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GEC 09: ETHICS

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GEC 09: ETHICS

This module makes you feel what ethics is about. The discussion starts with the
etymological definition of ethics. Major parts of this module are dedicated to
understanding what ethics is and what is not. Ethics talks about good and bad. But you
must remember not all good and bad are part of ethics. This module will help you make
the valuation of actions based on reason not based on emotion, legal, cultural, and
religious claims. In the latter part of the module, there are cases that you will analyze. It
will make you feel what ethics is. Lastly, follow the sequence of the module. Don’t skip.

At the end of this module, you should be able to:

1. explain what ethics is;

2. differentiate ethics from technical, societal, and aesthetic and recognize what are
ethical problems;

3. apply the concepts on actual life experience from news, events, and everyday
experience.

ETHICS

Ethics etymologically comes from the Greek word ethos. It means custom, usage,
character. The Latin equivalent of ethos is mores which in turn is the etymological word
of “moral”, “morality”, “morals”. Many people tried to make distinctions on the words ethics
and morality. According to Bulaong, et al. (2017), the word morals may be used to refer
to specific beliefs or attitudes that people have to describe acts that people perform. An
Individual’s conduct is referred to as his morals, and if he falls short behaving properly, it
is immoral. For example: When a man returned a lost wallet to the owner, his action is
considered moral. But when a man kept the lost wallet and has no intention to return it to
the owner, his action is considered as immoral. On the other hand, Ethics can be spoken
of as the discipline of studying and understanding the ideal of human behavior and ideal
ways of thinking. It could be acceptable or unacceptable behavior or describe as ethical
or unethical. This term is mostly used on ways of behaving in a given field, this is popularly
known as “professional ethics” (Bulaong, et al, 2017). For example, a policeman arresting
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a man bribing him, the action is considered as ethical. But if the policeman accepts the
bribe and sets the man free, his action is considered as unethical.

The distinction between ethics and morals could clarify different dimensions of our
lives. But in our discussion, we will be using the terms ethical and moral interchangeably.
According to Reyes (2009), “ethics and morals are ordinarily used as equivalent terms in
Western language that refers to traditional manners, customs, habits, systems of values
or character of the community.”

VALUE

We can easily say that ethics is about what is good or bad actions, right or wrong,
acceptable or unacceptable. It is doing what is good and avoiding what is bad. In ethics,
we are putting a value on our actions. For example, An elected official helps the poor to
battle the pandemic that we are experiencing. We say that the value of his action is good.
But an elected official takes advantage of the situation by placing his relatives to be the
first recipient of the government’s social amelioration is valued to be as bad. Here we can
see that the primary concern of ethics is good and bad or right and wrong. But we must
be able to clarify that not all that is valued to be good and bad are part of ethics. For
instance, Ben and Ben's songs are good because of their vibe. The movie I watched is
bad because of the storyline. It is right to dip my fried chicken on the gravy. It is wrong to
wear basketball shorts during formal events. In the examples, we can see that there are
valuations of what is good and bad or right and wrong. However, the valuation is not part
of ethics rather it is part of aesthetics. The word aesthetic comes from the Greek word
aesthesis which means sense or feeling. The judgments are based on what we see, hear,
smell, or taste. It is leaning towards our taste. When we talk about taste it is subjective.
Take this as an example, Pedro sports a neon pink socks and neon shorts. Many will say
it is not good because it was not good for our taste. The valuation of its goodness or
badness is more on personal aesthetic preference and it is not the case in ethics.

Besides aesthetics, there is another way we can value judgment on the goodness
and badness of actions and it is what we call etiquette. This is telling us what is proper to
do in specific situations. Take these examples: When a young boy talks to an elder, he
say “po” or “opo”. When we eat, we don’t talk when our mouth is full. These actions will
receive our approval. But if the bus is full and the young guy did not offer his seat to an
old lady, it is disgust. This will get our disapproval. Many people have a connotation that
ethics and etiquette are the same but they are not. Yes, etiquette is indeed concerned
with what is right and wrong actions but to a certain degree, it is not enough to be in
parallel with ethics. Let us clarify it, we may be displeased when somebody interrupts us
when we are speaking (etiquette), and it will be much of greater offense when this man
starts to curse us and utter libelous words towards us (ethics).

The technique is another thing that has the notion of good and bad or right and
wrong but is not part of ethics. Technique comes from the Greek word “techne” which
means the proper way of doing things. Take the example of cooking bacon, there is a
technique when we cook bacon. The proper way to cook it is by not putting oil in the pan.
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The bacon will produce its oil and when we put oil the bacon will shrink. But it only makes
sense in cooking and it does not have any connection of whatever in ethics. Hence, it is
not part of ethics.

Now it is clear that aesthetics, etiquette, and technique is not part of ethics. So,
every problem raised on aesthetics, etiquette, and technique cannot be considered as
ethical problems. When we see a person not dressing up properly for the occasion does
not violate any ethical norms because it is not an ethical problem. Same as when a person
barges into one’s room without knocking is not an ethical problem. Recognizing ethical
problems will greatly help us understand what ethics is all about. There seems to be a
certain degree that can qualify an event or action to be ethical problems. Many ethicists
believe that matters concerns the life or matters concerns about man’s well-being are
considered part of ethics. Issues like the death penalty, corruption in the government, and
the inequality are part of ethics, thus they are considered to be ethical problems.

This discussion clarifies that not all kinds of valuation belong to ethics. You must
be able to remember that ethics is not dependent on taste to be able to classify what is
good and bad action. Ethics does not value good or bad actions based on its acceptability
and unacceptability in the community. Lastly, ethics does not classify good and bad
actions based on technique or the proper way of doing things.

SOURCE OF AUTHORITY

It is clear to us that ethics is about good and bad actions. But how can we
determine good and bad action? Let us take the action lying. We can say that lying is bad
or wrong. But what is the basis? Why do we value lying as a bad action? What is the
source that will tell us why lying is bad? Many of us will certainly go on the obvious sets
of standards that we have, like law, religion, and culture. We will say that lying is bad
because it is against the law. Others will say that it is prohibited in our religion. Some
would even declare that it is not acceptable in their culture. Now, can law, religion, and
culture be the source of authority in ethics? Let us try to analyze them.

Can a law be a source of authority in ethics? On the surface, we can easily say
that law can be the source of authority in ethics. Law guides every country in this world.
It prohibits things that should not be done. It does not allow bad actions. Law can easily
claim that actions like stealing or murder are unethical because it is prohibited by law. An
action is considered good if it is not prohibited by law. Very simple. Law seems to be a
good source of authority in ethics. But let us analyze it further. In the Philippines, Family
members who steal from you may not be criminally liable. According to Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code of the Philippines: states that persons exempt from criminal liability
in the event of the crimes of theft, swindling or malicious mischief include spouses of
relatives by affinity in the same line, the widowed spouse with respect to the property that
belonged to the deceased spouse, and brother and sisters or brothers-in-law and sisters-
in-law. So, this means that stealing is permitted only to your family members. You can
steal from them. Now imagine, if the law will be the source of authority in ethics. Will you
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agree with it? Perhaps we should think that ethics does not simply identify it with
obedience to the law. Remember the cliché: “What is legal is not necessarily moral”.

Now, can religion be a source of authority in ethics? In religion, it talks about what
is pleasing and not pleasing in the eyes of God. It tells us that if it is pleasing in the eyes
of God then it is good and if it is not pleasing then it is bad. Religion greatly contributes to
molding their faithful to be good. We members of particular religions are guided by God’s
commandment, to be specific it is the Ten Commandments. This commandment gives us
the guiding principle on how to be a good person. It simply tells us that to become a good
person we must avoid the following do not kill, steal, lie, and commit adultery. When we
look closer, we will realize that most of our laws are patterned on the precepts of God’s
Ten Commandments. Now for us believers, we can see that religion has a strong case to
be the source of authority in ethics. Let us analyze it further. Let us assume that religion
is the source of authority in ethics. If this is true, it will just lead us to more confusion.
Why? Because of the multiplicity of religion. There are thousands of religions in the world.
The problem lays on which among these thousands of religions is the ultimate source of
authority on ethics. One religion may say that they are the ultimate source of authority but
definitely, other religions have the same claim. Here in the Philippines, you can already
see the conflicts of religions. This kind of problem could clarify that religion cannot become
the source of authority in ethics. Another problem it may bring is the reality that there are
people who are atheists, persons who do not believe in deities (God), who do good
actions. So how can we say that religion is the source of authority in ethics if there are
persons who do not have religion and yet do good actions? This is why we do not bring
religion into the arguments of ethics.

Lastly, can culture be the source of authority in ethics? Culture sets standards in
our community. It tells the community what we should do and not to do. Philippine culture
for example sees that it is moral for a man and woman to live together after they get
married. It seems that culture could be a source of authority in ethics. But with the great
number of different cultures in this world, there will be different standards. Take the
example of the Namibian tribes, the Ovahimba and Ovazimba tribes have a unique
culture. When a man visits the tribe and knocks on the door, the husband gives him the
Okujepisa Omukazendu treatment. This means that his wife is given to his guest to spend
the night while the husband goes out of the house. In other cultures, this kind of practice
is unacceptable. But we are not in the position to say that it is unacceptable. We cannot
deny the fact that culture is something relative to us. It means that we can say it is good
or bad depending on one’s culture. This brings us to the same criticism that religion face.
Due to the multiplicity of culture which culture is the standard in ethics. We must bear in
mind that the standards of ethics must be universal. It must be acceptable for you and me
even we have a different culture. That is why culture cannot be the source of authority in
ethics.

So what is the source of authority in ethics? Ethicists would confer that the source
of authority in ethics must be common to all. It must be something universal. So let us try
to see what is common to all men that makes him unique from other creatures. All of us
would agree that what is common to all men is our ability to reason. There is no other
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creature that can reason out. The reason is the source of authority in ethics. Let us see
how reason works in ethics. Have you ever asked yourself: Why I am not stealing goods?
Our initial answer would be: “I do not steal because I am afraid I can get punish and I
don’t like to be punished”. But this reason is to shallow. So man realizes that we must be
able to give a good reason that will be acceptable to all something that would make sense.
A better answer is that stealing is wrong because it violates the principle of fairness and
the respect of other’s property. This principle becomes the ground of our judgment that
justifies our decisions. This moral principle is established in moral theory. This theory is
a system of ideas which is used to evaluate our valuing of actions and concludes decision
on a certain action. The moral theory will be the center of this course. The succeeding
modules will be centering on moral theories.

CLARIFICATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY

Recognizing the notions of good and bad, and right and wrong, are the primary
concern of ethics. In order to start. It would be useful to useful to clarify the following
points.

KINDS OF VALUATION
Our first point of clarification is to recognize that there are instances when we make
value judgements that are not considered to be part of ethics. For instance. I could say
that this new movie i had just seen was a "good" one because i enjoyed it, or a song i had
just heard on the radio was a "bad" one because it had an unpleasant tone, but these are
not part of a discussion of discussion of ethics. I may have an opinion as to what is the
"right" dip (sawsawan) for my chicken barbecue, or i may maintain that it is "wrong" to
wear a leather vest over a Barong Tagalog, and these are not concerns of ethics. These
are valuations that fall under the domain of aesthetics. The word "aesthetics" id derived
from the Greek word aisthesis ("sense" or "feeling") and refers to the judgments of
personal approval ot disapproval that we make about what we see, hear, smell, or taste.
In fact, we often use the word "taste" to refer to the personal aesthetic preferences that
we have on these matters, such as "his taste in music" or "her taste in clothes."
Similarly, we have sense of approval or disapproval comcerning certain actions
which can be considered relatively more trivial in nature. Thus, for instance, I may think
that it is "right" ti knock politely on someone's door, while it is "wrong" to barge into one's
office. Perhaps i may approve of a child who knows how to ask for something properly by
saying, "please" and otherwise, disapprove of a woman that i see picking her nose in
public. These and other similar examples belong to the category of etiquette, which is
concerned with right and wrong actions, but those which might be considered not quite
grave enough to belong to a discussion on ethics. To clarify this point, we can differentiate
how i may be displeased seeing a healthy young man refuse to offer his seat on the bus
to an elderly lady, but my indignation and shock would be much greater if i were to see a
man deliberately push another one out of a moving bus.
We can also consider how a notion of right and wrong actions can easily appear
in a context that is not a matter of ethics. This could also be when learning how to bake,
for instance. I am told that the right thing to do should be to mix the dry ingredients first,
such as flour or sugar before bringing in any liquids, like milk or cream: this id the right
thing to do in baking, but not one that bellongs to a discussion of ethics. This could also
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be when learning how to play basketball. I am instricted that it is against the rules to walk
more than two steps without dribbling the ball; again, obeying this rule to not travel is
something that makes sense only in the context of the game and is not an ethical
prohibition. We derive from the Greek word techne the English words "technique" and
"technical" which are often used to refer to a proper way (or right way) of doing things,
but a technical valuation (or right and wrong technique of doing things) may not
necessarily be an ethical one as these examples show.
Recognizing the characteristics of aesthetic and technical valuation allows us to
have a rough guide ss to what belongs to a discussion of ethics. They involve valuations
that we make in a sphere of human actions, characterized by certain gravity and concern
the human well-being or human life itself. Therefore, matters that concern life and death
such as war, capital punishment, or abortion and matters that concern human well-being
such as poverty, inequality, or sexual identity are often included in discussions of ethics.
However, this general description in only a starting point and will require further
elaboration.
One complication that can be noted id that the distinction between what belongs
to ethics and what does not id not always so clearly defined. At times, the question of
what is grave or trivial is debatable, and sometimes some of the most heated discussions
in ethics could be on the fundamental question of whether s certain sphere of human
activities belongs to this discussion. Are clothes always just a matter of taste or would
provocative clothing call for some kind of moral judgement? Can we say that a man who
verbally abuses his girlfriend is simply showing bad manners or does this behavior
deserve stronger moral condescension?

ETHICS AND MORALS

Our second point of clarification is on the use of the words "ethics" and "morals"
this discussion of ethics and morals would include cognates such as ethical, unethical,
immoral, amoral. Morality, and so on. As we proceed, we should be careful particularly
on the use of the word "not" when applied to the words "moral" or "ethical" as this can br
ambiguous. One might say that cooking is not ethical. That is. The act of cooking does
not belong to a discussion of ethics; om the other hand, one might say that lying id not
ethical. But the meaning here is that the act of lying would be sn unethical act.
Let us consider those two words further. Term "morals" may be used to refer to
specific beliefs or attitudes that people have or to describe acts that people perform. Thus,
it is sometimes said that an individual's personal conduct id referred to as his morals. And
if he falls short of behaving properly, this can be described as immoral. However, we also
have terms such as "moral judgement" or "moral reasoning," terms such as "moral
judgement" or "moral reasoning," which suggest a more rational aspect. The term "ethics"
can be spoken of as the discipline of studying and understanding ideal human behavior
and ideal ways of thinking. Thus, ethics is acknowledged as an intellectual discipline
belonging to philosophy. However, acceptable and unacceptable behaviors are also
generally described as ethical and unethical, respectively. In addition, with regard to the
acceptable and unacceptable ways of behaving in a given field, we have the term
"professional ethics" (e.g., legal ethics for the proper comportment of lawyers and other
people in the legal profession; medical ethics for doctors and nurses; and media ethics
for writers and reporters).
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Therefore, various thinkers and writers posit a distinction between the

terms"moral" and "ethics" and they may have good reason for doing so, but there is no
consensus as to how to make that distinction. Ordinary conversation presents a much
less rigid distinction between this terms, and in this book, we will lean in that direction as
we do not need to occupy ourselves here with the question of how different thinkers and
writers construe that distinction. So, in this book, we will be using the terms "ethical" and
"moral"(likewise,"ethics"and"morality") interchangeably.
Philosophy is commonly thought of today as a particular disciple in a college
curriculum, perhaps a subject that one could take, or a course in which one could get a
degree. The word "philosophy" is rooted in the Greek words that translate to "love of
wisdom" (philia is the noun often translated into English as some form of "friendship" or
"love," while sophia is the noun often translated into English as "wisdom"). More
specifically, the word "philosophy" had been first used by thinkers to refer to their striving
to better understand reality in a maintained and systematic manner. Historically speaking,
it can be said that philosophy started among the ancient Greeks around two and and a
half thousand years ago, when certain proper in the Mediterranean made the mental effort
of trying to make sense of the world and of human life in s unique way. As time passed,
asking certain specific questions would develop ingo specific methods; these particular
topics and the which of addressing them established themselves as disciplines in their
own right, which is why we now have the empirical sciences such as biology or the social
sciences such as psychology. Philosophy remains as the unique discipline that asks
significance questions that other fields are unable to address. the different branches or
areas of philosophy correspond to some of these questions, generally stated as follows:
metaphysics wonders as to what constitutes the whole of reality; epistemology asks what
is our basis for determining what we know; axiology refers broadly to the study of value
and is often divided into aesthetic, which concerns itself with the value of beauty, and
ethics, which concerns itself with the value of human actions.

DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE

Our third point of clarification is to distinguish between a descriptive and a
normative study of ethics. A descriptive study of ethics reports how people, particularly
groups, make their moral valuations without making any judgement either for or against
these valuations. This kind of study is often thr work of thr social scientist: either a
historian (studying different moral standards across cultures). A normative study of ethics,
as is often done in philosophy or moral theology, engages the question: What could or
should be considered as the right way of acting? In other words, a normative discussion
prescribes what we ought to maintain as our standards or bases of moral valuation. When
engaging in a discussion of ethic, it is always advisable to recognize whether one is
concerned whit a descriptive view (e.g., nothing how filial piety and obedience are
pervasive characteristics of Chinese culture) or with a normative perspective (e.g.,
studying how Confucian ethics enjoins us to obey our parents and to show filial piety).
We need to go further. A philosophical discussion of ethics goes beyond
recognizing the characteristics of some descriptive theory; also, it does not simply accept
as correct any normative theory. A philosophical discussion of ethics engages in s critical
consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of these theories. This will be our primary
concern thought this module.
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ISSUE, DECISION, JUDGEMENT, AND DILEMMA

As the final point of clarification, it may be helpful to distinguish a situation that
calls for moral valuation. It can be called a moral issue. Dor instance, imagine a situation
wherein a person cannot afford a certain item, but then the possibility presents itself for
her to steal it. This is a matter of ethics (and not just law) insofar as it involves the question
of respect for one's property. We should add that "issue" is also often used to refer to
those particular situations that are often the source of considerable and inconclusive
debate (thus, we would often hear topics such as capital punishment and euthanasia as
moral "issues").
When ine is placed in a situation and confronted by the choice of what act to
perform, she is called to make a moral decision. For instance, i choose bot to take
something i did not pay for. When a person id making a moral judgement. For instance,
a friend of mine chooses to steal from a stone, and i make an assessment that it is wrong.
Finally, going beyond the matter of choosing right over wrong, or good over bad,
and considering instead thd more complicated situation wherein one is torn between
choosing one of two goods or choosing between the lesser of two evils: this is referred to
as a moral dilemma. We have a moral dilemma when sn individual can choose only one
from a number of possible actions, and there are compelling ethical reasons for the
various choices. A mother may be conflicted between wanting to feed her hungry child,
but then recognizing that it would be wrong for her to steal is an example of a moral
dilemma.

REASONING
Why do we suppose that a certain way of acting is right and its opposite wrong?
the study of ethics is interested in questions like these: Why do we decide to consider this
way of acting as acceptable while that way of acting, its opposite, is unacceptable? To
put it in, what reasons do we give to decide or to judge that a certain way of acting is
another either right or wrong?
A person's fear of punishment or desire for reward can provide him a reason for
acting in a certain way. It is common to near someone say: "I did not cheat on the exam
because I was afraid that I might get caught;" or "I looked after my father in the hospital
because I wanted to get a higher allowance." In a certain sense, fear of punishment and
desire for reward can be spoken of as giving someone a "reason" for acting in a certain
way. But the question then would be: Is this reason good enough? That is to say, this of
way thinking seems to be a shallow way of understanding reason because it does not
show any true understanding of why cheating on an exam is wrong or why looking after
a member of my family is in itself a good thing. The promise of rewards and the fear of
punishments can certainly motivate us to act, but are not in themselves a determinant of
the rightness or wrongness of a certain way of acting or of the good or the bad in a
particular pursuit. s it possible to find better reasons for finding a certain way of acting
either acceptable or unacceptable?
I am in a situation wherein I could obtain a higher grade for myself by cheating. I
make the decision not to do so. Or I know that my friend was in a position to get a better
grade for herself by cheating. She refuses to do so; I then make the judgment of praising
her for this. In making this kind of moral decision or moral judgment, the question can be
asked: Why?
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Asking the question "why" might bring us to no more than a superficial discussion
of rewards and punishments, as seen above, but it could also bring us to another level of
thinking. Perhaps one can rise above the particulars of a specific situation, going beyond
whatever motivation or incentive is present in this instance of cheating (or not doing So).
pother words, our thinking may take on a level of abstraction, that is, detaching itself from
the particular situation and arriving at a statement like, "Cheating is wrong," by
recognizing proper reasons for not acting in this way. Beyond rewards and punishments,
it is possible or our moral valuation-our decisions and judaments-to be based on a
principle. Thus, one may conclude that cheating is wrong based on 'a sense of fair play
or a respect for the importance and validity of testing. From this, we can define principles
as rationally established grounds by which one justifies and maintains her moral decisions
and judgments.

But why do we maintain one particular principle rather than another? Why should
I maintain that I should care for fair play and that cheating is, therefore, wrong? Returning
to the case of fraternity hazing where we started this chapter, why is it wrong to cause
another person physical injury or to take another's life? We can maintain principles, but
we can also ask what good reasons for doing so. Such reasons may differ. So, for
example, what makes the death of Cris such a tragedy? One person may say that life is
sacred and God-given. Another person may declare that human life has a priceless
dignity. Still another may put forward the idea that taking another's life does not contribute
to human happiness but to human misery instead. How exactly do we arrive at any of
these claims? This is where we turn to theory:A moral theory is a systematic attempt to
establish the validity of maintaining certain moral principles. Insofar as a theory is a
system of thought or of ideas, it can also be referred to as a framework. We can use this
term, "framework," as a theory of interconnected ideas, and at the same time, a structure
through which we can evaluate our reasons for valuing a certain decision or judgment.
There are different frameworks that can make us reflect on the principles that we
maintain and thus, the decisions and judgments we make. By studying these, we can
reconsider, clarify, modify, and ultimately strengthen our principles, thereby informing
better both our moral judgments and moral decisions.
The next chapters of this book will explore different ethical frameworks that have
come down from the history of philosophy. This is not an exhaustive list, and many
worthwhile theories and thinkers have been set aside. But the choice had been made to
discuss more deeply and at greater length just a few of the more significant and influential
thinkers and ideas that have contributed to ethical discernment.
In The Apology of Socrates written by Plato, Sočrates makes the claim that it is the
greatest good for a person to spend time thinking about and discussing with others these
questions on goodness and virtue. Hopefully, as we pursue these topics, you will come
to agree with Socrates that this effort is indeed a good thing. We will be returning to Plato
later in this chapter, as he guides us though some further difficulties.

PLATO (427-347 BCE)

The Greek thinker Plato is credited as one of the pioneers of philosophy as his
various writings bring up and discuss carefully and creatively some of the questions that
later thinkers will find to be of lasting significance to humankind, such as "Can virtue be
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taught?" "What is beauty?" and "What is love?" He started a school in Athens which would
be known as the Academy and is believed to be the first institution of higher learning in
the Western world.

Before turning to the ethical theories, we will spend the rest of this chapter
exploring certain notions of ethics that are commonly maintained, but further thought on
these notions will reveal that these are quite problematic. These involve either an appeal
to a particular form of authority or to a particular way of understanding the self.

SOURCES OF AUTHORITY
Several common ways of thinking about ethics are based on the idea that the
standards of valuation are imposed by a higher authority that commands our obedience
In the following section, we will explore three of such ideas: the authority of the law, the
authority of one's religion, and the authority of one's own culture.

LAW
It is supposed that law is one's guide to ethical behavior. In the Philippines,
Filipinos are constrained to obey the laws of the land as stated in the country's criminal
and civil codes. Making this even more particular, in Cebu, residents are constrained to
follow any provincial laws or city ordinances. One can easily imagine this becoming even
more localized to the barangay or village level, where local or municipal layers of
obligation are there for residents to follow. The term positive law refers to the different
rules and regulations that are posited or put forward by an authority figure that require
compliance.
At first glance, this seems to make a lot of sense. We recognize that there are
many acts that we immediately consider unethical (e.g., murder or theft), which we also
know are forbidden by law. Furthermore, the law is enforced by way of a system of
sanctions administered through persons and institutions, which all help in compelling us
to obey. Taking the law to be the basis of ethics has the benefit of providing us with an
objective standard that is obligatory and applicable to all. So, we would not be surprised
if we were to hear someone say, "Ethics? It is simple. Just follow whatever the law says."
However, there are some problems with this. Of course, we do maintain that,
generally speaking, one should obey the law. However, the idea that we are examining
here Is a more controversial one: the more radical claim that one can look to the law itself
in order to determine what is right or wrong. But the question is: can one simply identify
ethics with the law?
One point to be raised is the prohibitive nature of law. The law does not tell us what
we should do; it works by constraining us from performing acts that we should not do. To
put it slightly differently, the law cannot tell us what to pursue, only what to avoid. Would
we be satisfied thinking about ethics solely from the negative perspective of that which
we may not do, disregarding the important aspect of a good which we could and maybe
even should do, even if it were not required of us by the law?

In line with this, we might find that there are certain ways of acting which are not
forbidden by the law, but are ethically questionable to us. For instance, a company that
pads its profits by refusing to give its employees benefits may do so within the parameters
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of the law. The company can do so by refusing to hire people on a permanent basis, but
offering them six-month contracts. Constrained to work under this contractual system, the
employees are thus deprived not only of benefits, but also of job security. Here, no law is
violated, yet one can wonder whether there is something ethically questionable to this
business practice. The fact that one can make such a negative value judgment of the
practice where there is no violation of the law is already a hint that one can look to
something beyond the law when making our ethical valuations.
To make this point concrete, recall the story of a toddler who had been run over by
a couple of vehicles. While there were many passers-by who witnessed what had
happened, for quite a long while, no one did anything to help. The child later died in the
hospital. The law does not oblige people to help others in need, so none of these passers-
by were guilty of breaking any law. However, many people reacting to this sad news report
share a sense that those passers-by were somewhat ethically culpable in their
negligence. In view of all this, perhaps one should think of ethics in a way that does not
simply identify it with obedience to the law. Later, we shall see how the concept of law is
creatively utilized in the Deontology of Immanuel Kant in a more ethically significant way.

RELIGION
"Love the Lord, Your God, therefore, and always heed his charge: his statutes,
decrees, and commandments." (New American Bible)
This verse is the first line of Chapter 11 of the book of Deuteronomy. It expresses
a claim that many people of a religious sensibility find appealing and immediately valid:
the idea that one is obliged to obey her God in all things. As a foundation for ethical
values, this is referred to as the divine command theory. The divinity called God, Allah,
or Supreme Being commands and one is obliged to obey her Creator. There are persons
and texts that one believes are linked to the Divine. By listening to these figures and
reading these writings, an individual discovers how the Divine wants her to act. Further,
someone maintaining a more radical form of this theory might go beyond these
instruments of divine revelation and claim that God "spoke" to her directly to instruct her
what to do.
At first glance, this seems to make a lot of sense. Many of us had been brought up
with one form of religious upbringing or another, so it is very possible that there is a strong
Inclination in us to refer to our religious background to back up our moral valuations. We
are presented with a more-or-less clear code of prohibitions and many of these
prohibitions given by religion-"Thou shall not kill," "Thou shall not steal," and "Thou shall
not commit adultery"-seem to intuitively coincide with our sense of what ethics should
rightly demand. In addition, there is an advance here over the law because religion is not
simply prohibitive, but it also provides ideals to pursue. For instance, one may be called
to forgive those who sinned against him or be charitable to those who have less. Further,
taking religion as basis of ethics has the advantage of providing us with not only a set of
commands but also a Supreme Authority that can inspire and compel our obedience in a
way that nothing else can. The Divine can command absolute obedience on one's part
as the implications of her actions involve her ultimate destiny. Thus, we would not be
surprised if we were to bear someone say, "Ethics? It is simple. Just follow whatever your
religion says."
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However, there are some problems with this. First, on the practical level, we realize
the presence of a multiplicity of religions. Each faith demands differently from its
adherents which would apparently result in conflicting ethical standards. For instance,
certain religions have prohibitions concerning what food may be consumed, while others
do not share the same constraints. Are we then compelled to judge others negatively
given their different morality? Are we called upon to convert them toward our own faith?
How about the problem of realizing that not everyone is devout or maintains a religious
faith? Would we be compelled to admit then that if religion is the basis of morality, some
people would simply have no moral code? Differences, however, are not confined to being
problematic of varying religious traditions. Experience teaches us that sometimes even
within one and the same faith, difference can be a real problem. For instance, we can
easily imagine a number of Christians agreeing that they should read and find their
inspiration from the Bible; but we could also easily imagine them disagreeing on which
particular linės they need to focus on. Which of the passages from the sacred Scriptures
are they supposed to follow? All of them or only some? If so, which ones? Which pastor
am I supposed to obey if I find them debating over how to interpret the scriptures, not to
mention ethical issues? The problem of difference thus remains.
Second, on what may be called a more conceptual level, we can see a further
problem where one requires the believer to clarify her understanding of the connection
between ethics and the Divine. This problem was first elucidated in the history of thought
by Plato in his dialogue titled Euthyphro.

EUTHYPHRO
Plato

EUTHYPHRO: But I would certainly say that the holy is what all the gods love, and that
the opposite, what all the gods hate, is unholy.

SOCRATES: Well, Euthyphro, should we examine this in turn to see if it is true? Or should
we let it go, accept it from ourselves or anyone else without more ado, and agree that a
thing is so if only someone says. it is? Or should we examine what a person means when
he says something?

EUTHYPHRO: Of course, I believe, though, that this time what I say is true.

SOCRATES: Perhaps we shall learn better, my friend. For consider: is the holy. loved by
the gods because it is holy? Or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?

In the exchange between Socrates and Euthyphro, the question is raised as to

how one is supposed to define "holiness." Euthyphro puts forward the idea that what is
holy is loved by the gods. Socrates calls this into question by asking for the following
clarification: Is it holy only because it is loved by the gods, or is it holy in itself and that is
why it is loved by the gods? The relevance of these questions to our discussion becomes
clear if rephrased this way: Is it the case that something is right only because God
commanded it, or is it the case that something is right in itself and that is why God
commanded it?
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If we presume that taking another's life is wrong, we can ask the question: Is it the
case that this is so only because God commanded it, or that killing is in itself wrong, and
that is the reason why God commanded it? If we were to accept that it is wrong to take
another's life because God commanded it, we are left with the difficult conclusion that
there is nothing inherently wrong with killing. It is only because God said so-"Thou shall
not kill"-that we consider such an act wrong. It would seem then that there is something
arbitrary about it all, in the sense that God could will whatever He wants. On that basis
and nothing further, we have the distinction between right from wrong. As a further
disturbing thought, we may find an occasion wherein we could believe that God is
suddenly commanding us to do otherwise-that killing might now become acceptable.
History reveals many sad instances of people believing that God so wills it, allowing them
to kill their fellow human beings in His name. The Crusades of the Middle Ages are a
tragic case in point. Can we be satisfied with this idea that the divine will could be
arbitrary?
If, on the other hand, we were to accept that killing is in itself wrong, then we
acknowledge that perhaps there are standards of right and wrong that we can refer to
independently of God. But if this is the case, then we actually do not obey a command
because God commanded it, but are looking for those objective standards of right and
wrong, to which God simply concurs. One would not even have to think in terms of
obeying God-or even believing in Him-in order to abide by such ethical standards.
Having said this, we maintain that, generally speaking, it is a good thing for a
person of faith to abide by the teachings of her particular religion. But the divine command
theory demands more than this as it requires us to identify the entire sense of right and
wrong with what religion dictates. The conceptual problem we have seen and the practical
difficulties of simply basing ethics on the divine command are reasons enough for us to
wonder whether we have to set this way of thinking aside. Now, let us clarify this point:
Our calling into question of the divine command theory is not a calling into question of
one's belief in God; it is not intended to be a challenge to one's faith. Instead, it is an
invitation to consider whether there may be more creative and less problematic ways of
seeing the connection between faith and ethics, rather than simply equating what is
ethical with whatever one takes to be commanded by God.
Later, we shall see one way that we can have a more subtle and yet powerful
presentation of how one's faith may contribute to ethical thought when we look at the
Natural Law theory of Thomas Aquinas.

CULTURE
Our exposure to different societies and their cultures makes us aware that there of
thinking and valuing that are different from our own, that there is in fact a wide diversity
of how different people believe it is proper to act. There are aesthetic differences
Japanese art vs. Indian art), religious differences (Buddhism vs. Christianity), and
etiquette differences (conflicting behaviors regarding dining practices). In these bases, it
may become easy to conclude that this is the case in ethics as well. There are also various
examples that are ways seem to bear these out: nudity can be more taboo in one culture
than in another. Another example would be how relations between men and women can
show a wide variety across different cultures, ranging from greater liberality and equality
on"one hand, to greater inequality and a relation of dominance versus submission on the
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other. From the reality of diversity, it is possible for someone to jump to the further claim
that the sheer variety at work in the different ways of valuation means there is no single
universal standard for such valuations, and that this holds true as well in the realm of
ethics. Therefore, what is ethically acceptable or unacceptable is relative to, or that is to
say, dependent on one's culture. This position is referred to as cultural relativism.
There is something appealing to this way of thinking because cultural relativism
seems to conform to what we experience, which is the reality of the differences in how
cultures make their ethical valuations, Second, by taking one's culture as the standard,
we are provided a basis for our valuations. Third, this teaches us to be tolerant of others
from different cultures, as we realize that we are in no position to judge whether the ethical
thought or practice of another culture is acceptable. or unacceptable. In turn, our own
culture's moral code is neither superior to nor inferior to any other, but they would provide
us the standards that are appropriate and applicable to us. So, we would not be surprised
if we were to hear someone say, "Ethics? It is simple. Just follow whatever your culture
says."
This discussion would not be complete if we were to ignore the topic of Filipino
values. Early in our upbringing, we were taught about certain valuable traits that we say
are characteristics of Filipinos, such as.respect for the elderly close family ties, a sense
of hospitality, and also of solidarity with athers at times of distress. We proudly say that
we value these qualities of Filipinos. These are indeed laudable qualities, but could we
simply identify ethics with thể positive valuation that we make of these qualities? We will
be discussing this and related questions more thoroughly in the last chapter.
Tempting as this idea is, there are problems. In a classic exposition of this topic by
James Rachels, he presents some of these difficulties. The first three points in the
following paragraphs are a brief restatement of some of his criticisms of cultural relativism;
these are followed by an additional fourth point of criticism based on more recent and
more contextualized observations.

First, the argument of cultural relativism is premised on the reality of difference.

Because different cultures have different moral codes, we cannot say that any one moral
code is the right one. But is it a case of the presence of disagreemenf means there are
no right or wrong answers? Isn't it a common experience to be confronted by a
disagreement between persons and then to have the conflict clarified later as to who is
right or wrong? In other words, disagreement may mean that the question of who is right
or wrong is not immediately evident, but it does not necessarily mean that there is no one
correct resolution.

