Bangladesh Bank Cyber Heist:

Incident Analysis
Ramkumar Balu
rbalu@gatech.edu

1 INTRODUCTION

In one of the largest cyber heists that took place in February 2016, the Central
Bank of Bangladesh (Bangladesh Bank) lost $81 million from its account held in
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Mazumder & Sobhan, 2021). The hackers
originally attempted to steal a whopping $951 million in a well-planned sophis-
ticated attack. They compromised the bank’s network and navigated the SWIFT1
gateway to send 35 fraudulent fund transfer requests on behalf of the bank.

This paper applies Diamond model of Intrusion Analysis on the discussed cyber
incident. In the later part, the paper discusses policy assessment at various levels
as well as the policy impact that happened in response to the incident.

2 APPLYING THE DIAMOND MODEL

Diamond model is a simple yet powerful analytic tool that serves as a formal
method for intrusion analysis (Caltagirone et al., 2013). As shown in Figure 1, the
four vertices of the diamond (core features) correspond to adversary, capability,
infrastructure, and victim, while the edges represent the relationship between
them.

2.1 Core Features

2.1.1 Adversary

BAE systems was the first to find similarities between Bangladesh Bank (BB)
heist and Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE) hack that happened in 2014 (BAE
Systems, 2016a). Kaspersky, after a yearlong investigation, published a report
linking “Lazarus Group2” to the BB heist (Kaspersky, 2017).

Adversary Operator— Private cybersecurity companies such as Kaspersky, BAE

systems, and Symantec Corp attributed the attack to Lazarus group. The FBI filed

1 Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (www.swift.com)

2 North Korea based Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group

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criminal complaint against one of the members of the group, Park Jin Hyok (U.S.
v. Park, 2018).

Adversary Customer—The FBI and NSA alleged that the attack was carried out
on behalf of the North Korean government based on its similarities with SPE
hack (Elias Groll, 2017; U.S. v. Park, 2018). However, the North Korean govern-
ment denied all the allegations.

Figure 1— Diamond Model for Bangladesh Bank Cyber Heist

2.1.2 Capability

The attack used highly sophisticated tools and techniques which suggested that
the adversary is an APT group. The various capabilities used against the Bangla-
desh Bank are as follows,

• Spear Phishing – For initial access to the bank’s network, the hackers
used job application themed3 spear phishing emails with malicious at-
tachments (U.S. v. Park, 2018).

3 Same tools and techniques used in Sony Pictures Entertainment hack (2014).

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 • Command and Control – The adversary used C&C servers and had direct
control of the infected systems using a backdoor.
• SWIFT-DRIDEX – The attackers developed a custom malware based on
DRIDEX to interact with victim’s SWIFT Alliance Access software (BAE
Systems, 2016b; Basoya & Arora, 2020). The malware helped them send
fraudulent payment requests and cover traces by tampering SWIFT re-
sponses.
• Fake TLS Protocol3 – Custom network protocol developed to mimic TLS
traffic to bypass network security measures (DiMaggio, 2022).
• Secure File Wiper – A unique file wipe-out module was used to erase
traces (BAE Systems, 2016a).
• Other malwares – The forensic analysis found traces of malwares
codenamed NestEgg, Macktruck3 and Sierra Charlie4 that were used for
lateral movement, persistence, and backdoor access (U.S. v. Park, 2018).
• Money laundering – The attackers made the stolen money disappear by
running it through a Philippine bank and a few casinos.

2.1.3 Infrastructure

The BAE Systems investigation revealed an Egypt IPv4 address (shown in Table
1) that was used as C&C in one of the malwares (BAE Systems, 2016b). The IP
address location suggests that it could be a compromised host or controlled by
an intermediary (type 2 infrastructure).

Forensic review of an infected computer at BB revealed two domain names,

whose DDNS5 accounts were later linked to Lazarus (U.S. v. Park, 2018).

The FBI found email addresses used by the adversary to send spear-phishing
emails (infection vector) and perform reconnaissance on BB employees (U.S. v.
Park, 2018).

