Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 12/06/2022 04:23 PM Sherri R.

Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by K. Hung,Deputy Clerk

1 Ethan J. Brown (SBN 218814)

2 ethan@bnsklaw.com
Sara C. Colón (SBN 281514)
3 sara@bnsklaw.com
Kete P. Barnes (SBN 302037)
4 kete@bnsklaw.com
5 11601 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 2080
Los Angeles, CA 90025
6 T: (310) 593-9890
F: (310) 593-9980
7

8 Attorneys for Defendant,

Melanie Lee
9

10 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

11 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – STANLEY MOSK COURTHOUSE
12
RCP FINANCIAL, INC., a California stock Case No. 22STCV34672
13
corporation; 7M FILMS, INC., a California
14 stock corporation; SHEKINAH CHURCH, a [Hon. Christopher K. Lui, Dept. 76]
California nonprofit corporation; ROBERT
15 ISRAEL SHINN, an individual; and HANNAH DEFENDANT MELANIE LEE’S NOTICE OF
GRACE SHINN, an individual; MOTION AND SPECIAL MOTION TO
16
STRIKE PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL
17 Plaintiffs, PROCEDURE § 425.16; MEMORANDUM OF
v. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
18

19
ELISHA PRISCYLLA LEIGH, an individual; [Filed concurrently: Declarations of Melanie Lee,
MELANIE LEE GOLDMAN, an individual; Sara Colón, Negar Saatchi, Alexandra Watkins,
20 HALEY MARIE CARROLL, an individual; Gordon Watkins, Kevin Davis, Aubrey Fisher-
HALEY ELIZABETH PHIPPS, an individual; Greene, and Kylie Douglas; Request for Judicial
21 KAYLEY IRENE SHAFFER, an individual; Notice; [Proposed] Order]
22 and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,
Date: January 3, 2023
23 Defendants. Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept: 76
24

25 RES ID: 458204912356

26

27

28

DEFENDANT MELANIE LEE’S SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE

1 TO PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 3, 2023, at 8.30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter
3 may be heard in Department 76 of the above-entitled courthouse, located at 111 N. Hill Street, Los
4 Angeles, CA 90012, Defendant Melanie Lee Goldman will and hereby does move the Court for an order
5
striking the Plaintiffs’ fifth through eighth and tenth through seventeenth causes of action.
6
This Special Motion to Strike is based on the grounds that the fifth through eighth and tenth
7
through seventeenth causes of action in the Complaint arise from Defendant Melanie Lee’s acts in
8
furtherance of the constitutional rights of petition and speech, and that Plaintiffs cannot establish a
9
probability of prevailing on their claims against Defendant Lee.
10
This Special Motion to Strike is based on this Notice of Motion and Special Motion to Strike; the
11
concurrently-filed Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Request for Judicial Notice, Declaration of
12
Melanie Miriam Lee (also known as Melanie Lee Goldman), Declaration of Sara Colón, Declaration of
13
Negar Saatchi, Declaration of Alexandra Watkins, Declaration of Gordon Watkins, Declaration of Kevin
14

15 Davis, Declaration of Aubrey Fisher-Greene, Declaration of Kylie Douglas, all evidence and argument to

16 be presented to the Court at the hearing on this motion, all papers, records, and documents on file in this

17 action, and such evidence as may be presented at or before the hearing of the motion.

18

19 Date: December 6, 2022 BROWN NERI SMITH & KHAN, LLP

20

21 By:
Sara C. Colón
22

23 Attorneys for Defendant

Melanie Lee
24

25

26

27

28

1
DEFENDANT MELANIE LEE’S SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
I. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................... 1
2 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................................... 1
3 A. Robert Shinn and Shekinah Church ............................................................................. 1
B. Plaintiff Robert Shinn’s Promotion of Himself and Shekinah Church ..................... 2
4
1. Millionaire’s Club TV Show ................................................................................... 2
5 2. Robert Shinn Authored Multiple Books................................................................. 2
6 C. Ms. Lee and the Alleged Defamation ............................................................................ 3
III. LEGAL STANDARD ................................................................................................................. 3
7
IV. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................... 5
8 A. All Causes of Action Against Ms. Lee are Subject to the Anti-SLAPP Statute ........ 5
9 1. The Complaint Alleges Protected Activity .............................................................. 5
(a) Ms. Lee’s Statements Were Made in a Public Forum .................................... 5
10
(b) Ms. Lee’s Conduct and Statements Concern an Issue of Public Interest........ 6
11 2. Causes of Action 5- 8 and 10- 17 All Arise Out of Protected Acts ........................ 7
12 B. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish a Probability of Prevailing on their Causes of Action .. 7
1. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Defamation ................................................................ 8
13
(a) Plaintiffs RCP and Hannah Shinn’s Claims for Defamation Against Ms.
14 Lee Fail ........................................................................................................... 8
(b) Plaintiffs Defamation Claims Fail Because Ms. Lee’s Statements Are
15 Non-Actionable Opinion or Hyperbole .......................................................... 8
16 (c) Robert Shinn and Shekinah’s Defamation Claims Against Ms. Lee Fail
Because They Are Public Figures and Cannot Show Malice ....................... 10
17
(d) Plaintiffs Cannot Prove that Ms. Lee’s Statements are False ....................... 11
18 2. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Trade Libel .............................................................. 12
19 3. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Their Business Tort Claims .................................... 13
(a) Plaintiffs’ Business Torts Claim Fail as a Matter of Law ............................... 1
20 (b) Plaintiffs Have No Prima Facie Evidence to Support Their Business Tort
21 Claims ........................................................................................................... 14
4. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish False Light Invasion of Privacy ............................. 14
22
5. Plaintiffs Cannot Succeed on Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
23 Claim...................................................................................................................... 14
C. Defendant Melanie Lee is Entitled to Recover the Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
24
Incurred in Bringing this Motion and Any Subsequent Motion for Attorneys’
25 Fees and Costs ............................................................................................................... 15