Second, under cultural relativism, we realize that we are in no position to render

any kind of judgment on the practices of another culture. This seems to be a generous
and an open-minded way of respecting others. But what if the practice seems to call for
comment? What if a particular African tribe thought it is advantageous and therefore right
for them to wipe out a neighboring people through a terrible practice of genocide? What
if some Middle Eastern country was highly repressive toward women reaching to the point
of violence? What about the traditional practice of head-hunting that is still maintained by
certain societies in the Cordilleras? Are we in no position to judge any of this as wrong?
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Would we be satisfied with concluding that we cannot judge another culture? But this is
one of the implications of cultural relativism.
Third, under cultural relativism, we realize that we are in no position to render
judgment on the practices of even our own culture. If our culture was the basis for
determining right and wrong, we would be unable to say that something within our cultural
practice was problematic, precisely because we take our culture to be the standard for
making such judgments. If we came from a particular society wherein there is a tradition
of arranged marriage, we would simply have to accept that this is how we do things. But
what if we are not satisfied by this conclusion? We may be proud and glad about
identifying certain traits, values, and practices of our culture, but we may not necessarily
laud or wish to conform to all of them. It is possible that we may not be satisfied with the
thought of not being able to call our own culture into question.
Fourth, perhaps the most evident contemporary difficulty with cultural relativism is
that we can maintain it only by following the presumption of culture as a single, clearly-
defined substance or as something fixed and already determined. Now, it is always
possible to find examples of a certain culture having a unique practice or way of life and
to distinguish it from other cultures' practices, but it is also becoming increasingly difficult
to determine what exactly defines one's culture. Is my culture "Filipino"? What if I identify
more with a smaller subset within this group, if, for example, I am Igorot? Is this then my
culture? Why not go further and define my culture as being Kankana-ey rather than Ibaloi?
Is this then my culture? The point here precisely is the question: What am I supposed to
take as "my culture ?
We can think of many other examples that reflect the same problem. Let us say
that My father is from Pampanga and my mother is from Leyte, and I was brought up in
Metro Manila: What is my culture? On one hand, let us say that my father is American
and my mother is Filipina, and I was brought up in San Diego, California, but I am currently
studying in a university in the Philippines: What am I supposed to take as "my culture"?
In an increasingly globalized world, the notion of a static and well-defined culture gives
way to greater flexibility and integration. One result of this is to call into question an idea
like cultural relativism, which only makes sense if one could imagine a clear-cut notion of
what can be defined as my culture.
We can conclude this criticism of cultural relativism by pointing out how it is a
problem in our study of ethics because it tends to deprive us of our use of critical thought.
On the positive side, cultural relativism promotes a sense of humility, that is, urging us
not to imagine that our own culture is superior to another. Such humility, however, should
go hand in hand with a capacity for a rational, critical discernment that is truly appreciative
of human values. Unfortunately, what happens in cultural relativism is that it basically
renders us incapable of discerning about the values we may wish to maintain as we are
forced to simply accept whatever our culture gives us. It keeps us from exploring whether
there are values that are shared between cultures; it keeps us from comparing and
judging-either positively or negatively-the valuations that are made by different cultures.
As previously mentioned, this presumes that we can determine culture in the first place,
which becomes increasingly questionable in a transcultural world.
As with our earlier discussions on law and religion, this is not to set aside culture
entirely as if it were irrelevant. Instead, we are urged to think more carefully about how
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one's understanding of her belonging to a certain culture could be more fruitful and
meaningful for her ethical discernment. We will explore this further in the last chapter.

SENSES OF THE SELF

It is sometimes thought that one should not rely on any external authority to tell
oneself what the standards of moral valuation are, but should instead turn inwards. In this
section, we will look Into three theories about ethics that center on the self: subjectivism,
psychological egoism, and ethical egoism,

SUBJECTIVISM
The starting point of subjectivism is the recognition that the individual thinking
person (the subject) at the heart of all moral valuations. She is the one who is confronted
with the situation and is burdened with the need to make a decision or judgment. From
this point, subjectivism leaps to the more radical claim that the individual is the sole
determinant of what is morally good or bad, right or wrong. A number of clichés familiar
to us would echo this idea:

"No one can tell me what is right and wrong."

"No one knows my situation better than myself."
"I am entitled to my own opinion."
"It is good if I say that it is good."

There is something appealing about these statements because they seem to

express a cherished sense of personal independence. But a close look at these
statements may reveal problems and in seeing these, we see the problems of
subjectivism.
"No one can tell me what is right and wrong" In a sense, there is some validity to
this. No one can compel another to accept a certain value judgment if she herself does
not concur with it. However, we know that this statement cannot be taken as absolute.
We realize, in many instances, that we had maintained an idea or an opinion that further
discussion reveals it was actually erroneous. We realize that we can be mistaken and
that we can be corrected by others. Why is this not also possibly applicable when we are
speaking of ethics?
"No one knows my situation better than myself." Once again, in a sense, there is
some validity to this. This particular person who is put in a certain situation, which calls
for a decision, has knowledge of the factors that affect her situation and decision. But to
take this fact as a ground for not listening to others is to have a mentality that imagines
that one's own situation or concern is so personal.and unique that there is no way another
person can possibly understand her and give her any meaningful advice. But does not it
make greater sense to recognize the reality that many human experiences are
commonand that othersxmay have something useful to suggest?
"I am entitled to my own opinion." Here, once again, is a valid point that is often
misused. Certainly, each person has the right to believe what she believes and has the
right to express this. But this right is often stubbornly misconstrued as some kind of
immunity from criticism and correction. A bigoted racist has an opinion against anyone
who is dark- skinned, an anti-Semite has an opinion against Jews, and a misogynist has
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an opinion against women. We realize that these opinions are highly problematic because
there is no basis for considering any of these groups of people as inferior.We would rightly
be indignant about an employer who pays his female employees less than the male
employees, simply because he is of the opinion that women are inferior to men. But isn't
he entitled to his own opinion? To insist on one's right in to having opinions whatever
these happen to be is to exhibit a closed-mindedness that rightly invites censure from
someone trying to think more critically about values.
"It is good if I say that it is good." With this line, we get to the heart of the problem
with subjectivism. The statement implies: "It is my personal consideration of X as good
that makes X good. X is good on the basis of my saying so." The problem now becomes:
"What is my basis for saying X is good?" This renders subjectivism an untenable view for
someone Who is interested in ethics. It takes the fact that I am the subject making the
valuation and uses this fact as the very basis for that valuation. But when "I," as subject,
am asking what is right or wrong, good or bad, with subjectivism, there is no other basis
that I can look toward

PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM
Let us consider another cliché. It would go like this: "Human beings are naturally
self-centered, so all our actions are always already motivated by self-interest."
This is the stance taken by psychological egoism, which is a theory that describes
the underlying dynamic behind all human actions. As a descriptive theory, it does not
direct one to act in any particular way. Instead, it points out that there is already an
underlying basis for how one acts. The ego or self has its desires and interests, and all
our actions are geared toward satisfying these interests.
This may not seem particularly problematic when we consider many of the actions
that we do on a day-to-day basis. I watch a movie or read a book because I want to, or
go for a walk and do some window shopping in the mall because I enjoy that. I take a
certain course in college because I think it will benefit me, or l join an organization
because I will get some good out of it. We do things in pursuit of our own self-interest all
the time.
But what about other types of behavior that we would commonly say are directed
toward the other? Consider, for example, an act of generosity, in which someone helps a
friend with her thesis rather than play videogames, or someone makes use of her free
Saturday helping build houses for Gawad Kalinga? The psychological egoist would
maintain that underlying such apparently other-directed behavior is a self-serving desire,
even if one does not acknowledge it or is even conscious of it. Perhaps he only helped
his friend with her thesis because he is trying to impress her. Perhaps she helps out with
Gawad Kalinga because this is how she relieves her sense of guilt at being well-off
compared to others. The idea is that whether or not the person admits it, one's actions
are ultimately always motivated by self-serving desire.
This theory has a couple of strong points. The first is that of simplicity. When an
idea is marked by simplicity, it has a unique appeal to it; a theory that conveniently
identifies a single basis that will somehow account for all actions is a good example of
this. The second is that of plausibility. It is plausible that self-interest is behind a person's
actions. It is clearly the motivation behind many of the actions one perform which are
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obviously self-serving; it could very well also be the motivation behind an individual's
seemingly other-directed actions. It is not only plausible, but also irrefutable.

Psychological egoism is an irrefutable theory because there is no way to try to

answer it without being confronted by the challenge that, whatever one might say, there
is the self- serving motive at the root of everything. The psychological egoist can and will
insist on his stand no matter how one might try to object. This opens up two questions:
first, "Because we cannot refute it, shall we accept it as true?" and "Do we accept the
consequences of this theory?"
The first question asks whether we have to accept the theory because it happens
to be irrefutable. Let us consider this analogy: A posits that B has an Oedipal complex
and according to A, this translates into a desire in B to get rid of the father figure. Then,
A insists that everything about B and what he does-his choice in music, course, favorite
food-is all ultimately rooted in this complex. Therefore, no matter what B says, A would
be able to insist that even without his acknowledging it deep down, it is this complex that
drives him to act the way he does. In this scenario, A's claim is irrefutable. But does B
have to accept it? Similarly, one could maintain, if he really wanted to, that human nature
is intrinsically self- interested and that human beings could not possibly be benevolent.
When they seem to be so, it is only a matter of pretense. One.could maintain that but
does one have to?
The second point has to do with the problematic consequences of this theory.
Consider this scenario: One woman spends her money on expensive clothes, and
another woman donates to charity. In terms of psychological egoism, they are both simply
and equally doing what is self-serving for themselves. Because they both are simply
fulfilling what would serve them, they are of equal moral worth. In judging these persons
and these actions, we can ask ourselves: Do we want to give up on our moral intuition
concerning the goodness and value of generosity versus the wrongness of selfishness
just for the sake of this theory? Most significantly, turning to the next consequence when
we move from moral judgment to moral decision, the question is: How theń are we
supposed to decide? Given psychological egoism, it does not matter. We only think that
we have a choice but actually whatever way that we end up acting, our minds have
actually already determined what serves our interests best.
So psychological egoism, when we look at its consequences, leads us to a cynical
view of humanity, to a gloomy description of human nature, and finally to a useless theory
for someone who is concerned with asking herself what is the right thing to do. This is
because it ends up nullifying the possibility of any normative ethics in its view of the
already determined human being.

ETHICAL EGOISM
Ethical egoism differs from psychological egoism in that it does not suppose all our
actions are already inevitably self-serving. Instead, ethical egoism prescribes that we
should make our own ends, our own interests, as the single overriding concern. We may
act in a way that is beneficial to others, but we should do that only if it ultimately benefits
us. This theory acknowledges that it is a dog-eat-dog world out there and given that,
everyone ought to put herself at the center. One should consider herself as the priority
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and not allow any other concerns, such as the welfare of other people, to detract from this
pursuit
It is clear that we have our interests and desires, and would want them satisfied
Thus, this question can be asked: Why should I have any concern about the interests of
Others? In a sense, this question challenges in a fundamental way the idea of pot study
of ethics, but also the effort of being ethical: Why not just look after one's own self? To
examine ethical egoism, we will take a look into Plato's Republic, which is Plato's
response to the assertion that one should only care about one's own interests.
The Myth of Gyges
Plato's Republic (359c-360d)
Now, that those who practice justice do so involuntarily and because they have not
the power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine something of this kind: having given
both to the just and the unjust power to do what they will, let us watch and see whither
desire will lead them; then we shall discover in the very act the just and unjust man to be
proceeding along the şame road, following their interest, which all natures deem to be
their good, and are only diverted into the path of justice by the force of law. The liberty
which we are supposing may be most completely given to them in the form of such a
power as is said to have been possessed by Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian.
According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the king of Lydia; there
was a great storm, and an earthquake made an opening in the earth at the place where
he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, where,
among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he
stooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him, more than
human, and having nothing on but a gold ring; this he took from the finger of the dead
and reascended. Now the shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might
send their monthly report about the flocks to the king; into their assembly he came having
the ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet of
the ring inside his hand, when instantly he became invisible to the rest of the company
and they began to speak of him as if he were no longer present. He was astonished at
this, and again touching the ring he turned the collet outwards and reappeared: he made
several trials of the ring, and always with the same result-when: he turned the collet
inwards he became. invisible, when outwards he reappeared. Whereupon he contrived
to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court; whereas soon as he
arrived he seduced the queen, and with her help conspired against the king and slew him,
took the kingdom. Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put
on one of them and the unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such and an
iron nature that he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was
not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses
and lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill’ or release from prison whom he would, and in
all respects be like a God among men. Then the actions of the just would be as the actions
of the unjust; they would both come at last to the same point. And this we may truly affirm
to be a great proof that a man is.just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any
good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever any one thinks that he can safely
be unjust, there,he is unjust. For all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more
profitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as i have been supposing, will
say that they are right. If you could imagine any one obtaining this power of becoming
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invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another's, he would be thought
by the lookers-on to be a most wretch idiot , was another's, he would praise him to one
another's face, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear. that they too might
suffer injustice.
In the Republic, the characters are engaged in a discussion about justice. Socrates
gets his companions to firsť consider the question, "What is justice?" and later, "Why
should one be just?" In Book 2 of the text, the character named Glaucon provides a
powerful restatement of the case for egoism-by way of à myth. The myth describes a
man, a figure named Gyges, who obtains the power to make himself invisible at will and
how he quickly learns how to use this power for his own desires rather than for any notion
of. "justice." Glaucon then asks plaintively, would not we ourselves act with-impùnity if.we
had this power to be invisible? To put it simply, if we would never be called in order to
account for our actions, perhaps we, too, would just choose to do whatevér we want. It
seems; Glaucon concludes, that if we are to be honest with ourselves, we would admit
that what we really care for is our own self-interest rather than some notion of justice or
moral goodness.
It will take Socrates the rest of the ten books of the Republic to try to answer this
most important question on whether the pursuit of ethics is worthwhile. Does it make
sense to be ethical? The beginning of Socrates's answer can be found in Book 4, in which
Socrates presents how the good human life stems from a proper harmony of the parts of
the soul. Harmony requires a certain ordering, a hierarchical system in which reason as
the "highest" part is in charge dutifully followed by the "lower" parts of the soul of will and
appetite. The presence of such an internal ordering that one consciously strives to
accomplish is what it means for justice to be present in the individual. On the other hand,
the absence of order or the lack of harmony, with desires and appetites running rampant,
results in acts of injustice. This point is developed in Book 9 with the portrayal of the
tyrant. The presence of internal disorder in a person placed in power turns the seemingly
pleasant prospect of doing whatever one wants-of acting with impunity-into a terrifying
portrait of a character without self-control or self-possession. Being nothing more than a
disordered and nervous Jumble of cravings, such a person would be so obsessed with
these longings than to bother
caring about how this might affect others. Situating this story into a larger social
and Political context, the connection can be made between one's pursuit of one's own
interest with abuse of power that may easily result in the misery of millions. The question
then that we can ask is: Do we still want to say, in the face of what history has shown us
of tyrants and dictators, that to act with impunity is desirable?
This is what ethical egoism ultimately translates into--notjust some pleasant pursuit
of one's own desires, but the imposition of a will to power that is potentially destructive of
both the self and of others. One can take on this view, if one wishes, but it is also possible
to wonder whether there is a way of recognizing our being in the world with others, of
thinking of our own well-being concomitantly with the well-being of others. Perhaps this
is what the study of ethics is all about.
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GEC 09: ETHICS

SUMMARY (AND NEXT STEPS)

In this module, we have established the scope and the rationale for a discussion
of ethics. We explored various domains of valuation in order to distinguish what makes a
particularly grave type of valuation a moral or ethical one. We clarified some of the terms
that will be used in the study of ethics. We have also explored a number of problematic
ways of thinking of ethics; some give a too simplistic answer to the question of our
grounds or foundations for moral valuation, while others seem to dismiss the possibility
of ethics altogether.
In the following chapters, we will explore a number of different moral theories that
have been handed down to us by the history of philosophy. These are various approaches
from thinkers who have presented to us their own unique way of thinking on how to
determine the moral principles that should be maintained. We will first explore
Utilitarianism, which establishes that the best consequences for everyone concerned
might be our measure for determining what is right. We then turn to a different notion in
the Natural Law Theory, which puts forward the idea that we can base our notion of good
and bad on something more intrinsic than the consequences of our actions--that is our
human nature itself. We will then turn to Deontology, which will argue that it is unreliable
to base ethics on consequences or on a supposed intrinsic nature; however, reason is
able to determine through its own exploration of itself what our moral duty is. We then
round out our discussion of theories with one often referred to as Virtue Ethics, which
requires us to think of our concept of reason within the larger context of the development
of a moral character.
In the final module, we will see how these diverse theories-which at first glance
may seem to simply be contradicting each other-can inform our own attempts to think of
our own grounds for determining moral value.

Read the case study below and try to answer the following questions:

CASE STUDY 1:
ART AND OFFENSE

In 2011, the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) mounted an exhibit that
included Mideo Cruz's "Politeismo,"an installation comprised of an amalgam of many
images including a statue of Jesus wearing Mickey Mouse ears, a crucifix adorned with
a bright red phallus, and a picture of the face of Jesus with a wooden ash tray with penis
tacked on the middle. Apparently conceived as a piece to promote critical thought and
perhaps debate on idolatry, it was seen by many in this predominantly Catholic country
to be a deliberate insult to their faith. Given the public outcry and the strong
denouncement from various religious and secular leaders, the exhibit was abruptly
closed. In addition to being threatened and having his work vandalized, Cruz was charged
with obscenity. However, he (as well as the administrators of the CCP) was acquitted of
these charges by the courts in 2013. A case such as this allows us to consider questions
on aesthetics, such as "Is it the point of the work of art to be appealing or to be thought-
provoking?" It also allows us to consider political questions, such as "Who gets to decide
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GEC 09: ETHICS

which artists and which projects may or may not receive funding from the state?" Our
concern here is ethical, and perhaps we can recognize that a number of highly significant
ethical questions can be raised: Does the artist have an ethical obligation to the
sensibilities of his audience? Or does he have a moral obligation only to be faithful to his
vision and his art? What constitutes offense, and at what point is offense severe enough
as to require control or to justify retribution? Does a religious majority have a monopoly
on the understanding of what is right or wrong? Does an artist have absolute freedom of
expression, or are there proper restrictions to this right? What do you think?

1. Imagine a scenario in which an image of someone who is the object of religious

devotion (such as Jesus Christ or Mary, the Mother of Jesus) is placed side by
side with a phallic image.
a. Is this an ethical issue? Why or why not?
b. Does the question of the rightness or wrongness of this depend on which
religion you belong to? Explain your answer.
2. Look for another example of an artistic creation-a painting, poem, or song-that is
a source of either actual or potential conflict between the expression of the artist
and sensibility that finds this offensive. Present the significant details and the
reasons that the conflicting sides might have on this issue.
3. Look for and list down other sources wherein we find a dialogue between ethics
and the various domains of aesthetic, culture, and religion.

Answer the following questions stated below:

1. Identify a list of: (a) obligations we are expected to fulfill, (b) prohibitions we are
required to respect, and (c) ideals we are encouraged to meet. Discuss whether
these are ethical in nature or not.
2. Are clothes a matter of pure aesthetic taste, or does it make sense for clothes to
become a subject in a discussion of ethics? Why? How about other forms of
adornment, such as tattos and piercings?
3. Look for a newspaper article that tackles an ethical issue. Consider the following
questions:
a. What makes this a matter of ethics?
b. What is your own ethical judgment on this case?
c What are your reasons for this judgment?
4. Brainstorm and come up with a list of common Filipino values. Consider the
strenaths and weaknesses of these.
5. Is looking after the benefit of your own family over all other aspects considered
as another form of egoism? Discuss.
 24
GEC 09: ETHICS

Frankfurt, Harry."Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." The Importance of
What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979, pp. 11-25.

Nagel, Thomas. "The Fragmentation of Value!" Mortal Questions. Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversity Press, 1979, pp. 128-41.

Rachels, James."Can Ethics Provide Answers?" The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 10,
No. 3, June 1980, pp. 32-40.

Reyes, Ramon Castillo. "The Relation between Ethics and Religious Belief." The Moral
Dimension: Essays in Honor of Ramon Castillo Reves, edited by Nemesio S. Que, Jr.,

Oscar G. Bulaong, Jr., and Michael Ner E. Mariano, Quezon City: Office of Research and
Publications, Ateneo de Manila University, 2003, pp. 107-112.
 25
GEC 09: ETHICS

Do you remember the last part of Module 1? It discussed the source of authority in
ethics. It is said that a good source of authority in ethics is moral theories. So what are
we going to do in module 2 is to discuss one of the moral theories, Virtue Ethics. This
theory is a product of Aristotle's intuitive mind. We will start on the background on how
Aristotle arrived in conceptualizing Virtue Ethics. The module would also focus on the
important concepts in Virtue Ethics like telos, eudaimonia, arete, mesotes and phronimos.
We will characterize actions as virtuous acts or non-virtuous acts. Then we will try to apply
the concept of virtue ethics in a real-life setting. You will analyze a case for you to
experience how virtue ethics work.

At the end of this module, you should be able to:

1. explain the important concepts and principles of virtue ethics;
2. differentiate virtuous acts from non-virtuous acts;
3. use the principles of virtue ethics in real-life situations.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Aristotle lived from 384-322 BC. He was a student of Plato in Academia in Athens.
Most of the time Aristotle was in an intellectual dispute with Plato. Due to these disputes
with Plato, he founded his school, the Lyceum. Aristotle made a good account of himself.
He was able to create different works in different fields. Some of the notable works of
Aristotle were Metaphysics, De Generatione et Corruptione (biology), De Anima
(psychology), Nicomachean Ethics, and the Organon (logic). Some historians claimed
that Aristotle was greatly influenced by his father who was a physician. Aristotle was very
observant of the surrounding like a physician who tries to observe his patients. He had a
son and named him Nichomachus. The book of Aristotle in ethics was named after his
son and it was called Nichomachean Ethics.

NICHOMAEN ETHICS
Aristotle establishes his ideas in Ethics using the Platonic understanding of reality
and its concept of good as his springboard. He abandons the idea of Plato about reality
and good. Aristotle particularly contests the separation of matter and form. If you are
going to look at Plato's understanding of reality and its concept of good it is quite ideal.
He believes that everything outside the world of forms or ideas are not true. Take this
example: Juan is a good boy. Plato argues that Juan is not a good boy. Because he is in
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GEC 09: ETHICS

a world of matter. Everything in the world of matter is not true because they are subject
to change. Plato would claim that Juan's goodness is just a copy of the real goodness
that is found in the world of forms or ideas. But Aristotle did not agree with this. He
contests that we will not be able to understand a thing without having matter and form.
We will not understand that Juan is a good boy if there is no matter and form. We will not
be able to know Juan is a good boy if we don't see the body (matter) of Juan, his looks,
and his built, and if we don't have the idea (form) of what is a good boy. When we say
that Juan is a good boy, it means that being good does not exist independently of Juan.
Our experience dictates when we say that Juan is a good boy, we are referring to Juan
in his totality as a composition of matter and form, not as a separate entity.

TELOS
As we establish the ground of Aristotle's ethical framework, we now look at how it
works. Aristotle's ethical framework starts with observing what is there in nature. Aristotle
is keen on looking for what is common in nature. In his observation, he sees that when
you throw a stone upward it will go down. It will not suspend in the air. If you throw it up
ten thousand times, it will go down ten thousand times. Similar to a ball place on a slope.
If you put a ball on a slope, it has nothing to do but to roll downwards. When a person
performs actions, it is always directed towards something. It is directed towards a
purpose. A person can't perform actions without a purpose. Aristotle sees that there in
common in all of these. He concludes that everything in this world including a person has
"telos". The word telos means end, goal, or purpose. When we go back to our example,
a stone thrown upward will end downward, a ball place in the top of the slope will end on
the lower part of the slope and a person jumps into action because of the goal or purpose.
We already know that a person acts towards a goal or purpose. We cannot deny the fact
that there is a purpose why we do something. Now a person will perform an act when she
sees the purpose as good. No person will do something if she sees the purpose as bad.
We eat because we know that it is good. It will give much-needed sustenance to our
bodies. You enroll in this course because you see good on it. You believe that it will
provide you a good future. So it means that the telos or the purpose is always good. A
person performs an act because she sees that the telos or the purpose as good. But you
may ask why are there some people who do bad acts. Let us take the example of a drug
dependent. She takes an illegal drug because she believes that it will solve all her
problems. Here you will find that the purpose is good, to solve all her problems. The
problem lies in the action she has taken. It is bad. Taking illegal drugs is bad. We do not
say that taking illegal drugs can become good what we are showing is that the telos or
purpose is good. It is what all of us seek to achieve.
In our experience, we act because we seek to achieve a specific purpose. But we
cannot also deny that this purpose is used to attain a higher goal or purpose. Let's have
the example of a student. We all know that you are here to study so you can earn a
degree. You are moved to study because of the purpose of earning a degree. But it does
not end there. You want to earn a degree so you can find a job. Because Filipinos believe
that if you have a degree you can find a job easily. But it does not end there. You want to
find a job so that you can earn money. You want to earn money so you can buy things
you want. There seems to be a hierarchy of telos, goal, or purpose.
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GEC 09: ETHICS

EUDAIMONIA
In the hierarchy of telos, goal, or purpose there must be the highest purpose, this
must be ultimate. It is the ultimate good of a human being. Now let us see what is the
ultimate purpose of a person. When we say ultimate it means that it is last and final.
Nothing follows. According to Aristotle, to consider the telos to be ultimate it must fit the
criteria. The first criterion says that it must be final. It means that it is the final end or
purpose and it is not used to attain any other higher ends. Unlike the examples in the
earlier discussion, we can see that the end is used to attain another end. Studying to earn
a degree and earning a degree to find a job. So these goals cannot be considered as
ultimate telos because they are not final. The second criterion of the ultimate telos is that
it must be self-sufficient. Meaning that when we attain it nothing else will be sought. It will
completely satisfy our desires to attain something once we attain the ultimate telos. The
last criterion of the ultimate telos is that it must be attainable. It is non-sense if the ultimate
telos of a person is not attainable. It is absurd to say that the ultimate telos of a person
cannot be attained.
So what is the ultimate telos of a person? According to Aristotle the ultimate telos of a
person is "eudaimonia". It means happiness. But mind you the happiness that Aristotle is
telling is not an emotion. Like the happiness that we experience when we receive gifts
during our birthdays. This kind of happiness is on the level of feelings. Aristotle is not
referring to this kind of happiness because it is temporary. He argues this happiness is
permanent and it is what everybody desires to attain. Eudaimonia being the ultimate telos
makes every person desires it.

ERGON
We already established that the ultimate telos is eudaimonia or happiness, but how
can we attain it. According to Aristotle, we can achieve eudaimonia by fulfilling a person's
"ergon". The word ergon means function. So, it only means that we can attain the ultimate
telos by fulfilling our function. But what is the function of a person? A function is what
distinguishes or characterizes the thing from other beings. Example: key, it is used to lock
or unlock doors, cabinet, etc. This makes the key unique from other things. Again, what
is the function of the person? What distinguishes a person from other beings? What sets
a person apart from other beings? The function of a person is the ability to reason. This
ability distinguishes a person from other beings. There is no other being that can reason.
To be a person is to act in accordance with reason. Aristotle argues that we can attain
eudaimonia by performing our ergon which is the ability to reason but it is not enough by
just performing it. He would say that we should perform our function well. We must
perform it in a good or excellent way.

ARETE
In Greek, performing in a good or excellent way is "Arete". The word arete is
equated to the word virtue. The word virtue is associated with the words good, excellent,
and noble. Now, how do we attain virtue? According to Aristotle, virtue cannot be
accomplished in a single act. Virtue is accomplished through repetitive actions. It is
acquired through habits. But remember that habit is not always good. That is why Aristotle
distinguishes what habit we need to have. Habit is essential to the formation of one's
character. So to be able to have a good character, we need to habitually do the good,
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GEC 09: ETHICS

thus we will acquire virtue. But acquiring virtue is not that easy. The test is on how to act
out the right feelings and passions. It is how we can control our feelings and passions
because they are neither good nor bad. According to Aristotle, virtue is the excellent
management of one's feelings and passions. Let us take an example. We all know that
anger is an example of feelings and passions. It is neither good nor bad. To be a virtuous
person, we must have excellent management of anger. We can get angry for the right
reason, time, manner, and to the right person. Which is something difficult to attain. The
difficulty lies in finding the mesotes (mean) according to Aristotle. "Hence it is hard work
to be virtuous since in each case it is hard work to find what is the mean (mesotes)...So
also getting angry, or giving and spending money, is easy and anyone can do it, but doing
it to the right person, in the right amount at the right time, for the right end, and in the right
way is no longer easy, nor can everyone do it. Hence, well is rare, praiseworthy, and fine.
" (Nichomachean Ethics Bk. II, 1109a24) To become a virtuous person, we need to find
the mesotes. Aristotle believes that when a person is already habituated on finding the
mesotes she will be called "phronimos". This phronimos is a virtuous person who does
not have to control oneself because one's resolution has been habituated to always do
the right act, self-possessed.

VIRTUE
"Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with a choice, lying in a mean, i.e.,
the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, by that principle by
which the man of practical wisdom would determine it". (Nichomachean Ethics Bk. II,
1106b36-1107a2) It simply means that virtue is the mean between two vices. It is the
mean between excess and deficiency. Vices are either excess or deficiency. Let's have
an example. Let us see what is the mean (mesotes) of fear and confidence. The mean is
courage, the excess is rashness and the deficiency is cowardice. The mean (mesotes) is
always exact or as the maximum act, not an excess nor a deficiency. It is not good if the
person is "sobrang bait, sobrang tapang at medyo palakaibigan" because this is not exact.
You must also be careful on genaralizing that all actions have mesotes. Many actions do
not have mesotes and they are considered as wrong actions. Examples would be
stealing, committing adultery and killing. Can you find their mesotes? None, there is no
such thing as stealing the right amount of money. No matter what a person steals, whether
it is in a small amount or a big amount they are both stealing.

Rean the following case studies and apply the concepts of virtue ethics in
analyzing each.
CASE STUDY 1
Violence in Philippine Television
An online news account narrates key officials from both the legislative and
executive branches of the government voicing out their concern on the possible ill effects
of too much violence seen by children on television. The news estimates that by the time
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GEC 09: ETHICS

children reach 18 years old, they will have watched around 18,000 simulated murder
scenes. This prompted then-Department of Education Secretary Bro. Armin Luistro, to
regulate television programs would help in the development of children’s values.
According to the news article, the Department of Education held a series of
consultations with various stakeholders to address the issue of exposure of children to
TV violence. They also implemented the rules and guidelines for viewing safety and
created a television violence rating code to be applied in all TV programs. Lastly, they
also set 15% of television airtime for shows conducive to children.
Luistro’s claim seems to be based on a particular vision of childhood development.
Children at a young age have not yet achieved full personal growth and mental
development. This situation makes them particularly vulnerable to possible undesirable
effects of seeing violent images presented on television. When they see violence on
television on a regular basis, they may consider such violent acts as “normal” and part of
the daily occurrences in life. Much worse is that they might tend to believe that such acts,
since committed by adults, are permissible. In this situations, the saying “Life imitates art”
unfortunately becomes uncomfortably true.

CASE STUDY 2
Rajat Gupta and Insider Trading
Rajat Gupta is an Indian American businessman who was the managing director of
management consultancy McKinsey & Company and a business leader in India and the
United States. Rajat Gupta also served as corporate chairman, board director or strategic
advisor to Goldman Sachs, Procter and Gamble and American Airlines, and non-profits
organizations, The Gates Foundation, The Global Fund and the International Chamber of
Commerce.
Rajat Gupta was convicted in June 2012 on insider trading charges. He was sentenced
in October 2012 to two years in prison, an additional year on supervised release and
ordered to pay $5 million in fines. His trial began on May 22, 2012. On June 15, 2012,
Gupta was found guilty on three counts of securities fraud and one count of conspiracy.
The primary parties are affected are Rajat Gupta, McKinsley & Company, Goldman
Sachs, Raj Rajaratnam, Galleon Group, Warren Buffet, and the U.S. equity markets.
Other parties indirectly affected are family and friends of Rajat Gupta, employees at
McKinsley & Company and Galleon Group, investors in Goldman Sachs and its creditors,
and government and officials involved with the case.
In September 2008 Warren Buffet agrees to pay $5 billion to Goldman Sachs in exchange
for preferred shares in the company. This news is likely to raise the share price of
Goldman Sachs. The news is not supposed to be announced and made public until the
end of day. Less than a minute after the board approved the Buffet purchase, Rajat Gupta
calls his longtime friend Raj Rajaratnam, a hedge fund manager and billionaire founder
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GEC 09: ETHICS

of Galleon Group. Once Rajaratnam gets this information, he immediately buys shares of
Goldman Sachs. Next day when the stock market opens, Raj Rajaratnam makes nearly
$1.2 million in profits as Goldman Sachs shares rose. The SEC estimates the tip leaked
by Rajat Gupta generates profits and avoids losses of more than $23 million.
Activity: Filipino Virtues
We have lists of Filipino Virtues on the table. The word virtue is translated as birtud.
While deficiency is pagkukulang and excess is pagmamalabis. What are you going to do
is to list the pagkukulang and pagmamalabis of each birtud.

Pagmamalabis Birtud Pagkukulang

Pakikisama
Utang na loob
Hiya
Relihiyoso
Magalang sa Matanda

CASE STUDY
Virtue Ethics Applied

Wait or Marry? You will analyze the case using virtue ethics. You will analyze a
case about the virtue of prudence. Don't use your feelings. Analyze it well. Read the rubric
so that you will be guided in answering the case.
A piece of news broke out that Juan, a soldier was killed in an encounter with the
rebels. But the news on the death of Juan was sketchy. There are no clear details about
Juan's death. The sketchy news reached Maria, Juan's wife. Due to this, there is
uncertainty on the part of Maria. Years had passed and there is no certain news about
Juan.
The long years of wait allowed Pedro to court Maria. True enough Pedro's
perseverance made Maria fall in love. Pedro had found that it is the right time to propose
to marry Maria. Now if you are Maria will you give in to Pedro's proposal or wait for the
confirmation on the death of Juan? What if you already married Pedro and Juan was alive
and ready to come home, what will you do?
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GEC 09: ETHICS

Frankfurt, Harry."Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." The Importance of
What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979, pp. 11-25.
Nagel, Thomas. "The Fragmentation of Value!" Mortal Questions. Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversity Press, 1979, pp. 128-41.
Rachels, James."Can Ethics Provide Answers?" The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 10,
No. 3, June 1980, pp. 32-40.
Reyes, Ramon Castillo. "The Relation between Ethics and Religious Belief." The Moral
Dimension: Essays in Honor of Ramon Castillo Reves, edited by Nemesio S. Que, Jr.,
Oscar G. Bulaong, Jr., and Michael Ner E. Mariano, Quezon City: Office of Research
and Publications, Ateneo de Manila University, 2003, pp. 107-112.
 32
GEC 09: ETHICS

This module deals with the Natural Law Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas. It defines
law and discusses the different kinds of law. The module clarifies the difference between
Natural Law from Eternal Law, Divine Law, and Human Law. In this module, you must
read the text, Summa Theologica by Thomas Aquinas which is provided. Lastly, the
module challenges you to apply the precepts of the natural law to contemporary moral
issues.

At the end of this module, you should be able to:

1. define what is a law and its kinds;

2. distinguish natural law from the eternal law, divine law and human law, and;

3. apply the precepts of natural law to contemporary moral issues.

Introduction
In October 2016, newspapers reported that Pantaleon Alvarez, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, was intending to draft a bill which would amend the country’s
Family Code, thereby allowing for the legalization of same-sex unions. This would result
in the possibility of two men together or two women together being identified as couple
with rights guaranteed and protected by the law. However, as one newspaper report
revealed, even before anything could be formally proposed other fellow, legislators had
already expressed to the media their refusal to support any initiative.
The reasons given in the news article vary, ranging from the opinion that seeing two men
kiss is unsightly, to the statement that there is something “irregular” about belonging to
the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender (LGBT) community, and to the judgement that
two people of the sex being together is unnatural.
We are used to hearing people justify done something by making the appeal that
what they maintain is what is “natural”, and therefore acceptable. Likewise, people would
judge something as unacceptable on the basis that it is supposedly “unnatural”. Thus, we
are no longer surprised when we hear people condemn and label many different things
as “unnatural”: maybe receiving blood transfusion, eating meat, or, as our news report
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shows, engaging in sexual relations that might find ourselves astonished or perplexed as
to what different people might consider “unnatural”. In order to proceed, it is therefore
necessary to ask: “What to do the words natural and Unnatural mean? “Sometimes, the
word “natural” seems to be used to refer to some kind of intuition that a person has, one
which is so apparently true to him that it is unquestioned. For example, a woman may
claim that it is simply “unnatural” to eat any kind of insect, and what this means is that she
personally finds herself averse to the idea of doing so. In order instances, the word is
used to try to justify a certain way of behaving by seeing its likeness somewhere in the
natural world. For example, a man might claim that it is okay for him to have more than
one sexual partner, since, in a pride of lions, the alpha male gets to mate with all the she-
lions. In yet other instances, the word “natural” is used as an appeal to something
instinctual without it being directed by reason. For example, a man may deem it all right
if he were to urinate just anywhere because after all he sees it as “natural” function of
humans. Lastly, we also easily find people using the word “natural” to refer to what we
seems common to them given their particular environment. For instance, a Filipino may
suppose that eating there full meals of rice and ulam every day is what is “natural”
because everyone she knows behaves in that way.
Given these varied meaning of the term “natural” we need to find a more solid and
nuanced way to understand the term. In this chapter, we will explore how Thomas
Aquinas provides this emphasizing the capacity for reason as what is essential in our
human nature. This understanding of human nature anchored on our capacity for reason
will become the basis of the natural law theory, a theory which will provide us a unique
way of determining the moral status of our actions.