4 Shares common framework with Brambul worm used in SPE hack (2014).
5 Dynamic DNS

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 Table 1 — Attacker Infrastructure

Infrastructure Type Service Provider

196.202.103.174 Type 2 TE Data, Egypt

mlods[.]strangled[.]net Type 1 Free-DNS6

bepons[.]us[.]to

yardgen[at]gmail.com Type 1 Google

agena316[at]gmail.com

watsonhenny[at]gmail.com

rasel.aflam[at]gmail.com

rsaflam8808[at]gmail.com

2.1.4 Victim

Victim Persona – Bangladesh Bank is the central bank of Bangladesh owned by

the nation’s government.

Victim Asset – Victim assets in this case include workstations belonging to the
Bangladesh Bank, SWIFT Alliance Access software, and Bangladesh Bank’s
funds (end-target) held in NY Federal Reserve Bank.

2.2 Meta-Features

2.2.1 Timestamp

Although the final phase of the attack happened between February 4–5, 2016, the
investigations revealed that the attackers entered the bank’s network a year be-
fore (U.S. v. Park, 2018).

2.2.2 Phase

The attack included most of the phases of cyber kill chain with some phases ex-
ecuted multiple times. For example, after initial foothold, the attackers further
learned about the internal banking infrastructure and delivered customized
6 Free DNS - https://freedns.afraid.org/

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malware that interacted with the SWIFT gateway. The phases are illustrated in a
simplified activity thread shown in Table 2.

Table 2 — Simplified activity thread illustrating Lazarus group's

attack against Bangladesh Bank. The Diamond events 1 through
4 represent the initial access through spear phishing. The events
5 to 7 represent backdoor installation whereas 8 to 13 represent
the SWIFT compromise using DRIDEX malware.

Lazarus Group

Reconnaissance 1 8
H
A
Weaponization 9
I

Delivery 2 5
G
10
B

Exploitation 3 E J
D

Installation C 6 11
F K

C2 4 7 12
L

Action on Objectives 13

Bangladesh Bank

2.3 Social-Political Meta-Feature: Adversary-Victim Relationship

The Bangladesh Bank incident is a straightforward robbery where cybercrimi-

nals dared to steal almost a billion dollars from a central bank’s reserve. There
are interesting speculations on the adversary’s motivation. Among several al-
leged crime-for-profit activities of the North Korean state, the superdollar (coun-
terfeited U.S. currency) alone was estimated to have generated a profit of at least
$15 million per year (Perl & Nanto, 2007). After earnest efforts by U.S. including
2013 redesign of dollar notes, the circulation of counterfeit currencies was greatly
reduced (Buchanan, 2020). To continue its high defense spending including de-
velopment of nuclear weapons and ICBMs, the central command economy had
to do better.

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Persistent Relationship – In Bangladesh Bank incident, the adversary was more
towards the Enduring side in the Degree of Persistence spectrum. The hackers
were inside the Bank’s network for almost a year and used capabilities to not get
detected.

Victim of Interest vs Victim of Opportunity – The Bangladesh Bank was a vic-

tim of Interest. While aiming for a billion dollars, there are only handful of enti-
ties to rob such as central banks.

Shared Threat Space – Financial institutions with access to fortunes fall under
the same threat space. In fact, after BB, the same adversary was found to have
attacked a bank in Philippines (Symantec, 2016).

2.4 Technology Meta-Feature: Connecting Infrastructure and Capability

The malwares used in Bangladesh Bank attack seems to be part of a wider attack
toolkit. The MACKTRUCK malware which was used to have backdoor access to
the bank’s workstations, communicated with C&C servers using a protocol dis-
guised as TLS traffic (Kasza & Yates, 2017). The malware used popular domain
names to create fake TLS handshake sessions with the C&C server. This made
the network traffic look legitimate. The underlying data exchange with the C&C
used HTTP REST standard.

The DRIDEX based malware which was used to control the SWIFT Alliance Ac-
cess software had an encrypted config file (BAE Systems, 2016b). The malware
behavior was highly configurable such that it can be easily reused for similar
attacks in future. The malware monitored SWIFT events and periodically com-
municated them to the C&C using HTTP REST messages (BAE Systems, 2016b).

3 POLICY ASSESSMENT

In response to the 2016 Bangladesh Bank heist, policy changes occurred at organ-
izational and industry level. However, there were little to no public policy
changes at the national and transnational level where it could be more effective.

