Policy Subsystems

The use of the term subsystem has been widely used in political science
literature, especially in the United States, for decades. Operating as a tool within policy
making, subsystems help cultivate public policy around special interests. When looking
at the analysis of subsystems, it is important to understand the actors involved in policy
making, because different theories and perspectives attribute varying levels of
importance to the actors involved in the policy making process. From a pluralist
perspective, societal actors have the most power in shaping policy because of their
participation in interest groups. The theory of statism can be seen as balance between
the power of societal actors and the role governmental actors play in the policy making
process. I argue, the concept of a policy subsystem proves to be most useful and
effective when it operates in a state where both societal and government actors
participate equally. First, I will give an overview of both pluralism and statism. Second, I
will contrast the two theoretical approaches and display the pitfalls of a power
imbalance in subsystems in the case of the OPEC oil crisis in the United States and
tobacco policy in Indonesia. In conclusion, I will show the necessity for a balance of
participation between interest groups and government actors in the policy making tool of
a subsystem, and how the intimate attachment and balance of governmental actors and
interest groups is key to subsystems maintaining their role as the decision making
center of public policy.

When analyzing policy from a pluralist perspective, societal actors play a crucial
role because, “pluralism is based on the assumption interest groups are the political
actors that matter most in shaping public policy” (Howlett, Perl and Ramesh, 2009).
Pluralism is often tied to the the subsystem approach of politics because, “pluralists
argue that groups make demands on government to foster their legitimate interests and
that government has perceived its proper role as the promoter of these interests in
society” (Thurber, 1996). With this view, it would seem the express desires of the public
as societal actors and powerful collections of interest groups are the designers of public
policy, and subsystems act as a tool for the public to infiltrate the political hierarchy
existing in government. In further analysis of pluralism, it also sees individual
membership in a number of interest groups as a way to further public policy. As
described by Howlett, “politics, in the pluralist perspective, is the process by which
various competing interests and groups are reconciled” (2009). The focus of pluralism
heavily relies on the activities and participation of societal actors and interest groups in
order to form policies, because it sees the creation of policy as, “a result of competition
and collaboration among groups working to further their members’ collective interests”
(Howlett, Perl and Ramesh, 2009). It gives little explanation to the role of the state,
aside from meeting the will of the people.

In contrast to pluralism, strong statist views see, “government as the leading

institution in society and the key agent in the political process” (Howlett, Perl and
Ramesh, 2009). Statism can be held in extremely strict views, attributing autonomy
entirely to the state without giving any weight to public opinion, but a more mild and
common held view of statism simply sees state centrality as a variable giving a better
explanation for policy development (Howlett, Perl and Ramesh, 2009). A mild statist
view offers more of a balance between the strict, state-centrist view of statism and the
society-centered view of pluralism. When it comes to analyzing subsystems from a
statist perspective,“the statist perspective on policy-making explicitly acknowledges that
policy preferences and capacities are best understood in the context of the society in
which the state is embedded” (Howlett, Perl and Ramesh, 2009). In essence, the role of
the government can not be undermined by the societal actors within a subsystem or the
policy making process. By contrasting pluralism and statism, we can further analyze the
concept of a subsystem.

As stated previously, a pluralist response sees competition and collaboration

amongst interest groups as a benefit to the making of policy, but further analysis of
policy subsystems proves this to be false. In order for subsystems to operate
consistently and effectively, they must remain under the radar, out of the vast scope of
media attention and the public eye, and operate with a group of specialized members,
committed to one interest (Thurber, 1996). The nature of pluralism desires societal
actors to span multiple interest groups in order to facilitate competition and collaboration
to create policy, and this policy should therefore be a representation of not only the
members interests but of the overall public as well. Let us examine a specific subsystem
existing in the United States to see the impact collaboration and competition have on
policy.

During the OPEC oil crisis in the 1970’s in the United States, the dominant policy
subsystem surrounding oil was brought into a macro political light due to an oil shortage
and the widespread impact it had on consumers. The media coverage initiated by the oil
shortages exposed a subsystem that had long been dominated by a small amount of
government and business actors (Thurber, 1996). The attention given to this particular
subsystem caused it to fragment into a multitude of policy stances. This, in turn, brought
competition and exposure to the long dominating oil subsystem. According to Thurber,
“The increased political competition was all sound and fury. There was no long-term,
rational energy policy in the United States. No one dominated the open, dynamic, and
complex set of subsystems surrounding energy policy” (1996). From a pluralist
perspective, the competition amongst energy groups should have brought forth a long-
term energy policy, but the opposite actually occurred. The competition and public
involvement caused a fragmenting, which stalled the policy process surrounding oil and
energy in America.

As shown, a pluralist perspective on societal actor involvement tends to deter the

policy making process. As “observed in the USA, interest groups became more active in
order to reduce their uncertainty. However, interest group activity begets yet more
interest group activity thus increasing, not decreasing, uncertainty as the number of
stakeholders increases” (Richardson, 2000). An increase in participants does not equal
an increase in effective policy, and stakeholders will not feel secure in their ability to
address their concerns if more activity ensues. Generally, the average citizen is not
involved in the decision making process of policy. Policy issues can become incredibly
complex and technical, which further isolates the general electorate from being
involved. The general population only becomes aware of a policy issue if it begins to
strain the routine of their everyday lives, such as the case of the OPEC oil crisis. With
the removal of the general electorate from regular policy decision making, Thurber
points out, “subsystem actors develop policy expertise and continuing relationships with
one another in arenas of direct interest to themselves. Because they understand the
issue, they have considerable independence in the development, implementation, and
evaluation of policy under the subsystem's jurisdiction” (1996). With the description
given by Thurber, we see policy subsystems contain a complex network of actors from
both society and government. Contrary to the broad scope of collaboration and
competition within the pluralist perspective, specialization and expertise are the true
driving force behind societal actors role in subsystems. Special interest groups are one
way in which the voice and concerns of the public can be expressed, but interest groups
are most effective when societal actors develop expertise and remain rooted in a
specific subsystem versus generalizing their knowledge and spreading themselves
across too many points of interest.