THOMAS AQUINAS

There have been various thinkers and systems of thought emerging throughout
history that could be said to present a natural law theory. Among them, the one we will
be focusing on is the medieval thinker Thomas Aquinas. It has to be recognized, however,
that this natural law theory is part of larger discussion, which is his moral theory taken as
a whole. This moral theory, in turn, is part of a larger project, which is Aquinas’s vision of
the Christian faith. Before we turn to the natural law theory, let us take a look at these
contexts.

THE CONTEXT OF THE CHRISTIAN STORY

The fundamental truth maintained and elaborated by Aquinas in all his works is the
promise right at the center of the Christian faith: that we are created by God in order to
ultimately return to Him. The structure of his magnum opus, Summa Theologiae follows
the trajectory of this story.
There are three parts to this voluminous work. In the first part, Aquinas speaks of
God, and although we acknowledge that our limited human intellect cannot fully grasp
Him, we nevertheless are able to say something concerning His goodness, His might,
and His creative power. Recognizing that we are created by God, we move on to the
second part, which deals with man or the dynamic of human life. This is characterized by
our pursuit of happiness, which we should realize rests ultimately not on any particular
good thing that is created by God, but in the highest good which is God himself. Our
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striving for this ultimate happiness, while important, will not in itself bring us to this blessed
state. In other words, salvations only possible through the presence of God’s grace and
that grace become perfectly incarnate in the person of Jesus. Thus, the third part focuses
on Jesus as our Savior.
Given that occur concern here is the
question of ethics, it would seem clear that what
would be greatest interest to us is the second part
or the section of this story that centers on human
life and its striving toward God. However, bringing
up the notion that living a good life leads us to God
could easily be misunderstood as a simple
exhortation to obey certain rules as given to us
through Church doctrines or by following certain
passages lifted randomly from sacred Scriptures. in
other words, we may fall into the danger of the
divine command theory, which we had explored in
the first chapter. Instead, we should hope to find
that there is much greater complexity, but also
coherence, to the ethics of Aquinas.
Hailed as a doctor of the Roman Catholic
Church, Thomas Aquinas was a Dominican fair
who was the preeminent intellectual figure of the
scholastic period of the Middle Ages, contributing to the doctrine of the faith more than
any other figure of his time. His Summa Theologiae, Aquinas’s magnum opus, is a
voluminous work that comprehensively discusses many significant points in Christian
theology. He was canonized in 1323.

THE CONTEXT OF AQUINAS’S ETHICS

A full consideration of Aquinas’s ethics would require us to explore his discussion
of other matters, such as how, in our pursuit of happiness, we direct our actions toward
specific ends. We might explore how emotions ̶ “the passions” ̶ are involved in this
process, and therefore require a proper order if they are to properly contribute to a good
life. We might explore how our actions are related to certain dispositions (often referred
to as “habits”) in a dynamic way since our actions both arise from our habits and at the
same time reinforce them. We might explore his discussion of how we develop either
good or bad habits with a disposition leading us toward making moral choices, thereby
contributing to our moral virtue, and a bad disposition inclining us toward making immoral
choices, bringing us to vice. The Christian life, therefore, is about developing the
capacities given to us by God into a disposition of virtue inclined toward the good.
Aquinas also puts forward that there is within us a conscience that directs our moral
thinking. This does not refer to some simple intuition or gut feeling. For Aquinas, there is
a sense of right and wrong in us that we are obliged to obey. However, he also adds that
this sense of right and wrong must be informed, guided, and ultimately grounded in an
objective basis for morality.
So, we are called to heed the voice of conscience and enjoined to develop and
maintain a life of virtue. However, these both require content, so we need something
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more. We need a basis for our conscience to be properly informed, and we need a clearer
guidepost on whether certain decisions we make lead us toward virtue or vice. Being told
that one should heed one’s conscience or that one should try to be virtuous, does very
little to guide people as to what specifically should be done in a given situation. Thus,
there is a need for a clearer basis of ethics, a ground that will more concretely direct our
sense of what is right and wrong. For Aquinas, this would be the natural law.
We can recall how ethical approach called the divine command theory urges a
person toward unthinking obedience to religious precepts. Given the problems of this
simplistic approach to ethics, we can contrast how the moral theory of Aquinas requires
the judicious use of reason. in doing so, one’s sense of right and wrong would be
grounded on something stable: human nature itself.
We will start by exploring how Aquinas restates the Christian message, making
use of a philosophical vocabulary appropriated from the ancient Greeks. We then look at
how Aquinas speaks of the essence and also the varieties of law. From there, we will be
able to explore the precepts of the natural law.

THE GREEK HERITAGE

NEOPLATONIC GOOD
God creates. This does not only mean that He brings about beings, but it also
means that He cares for, and thus governs, the activity of the universe and of every
creature. This central belief of the Christian faith, while inspired by divine revelation, has
been shaped and defined by an idea stated in the work of the ancient Greek philosopher
Plato, which had been put forward a thousand years before Aquinas. He is credited for
giving the subsequent history of philosophy in one of its most compelling and enduring
ideas: the nation of a supreme and absolutely transcendent good.
In this The Republic, it is often supposed that Plato is trying to envision the ideal
society. But that plan is only a part of a more fundamental concern that animates the text,
which is to provide an objective basis and standard for the striving to be moral. In other
words, it can be said that Plato was trying to answer question such as, “Why should I
bother trying to be good?” and “why cannot ´good´ be just whatever I say it is?” His
answer, placed in the mouth of the main character Socrates, is that the good is real and
not something that one pretend to make up or ignore.
Socrates, in discussing this, elevates the notion of the good to unprecedented
heights:

The Idea of the Good

Excerpt from The Republic
Plato

Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower
is what I would have you term the idea of good, and this you will deem to be the cause of
science, and of truth in so far as the latter becomes the subject of knowledge; beautiful
too, as are both truth and knowledge , you will be right in esteeming this other nature as
more beautiful than either; and, as in the previous instance, light and sight may be truly
said to be like the sun, and yet not to be the sun, so in this other sphere, science and
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truth may be deemed to be like the good, but not the good; the good has a place of honor
yet higher.
You would say, would you not, that the sun is not only the author of visibility in all
visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not
generation? In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge
to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but
far exceed essence in dignity and power.

Readers of The Republic have long been baffled by this enigmatic passage and
are still trying to figure out how exactly to interpret it. Rather than be dismissed, the idea
of the good ̶ a good which is prior to all being and is even the cause of all being ̶ will
become a source of fascination and inspiration to later thinkers even to this day.
In the next centuries after Plato’s time, some scholars turned to his texts and tried
to decipher the wealth of ideas contained there. Because they saw their task as basically
clarifying and elaborating on what the great thinker had already written, these later
scholars are often labeled as Neoplatonists.

In the hands of the Neoplatonists, Plato’s idea of the good, which is the source of
all beings, becomes identified with the One and the Beautiful. This is the ultimate reality,
which is the oneness that will give rise to the multiplicity of everything else in the cosmos.
All these beings have a single goal, which is to return to that unity.

The Good and the One

Excerpt from the Enneads
Plotinus

Still, do not, I urge you, look for The Good through any of these other things; if you
do, you will see not itself but its trace: you must form the idea of that which is to be grasped
cleanly standing to itself not in any combination, the unheld in which in which all have
hold; for no other is such, yet one such there must be.
Now it is clear that we cannot possess ourselves of the power of this principle in
its concentrated fullness: so to do one must be identical with it: but some partial attainment
is within our reach.
You who make the venture will throw forward all your being but you will never tell
it entire ̶ for that, you must be yourself be the divine Intellect in Act ̶ and at your utmost
success it will still pass from you or, rather, you from it. In ordinary vision you may think
to see the object entire: in this intellective act, all, less or more, that you can take to mind
you may set down as The Good.
It is The Good since, being a power, it is the cause of the intelligent and intellective
life as of life and intellect; for these grow from it as from the source of essence and of
existence, the Source as being One, simplex and first because before it was nothing. All
derives from this; it is the origin of the primal movement which it does not possess and
the other repose which is but its absence of need; for neither rest nor movement can
belong to that which has no place in which either could occur; center, object, ground, all
are alike unknown to it, for it is before all. Yet its Being is not limited; what is there to set
bounds to it? Nor, on the other hand, is it infinite in the sense of magnitude; what place
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can there be to which it must extend, or why should there be movement where there is
no lacking? All its infinitude resides in its power; it does not change and will not fail; and
in it all that is unfailing finds duration.

Through Neoplatonists like Plotinus, the Platonic idea of the good would continue
well into the Christian Middle Ages, inspiring later thinkers and allowing it to be thought
anew in a more personal was as creative and loving God.

ARISTOTELIAN BEING AND BECOMING

In Aristotle’s exploration of how to discuss beings, he proposes four concepts
which provide a way of understanding any particular being under consideration. Any
being, according to Aristotle, can be said to have four causes.
First, we recognized that any being we can see around is corporeal, possessed of
a certain materially or physical “stuff.” We can refer to this as the material cause. A being
is individuated ̶ it becomes the unique, individual being that it is ̶ because it is made up of
this particular stuff. Yet, we also realize that this material takes on a particular shape: so
a bird is different from a cat, which is different from a man. The “shape” that makes a
being a particular kind be called its form. Thus, each being also has a formal cause.
One can also realize that a being does not simply “pop up” from nothing, but comes
from another being which is prior to it. Parents beget a child. A mango tree used to be a
seed that itself came from an older tree. A chair is built as the product of a carpenter.
Thus, there is something which brings about the presence of another being. This can be
referred to as the efficient cause. Also, since a being has an apparent end or goal, a chair
to be sat on, a pen for writing, a seed to become a tree, or a child to become an adult,
one can speak of the final cause of being. Identifying these four causes ̶ material, format,
efficient, and final ̶ gives a way to understand any being.

Four Causes
Excerpt from the Physics
Book II Chapter 3; 194b17 ̶ 195a5
Aristotle
Now that we have established these distinctions, we must proceed to consider causes,
their character, and number. Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think
they know a thing till they have grasped the “why” of (which is to grasp its primary cause).
So clearly we too must do this as regards both coming to be and passing away and every
kind of physical change, in other that, knowing their principles, we may try to refer to these
principles each of our problems.
In one sense, then, (1) that out of which a thing come to be and which persist, is called
“causes” (e.g., of the octave the relation of 2:1, and generally number), and the parts in
the definition.
Again (3) the primary source of the change or coming to rest; for example, the man who
gave advice is a cause, the father is of the child, and generally what makes of what is
made and what causes change of what is changed.
Again (4) in the sense of end or “ that for sake of which” a thing is done, for example,
health is the cause of walking about. (“Why is he walking about?” we say. “To be healthy,”
and, having said that, we think we have assigned the cause.) The same is true also of all
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the intermediate steps which are brought about through the action of something else as
means towards the end, for example, reduction of flesh, purging drugs, or surgical
instruments are means towards health. All these things are ”for the sake of” the end,
though they differ from one another in that some are activities, others instruments.
This then perhaps exhausts the number of ways in which the term “cause” is used.

Of course, it is not a case of a being that is something which is already permanently set
as it is and remains forever unchanging. So in addition to describing a being, Aristotle
also has to explain to us the process of becoming or the possibility of change that takes
place in a being. A new pair of principles is introduced by him, which we can refer to as
potency and act. A being may carry within itself certain potentials, but these require being
actualized. A puppy is not yet a full-grown dog. These potencies are latent in the puppy
are actualized as the puppy grows up and achieves what it is supposed to be. The process
of becoming ̶ or change ̶ can thus be explained in this way. Understanding beings how
they are and how they become or what they could be, is the significant Aristotle
contribution to the picture which will be given to us by Aquinas.

SYNTHESIS
The idea of a transcendent good prior to all being resurfaces in Aquinas in the form of the
good and loving God, who is Himself the fullness of being and of goodness; as Aquinas
put it, God is that which essentially good. So, we recognize that all beings are only
possible as participating in the first being, which is God Himself. God’s act, like an
emanation of light, is the creation of beings.
Insofar as God is that from which all beings come, it is possible for us to speak of Him as
the first efficient cause. Insofar as God that toward which all beings seek to return, it is
possible to us to speak of Him as the final cause. We see here the beginning of the
synthesis by nothing how the Neoplatonic movement from and back toward the
transcendent is fused with the Aristotelian notion of causes.
It must be noted, though, that this is not some mechanistic unthinking process. It is God’s
will and love that are the cause of all things; to every existing thing. God wills goodness.
Since each being in this way participates in God’s goodness, each being is in some sense
good.
However, while being are good because they are created by God, the goodness
possessed by being remains imperfect. “For Aquinas, only God in the fullness of His being
and goodness is perfect; all other beings are participating in this goodness, and are good
to that extent, but are imperfect since they are limited in their participation. “But, once
again, God did not create us to simply be imperfect and stay that way as He leaves us
alone. Instead, God, in His infinite wisdom, directs how we are to arrive at our perfection.
The notion of divine providence refers to how beings are properly ordered and even
guided toward their proper end; this end, which is for them to reach their highest good, is
to return to the divine goodness itself. God communicates to each being His perfection
and goodness. Every creature then strives to its own perfection; thus the divine goodness
is the end of all actions. All things come from God and are created by Him in order to
return to Him.
We now need to recall that beings are created by God in a particular way. It is not
accidental how beings emerge into existence; each being is created as determinate
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substance, as a particular combination of form and matter. This applies to all beings,
including man. The particular form determines the materiality which makes a being a
certain kind of being; the unique way that we have been created can be called our nature.
God’s goodness, is both and imperfect at the same time. It has limitation, it has yet be
perfected. Perfection means fulfilling our nature the best we can, It is God intend for us.
We accomplish this by fulfilling or actualizing the potencies that are already present in our
nature.
It is of key importance then that the presence of a capacity for reason is the prime
characteristic of the kind of beings we are, and how that capacity for reason is the very
tool which God had placed in our human nature as the way toward our perfection and
return to Him.
THE ESSENCE AND VARIETIES OF LAW
ESSENCE
As rational beings, we have free will. Through our capacity for reason, we are able to
judge between possibilities and choose to direct our actions in one way or the other. We
work on a project to complete it. These are goods, and we act in a certain way to pursue
them, so goods are sometimes referred to as the ends of actions.
Acts are rightly directed toward their ends by reason. But this does not simply mean that
trough reason we can figure out how to pursue something that we already had
thoughtlessly supposed to be good for us; what is necessary is to think carefully of what
really is in fact good for us.
A law, therefore, is concerned with the common good. In a way, making of a law belongs
either to the whole people or to a public person who has care for the common good or is
tasked with the concern for the good of the community or of the whole people.
Now, in thinking about community, what if we thought more grandly, not just a small group,
a class, a city, or even a country? What if we think of vast community which is the entire
universe and everything in it, or in other words, all of being? Is there Someone in charge
of his community, guiding all toward their common good and directing all with His wisdom?

VARIETIES
It includes the proper measure governing the acts of these beings. Aquinas write “ He
governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each single creature, so the
type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, bears the character of law
or eternal law, refers to what God will for creation.
Therefore, irrational creatures are participating in the eternal law. On the other hand,
human being’s participation is different. Aquinas write: “ Wherefore it has a share of the
Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end this
participation and of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law.
While reflecting on our human nature will provide us the precepts of the natural law, these
are quite general and would have to be made more specific, and at the same time more
concrete in the actual operation of human acts. There is also human law, it refers to all
instances wherein human beings construct and enforce laws in their communities.
According to Thomas Aquinas:
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The Natural Law

Summa Theologiae 1-2, Question 94, Article 2
Since however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence
it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended
by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of purs uit, and their contraries
as evil, and object of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations,
is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an
inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all
substances inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being,
according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of
preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law.
Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially,
according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of
this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has
taught to all animals“ … such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth.
Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason,
which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about
God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination
belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those
among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.

ORDER OF THE PRECEPTS OF NATURAL LAW

According to Thomas Aquinas, God created the world according to natural law. It
is a goal driven system whereby life is sustained and everything function smoothly. God
created a good thing for His creatures. Like meat that is good for dogs and cats or water
that is good for plants. God being the creator, Thomas Aquinas argues that God instills in
creatures an intuitive desire or inclination to seek what is best for them. We, creatures,
are designed to seek basic goods. Now, what are the basic goods? There are seven basic
goods: self-preservation, procreation, educate offspring, seek God, live in society, avoid
offense, and shun ignorance.

The first basic good is self- preservation. We cannot deny the fact that the drive to
sustain life is very visible to all creatures. It is common to all beings. Have you noticed it?
There are certain trees when they are cut they release a certain foul odor that shoos away
threats. Animals fight back or run away when they feel that their lives are in danger. In
the same way that persons have that natural inclination to preserve their being. When we
hear a gunshot like sounds we duck or stop to process what we think is a potential threat.

The second basic good is reproduction. It is a desire to do sexual intercourse. This

process makes us feel good. Similar to other beings that periodically engage in this kind
of activity. Reproduction leads to the third basic good, which is the education of offspring.
It is good to take care of the offspring. We need to feed, give them shelter, and educate
them. Similarly, persons and animals do educate their offspring. Persons do bring their
offspring to school while animals teach their offspring how to hunt or protect themselves
from predators.
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The first three basic goods are a commonality of person to other beings but the
remaining four basic goods are exclusive to a person. It is exclusive because it uses
reason. The fourth basic good is to seek God. It is a natural inclination to seek God. We
seek the truth about God because of reason. People tend to think that there is a greater
good. It does not end there. We want to be part of the community. This leads us to the
fifth basic good and that is to live in the community. Persons are social animals and we
have this inclination to live in the community. Thomas Aquinas would argue that we
basically pack animals, our desire for love and acceptance, and our susceptibility to peer
pressure are all evidence of this desire. So, to be accepted in the community, we need to
avoid offense, which is the sixth basic good. We must avoid alienating others. Our reason
tells us that it is not good to alienate others. Like stealing something from them or
spreading gossip about others. The last basic good is to shun ignorance. There is no
denying that persons are knowers. We think that knowledge promotes survival. Thomas
Aquinas argues that knowledge promotes survival and ignorance can mean starving to
death. This very inclination pushes us to study to shun ignorance. Have you noticed it?
Parents will always tell that the only inheritance they can give their children is education.
They do not like that their children become ignorant. Being ignorant is not a good thing.

Thomas Aquinas believes that from these seven basic goods, the natural law is
derived. Our inclination shows us basic good and reason allows us to derive natural law
from them. This brings us to the understanding that the right acts are in accordance with
natural law. How thus this system of Natural law works? Let us take the obvious
inclination, self-preservation. We all see that our lives are valuable. It is the reason why
we do not do stupid or dumb acts that will put our lives in danger. However, we cannot
deny the fact that others’ lives are also valuable the same as ours. The reason will tell us
that killing is wrong because it is a violation of natural law.
From here, we will be able to create prohibition: “do not kill”. In turn, it will bring to a
positive injunction which promotes life.

There are different kinds of law. We have seen it in the readings and you have defined it clearly.
We now turn our attention to natural law. When we talk about natural, it brings more questions
rather than answers. How might one commonly define what is “natural” or “unnatural”? Persons
are having difficulty in differentiating what is natural and unnatural. Let us test your understanding
of what is natural and what is not. We have here some list and tell us whether it is natural or
unnatural. After finishing the module we go back to your answers and test it if you got it right.

Situation Natural or Unnatural

eating insects
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picking one’s nose (pangungulangot)

mixed martial arts (combat sports)

plastic surgery

eating raw beef

cross-dressing

IUD (intra-uterine device)

incest

male on male sex

male infidelity (pambababae)

Answer the following questions:

1. Are there other ways that word “natural” is used to justify a particular way of
behaving? How do these approaches compare to the theory of Aquinas?
2. Can you think of human laws that are proper extensions of the natural law? Explain
how this is so. Can you think of other human laws that violate the natural law?
Explain how this is so.
3. Are there other forms of harm short of killing another person that may be taken as
violation of the natural inclination to preserve one’s being? Justify your answer.
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Post - Truth
We find the lines blurred between fact and fiction, between news reports and
advertisements. We are accustomed to hearing and reading fake news. We are inundated
by figures and statistics that we can barely comprehend, much less confirm. We are told
consider alternative facts and to not take seriously everything we might hear our political
leaders say. We read and revel in and then repost the most hyperbolic and hysterical
statements without asking ourselves whether we or anyone else should reasonably
maintain this. we are now in the “post – truth” era.
This label of “post – truth” means that we are more and more becoming habituated to
disregard or at least to devalue the truth. It is a tendency to think of truth as insignificant
in view of other concerns. This is a significant question in the field of media ethics, as
practitioners in that field (news reporters, writers, investigative journalists, and advertisers
ought to ask the question as to what extent the integrity of their work might be
compromised in view of other interests, such as popularity, profit, higher viewership, or
stronger sales. Yet, this issue is not limited to people working in media. It should be
recognized as relevant by anyone who makes use of social media, caught up in
statements and exchanges of dubious worth. It should be considered by anyone who
wants to take seriously Aquinas’ claim that the reason and concern for truth are what
makes us human.

I. Go online and look for an instance of what might be fake news. See whether
you are able to determine the veracity of the news report. Detail your findings
and opinion below.
II. In view of Aquinas’s assertion that reason is what makes us uniquely human
and that being reasonable opens up both an epistemic concern for truth and
also a social concern of being in relation with others, provide an assessment
on the value or disvalue of post – truth phenomena such as fake news or
alternative facts.
III. Consider other topics within the realm of media ethics. Select one and give an
initial presentation of the significance of discussing this topic.

Frankfurt, Harry."Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." The Importance of
What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979, pp. 11-25.

Nagel, Thomas. "The Fragmentation of Value!" Mortal Questions. Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversity Press, 1979, pp. 128-41.

Rachels, James."Can Ethics Provide Answers?" The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 10,
No. 3, June 1980, pp. 32-40.
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This module tackles deontology of Immanuel Kant. It shows how Kant establish his ethical
system using pure reason. This pure reason bring us to the idea of imperatives. There
are two kinds of imperatives, hypothetical and categorical imperatives. The emphasis of
this module is on categorical imperative that has three formulations: universalizability,
autonomy and kingdom of ends. There are ethical problems you are going to resolve. You
are task to resolve them using the test of universalizability.

At the end of this module, you should be able to:

1. discuss Kant's ethical system based on pure reason,
2. apply the concepts of the formulations of categorical imperatives, and;
3. evaluate actions using the universalizability test.

INTRODUCTION
During the flag ceremony of that Monday morning, January 24, 2017, the mayor of
Baguio City awarded a certificate from the City Government that commended Reggie
Cabututan for his "extraordinary show of honesty in the performance of their duties or
practice of profession."' Reggie is a taxi driver who, just three days before the awarding,
drove his passenger, an Australian named Trent Shields, to his workplace. The foreigner,
having little sleep and was ill the previous day, left his suitcase inside the taxi cab after
he reached his destination. The suitcase contained a laptop, passport, and an expensive
pair of headphones, which Trent claimed amounted to around P260,000.
Consider closely the moment when Reggie found that Trent had left a suitcase in
his taxi cab: If he were to return the suitcase, there was no promise of an award from the
City Government of Baguio and no promise of a reward from the owner. What if he took
the suitcase and sold its contents? That could surely help him supplement his daily
wages. Life as a taxi driver in the Philippines is not easy. A little extra cash would go a
long way to put food on the table and to pay tuition fees for his children.
Yet, Reggie returned the suitcase without the promise of a reward. Why? Perhaps,
he had previously returned lost luggage to passengers. Maybe, it was his first time to do
so. Maybe, he received a reward before, or maybe he knows some fellow taxi drivers who
did or did not receive rewards from passengers after they returned lost luggage. However,
the point is that there was no promise of a reward. A reward, in the first place, is not an
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entitlement. It is freely given as an unrequired gift for one's service or effort. Otherwise, it
would be a payment, not a reward, if someone demanded it.
Why did Reggie return the suitcase? For now, let us suppose his main reason was
simply because it was right to return lost property to the rightful owner, no matter how
tempting it is to keep it for oneself. Is it possible that Reggie's reason for returning the
luggage was not because of any reward whether psychic or physical? "It is simply the
right thing to do," Reggie might have told himself.
What if Reggie did not return the suitcase, destroyed the lock, then took and sold
its valuable contents? What is wrong about keeping and benefitting from the valuables
that someone misplaced? "It is his fault; he was mindless and careless," Reggie could
have thought. As the saying goes: Finders keepers, losers weepers. On one hand, Reggie
could have mused:" He will learn to be more mindful of his things from now on. Yet,
Reggie returned the suitcase without the promise of a reward.
As we previously said, perhaps, Reggie believed that it was the right thing to do.
Even if he felt that he could have benefitted from the sale of the valuable items in the
suitcase, he must have believed the principle that it is right to do the right thing. Reggie
could be holding on to this moral conviction as a principle of action.
To hold a moral conviction means believing that it is one's duty to do the right thing.
What is duty? Why does one choose to follow her duty even if doing otherwise may bring
her more benefits?

DUTY AND AGENCY

The moral theory that evaluates actions that are done because of duty is called
deontology. Deontology comes from the Greek word deon, which means “being
necessary.” Hence, deontology refers to the study of duty and obligation. The main
proponent of deontology is Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). He was a German
Enlightenment philosopher who wrote one of the most important works on moral
philosophy, Groundwork towards a Metaphysics of Morals (1785). In this work, Kant
brings our attention to the fact that we, human beings, have the faculty called rational will,
which is the capacity to act according to principles that we determine for ourselves.
To consider the rational will is to point out the difference between animals and
persons. On one hand, animals are sentient organisms. Sentience, meaning an organism
has the ability to perceive and navigate its external environment. Insofar as dogs and
carabaos are sentient organisms, we do not see them bumping into trees and walls unless
their senses are weak. Animals constantly interact with their surroundings. This is also
true to us humans; we are also sentient. Thus, both animals and persons interact in and
with the world, reacting to external stimuli and internal impulses to survive and thrive.

On the other hand, people are also rational. Rationality consists of the mental
faculty to construct ideas and thoughts that are beyond our immediate surroundings. This
is the capacity for mental abstraction, which arises from the operations of the faculty of
reason. Thus, we have the ability to stop and think about what we are doing. We can
remove ourselves mentally from the immediacy of our surroundings and reflect on our
actions and how such actions affect the world. We can imagine a different and better
world, and create mental images of how we interact with other people in that world. In the
same way, an architect "first" constructs her blueprint of a house in her mind. When the
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draft of that construction is drawn, she can then give instructions to masons and
carpenters on how to build the actual house, which becomes the “second" construction.
This happens often in our lives such as when a young girl puts on her nice dress and
makeup, when a student writes the outline for an English essay, or when a painter makes
initial sketches on a canvass. The first construction consists in how we imagine things
can be, then we implement that in the second construction. Through the capacity for
imagination and reflection, we conceive of how we could affect, possibly even change,
the world we live in.

Thus, we do not only have the capacity to imagine and construct mental images,
but we also have the ability to act on-to enact and make real-those mental images. This
ability to enact our thoughts is the basis for the rational will. The rational will refers to the
faculty to intervene in the world, to act in a manner that is consistent with our reason. As
far as we know, animals only act according to impulses, based on their natural instincts.
Thus, animals “act” with immediacy (from Latin: i + medius, or ＂no middle" with nothing
that intervenes between the impulse and the action. They do not and cannot deliberate
on their actions. In fact, we may say that animals do not "act" They only "react" to their
external surroundings and internal impulses. In contrast, we humans have reason, which
intervenes between impulse and act. We have the ability to stop and think about what we
are doing to evaluate our actions according to principles. Simply stated, we are not only
reacting to our surroundings and internal impulses, but are also conceiving of ways to act
according to certain rational principles.

Right now, for example, you may feel lethargic. Your head feels heavy and your
eyes are droopy. The corresponding impulse is to close your eyes and then fall asleep.
However, your rational will demand something else. Perhaps, you have to finish reading
this chapter for a quiz tomorrow. That quiz is part of the big picture, that is, your formation
as a student to earn a degree and do productive work. So you struggle to stay awake;
you stand up briefly to stretch your legs. You may have already taken some coffee. Right
now, as you struggle to stay awake and understand the words on this page, your rational
will is victorious over your bodily impulses as long as you stay awake. This demonstrates
the triumph of your rational will over your base impulse to just go to sleep. This triumph
clarifies the meaning of rational will, the capacity of a person to be the cause of her actions
based on reasons and not merely to mindlessly react to the environment and base
impulses. In philosophical discussions about human freedom, this capacity is called
agency, which is the ability of a person to act based on her intentions and mental states.

Let us go back to Reggie. The moment he discovered that Trent had left his
suitcase. in the taxi cab, Reggie reacted according to his rational will-to return the
suitcase. He determined that it was his duty to return it inasmuch as his rational will had
conceived such a duty.

Hence, to act according to a duty is a specifically human experience. Animals, if it

is true that they do not possess the faculty of rational will, cannot conceive of having
duties. This is the starting point of deontology. We may claim that as long as we have
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rationality, there will always be the tension between our base impulses and our rational
will.

AUTONOMY

Kant claims that the property of the rational will is autonomy (Ak 4:440), which is
the opposite of heteronomy. These three Greek words are instructive: autos, heteros, and
nomos, which mean “self” “other” and “law, respectively. Hence, when we combine autos
and nomos, we get autonomy; heteros and nomos to heteronomy. Crudely stated,
autonomy means self-law (or self-legislating) and heteronomy means other law.

Consider the trivial example of brushing one's teeth, which is not yet a moral
dilemma but is sufficient to explain the difference between autonomy and heteronomy.
When you were a child, did you like to brush your teeth? As far as we can tell, children
do not like to brush their teeth, but parents know that children should, to maintain oral
hygiene. So parents try to find ways to get their small children to brush their teeth before
going to bed, using a variety of incentives or threats of undesirable consequences. "Hey,
Ryan," a mother tells her boy,“go and brush your teeth now or else your teeth will
rot!""Come on now, Liza," a father tells his daughter, "If you brush your teeth in fivé
minutes, I will let you play your computer game tonight.” In the case of Ryan and Liza,
are they autonomous? Certainly not, as their parents are the ones that legislate the
principle that children should brush their teeth before they go to bed and impose such a
principle by using threats or incentives.

Now think about Ryan and Liza twenty years later when they are in their mid-
twenties. Suppose they brush their teeth every night before they go to bed, and they do
so without the prodding of their parents. At a certain point, perhaps when they were
growing up as teenagers, they both reflected on the whole business of brushing one's
teeth. Both concluded that they (1) agree with the principle behind it (oral hygiene) and
thus, (2) every night they impose it upon themselves to brush their teeth before going to
bed. Number 1 refers to the act of legislating a principle, while number 2 refers to the
enacting of the principle. Thus, it also refers to the willing of the adopted principle into
reality. Are they. autonomous? Yes, certainly. Kant describes this as follows:

The will is thus not only subject to the law, but it is also subject to the law in such
a way that it gives the law to itself (self-legislating), and primarily just in this way that the
will can be considered the author of the law under which it is subject. (Ak 4:431)

This description of autonomy is unusual. When we think of someone being "subject

to the law" we usually think of an imposing authority figure that uses his power to control
the subject into complying with his will. Imagine a policeman who apprehends a
suspected criminal by forcing him on the ground and putting handcuffs on his wrists.
Incidentally, “subject” comes from the Latin words sub (under) and jacere (to throw).When
combined, the two words refer to that which is thŕown or brought under something. The
will must comply with the law, which is the authority figure.
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Surprisingly though, the will must give the law to itself. Therefore, the will is, at the
same time, the authority figure giving the law to itself. How can the rational will be
subordinate to that which is simultaneously its own authority figure? Isn't that
contradictory to be subject to the law and yet also be the authority figure for itself? Thus,
Kant describes autonomy as the will that is subject to a principle or law.

This apparent contradiction is entirely possible to exist, but only for self-reflexive
human beings that have rational will. Remember Ryan and Liza, and the principle of
brushing their teeth. On one hand, heteronomy is the simple legislation and imposition of
a law by an external authority (a person must brush her teeth before going to bed).Their
parents are the authority figures, and the law is imposed externally by rewards or
punishments. On the other hand, autonomy belongs to the grown-up and already rational
Ryan and Liza, who have adopted such a law about brushing their teeth. They regularly
impose such a law on themselves out of the enactment of the will to follow the law.

The distinguishing point here is the locus of the authorship of the law. In any given
scenario where a person complies with the law, we ask where the author is, whether it is
external or internal. If the author of the law is external, the will is subjected to an external
authority, thus heteronomous will. In contrast, if the author was the will itself, imposing
the law unto itself, then we describe the will as autonomous. For the 25-year-old versions
of Ryan and Liza who brush their teeth before going to bed without any prompting from
their parents, their adoption of the childhood law about toothbrushing makes the locus of
the authorship internal. Thus, they are autonomous.

However, trivial actions such as brushing one's teeth can hardly be considered
"moral" Real moral issues often involve actions like stealing, lying, and murder, in that
they have a certain gravity, insofar as those actions directly harm or benefit the well-being
of persons. Reggie's case, seen in this light, is clearly a moral issue.

Let us remember that alternative scenario that we imagiņed earlier: What if Reggie
did not return the suitcase, destroyed the lock, then took and sold its valuable contents?
Is this not an act of rational will? Can we not claim that Reggie's rational will determines
for itself how it enacts its duty in this alternative scenario? Is Reggie not, after all, acting
as an autonomous agent? Reggie could have easily come upon the odious principle that
he should benefit from Trent's loss because people who lose their things are careless,
and thus. do not deserve to keep those things. Therefore, Reggie may have concluded,“I
am entitled to benefit from this lost suitcase. I am the author of this principle. I am acting
autonomously” He may conclude this šince no external authority is legislating laws for
him by using rewards or punishments. However, this kind of reasoning is mistaken from
a Kantian understanding as we will show below.

What do you think of Reggie's principle that he should benefit from other people's
loss because they are careless, and thus do not deserve to keep those things? Is it still
autonomous agency when a person enacts any apparently self-legislated principle? We
may argue that the locus of the authorship of the law was certainly internal, when he tells
himself, “I am entitled to benefit from this lost suitcase” based on how we have described
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the difference between autonomy and heteronomy-self and other. Is that what autonomy
properly means? Certainly not.

Kant claims that there is a difference between rational will and animal impulse.
Take a close look at how he describes the distinction in this passage:

The choice that can be determined by pure reason is called free choice. That which is
determinable only by inclination (sensible impulse, stimulus) would be animal choice
(arbitrium brutum). Human choice, in contrast, is a choice that may indeed be affected
but not determined by impulses, and is therefore in itself (without an acquired skill of
reason) not pure, but can nevertheless be determined to do actions from pure will
(Ak 6:213).

Thus, there is a difference between what determines a choice or decision, whether

it is caused by sensible impulse or by pure reason. On one hand, sensible impulses are
usually bodily and emotional. Bodily instincts and desires, such as the urge to eat, drink,
sleep, or have sexual intercourse, comprise the set of human compulsions for survival
and the propagation of the species. Emotions and sentiments also make up what Kant
considers sensible impulses. Practical examples are the jealousy from seeing your
girlfriend or boyfriend make eyes at someone, and the rage from being pushed foully by
your opponent in a basketball game. As we previously claimed, when we discussed the
difference between animals and humans, there is immediacy to sensible impulses. There
is hardly anything that comes between the stimulus and the reaction. Kant calls this set
of actions that are caused by sensible impulse animal choice or arbitrium brutum.

On the other hand, there is a choice or action that is determined by pure reason.
Kant calls this kind of action'free choice, and one may argue that human freedom resides
in this capacity of reason to intervene, to “mediate" within arbitrium brutum. Previously,
rationality was described as the mental capacity to construct ideas and thoughts that are
beyond one's immediate surroundings. This mental capacity is what makes the
intervention possible between stimulus and reaction.With the faculty ofreason, a person
can break the immediacy of stimulus and reaction by stopping to deliberate and assess
possible alternative actions. The above-described jealous partner and raging basketball
player, if they had enough self- possession, could refrain from reacting mindlessly to the
triggering stimuli and instead construct a rational response. For instance, you may open
up with your partner to talk about trust and setting boundaries, or you may tell the guarding
opponent to take it easy and play the game well. In both cases, you orient your actions
toward an overall aim that you aspire for trust and sportsmanship, respectively. These
aims are mental constructions of the faculty of reason. These examples do not imply that
people are not affected by sensible impulses. The jealous feelings and anger are present,
but they do not immediately and automatically cause the actions. Based on the quote
above (Ak 6:213), Kant describes that human choice can be affected but is not determined
by sensible impulses.