26
V. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 15

27

28

1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
1

2 CASES
3 Ampex Corp. v. Cargle, 128 Cal. App. 4th 1569 (2005) ........................................................................ 10
4 Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. J. Lamb, Inc., 100 Cal. App. 4th 1017 (2002) ............................................. 12

5 Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal. 5th 376 (2016) ................................................................................................. 4, 7

Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33 (2006) .............................................................................................. 3
6
Barry v. State Bar of Cal., 2 Cal. 5th 318 (2017) ..................................................................................... 4
7
Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., 48 Cal.3d 711 (1989) ....................................................................... 11
8
Brunette v. Humane Society of Ventura County 40 Fed. Appx. 594 (2002) ........................................... 14
9 Carpenter v. Jack in the Box Corp., 151 Cal. App. 4th 454 (2007) ....................................................... 15
10 City of Cotati v. Cashman, 29 Cal. 4th 69 (2002)..................................................................................... 4
11 Chaker v. Mateo, 209 Cal. App. 4th 1138 (2002)............................................................................... 6, 10

12
Computerxpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993 (2001) ....................................................... 10, 12
Copp v. Paxton, 45 Cal. App. 4th 829 (1996)............................................................................. 10, 11, 14
13
Feriauto v. Hamsher, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1394 (1999) ................................................................................ 9
14
Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal.2d 632 (1960) ..................................................................................... 13
15 Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 4th 375 (2004) ................................................. 8, 9, 13
16 Gallagher v. Connell, 123 Cal. App. 4th 1260 (2004) ............................................................................. 6
17 GeneThera, Inc. v. Troy & Gould Professional Corp., 171 Cal. App. 4th 901 (2009) ............................ 4
18 Gilbert v. Sykes, 147 Cal. App. 4th 13 (2007) ............................................................................ 10, 13, 14
Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, Inc. v. Happening House Ventures, 184 Cal.App.4th 1539 (2010) .......... 5
19
Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Swift Distribution, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 277 (2014) ............................................. 11
20
Jackson v. Mayweather, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1240, 1252 (2017), as modified (Apr. 19, 2017) ................... 5
21
Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1133 (2001) ................................................................................. 15
22 Korea Supply Company v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134 (2003). .................................... 13
23 Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154 (2008) .................................................................................. 10
24 Lee v. Fick, 135 Cal. App. 4th 89 (2005) ................................................................................................. 4

25 Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82 (2002) ............................................................................................ 3, 4

Navellier v. Sletten, 106 Cal. App. 4th 763 (2003) ................................................................................... 4
26
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ............................................................................. 8
27
Nizam-Aldine v. City of Oakland, 47 Cal. App. 4th 364 (1996) ....................................................... 11, 12
28
Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP, 18 Cal. App. 5th 95 (2017) .............. 5

1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
 Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, LLP, 133 Cal. App. 4th 658 (2005) . 7
1
Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 543 (1985) ............................................. 12
2
Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea, 175 Cal. App. 4th 1363 (2009) ...................................................... 4
3
Ringler Assocs. Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 80 Cal. App. 4th 1165 (2000) .............................................. 8
4 Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal. 4th 1048 (2006) ......................................................................................... 3, 4
5 Schaffer v. City and County of San Francisco, 168 Cal. App. 4th 992 (2008) ......................................... 3
6 Summit Bank v. Rogers, 206 Cal. App. 4th 669 (2012) .................................................................. 8, 9, 10

7 Wong v. Tai Jing, 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354 (2010) .................................................................................... 8

8
STATUTES
9
Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16, subd. (c)(1); .................................................................................................. 15
10
Code Civ. Proc. §§ 425.16 (e)................................................................................................................... 5
11

12 OTHERS
13 5 Witkin, Summary 11th Torts § 750 (2017) .......................................................................................... 11

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
1
I. INTRODUCTION
2
This lawsuit is the epitome of an effort to chill speech. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit after
3
discovering that some of the defendants would be participating in a documentary about plaintiffs and after
4
Defendant Elisha Leigh sent a demand letter to Plaintiffs Robert Shinn and Hannah Shinn (“the Shinn
5
Plaintiffs”) laying out a lawsuit she intended to file against them. In response to the demand letter, counsel
6
for the Shinn Plaintiffs asked for more time to respond. The instant lawsuit was apparently their response.
7
The Court should grant Defendant Melanie Lee’s Special Motion to Strike pursuant to Code of
8
Civil Procedure Section 425.16 because all of Plaintiffs’ claims against Ms. Lee arise out of protected acts
9
and Plaintiffs cannot establish a probability of prevailing on their causes of action, as set forth in more
10
detail herein.
11

12
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

13 A. Robert Shinn and Shekinah Church

14 Plaintiff Robert Shinn (“Robert”) is the founder of Shekinah Church (“Shekinah”) and a self-

15 proclaimed “man of God.” Plaintiff Hannah Shinn is Robert’s current wife. She is also a partial owner

16 of Plaintiff RCP Financial Inc (“RCP”) and 7M Films Inc. (“7M”).

17 In 1999 Shinn recruited Defendant Melanie Lee, who was 13 years old at the time, and her older

18 sisters, including Defendant Elisha Leigh, to Shekinah. Ms. Lee and Ms. Leigh had been abandoned by

19 their parents and were struggling to make ends meet. See Declaration of Melanie Miriam Lee (“Lee Decl.”)

20 ¶ 3.

