
(Sun, et al. 2020) suggest that the actual hazard is much lower, on the order of one TR and explosion per
105 EVs per year; no comprehensive database of EV TRs exists, but Sun et al attempted to catalogue all
known incidents in a year.

We consider that our estimate may be so high due to several potential sources of error. First, the largest
contribution to the hazard rate is from TRs due to collisions. It is possible that EVs are involved in fewer
collisions than the average vehicle, since EVs tend to be newer (due to the recent adoption and rapid
growth of the technology) and newer vehicles tend to have more collision-avoidance features. It is also
possible that our estimate of the proportion of collisions that defeat the structure protecting the battery
was pessimistic. Our assumption that one component per million is produced with a defect may also
have been pessimistic; it would be reasonable for the EV manufacturers to apply quality control
measures that are even more strict than six-sigma to safety-critical components. Lastly, we may have
been too pessimistic in our assumption of what proportion of drivers would disobey the recommended
operating procedures for their EV.

Team Contributions
Initial identification of barrier failure scenarios: collectively brainstormed by all team members.

Qualitative assessment of hazards: work shared among all team members, report compiled by Nevin.

Fault trees: Nevin and Farhad

Cut set determination and probability calculation: Farhad and Nevin

Presentation slideshow creation: Led by Farhad with input from all team members

Final report: compiled by Nevin, summarizing the team’s collective efforts.

Appendices
Appendix 1: Initial qualitative analysis

Appendix 2: fault-tree event probability calculations (separate Excel spreadsheet)

Works Cited
Coffin, David, and Jeff Horowitz. 2018. "The Supply Chain for Electric Vehicle Batteries." Journal of
International Commerce and Economics (United States International Trade Commission).
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/the_supply_chain_for_electric_vehicle_batter
ies.pdf.

Federal Highway Administration. 2018. Highway Statistics 2015. May.

https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2015/vm1.cfm.

Hewson, John C., and Stefan P. Domino. 2015. "Thermal runaway of lithium-ion batteries and hazards of
abnormal thermal environments." 9th U.S. National Combustion Meeting. Cincinnati, OH:
Central States Section of the Combustion Institute.
https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1249044.

Insurance Information Institute. 2020. Facts + Statistics: Highway safety: III. https://www.iii.org/fact-
statistic/facts-statistics-highway-safety.

Modarres, Mohammad. 2006. Risk Analysis in Engineering: Techniques, Tools, and Trends. Boca Raton,
Florida: CRC Press.

Naguib, Michael, Srikanth Allu, Srdjan Simunovic, Jianlin Li, Hsin Wang, and Nancy J. Dudney. 2018.
"Limiting Internal Short-Circuit Damage by Electrode Partition for Impact-Tolerant Li-Ion
Batteries." Joule 2 (1): 155-167. doi:10.1016/j.joule.2017.11.003.

National Fire Protection Association. 2020. "Fire Loss in the United States During 2019." NFPA.
September. https://www.nfpa.org/~/media/fd0144a044c84fc5baf90c05c04890b7.ashx.

Sun, Peiyi, Roeland Bisschop, Huichang Niu, and Xinyan Huang. 2020. "A Review of Battery Fires in
Electric Vehicles." Fire Technology 56: 1361-1410. doi:10.1007/s10694-019-00944-3.

Xiong, Rui, Suxiao Ma, Hailong Li, Fengchun Sun, and Ju Li. 2020. "Toward a Safer Battery Management
System: A Critical Review on Diagnosis and Prognosis of Battery Short Circuit." Iscience 101010.
Appendix 1 – Qualitative Assessment of Hazards
Several of the hazard scenarios we identified in our initial report have been combined for this
assessment, as their severity and probability would be very similar. The scenarios below are numbered
to indicate which scenarios from our first report are represented by each.

The qualitative assessments of severity are according to the following criteria:

• Catastrophic: people are killed and/or the EV is destroyed

• Critical: severe injury and/or severe damage to the EV or other property
• Marginal: minor injury and/or minor damage to the EV or other property
• Negligible: no injury or lasting damage

Probability assessments are on the scale from Frequent to Incredible proposed by Modarres in the
textbook (Modarres 2006).