What does it mean for a human to be affected but is not determined by sensible
impulse? It implies that we are indeed basically animals, but we cannot be reduced to
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mere animality. This is where the correlative conjunction "not only, but also"is useful.
When we claim, "The human person is not only an animal, but is also rational," we admit
to two possible causes of our actions: sensible impulses and the faculty of reason. Human
freedom resides in that distinction.

Let us return once again to Reggie and the alternative scenario when he tells
himself, “I am entitled to benefit from this lost suitcase" Is Reggie acting autonomously
supposing he did not return the suitcase and instead sold its contents for his own benefit?
We asked this at the beginning of this section: Is it always autonomous agency when a
person enacts any apparently self-legislated principle? Certainly not. The difference
between human choice and animal choice is crucial to giving a correct answer here.
Autonomy is a property of the will only during instances when the action is determined by
pure reason. When the action is determined by sensible impulses, despite the source of
those impulses being nevertheless internal, it is considered heteronomous. Why
heteronomous? Because a sensible impulse is“external" to one's self-legislating faculty
of reason. Kant confirms this point when he states that the action caused by sensible
impulses results always only in the heteronomy of the will because it is what he calls“a
foreign impulse" (Ak 4:444), insofar as the will does not give itself the law.

Therefore, Reggie is not acting autonomously, supposing he was to take and

benefit. from the contents of the suitcase. Why would we consider his will as being
heteronomous? Because a sensible impulse would be the cause of such an action,
whether it is greed or the excitement of obtaining easy money without working for it, or
the shame that arises from being unable to provide for his family. In any of those causes,
a sensible impulse is akin to a “foreign impulse” that has the same immediacy of an
external authority figure that imposes its will on Reggie.

We can thus make the conclusion that heteronomy ofthe will occurs when any
foreign impulse, whether it is external (as in other persons or institutions that impose their
will on the agent) or sensible (as in bodily instincts or base emotions) is what compels a
person to act. In contrast, autonomy is the property of the will in those instances when
pure reason is the cause of the action.

But what consists in an action that is done by an autonomous will insofar as the
cause of the action is pure reason? What does it mean to act according to pure reason?

UNIVERSALIZABILITY.

To figure out how the faculty of reason can be the cause of an autonomous action,
we need to learn a method or a specific procedure that will demonstrate autonomy of the
will. But before explaining this procedure, it will be helpful to first make a distinction about
kinds of moral theories, namely, substantive and formal moral theories.

A substantive moral theoryimmediately promulgates the specificactions that

comprise that theory. As such, it identifies the particular duties in a straightforward
manner that the adherents of the theory must follow. The set of Ten Commandments of
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the Judeo-Christian tradition is an unambiguous example of a substantive moral

theory.The specific laws are articulated mostly in the form of a straightforward moral
command: "Honor your father and mother” “You shall not kill," and so forth.

In contrast,a formal moral theorydoes not supplythe rules or commands

straightaway. It does not tell you what you may or may not do. Instead, a formal moral
theory provides us the "“form” or "framework” of the moral theory. To provide the "form”
of a moral theory is to supply a procedure and the criteria for determining, on one's own,
the rules and moral commands. Metaphorically, we can think of a.cookbook as akin to a
formal moral theory. In using a cookbook, we are given instructions on how to cook certain
dishes, but we are not given the actual food themselves, which would be “substantive" In
following a recipe for sinigang, for example, we may add a slight variation to the
ingredients and sequence of steps. But if we want the dish to remain sinigang and not
transform it into some other kind of viand like pochero, we need to follow the steps that
are relevant to making sinigang. To be exact, a formal moral theory will not give us a list
of rules or commands. Instead, it will give us a set of instructions on how to make a list of
duties or moral commands.

Kant endorses this formal kind of moral theory. The Grundlegung zur Metaphysik
der Sitten, which he wrote in 1785, embodies a formal moral theory in what he calls the
categorical imperative, which provides a procedural way of identifying the rightness or
wrongness of an action. Kant articulates the categorical imperative this way:

Act only according to such a maxim, by which you can at once will that it become
a universal law.(Ak 4:421)

There are four key elements in this formulation of the categorical imperative,
namely, action, maxim, will, and universal law. Kant states that we must formulate an
action as a maxim, which he defines as a “subjective principle of action" (Ak 4:422). In
this context, a maxim consists of a "rule" that we live by in our day-to-day lives, but it does
not have the status of a law or a moral command that binds us to act in a certain way.
Rather, maxims depict the patterns of our behavior. Thus, maxims are akin to the
“standard operating procedures" (SOPs) in our lives. We act according to a variety of
maxims, even if we are not aware of them. Actually, we become aware of our maxims
when we talk about ourselves, when we reveal our habits and the reasons behind them.
For example, we tell our friends what we ordinarily do in certain specific situations: When
the weekend comes, I usually go to the beach with my family to relax. When the exam
week begins, I go to mass so that l will be blessed with good luck. Whenever I meet my
crush, I wear my hair in a braid so that he will notice me. These are usually personal
"policies" that may or may not be unique to us, but we act according to these maxims
nonetheless. This is why Kant calls a maxim a subjective principle of action. We have
many maxims in our daily lives, and we live according to them.

In the formulation of the categorical imperative, Kant calls our attention to the kind
of maxims that we live by. He claims that we ought to act according to the maxim “by
which you can at once will that it become a universal law." What does it mean to will a
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maxim that can become a universal law? It means that the maxim must be
universalizable, which is what it means to "will that it become a universal law"This means
nothing other than imagining a world in which the maxim, or personal rule, that I live by
were adopted by everyone as their own maxim. In this formulation, Kant is telling us to
conceive of the maxim as if it obligated everyone to comply. This mental act of imagining
a universalized maxim does not mean we picture a world in which everyone actually
followed the maxim. Instead, we merely imagine the maxim as a law that everyone ought
to follow. The proper way to imagine the universalized maxim is not by asking, “What if
everyone did that maxim?” but by asking, “What if everyone were obligated to follow that
maxim?" Here is a clear example.

In Groundwork towards a Metaphysics of Morals, Kant takes up the issue of

making false promises (Ak 4:422). He narrates the predicament of a man who needs
money, but has no immediate access to obtain it except by borrowing it from a friend. This
man knows that he will not be able to pay the money back, but if he says he cannot return
the money, then no money will be lent to him. Hence, the predicament is simply about
him borrowing money, while knowing that he cannot pay it back. This is a specific act
under the general category of acts called false promising. Kant says that the man would
like to make such a promise, but he stops and asks himself if what he is about to do is
right or wrong: Is it really wrong to borrow money without intending to pay it back? If we
were to formulate this act as a maxim, it would go this way: "When I am in need of money,
I shall borrow it even when I know I cannot pay it back"

Remember that Kant states that we should act according to a maxim by which we
can at once will that it become a universal law. What does it mean to universalize the
maxim about borrowing money without intending to return it? It is simple. Imagine a
hypothetical world in which each person, whenever she is in need of money, is obligated
to borrow from another even when she knows she cannot pay it back. We do not imagine
that people actually borrowed money without intending to return it. Instead, we think of
them as obligated to do so. Now, there are two possibilities in this hypothetical world
where people are obligated to borrow money without intending to pay: the maxim can
either make sense or not make sense as a universal law. By"making sense," we refer to
the logical plausibility of the universalized maxim. The opposite of logical plausibility is
self-contradiction or logical impossibility.

Let us assess that hypothetical world. If borrowing money without intending to pay
were everyone's obligation to comply with, what would happen to the status of the
universalized maxim? The purpose of borrowing money would be defeated because no
one will lend money. In a world where it is an obligation to borrow money without paying
back, all lenders would know that they will not be paid and they will refuse to lend money.
The institution of money-borrowing would lose its meaning if everyone was obligated to
borrow money without intending to pay it back. As a universalized maxim, it would self-
destruct because it becomes impossible. This is how Kant assesses it:
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Here I see straightaway that it could never be valid as a universal law of nature and be
consistent with itself, but must necessarily contradict itself. For the universality of a law
that each person, when he believes himself to be in need, could promise whatever he
pleases with the intent not to keep it, would make the promise and the purpose that he
may have impossible, since no one would believe what was promised him but would laugh
at all such expressions as futile pretense (Ak 4:422).

In the passage above,Kant distinguishes between being "consistent with itself"and

“contradict itself." Look at the maxim again: "When I am in need of money, I shall borrow
it even when I know I cannot pay it back"The meaning of the act "to borrow" implies taking
and using something with the intent to return it. In the maxim, the claim is to borrow "even
when I know I cannot pay it back," which contradicts the very meaning of "to borrow." The
contradiction is evident: to borrow (implies returning) but the intention is not to return. Of
course, in the real world, many people borrow money without intending to pay, but it is
the logical plausibility of the universalized maxim that is at stake. Here, we reveal the
contradiction that occurs when we scrutinize the maxim because, after all, one contradicts
oneself when one borrows money (implies intent to return) without intending to pay it
back. It makes no sense. This is why Kant claims that the universalized maxim "could
never be valid as a universal law of nature and be consistent with itself, but must
necessarily contradict itself" Thus, we can conclude that the act of borrowing money
without intending to pay is rationally impermissible. Here, we discover two ways by which
Kant rejects maxims. The universalized maxim becomes either (1) self-contradictory or
(2) the act and its purpose become impossible.

What is the result of all these? We reveal the rational permissibility of actions
insofar as they cannot be rejected as universalizable maxims. In contrast, those
universalized maxims that are rejected are shown to be impermissible, thatis, they are
irrational and thus, in Kant's mind, immoral. But what does rational permissibility mean?
Simply put, it refers to the intrinsic quality of an action that it is objectively and necessarily
rational. Using the universalizability test, we can reveal the objective necessity of an
action as rational. Observe, for example, the quality of the arithmetical claim, “1 + 1 = 2."
It is objectively necessary because the quality of the claim is universally and logically
valid, and we understand this to be always true as rational beings. Observe the difference
between the quality of objectively necessary claims with contingent claims, such as claims
about the world like "The sky is blue," the truth of which depends on the actual situation
in the world. Therefore, we have demonstrated that borrowing money without intending
to pay, as a kind of false promise, is objectively and necessarily wrong, insofar as it
encounters a self-contradiction and logical impossibility when it is universalized as a
maxim.

SUMMARY

At this juncture, it has become clear how Kant's categorical imperative is a formal,
not substantive, moral philosophy. We have shown how an action can be tested and via
this test, it can also be distinguished whether such an action is permissible or not.Instead
of being given a list of substantive moral commands, we now have a sort of tool, like a
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measuring instrument, that tells us whether an action is morally permissible or not. Hence,
we have the capacity to make our own list of moral commands. Instead of receiving them
from others, we use our own rational faculty to produce our own list of moral duties.

Returning to Reggie and the suitcase that was left in his cab, he can now test on
his own the moral permissibility of the formulated maxim: "When a suitcase that does not
belong to me is left in my cab, I shall take its contents and sell them for my own benefit."
He can now assess this maxim by imagining it as everyone's obligation. Does the
universalized maxim encounter a self-contradiction, or does it remain self-consistent?
Certainly, the meaning of ownership, when a suitcase belongs to someone, is to have the
right to possess, use, and dispose of the thing as one pleases. So what happens when a
person is obligated to take possession of an object that does not belong to her? The
universalized maxim of Reggie becomes contradictory, for the meaning of ownership is
contradicted. How is it that everyone is obligated to take a suitcase and sell its contents,
despite the fact that they do not have the right to possess, use, and dispose of that
suitcase?

Now, imagine applying this procedure to other scenarios in which person

encounters moral problems, such as lying, cheating in an exam, murder, and adultery,
among others. You may also test positive actions, such as paying for something that you
are. buying, returning something you borrowed, or submitting a school project on time.
Can the maxims in the specific actions under those moral issues be universalized without
encountering self-contradiction? It is for each one of us to test on our own, not for Kant
or any other authority figure to determine for us. On your own, try identifying an action
that is considered lying or cheating in an exam, formulate the maxim, then test that maxim
for universalizability. Is there a contradiction that is revealed in the universalized maxim?.

In summary, this procedure is properly used when one wishes to determine the
moral permissibility of an action. Indeed, we are often already told which actions are-right
or wrong, but this knowledge is usually based on what authority figures say. Our parents,
priests, school rules and regulations, and government ordinances already prescribe
clearly determined moral commands. So what is the categorical imperative for, if we
already know whether or not an action is right?

The categorical imperative is precisely for the rational will that is autonomous.
Recall that autonomy implies a self-legislating will.The test for universalizability makes
possible that self-legislation,for the result of the categorical imperative, is nothing other
than the capacity to distinguish between permissible and impermissible moral acts.Any
rational will can then begin the work of producing a list of duties, what a rational and
autonomous will believes to be right and wrong actions.

In conclusion, what can deontology contribute to our lives, specifically to our moral
reflection? The answer lies in one concept: enlightenment morality. This kind of morality
is opposed to paternalism, which evokes the metaphor of father (from the Latin pater). A
father is a benevolent authority figure who takes care and provides safety and sustenance
for his children. In this metaphor, the father has the power to make decisions for and
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enforce obedience on the children, as long as the children are dependent and may not
know yet what is best for them. Thus, the father makes decisions on behalf of and in the
interest of the children. It is his duty to raise and nurture them for their own good. The
children are expected to comply and obey because they are still unfit to make good
decisions on their own. Children, when let on their own, would likely follow base impulses
because they lack the necessary experience and rational will to survive and flourish in
this world. But what happens when children grow and become mature adults? When they
move on to develop their minds and live their own lives? Certainly, paternalism has to
give way to a more mature rational will when the children are no longer children, when
they mature, and can begin to navigate the complex world.

This is therefore the place of deontology in the spirit of enlightenment morality.

Deontology is based on the "light” of one's own reason when maturity and rational
capacity take hold of a person's decision-making. Reason is depicted as having its own
light in contrast to our long experience of “paternalism” in human history, in which we find
dictatorship and authority figure that claim to be benevolent, but have proven to be
oppressive and exploitative of those who do not have political power. With deontology,
particularly the method of universalizability, we can validate and adopt those rules and
laws that are right and reject those that are irrational, thus impermissible because they
are self-contradictory. This is then the practical value of deontology in our moral reflection:
we are encouraged to have courage to think on our own,to use our rational will against
external authorities as well as internal base impulses that tend to undermine our
autonomy and self-determination.

UNIVERSALIZABILITY TEST

You are going to perform universalizability test of the following:

1. stealing someone’s valuables

2. lying about credentials on curriculum vitae (CV)
3. refusing to give a bribe, taking a ticket
4. studying test leakage for aboard exam

Case study:

National Telecommunication Commission(NTC), a government regulatory office, handed

ABS-CBN company a cease and desist order stopping its broadcast. It is due to the
company's expired franchise. The company's franchise expired May 4, 2020. Many
people are saddened. ABS-CBN's top official contested the stoppage of their broadcast.
They would argue that it is wrong to hand down the order of stoppage because it will
greatly affect their eleven thousand employees (11,000). Arguments could go as far as
saying that the stoppage will be against the interest of the Filipino because of the
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pandemic we are experiencing. They would even claim that it clear violation of press
freedom.

Let us analyze this. Is it unethical for NTC to issue stoppage of ABS-CBN because of
their expired franchise to operate? or it is unethical for NTC to issue stoppage of ABSCBN
because of their expired franchise but it is pandemic and greatly affects 11,000
employees?

Analyze it using Kant's Universalizability Test.

1. Test the morality of the case using Kant's Universalizability Test.

2. Explain the morality of the cases. Explain it in 5 to 7 sentences.

Answer the following questions:

1. In what way does a rational will distinguish a human being from an animal insofar
as the animal is only sentient?
2. What is the difference between autonomy and heteronomy? What does
autonomy have to do with free will in contrast to animal impulse?

Whistle-Blowing and the Duty of Speaking Truth to Power

Business ethics is a field of applied moral philosophy wherein the principles of right
and wrong (as we are learning about deontology, virtue ethics, utilitarianism, among
others) are made pertinent and relevant to the workplace. Just because the primary
purpose of business is the proverbial bottom-line called profit, it does not mean that profit
is the only motive. More and more people are realizing that to make a business
sustainable, we need to make decisions that balance a triple bottom-line; namely, people,
planet, and profit. This requires that we must improve our competence in decision-making
that calibrates benefits for the stakeholders (people), the environment (planet), and the
investors (profit). Often, those business decision-makers who do everything, especially
the illegal and immoral acts to maximize profit in a single-minded way, somehow harm
their company's long-term sustainability. For example, they may lose customers if they
produce substandard goods and services just to make short-term profit. On the other
hand, their employees might keep resigning and they have to continuously hire new
people because the compensation is not fair and just. They lose money in the long-term
because they spend more for training costs because they pay below minimum wage
salaries therefore hiring employees that lack certain qualities they need for their company.
Thus, there is a place for ethical principles in business, insofar as a business decision-
maker's goal is sustainability and not merely profit. But what can someone in the
workplace do in the face of unethical business practices?
Recent history in the Philippines has witnessed many controversial whistle-
blowers. Names such as Primitivo Mijares,Heidi Mendoza,and Rodolfo Lozada Jr. have
become part of the narratives of different ethical scandals in the past few decades. But
what is whistle-blowing? We can consider it as a kind of speaking truth to power. It
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happens often in the workplace that an authority figure violates a law or makes an
unethical decision, such as bribery or extortion, deception, and exploitation of labor,
among others. When it happens that an authority figure instructs a subordinate to do an
unethical act, the subordinate may not agree with undertaking the act if he wants to live
by certain moral principles. There is a problem that arises here. On one hand, the
subordinate must follow the instructions of the authority figure because the employer-
employee contract binds the subordinate to follow the orders of the authority figure. To
do otherwise would be insubordination, which can be grounds for termination. He could
lose his job. On the other hand, if the unethical act that is instructed by the authority figure
is clearly against the principles of the subordinate, can he refuse to do it without fear of
losing his job? In this problematic scenario, the subordinate needs to find a solution.
Whistle-blowing is one way of making an ethical intervention.

However, the whistle-blowers that we named above resorted to one kind of whistle.
blowing; namely, exposing the wrong doing externally either by testifying in a public panel.
or by going-to mass media such as a radio announcer or journalist. While external whistle-
blowing can be effective, it is not the only manner by which a subordinate can blow the
whistle against an erring authority figure. Here are three other intervention methods: (1).
secretly informing a higher authority figure (the “boss of the boss") about the unethical
act, (2) writing an anonymous letter to the authority figure threatening to expose the
wrong-doing, and (3) collaborating with like-minded colleagues to sabotage the
undertaking of the unethical act and to prevent it from being done. It takes a strong moral
character to stand up to authority in the spirit of doing the right thing. But more than moral
character, it is important to be wise and clever in choosing which intervention method to
use in order to uphold one's moral principles.

I. Go online and look for news items on whistle-blowers. Identify the crime or
unethical act that they are exposing as well as the perpetrators of the crime
Detail your findings and opinion below.
II. Reconcile these two topics: our discussion of autonomy and the duty to
"speaking truth to power" Suppose you are already working for a company
and your boss tells you that you should offer a bribe to a government agent to
obtain permit to build and operate a factory in a province. What would you
do? What are your alternatives if you believe that it is wrong to bribe
government agencies?
III. Consider other topics in the field of business ethics. Select one and give a
presentation of the significance of discussing this topic.

Bulaong, O. et. al. (2018). Ethics: foundation of moral valuation. Manila: Rex Bookstore.
Thiroux, J. (2012). Ethics: theory and practice.(11th ed.). Engelewood Cliffs: Prentice
Hall.
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This module tackles principles of Utilitarianism. It differentiates Jeremy Bentham’s

utilitarian concept and John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian concept. The module tries to see the different
types of utilitarianism. You need to apply the principles of utilitarianism in different situations.

At the end of this module, you should be able to:

1. discuss the basic idea of utilitarianism,
2. distinguish Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism from John Stuart Mill’s
utilitarianism
3. apply utilitarianism in evaluating community scenarios.

On January 25, 2015, the 84th Special Action Force (SAF) conducted police
operation at Tukanalipao, Mamasapano in Maguindanao. Also known as Oplan Exodus,
it was intended to serve an arrest warrant for Zulkifli bin Hir or Marwan, a Malaysian
terrorist and bomb-maker who had a $5 million bounty on his head. This mission
eventually led to a clash between the Philippine National Police’s (PNP) SAF, on the one
hand, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) on the other. Although the police operation was “successful”
because of the death of Marwan, the firefight that ensued claimed sixty-seven lives
including forty- four SAF troopers, eighteen MILF Fighters, and five civillians. However,
the relatively high number of the SAF members killed in this operation caught the attention
of many including the Philippine media and the legislature.

In one of the Congress investigations that followed this tragic mission, then Senate
President Franklin Drilon and Senator Francis Escudero debated the public hearing of an
audio recording of an alleged conversation that attempted to cover up the massacre of
the PNP-SAF commandos. Drilon questioned the admissibility of these recordings as
evidence under the Anti-Wire Tapping Law whereas Escudero cited the legal brief of the
Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) arguing that the Anti-Wire Tapping Law protects
only the recording and interception of private communications. Drilon cited Section 4 of
the Anti-Wire Tapping Act (RA 4200) and explained that “any communication or spoken
word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in
violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
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judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation, “Senator

Grace Poe, previous chairperson of the Senate committee on public order and dangerous
drugs, argued otherwise. “Sinabi na ni Senator Drilon na ito daw ay illegal, na hindi daw
pwede na ako daw ay pwedeng maging liable kung ito daw ay ipapakinig ko sa Senado,
ako naman, ano ba itong mga batas na ito?. . .Ang mga batas na ito ay para malaman
natin ang katotohanan at magkaroon tayo ng hustisya itong mga anti-wiretapping or mga
recording na ganito, kung hindi pwedeng ilabas sa publiko, pwede naming gawing
basehan sa excutive session.”

Senators Poe’s response leads us to ask: Can the government infringe individual
rights? If it is morally permissible for the government to infringe individual rights, when
can the government do so? Does it become legitimate to sacrifice individual rights when
considering the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people?

This case exposes the aftermath of the Mamasapano incident and the Senate
investigations. The Senate inquiry proceedings raised questions on the possibility of wire-
tapping and the intrusion to ones right to privacy. While the 1987 Philippine Constitution
does protect one’s right to private communication, it did provide some exemptions to its
inviolability. These exemptions include a lawful order of the court and/or issues involving
public safety and order. In fact, RA 4200 (or the Anti-Wire Tapping Law) and RA 9372
(for the Human Security Act of 2007) both provided exemptions to the inviolability of the
right to privacy in instances of treason, espionage, rebellion, and sedition. While this is
certainly a legal issue, can it also constitute a moral concern? By raising the distinction
between moral and legal issues and concerns, do you think that these two are different?
To simplify things, let us put aside the question of law and let us assume that you were
asked to decide whether wiretapping is morally permissible or not. On what instances is
wiretapping morally permissible and on what instances is it not morally permissible?

When considering the moral permissibility of wiretapping, we calculate the costs

and benefits of wiretapping. If we calculate the costs and benefits of our actions, then we
are considering an ethical theory that gives premium to the consequences of actions as
the basis of morality and as such is utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is an ethical theory that
argues for the goodness of pleasure and the determination of right behavior based on the
usefulness of the action’s consequences. This means that pleasure is good and that the
goodness of an action is determined by its usefulness. Putting these ideas together,
utilitarianism claims that one’s actions and behavior are good in as much as they are
directed toward the experience of the greatest pleasure over pain for the greatest number
of persons. Its root word is “utility,” which refers to the usefulness of the consequences of
one’s action and behavior. When we argue that wiretapping is permissible because doing
so results in better public safety, then we are arguing in a utilitarian way. It is utilitarian
because we argue that some individual rights can be sacrificed for the sake of the greater
happiness of the many. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)
are the two foremost utilitarian thinkers.

Their system of ethics emphasizes the consequences of actions. This means that
the goodness or the badness of an action is based on whether it is useful in contributing
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to a specific purpose for the greatest number of people. Utilitarianism is consequentialist.

This means that the moral value of actions and decisions is based solely or greatly on the
usefulness of their consequences; it is the usefulness of results that determines whether
the action or behavior is good or bad. While this is the case, not all consequentialist
theories are utilitarian. For Bentham and Mill, utility refers to a way of understanding the
results of people’s actions. Specifically, they are interested on whether these actions
contribute or not to the total amount of resulting happiness in the world. The utilitarian
value pleasure and happiness; this means that the usefulness of actions is based on its
promotion of happiness. Bentham and Mill understand happiness as the experience of
pleasure for the greatest number of persons, even at the expense of some individual’s
rights.

Jeremy Bentham was born on February 15, 1745 in

London, England. He was the teacher of James Mill, father
of John Stuart Mill. Bentham first wrote about the greatest
happiness principle of ethics and was known for a system
of penal management called panopticon. He was an
advocate of economic freedom, women’s rights, and the
separation of church and state, among others. He was also
an advocate of animal rights and the abolition of slavery,
death penalty, and corporal punishment for children.
Bentham denied individual legal rights nor agreed with the
natural law. On his death on June 6,1832, Bentham
donated his corpse to the University College London,
where his auto-icon is in public display up to this day to
serve as his memorial.

THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

In the book An introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), Jeremy
Bentham begins by arguing that our actions are governed by two “sovereign masters” –
which he calls pleasure and pain. These “masters” are given to us by nature to help us
determine what is good or bad and what ought to be done and not, they fasten our choices
to their throne.

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of the two sovereign, masters, pain
and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine
what we shall do. On the one hand, the standard of right and wrong, on the other, the
chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in
all sire, in all we think; every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but
to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire; but in
reality, he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility recognizes this
subjection, and assume it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear
the fabric of facility by the hands of reason and of law.”
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The principle of utility is about our subjection to these sovereign masters: pleasure and
pain. On one hand, the principle refers to the motivation of our actions as guided by our
avoidance of pain and our desire for pleasure. It is like saying that in our everyday actions,
we do what is pleasurable and we do not do what is painful. On the other hand, the
principle also refers to pleasure as good if, and only if, they produce more happiness than
unhappiness. This means that it is not enough to experience pleasure, but to also inquire
whether the things we do make us happier. Having identified the tendency for pleasure
and the avoidance of pain as the principle of utility. Bentham equates happiness with
pleasure.

Mill supports Bentham’s principle of utility. He reiterates moral good as happiness and
consequently, happiness as pleasure. Mill clarifies that what makes people happy is
intended pleasure and what makes us unhappy is the privation of pleasure. The things
that produce happiness and pleasure are good; whereas, those that produce
unhappiness and pain are bad, Mill explains:

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility or the greatest happiness
principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness;
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness, is intended
pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and privation of pleasure. To
give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be
said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure, and what
extent, this is left an open question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect
the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded – namely, that pleasure and
freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things
(which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for
pleasure inherent in themselves or as a means to the promotion of pleasure and the
prevention of pain.

Clearly, Mill argues that we act and do things because we find them pleasurable and we
avoid doing things because they are painful. If we find our actions pleasurable, Mill
explains, it is because they are inherently pleasurable in themselves or they eventually
lead to the promotion of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Bentham and Mill
characterized moral value as utility and understood it as whatever produced happiness
or pleasure and the avoidance of pain. The next step is to understand the nature of
pleasure and pain to identify a criterion for distinguishing pleasures and to calculate the
resultant pleasure or pain; it is in relation to these aforementioned themes that a
distinction occurs between Bentham and Mill.

What Bentham identified as the natural moral preferability of pleasure, Mill refers to as a
theory of life. If we consider, for example, what moral agents do and how they assess
their actions, then it is hard to deny the pursuit for happiness and the avoidance of pain.
For Bentham and Mill, the pursuit for pleasure and the avoidance of pain are not only
important principle – they are in fact the only principle in assessing an action’s morality.
Why is it justifiable to wiretap private conversation in instances of treason, rebellion,
espionage, and section? Why is it preferable to alleviate poverty or eliminate criminality?
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Why is it good to improve the quality of life and the like? There is no other answer than
the principle of utility that is to increase happiness and decrease pain.

What kind of pleasure is morally

preferable and valuable? Are all
pleasures necessarily and ethically
good? Does this mean that because
eating or exercising is good, it is
morally acceptable to eat and
exercise excessively? While
utilitarian supporters do not condone
excessive pleasures while others are
suffering, it cannot be justified on
utilitarian grounds why some persons
indulge in extravagant pleasures at
the expense of others. Suppose
nobody is suffering, is it morally
permissible on utilitarian principles to
maximize pleasure by wanton
intemperance? While Bentham and
John Stuart Mill was born on May 20, 1806 in Mill agree on the moral value of
Pentonville, London, United Kingdom. He was pleasure, they do not have the same
the son of James Mill, a friend and disciple of view on these questions.
Jeremy Bentham. John Stuart Mill was home-
schooled. He studied Greek at the age of In determining the moral preferability
three and Latin at the age of eight. He wrote a of actions, Bentham provides, a
history of Roman Law at age eleven, and framework for evaluating pleasure
suffered a nervous breakdown at the age of and pain commonly called felicific
calculus. Felicific calculus is a
twenty. He was married to Harriet Taylor after
common currency framework that
twenty-one years of friendship. His ethical
calculates the pleasure that some
theory and his defense of utilitarian views are actions can produce. In this
found in his long essay entitled Utilitarianism framework, an action can be
evaluated on the basis of intensity or
strength of pleasure duration or length of the experience of pleasure; certainty,
uncertainty, or the likelihood that pleasure will occur; and propinquity, remoteness, or how
soon there will be pleasure. These indicators allow us to measure pleasure and pain in
an action. However, when we are to evaluate our tendency to choose these actions, we
need to consider two more dimensions; fecundity or the chance it has of being followed
by sensations of the same kind, and purity or the chance it has of not being followed by
sensations of the opposite kind. Lastly, when considering the number of persons who are
affected by pleasure or pain, another dimension is to be considered – extent. Felicific
calculus allows the evaluation of all actions and their resultant pleasure. This means that
actions are evaluated on this single scale regardless of preferences and values. In this
sense, pleasure and pain can only quantitatively differ but not qualitatively differ from
other experiences of pleasure and pain accordingly.
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Mill dissents from Bentham’s single scale of pleasure. He thinks that the principle of utility
must distinguish pleasures qualitatively and not merely quantitatively. For Mill
utilitarianism cannot promote the kind of pleasures appropriate to pigs or to any other
animals. He thinks that there are higher intellectual and lower base pleasures. We, as
moral agents, are capable of searching and desiring higher intellectual pleasures more
than pigs are capable of. We undermine ourselves if we only and primarily desire
sensuality; this is because we are capable of higher intellectual pleasurable goods. For
Mill, crude bestial pleasures, which are appropriate for animals, are degrading to us
because we are by nature not easily satisfied by pleasures only for pigs. Human pleasures
are qualitatively different from animal pleasures. It is unfair to assume that we merely
pursue pleasures appropriate for beasts even if there are instances when we choose to
pursue such base pleasures. To explain this, Mill recognizes the empirical fact that there
are different kinds of pleasure.

It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that some kinds of
pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while,
in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of
pleasure should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.

Contrary to Bentham, Mill argues that quality is more preferable than quantity. Am
excessive quantity of what is otherwise pleasurable might result in pain. We can consider
for example, our experience of excessive eating or exercising. Whereas, eating the right
amount of food can be pleasurable, excessive eating may not be. The same is true when
exercising. If the quality of pleasure is sometimes more important than quantity, then, it
is important to consider the standards whereby differences of pleasures can be judged.
The test that Mill suggests is simple. In deciding over two comparable pleasures, it is
important to experience both and to discover which one is actually more preferred than
the other. There is no other way of determining which of the two pleasures is preferable
except by appealing to the actual preferences and experiences. What Mill discovers
anthropologically is that actual choices of knowledgeable persons point that higher
intellectual pleasures are preferable than purely sensual appetites.

In defending further, the comparative choice between intellectual and bestial pleasures.
Mill offers an imaginative thought experiment. He asks whether a human person would
prefer to accepts the highly pleasurable life of an animal while at the same time being
denied of everything that makes him a person. He thinks that few, if any, would give up
human qualities of higher reason for the pleasures of a pig. In the most famous quotes in
Mill’s Utilitarianism, we read:

It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied, better to be Socrates

dissatisfied than a food satisfied, And if the food, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is
because they only know their own side of question. The other party to the comparison
knows both sides.

While it is difficult to understand how Mill was able to compare swinish pleasures with
human ones, we can presume that it would be better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a
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pig satisfied. Simply put, as human beings, we prefer the pleasures that are actually within
our grasp. It is easy to compare extreme types of pleasures as in the case of pigs and
humans, but it is difficult to compare pleasures deeply integrated in our way of life. The
pleasures of an Illonggo eating chicken inasal and an Igorot eating pinikpikan is an
example. This cannot be done by simply tasting inasal or pinikpikan. In the same way,
some people prefer puto to bibingka or liking for the music of Eraserheads than that of
the APO Hiking Society.

PRINCIPLE OF THE GREATEST NUMBER

Equating happiness with pleasure does not aim to describe the utilitarian moral agent
alone and independently from others. This is not only about our individual pleasures,
regardless of how high, intellectual, or in other way noble it is, but it is also about the
pleasure of the greatest number affected by the consequences of our actions, Mill
explains:

I have dwelt on this point, as being part of a perfectly just conception of utility or
happiness, considered as the directive rule of human conduct. But it is by no means an
indispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard; for that standard is
not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether;
and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its
nobleness there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier and that the world in
general is immediately a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by
the general cultivation of nobleness of others, and his owns, as far as happiness is
concerned were a sheer deduction from the benefit. But the bare enunciation of such an
absurdity as this fast, renders refutations superfluous.

Utilitarianism cannot lead to selfish acts. It is neither about our pleasure nor happiness
alone; it cannot be all about us. If we are the only ones satisfied by our actions. If does
not constitute a moral good. If we are the only ones who are made happy by our actions,
then we cannot be morally good. In this sense, utilitarianism is not dismissive of sacrifice
that procure more happiness for others.

Therefore, it is necessary for us to consider everyone’s happiness, including our own, as

the standard by which to evaluate what is moral. Also, it implies that utilitarianism is not
at all separate from liberal social practices that aim to improve the quality of life for all
persons. Utilitarianism is interested with everyone’s happiness, in fact, the greatest
happiness of the greatest number. Mill identifies the eradication of disease, using
technology, and other practical ways as examples of utilitarianism. Consequently,
utilitarianism maximizes the total amount of pleasure over displeasure for the greatest
number. Because of the premium given to the consequences of actions, Mill pushes for
the moral irrelevance of motive in evaluating action:
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He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his
motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his trouble, he who betrays the friend that
trusts him, is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to serve another friend to whom he is
under greater obligations. But to speak only of actions done from the motive of duty, and
in direct obedience to principles; it is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought,
to conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as
the world, or society at large. The great majority of good actions are intended, not for the
benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up;
and the thoughts of the most virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond
the particular persons concerned, except so far as is necessary to assure himself that in
benefiting them he is not violating the rights – that is, the legitimate and authorized
expectations – of anyone else.

Utilitarian is interested with the best consequence for the highest number of people. It is
not interested with the intention of the agent. Moral value cannot be discernible in the
intention or motivation of the person doing the act; it is based solely and exclusively on
the difference it makes on the world’s total amount of pleasure and pain. This leads us to
question utilitarianism’s take of moral rights. If actions are based only on the greatest
happiness of the greatest number, is it justifiable to let go of some rights for the sake of
the benefit of the majority.

JUSTICE AND MORAL RIGHTS

What is a right? Mill understands justice as a respect for rights directed toward society’s
pursuit for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. For him, rights are a valid claim
on society and are justified by utility. He explains:

I have, throughout, treated the idea of a right residing in the injured person, and violated
by the injury, not as a separate element in the composition of the idea and sentiment, but
as one of the forms in which the other two elements clothe themselves. These elements
are a hurt to some assignable person or persons on the one hand, and a demand for
punishment, on the other. An examination of our minds, I think, will show that these two
things include all that we mean when we speak of violation of a right. When we call
anything a person’s right, we mean that he has valid claim on society to protect him in the
possession of it, either by the force of law, or by that of education and opinion. If he has
what we consider a sufficient claim, on whatever account, to have something guaranteed
to him by society, we say that he has a right to it.

Mill expounds that the abovementioned rights referred are related to the interests that
serve general happiness. The right to due process, the right to free speech or religion,
and others are justified because they contribute to the general good. This means that
society is made happier if its citizens are able to live their lives knowing that their interests
are protected and that society (as a whole) defends it. Extending this concept to animals,
they have rights because of the effect of such principles on he sum total of happiness that
follow as a consequence of instituting and protecting their interests. It is not accidental,
therefore, that utilitarians are also the staunchest defenders of animal rights. A right is
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justifiable on utilitarian principles inasmuch as they produce an overall happiness that is

greater than the unhappiness resulting from their implementation.