21 Ms. Lee was able to leave Shekinah in 2011. Until then, the Shinn Plaintiffs subjected her (and

22 numerous others) to brainwashing, physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional abuse, manipulation, and

23 exploitation. In operating his “church,” Shinn preached that without him the members of Shekinah would

24 be cursed. He convinced Ms. Lee and other members that unless they fully submitted to him, their lives

25 and their families’ lives would be destroyed, and that they would go to hell. He told them they would

26 experience poverty, sickness, and death of their loved ones without full submission. He required Ms. Lee

27 and other members to disclose their deepest secrets and fears, so he could exploit them, and use them for

28 blackmail. He brainwashed them into understanding that submission to “the Man of God” also meant

1
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1 economic and physical submission, which he then used to steal their labor and sexually abuse them. See
2 Lee Decl. ¶¶ 4 – 15.
3 While Defendants claim that Ms. Lee and the other Defendants created social media accounts and
4 have conspired to “cancel” his “church” since March 2022, coincidentally, they did not sue them until
5 October 2022, two weeks after Ms. Leigh, Ms. Lee’s sister, sent him a demand letter. See Declaration of
6 Sara C. Colón, ¶¶ 2 – 5, Exhibits A-C. Opposing counsel said that the Shinn Plaintiffs would respond to
7 the demand letter the week of October 24th and filed the Complaint the Friday of that week. Presumably
8 Plaintiffs sought to dissuade Ms. Leigh from revealing the contents of her letter. After all, her demand
9 summarized the despicable, horrendous, and unlawful conduct that Plaintiffs engaged in, all under the
10 guise of their “church.” Shekinah is a cult. A cult that engages in egregious and despicable illegal behavior.
11 B. Plaintiff Robert Shinn’s Promotion of Himself and Shekinah Church
12 Plaintiff Robert Shinn and Plaintiff Shekinah Church have held themselves out as public figures
13 to the community.
14 1. Millionaire’s Club TV Show
15
Beginning in approximately 2000, Plaintiff Robert Shinn produced and starred in a television show
16
called “Millionaire’s Club.” The show aired on cable television and each episode was approximately one
17
hour long and involved Plaintiff Shinn giving a sermon. The show had a banner across the bottom of the
18
screen with the name “Shekinah Church” as well as the then current address and telephone number for
19
Shekinah. The end credit included this information as well. Defendant Melanie Lee was the
20
cinematographer for the show. Lee Decl. ¶ 16, Ex. A.
21
2. Robert Shinn Authored Multiple Books
22
Robert Shinn also authored multiple books relating to the religious beliefs he espoused in his role
23
as pastor of Shekinah Church. Id., at ¶ 17. Members of Shekinah Church were required to purchase at
24

25 least some of these books upon becoming members of the Church. Id. One such book was entitled “How

26 to Get Healed and Not Die,” which was authored by Robert and published in 1999 by his company SCI

27 Publishing Inc. Id. The last page of the book states “If you have been blessed by this book, have a

28

2
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1 testimony to share or a prayer to request, please contact us at Shekinah Church International, P.O. Box
2 3550, Cerritos, CA 90703.” Id., Ex B at 183.
3 C. Ms. Lee and the Alleged Defamation
4 Despite having sought publicity and fame for himself and the Church, Robert and his associates
5 have attempted to silence Ms. Lee with false accusations in the Complaint. Most of the allegations
6 regarding Ms. Lee are false, including but not limited to the following reasons:
7 • Melanie Lee did not make any of the Instagram accounts, referenced in the complaint
8 except for @surviving_shekinah and @melgoldy. Id at ¶ 19.
9 • Ms. Lee did not post anything regarding Plaintiffs on her social media accounts. Id.
10 • Melanie Lee didn’t have any contact with the TikTok dancers referred to in the
11 Complaint until after they had already left Shekinah. Id at ¶ 22; See Declaration of
12 Alexandra Watkins; Declaration of Gordon Watkins; Declaration of Kevin Davis;
13 Declaration of Aubrey Fisher-Green; and Declaration of Kylie Douglas (the “Dancer
14 Decls.”) The Tik Tok dancers did not leave Plaintiff 7M as a result of any of Ms. Lee’s
15 conduct or statements. See Lee Decl. at ¶ 22; Dancer Decls.
16 • The statements Ms. Lee made on Instagram Live were her opinions based on her
17 experiences in Shekinah. See Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 15, 23, 25 - 27, 29 - 32.
18 • Ms. Lee did not settle her labor case with Robert – she won. See Lee Decl. ¶ 23, Ex. C.
19 In sum, the filing of Plaintiffs’ Complaint was at once an attempt to change the narrative before
20 Ms. Leigh could file a complaint and to scare their critics into silence.
21 III. LEGAL STANDARD
22 “A SLAPP suit—a strategic lawsuit against public participation—seeks to chill or punish a party’s
23 exercise of constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances.
24 The Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16—known as the anti-SLAPP statute—to
25 provide a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid exercise of
26 constitutional rights.” Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1055–1056 (2006). The purpose of the anti-
27 SLAPP statute is “to curtail the chilling effect meritless lawsuits may have on the exercise of free speech
28 and petition rights, and the statute is to be interpreted broadly to accomplish that goal.” Schaffer v. City