Approaching the concept of subsystems from the lens of a statist perspective

gives way to a more accurate portrayal of the policy making process. Subsystems are
balanced between the participation of societal and government actors. In the case of
policy analysis and evaluation, Anders Hanberger notes, “The state, and various levels
of government, are actors in the policy process and should be treated on equal terms
with others” (2001). A pluralist perspective would relate the activity of government
actors as merely, “their sponsors in Congress and the bureaucracy. Pluralists further
argue that new policies are enacted, new agencies created (or old ones expanded or
reorganized), new congressional committees or subcommittees added ( or jurisdictions
expanded) to promote the interest of powerful competing groups in society, as interest
groups in society gain sufficient power to ‘own' some 'turf' in Congress and the
executive branch” (Thurber, 1996 ). However, collectively containing government actors
as a subcategory of societal actors diminishes the power the government plays in
subsystems.

The role government actors play in policy making and subsystems does not fall
subservient to the role of societal actors. Pluralism does not take into account the power
government yields with the policy making process. As Richardson points out, “interest
groups also have to deal with other actors in the policy process – especially
governments….Governments can seize power over established institutions such as
policy communities and networks” (Richardson, 2000). The seizure of power from
governmental actors within a subsystem, as described by Richardson, can also lead to
an imbalance of policy advancement from a subsystem.

In an article written on Indonesia’s developing tobacco policy, Andrew Rosser

analyses the process of policy making from a health subsystem within Indonesia (2015).
In analyzing the case study of tobacco policy in Indonesia, the power balance between
societal and government actors becomes more clear. Rosser dissects a number of
actors existing within the health subsystem in Indonesia, such as NGO’s, special
interest groups, health organizations, and the economic powerhouses of tobacco
companies and farmers. While Rosser’s article gives large amounts of focus to societal
actors in the health subsystem, his analysis pays special attention to the role the
government has had in limiting the advance of tobacco policy in Indonesia (Rosser,
2015). In Indonesia, the governments support of tobacco products has crippled effective
tobacco policy, but Rosser offers a beacon of hope in the form of balance between
societal actors and government agents in the health subsystem in Indonesia. His final
analysis offers a positive outlook on the road to reform for tobacco policy in the country,
as the role between government actor and special interest groups begin to balance
(Rosser, 2015).

After analyzing both a pluralist and statist approach to subsystems, it can be

seen that a subsystem proves to be most useful in the process of policy making when a
balance between governmental and societal actors is achieved. Where societal actors
and interest groups remain specialized and governmental actors remain on a equal
plane, a subsystem can formulate policy instead of fizzling into divisive fragmentation. I
have shown that in instances such as the subsystem stalemate of energy policy after
the OPEC oil crisis, a dominance of societal actors can prohibit policy from being
formed. And in comparison, as demonstrated in Indonesian tobacco policy, the
dominance of governmental actors can withhold lifesaving policy from emerging through
a health subsystem. In conclusion, an imbalance of governmental and societal power
leads to ineffective policy making and obsolete subsystems, and while perfect power
proportions cannot be maintained 100% of the time, pursuing a balance of power
between actors proves subsystems to be a useful component of public policy.

Word Count: 1,891

References

Hanberger, A. (2001). What is the Policy Problem?. Evaluation, 7(1), pp.45-62.

Howlett, M., Perl, A. and Ramesh, M. (2009). Studying public policy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.

Richardson, J. (2000). Government, Interest Groups and Policy Change. Political

Studies, 48(5), pp.1006-1025.

Rosser, A. (2015). Contesting Tobacco-Control Policy in Indonesia. Critical Asian

Studies, 47(1), pp.69-93.

Thurber, J. 1996. Political Power and Policy Subsystems in American Politics. In:
Peters, B.G. and Rockman, B.A. ed. Agenda for Excellence: Administering the State.
Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, pp.76-104.

Background Reading

Burstein, P. and Hirsh, C. (2007). Interest Organizations, Information, and Policy

Innovation in the U.S. Congress. Sociological Forum, 22(2), pp.174-199.

May, P. and Jochim, A. (2013). Policy Regime Perspectives: Policies, Politics, and
Governing. Policy Studies Journal, 41(3), pp.426-452.

McCool, D. (1998). The Subsystem Family of Concepts: A Critique and a Proposal.

Political Research Quarterly, 51(2), p.551.

Szarka, J. (2010). Bringing interests back in: using coalition theories to explain
European wind power policies. Journal of European Public Policy, 17(6), pp.836-853.

Wilkinson, K. (2010). Organised Chaos: An Interpretive Approach to Evidence-Based

Policy Making in Defra. Political Studies, 59(4), pp.959-977.
FEEDBACK
The essay gets marks for engaging with the literature and using them in support
of the argument, but it does not directly address the question. It seems to be
answering the question of when the concept of a subsystem is useful, rather
than how useful it is. A better response would have focused on what a
subsystem is before discussing its usefulness and limitations. This conceptual
work out of the way, you can focus on building the rest of your essay. Ahead of
the marked essay you should discuss your thesis beforehand.

MARK
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