Utilitarian argue that issues of justice carry a very strong emotional import because the
category of rights is directly associated with the individual’s most vital interests. All of
these rights are predicted on the person’s right to life, Mill describes;

To have a right, then is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to defend me
in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can give him no other
reason than general utility. If that expression does not seem to convey a sufficient feeling
of the strength of the obligation, nor to account for the peculiar energy of the feeling, it is
because there goes to the composition of the sentiment, not a rational only but also an
animal element, the thirst for retaliation; and this thirst derives its intensity, as well as its
moral justification, from the extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility which
is concerned. The interest involved is that of security, to everyone’s feelings the most vital
of all interests.

In this context, our participation in government and social interaction can be explained by
the principle of utility and be clarified by Mill’s consequentialism. Mill further associates
utilitarianism with the possession of legal and moral rights.

We are treated justify when our legal and moral rights are respected. Mill enumerates
different kinds of goods that he characterized as rights and are protected by law. Mill
understand that legal rights are neither inviolable nor natural, but rights are subject to
some exceptions:

… It is mostly considered unjust to deprive any one of his personal liberty, his property,
or any other thing which belongs to him by law. Here, therefore, is one instance of the
application of the terms just and unjust in a perfectly definite sense, namely, that it is just
to respect, unjust to violate, the legal rights of anyone. But this judgement admits of
several exceptions, arising from the other forms in which the notions of justice and
injustice present themselves. For example, the person who suffers the deprivation may (as
the phrase is) have forfeited the rights which he is so deprived of; a case to which we shall
return presently…

Mill creates a distinction between legal rights and their justification. He points out that when
legal rights are not morally justified in accordance to the greatest happiness principle, then
these rights need neither be observed, nor be respected. This is like saying that there are
instances when the law is not morally justified and, in this case, even objectionable.

…The legal rights of which he is deprived may be rights which ought not to have belonged to
him; in other words, the law which confers on him these rights may be a bad law. When it is
so, or when (which is the same thing for our purpose). It is supposed to be so; opinions will
differ as to the justice or injustice of infringing it. Some maintain that no law, however bad,
ought to be disobeyed by an individual citizen; that his opposition to it, if shown at all, should
only be shown in endeavoring to get it altered by competent authority. This opinion (which
condemns many of the most illustrious benefactors of mankind and would often protect
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pernicious institutions against the only weapons which, in the state of things existing at the
time, have any chance of succeeding against them) is defended, by those who hold it, on
grounds of expediency; principally on that of the importance, to the common interest of
mankind, of maintaining inviolate the sentiment of submission to law… When, however, a law
is thought to be unjust, it seems always to be regarded as being so in the same ways in which
a breach of law is unjust, namely, by infringing somebody’s right; which, as it cannot in this
case be a legal right, receives a different appellation, and is called a moral right. We may say,
therefore, that a second case on injustice consists in taking or withholding from any person
that to which he has moral right…

Mill seems to be suggesting that it is morally permissible to not follow, even violate, and unjust
law. The implication is that those who protest over political policies of a morally objectionable
government act in a morally obligatory way. While this is not always preferred, Mill thinks that
it is commendable to endure legal punishments for acts of civil disobedience for the sake of
promoting a higher moral good. At an instance of conflict between moral and legal rights. Mill
points out that moral rights take precedence over legal rights.

While it can be justified why others violate legal rights, it is an act of injustice to violate
an individual’s moral rights. However, Mill seems to provide some extenuating circumstances
in which some moral rights can be overridden for the sake of the greater general happiness.
Going back to the case of wiretapping, it seems that one’s right to privacy can be sacrificed
for the sake of the common good. This means that moral rights are only justifiable by
considerations of greater overall happiness. He qualifies moral rights in this way:

All persons are deemed to have a right to equality of treatment. except when some
recognized social expediency requires the reverse. And hence all social inequalities which
have ceased to be considered expedient, assume the character not of simple inexpediency,
but of injustice, and appear so tyrannical, that people are apt to wonder how they ever could
have been tolerated; forgetful that they themselves perhaps tolerate other inequalities under
an equally mistaken notion of expediency, the correction of which would make that which they
approve seem quite as monstrous as what they have at least learnt to condemn.

In this sense, the principle of utility can “theoretically” because this merely constitutes
a thoughts experiment and need not be actualized. Since what matters in the assessment of
what we do is the resultant happiness, then anything may be justified for the sake of producing
the greatest happiness of the greatest number people.

Thus, to save a life, it may not only be allowable, but a duty to steal or take by force,
the necessary food or medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to officiate, the only qualified
medical practitioner. In such cases, as we do not call justice which is not a virtue, we usually
say, not that justice must give way to some other moral principle, but that what is just in
ordinary cases is, by reason of that other principle, not just in the particular case. By this
useful accommodation of language, the character of indefeasibility attributed to justice is kept
up, and we are saved from the necessity of maintaining that there can be laudable injustice.

While there is no such thing as a laudable and praiseworthy injustice. Mill appeals to
the utilitarian understanding of justice as an act justified by the greatest happiness principle.
There is no right to violate where utility is not severed by the social protection of individual
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interests. While he recognizes how utilitarian principles can sometimes obligate us to perform
acts that would regularly be understood as disregarding individual rights; he argues that this
only possible if it is judges to produce more happiness than unhappiness. In short, Mill’s moral
rights and considerations of justice are not absolute, but are only justified by their
consequences to promote the greatest good of the greatest number.

With these understanding of rights in place, Mill explains his understanding of justice
and it is with this that we end this section. For Mill, justice can be interpreted in terms of moral
rights because justice promotes the greater social good. He explains:

…the idea of justice supposes two things: a rule of conduct and a sentiment which sanctions
the rule. The first must be supposed common to all mankind, and intended for their good. The
other (sentiment) is a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who infringe the rule.
There is involved, in addition, the conception of some definite person who suffers by the
infringement; whose rights (to use the expression appropriated to the case) are violated by it.
And the sentiment of justice appears to me to be, the animal desire to repel or retaliate a hurt
or damage to oneself, or to those with whom one sympathizes, widened so as to include all
persons, by the human capacity of enlarged sympathy; and the human conception of
intelligent self-interest. From the latter elements, the feeling derives its morality; from the
former, its peculiar impressiveness, and energy of self-assertion.

SUMMARY

Bentham and Mill see moral good as pleasure, not merely self-gratification, but also the
greatest happiness principle or the greatest number of people. We are compelled to do
whatever increases pleasure and decreases pain to the most number of persons,
counting each as one and none as more than one. In determining the greatest happiness
for the greatest number of people, there is no distinction between Bentham and Mill.
Bentham suggest his felicific calculus, a framework for quantifying moral valuation. Mill
provides a criterion for comparative pleasures. He thinks that persons who experience
two different types of pleasures generally prefer higher intellectual pleasures to base
sensual ones.

Mill provides an adequate discourse on rights despite it being mistakenly argued to be

the weaknesses of utilitarianism. He argues that rights are socially protected interests that
are justified by their contribution to the greatest happiness principle. However, he also
claims that in extreme circumstances, respect for individual rights can be overridden to
promote the better welfare especially in circumstances of conflict valuation.
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A. Answer the following questions:

1. Are all pleasures commensurable? Can they be evaluated on a single scale?

Can some goods , like friendships, be balanced against other goods, like money?
2. Mill proposes that “higher” pleasure are those preferred by the majority of people.
Do you agree that this is a good way of distinguishing between higher and lower
pleasures? Can a well-informed majority prefer higher pleasure?
3. Does utilitarianism questions individual rights? What if violating the civil rights of
a minority increases the sum of total pleasures of the majority?
4. Do you agree that happiness is the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain,
and that all actions are directed toward pleasure?
5. Is it justifiable to build a basketball court because there are basketball fans, than
to build a hospital because there are fewer sick people?

B. You need to answer this problem using the principle of utilitarianism. Limit your
answer from 10 to 15 sentences.

It is noticeable before the pandemic that most of the elected officials have made
projects. The most common infrastructure projects are basketball courts. Because
most Filipinos are fans of basketball elected officials realized that building basketball
court is more productive in promoting health than building hospital. So, is it justifiable
to build basketball court because there are many basketball fans, than to build a
hospital because there are fewer sick people?

ANIMAL RIGHTS AND WELFARE

Peter Singer, in his books Animal Liberation, argues that animals are equal candidates
for moral respect; this does not mean equal treatment as it does equal consideration.
While Rene Descartes argues that animals are incapable of feeling pleasure and pain
because they do not have any minds, Bentham and Mill argues otherwise. For them,
animals are capable of feeling pleasure and pain and are thus to be included in whatever
moral deliberation we are to make, especially when the decisions we make affect them.
The animal’s capacity for suffering is a vital characteristic that entitles them to equal
consideration. While animal intelligence is another moral issue to confront, it cannot be
denied that animal behaviorists have established that animals do feel physical pain. While
other researches simply dismiss this as an act of anthropomorphizing, the vast research
on animal consciousness is worth considering at this point. Should animals have moral
rights?
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Utilitarianism recognizes that animals do feel physical and emotional pain. But this does
not mean that we are not allowed to cause animals pain. When causing animal pain
obtains a greater happiness to the majority of humans and nonhumans animals, then
doing so to sentient creatures can be morally permissible. For this reason, utilitarian’s
nowadays rarely use the term animal rights as they do talk about animal welfare. If human
rights, according to Bentham, are “nonsense upon stilts,” then the same is true with animal
rights. These rights are not absolute especially when it would be detrimental to the
society. Mill do talk about rights to security, liberty, and justice, but he also argues that
“particular cases may occur in which some other social duty is so important, as to overrule
any one of the general maxims of justice.” This can mean that, as a utilitarian, the pain
and pleasure of nonhuman animals must be taken into consideration when there are no
concerns that would justify their pain for the sake of the greatest happiness of the greatest
number. In this case, when animals are used for the development of household products
and cosmetics, they are condemned by utilitarian’s. However, when they are used for
medical experimentation that can lead to cure for a debilitating or terminal illness, they
are acceptable to a utilitarian. Do you agree with this?

1. Go online and look for an instance where animal rights and welfare can be considered
an issue. What is the issue that you have identified? Detail your findings and opinion
below. Check on the arguments presented by Peter Singer, Joel Feinberg, and Steve
Sapontzis.

2. In view of Bentham’s and Mill’s assertion of the greatest happiness of the greatest
number, do you think that animal rights and welfare should even be a concern in the
Philippines where millions of Filipinos below the poverty threshold are struggling to have
a descent lives? Is the concern for animal rights and welfare a first world problem?

3. Consider other topics within the realm of animal rights and welfare. Select one and give
an initial presentation of the significance of discussing the topic. Consider too if trees and
other elements of nature should also be given rights; check the paper of Christopher tone
entitled “ Should Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects.”

Bulaong, O. et. al. (2018). Ethics: foundation of moral valuation. Manila: Rex Bookstore.
Thiroux, J. (2012). Ethics: theory and practice.(11th ed.). Engelewood Cliffs: Prentice
Hall.
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What is the value of a college-level class in Ethics? We have been introduced to

four major ethical theories or frameworks: utilitarianism, natural law ethics, Kantian
deontology, and virtue ethics. None of them is definitive nor final. What then is the use of
studying them? Each represents the best attempts of the best thinkers in history to give
fully thought-out answers to the questions "What ought I to do?” and “Why ought I to do
so?" This quest has not reached its final conclusion; instead, it seems that the human
condition of finitude will demand that we continue to grapple with these questions. The
story of humanity appears to be the never-ending search for what it means to be fully
human in the face of moral choices.
The preceding chapters clarified several notions: (1) These questions of what the
right thing to do is and why are questions that all human beings-regardless of race, age,
socioeconomic class, gender, culture, educational attainment, religious affiliation, or
political association-will have to ask at one point or another in their lives; (2) Neither the
laws nor rules of one's immediate community or of wider culture or of religious affiliation
can sufficiently answer these questions, especially when different duties, cultures, or
religions. intersect and conflict; (3) Reason has a role to play in addressing these
questions, if not in resolving them. This last element, reason, is the power that identifies
the situations in which rules and principles sometimes conflict with one another. Reason,
hopefully, will allow one to finally make the best decision possible in a given situation of
moral choice.
Chapter I pointed out one of the capacities reasons provides us-it enables us to
distinguish between human situations that have a genuinely moral character from those
that are non-moral (or amoral). It shows us that aesthetic considerations and questions
of etiquette are important facets of human life, but they do not necessarily translate into
genuine ethical or moral value. However, reason also reminds us that the distinctions are
not always easy to identify nor explain. The choice of clothing that one is to wear, in
general, seems to be merely a question of aesthetics, and thus one is taste. In many
urban centers in the Philippines in the twenty-first century, people wear a wide variety of
clothing styles and such a situation does not seem to attract attention. Yet in some
cultures, what a woman wears (or does not wear) may bring upon harsh punishment to
her according to the community's rules. Afghanistan in the 1990s was ruled by the
Taliban, and women were expected to wear the full-body burqa; a woman caught in public
with even a small area of her body exposed could be flogged severely. How is one to
make an intelligent, sensible decision when confronted by such possible quandaries in
specific situations?
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The ethical or moral dimension compared to the realms of the aesthetic or of

etiquette is qualitatively weightier, for the ethical or moral cuts to the core of what makes
one human. Mistakes in aesthetics (“crimes," as it were, against the "fashion police") or
in etiquette (which can be considered "rude" at worst) can be frowned upon by members
of one human society or another, but need not merit the severest of punishments or
penalty. Reason, through proper philosophizing, will aid an individual (and hopefully her
wider community) to make such potentially crucial distinctions. Ethics teaches us that
moral valuation can happen in the level of the personal, the societal (both local and
global), and in relation to the physical environment. Personal can be understood to mean
both the person in relation to herself, as well as her relation to other human beings on an
intimate or person-to-person basis. Ethics is clearly concerned with the right way to act in
relation to other human beings and toward self. How she takes care of herself versus how
she treats herself badly (e.g., substance abuse, suicide, etc.) is a question of ethical value
that is concerned mainly with her own person. Personal also refers to a person's intimate
relationships with other people like her parents, siblings, children, friends, or other close
acquaintances. When does one's relationship lead to personal growth for the other?
When does it ruin the other? For most people, it is clear enough that there are right and
wrong ways to deal with these familiar contacts. Ethics can help us navigate what those
ways can be.

The second level where moral valuation takes place is societal. Society in this
context means one's immediate community (one's neighborhood, barangay, or town),the
larger sphere (one's province, region, or country), or the whole global village defined as
the interconnection of the different nations of the world. One must be aware that there are
many aspects to social life, all of which may come into play when one needs to make a
decision in a moral situation. All level is of society involve some kind of culture, which may
be loosely described as the way of life of a particular community of people at a given
period of time. Culture is a broad term: it may include the beliefs and practices a certain
group of people considered valuable and can extend to such realms as art (e.g., music,
literature, performance, and so on), laws (e.g., injunctions against taboo practices), fields
of knowledge (e.g., scientific, technological, and medical beliefs and practices at a given
point in time), and customs of a community (e.g., the aforementioned rules of etiquette).
Ethics serves to guide one through the potentially confusing thicket of an individual's
interaction with her wider world of social roles, which can come into conflict with one
another or even with her own system of values.

Of specific interest for the individual living in the twenty-first century is the interplay
between her membership in her own society and her membership in the larger human,
that is,the global community. In an age defined to a large extent by ever-expanding
globalization, how does one negotiate the right thing to do when one's own culture clashes
with the outside community's values? Again, ethics will assist one in thinking through such
difficulties. This will be discussed further as this chapter progresses.

The latter part of the twentieth century gave birth to an awareness among many
people that "community" does not only refer to the human groups that one belongs to, but
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also refers to the non-human, natural world that serves as home and source of nurturance
for all beings. Thus, ethics has increasingly come to recognize the expansion of the
question “What ought I to do?" into the realm of human beings' responsibilities toward
their natural world. The environmental crises that currently beset our world, seen in such
phenomena as global warming and the endangerment and extinction of some species,
drive home the need to think ethically about one's relationship to her natural world.

Applying rational deliberation to determine a person's ethical responsibility to

herself society, and environment is the overall goal of a college course in ethics. We shall
explore all of these later in this chapter. In order to do this, we must first attempt to explore
the self that must undertake this challenge. We are talking about the moral agent, the one
who eventually must think about her choices and make decisions on what she ought to
do. We cannot simply assume that ethics is an activity that a purely rational creature
engages in. Instead, the realm of morality must be understood as a thoroughly human
realm. Ethical thought and decision-making are done by an agent who is shaped and
dictated upon by many factors within her and without. If we understand this, then we shall
see how complex the ethical situation is, one that demands mature rational thinking as
well as courageous decision-making.

At the end of this module, you should be able to:

1. Identify the different factors that shape an individual in their moral decision
making;
2. Internalize the necessary steps toward making informed moral decisions; and
3. Apply the ethical theories or frameworks on moral issues involving the self,
society, and the non-human environment.

Ramon Castillo Reyes was born in 1935 in the

Philippines. He attended the Ateneo de Manila University
in Quezon City where he earned his Bachelor of Arts
degree in 1956. He obtained his PhD in Philosophy from
the Université Catholique de Louvain in Belgium in 1965.
Reyes returned to the Philippines and was a teacher in the
Department of Philosophy of the Ateneo de Manila
University from 1965 to 2013, where he taught Ethics,
Modern Philosophy, and Contemporary Philosophy to
generations of Ateneo students. He was awarded the
Metrobank Most Outstanding Teacher Award in
1987.Reyes was one of the pioneers in the Philippines of
the philosophical approach known as existential
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phenomenology. His book Ground and Norm of Morality:Ethics for College Students, first
published in 1988, has served as the textbook for thousands of students in the country.
“Doc Reyes," as he was fondly called by students and colleagues, died in 2014.

THE MORAL AGENT AND CONTEXTS

The one who is tasked to think about what is "right" and1 why it is so, and to choose
to do so, is a human individual. Who is this individual who must engage herself in ethical
thought and decision-making? Who one is, in the most fundamental sense, is another
major topic in the act of philosophizing. The ancient Greeks even had a famous saying.
for it: “Epimeleia hē auto,” usually translated into English as “Know thyself" In response
to this age-old philosophical challenge, the Filipino philosopher Ramon C. Reyes (1935-
2014), writing in his essay "Man and Historical Action,"1 succinctly explained that "who
one is” is a cross-point. By this, he means that one's identity, who one is or who I am, is
a product of many forces and events that happened outside of one's choosing. Reyes
identifies four cross-points: the physical, the interpersonal, the social, and the historical.
Who one is, firstly, is a function of physical events in the past and material factors in the
present that one did not have a choice in. You are a member of the species Homo sapiens
and therefore possess the capacities and limitations endemic to human beings
everywhere. You inherited the genetic material of both your biological parents. Your body
has been shaped and continues to be conditioned by the given set of environmental
factors that are specific to your corner of the globe. All of these are given; they have
happened or are still happening whether you want to or not. You did not choose to be a
human being, nor to have this particular set of biological parents, nor to be born in and/or
grow up in such a physical environment (i.e., for Filipinos to be born in an archipelago
with a tropical climate situated near the equator along the Pacific Ring of Fire, with a
specific set of flora and fauna, which shape human life in this country to a profound
degree).

An individual is also the product of an interpersonal cross-point of many events

and factors outside of one's choosing. One did not choose her own parents, and yet her
personality,character traits, and her overall way of doing things and thinking about things
have all been shaped by the character of her parents and how they brought her up. All of
these are also affected by the people surrounding her: siblings, relatives, classmates,
playmates, and eventually workmates. Thus, who one is-in the sense of one's character
or personality-has been shaped by one's relationships as well as the physical factors that
affect how one thinks and feels. Even Jose Rizal once argued that what Europeans
mistook as Filipino “laziness” was actually a function of the tropical climate and natural
abundance in the archipelago: Filipinos supposedly did not need to exert themselves as
much as Europeans in their cold climates and barren lands were forced to do.

A third cross-point for Reyes is the societal: “who one is" is shaped by one's
society. The term"society" here pertains to all the elements of the human groups-as
opposed to the natural environment-that one is a member of. "Culture” in its varied
aspects is included here. Reyes argues that “who one is” is molded in large part by. the
kind of society and culture-which, for the most part, one did not choose-that one belongs
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to. Filipinos have their own way of doing things (e.g., pagmamano), their own system of
beliefs and values（e.g., closely-knit family ties, etc.), and evén their own notions of right
and wrong (e.g., a communal versus an individualistic notion of rights). This third cross-
point interacts with the physical and the interpersonal factors that the individual and her
people are immersed into or engaged in.

The fourth cross-point Reyes names is the historical, which is simply the events
that one's people has undergone. In short, one's people's history shapes"who one is" right
now. For example, the Philippines had a long history of colonization that affected how
Philippine society has been formed and how Philippine culture has developed. This effect,
in turn, shapes the individual who is a member of Philippine society. A major part of
Philippine history is the Christianization of the islands during the Spanish conquest.
Christianity, for good or bad, has formed Philippine society and culture, and most probably
the individual Filipino,whether she may be Christian herself or not. The historical cross-
point also interacts with the previous three. Each cross-point thus crosses over into the
others as well.

However, being a product of all these cross-points is just one side of “who one is"
According to Reyes, “who one is" is also a project for one's self. This happens because a
human individual has freedom. This freedom is not absolute: one does not become
something because one chooses to be. Even if one wants to fly, she cannot, unless she
finds a way to invent a device that can help her do so.This finite freedom means that one
has the capacity to give herself a particular direction in life according to her own ideal
self.Thus, for Reyes,"who one is"is a cross-point,but in an existential level, he argues that
the meaning of one's existence is in the intersection between the fact that one's being is
a product of many forces outside her choosing and her ideal future for herself. We can
see that ethics plays a big role in this existential challenge of forming one's self. What one
ought to do in one's life is not dictated by one's physical, interpersonal, social, or historical
conditions. What one ought to do is also not abstracted from one's own specific situation.
One always comes from somewhere. One is always continuously being shaped by many
factors outside of one's own free will. The human individual thus always exists in the
tension between being conditioned by external factors and being a free agent. The human
individual never exists in a vacuum as if she were a pure rational entity without any
embodiment and historicity. The moral agent is not a calculating, unfeeling machine that
produces completely objective and absolutely correct solutions to even the most complex
moral problems.

Using Reyes's philosophical lens, we can now focus on one of the major issues in
ethical thought: What is the relationship between ethics and one's own culture? The
following section focuses on this philosophical question.

CULTURE AND ETHICS

A common opinion many people hold is that one's culture dictates what is right or
wrong for an individual. For such people, the saying “when in Rome, do as the Romans
do” by St. Ambrose applies to deciding on moral issues. This quote implies that one's
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culture is inescapable, that is, one has to look into the standards of her society to resolve
all her ethical questions with finality. How she relates to herself, her close relations, her
own society, with other societies, and with the natural world are all predetermined by her
membership in her society and culture.

Generalizations concerning supposed Filipino traits sometimes end up as empty

stereotypes, especially since one may be hard put to think if any other culture does not
exhibit such traits. For instance, in the case of what many assume is a trait that Filipinos
possess,namely hospitality, can we say that Chinese are not hospitable? Most probably,
they are hospitable too, but they may exhibit such hospitality in radically different ways.
Thus, to simply say that there is a“Filipino way" of doing things, including a “Filipino way”
of thinking about what is the right thing to do and why, remains a matter for discussion. Is
there really a Filipino morality that may be distinct from a Chinese morality? We hear
claims from time to time that "Americans are individualistic; Filipinos are communal," a
supposed difference that grounds, for some people, radically different sets of moral
values. But one may ask: ls there really any radical difference between one culture's moral
reasoning and another's? Or do all cultures share in at least some fundamental values
and that the differences are not on the level of value but on the level of its manifestation
in the context of different socio- historical-cultural dimensions? One culture, because of
its particular history, may construct hospitality in a particular way and manifest it in its own
customs and traditions. Yet, both cultures honor hospitality.

The American philosopher James Rachels (1941-2003) provided a clear argument

against the validity of cultural relativism in the realm of ethics.2 Rachels defines cultural
relativism as the position that claims that there is no such thing as objective truth in the
realm of morality. The argument of this position is that since different cultures have
different moral codes, then there is no one correct moral code that all cultures must follow.
The implication is that each culture has its own standard of right or wrong, its validity
confined within the culture in question. However, Rachels questions the logic of this
argument: first, that cultural relativism confuses a statement of fact (that different cultures
have different moral codes), which is merely descriptive, with a normative statement (that
there cannot be objective truth in morality). Rachels provides a counter-argument by
analogy: Just because some believed that the Earth was flat, while some believe it is
spherical, it does not mean that there is no objective truth to the actual shape of the Earth.

Beyond his criticism of the logic of cultural relativism, Rachels also employs a
reductio ad absurdum argument. It is an argument which first assumes that the claim in
question is correct, in order to show the absurdity that will ensue if the claim is accepted
as such. He uses this argument to show what he thinks is the weakness of the position.
He posits three absurd consequences of accepting the claim of cultural relativism. First,
if cultural relativism was correct, then one cannot criticize the practices or beliefs of
another culture anymore as long as that culture thinks that what it is doing is correct. But
if that is the case, then the Jews, for example, cannot criticize the Nazis' plan to
exterminate all Jews in World War II, since obviously, the Nazis believed that they were
doing the right thing. Secondly, if cultural relativism was correct, then one cannot even
criticize the practices or beliefs of one's own culture. If that is the case, the black South
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African citizens under the system of apartheid, a policy of racial segregation that
privileges the dominant race in a society, could not criticize that official state position.
Thirdly, if cultural relativism was correct, then one cannot even accept that moral progress
can happen. If that is the case, then the fact that many societies. now recognize women's
rights and children's rights does not necessarily represent a better situation than before
when societies refused to recognize that women and children even had rights.

Rachels concludes his argument by saying that he understands the attractiveness

of the idea of cultural relativism for many people, that is, it recognizes the differences
between cultures. However, he argues that recognizing and respecting differences
between cultures do not necessarily mean that there is no such thing as objective truth in
morality. He argues instead that though different cultures have different ways of doing
things, cultures may hold certain values in common. Rachels posits that if one scrutinizes
the beliefs and practices of different cultures, however far apart they are from each other,
no culture, whether in the present world or in the past, would promote murder instead of
prohibiting it. Rachels argues that a hypothetical culture that promotes murder would
immediately cease to exist because the members would start murdering each other.
Rachels ends his article on cultural relativism by noting that someone can recognize and
respect cultural differences and still maintain the right to criticize beliefs and practices that
she thinks are wrong, if she performs proper rational deliberation.

This, however, should not be taken as a reconciliation of all differences in the name
of some abstract universal value system. The cultural differences between one society
and another in terms of norms, practices, and beliefs are not trivial matters that one can
disregard. They are actually part of "who one is" and cannot be set aside. One should
instead think of a common human condition, a set of existential situations that human
beings share and that are fleshed out through a group's unique set of historical
experiences and manifested in a group's particular cultural constructions.

Thus, the challenge of ethics is not the removal of one's culture because that is
what makes one unique. Instead, one must dig deeper into her own culture in order to
discover how her own people have most meaningfully explored possibly universal human
questions or problems within the particularity of her own people's native ground. Thus,
hospitality, for example, may be a species-wide question. But how we Filipinos observe
and express hospitality is an insight we Filipinos must explore because it may be in our
own practices that we see how best we had responded to this human question. It may be
best because we responded specifically to the particularity of our own environmental and
historical situation. One can then benefit by paying attention to her own unique cultural
heritage, because doing so may give her a glimpse into the profound ways her people
have grappled with the question of "What ought I to do?”

Ethics, therefore, should neither be reduced to one's own cultural standards, nor
should it simplistically dismiss one's unique cultural beliefs and practices. The latter can
possibly enlighten her toward what is truly ethical. What is important is that one does not
wander into ethical situations blindly, with the naive assumption that ethical issues will be
resolved automatically by her beliefs and traditions. Instead, she should challenge herself
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to continuously work toward a fuller maturity in ethical decision-making. Moral

development then is a prerequisite if the individual is to encounter ethical situations with
a clear mind and with her values properly placed with respect to each other. We shall
discuss moral development further but let us now focus on the relationship between one's
religion and the challenge of ethical decision-making.

RELIGION AND ETHICS

Many people who consider themselves "religious" assume that it is the teachings
of their own religion that define what is truly "right" or "wrong," "good" or "bad." The
question of the proper relationship between religion and ethics, therefore, is one that
demands philosophical exploration. There are many different religions in the world.
Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism are four of the largest religious groups in the
world at present, based on population. The Philippines is predominantly Roman Catholic,
yet many other religions continue to flourish in the archipelago. Beyond all the differences,
however, religion in essence represents a group's ultimate, most fundamental concerns
regarding their existence. For followers of a particular religion, the ultimate meaning of
their existence, as well as the existence of the whole of reality, is found in the beliefs of
that religion. Therefore, the question of morality for many religious followers is reduced to
following the teachings of their own religion. Many questions arise from this assertion.
This is where a philosophical study of ethics enters.

Many religious followers assume that what their religion teaches can be found
either in their sacred scripture (e.g., the Bible for Christians, the Qur'an for Muslims, etc.)
or body of writings (e.g., the Vedas, including the Upanishads, and other texts for Hindus;
the Tao Te Ching, Chuang-tzu, and other Taoist classics for Taoists) or in other forms
(other than written texts) of preaching that their leaders had promulgated and become
part of their traditions. A Critical, philosophical question that can be asked, vis-à-vis
ethics, is "What exactly does sacred scripture (or religious teaching) command?" This is
a question of interpretation since even the same passage from a particular religious
tradition (e.g., "An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" [Genesis 21:24]) can have many
different interpretations from religious teachers even from within the same tradition.
Therefore, based on what Ramon C. Reyes says concerning an individual's cross-points,
one can see that the reading or interpretation of a particular passage or text is the product
of an individual's embodiment and historicity and on the other hand, her existential ideal.
This does not mean that religious teaching is relative to the individual's particular situation
(implying no objective and universal truth about the matter) but that any reading or
interpretation has a historical particularity affected by the situatedness of the reader. This
implies that the moral agent in question must still, in full responsibility, challenge herself
to understand using her own powers of rationality, but with full recognition of her own
situatedness and what her religious authorities claim their religion teaches.

Second, one must determine what justifies the claim of a particular religious teaching
when it commands its followers on what they "ought to do" (whether in general or in
specific situations). Relevant to this is Plato's philosophical question in his dialogue
Euthyphro, which was mentioned in an earlier chapter: "Is the pious loved by the gods
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because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" Philosophers have

modified this question into a moral version: When something is "morally good,"' is it
because it is good in itself and that is why God commands it, or is it good because God
simply says so? If a particular preacher teaches her followers to do something because
it is what (for example) their sacred scripture says, a critical-minded follower might ask
for reasons as to why the sacred scripture says that. If the preacher simply responds "that
is what is written in the sacred scripture", that is tantamount.to telling the follower to stop
asking questions and simply follow. Here, the critical-minded follower might find herself
at an unsatisfying impasse. History reveals that there were people who twisted religious
teaching that brought harm to their followers and to others. An example is the Crusades
in the European Middle 'Ages. European Christians, who followed their religious leaders'
teaching, massacred Muslims, Jews, and even fellow Christians to recapture the Holy-
City of Jerusalem from these so-called heathens. A contemporary example is when
terrorists who are religious extremists use religion to justify acts of violence they perform
on fellow human beings. The problem here is hot
that religion misleads people; the problem is that too many people perform heinous acts
simply because they assumed they were following the teachings of their supposed
religion, without stopping to think whether these actions are harmful. The philosophical-
minded individual therefore is tasked to be critical even of her own set of beliefs and
practices and to not simply follow for the sake of blind obedience.
These critical questions about one's culture and religious beliefs show us the need
for maturity or growth in one's morality, both in terms of intellect and character. The
responsible moral agent then is one who does not blindly follow externally-imposed rules,
but one who has a well-developed "feel" for making informed moral decisions. The
following section discusses this need for developing one's feel for morality.

MORAL DELIBERATION

There is a big difference between a young child's reasoning on the right thing to
do and the manner a morally mature individual arrives at an ethical decision. This
necessary growth, which is a maturation in moral reasoning, has been the focus of study
of many theorists. One of them is the American moral psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg
(1927-1987) who theorized that moral development happens in six stages, which he
divided into three levels. The first level is what he called pre-conventional and it
corresponds to how infants and young children think. This pre-conventional level, whose
reasoning is centered on the consequences of one's actions, is divided into two stages.
The first stage of reasoning centers around obedience and the avoidance of punishment:
to a young child's mind, an action is "good" if it enables one to escape from punishment;
"bad" if it leads to punishment. Later, a child enters the second stage of reasoning and
learns to act according to what she thinks will serve her self-interest; thus, what is "good"
at this age is what the child thinks can bring her pleasure. Kohlberg used the term pre-
conventional to refer to these two stages since at this age, a young child basically thinks
only in terms of the pain (punishment)or pleasure(reward)brought about as a
consequence of her actions, Thus, her concentration in herself and what she can feel,
instead of her society's conventions on what is right or wrong.
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The second level of moral development according to Kohlberg is the conventional

since this is the age in which older children, adolescents, and young adults learn to
conform to the expectations of society. This is the time when one learns to follow the
convention of her group. This second level is divided into wo stages, the third and fourth
stages of moral development. The third stage is when one begins to act according to what
will benefit her best is when the other members of her group approve of her actions. The
general tendency at this age is to conform first to the values of one’s immediate group
such as her family, playmates, or later on, barkada. Older children and adolescents
eventually begin to value the expectations of the larger group they belong to, whether it
be their school, religion, or state. The fourth stage is achieved when a person realizes
that following the dictates of her society is not just good for herself but more importantly,
it is necessary for the existence of society itself. The individual at this stage values most
the laws, rules, and regulations of her society, and thus her moral reasoning is shaped
by dutifulness to the external standards set by society.

In Kohlberg's reasoning, people who merely follow the rules and regulations of
their institution, the laws of their community or state, the doctrine of their religion-even If
they seem to be the truly right thing to do-are trapped in this second or conventional level,
which is still not yet the highest. The point of Kohlberg's theory is not to ascertain what
defines the goodness or rightness of the act. Thus, in this sense, Kohlberg's idea is not
an ethical theory. Instead, it is a psychological theory that attempts to describe the stages
of a person's growth in moral thinking. The morally mature individual, for Kohlberg, must
outgrow both (1) the pre-conventional level, whose pleasure-and-pain logic locks one into
self-centered kind of thinking, an egoism, as well as (2) the conventional level, which at
first glance looks like the sensible approach to morality. The second level might, de facto,
be the way that many (if not most) adults think about morality, that it is simply a question
of following the right rules. The great insight of Kohlberg, however, is that a truly morally
mature individual must outgrow even the simple following of supposedly right rules. This
is where the third level comes in.

The third and highest level of moral development for Kohlberg is what he calls
post-conventional since the morally responsible agent recognizes that what is good or
right is not reducible to following the rules of one's group. Instead, it is a question of
understanding personally what one óught to do and deciding, using one's free will, tò act
accordingly. This level, which is also divided into two stages (the fifth and the sixth),
represents the individual's realization that the ethical principles she has rationally arrived
at take precedence over even the rules or conventions that her society dictates. Moral
maturity therefore is seen in an agent who acts on what she has understood, using her
full rationality, to be what is right, regardless of whether the act will'bring the agent
pleasure or pain and even regardless of whether the act is in accordance with one's
community's laws or not. An agent has attained full moral development if she acts
according to her well-thought-out rational principles. In the earlier stage of this level of
moral development in the fifth stage, the moral agent sees the value of the social contract,
namely, agreements that rational agents have arrived at whether explicitly or implicitly in
order to serve what can be considered the common good are what one ought to honor
and follow. This notion of common good is post-conventional in the sense that the moral
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agent binds herself to what this theoretical community of fational agents has identified as
morally desirable, whether the agent herself will benefit from doing so or not. Additionally,
this notion of the common good is not reducible to pre- existing communal rules,
traditions, or laws since even these must be weighed using rational discourse. Thus, what
is good or right is what honors the social contract; what contradicts it is bad.

The sixth and highest stage of moral development that exists even beyond the fifth
stage of the social contract is choosing to perform actions based on universal ethical
principles that one has determined by herself. One realizes that all the conventions (laws,
rules, and regulations) of society are only correct if they are based on these universal
ethical principles; they must be followed only if they reflect universal ethical principles.
This is, for Kohlberg, the full maturity of post-conventional thinking since this stage
recognizes that in the end, the question of what one ought to do goes back to the
individual moral agent and her own rationality. Kohlberg's insight is that, ultimately, one
must think for herself what she ought to do. This stand recognizes the supposed fact that
there might be instances when the agent must choose to go against what the community
of rational thinkers deems as good if she really thinks she must, assuming that she has
committed her full rationality in arriving at that decision.