3
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1 and County of San Francisco, 168 Cal. App. 4th 992, 998 (2008).
2 “Nothing in the statute ... excludes any particular type of action from its operation.” Navellier v.
3 Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82, 92 (2002). The anti-SLAPP law has been applied to each of the causes of action
4 Plaintiffs have alleged in their Complaint here: defamation (Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal.4th 33 (2006));
5 trade libel (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea, 175 Cal. App. 4th 1363, 1368-72 (2009)); interference
6 with contractual relations (GeneThera, Inc. v. Troy & Gould Professional Corp., 171 Cal. App. 4th 901,
7 907-8 (2009)); and interference with prospective economic advantage (Lee v. Fick, 135 Cal. App. 4th 89
8 (2005).) Several of Plaintiffs’ claims here are among the favored causes of actions in SLAPPs: “[t]he
9 favored causes of action in SLAPP suits are defamation, various business torts such as interference with
10 prospective economic advantage . . . .” Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 816 (1994).
11 “The analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion proceeds in two steps.” Barry v. State Bar of Cal., 2 Cal.
12 5th 318, 321 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). At step one, “the court decides whether the
13 defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected
14 activity.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). When a claim is mixed, meaning that it is based on
15 allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded at the first
16 step. Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal. 5th 376, 396 (2016) (“Baral”).
17 The moving party’s burden at step one is to show “the challenged cause of action arises from
18 protected activity.” Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 1056. “[T]he statutory phrase ‘cause of action ... arising
19 from’ means simply that the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have
20 been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech. In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical
21 point is whether the plaintiff’s cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant’s
22 right of petition or free speech. ‘A defendant meets this burden by demonstrating that the act underlying
23 the plaintiff’s cause [of action] fits one of the categories spelled out in section 425.16, subdivision (e).’”
24 City of Cotati v. Cashman, 29 Cal. 4th 69, 78 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
25 Plaintiffs bear the burden at the second step of demonstrating that the complaint is both legally
26 sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the
27 evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal. 4th at 1056. “Thus, plaintiffs'
28 burden as to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP test is akin to that of a party opposing a motion for

4
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1 summary judgment.” Navellier v. Sletten, 106 Cal. App. 4th 763, 768 (2003) (“Navellier”). If the plaintiff
2 fails to carry that burden, the cause of action is stricken.
3 IV. ARGUMENT
4 A. All Causes of Action Against Ms. Lee are Subject to the Anti-SLAPP Statute
5 All of the causes of action (5- 8 and 10- 17) against Ms. Lee arise from activity protected by the
6 Anti-SLAPP statute. The first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis involves two related inquiries: (1) whether
7 the pleading alleges activity protected by section 425.16 and (2) whether the cause or causes of action
8 alleged “arise from” those activities Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, Inc. v. Happening House Ventures,
9 184 Cal. App. 4th 1539, 1547 (2010).
10 1. The Complaint Alleges Protected Activity
11 “A defendant’s burden on the first prong is not an onerous one. A defendant need only make a
12 prima facie showing that plaintiffs’ claims arise from defendant's constitutionally protected free speech or
13 petition rights.” Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP, 18 Cal. App. 5th 95,
14 112 (2017). California’s anti-SLAPP statute defines an “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition
15 or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue” as
16 follows:
17 “… (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a
18
public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in
19
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional
20
right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
21
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 425.16 (e).
22
(a) Ms. Lee’s Statements Were Made in a Public Forum
23
The only allegations that form the basis for Plaintiff’s claims that are specifically against Ms.
24
Lee are that she made certain statements on Instagram regarding Robert Shinn and Shekinah.
25
Complaint ¶ 51. California case law clearly establishes that statements made on Instagram are
26
statements made in a “public forum” for purposes of California's anti-SLAPP statute. See Jackson v.
27

28
Mayweather, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1240, 1252 (2017), as modified (Apr. 19, 2017).

5
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1 (b) Ms. Lee’s Conduct and Statements Concern an Issue of Public Interest
2 Ms. Lee’s statement, and any conduct that Ms. Lee is alleged to have participated in, is regarding
3 Plaintiff Shekinah Church and its members, which is a matter of public interest. “An ‘issue of public
4 interest’ is ‘any issue in which the public is interested.’” Chaker v. Mateo, 209 Cal. App. 4th 1138,
5
1146 (2002) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). In considering whether a statement is made
6
regarding an issue of “public interest” such that it is subject to a motion to strike under California's anti-
7
SLAPP statute, courts must construe the statement broadly. Chaker, 209 Cal. App. 4th at 1146.
8
Plaintiffs effectively admit that the public is interested in them by noting in the Complaint that the
9
Social Media accounts created to discuss Plaintiffs have 7,000 members of the public following the
10
accounts and that there is a docuseries in the works regarding Plaintiffs. Complaint ¶¶ 45 - 59.
11
Furthermore, The Daily Beast, The US Sun, and Business Insider, among others, have published articles
12
in the last year regarding Mr. Shinn and Shekinah Church. See Defendant Melanie Lee’s Request for
13
Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Exs. 1 - 6.
14

15 The case of Gallagher v. Connell is instructive here. In Gallagher v. Connell, the Court concluded

16 that:

17 [W]hether Gallagher, a parish priest, took unfair advantage of Petone, an elderly parishioner
who reportedly suffered from dementia, is a matter of concern not only to Petone's friends but to
18 the more than 3,000 members of the Mary Star parish where Gallagher is in charge of parish
finances…whether or not the accusations against Gallagher are true, the story may cause elderly
19 individuals to be more cautious about whom they allow to control their financial affairs; it may
20 cause relatives and friends to more closely monitor the personal well-being of their elderly
relatives and friends; it may lead religious organizations to develop standards for their
21 employees' involvement in the financial affairs of their members; and it may lead to legislation to
further protect the interests of the elderly and mentally impaired. Therefore, we find the
22 statement at issue in this case involves a matter of public interest. Gallagher v. Connell, 123 Cal.
23 App. 4th 1260, 1275 (2004).