Scenario Description Risk Assessment

Delayed An EV fire beginning with battery
Emergency thermal runaway progresses to
Response destroy the vehicle, due to
(precondition inadequate firefighting responses
for explosion) and/or because the fire had
become uncontrollable before
firefighters arrived.
Barriers failing: inability to provide
a proper firefighting capability to
prevent the TR developing into an
explosion.
Collision (#1 Battery cells are ruptured in a
to 4) single- or multi-vehicle collision.
This could be due to gross
deformation from collision forces;
penetration by an external object
or by another part of the EV; or
penetration of battery cell
separators by the cell’s own
electrodes.
Barriers failing: collision safety
measures, driver avoidance of
collisions, structure protecting the
battery, and cell structure
containment of the electrolyte
This scenario would be Catastrophic in severity. It
implies that the severity would have been lesser
had the fire been fought immediately, but
instead the EV is destroyed.
This scenario is Remote, as it could be initiated by
any of the other scenarios and it is fairly likely
that an EV fire might not be reported
immediately, or might be far enough away from a
fire department that the firefighters cannot
arrive in time to save the EV. Fighting an EV fire
requires approximately 10,000 L of water (Sun, et
al. 2020) so fighting the fire before the
firefighters arrive is infeasible.
This scenario would be Catastrophic in severity. A
collision severe enough to cause a thermal
runaway could have left people incapacitated or
trapped inside the EV, so a post-crash thermal
runaway, fire, and explosion could easily be fatal.
This scenario is Remote in probability. It is
unlikely, but possible, that any individual EV will
be involved in a severe collision during its service
life. Improbable would be too low, as several
post-crash fires are known to have already
occurred (Sun, et al. 2020). Occasional would be
too high, as a severe collision is not “likely to
occur sometime in the life of an individual” EV.
Mechanical The cell barrier is subjected to
stress mechanical stress beyond its
(#5 to 7) design capability, and fails,
resulting in thermal runaway and
an explosion. Failure could be due
to deterioration from material
fatigue, dissimilar thermal
expansion properties of the parts
of the cell, or pressure buildup
within the cell that is not properly
vented.
Barriers failing: material strength
of the cells, anti-fatigue and anti-
corrosion practices in the cell
design, and the vents that are
supposed to prevent
overpressure.
Short Circuit - Manufacturing defect or
Electrical deterioration causes a short
Causes (10) circuit in the battery circuitry.
Short circuit leads to increased
temperature and eventually
triggers thermal runaway.
Barriers failing: manufacturing
quality control, circuitry insulation
against short circuits.
Short Circuit- Water ingress due to, e.g.,
Mechanical rainstorms and/or battery coolant
Causes (#8, 9) leakage into the battery pack can
cause a short circuit inside the
battery pack, causing thermal
runaway and fire.
Barrier failing: leakproofing of the
battery casing and coolant paths.
This scenario would be Critical in severity. An
uncontrolled thermal runaway would cause
severe damage to the EV even with an adequate
emergency response and might cause injury to
people nearby, but would not trap people in an
explosion so would be unlikely to be fatal.
This scenario is Improbable, as we would assume
it would not be encountered in the life of an
individual EV. Fatigue, thermal expansion, and
pressure buildup within cells are all well-known
issues for engineers, so we would expect that
these scenarios would not be encountered in-
service except if caused by an oversight in the
design process, a quality-control issue permitting
a manufacturing defect to affect a shipped item,
or by using the EV outside of its intended
operating conditions and maintenance schedule.
None of the fires discussed by Sun et al. were
linked to these mechanisms.
Severity: Critical. In and of itself, thermal
runaway causes severe damage to the battery
and possibly other vehicle systems.
Probability: This scenario is Remote. According to
(Xiong, et al. 2020), electrical causes leading to
the short circuit are more probable than
mechanical causes; thereby, their frequency of
occurrences is greater than the mechanical
causes. Thus, we assume this scenario to be
Remote.
This scenario would be Critical in severity.
Although thermal runaway, particularly a
cascading case with multiple cells involved, would
cause severe damage/injury to the EV/people but
would be unlikely to be fatal or to immediately
destroy the EV.
This scenario is Remote. According to (Xiong, et
al. 2020), about one EV fire per year is
attributable to soaking the battery. This indicates
that these scenarios is unlikely but possible in the
life of any given EV.
Short Circuit- Internal short circuits may be
Improper caused by manufacturing errors.
Manufacturing This includes metallic particular
(#12, 13) impurities introduced during a
faulty manufacturing process, or
battery pack stress in the
assembly process.
Barrier failing: manufacturing
quality control.
Short Circuit – The battery fails due to
Usage inappropriate usage or external
(#11, 14, 15) conditions. This includes dendrite
growth due to repeated
overdischarge or cold soaking of
the battery; overcharging or
improper charging equipment;
and lack of cooling capacity for
the battery.
Barriers failing: safe operating
limits set by the manufacturer,
hardware or software failure in
the protective systems of the
charger or battery, or the cooling
systems.
External Thermal runaway is initiated by an
Factors external fire (e.g. a house fire)
(#16) Barrier failing: external
environment becomes hostile due
to presence of an external fire.
This scenario would be Critical in severity.
Although thermal runaway, particularly a
cascading case with multiple cells involved, would
cause severe damage/injury to the EV/people but
would be unlikely to be fatal or to immediately
destroy the EV.
This scenario is Improbable since the sources we
consulted do not identify any known instances of
an EV fire due to these causes (Sun, et al. 2020)
(Xiong, et al. 2020) and it is therefore possible
but unlikely that this scenario occurs among the
EV population.
This scenario would be Critical in severity.
Although thermal runaway, particularly a
cascading case with multiple cells involved, would
cause severe damage/injury to the EV/people but
would be unlikely to be fatal or to immediately
destroy the EV.
This scenario is Remote. According to (Xiong, et
al. 2020), several EV fires per year are
attributable to overcharging the battery, and
some of the fires attributable to ‘spontaneous
combustion’ and ‘other causes’ are probably
attributable to these scenarios as well. This
indicates that these scenarios is unlikely but
possible in the life of any given EV.
This scenario would be Catastrophic in severity. If
thermal runaway is triggered by an external fire,
the rest of the EV is already in danger of burning
so the fire following thermal runaway is likely to
be intense and rapid.
This scenario is Remote; fires are common
enough that it cannot be assume that a particular
EV won’t be exposed to one. Fleet vehicles and
vehicles in multistorey or underground parking
structures are particularly vulnerable as fire may
spread easily from vehicle to vehicle (Sun, et al.
2020).
Summary of Results

Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible

Likely
Probable
Occasional
Remote 3 3
Improbable 2
Incredible
Appendix 2 – Fault-tree event probability calculations