One does not have to agree completely with Kohlberg's theory of moral
development to see its overall value. This theory helps, at the very least, point out the
differences in moral reasoning: the more mature kind is seen in people who are not
anymore dictated by the logic of reward and punishment, or pain and pleasure. Simply
following rules even if, theoretically, they are the correct ones, does not necessarily
qualify as morally mature behavior. One must make free use of her own power of
reasoning in cases of moral choice and not remain a creature of blind obedience to either
pain and pleasure or to the demands of the group, if one aspires to moral maturity.

The significance of studying the different ethical theories and frameworks becomes
clear only to the individual who has achieved, or is in the process of achieving, moral
maturity. For someone who is still in Kohlberg's preconventional or conventional stages,
moral valuation remains a matter of seeking reward or avoiding punishment, or at best, a
question of following the dictates of other people.

For one who is well on the way to moral maturity, the task of using one's reason to
understand moral issues becomes a real possibility and an authentic responsibility. Part
of this maturity is also the realization that ethical thinking is not a completely intellectual
task, but one that also involves the feelings. In the next section, we shall have a brief
treatment of the role of emotions and feelings in moral deliberation. Armed with this
clarification, let us afterward turn to the challenge of making sense of moral problems.

FEELINGS IN MORAL DELIBERATION

Emotions or feelings have long been derided by purely rationalistic perspectives

as having no place in a properly executed moral decision. This prejudice, however, needs
to be re-examined thoroughly. Although some emotions or feelings can derail one from a
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clear-minded decision in an ethical situation, it is also not possible that human choice can
be purged of all feelings; the moral agent, after all, is neither robot nor computer. A more
realistic attitude toward decision-making is to appreciate the indispensable role emotions
have on an agent's act of choosing. Aristotle precisely points out that moral virtue goes
beyond the mere act of intellectually identifying the right thing to do. Instead, it is the
condition of one's character by which the agent is able to manage her emotions or
feelings. Note that Aristotle does not say, “Remove all feelings" Instead, he sees that
cultivating one's character lies in learning to manage one's feelings. The emotions are,
as much as reason itself, part of what makes one a human being. There is a popular
Filipino saying:“tulak ng bibig; kabig ng dibdib"（literally, "The mouth says one thing, but
the heart drives you to do another thing."'). This saying can mean that what an individual
says, and in that sense what an individual's mind or intellect dictates what one ought to
do, can sometimes be overcome by what her feelings actually drive her to do. Thus, part
of the genius of Aristotle is his realization that it is possible that there can be a disconnect
between intellectual knowledge of the good and the actual ability of an individual to
perform accordingly. The latter is mainly a function of character formation, that is, of
habituating the proper management of one's feelings. Aristotle accepts that feelings
cannot be set aside in favor of some illusory, purely intellectual acceptance of the good.
Instead, he sees moral virtue as a matter of habitually managing one's feelings in the
rightful manner. As his famous line from Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics puts it:＂
Anyone can get angry-that is easy...; but to do this to the right person, to the right extent,
at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for everyone, nor is
it easy.” Doing the right thing for Aristotle is being able to manage one's feelings so that
she is actually driven or propelled to do what she already sees (intellectually) as right.

The responsible moral agent then as a supposedly "dispassionate" moral decision-

maker is an unrealistic ideal. The passions or feelings do not necessarily detract from
making an informed moral decision. One can even argue that making a moral decision,
because it is all about what she values, cannot but involve her most serious feelings.
What she must do then is to educate and to cultivate her feelings so that they do not
remain in the pre-conventional level, that is, of self-centered feelings reducible to
individualistic notions of pleasure and pain. The morally developed or mature individual
or agent therefore must have honed her intellectual capacity to determine the relevant
elements in a moral situation, including the moral principles to explore. On top of that, she
must also have cultivated her feelings so that she neither simply gives in to childish
emotions, nor does she also dismiss the "right feelings" required for a truly informed moral
decision. The mature moral agent realizes that she is both a product of many forces,
elements, and events, all of which shape her situation and options for a decision. She
also realizes that she is not merely a puppet of external causes. Instead, a meaningful
moral decision is one that she makes in full cognizance of where she is coming from and
of where she ought to go. At this point, we are ready to identify the steps in making
informed moral decisions.

MORAL PROBLEMS
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What must a morally mature individual do when she is confronted with a moral
problem? In order to answer this question, we must first understand that there are different
types of moral problems, each one requiring a particular set of rational deliberations. We
may attempt to construct an outline of what we ought to do when confronted with the
potential ethical issue.

The first step that we ought to take if there is a potential ethical issue is to
determine our level of involvement in the case at hand. Do we need to make a moral
decision in a situation that needs action on our part? Or are we trying to determine the
right thing to do in a particular situation being discussed? In the latter situation, we may
be making a moral judgment on a particular case, but one that does not necessarily
involve ourselves. We may just be reading about a case that involves other people but
we are not part of the case. In any Ethics class, students are made to imagine what they
would do in a particular situation. Their moral imagination is being exercised in the hope
of cultivating moral reasoning and giving direction to the needed cultivation of their
feelings through habits. But they must be able to distinguish between making a judgment
on a particular ethical situation and coming up with a morally responsible decision for a
situation that they are actually a part of. Being a moral agent specifically refers to the
latter situation.We must therefore identify which activity we are engaged in,whether we
are making a judgment on a case that we are not involved in or if we truly need to make
a decision in a situation that demands that we act.

After ascertaining our involvement in the potential moral situation, we then need to
make sure of the facts. The first fact to establish is whether we are faced with a moral
situation or not. Are we truly confronted with a genuinely moral situation, or one that
merely involves a judgment in the level of aesthetics or of etiquette and therefore is just
an amoral or non-ethical question? But if the situation we are involved in truly has moral
weight, fit strikes one to the core because it involves what it truly means to be human,then
we must now establish all the facts that might have a bearing on our decision. We must
set aside all details that have no connection to the situation.We must also identify whether
an item in consideration is truly factual or merely hearsay, anecdotal, or an unfounded
assumption, and thus unsupportable. This is where such things as "fake news" and
"alternative facts" have to be weeded out.Letting such details seep into our ethical
deliberation may unfairly determine or shape our ethical decision-making proces,leading
us into potentially baseless choices or conclusions,The responsible moral individual must
make sure that she possesses all the facts she needs for that particular situation,but also
only the facts that she needs- no more, no less.

The third step is to identify al the people who may potentially be affected by the
implications of a moral situation or by our concrete choice of action. These people are
called the stakeholders in the particular case. Identifying these stakeholders forces us to
give consideration to people aside from ourselves. The psychological tendency of most
of us when confronted with an ethical choice is to simply think of ourselves, of what we
need, or of what we want. This is also where we can be trapped in an immature
assumption that the only thing important is what we "feel" at that moment, which usually
is reducible to Kohlberg's notion of pre-conventional thinking. When we identify all the
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stakeholders, we are obliged to recognize all the other people potentially concerned with
the ethical problem at hand,and thus must think of reasons aside from our own self-
serving ones, to come up with conclusions that are impartial (in the sense that they take
consideration of everyone's welfare), though still thoroughly involved.
Aside from identifying the stakeholders, we must also determine how they may be
affected by whichever choice the agent makes in the given ethical situation, as well as to
what degree. Not all stakeholders have an equal stake in a given moral case; some may
be more favorably or more adversely affected by a particular conclusion or choice
compared to others. A person's awareness of these probabilities is necessary to gain a
more comprehensive assessment of the matter at hand in order to arrive at hopefully
stronger reasons for making a definite ethical conclusion or choice.

After establishing the facts and identifying the stakeholders and their concerns in
the matter, we must now identify the ethical issue at hand. There are several types of
ethical problems or issues:
a. The first one is a situation in which we need to clarify whether a certain action is
morally right or morally wrong. This is where the different ethical theories or frameworks
can serve. Why is murder said to be an unethical or immoral act? How will utilitarianism
explain the moral significance of this action? How about the natural law theory?
Deontology? Virtue ethics?
b. The second type involves determining whether a particular action in question. can
be identified with a generally accepted ethical or unethical action. An example would be
the issue of the ethical value of the death penalty. Can we say that death penalty is
tantamount to murder? What would the different ethical theories or frameworks say
regarding this issue? There is hardly an ethical. problem if the agent's question is clearly
about performing a widely-considered unethical or immoral action, such as "Ought I to
murder my neighbor?"Murder in almost all, if not all, societies is unquestionably
considered one of the worst acts a human being can perform. The situation in question
only assumes an ethical identity if, in this case, there is a query as to whether a particular
act of killing a human being is tantamount to murder or not. The issue of legalizing the
death penalty, for example, is precisely an ethical issue or question, since for some
people, the act in which a state executes someone guilty of a heinous crime should not
be considered an act of murder, which is always wrong. The ethical debate surrounding
the imposition of the death penalty is generally not about whether some acts of murder
are justifiable or not, but rather whether legally-sanctioned executions ought to be
considered as murder or not.
c. The third type points to the presence of an ethical dilemma. Dilemmas are ethical
situations in which there are competing values that seem to have equal worth. The
problem can be concerned either with a choice between two competing moral goods or
between two evils. The responsible moral individual therefore must be able to recognize
what exactly the ethical issue at hand is and formulate and state it clearly as a moral
problem. She has to identify the fundamental values in conflict in such a situation in order
to assess later if a workable solution to the ethical problem can be negotiated that will
somehow not end up surrendering one value for the sake of another.The individual must
try to find the best balance possible that may honor the competing values. She must theń
identify the possible choices in a given ethical situation and weigh which one among them
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can best meet the interest of all the stakeholders in question, as well as provide a
satisfactory balance between the values in question. The individual must therefore identify
the probable consequences that a particular choice of action will bring to the stakeholders
concerned in order to determine which choice possibly is the best, given the situation.
The popular “Robin Hood” scenario is an example of such. Usually put in the question,
“Is it right to steal from the rich in order to feed the poor?"What one is confronted here is
a situation in which two competing values are in conflict with one another.

The final step, of course, is for the individual to make her ethical conclusion or
decision, whether in judging what ought to be done in a given case or in coming up with
a concrete action she must actually perform. Real ethical decisions are often very difficult
enough to make and for so many different reasons. Not all the facts in a given case may
be available to the agent for her consideration. Some facts may eventually turn out to be
misleading, or not true at all, and so the agent's vigilance and meticulousness in
establishing the facts will always be tested in any given ethical situation. Additionally, it is
extremely demanding to account for all the stakeholders concerned as well as the identity
and extent of their interests in the particular case. An agent may overlook certain
individuals or undervalue their interests. Many people tend to underestimate the value of
the human rights of criminals,assuming immediately that criminals have surrendered all
their rights on account of the crime they committed against society especially in cases of
heinous offenses such as serial murder or terrorism. Then, there is the difficulty of
identifying all the values at play in a given ethical issue.The moral agent must be able to
learn how to avoid the seduction of surrendering to blind simplification. It is so much easier
to turn a blind eye to other values that one does not want to consider in a situation for
whatever reason.Often,in the name of some value that is valid enough,such as"peace
and security," an agent may be tempted to minimize other values,such as human rights
or the supposed inviolable dignity of the individual human person.

The responsible moral individual, however, must forge on realizing full well that
cultivating one's capacity for mature moral choice is a continuing journey in her
life.Aristotle recognizes the importance of continuous habituation in the goal of shaping
one's character so that she becomes more used to choosing the right thing. Not that doing
so will ever become an automatic process, the way a computer performs mathematical
calculations mechanically.A moral individual is always a human being whose intellect
remains finite and whose passions remain dynamic, and who is always placed in
situations that are unique. There are no automatic moral decisions; therefore, such a
phrase is patently paradoxical. One must continue to manage her reason and passions
to respond in the best way possible to the kaleidoscope of moral situations that she finds
herself in.

THE VALUE OF STUDYING ETHICAL THEORIES OR FRAMEWORKS

What then is the role of ethical theories or frameworks in the continuing cultivation
of one's capacity for moral choice? Given the remark at the beginning of this chapter that
none of the ethical frameworks we have studied is final and complete, how then should
one make use of them for the development of her faculty for moral valuation?.
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These ethical theories or frameworks may serve as guideposts, given that they are
the best attempts to understand morality that the history of human thought has to offer.
As guideposts, they can shed light on many important considerations, though of course
not all, in one's quest to answer the twin questions of“What ought I to do?" and "Why
ought I to do so?” Individually, they can clarify many important aspects of morality.
Utilitarianism pays tribute to the value of impartiality, arguing that an act is good if it will
bring about the greatest good for the greatest number of those affected by the action, and
each one of those affected should be counted as one,each equal to each. Utilitarianism
thus puts every single stakeholder at par with everyone else, with no one being worth
more than any other. Whether president or common citizen, rich or poor, man or woman,
young or old, everyone has as much worth as anyone else. Utilitarianism, arguably, puts
more value on the notion of＂common good" compared to any of the other ethical
frameworks we have covered.

The natural law theory, on the other hand, puts more emphasis on the supposed
objective,universal nature of what is to be considered morally good, basing its reasoning
on the theorized existence of a "human nature." This theory has the advantage of both
objectivity and a kind of intuitiveness.The latter pertains to the assumption that whatever
is right is what feels right,that is,in the innermost recesses of one's being or ofone's
conscience（and notjust in some shallow emotional level)because what is good is
imprinted in our very being in the form of natural inclinations.

Kantian deontology puts the premium on rational will, freed from all other
Considerations, as the only,human capacity that can determine one's moral duty. Kant
focuses on one's autonomy as constitutive of what one can consider as moral law that is
free from all other ends and inclinations-including pain and pleasure as well as conformity
to the rules of the group.This shows Kant's disdain for these rules as being authorities
external to one's own capacity for rational will.

From valuing all human beings to intuiting what is universally good and to
practicing one's autonomy in determining what one ought to do, all of these explore the
possible roles of reason and free will in identifying what one ought to do in a given moral
situation.What Aristotle's virtue ethics in the end indicates is the need for the habituation
of one's character to make any and all of these previous considerations possible.To weigh
the collective happiness of human beings, to choose to act on what one's innermost
nature dictates, and to practice one's autonomy regardless of all other considerations
especially those that impinge on one's will: these are lofty enough goals for human reason
and wil. But what can possiblysustain or brace a moral agent so that she is able to
maintain the effort to implement such rigorous demands on the part of reason? Aristotle's
answer is the solid resolve of one's character, which can only be achieved through the
right kind of habituation.

One has to realize that the philosophical study of ethical theories or frameworks
must not merely end in a smorgasbord of theories from which one may choose a
framework that she may apply willy-nilly to a. particular moral situation. The assumption
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that ethics is merely a matter of finding whichever theory seems to work for the case ,at
hand ends in a cynical cul-de-sac: such an attitude still does not make any substantial
headway into answering the twin questions of“What ought I to do?" and"Why ought I to
do so?” Such an approach substitutes a smug attitude of expediency for the complex and
difficult task of truly searching for what is right.

What the responsible moral individual must instead perform is to continuously test
the cogency and coherence of the ethical theory or framework in question against the
complexity of the concrete experience at hand. In such a spirit of experimentation, the
moral individual is able to play off the theories against one another,noting the weakness
in one for a particular case and possibly supplementing it with the strengths of another.

In the following section, let us try to show the strengths and drawbacks of each
theory or framework in application to the different realms of human action: the personal,
the social (both local and global), and the environmental.

SELF,SOCIETY,AND ENVIRONMENT
INDIVIDUAL/SELF

In the realm of the self as noted earlier, one has to pay attention not just on how
one deals with oneself,but also on how one interacts wio Poy aet individuals personal
relations One may respond to the demand for an ethically responsible care for the self
making full use of the four ethical theories or frameworks.

John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism, though seemingly a hedonistic theory given its
emphasis on maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain, elevates the human element
above the animalistic and above the merely selfish. Mill builds on the earlier version of
utilitarianism,the one espoused by Jeremy Bentham,which first posited that what makes
an action good is that it brings about the greatest happiness for the greatest number. The
genius of Bentham was his addition of extent, (that is, the number of people affected by
an action) to the list of circumstances that an individual must consider in determining what
one ought to do in a particular situation. Greatest happiness for Bentham then means
quantity, but not just for oneself since the other half of his maxim refers to "the greatest
number" that points to the extent or number of people affected by this happiness. Thus,
there is no selfishness even in Bentham's version. Mill additionally stresses the difference
between kinds of pleasures and remarks that"It is better to be a Socrates dissatisfied
rather than a pig satisfied." This important distinction exalts the moral individual over and
above her purely physical, material feelings or emotions.Therefore, what is good or right
does not simply reduce to what"I feel is good for me" It instead puts premium on the
higher kinds of pleasure that are apt for the human being and which would be of benefit
to the greatest number affected. One's moral or ethical responsibility to herself then is to
make sure that everything she does will be for the greatest happiness, not just in number
but in kind and nót just for her but for everyone affected by her acts.

Thomas Aquinas's natural law theory states as its first natural inclination the innate
tendency that all human beings share with all other existing things; namely, the natural
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propensity to maintain oneself in one's existence. Any action therefore that sustains and
cultivates one's biological or physical existence is to be deemed good, while all actions
that lead to the destruction of one's existence is to be called bad or evil. Aquinas thus
specifies that taking care of one's being is a moral duty that one owes to herself and to
God. Making sure that one lives a healthy life and that one avoids all things that may hurt
one or cause one harm is, for Aquinas, part of a person's moral responsibility for
herself.On top of this first inclination, one may also look at the third natural inclination that
says that part of human nature is to promote the truth and cultivate a harmonious life in
society with other humans. Part of one's responsibility to herself then is a dedication to
the truth (and thus to cultivate an aversion for lies and ignorance) and to live a peaceful
social life. Aquinas teaches that a person cannot remain within her own selfish desires
since doing so might lead her to harm herself,to dispense with the truth,or to destroy
harmony in her community.Thus,the moral philosophy of Aquinas calls on a person to go
beyond what she thinks she wants and to realize instead what her innermost nature
inclines her to do, which is the promotion of life, of the truth, and of harmonious
coexistence with others.,

Kant's deontology celebrates the rational faculty of the moral agent,which sets it
above merely sentient beings. Kant's principle of universalizability challenges the moral
agent to think beyond her own predilections and desires, and to instead consider.what
everyone ought to do.His principle of humanity as end in itself teaches one to always treat
humanity,whether in her own self or in any other individual, as the end or goal of all human
actions and never merely as the means.Kant goes beyond simply telling people to not
use others as instruments. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with using a human being
as a means or a tool for one's own purposes because human interaction is not possible
without that happening.What Kant is concerned with is when someone merely uses a
human being, whether another person or herself, and forgets to treat that human being
as the goal or purpose of an action in and of herself. Many people lose sight of what is
truly important because they become consumed with manyother perceived goals:financial
wealth,revenge, domination, and so on. What they seldom realize is that they have lost
themselves in the process of attempting to satisfy such desires. Lastly, Kant's principle of
autonomy teaches one that no one else can tell her what she ought to do in a particular
situation; the highest authority is neither the king nor the general nor the pope. The
highest authority, that which is self-legislating in the realm of moral law, is none other than
the rational individual herself. Her moral or ethical responsibility to herself is to maintain
her dignity as a rational agent, and thus become the self-legislator in the realm of morality.
She cannot be the follower or the slave of her own selfish desires or of external authority.

Aristotle's virtue ethics teaches one to cultivate her own intellect as well as her
character to achieve eudaimonia in her lifetime. For Aristotle, one's ethical or moral
responsibility to herself is one of self-cultivation. Aristotle is quite forgiving when it comes
to individual actions, knowing full well the difficulty of"hitting the mark" in a given moral
situation. What the thinker is more concerned with is whether one's actions lead one to
become a better person in terms of cultivating her character. One may make mistakes
from time to time, but in the end, the important question to ask is whether the person
learned from such mistakes and therefore construçted a more or less orderly life. If the
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person's life in the end is one big mistake, then the person has not become eudaimon or
a"happy" (that is,“flourishing") person.Life for Aristotle is all about learning from one's own
experiences so that one becomes better as a person. But make no mistake about this,
one must become a better person and not just live a series of endless mistakes.

The realm of the personal also extends to one's treatment of other persons within
one's network of close relations. Utilitarianism's recognition of the greatest happiness
principle shows that even in interpersonal interaction, what must rule is not one's own,
subjective notion of what is pleasurable.Instead,the greatest happiness, in this case
where everyone is affected by this particular set of relationships,is what must take
precedence in one's choice of actions.The other,therefore,is as important as one's selfin
her consideration of the moral worth of her actions. Thus, in a person's relationship with
her parents,siblings, other family members,neighbors,classmates,playmates,and
eventually workmates, she must putinto consideration the happiness of every single
individual affected by her actions.

Natural law theory, through its recognition of the inviolable vaiue of human life
whomeverit belongs to,immediately offers an ethic of interpersonal relationships,Coupled
with this,the value that Aquinas gives to the production and care for offspring(the second
natural inclination), as well as to the promotion of the truth and the peaceful and orderly
social life (the third natural inclination), provide guidance on how one ought to relate with
her close relations.Again, the value of human life, of proper education, and of promoting
the truth and peaceable social life, must be upheld by the individual in her relations with
family and friends.

Kant's deontology recognizes the principle of humanity as end in itself and as a

cornerstone of ethical decision-making because this theory recognizes the full autonomy
of every single rational agent. Everything else in the universe can be used by the rational
agent as mere means; only a rational agent herself can never be reduced to mere means,
but must always be treated as end it itself. Thus, one must not abuse either oneself, nor
one's fellow human beings (in the context of one's close relations) by treating them as
mere means. “One must always treat humanity, whether in oneself or in any other, always
as end in itself" as Kant himself said. It does often happen that one can forget the innate
value of one's parents（over and above their usefulness as one's “source of finances")
or one's friends (over and above the fact that“they entertain me” Kant reminds one to
never reduce a human being to the level of the instrument or tool.

Finally, Aristotle's Virtue Theory teaches that one must always find and act on the
mesotes whether in treating oneself or any other human being. This mesotes points to
the complexity of knowing what must be done in a specific moral situation (a measure
that does notnecessarily apply to a different situation), which involves identifying the
relevant feelings that are involved and being able to manage them. It happens too often
in one's personal relationship with others, whom one is close to, that “feelings” get in the
way of forming meaningful, constructive bonds. There is a saying that “familiarity breeds
contempt” which refers to the tendency of many people to lapse into an attitude that tends
to be hurtful to others one is closest to. This attitude is a compound of feelings that one
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has, but these are feelings one most probably has not yet sifted through. Temperance,
therefore, is one Aristotelian virtue that clearly applies to treating oneself and other people
close to oneself fairly and with much circumspection.

SOCIAL LIFE:IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT AND IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE

One's membership in any society brings forth the demands of communal life in
terms of the group's rules and regulations. The ethical question arises when the
expectations of a particular society come into conflict with one's most fundamental values.
Philippine society, for example, is made up of many ethnolinguistic groups, each with its
own possibly unique culture and set of traditions. The demands of the nation-state, as
seen in the laws of the land,sometimes clash with the traditions of indigenous culture.One
example is the issue of land ownership when ancestral land is at stake:Can members of
an indigenous group lay claim to a land that they do not technically own because they do
not have a legal title for it? Aswe had seen earlier in this chapter in the discussion of
cultural relativism,it is problematic for an individual to simply accede to her group's given
set of beliefs and practices. How would each 'ethical framework discuss this problem?

Mill's utilitarian doctrine will always push for the greatest happiness principle as
the prime determinant of what can be considered as good action, whether in the personal
sphere or in the societal realm.Thus, Filipinos cannot simply assume that their action is
good because their culture says so. Instead, the fundamental question ought to be,"Will
this action bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number?" An individual
must therefore think carefully whether her action, even if her culture approves of it
(whichever it might be-“Filipino" culture,Ibaloi culture, and Maranaw culture, among
others),will truly benefit everyone affected by it.The notion of the"greatest number" can
also go beyond the borders of one's own perceived territory. Should one stop at "what is
good for us" even if it is for the detriment of other people from other-lands? Such
considerations suggest that even an action done by Filipinos within the Philippine territory
technically cannot remain a“matter for Filipinos only" if the action can potentially affect
those outside the borders of the nation.

Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, in his natural law theory, has a clear
conception of the principles that should guide the individual in her actions that affect her
larger. society. Once more, human life, the care and education of children, and the
promotion of truth and harmonious social living should be in the mind of an individual
when she performs actions directed to the larger whole. For Aquinas, no harmonious
social life will be possible if individuals that comprise such a society do not value human
life, telling the truth and peaceful coexistence. Thus, contemporary social issues that have
to do with the dissemination of“post-truth,""alternative facts," and “fake news" in the realm
of social media are rightful targets of a Thomistic criticism of what ought and ought not to
be allowed in our dealings with each other. On the other hand, the demand of the natural
law for a peaceful and orderly social life can be put in danger by acts of criminality and
terrorism. The morally responsible agent must therefore guard against committing any
act that can go against this － twofold requirement of the third natural inclination of human
nature.
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Immanuel Kant argues for the use of the principles of universalizability and of
humanity as end in itself to form a person's autonomous notion of what she ought to do.
These principles can and should apply directly to the construction of ethical duty in one's
social life. Thus, no manner of heteronomous rúles and expectations should dictate one's
choice of actions, whether they be laws of the state or international treaties, cultural norms
and customs, or even the laws of one's religion. According to Kant's framework, if a
person is to follow any of these heteronomous laws, it must be because such a law is in
accordance with her understanding of her moral duty, but must not be in any waycontrary
to it.Thusi Kant is not saying that a person ought not to follow any heteronomous laws.
Instead, she must make sure that if she were to follow such a law,that she understands
why it is truly the right thing to do.More positively, citizens of a particular society ought to
make sure that the laws and rules that they come up with are actually in line with what
universalizable moral duty will prescribe.

Aristotle's virtue ethics prescribes mesotes as the guide to all thé actions that a
person has to take, even in her dealing with the larger community of people. Virtues such
as justice, liberality, magnificence, friendliness, and rightful indignation suggest that they
are socially-oriented Aristotelian virtues. A person ought to be guided by them in her
dealings with either the local or the wider global society. She must also be aware that
none of these virtues are fixed points; rather, each one will have a mesotes that is
determined by the particular context. This is a very important point, especially if a person
is in discourse with people coming from other groups within her own society or even from
other societies and cultures. Within the Philippines, there are around 175 ethnolinguistic
groups, each with its own language and culture, and therefore each with its own set of
beliefs and practices. Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), on the other hand, perform
their jobs in other countries abroad, and so they must balance the need for acculturation
on one hand and keeping one's Filipino identity on the other. Temperance once again
presents itself as one Aristotelian virtue that will be vital here: In the name of other virtues
such as justice, much temperance is needed in dealing with the other participants in social
intercourse.

We have seen here how each of the four ethical frameworks we have covered can
be used as a fecund starting point for thinking through what a person's moral responsibility
is toward herself, her close relations, her fellow members in society, and her fellow human
beings in a global society. All four frameworks concern one's relationship with humans.
However,one realm that has only recently been given much attention, but one which
seems to demand an ethical response, is that of the non-human, physical environment
that human beings live in.

THE NON-HUMAN ENVIRONMENT

Questions of environmental ethics, of the ethical or moral responsibilities human.

beings have toward the non-human world, only appeared in the twentieth century.
Previously, most ethical theorists focused more on interhuman relations rather than
human-to-non-human relations. Consequently, some argues that using any of the four
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ethical theories or frameworks may be an exercise in anachronism, that is, in forcing

together elements that belong to different time periods. We will, therefore, merely suggest
beginning possibilities for further exploration into an envirònmental ethics based on any
of the four. classical ethical theories.

In the case of utilitarianism, some scholars point out that this hedonistic doctrine
that focuses on the sovereignty of pleasures and pains in human decision-making should
extend into other creatures that can experience pleasures and pains; namely, animals.
Thus, one of the sources of animal ethics is utilitarianism. Of course, animals themselves
cannot become moral agents because they do not seem to have reason and free will.
Some thinkers, however,will argue that animals can experience pleasure and pain.Some
would therefore argue that since the greatest happiness priciple covers the greatest
number of creatures that experience pleasure and pain, then that number should include
animals. Therefore. though only humans can make moral decisions, animal ethics
proponents argue that humans should always take into account the potential pleasure or
pain that they may inflict on animals. What is good then is not only what is good for the
greatest number of human beings affected, but also for the greatest number of creatures
that can feel pleasure or pain. To extend the argument, though the other members of an
ecosystem (e.g., plants) may not have the capacity for pleasure and pain, humans still
ought to perform actions that willnot lead to their destruction, that in turn might lead to
pain for the animals that live off them. There is a general call for actions that do not just
benefit humans but the whole ecosystem as well, since it is possible that nonhuman
creatures might be harmed by neglecting the ecosystem.

Since Kantian deontology focuses on the innate dignity of the human being as
possessing reason, it can be argued that one cannot possibly universalize maxims that,
in the end, will lead to an untenable social existence. Can one accept the following maxim
as something that everyone ought to follow: "One ought to not worry about environmental
destruction, as long as it produces economic wealth for my society?” Such thinking is
shortsighted and, in the end, does not produce universalizable maxims.

Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, may not necessarily talk about the physical
environment and human moral responsibility to it as such, but one can try to infer from
his philosophy that certain,actions should be avoided because they do not produce a
harmonious, peaceful society. One can argue that neglecting the physical environment
because of shortsighted economic goals (e.g., overfishing the waters off the coast of our
islands or cutting down trees in our mountains and hills) will eventually lead to disasters
such as flooding or famines that will affect society in a detrimental fashion..

Lastly, Aristotle's virtue ethics also pick up on the problem of such

shortsightedness and ask how this can possibly lead to becoming a better person. One
may actually invent a neo-Aristotelian vice here: the vice of myopia. This is a
nearsightedness, not a physical one, but in one's understanding of the implications of her
actions. This problem is therefore connected to a lack of intellectual virtue, to a deficiency
in foresight. How can a person claim that she is cultivating her character (for the purpose
of finally attaining eudaimonia) if she is guilty of the vice of myopia? One becomes a better
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person, therefore, if she learns to expand her vision to see beyond what is merely at close
hand. Thus,seeing beyond the immediate is a virtue.One may argue therefore that
Aristotle would support the argument that a person has the moral responsibility to see
beyond what is immediate. If so,one must see beyond the satisfaction of immediate
economic needs and make sure that harming the environment for the sake of such will
not eventually lead to something much worse.

What we have tried to show here in this current section is possibility:that clasical
ethical theories contribute to potentially solve twenty-first century problems. The important
point here is not to"force answers" but to be open to real possibilities, as well as accepting
real dead-ends. One must see the value of testing one's hypotheses, but also of the virtue
of accepting that some hypotheses need to be let go.

A CLOSING THAT IS REALLY AN OPENING

At the end of this introduction to ethical study, we should already have a more or
less clear idea of how to make informed moral decisions. You should, at this point, have
sufficient mental and affective equipment to arrive at sound judgments for cases in
discussion or for enacting real-life decisions. The four classical ethical theories or
frameworks that we have taken up are in no way exhaustive. There are many other
theories especially in the twentieth century that have emerged to take up the question of
“What ought I to do?" and “Why ought I to do it?" These four frameworks, however, have
proven to be some of the most influential in human thought and should serve as an
introduction to other theories or to further discussions on moral philosophy. They are not
to be seen as options to dictate on what one is supposed to do in a particular situation.
This is the cynical way these frameworks are sometimes employed: use them as needed
to justify what one wants to do in a particular situation. The more productive use of these
frameworks instead is to employ them as beginning guides to one's further exploration
into the topic of morality. Test them out: identify their strengths, recognize their weak
points, stretch them out to see up to where they can work, and think of what can.be added
to the parts where they do not work anymore.

In the end, there is only a beginning: We do not have a computer program here
that can automatically calculate what is the right thing to do in a given situation. It seems
safe to assume that there can never.be such a thing. There is only the human individual
along with her community of fellow human beings who need to accept that they must
continue to explore the meaning of what is good and right while hoping to arrive at the
best judgments they can make at this point in time. Realizing the finitude of human
understanding and. of the capacity to make choices, but at the same time hoping that
one's best attempt at doing what is right does mean something in the end-these are part
and parcel of making informed moral decisions. Do not worry, you can do it!

SUMMARY

Making informed decisions in the realm of morality entails first understanding who
one is, in order to account for reasons that one comes up with as the agent who must
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choose in a moral situation. Reyes explains that one's self is a cross-point of many forces
and factors that shape one's choices but do not dictate upon them. The mature moral
agent must understand how her society, history, culture, and even religion shape who
she is. She must also realize though that her choices in the end cannot simply be a mere
product of these outside forces, but must be made in the spirit of freedom. Kohlberg
teaches that one's realization of her own freedom to determine her own moral principles,
free from all conventions, happens in a process of maturity. An essential element in
maturity is the realization that one's choices, even in the realm of ethics, cannot simply
be a function of rational thought but are inevitably shaped also by the feelings. Thus, there
is the additional responsibility of cultivating one's feelings as well as one's reason. The
moral agent must be mature enough to be able to cultivate the necessary steps to ensure
a sound, well-informed moral decision.With the aid of the different ethical theories or
frameworks discussed in the previous chapters, the morally mature agent will be able to
appreciate her responsibility toward herself, her society, and her environment.

Answer the following questions:

1. How can you be a genuine Filipino if you do not follow custom?

2. What is the distinction between a religious notion of sin and the philosophical
understanding of immoral or unethical acts?
3. How realistic is Kohlberg’s ideal of the highest stage pf post - conventional
morality, that of universal ethical principles, given that feelings and emotions are
inseparable from human choice?
4. Given that human condition is one of finitude, how will you know that you are
sufficiency informed when you finally make your moral judgement?

ORGAN TRAFFICKING AND HUMAN NEEDS

The many developments in the past few decades in both the life sciences and in
biotechnology have given rise to the recognition of a host of ethical issues that are
concerned with physical survival and welfare of living creatures including, of course,
human beings. These ethical discussions have bee gathered under the name of bioethics,
a rapidly emerging field of applied ethics. Both medical ethics and animal ethics can
actually be classified as subfields within the larger sphere of bioethics, while
environments ethics can have a lot of concerns that are tied up with bioethics. Given that
animal ethics, in the form of topics of animal rights, has already been covered in Chapter
II and environmental ethics treated earlier in this chapter, let us now concentrate on
medical ethics. This field focuses on moral issues in medical practice and research. One
such issue that has given rise to much debate is the phenomenon of organ trafficking,
which is defined as the trade in human organs ( whether from living or nonliving people)
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for the purpose of transplantation. The trade can happen through the sale of organs or
through any other means including coercive force.
In 2009, the Philippines government halted a planned kidney transplant from a Filipina
wife to her Saudi Arabian husband. It was discovered that the couple had only been
married for a short time and that the man did not know how to speak in English or Filipino,
while the wife could not speak Arabic a situation that raised a lot of suspicion on the part
of the authorities. The government’s allegation was that the planned transplant was not
really an organ donation, which Philippines law allows, but was, in actually, a case of an
organ sale, which is tantamount to organ trafficking prohibited by law. One possible
reason for the woman’s consent to this alleged deal is the widespread poverty among
Filipinos. Although organ trafficking is patently illegal in the Philippines and in many others
nations, it continues to be tempting possibility, especially for improvised individuals can
live on a single kidney. Supposing that the transplant will be done under the strict medical
supervision, that there is shortage of available kidney donors, and setting aside the clear
illegal status of organ trafficking, it is really wrong for a person in great financial need to
sell one of her kidneys to someone who requires a transplant to survive and who is willing
and able to offer a generous amount of cash?

I. This chapter identified and explained the steps in making informed decision when
confronted with moral problems. The steps can be summarized as follows:
1. Determine your involvement in the moral situation.
2. Gather all the necessary facts.
3. Identify the stakeholders
4. Name all the alternative choices possible and their potential effects on all
stakeholders.
5. Identify the type of ethical issue at hand
6. Make your ethical conclusion or decision.

Apply now all six steps to the question, “Is selling one of my kidneys to a paying
costumer morally defensible?” Write down your application below.
Step 1:
Step 2:
Step 3:
Step 4:
Step 5:
Step 6:

II. Examine your feelings or emotions regarding the issue of organ trafficking. Did
you feel sympathetic to the woman who was about to sell her kidney to her Saudi
Arabian husband? Or were you morally repulsed by what she was planning to
do? Apply Ramon C. Reyes’s idea of the five cross points that contribute to the
formation of who you are in order to understand your feelings about this
particular moral issue. List below the elements that make up each of your cross –
points:
1. Physical Cross – Point
2. Interpersonal Cross – Point
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3. Social Cross- Point

4. Historical Cross- Point
5. Existential Cross – Point

Given the five cross - points that make up who you are, can you provide an
explanation below why you feel the way that you do toward the woman who was
about to sell her kidney? How can you make sure that your feelings about the
matter are not trapped in Kohlberg’s pre-conventional stage?