24 As in Gallagher, Ms. Lee’s statements concerning Shekinah clearly relate to a matter of

25 widespread public concern regarding cults as evidenced by the multiple articles published regarding
26 allegations against Shekinah as a cult and Robert as its leader, as well as the thousands of followers to
27 the Instagram accounts Plaintiffs complain of. See RJN, Exs. 1 - 6. Similarly to Gallagher, the
28
controversy regarding Plaintiffs and whether they are a cult will also affect the public at large: it may

6
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1 cause members of the public to be more cautious in joining religious organizations or may cause
2 families to more closely monitor their young-adult children who do so.
3 All of the allegations regarding the statement and conduct of Ms. Lee and the Social Media
4 Defendants, within which Ms. Lee is lumped, are related to Shekinah Church or its members, and are
5
therefore a matter of public interest.
6
2. Causes of Action 5- 8 and 10- 17 All Arise Out of Protected Acts
7
The fifth through eighth and tenth through seventeenth causes of action are against Ms. Lee and
8
arise out of protected acts. The only allegations against Ms. Lee relate to her statements on Instagram
9
Live or her alleged activities in connection with the Social Media Defendants. Therefore, all of Plaintiffs’
10
claims against Ms. Lee arise out of those alleged statements and actions, which as set forth in Section
11
IV.A.1, are protected acts.
12
B. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish a Probability of Prevailing on their Causes of Action
13
As set forth above, Ms. Lee has made the prima facie showing that is required to establish that
14
the statements she made on Instagram Live, and any of the unspecified statements and conduct allegedly
15
made in conjunction with the Social Media Defendants, were protected speech.
16
Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs “to establish a ‘probability’ of prevailing on their claims ‘by
17
establishing a probability of success’ through stating a ‘legally sufficient claim’ and providing a “factual
18
showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.” Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 384-385 (internal
19

20 quotations omitted). The complaint must be both (a) legally sufficient and (b) supported by a

21 sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the admissible evidence

22 submitted by the plaintiff is credited. Id. With respect to the second step, a defendant's anti-SLAPP

23 motion should be granted either “by showing the plaintiff cannot establish an element of its cause of

24 action or by showing there is a complete defense to the cause of action . . . .” Peregrine Funding, Inc.
25 v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, LLP, 133 Cal. App. 4th 658, 676 (2005). Plaintiffs cannot
26 demonstrate a probability of prevailing on their causes of action against Ms. Lee for the reasons
27 explained below.
28

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1 1. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Defamation.
2 Plaintiffs cannot establish a probability of succeeding on their eleventh and twelfth causes of
3 action for defamation per se and per quod. As an initial matter, statements of fact are actionable as
4 defamation, while opinions are not. Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 4th 375, 384 –
5
385 (2004). The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory,
6
(4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage. Wong v. Tai Jing,
7
189 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1369 (2010). Furthermore, public figures must prove by clear and convincing
8
evidence that an alleged defamatory statement was made with actual malice. New York Times Co. v.
9
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–280 (1964). In “all cases of alleged defamation, whether libel or slander,
10
the truth of the offensive statements or communication is a complete defense against civil liability,
11
regardless of bad faith or malicious purpose… it is sufficient if the substance of the charge is proven
12
true, irrespective of slight inaccuracy in the details.” Ringler Assocs. Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 80
13
Cal. App. 4th 1165, 1180–81 (2000) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiffs’ defamation claims cannot
14

15 survive the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis for a number of independent grounds, as set forth

16 below.
(a) Plaintiffs RCP and Hannah Shinn Fail to State a Claim for Defamation
17 Against Ms. Lee
18 Plaintiffs’ RCP and Hannah Shinn fail to state claims for defamation against Ms. Lee. The
19 eleventh and twelfth claims for defamation are by all Plaintiffs against all Defendants. However, Plaintiffs
20 RCP and Hannah Shinn fail to allege that Ms. Lee made any statements whatsoever about them, as
21
required for a defamation claim. Therefore, the defamation claims by Plaintiffs RCP and Hannah Shin as
22
against Ms. Lee fail the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.
23
(b) Plaintiffs Defamation Claims Fail Because Ms. Lee’s Statements Are
24 Non-Actionable Opinion or Hyperbole

25 All Plaintiffs defamation claims fail for the additional reason that Ms. Lee’s statements cannot

26 form the basis of a defamation claim. Whether a statement conveys factual information that can form

27 the basis of a defamation claim is a question of law. Summit Bank v. Rogers, 206 Cal. App. 4th 669,

28 696 (2012). Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc lays out the analysis for determining whether opinion

8
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1 related statements can be defamatory, which includes examining the totality of the circumstances
2 surrounding the statement, including the substance of the statement and the context in which it was
3 made. Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc 116 Cal.App.4th 375, 385 (2004).
4 As an initial matter, Ms. Lee opens her remarks about Robert by saying “You’re allowing people
5
to have a voice and speak their truth, and it’s no one’s position to say someone’s truth is not accurate,
6
everyone has their own experience with Robert,” acknowledging that one’s experience in Shekinah is
7
subjective. Declaration of Negar Saatchi (“Saatchi Decl.”) ¶¶ 2 -3, Ex. A. Ms. Lee uses phrases like
8
“I think” or “I thought” in several of the statements Plaintiffs complain about. Id. This language clearly
9
reflects an opinion not a fact. Complaint ¶ 51 (“I left because I honestly thought my life was being
10
threatened…”; “I don’t think it’s a church anymore. I think now it’s just like an organization that makes
11
[Robert] money;” “I have no idea what Robert’s thinking…he thought he could get away from it for so
12
long…” ). Ms. Lee literally says twice that her comment with respect to Robert Shinn being a sex
13
addict is an opinion, but Plaintiffs misleadingly left that portion of her statement out of the
14

15 Complaint: “This is just my opinion I guess I have to put a disclaimer… this is just my

16 opinion…[Robert’s] just like a sex addict…” Saatchi Decl. ¶¶ 2 -3, Ex. A (Transcript at 10; video at

17 23:55).