3.1 National Level

Bangladesh, since 2013, has seen an increasing trend in cyber-attacks especially

against its financial sector (Kundu et al., 2018). The risk posed by these threats to
financial sector are very severe. If all the fraudulent transactions totaling to

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almost $1 billion were successful, it would have been disastrous to the Bangla-
desh economy, whose GDP in 2016 was approximately $221 billion7. The Gov-
ernment of Bangladesh had launched “National Cybersecurity Strategy8” in 2014
(Md. R. Uddin, 2017). However, no immediate public policy change could be
seen in response to the 2016 bank heist.

Although the National Cybersecurity Strategy talks about critical infrastructure,

more work to be done on prioritizing nation’s critical infrastructure security. A
central agency, like U.S. CISA, can be set up to coordinate with critical infrastruc-
ture providers, improve situational awareness and build resiliency towards
cyber threats.

Moving millions of dollars across borders is not trouble-free. Yet, major part of
the stolen money is still not recovered. The attackers used old school money
laundering techniques to vanish the stolen funds (Katz & Fan, 2017). The stolen
funds were initially transferred into 4 accounts in RCBC 9 Bank and were routed
through several casinos in Philippines. In 2016, casinos didn’t come under
AMLC10 scrutiny in Philippines (Hofilena & Sy, 2017). It is evident that Philip-
pines needs to tighten its Anti-Money Laundering (AML) laws and ease bank
secrecy law to be on par with international standards.

In response to the incident, the AML act was amended to include casinos (Repub-
lic Act No. 10927, 2017). Hofilena & Sy (2017) propose further amendments in-
cluding granting AMLC the authority to issue ex parte freeze order directly rather
than going through several court procedures.

3.2 Transnational Level

At the transnational level, there is scope for improving cyber-attribution. When

nation states are involved in cyber-attacks, correct attribution is critical for geo-
political accountability and deterrence (Mueller et al., 2019). However, assigning
responsibility to a state is not simple, especially when states contract out attacks
through APT groups. Microsoft, in its Digital Geneva Convention proposal,
called for a neutral international organization to attribute state-sponsored at-
tacks (Microsoft, 2017). RAND corporation advocated for a Global Cyber
7 Data from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=BD
8 https://www.dpp.gov.bd/upload_file/gazettes/10041_41196.pdf
9 Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, Philippines

10 Anti-Money Laundering Council, Philippines

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Attribution Consortium independent of nation-states (Davis et al., 2017). The
need for such a neutral expert group is evident so that the attributions are taken
seriously by the international community.

Regarding law enforcement efforts, Bangladesh has no existing MLA treaty with
Philippines. Philippines claims that their AMLC coordinated regularly with fi-
nancial intelligence of Bangladesh. However, Katz & Fan (2017) claims that the
gamblers were allowed to continue their casino play even after Bangladesh offi-
cials called Philippines for help. Though eventually the remaining funds were
frozen, it was too late. This shows the importance of MLA treaties with emphasis
on immediate action for ongoing crimes.

3.3 Industry Level

Although the attackers didn’t exploit any vulnerabilities in the SWIFT payment
network, the incident demanded response from the Belgian cooperative society.
SWIFT can mandate standards at the industry level through private contracts
like ICANN11. In 2017, the SWIFT provider launched Customer Security Program
(CSP) in response to the Bangladesh Bank incident (SWIFT, 2017). As part of CSP,
the SWIFT published Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) that in-
cludes mandatory and advisory security controls for its customers. Participants
are needed to attest their level of compliance annually.

Also, after three years, in 2019, SWIFT Payment Controls feature was launched
that performs real time validation of payment messages according to the policy
set by the customer (SWIFT, 2019). SWIFT claims that it can identify uncharac-
teristic payments that could be a threat.

3.4 Organizational Level

Shortly after the incident, BB announced that it is planning to set up an internal

Cybersecurity Unit (CSU) to oversee IT system security (A. Z. Uddin, 2016). It
took nearly 3 years to establish CSU which is now responsible to manage cyber
risk, strengthen the security policy and formulate implementation plan for BB
(Bangladesh Bank, 2019).

11 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers

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4 CONCLUSION

The Diamond Model analysis demonstrated the features of the event as well as
the relationship between them. The policy assessment provided useful insights
into the policy gaps at various levels.

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