1. How did I feel toward the woman who was about to sell her kidney and
why:
2. How do I make sure my feelings are morally mature and not trapped in
the pre-conventional stage:

Bulaong, O. et. al. (2018). Ethics: foundation of moral valuation. Manila: Rex Bookstore.
Thiroux, J. (2012). Ethics: theory and practice.(11th ed.). Engelewood Cliffs: Prentice
Hall.
Frankfurt, Harry."Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." The Importance of
What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979, pp. 11-25.

Nagel, Thomas. "The Fragmentation of Value!" Mortal Questions. Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversity Press, 1979, pp. 128-41.

Rachels, James."Can Ethics Provide Answers?" The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 10,
No. 3, June 1980, pp. 32-40.

Reyes, Ramon Castillo. "The Relation between Ethics and Religious Belief." The Moral
Dimension: Essays in Honor of Ramon Castillo Reves, edited by Nemesio S. Que, Jr.,

Oscar G. Bulaong, Jr., and Michael Ner E. Mariano, Quezon City: Office of Research and
Publications, Ateneo de Manila University, 2003, pp. 107-112.
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APPENDICES
THE SUMMA THEOLOGICAL
of St. Thomas Aquinas
Questions 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, and 95

Question 90. The essence of law

1. Is law something pertaining to reason?

2. The end of law
3. Its cause
4. The promulgation of law

Article 1. Whether law is something pertaining to reason?

Objection 1. It would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason. For the
Apostle says (Romans 7:23): "I see another law in my members," etc. But nothing
pertaining to reason is in the members; since the reason does not make use of a bodily
organ. Therefore, law is not something pertaining to reason.

Objection 2. Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power, habit, and act. But
law is not the power itself of reason. In like manner, neither is it a habit of reason:
because the habits of reason are the intellectual virtues of which we have spoken above
(Article 57). Nor again is it an act of reason: because then law would cease, when the
act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are asleep. Therefore, law is nothing
pertaining to reason.

Objection 3. Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act aright. But it
belongs properly to the will to move to act, as is evident from what has been said above
(Question 9, Article 1). Therefore, law pertains, not to the reason, but to the will;
according to the words of the Jurist (Lib. i, ff., De Const. Prin. leg. i): "Whatsoever
pleaseth the sovereign, has force of law."
On the contrary, It belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it belongs to
reason to command, as stated above (Question 17, Article 1). Therefore, law is
something pertaining to reason.
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I answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is
restrained from acting: for "lex" [law] is derived from "ligare" [to bind], because it binds
one to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first
principle of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated above (1, 1, ad 3); since
it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of
action, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now that which is the principle in any
genus, is the rule and measure of that genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers,
and the first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently, it follows that law is
something pertaining to reason.
Reply to Objection 1. Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in something
in two ways. First, as in that which measures and rules: and since this is proper to reason,
it follows that, in this way, law is in the reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is
measured and ruled. In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to something
by reason of some law: so that any inclination arising from a law, may be called a law,
not essentially but by participation as it were. And thus the inclination of the members to
concupiscence is called "the law of the members."
Reply to Objection 2. Just as, in external action, we may consider the work and the
work done, for instance the work of building and the house built; so in the acts of reason,
we may consider the act itself of reason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and something
produced by this act. With regard to the speculative reason, this is first of all the definition;
secondly, the proposition; thirdly, the syllogism or argument. And since also the practical
reason makes use of a syllogism in respect of the work to be done, as stated above (13,
3; 76, 1) and since as the Philosopher teaches (Ethic. vii, 3); hence we find in the practical
reason something that holds the same position in regard to operations, as, in the
speculative intellect, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such like universal
propositions of the practical intellect that are directed to actions have the nature of law.
And these propositions are sometimes under our actual consideration, while sometimes
they are retained in the reason by means of a habit.
Reply to Objection 3. Reason has its power of moving from the will, as stated above
(Question 17, Article 1): for it is due to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason
issues its commands as regards things ordained to the end. But in order that the volition
of what is commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some
rule of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the will of the
sovereign has the force of law; otherwise the sovereign's will would savor of lawlessness
rather than of law.

Article 2. Whether the law is always something directed to the common good?
Objection 1. It would seem that the law is not always directed to the common good
as to its end. For it belongs to law to command and to forbid. But commands are
directed to certain individual goods. Therefore, the end of the law is not always the
common good.
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Objection 2. Further, the law directs man in his actions. But human actions are
concerned with particular matters. Therefore, the law is directed to some particular good.
Objection 3. Further, Isidore says (Etym. v, 3): "If the law is based on reason, whatever
is based on reason will be a law." But reason is the foundation not only of what is
ordained to the common good, but also of that which is directed private good. Therefore,
the law is not only directed to the good of all, but also to the private good of an individual.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that "laws are enacted for no private profit,
but for the common benefit of the citizens."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), the law belongs to that which is a principle of
human acts, because it is their rule and measure. Now as reason is a principle of human
acts, so in reason itself there is something which is the principle in respect of all the rest:
wherefore to this principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred. Now the first
principle in practical matters, which are the object of the practical reason, is the last end:
and the last end of human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above (2, 7; 3, 1).
Consequently, the law must
regard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since every part is ordained
to the whole, as imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect
community, the law must regard properly the relationship to universal happiness.
Wherefore the Philosopher, in the above definition of legal matters mentions both
happiness and the body politic: for he says (Ethic. v, 1) that we call those legal matters
"just, which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its parts for the body
politic": since the state is a perfect community, as he says in Polit. i, 1.
Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of the others, and the
others belong to that genus in subordination to that thing: thus fire, which is chief among
hot things, is the cause of heat in mixed bodies, and these are said to be hot in so far as
they have a share of fire. Consequently, since the law is chiefly ordained to the common
good, any other precept in regard to some individual work, must needs be devoid of the
nature of a law, save in so far as it regards the common good. Therefore, every law is
ordained to the common good.
Reply to Objection 1. A command denotes an application of a law to matters regulated
by the law. Now the order to the common good, at which the law aims, is applicable to
particular ends. And in this way commands are given even concerning particular matters.
Reply to Objection 2. Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: but those
particular matters are referable to the common good, not as to a common genus or
species, but as to a common final cause, according as the common good is said to be
the common end.
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Reply to Objection 3. Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the speculative reason
except that which is traced back to the first indemonstrable principles, so nothing stands
firm with regard to the practical reason, unless it be directed to the last end which is the
common good: and whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the nature of a law.
Article 3. Whether the reason of any man is competent to make laws?
Objection 1. It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to make laws. For
the Apostle says (Romans 2:14) that "when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by
nature those things that are of the law, . . . they are a law to themselves." Now he says
this of all in general. Therefore, anyone can make a law for himself.
Objection 2. Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii. 1), "the intention of the
lawgiver is to lead men to virtue." But every man can lead another to virtue. Therefore,
the reason of any man is competent to make laws.
Objection 3. Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the state, so every father
of a family governs his household. But the sovereign of a state can make laws for the
state. Therefore, every father of a family can make laws for his household.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v. 10): "A law is an ordinance of the people,
whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together with the Commonalty."
I answer that, A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the order to the
common good. Now to order anything to the common good, belongs either to the whole
people, or to someone who is the viceregent of the whole people. And therefore the
making of a law belongs either to the whole people or to a
Reply to Objection 1. Those things that are not in themselves, exist with God, inasmuch
as they are foreknown and preordained by Him, according to Romans 4:17: "Who calls
those things that are not, as those that are." Accordingly, the eternal concept of the Divine
law bears the character of an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained by God to the
government of things foreknown by Him.
Reply to Objection 2. Promulgation is made by word of mouth or in writing; and in both
ways the eternal law is promulgated: because both the Divine Word and the writing of
the Book of Life are eternal. But the promulgation cannot be from eternity on the part of
the creature that hears or reads.
Reply to Objection 3. The law implies order to the end actively, in so far as it directs
certain things to the end; but not passively--that is to say, the law itself is not ordained to
the end--except accidentally, in a governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and to which
end his law must needs be ordained. But the end of the Divine government is God
Himself, and His law is not distinct from Himself. Wherefore the eternal law is not
ordained to another end.
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Article 2. Whether there is in us a natural law?

Objection 1. It would seem that there is no natural law in us. Because man is governed
sufficiently by the eternal law: for Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i) that "the eternal law is
that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But nature does not abound
in superfluities as neither does she fail in necessaries. Therefore, no law is natural to
man.
Objection 2. Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end, as stated above
(Question 90, Article 2). But the directing of human acts to their end is not a function of
nature, as is the case in irrational creatures, which act for an end solely by their natural
appetite; whereas man acts for an end by his reason and will. Therefore, no law is natural
to man.
Objection 3. Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the law. But man
is freer than all the animals, on account of his free-will, with which he is endowed
above all other animals. Since therefore other animals are not subject to a natural
law, neither is man subject to a natural law.
On the contrary, A gloss on Romans 2:14: "When the Gentiles, who have not the law,
do by nature those things that are of the law," comments as follows: "Although they
have no written law, yet they have the natural law, whereby each one knows, and is
conscious of, what is good and what is evil."
I answer that, As stated above (90, 1, ad 1), law, being a rule and measure, can be in a
person in two ways: in one way, as in him that rules and measures; in another way, as
in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it
partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine providence
are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above (Article 1); it is evident
that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being
imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends.
Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most
excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both
for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has
a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in
the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying (Psalm
4:6): "Offer up the sacrifice of justice," as though someone asked what the works of
justice are, adds: "Many say, Who showeth us good things?" in answer to which question
he says: "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": thus implying that
the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is
the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It
is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's
participation of the eternal law.
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Reply to Objection 1. This argument would hold, if the natural law were something
different from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but a participation thereof, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2. Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which is
according to nature, as stated above (Question 10, Article 1): for every act of reasoning
is based on principles that are known naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of
the means is derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end. Accordingly, the
first direction of our acts to their end must needs be in virtue of the natural law.
Reply to Objection 3. Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the Eternal
Reason, just as the rational creature does. But because the rational creature partakes
thereof in an intellectual and rational manner, therefore the participation of the eternal
law in the rational creature is properly called a law, since a law is something pertaining
to reason, as stated above (Question 90, Article 1). Irrational creatures, however, do not
partake thereof in a rational manner, wherefore there is no participation of the eternal
law in them, except by way of similitude.
Article 3. Whether there is a human law?
Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a human law. For the natural law is a
participation of the eternal law, as stated above (Article 2). Now through the eternal law
"all things are most orderly," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Therefore, the natural
law suffices for the ordering of all human affairs. Consequently, there is no need for a
human law.
Objection 2. Further, a law bears the character of a measure, as stated above (Question
90, Article 1). But human reason is not a measure of things, but vice versa, as stated in
Metaph. x, text. 5. Therefore no law can emanate from human reason.
Objection 3. Further, a measure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3.
But the dictates of human reason in matters of conduct are uncertain, according to
Wisdom 9:14: "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain."
Therefore, no law can emanate from human reason.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) distinguishes two kinds of law, the one
eternal, the other temporal, which he calls human.

answer that, As stated above (90, 1, ad 2), a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now
it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the
speculative reason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above
(De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Accordingly, we conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from
naturally known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions of the various
sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the
efforts of reason, so too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from general and
indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to the more
particular determination of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by
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human reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be
observed, as stated above (90, A2,3,4). Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric (De Invent.
Rhet. ii) that "justice has its source in nature; thence certain things came into custom by
reason of their utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were
approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law."
Reply to Objection 1. The human reason cannot have a full participation of the dictate
of the Divine Reason, but according to its own mode, and imperfectly. Consequently, as
on the part of the speculative reason, by a natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there
is in us the knowledge of certain general principles, but not proper knowledge of each
single truth, such as that contained in the Divine Wisdom; so too, on the part of the
practical reason, man has a natural participation of the eternal law, according to certain
general principles, but not as regards the particular determinations of individual cases,
which are, however, contained in the eternal law. Hence the need for human reason to
proceed further to sanction them by law.
Reply to Objection 2. Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but the principles
impressed on it by nature, are general rules and measures of all things relating to human
conduct, whereof the natural reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the
measure of things that are from nature.
Reply to Objection 3. The practical reason is concerned with practical matters, which
are singular and contingent: but not with necessary things, with which the speculative
reason is concerned. Wherefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs
to the demonstrated conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessary for every measure to
be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it is possible in its own particular
genus.
Article 4. Whether there was any need for a Divine law?
Objection 1. It would seem that there was no need for a Divine law. Because, as stated
above (Article 2), the natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law. But the eternal
law is a Divine law, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore, there was no need for a Divine
law in addition to the natural law, and human laws derived therefrom.
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Sirach 15:14) that "God left man in the hand of his own
counsel." Now counsel is an act of reason, as stated above (Question 14, Article 1).
Therefore, man was left to the direction of his reason. But a dictate of human reason is
a human law as stated above (Article 3). Therefore, there is no need for man to be
governed also by a Divine law.
Objection 3. Further, human nature is more self-sufficing than irrational creatures.
But irrational creatures have no Divine law besides the natural inclination impressed
on them. Much less, therefore, should the rational creature have a Divine law in
addition to the natural law.
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On the contrary, David prayed God to set His law before him, saying (Psalm 118:33):
"Set before me for a law the way of Thy justifications, O Lord."
I answer that, Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing
of human conduct to have a Divine law. And this for four reasons. First, because it is
by law that man is directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end. And
indeed if man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his
natural faculty, there would be no need for man to have any further direction of the
part of his reason, besides the natural law and human law which is derived from it. But
since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness which is m\disproportionate to
man's natural faculty, as stated above (Question 5, Article 5), therefore it was
necessary that, besides the natural and the human law, man should be directed to his
end by a law given by God.
Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on
contingent and particular matters, different people form different judgments on human
acts; whence also different and contrary laws result. In order, therefore, that man may
know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was
necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by God, for it is
certain that such a law cannot err.
Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is competent to judge.
But man is not competent to judge of interior movements, that are hidden, but only of
exterior acts which appear: and yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to
conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently, human law could not
sufficiently curb and direct interior acts; and it was necessary for this purpose that a
Divine law should supervene.
Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5,6), human law cannot punish or
forbid all evil deeds: since while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with
many good things, and would hinder the advance of the common good, which is
necessary for human intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain
unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary for the Divine law to supervene, whereby
all sins are forbidden.
And these four causes are touched upon in Psalm 118:8, where it is said: "The law of the
Lord is unspotted," i.e. allowing no foulness of sin; "converting souls," because it directs
not only exterior, but also interior acts; "the testimony of the Lord is faithful," because of
the certainty of what is true and right; "giving wisdom to little ones," by directing man to
an end supernatural and Divine.
Reply to Objection 1. By the natural law the eternal law is participated proportionately
to the capacity of human nature. But to his supernatural end man needs to be directed
in a yet higher way. Hence the additional law given by God, whereby man shares more
perfectly in the eternal law.
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Reply to Objection 2. Counsel is a kind of inquiry: hence it must proceed from some
principles. Nor is it enough for it to proceed from principles imparted by nature, which
are the precepts of the natural law, for the reasons given above: but there is need for
certain additional principles, namely, the precepts of the Divine law.
Reply to Objection 3. Irrational creatures are not ordained to an end higher than that
which is proportionate to their natural powers: consequently, the comparison fails.
Article 5. Whether there is but one Divine law?
Objection 1. It would seem that there is but one Divine law. Because, where there is one
king in one kingdom there is but one law. Now the whole of mankind is compared to God
as to one king, according to Psalm 46:8: "God is the King of all the earth." Therefore,
there is but one Divine law.
Objection 2. Further, every law is directed to the end which the lawgiver intends for
those for whom he makes the law. But God intends one and the same thing for all men;
since according to 1 Timothy 2:4: "He will have all men to be saved, and to come to the
knowledge of the truth." Therefore, there is but one Divine law.
Objection 3. Further, the Divine law seems to be more akin to the eternal law, which is
one, than the natural law, according as the revelation of grace is of a higher order than
natural knowledge. Therefore, much more is the Divine law but one.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Hebrews 7:12): "The priesthood being translated, it
is necessary that a translation also be made of the law." But the priesthood is twofold, as
stated in the same passage, viz. the levitical priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ.
Therefore, the Divine law is twofold, namely the Old Law and the New Law.
I answer that, As stated in the I, 30, 3, distinction is the cause of number. Now things
may be distinguished in two ways. First, as those things that are altogether specifically
different, e.g. a horse and an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species,
e.g. a boy and a man: and in this way the Divine law is divided into Old and New. Hence
the Apostle (Galatians 3:24-25) compares the state of man under the Old Law to that of
a child "under a pedagogue"; but the state under the New Law, to that of a full grown
man, who is "no longer under a pedagogue."
Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken in connection with
the three conditions pertaining to law, as stated above. For, in the first place, it belongs
to law to be directed to the common good as to its end, as stated above (Question 90,
Article 2). This good may be twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good; and to this,
man was directly ordained by the Old Law: wherefore, at the very outset of the law, the
people were invited to the earthly kingdom of the Chananaeans (Exodus 3:8-17).
Again it may be an intelligible and heavenly good: and to this, man is ordained by the
New Law.
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Wherefore, at the very beginning of His preaching, Christ invited men to the kingdom of
heaven, saying
(Matthew 4:17): "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Hence Augustine
says (Contra Faust. iv) that "promises of temporal goods are contained in the Old
Testament, for which reason it is called old; but the promise of eternal life belongs to the
New Testament."
Secondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts according to the order of
righteousness (4): wherein also the New Law surpasses the Old Law, since it directs our
internal acts, according to Matthew 5:20: "Unless your justice abound more than that of
the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." Hence the
saying that "the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls the mind" (
Sentent. iii, D, xl).
Thirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe its commandments. This the Old
Law did by the fear of punishment: but the New Law, by love, which is poured into our
hearts by the grace of Christ, bestowed in the New Law, but foreshadowed in the Old.
Hence Augustine says (Contra Adimant.

Manich. discip. xvii) that "there is little difference [The 'little difference' refers to the Latin
words 'timor' and 'amor'--'fear' and 'love.'] between the Law and the Gospel--fear and
love."
Reply to Objection 1. As the father of a family issues different commands to the children
and to the adults, so also the one King, God, in His one kingdom, gave one law to men,
while they were yet imperfect, and another more perfect law, when, by the preceding law,
they had been led to a greater capacity for Divine things.
Reply to Objection 2. The salvation of man could not be achieved otherwise than
through Christ, according to Acts 4:12: "There is no other name . . . given to men,
whereby we must be saved." Consequently, the law that brings all to salvation could not
be given until after the coming of Christ. But before His coming it was necessary to give
to the people, of whom Christ was to be born, a law containing certain rudiments of
righteousness unto salvation, in order to prepare them to receive Him.
Reply to Objection 3. The natural law directs man by way of certain general precepts,
common to both the perfect and the imperfect: wherefore it is one and the same for all.
But the Divine law directs man also in certain particular matters, to which the perfect and
imperfect do not stand in the same relation. Hence the necessity for the Divine law to be
twofold, as already explained.
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Article 6. Whether there is a law in the fomes of sin?

Objection 1. It would seem that there is no law of the "fomes" of sin. For Isidore says
(Etym. v) that the "law is based on reason." But the "fomes" of sin is not based on
reason, but deviates from it. Therefore, the "fomes" has not the nature of a law.
Objection 2. Further, every law is binding, so that those who do not obey it are called
transgressors. But man is not called a transgressor, from not following the instigations of
the "fomes"; but rather from his following them. Therefore, the "fomes" has not the nature
of a law.
Objection 3. Further, the law is ordained to the common good, as stated above
(Question 90, Article 2). But the "fomes" inclines us, not to the common, but to our own
private good. Therefore, the "fomes" has not the nature of sin.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Romans 7:23): "I see another law in my members,
fighting against the law of my mind."
I answer that, As stated above (2; 90, 1, ad 1), the law, as to its essence, resides in him
that rules and measures; but, by way of participation, in that which is ruled and measured;
so that every inclination or ordination which may be found in things subject to the law, is
called a law by participation, as stated above (2; 90, 1, ad 1). Now those who are subject
to a law may receive a twofold inclination from the lawgiver. First, in so far as he directly
inclines his subjects to something; sometimes indeed different subjects to different acts;
in this way we may say that there is a military law and a mercantile law. Secondly,
indirectly; thus by the very fact that a lawgiver deprives a subject of some dignity, the
latter passes into another order, so as to be under another law, as it were: thus if a soldier
be turned out of the army, he becomes a subject of rural or of mercantile legislation.
Accordingly, under the Divine Lawgiver various creatures have various natural
inclinations, so that what is, as it were, a law for one, is against the law for another: thus
I might say that fierceness is, in a way, the law of a dog, but against the law of a sheep
or another meek animal. And so the law of man, which, by the Divine ordinance, is
allotted to him, according to his proper natural condition, is that he should act in
accordance with reason: and this law was so effective in the primitive state, that nothing
either beside or against reason could take man unawares. But when man turned his back
on God, he fell under the influence of his sensual impulses: in fact this happens to each
one individually, the more he deviates from the path of reason, so that, after a fashion,
he is likened to the beasts that are led by the impulse of sensuality, according to Psalm
48:21: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to
senseless beasts, and made like to them."
So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is called the "fomes," in other animals
has simply the nature of a law (yet only in so far as a law may be said to be in such
things), by reason of a direct inclination. But in man, it has not the nature of law in this
way, rather is it a deviation from the law of reason. But since, by the just sentence of
God, man is destitute of original justice, and his reason bereft of its vigor, this impulse
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of sensuality, whereby he is led, in so far as it is a penalty following from the Divine law
depriving man of his proper dignity, has the nature of a law.
Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the "fomes" in itself, as an incentive to
evil. It is not thus that it has the nature of a law, as stated above, but according as it
results from the justice of the Divine law: it is as though we were to say that the law allows
a nobleman to be condemned to hard labor for some misdeed.
Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers law in the light of a rule or measure:
for it is in this sense that those who deviate from the law become transgressors. But
the "fomes" is not a law in this respect, but by a kind of participation, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the "fomes" as to its proper inclination,
and not as to its origin. And yet if the inclination of sensuality be considered as it is in
other animals, thus it is ordained to the common good, namely, to the preservation of
nature in the species or in the individual. And this is in man also, in so far as sensuality
is subject to reason. But it is called "fomes" in so far as it strays from the order of reason.
Question 92. The effects of law
0. Is an effect of law to make men good?
1. Are the effects of law to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish, as the Jurist
states?
Article 1. Whether an effect of law is to make men good?
Objection 1. It seems that it is not an effect of law to make men good. For men are good
through virtue, since virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6 is "that which makes its subject good."
But virtue is in man from God alone, because He it is Who "works it in us without us," as
we stated above (Question 55, Article 4) in giving the definition of virtue. Therefore, the
law does not make men good.
Objection 2. Further, Law does not profit a man unless he obeys it. But the very fact
that a man obeys a law is due to his being good. Therefore, in man goodness is
presupposed to the law. Therefore, the law does not make men good.
Objection 3. Further, Law is ordained to the common good, as stated above (Question
90, Article 2). But some behave well in things regarding the community, who behave ill
in things regarding themselves. Therefore, it is not the business of the law to make men
good.
Objection 4. Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 6). But
a tyrant does not intend the good of his subjects, but considers only his own profit.
Therefore, ,law does not make men good.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that the "intention of every lawgiver
is to make good citizens."
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I answer that, as stated above (90, 1, ad 2; A3,4), a law is nothing else than a dictate of
reason in the ruler by whom his subjects are governed. Now the virtue of any subordinate
thing consists in its being well subordinated to that by which it is regulated: thus we see
that the virtue of the irascible and concupiscible faculties consists in their being obedient
to reason; and accordingly "the virtue of every subject consists in his being well subjected
to his ruler," as the Philosopher says (Polit. i). But every law aims at being obeyed by
those who are subject to it. Consequently, it is evident that the proper effect of law is to
lead its subjects to their proper virtue: and since virtue is "that which makes its subject
good," it follows that the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is given, good,
either simply or in some particular respect. For if the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on
true good, which is the common good regulated according to Divine justice, it follows that
the effect of the law is to make men good simply. If, however, the intention of the lawgiver
is fixed on that which is not simply good, but useful or pleasurable to himself, or in
opposition to Divine justice; then the law does not make men good simply, but in respect
to that particular government. In this way good is found even in things that are bad of
themselves: thus a man is called a good robber, because he works in a way that is
adapted to his end.
Reply to Objection 1. Virtue is twofold, as explained above (Question 63, Article 2), viz.
acquired and infused. Now the fact of being accustomed to an action contributes to both,
but in different ways; for it causes the acquired virtue; while it disposes to infused virtue,
and preserves and fosters it when it already exists. And since law is given for the purpose
of directing human acts; as far as human acts conduce to virtue, so far does law make
men good. Wherefore the Philosopher says in the second book of the Politics (Ethic. ii)
that "lawgivers make men good by habituating them to good works."
Reply to Objection 2. It is not always through perfect goodness of virtue that one obeys
the law, but sometimes it is through fear of punishment, and sometimes from the mere
dictates of reason, which is a beginning of virtue, as stated above (Question 63, Article
1).
Reply to Objection 3. The goodness of any part is considered in comparison with the
whole; hence Augustine says (Confess. iii) that "unseemly is the part that harmonizes
not with the whole." Since then every man is a part of the state, it is impossible that a
man be good, unless he be well proportionate to the common good: nor can the whole
be well consistent unless its parts be proportionate to it. Consequently, the common good
of the state cannot flourish, unless the citizens be virtuous, at least those whose business
it is to govern. But it is enough for the good of the community, that the other citizens be
so far virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers. Hence the Philosopher says
(Polit. ii, 2) that "the virtue of a sovereign is the same as that of a good man, but the virtue
of any common citizen is not the same as that of a good man."
Reply to Objection 4. A tyrannical law, through not being according to reason, is not a
law, absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of law; and yet in so far as it is something
in the nature of a law, it aims at the citizens' being good. For all it has in the nature of a
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law consists in its being an ordinance made by a superior to his subjects, and aims at
being obeyed by them, which is to make them good, not simply, but with respect to that
particular government.
Article 2. Whether the acts of law are suitably assigned?
Objection 1. It would seem that the acts of law are not suitably assigned as consisting
in "command," "prohibition," "permission" and "punishment." For "every law is a general
precept," as the jurist states. But command and precept are the same. Therefore, the
other three are superfluous.
Objection 2. Further, the effect of a law is to induce its subjects to be good, as stated
above (Article 1). But counsel aims at a higher good than a command does. Therefore,
it belongs to law to counsel rather than to command.
Objection 3. Further, just as punishment stirs a man to good deeds, so does reward.
Therefore, if to punish is reckoned an effect of law, so also is to reward.
Objection 4. Further, the intention of a lawgiver is to make men good, as stated above
(Article 1). But he that obeys the law, merely through fear of being punished, is not good:
because "although a good deed may be done through servile fear, i.e. fear of
punishment, it is not done well," as Augustine says (Contra duas Epist. Pelag. ii).
Therefore, punishment is not a proper effect of law.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 19): "Every law either permits something, as: 'A
brave man may demand his reward'": or forbids something, as: "No man may ask a
consecrated virgin in marriage": or punishes, as: "Let him that commits a murder be put
to death."
I answer that, Just as an assertion is a dictate of reason asserting something, so is a law
a dictate of reason, commanding something. Now it is proper to reason to lead from one
thing to another. Wherefore just as, in demonstrative sciences, the reason leads us from
certain principles to assent to the conclusion, so it induces us by some means to assent
to the precept of the law.
Now the precepts of law are concerned with human acts, in which the law directs, as
stated above (90, A1,2; 91, 4). Again there are three kinds of human acts: for, as stated
above (Question 18, Article 8), some acts are good generically, viz. acts of virtue; and in
respect of these the act of the law is a precept or command, for "the law commands all
acts of virtue" (Ethic. v, 1). Some acts are evil generically, viz. acts of vice, and in respect
of these the law forbids. Some acts are generically indifferent, and in respect of these
the law permits; and all acts that are either not distinctly good or not distinctly bad may
be called indifferent. And it is the fear of punishment that law makes use of in order to
ensure obedience: in which respect punishment is an effect of law.
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Reply to Objection 1. Just as to cease from evil is a kind of good, so a prohibition is

a kind of precept: and accordingly, taking precept in a wide sense, every law is a kind
of precept.
Reply to Objection 2. To advise is not a proper act of law, but may be within the
competency even of a private person, who cannot make a law. Wherefore too the
Apostle, after giving a certain counsel (1 Corinthians 7:12) says: "I speak, not the
Lord." Consequently, it is not reckoned as an effect of law.
Reply to Objection 3. To reward may also pertain to anyone: but to punish
pertains to none but the framer of the law, by whose authority the pain is inflicted.
Wherefore to reward is not reckoned an effect of law, but only to punish.
Reply to Objection 4. From becoming accustomed to avoid evil and fulfill what is good,
through fear of punishment, one is sometimes led on to do so likewise, with delight and
of one's own accord. Accordingly, law, even by punishing, leads men on to being good.

1. What is the eternal law?

2. Is it known to all?
3. Is every law is derived from it?
4. Are necessary things subject to the eternal law?
5. Are natural contingencies subject to the eternal law?
6. Are all human things subject to it?

Article 1. Whether the eternal law is a sovereign type [Ratio] existing in God?
Objection 1. It would seem that the eternal law is not a sovereign type existing in God.
For there is only one eternal law. But there are many types of things in the Divine mind;
for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 46) that God "made each thing according to its type."
Therefore, the eternal law does not seem to be a type existing in the Divine mind.
Objection 2. Further, it is essential to a law that it be promulgated by word, as stated
above (Question 90, Article 4). But Word is a Personal name in God, as stated in the I,
34, 1: whereas type refers to the Essence. Therefore, the eternal law is not the same as
a Divine type.
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxx): "We see a law above our
minds, which is called truth." But the law which is above our minds is the eternal law.
Therefore, truth is the eternal law. But the idea of truth is not the same as the idea of a
type. Therefore, the eternal law is not the same as the sovereign type.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal law is the sovereign
type, to which we must always conform."
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I answer that, Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of the things that are made
by his art, so too in every governor there must pre-exist the type of the order of those
things that are to be done by those who are subject to his government. And just as the
type of the things yet to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar of the products
of that art, so too the type in him who governs the acts of his subjects, bears the character
of a law, provided the other conditions be present which we have mentioned above
(Article 90). Now God, by His wisdom, is the Creator of all things in relation to which He
stands as the artificer to the products of his art, as stated in the I, 14, 8. Moreover He
governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each single creature, as was
also stated in the I, 103, 5. Wherefore as the type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by
It all things are created, has the character of art, exemplar or idea; so the type of Divine
Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, bears the character of law. Accordingly,
the eternal law is nothing else than the type of Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions
and movements.
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking in that passage of the ideal types which
regard the proper nature of each single thing; and consequently in them there is a certain
distinction and plurality, according to their different relations to things, as stated in the I,
15, 2. But law is said to direct human acts by ordaining them to the common good, as
stated above (Question 90, Article 2). And things, which are in themselves different, may
be considered as one, according as they are ordained to one common thing. Wherefore
the eternal law is one since it is the type of this order.
Reply to Objection 2. With regard to any sort of word, two points may be considered:
viz. the word itself, and that which is expressed by the word. For the spoken word is
something uttered by the mouth of man, and expresses that which is signified by the
human word. The same applies to the human mental word, which is nothing else that
something conceived by the mind, by which man expresses his thoughts mentally. So
then in God the Word conceived by the intellect of the Father is the name of a Person:
but all things that are in the Father's knowledge, whether they refer to the Essence or to
the Persons, or to the works of God, are expressed by this Word, as Augustine declares
(De Trin. xv, 14). And among other things expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself
is expressed thereby. Nor does it follow that the eternal law is a Personal name in God:
yet it is appropriated to the Son, on account of the kinship between type and word.
Reply to Objection 3. The types of the Divine intellect do not stand in the same relation
to things, as the types of the human intellect. For the human intellect is measured by
things, so that a human concept is not true by reason of itself, but by reason of its being
consonant with things, since "an opinion is true or false according as it answers to the
reality." But the Divine intellect is the measure of things: since each thing has so far truth
in it, as it represents the Divine intellect, as was stated in the I, 16, 1. Consequently the
Divine intellect is true in itself; and its type is truth itself.
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Article 2. Whether the eternal law is known to all?

Objection 1. It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all. Because, as the
Apostle says (1 Corinthians 2:11), "the things that are of God no man knoweth, but the
Spirit of God." But the eternal law is a type existing in the Divine mind. Therefore, it is
unknown to all save God alone.
Objection 2. Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) "the eternal law is that by
which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But all do not know how all things
are most orderly. Therefor,e all do not know the eternal law.
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that "the eternal law is not
subject to the judgment of man." But according to Ethic. i, "any man can judge well of
what he knows." Therefore, the eternal law is not known to us.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "knowledge of the eternal law
is imprinted on us."
I answer that, A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in its effect,
wherein some likeness of that thing is found: thus someone not seeing the sun in its
substance, may know it by its rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in
itself, except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational creature knows
it in its reflection, greater or less. For every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and
participation of the eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says (De
Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all men know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the common
principles of the natural law: and as to the others, they partake of the knowledge of truth,
some more, some less; and in this respect are more or less cognizant of the eternal law.
Reply to Objection 1. We cannot know the things that are of God, as they are in
themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects, according to Romans 1:20:
"The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that
are made."
Reply to Objection 2. Although each one knows the eternal law according to his own
capacity, in the way explained above, yet none can comprehend it: for it cannot be made
perfectly known by its effects. Therefore, it does not follow that anyone who knows the
eternal law in the way aforesaid, knows also the whole order of things, whereby they are
most orderly.
Reply to Objection 3. To judge a thing may be understood in two ways. First, as when
a cognitive power judges of its proper object, according to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear
discern words, and the palate of him that eateth, the taste?"
It is to this kind of judgment that the Philosopher alludes when he says that "anyone can
judge well of what he knows," by judging, namely, whether what is put forward is true. In
another way we speak of a superior judging of a subordinate by a kind of practical
judgment, as to whether he should be such and such or not. And thus none can judge of
the eternal law.
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Article 3. Whether every law is derived from the eternal law?