18 Having been a former member of Shekinah and alleging abuse by Robert Shinn, no reasonable

19 listener would view Ms. Lee as an unbiased and impartial speaker on these subjects. To the contrary, Ms.

20 Lee is passionate – as she stated at the beginning of the Instagram Live – about getting other members of

21 Shekinah out. See Feriauto v. Hamsher, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1394, 1401 (1999) (“[W]here potentially

22 defamatory statements are published in a …setting in which the audience may anticipate efforts by the

23 parties to persuade others to their positions by use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole, language which

24 generally might be considered as statements of fact may well assume the character of statements of

25 opinion.”); see also Saatchi Decl. ¶¶ 2 -3, Ex. A at 3.

26 The fact that Ms. Lee appeared anonymously on the Instagram Live (she turned her camera off

27 and did not disclose her name) also makes her statements equivalent to those made in anonymous online
28 forums, which California courts have repeatedly held are non-actionable opinion. See Saatchi Decl.

9
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1 ¶¶ 2 -3, Ex. A at 5. These cases include: Chaker, supra, 209 Cal. App. 4th at 1149 (statements in online
2 forum ”to the effect Chaker picks up street walkers and homeless drug addicts and is a dead beat dad“
3 would not “be interpreted by the average Internet reader as anything more than the insulting name
4 calling”); Summit Bank, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at 696–701 (statements that CEO used the bank as her
5
personal bank and the plaintiff was a “problem bank,” suggesting the CEO was misappropriating money
6
and the bank was on the verge of insolvency were non-actionable opinion); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal.
7
App. 4th 1154, 1162 (2008) (statement that plaintiffs were “a management consisting of boobs, losers
8
and crooks” and that “Natan had been CFO of at least 3 bankrupt companies and I know Seifer filed
9
for personal bankruptcy and roughed up some patients, shares a rolls royce and a bently [sic ] with the
10
President and a $15mm [sic ] mansion,” were hyperbolic opinions.); Computerxpress, Inc. v. Jackson,
11
93 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1013 (2001) [“[W]hile the postings certainly could be considered disparaging,
12
their tone and content identified them as statements of opinion and not fact”]. Accordingly, Ms. Lee’s
13
statements are non-actionable opinion and Plaintiffs’ therefore have no basis for any defamation claims
14

15 against her. The Court should strike their claims against Ms. Lee for this reason alone.
(c) Robert Shinn and Shekinah’s Defamation Claims Against Ms. Lee Fail
16
Because They Are Public Figures and Cannot Show Malice
17
Even if the Court determines that Ms. Lee’s statements were not opinion and are actionable,
18
Robert and Shekinah’s defamation claims against her still fail because Robert and Shekinah are limited
19
public figures for the purpose of any defamation claim analysis. A limited public figure “is an
20
individual who voluntarily injects him or herself or is drawn into a specific public controversy, thereby
21
becoming a public figure on a limited range of issues” regarding the controversy giving rise to the
22
alleged defamation. Ampex Corp. v. Cargle, 128 Cal. App. 4th 1569, 1577 (2005); Gertz v. Robert
23
Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323, 351. It is sufficient that the person “attempts to thrust him or herself
24
into the public eye.” Gilbert v. Sykes, 147 Cal. App. 4th 13, 24 (2007). “Once he places himself in the
25
spotlight on a topic of public interest, his private words and conduct relating to that topic become fair
26

27 game.” Id., at 25 (defendant thrust himself into the public debate on the merits of plastic surgery by

28 appearing on a television show.) A limited public figure must show by clear and convincing evidence

10
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1 that the defamatory statement was made with malice (i.e., with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless
2 disregard of its truth or falsity). Copp v. Paxton, 45 Cal. App. 4th 829, 846 (1996).
3 Here, Robert and Shekinah are limited public figures because they’ve injected themselves into
4 the public controversy at issue in this lawsuit. The heart of the instant controversy is the reputation of
5
Shekinah Church and Robert as its leader: namely, Plaintiffs seek to promote Shekinah as a legitimate
6
religious organization, as opposed to a cult. This issue is a matter of public interest as discussed in
7
Section IV.A.1(b), supra. Long before this lawsuit, Plaintiffs Robert and Shekinah injected themselves
8
into this issue by seeking to achieve favorable reputations for themselves as a religious leader and
9
organization, respectively. They did so by promoting themselves on television, via the Millionaire’s
10
Club, and through the publication of numerous religious texts. Lee Decl. ¶¶ 16-17, Exs. A and B.
11
Robert used the Millionaire’s Club, which aired on cable television for approximately one year, to
12
promote himself and Shekinah through his sermons. See Lee Decl. ¶ 16. Robert’s books also attempt
13
to lend credibility to Shekinah by citing to the Bible and other religious texts. See Lee Decl. ¶ 17, Ex.
14

15 B.

16 Robert and Shekinah’s claims for defamation against Melanie Lee will fail because as limited

17 public figures they will not be able to show by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Lee made any

18 of the statements specified in the Complaint with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard for

19 their truth. In fact, there is ample evidence of everything Ms. Lee claimed on her Instagram Live
20 session. See Lee Decl. ¶¶15, 23, 25 - 27, 29 - 32.
21 (d) Plaintiffs Cannot Show Probability of Success on their Defamation Claims
22 Because They Cannot Prove that Ms. Lee’s Statements are False
23 In the unlikely event that the Court determines (1) Plaintiffs’ defamation claims are based on
24
actionable factual statements as opposed to opinion and (2) neither Shekinah or Robert are public figures
25
or that they can show malice by Ms. Lee, Plaintiffs’ defamation claims will still fail because they will be
26
unable to show that Ms. Lee’s statements are false. When “speech involves a matter of public concern, a
27
private-figure plaintiff has the burden of proving the falsity of the defamation.” Brown v. Kelly
28
Broadcasting Co., 48 Cal.3d 711, 747 (1989); see also Nizam-Aldine v. City of Oakland, 47 Cal. App. 4th

11
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1 364, 375 (1996) (“[t]he First Amendment trumps the common law presumption of falsity in defamation
2 cases involving private-figure plaintiffs when the allegedly defamatory statements pertain to a matter of
3 public interest”).
4 As set forth in Section IV.A.1 (b) supra, Ms. Lee’s statements relate to a matter of public concern.
5
Accordingly, Plaintiffs must show their falsity in order to successfully oppose this anti-SLAPP motion.
6
The statements Ms. Lee made on Instagram Live are based on former members’ experiences, including
7
her own, and Plaintiffs cannot prove their falsity. See Lee Decl. ¶¶ 15, 23, 25 - 27, 29 - 32.
8
2. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Trade Libel
9
Plaintiffs claim for trade libel will also fail. A trade libel is an intentional disparagement of the
10
quality of property that results in pecuniary damage. 5 Witkin, Summary 11th Torts § 750 (2017). In
11
California, a claim for trade libel requires “(1) a publication; (2) which induces others not to deal with
12
plaintiff; and (3) special damages” caused by a “false or misleading statement” which (4) “must
13
specifically refer to the plaintiff's product or business, and” (5) “must clearly derogate that product or
14

15 business.” Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Swift Distribution, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 277, 290-291 (2014). Thus, it

16 is similar to a defamation claim in that it requires a provably false statement of fact, and not mere

17 opinion. ComputerXpress, supra, 93 C.A. 4th at 1010.

18 As set forth above, Plaintiffs’ claims are not based on provably false statements that derogate

19 Plaintiffs’ business. Ms. Lee did not create or distribute the flyer referred to in paragraph 57 of the
20 Complaint. See Lee Decl. ¶ 21. In fact, the Complaint makes no reference to any statements made by
21 Ms. Lee that “specifically refer to the [plaintiffs’] product or business.”
22 Furthermore, the plaintiff in a trade libel claim must specifically plead and prove special
23 damages. In the context of trade libel, special damages usually means pecuniary damages resulting
24
from the diminished marketability of the property, or loss of prospective contracts with the plaintiff's
25
customers. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. J. Lamb, Inc., 100 Cal. App. 4th 1017, 1035 (2002). In trade
26
libel, pecuniary loss to the plaintiff must always be proved. Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court,
27
170 Cal. App. 3d 543, 549 (1985).
28
Plaintiff will not be able to prove any pecuniary loss from Ms. Lee’s Instagram Live appearance

12
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1 or any other unspecified statements or actions taken by Ms. Lee. Moreover, given other critical press
2 relating to Plaintiffs, there is no way to tie any special damages to Ms. Lee rather than the articles
3 regarding Plaintiffs that were not authored by Ms. Lee. See Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc., 116 Cal.
4 App. 4th 375, 394 (2004) (plaintiff cannot rely on logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc).
5
Further, Kevin “Konkrete” Davis, Alexandra Watkins, Gordon Watkins, Kyle Douglas, and Aubrey
6
Fisher-Green have attested that they had no communication with Ms. Lee prior to terminating their
7
affiliations with 7M and that no actions or statements by Ms. Lee caused them to leave 7M. See Lee
8
Decl. ¶22; Dancer Decls. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot sustain their burden of establishing a probability of
9
prevailing on this cause of action.
10
3. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Their Business Tort Claims
11
(a) Plaintiffs’ Business Torts Claim Fail as a Matter of Law
12
Plaintiffs’ fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action for intentional and negligent causes of action
13
for Interference with Contractual Relations and Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage
14

15 (herein referred to as the “business torts”) also fail the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. As

16 an initial matter, California law does not even recognize a cause of action for negligent interference

17 with contractual relations. See, e.g., Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 636 (1960). Further, the

18 business tort claims, which are all based on allegedly defamatory statements and/or conduct, must fail

19 for the same reasons as the defamation claims. Gilbert, supra, 147 Cal. App. 4th at 34 (“[T]o allow an
20 independent cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, based on the same acts
21 which would not support a defamation action, would allow plaintiffs to do indirectly what they could
22 not do directly. It would also render meaningless any defense of truth or privilege) (internal citations
23 and quotations omitted).
24
Additionally, the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage requires Plaintiffs to
25
plead and prove some “independently wrongful act” committed by the Plaintiff. Korea Supply Company
26
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1159 (2003). Here, Plaintiffs make the recursive claim that
27
Ms. Lee committed an independently wrongful act by defaming them. See Complaint ¶ 104. However,
28
for all the reasons described above, their defamation claim is not viable. Therefore, for the alternative

13
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1 and independent reason that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate an “independently wrongful act”, their
2 interference with prospective economic advantage must be stricken.
3 (b) Plaintiffs Have No Prima Facie Evidence to Support Their Business Tort
Claims
4
Finally, even if allegations of defamation sufficed as the basis for Plaintiffs’ business tort claims,
5
they have no prima facie evidence to support their claims. Plaintiffs have not and cannot identify even
6

7
one contractual or economic relationship affected by Ms. Lee specifically. Furthermore, Ms. Lee did not

8 have any knowledge of 7M’s relationships with Sally Hansen, Los Angeles Clippers, Bang Energy Drinks,