Objection 1. It would seem that not every law is derived from the eternal law. For there
is a law of the "fomes," as stated above (Question 91, Article 6), which is not derived
from that Divine law which is the eternal law, since thereunto pertains the "prudence of
the flesh," of which the Apostle says (Romans 8:7), that "it cannot be subject to the law
of God." Therefore, not every law is derived from the eternal law.
Objection 2. Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal law, because, as
stated above (2, Objection 2), "the eternal law is that, according to which it is right that
all things should be most orderly." But some laws are unjust, according to Isaiah 10:1:
"Woe to them that make wicked laws." Therefore, not every law is derived from the
eternal law.
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) that "the law which is framed for
ruling the people, rightly permits many things which are punished by Divine providence."
But the type of Divine providence is the eternal law, as stated above (Article 1).
Therefore, not even every good law is derived from the eternal law.
On the contrary, Divine Wisdom says (Proverbs 8:15): "By Me kings reign, and
lawgivers decree just things." But the type of Divine Wisdom is the eternal law, as stated
above (Article 1). Therefore, all laws proceed from the eternal law.
I answer that, As stated above (90, A1,2), the law denotes a kind of plan directing acts
towards an end. Now wherever there are movers ordained to one another, the power of
the second mover must needs be derived from the power of the first mover; since the
second mover does not move except in so far as it is moved by the first. Wherefore we
observe the same in all those who govern, so that the plan of government is derived by
secondary governors from the governor in chief; thus the plan of what is to be done in a
state flows from the king's command to his inferior administrators: and again in things of
art the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman to the under-
crafts-men, who work with their hands. Since then the eternal law is the plan of
government in the Chief Governor, all the plans of government in the inferior governors
must be derived from the eternal law. But these plans of inferior governors are all other
laws besides the eternal law. Therefore, all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason,
are derived from the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "in
temporal law there is nothing just and lawful, but what man has drawn from the eternal
law."
Reply to Objection 1. The "fomes" has the nature of law in man, in so far as it is a
punishment resulting from Divine justice; and in this respect it is evident that it is
derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it denotes a proneness to sin, it is
contrary to the Divine law, and has not the nature of law, as stated above (Question
91, Article 6).
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Reply to Objection 2. Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of right
reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far
as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law but of
violence. Nevertheless, even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some appearance of
law, though being framed by one who is in power, is derived from the eternal law; since
all power is from the Lord God, according to Romans 13:1.
Reply to Objection 3. Human law is said to permit certain things, not as approving
them, but as being unable to direct them. And many things are directed by the Divine
law, which human law is unable to direct, because more things are subject to a higher
than to a lower cause. Hence the very fact that human law does not meddle with matters
it cannot direct, comes under the ordination of the eternal law. It would be different, were
human law to sanction what the eternal law condemns. Consequently, it does not follow
that human law is not derived from the eternal law, but that it is not on a perfect equality
with it.
Article 4. Whether necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law?
Objection 1. It would seem that necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal
law. For whatever is reasonable is subject to reason. But the Divine will is reasonable,
for it is just. Therefore, it is subject to
(the Divine) reason. But the eternal law is the Divine reason. Therefore, God's will is
subject to the eternal law. But God's will is eternal. Therefore, eternal and necessary
things are subject to the eternal law.
Objection 2. Further, whatever is subject to the King, is subject to the King's law. Now
the Son, according to
1 Corinthians 15:28-29, "shall be subject . . . to God and the Father . . . when He shall
have delivered up the Kingdom to Him." Therefore, the Son, Who is eternal, is subject
to the eternal law.
Objection 3. Further, the eternal law is Divine providence as a type. But many necessary
things are subject to Divine providence: for instance, the stability of incorporeal
substances and of the heavenly bodies. Therefore, even necessary things are subject to
the eternal law.
On the contrary, Things that are necessary cannot be otherwise, and consequently need
no restraining. But laws are imposed on men, in order to restrain them from evil, as
explained above (Question 92, Article 2). Therefore, necessary things are not subject to
the eternal law.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), the eternal law is the type of the Divine
government. Consequently, whatever is subject to the Divine government, is subject to
the eternal law: while if anything is not subject to the Divine government, neither is it
subject to the eternal law. The application of this distinction may be gathered by looking
around us. For those things are subject to human government, which can be done by
man; but what pertains to the nature of man is not subject to human government; for
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instance, that he should have a soul, hands, or feet. Accordingly, all that is in things
created by God, whether it be contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal law: while
things pertaining to the Divine Nature or Essence are not subject to the eternal law, but
are the eternal law itself.
Reply to Objection 1. We may speak of God's will in two ways. First, as to the will itself:
and thus, since God's will is His very Essence, it is subject neither to the Divine
government, nor to the eternal law, but is the same thing as the eternal law. Secondly,
we may speak of God's will, as to the things themselves that
God wills about creatures; which things are subject to the eternal law, in so far as they
are planned by Divine Wisdom. In reference to these things God's will is said to be
reasonable [rationalis]: though regarded in itself it should rather be called their type
[ratio].
Reply to Objection 2. God the Son was not made by God, but was naturally born of
God. Consequently, He is not subject to Divine providence or to the eternal law: but
rather is Himself the eternal law by a kind of appropriation, as Augustine explains (De
Vera Relig. xxxi). But He is said to be subject to the Father by reason of His human
nature, in respect of which also the Father is said to be greater than He.
The third objection we grant, because it deals with those necessary things that are
created.
Reply to Objection 4. As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 6), some necessary
things have a cause of their necessity: and thus they derive from something else the fact
that they cannot be otherwise. And this is in itself a most effective restraint; for whatever
is restrained, is said to be restrained in so far as it cannot do otherwise than it is allowed
to.
Article 5. Whether natural contingents are subject to the eternal law?
Objection 1. It would seem that natural contingents are not subject to the eternal law.
Because promulgation is essential to law, as stated above (Question 90, Article 4). But
a law cannot be promulgated except to rational creatures, to whom it is possible to make
an announcement. Therefore, none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law;
and consequently natural contingents are not.
Objection 2. Further, "Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of reason," as stated
in Ethic. i. But the eternal law, is the supreme type, as stated above (Article 1). Since
then natural contingents do not partake of reason in any way, but are altogether void of
reason, it seems that they are not subject to the eternal law.
Objection 3. Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural contingent defects
occur. Therefore, they are not subject to the eternal law.
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On the contrary, It is written (Proverbs 8:29): "When He compassed the sea with its
bounds, and set a law to the waters, that they should not pass their limits."
I answer that, We must speak otherwise of the law of man, than of the eternal law which
is the law of God. For the law of man extends only to rational creatures subject to man.
The reason of this is because law directs the actions of those that are subject to the
government of someone: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a law on his own
actions. Now whatever is done regarding the use of irrational things subject to man, is
done by the act of man himself moving those things, for these irrational creatures do not
move themselves, but are moved by others, as stated above (Question 1, Article 2).
Consequently, man cannot impose laws on irrational beings, however much they may be
subject to him. But he can impose laws on rational beings subject to him, in so far as by
his command or pronouncement of any kind, he imprints on their minds a rule which is a
principle of action.
Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a kind of inward principle of action
on the man that is subject to him, so God imprints on the whole of nature the principles
of its proper actions. And so, in this way, God is said to command the whole of nature,
according to Psalm 148:6: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." And
thus all actions and movements of the whole of nature are subject to the eternal law.
Consequently, irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law, through being moved
by Divine providence; but not, as rational creatures are, through understanding the Divine
commandment.
Reply to Objection 1. The impression of an inward active principle is to natural things,
what the promulgation of law is to men: because law, by being promulgated, imprints on
man a directive principle of human actions, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2. Irrational creatures neither partake of nor are obedient to human
reason: whereas they do partake of the Divine Reason by obeying it; because the power
of Divine Reason extends over more things than human reason does. And as the
members of the human body are moved at the command of reason, and yet do not
partake of reason, since they have no apprehension subordinate to reason; so too
irrational creatures are moved by God, without, on that account, being rational.
Reply to Objection 3. Although the defects which occur in natural things are outside the
order of particular causes, they are not outside the order of universal causes, especially
of the First Cause, i.e. God, from Whose providence nothing can escape, as stated in
the I, 22, 2. And since the eternal law is the type of Divine providence, as stated above
(Article 1), hence the defects of natural things are subject to the eternal law.
Article 6. Whether all human affairs are subject to the eternal law?
Objection 1. It would seem that not all human affairs are subject to the eternal law. For
the Apostle says (Galatians 5:18): "If you are led by the spirit you are not under the law."
But the righteous who are the sons of God by adoption, are led by the spirit of God,
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according to Romans 8:14: "Whosoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons of
God." Therefore, not all men are under the eternal law.
Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Romans 8:7): "The prudence [Vulgate:
'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not subject to the law of God." But
many are those in whom the prudence of the flesh dominates. Therefore, all men are
not subject to the eternal law which is the law of God.
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal law is that by
which the wicked deserve misery, the good, a life of blessedness." But those who are
already blessed, and those who are already lost, are not in the state of merit. Therefore,
they are not under the eternal law.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12): "Nothing evades the laws of the
most-high Creator and Governor, for by Him the peace of the universe is administered."
I answer that, there are two ways in which a thing is subject to the eternal law, as
explained above (Article 5): first, by partaking of the eternal law by way of knowledge;
secondly, by way of action and passion, i.e. by partaking of the eternal law by way of
an inward motive principle: and in this second way, irrational creatures are subject to
the eternal law, as stated above (Article 5). But since the rational nature, together
with that which it has in common with all creatures, has something proper to itself
inasmuch as it is rational, consequently it is subject to the eternal law in both ways;
because while each rational creature has some knowledge of the eternal law, as stated
above (Article 2), it also has a natural inclination to that which is in harmony with the
eternal law; for "we are naturally adapted to the recipients of virtue" (Ethic. ii, 1).
Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent destroyed, in the wicked;
because in them the natural inclination to virtue is corrupted by vicious habits, and,
moreover, the natural knowledge of good is darkened by passions and habits of sin. But
in the good both ways are found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural
knowledge of good, there is the added knowledge of faith and wisdom; and again,
besides the natural inclination to good, there is the added motive of grace and virtue.
Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as always acting according
to it: whereas the wicked are subject to the eternal law, imperfectly as to their actions,
indeed, since both their knowledge of good, and their inclination thereto, are imperfect;
but this imperfection on the part of action is supplied on the part of passion, in so far as
they suffer what the eternal law decrees concerning them, according as they fail to act in
harmony with that law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15): "I esteem that the
righteous act according to the eternal law; and (De Catech. Rud. xviii): Out of the just
misery of the souls which deserted Him, God knew how to furnish the inferior parts of His
creation with most suitable laws."
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Reply to Objection 1. This saying of the Apostle may be understood in two ways. First,
so that a man is said to be under the law, through being pinned down thereby, against
his will, as by a load. Hence, on the same passage a gloss says that "he is under the
law, who refrains from evil deeds, through fear of punishment threatened by the law,
and not from love of virtue." In this way the spiritual man is not under the law, because
he fulfils the law willingly, through charity which is poured into his heart by the Holy
Ghost. Secondly, it can be understood as meaning that the works of a man, who is led
by the Holy Ghost, are the works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own. Therefore, since
the Holy Ghost is not under the law, as neither is the Son, as stated above (4, ad 2); it
follows that such works, in so far as they are of the Holy Ghost, are not under the law.
The Apostle witnesses to this when he says (2 Corinthians 3:17): "Where the Spirit of
the Lord is, there is liberty."
Reply to Objection 2. The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to the law of God as
regards action; since it inclines to actions contrary to the Divine law: yet it is subject to
the law of God, as regards passion; since it deserves to suffer punishment according to
the law of Divine justice. Nevertheless, in no man does the prudence of the flesh
dominate so far as to destroy the whole good of his nature: and consequently there
remains in man the inclination to act in accordance with the eternal law. For we have
seen above (Question 85, Article 2) that sin does not destroy entirely the good of nature.
Reply to Objection 3. A thing is maintained in the end and moved towards the end by
one and the same cause: thus gravity which makes a heavy body rest in the lower place
is also the cause of its being moved thither. We therefore reply that as it is according to
the eternal law that some deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the eternal
law that some are maintained in a happy state, others in an unhappy state. Accordingly,
both the blessed and the damned are under the eternal law.

Question 94. The natural law

1. What is the natural law?

2. What are the precepts of the natural law?

3. Are all acts of virtue prescribed by the natural law?
4. Is the natural law the same in all?
5. Is it changeable?
6. Can it be abolished from the heart of man?
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Article 1. Whether the natural law is a habit?

Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law is a habit. Because, as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. ii, 5), "there are three things in the soul: power, habit, and passion." But the
natural law is not one of the soul's powers: nor is it one of the passions; as we may see
by going through them one by one. Therefore, the natural law is a habit.
Objection 2. Further, Basil [Damascene, De Fide Orth. iv, 22 says that the conscience
or "synderesis" is the "law of our mind"; which can only apply to the natural law. But the
"synderesis" is a habit, as was shown in the I, 79, 12. Therefore the natural law is a habit.
Objection 3. Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be shown further on
(6). But man's reason, which the law regards, does not always think about the natural
law. Therefore, the natural law is not an act, but a habit.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "a habit is that whereby
something is done when necessary." But such is not the natural law: since it is in infants
and in the damned who cannot act by it. Therefore, the natural law is not a habit.
I answer that, A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First, properly and essentially:
and thus the natural law is not a habit. For it has been stated above (90, 1, ad 2) that
the natural law is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of
reason. Now that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he does it: for he
makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since then a habit is that by which
we act, a law cannot be a habit properly and essentially.
Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a habit: thus faith may
mean that which we hold by faith. And accordingly, since the precepts of the natural law
are sometimes considered by reason actually, while sometimes they are in the reason
only habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit. Thus, in speculative
matters, the indemonstrable principles are not the habit itself whereby we hold those
principles, but are the principles the habit of which we possess.
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher proposes there to discover the genus of virtue;
and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of action, he mentions only those things
which are principles of human acts, viz. powers, habits and passions. But there are other
things in the soul besides these three: there are acts; thus "to will" is in the one that wills;
again, things known are in the knower; moreover, its own natural properties are in the
soul, such as immortality and the like.
Reply to Objection 2. "Synderesis" is said to be the law of our mind, because it is a
habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are the first principles of human
actions.
Reply to Objection 3. This argument proves that the natural law is held habitually;
and this is granted.
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To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that sometimes a man is
unable to make use of that which is in him habitually, on account of some impediment:
thus, on account of sleep, a man is unable to use the habit of science. In like manner,
through the deficiency of his age, a child cannot use the habit of understanding of
principles, or the natural law, which is in him habitually.
Article 2. Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?
Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law contains, not several precepts, but one
only. For law is a kind of precept, as stated above (Question 92, Article 2). If therefore
there were many precepts of the natural law, it would follow that there are also many
natural laws.
Objection 2. Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature. But human nature,
as a whole, is one; though, as to its parts, it is manifold. Therefore, either there is but one
precept of the law of nature, on account of the unity of nature as a whole; or there are
many, by reason of the number of parts of human nature. The result would be that even
things relating to the inclination of the concupiscible faculty belong to the natural law.
Objection 3. Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above (Question
90, Article 1). Now reason is but one in man. Therefore, there is only one precept of the
natural law.
On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in man stand in relation to practical
matters, as the first principles to matters of demonstration. But there are several first
indemonstrable principles. Therefore, there are also several precepts of the natural law.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 91, Article 3), the precepts of the natural law
are to the practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the
speculative reason; because both are selfevident principles. Now a thing is said to be
self-evident in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposition is said
to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the notion of the subject:
although, to one who knows not the definition of the subject, it happens that such a
proposition is not self-evident. For instance, this proposition, "Man is a rational being,"
is, in its very nature, selfevident, since who says "man," says "a rational being": and yet
to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is not self-evident. Hence it is that,
as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), certain axioms or propositions are universally self-
evident to all; and such are those propositions whose terms are known to all, as, "Every
whole is greater than its part," and, "Things equal to one and the same are equal to one
another." But some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the
meaning of the terms of such propositions: thus to one who understands that an angel
is not a body, it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place: but this
is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.
Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended universally. For
that which, before aught else, falls under apprehension, is "being," the notion of which is
included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable
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principle is that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," which
is based on the notion of "being" and "not-being": and on this principle all others are
based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, text. 9. Now as "being" is the first thing that falls under
the apprehension simply, so "good" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of
the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under
the aspect of good. Consequently, the first principle of practical reason is one founded
on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek after." Hence this is the
first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All
other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical
reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the
natural law as something to be done or avoided.
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence
it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended
by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as
evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations,
is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an
inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all
substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being,
according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of
preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law.
Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially,
according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this
inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught
to all animals" [Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring
and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his
reason, which nature is proper to
him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in
society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural
law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to
live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.
Reply to Objection 1. All these precepts of the law of nature have the character of one
natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first precept.
Reply to Objection 2. All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of human nature, e.g.
of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far as they are ruled by reason, belong to
the natural law, and are reduced to one first precept, as stated above: so that the
precepts of the natural law are many in themselves, but are based on one common
foundation.
Reply to Objection 3. Although reason is one in itself, yet it directs all things regarding
man; so that whatever can be ruled by reason, is contained under the law of reason.
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Article 3. Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?
Objection 1. It would seem that not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law.
Because, as stated above (Question 90, Article 2) it is essential to a law that it be
ordained to the common good. But some acts of virtue are ordained to the private good
of the individual, as is evident especially in regards to acts of temperance. Therefore, not
all acts of virtue are the subject of natural law.
Objection 2. Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If therefore all acts of
virtue are prescribed by the natural law, it seems to follow that all sins are against nature:
whereas this applies to certain special sins.
Objection 3. Further, those things which are according to nature are common to all.
But acts of virtue are not common to all: since a thing is virtuous in one, and vicious in
another. Therefore, not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "virtues are natural."
Therefore, virtuous acts also are a subject of the natural law.
I answer that, We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first, under the aspect of
virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts considered in their proper species. If then we
speak of acts of virtue, considered as virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the natural
law. For it has been stated (2) that to the natural law belongs everything to which a man
is inclined according to his nature. Now each thing is inclined naturally to an operation
that is suitable to it according to its form: thus fire is inclined to give heat.
Wherefore, since the rational soul is the proper form of man, there is in every man a
natural inclination to act according to reason: and this is to act according to virtue.
Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law: since
each one's reason naturally dictates to him to act virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous
acts, considered in themselves, i.e. in their proper species, thus not all virtuous acts are
prescribed by the natural law: for many things are done virtuously, to which nature does
not incline at first; but which, through the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to
be conducive to well-living.
Reply to Objection 1. Temperance is about the natural concupiscence of food, drink
and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the natural common good, just as other
matters of law are ordained to the moral common good.
Reply to Objection 2. By human nature we may mean either that which is proper to
man--and in this sense all sins, as being against reason, are also against nature, as
Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): or we may mean that nature which is common
to man and other animals; and in this sense, certain special sins are said to be against
nature; thus contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is unisexual
lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural crime. Reply to Objection 3.
This argument considers acts in themselves. For it is owing to the various conditions of
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men, that certain acts are virtuous for some, as being proportionate and becoming to
them, while they are vicious for others, as being out of proportion to them.
Article 4. Whether the natural law is the same in all men?
Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all. For it is stated in
the Decretals (Dist.
i) that "the natural law is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel." But this is
not common to all men; because, as it is written (Romans 10:16), "all do not obey the
gospel." Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men.
Objection 2. Further, "Things which are according to the law are said to be just," as
stated in Ethic. v. But it is stated in the same book that nothing is so universally just as
not to be subject to change in regard to some men. Therefore even the natural law is not
the same in all men.
Objection 3. Further, as stated above (2,3), to the natural law belongs everything to
which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now different men are naturally inclined
to different things; some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and
other men to other things. Therefore there is not one natural law for all.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is common to all nations."
I answer that, As stated above (2,3), to the natural law belongs those things to which a
man is inclined naturally: and among these it is proper to man to be inclined to act
according to reason. Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as
stated in Phys. i. The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in this matter,
from the practical reason. For, since the speculative reason is busied chiefly with the
necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like
the universal principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical reason, on the other
hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: and
consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend
to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly, then in
speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as to
conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only
as regards the principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action, truth
or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the
general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not
equally known to all.
It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of
practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to
the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not
equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together
equal to two right angles, although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions
of the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is
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the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all to act according to
reason: and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to
another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but
it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable,
to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting
against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as we
descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be
restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater
the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle
may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore.
Consequently, we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for
all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which
are conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the same for all in the majority
of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail,
both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to generation
and corruption fail in some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to
knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil
disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural
law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello
Gall. vi).
Reply to Objection 1. The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever is
contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural law, since they contain many
things that are above nature; but that whatever belongs to the natural law is fully
contained in them. Wherefore Gratian, after saying that "the natural law is what is
contained in the Law and the Gospel," adds at once, by way of example, "by which
everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be done by."
Reply to Objection 2. The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of things that
are naturally just, not as general principles, but as conclusions drawn from them,
having rectitude in the majority of cases, but failing in a few.
Reply to Objection 3. As, in man, reason rules and commands the other powers, so all
the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers must needs be directed according
to reason. Wherefore it is universally right for all men, that all their inclinations should be
directed according to reason.
Article 5. Whether the natural law can be changed?
Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law can be changed. Because on Sirach
17:9, "He gave them instructions, and the law of life," the gloss says: "He wished the law
of the letter to be written, in order to correct the law of nature." But that which is corrected
is changed. Therefore, the natural law can be changed.
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Objection 2. Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery, and theft are against the
natural law. But we find these things changed by God: as when God commanded
Abraham to slay his innocent son (Genesis 22:2); and when he ordered the Jews to
borrow and purloin the vessels of the Egyptians (Exodus 12:35); and when He
commanded Osee to take to himself "a wife of fornications" (Hosea 1:2). Therefore, the
natural law can be changed.
Objection 3. Further, Isidore says (Etym. 5:4) that "the possession of all things in
common, and universal freedom, are matters of natural law." But these things are seen
to be changed by human laws. Therefore, it seems that the natural law is subject to
change.
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v): "The natural law dates from the
creation of the rational creature. It does not vary according to time, but remains
unchangeable."
I answer that, A change in the natural law may be understood in two ways. First, by way
of addition. In this sense nothing hinders the natural law from being changed: since
many things for the benefit of human life have been added over and above the natural
law, both by the Divine law and by human laws.
Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of subtraction, so that
what previously was according to the natural law, ceases to be so. In this sense, the
natural law is altogether unchangeable in its first principles: but in its secondary
principles, which, as we have said (4), are certain detailed proximate conclusions drawn
from the first principles, the natural law is not changed so that what it prescribes be not
right in most cases. But it may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence,
through some special causes hindering the observance of such precepts, as stated
above (Article 4).
Reply to Objection 1. The written law is said to be given for the correction of the natural
law, either because it supplies what was wanting to the natural law; or because the
natural law was perverted in the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they
esteemed those things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in need of
correction.
Reply to Objection 2. All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the death of nature:
which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God on account of original sin,
according to 1 Samuel 2:6: "The Lord killeth and maketh alive." Consequently, by the
command of God, death can be inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any
injustice whatever. In like manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife; who is
allotted to him by the law emanating from God. Consequently, intercourse with any
woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery nor fornication. The same applies
to theft, which is the taking of another's property. For whatever is taken by the command
of God, to Whom all things belong, is not taken against the will of its owner, whereas it
is in this that theft consists. Nor is it only in human things, that whatever is commanded
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by God is right; but also in natural things, whatever is done by God, is, in some way,
natural, as stated in the I, 105, 6, ad 1.
Reply to Objection 3. A thing is said to belong to the natural law in two ways. First,
because nature inclines thereto: e.g. that one should not do harm to another. Secondly,
because nature did not bring in the contrary: thus we might say that for man to be naked
is of the natural law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In
this sense, "the possession of all things in common and universal freedom" are said to
be of the natural law, because, to wit, the distinction of possessions and slavery were not
brought in by nature, but devised by human reason for the benefit of human life.
Accordingly, the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except by addition.
Article 6. Whether the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man?
Objection 1. It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from the heart of man.
Because on Romans 2:14, "When the Gentiles who have not the law," etc. a gloss says
that "the law of righteousness, which sin had blotted out, is graven on the heart of man
when he is restored by grace." But the law of righteousness is the law of nature.
Therefore, the law of nature can be blotted out.
Objection 2. Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than the law of nature. But the
law of grace is blotted out by sin. Much more therefore can the law of nature be blotted
out.
Objection 3. Further, that which is established by law is made just. But many things are
enacted by men, which are contrary to the law of nature. Therefore, the law of nature
can be abolished from the heart of man.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii): "Thy law is written in the hearts of men,
which iniquity itself effaces not." But the law which is written in men's hearts is the
natural law. Therefore, the natural law cannot be blotted out.
I answer that, As stated above (4,5), there belong to the natural law, first, certain most
general precepts, that are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary and more
detailed precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles.
As to those general principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can nowise be blotted out
from men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the case of a particular action, in so far as
reason is hindered from applying the general principle to a particular point of practice, on
account of concupiscence or some other passion, as stated above (Question 77, Article
2). But as to the other, i.e. the secondary precepts, the natural law can be blotted out
from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors
occur in respect of necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as
among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle states (Romans 1),
were not esteemed sinful.
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Reply to Objection 1. Sin blots out the law of nature in particular cases, not universally,
except perchance in regard to the secondary precepts of the natural law, in the way
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2. Although grace is more efficacious than nature, yet nature is more
essential to man, and therefore more enduring.
Reply to Objection 3. This argument is true of the secondary precepts of the natural
law, against which some legislators have framed certain enactments which are unjust.
Question 95. Human law

1. Its utility
2. Its origin
3. Its quality
4. Its division

Article 1. Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men?

Objection 1. It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed by men. Because
the purpose of every law is that man be made good thereby, as stated above (Question
92, Article 1). But men are more to be induced to be good willingly by means of
admonitions, than against their will, by means of laws. Therefore, there was no need to
frame laws.
Objection 2. Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a
judge as to animate justice." But animate justice is better than inanimate justice, which
contained in laws. Therefore, it would have been better for the execution of justice to
be entrusted to the decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition.
Objection 3. Further, every law is framed for the direction of human actions, as is
evident from what has been stated above (90, A1,2). But since human actions are about
singulars, which are infinite in number, matter pertaining to the direction of human
actions cannot be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who looks
into each one of them. Therefore, it would have been better for human acts to be
directed by the judgment of wise men, than by the framing of laws. Therefore, there was
no need of human laws.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were made that in fear thereof human
audacity might be held in check, that innocence might be safeguarded in the midst of
wickedness, and that the dread of punishment might prevent the wicked from doing
harm." But these things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore, it was necessary that
human laws should be made.
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I answer that, As stated above (63, 1; 94, 3), man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but
the perfection of virtue must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus
we observe that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for instance, in food and
clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from nature, viz. his reason and his hands;
but he has not the full complement, as other animals have, to whom nature has given
sufficiency of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice for himself
in the matter of this training: since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing
man from undue pleasures, to which above all man is inclined, and especially the young,
who are more capable of being trained. Consequently, a man needs to receive this
training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue. And as to those young
people who are inclined to acts of virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by custom,
or rather by the gift of God, paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions. But since
some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it
was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least,
they might desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they themselves,
by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what hitherto they did
from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training, which compels through
fear of punishment, is the discipline of laws. Therefore, in order that man might have
peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed: for, as the Philosopher says
(Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect in virtue, so is he the
lowest of all, if he be severed from law and righteousness"; because man can use his
reason to devise means of satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are
unable to do.
Reply to Objection 1. Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by being
admonished better than by coercion: but men who are evilly disposed are not led to
virtue unless they are compelled.
Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), "it is better that all things be
regulated by law, than left to be decided by judges": and this for three reasons. First,
because it is easier to find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find the
many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case. Secondly, because
those who make laws consider long beforehand what laws to make; whereas judgment
on each single case has to be pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man
to see what is right, by taking many instances into consideration, than by considering
one solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future events;
whereas those who sit in judgment of things present, towards which they are affected by
love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted.
Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man, and since it can
be deflected, therefore it was necessary, whenever possible, for the law to determine
how to judge, and for very few matters to be left to the decision of men.
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Reply to Objection 3. Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the law "have
necessarily to be committed to judges," as the Philosopher says in the same passage:
for instance, "concerning something that has happened or not happened," and the like.
Article 2. Whether every human law is derived from the natural law?
Objection 1. It would seem that not every human law is derived from the natural law. For
the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just is that which originally was a matter of
indifference." But those things which arise from the natural law are not matters of
indifference. Therefore, the enactments of human laws are not derived from the natural
law.
Objection 2. Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as stated by Isidore
(Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). But those things which flow as conclusions
from the general principles of the natural law belong to the natural law, as stated above
(Question 94, Article 4). Therefore, that which is established by human law does not
belong to the natural law.
Objection 3. Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the Philosopher says
(Ethic. v, 7) that "the natural just is that which is equally valid everywhere." If therefore
human laws were derived from the natural law, it would follow that they too are the same
for all: which is clearly false.
Objection 4. Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which are derived from the
natural law.
But "it is not possible to give the reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers,"
as the jurist says [Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; De Leg. et Senat.]. Therefore, not all
human laws are derived from the natural law.
On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii): "Things which emanated from nature and were
approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the laws."
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not just seems to be no
law at all": wherefore the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human
affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the
first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above (91,
2, ad 2). Consequently, every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is
derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is
no longer a law but a perversion of law.
But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law in two ways:
first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of determination of certain
generalities. The first way is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions
are drawn from the principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the
arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine
the general form of a house to some particular shape. Some things are therefore derived
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from the general principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; e.g. that "one must
not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that "one should do harm to
no man": while some are derived therefrom by way of determination; e.g. the law of
nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished; but that he be punished in this or that
way, is a determination of the law of nature.
Accordingly, both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those things
which are derived in the first way, are contained in human law not as emanating
therefrom exclusively, but have some force from the natural law also. But those things
which are derived in the second way, have no other force than that of human law.
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments which are by
way of determination or specification of the precepts of the natural law.
Reply to Objection 2. This argument avails for those things that are derived from the
natural law, by way of conclusions.
Reply to Objection 3. The general principles of the natural law cannot be applied to all
men in the same way on account of the great variety of human affairs: and hence arises
the diversity of positive laws among various people.
Reply to Objection 4. These words of the Jurist are to be understood as referring to
decisions of rulers in determining particular points of the natural law: on which
determinations the judgment of expert and prudent men is based as on its principles; in
so far, to wit, as they see at once what is the best thing to decide.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, "we ought to pay as
much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of persons who surpass us
in experience, age and prudence, as to their demonstrations."
Article 3. Whether Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is appropriate?
Objection 1. It would seem that Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is not
appropriate, when he says (Etym. v, 21): "Law shall be virtuous, just, possible to nature,
according to the custom of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful;
clearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed for no private
benefit, but for the common good." Because he had previously expressed the quality of
law in three conditions, saying that "law is anything founded on reason, provided that it
foster religion, be helpful to discipline, and further the common weal." Therefore, it was
needless to add any further conditions to these.
Objection 2. Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully says (De Offic. vii).
Therefore, after saying "honest" it was superfluous to add "just."
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Objection 3. Further, written law is condivided with custom, according to Isidore (Etym.
ii, 10). Therefore, it should not be stated in the definition of law that it is "according to the
custom of the country."
Objection 4. Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be necessary simply,
because it cannot be otherwise: and that which is necessary in this way, is not subject to
human judgment, wherefore human law is not concerned with necessity of this kind.
Again a thing may be necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as usefulness.
Therefore, it is superfluous to say both "necessary" and "useful."
On the contrary, stands the authority of Isidore.
I answer that, Whenever, a thing is for an end, its form must be determined
proportionately to that end; as the form of a saw is such as to be suitable for cutting
(Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything that is ruled and measured must have a form
proportionate to its rule and measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human
law: since it is both something ordained to an end; and is a rule or measure ruled or
measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is twofold, viz. the Divine law
and the natural law, as explained above (2; 93, 3). Now the end of human law is to be
useful to man, as the jurist states [Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv, ff., tit. iii; De Leg. et Senat.].
Wherefore Isidore in determining the nature of law, lays down, at first, three conditions;
viz. that it "foster religion," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the Divine law; that it be
"helpful to discipline," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the nature law; and that it "further
the common weal," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the utility of mankind.
All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three. For it is called
virtuous because it fosters religion. And when he goes on to say that it should be "just,
possible to nature, according to the customs of the country, adapted to place and time,"
he implies that it should be helpful to discipline.
For human discipline depends on first on the order of reason, to which he refers by saying
"just": secondly, it depends on the ability of the agent; because discipline should be
adapted to each one according to his ability, taking also into account the ability of nature
(for the same burdens should be not laid on children as adults); and should be according
to human customs; since man cannot live alone in society, paying no heed to others:
thirdly, it depends on certain circumstances, in respect of which he says, "adapted to
place and time." The remaining words, "necessary, useful," etc. mean that law should
further the common weal: so that "necessity" refers to the removal of evils; "usefulness"
to the attainment of good; "clearness of expression," to the need of preventing any harm
ensuing from the law itself. And since, as stated above (Question 90, Article 2), law is
ordained to the common good, this is expressed in the last part of the description.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Article 4. Whether Isidore's division of human laws is appropriate?
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Objection 1. It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human statutes or human law
(Etym. v, 4, seqq.). For under this law he includes the "law of nations," so called,
because, as he says, "nearly all nations use it." But as he says, "natural law is that which
is common to all nations." Therefore, the law of nations is not contained under positive
human law, but rather under natural law.
Objection 2. Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to differ not formally
but only materially. But "statutes, decrees of the commonalty, senatorial decrees," and
the like which he mentions (Etym. v, 9), all have the same force. Therefore, they do not
differ, except materially. But art takes no notice of such a distinction: since it may go on
to infinity. Therefore, this division of human laws is not appropriate.
Objection 3. Further, just as, in the state, there are princes, priests and soldiers, so
are there other human offices. Therefore, it seems that, as this division includes
"military law," and "public law," referring to priests and magistrates; so also it should
include other laws pertaining to other offices of the state.
Objection 4. Further, those things that are accidental should be passed over. But it is
accidental to law that it be framed by this or that man. Therefore, it is unreasonable to
divide laws according to the names of lawgivers, so that one be called the "Cornelian"
law, another the "Falcidian" law, etc.
On the contrary, The authority of Isidore (Objection 1) suffices.
I answer that, A thing can of itself be divided in respect of something contained in the
notion of that thing. Thus a soul either rational or irrational is contained in the notion of
animal: and therefore animal is divided properly and of itself in respect of its being rational
or irrational; but not in the point of its being white or black, which are entirely beside the
notion of animal. Now, in the notion of human law, many things are contained, in respect
of any of which human law can be divided properly and of itself. For in the first place it
belongs to the notion of human law, to be derived from the law of nature, as explained
above (Article 2). In this respect positive law is divided into the "law of nations" and "civil
law", according to the two ways in which something may be derived from the law of
nature, as stated above (Article 2). Because, to the law of nations belong those things
which are derived from the law of nature, as conclusions from premises, e.g. just buying
and selling, and the like, without which men cannot live together, which is a point of the
law of nature, since man is by nature a social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2. But those
things which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination, belong
to the civil law, according as each state decides on what is best for itself.
Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be ordained to the common good
of the state. In this respect human law may be divided according to the different kinds
of men who work in a special way for the common good: e.g. priests, by praying to God
for the people; princes, by governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for the safety of
the people. Wherefore certain special kinds of law are adapted to these men.
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magistrates; so also it should include other laws pertaining to other offices of the state.
Objection 4. Further, those things that are accidental should be passed over. But it is
accidental to law that it be framed by this or that man. Therefore, it is unreasonable to
divide laws according to the names of lawgivers, so that one be called the "Cornelian"
law, another the "Falcidian" law, etc.
On the contrary, The authority of Isidore (Objection 1) suffices.
I answer that, A thing can of itself be divided in respect of something contained in the
notion of that thing. Thus a soul either rational or irrational is contained in the notion of
animal: and therefore animal is divided properly and of itself in respect of its being rational
or irrational; but not in the point of its being white or black, which are entirely beside the
notion of animal. Now, in the notion of human law, many things are contained, in respect
of any of which human law can be divided properly and of itself. For in the first place it
belongs to the notion of human law, to be derived from the law of nature, as explained
above (Article 2). In this respect positive law is divided into the "law of nations" and "civil
law", according to the two ways in which something may be derived from the law of
nature, as stated above (Article 2). Because, to the law of nations belong those things
which are derived from the law of nature, as conclusions from premises, e.g. just buying
and selling, and the like, without which men cannot live together, which is a point of the
law of nature, since man is by nature a social animal, as is proved in
Polit. i, 2. But those things which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular
determination, belong to the civil law, according as each state decides on what is best
for itself.
Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be ordained to the common good
of the state. In this respect human law may be divided according to the different kinds
of men who work in a special way for the common good: e.g. priests, by praying to God
for the people; princes, by governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for the safety of
the people. Wherefore certain special kinds of law are adapted to these men.
Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be framed by that one who governs the
community of the state, as shown above (Question 90, Article 3). In this respect, there
are various human laws according to the various forms of government. Of these,
according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 10) one is "monarchy," i.e. when the state is
governed by one; and then we have "RoyalOrdinances." Another form is "aristocracy,"
i.e. government by the best men or men of highest rank; and then we have the
"Authoritative legal opinions" [Responsa Prudentum] and "Decrees of the Senate"
[Senatus consulta]. Another form is "oligarchy," i.e. government by a few rich and
powerful men; and then we have "Praetorian," also called "Honorary," law. Another form
of government is that of the people, which is called "democracy," and there we have
"Decrees of the commonalty" [Plebiscita].There is also tyrannical government, which is
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altogether corrupt, which,therefore, has no corresponding law. Finally, there is a form of

government made up of all these, and which is the best: and in this respect we have law
sanctioned by the "Lords and Commons," as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4,seqq.).
Fourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to direct human actions. In this respect,
according to the various matters of which the law treats, there are various kinds of laws,
which are sometimes named after their authors: thus we have the "Lex Julia" about
adultery, the "Lex Cornelia" concerning assassins, and so on, differentiated in this way,
not on account of the authors, but on account of the matters to which they refer.

Reply to Objection 1. The law of nations is indeed, in some way, natural to man, in so
far as he is reasonable being, because it is derived from the natural law by way of a
conclusion that is not very remote from its premises. Wherefore men easily agreed
thereto. Nevertheless, it is distinct from the natural law, especially it is distinct from the
natural law which is common to all animals. The Replies to the other Objections are
evident from what has been said.