9 Kevin “Konkrete” Davis, Alexandra Watkins, Gordon Watkins, Kylie Douglas, and Aubrey Fisher-Green

10 much less any intent to interfere with such relationships. See Lee Decl. ¶¶ 20, 22; Dancer Decls. Plaintiffs’

11 conclusion that the defendants knew about these relationships because the information was “publicly
12 available” does not follow. See Complaint ¶ 95.
13 4. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish False Light Invasion of Privacy
14 Plaintiffs’ thirteenth cause of action for False Light Invasion of Privacy also fails for the same
15 reasons as Plaintiffs’ defamation claims, discussed in Section IV.B.1, supra. See Copp, supra, 45 Cal.
16 App. 4th at 848 (Although the appeal has centered on the cause of action for defamation, the complaint
17
also alleges causes of action for invasion of privacy by placing plaintiff in a ‘false light’... It is now
18
established that claims for invasion of privacy … may not be based on speech that is entitled to
19
constitutional protection. Moreover, the statutory restrictions on a cause of action for defamation apply to
20
an alternative theory of invasion of privacy based on the same facts.”)
21
5. Plaintiffs Cannot Succeed on Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
22 Claim
23 Plaintiffs Robert and Hannah Shinn will not be able to succeed on their eighth claim for intentional
24 infliction emotion infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) against Ms. Lee. Their claim merely refers to
25 “outrageous conduct as described above” and a “campaign of harassment” as the basis for the claim. Even
26 if Plaintiffs claim that all of the Social Media Defendants’ conduct described in the Complaint forms the
27 basis for their IIED claim, this conduct also forms the basis of their defamation claim and cannot form the
28
basis for a separate IIED claim. Gilbert, supra, 147 Cal. App. 4th at 34, 53; see also Brunette v. Humane

14
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1 Society of Ventura County 40 Fed. Appx. 594, 598 (2002) (while emotional distress may be considered an
2 element of damage in a properly stated defamation action, it cannot form the basis of an independent claim
3 on the same facts). Accordingly, Plaintiffs can show no basis for their IIED claim against Ms. Lee.
4 C. Defendant Melanie Lee is Entitled to Recover the Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Incurred in Bringing this Motion and Any Subsequent Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
5
and Costs
6
A “prevailing defendant” on an anti-SLAPP motion “shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney
7
fees and costs.” Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16, subd. (c)(1); Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1133 (2001).
8
The California Supreme Court has held that: “an award of fees may include not only the fees incurred
9
with respect to the underlying claim, but also the fees incurred in enforcing the right to mandatory fees
10
under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.” Id., at 1141. The Court is not required to determine the
11
amount of fees and costs to be awarded when ruling on the motion itself, however. That determination
12
can be reserved until after the entry of an order striking the offending cause(s) of action, and the fees and
13
costs can be set forth and awarded on separate motion or via the filing of a memorandum of costs.
14
Carpenter v. Jack in the Box Corp., 151 Cal. App. 4th 454, 460-461 (2007).
15
V. CONCLUSION
16
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Melanie Miriam Lee respectfully requests that the Court
17
grant her motion and dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims against her with prejudice.
18

19
Date: December 6, 2022 BROWN NERI SMITH & KHAN, LLP
20

21
By:
22
Sara C. Colón
23
Attorneys for Defendant
24
Melanie Lee
25

26

27

28

15
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
 1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
I am employed in Los Angeles County, California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to
3
this action; my business address is 11601 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2080, Los Angeles,
4 California 90025. On the date below, I caused the following,

5 • DEFENDANT MELANIE LEE’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE

PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
6 AUTHORITIES
• DEFENDANT MELANIE LEE’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF
7 SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
• DECLARATION OF SARA C. COLÓN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT MELANIE LEE’S
8 SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
• DECLARATION OF NEGAR SAATCHI IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT MELANIE LEE’S
9 SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
• DECLARATION OF DEFENDANT MELANIE LEE IN SUPPORT OF SPECIAL MOTION TO
10
STRIKE
• DECLARATION OF KYLIE DOUGLAS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT MELANIE LEE'S SPECIAL
11
MOTION TO STRIKE
• DECLARATION OF KEVIN DAVIS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT MELANIE LEE'S SPECIAL
12
MOTION TO STRIKE
13 • DECLARATION OF GORDON WATKINS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT MELANIE LEE'S
SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
14 • DECLARATION OF ALEXANDRA WATKINS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT MELANIE LEE’S
SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
15 • DECLARATION OF AUBREY FISHER-GREENE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT MELANIE LEE’S
SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
16 • [PROPOSED] ORDER ON DEFENDANT MELANIE LEE’S SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE

17
to be served by email to the following addresses:
18

19 Daniel R. Gutenplan (dgutenplan@epglawyers.com)

Lauren B. Shelby (lshelby@epglawyers.com)
20 Philip M. Duclos (pduclos@epglawyers.com)
21
ENENSTEIN PHAM & GLASS
650 Town Center Drive, Suite 840
22 Costa Mesa, CA 92626
23
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
24
X BY ELECTRONIC MAIL: I caused such document(s) to be electronically mailed in
25 PDF format as an e-mail attachment to each addressee for the above-entitled case. The
transmission was complete and confirmed. A copy of the transmittal e-mail will be
26 maintained with the original document(s) in our office.
27 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing is true and correct. Executed on December 6, 2022, at Albany, New York.
28

________________________
Kete Barnes
PROOF OF SERVICE
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RCP FINANCIAL, INC., A CALIFORNIA STOCK CORPORATION, et al. vs ELISHA PRISCYLLA LEIGH, et al.
Case Number: 22STCV34672     Case Type: Civil Unlimited     Category: Other Commercial/Business Tort (not fraud/ breach of
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Date Filed: 2022-10-28   Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 76

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