345
BABY 520 notes
This Court agrees with the RTC that in obtaining a free patent over the lot under scrutiny,
petitioner had resorted to misrepresentation or fraud, signs of which were ignored by the CA. First, the
issuance of the free patent was not made in accordance with the procedure laid down by Commonwealth
Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Under Section 91 thereof, an investigation should
be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the application are true.
Further, after the filing of the application, the law requires sufficient notice to the municipality and the barrio
where the land is located, in order to give adverse claimants the opportunity to present their claims. Note
that this notice and the verification and investigation of the parcel of land are to be conducted after an
application for free patent has been filed with the Bureau of Lands. In this case, however, Alejaga Sr.’s
Application for Free Patent25 was dated and filed on December 28, 1978. On the other hand, the
Investigation & Verification Report26 prepared by Land Inspector Recio was dated December 27, 1978.
In that Report, he stated that he had conducted the "necessary investigation and verification in the
presence of the applicant." Even if we accept this statement as gospel truth, the violation of the rule cannot
be condoned because, obviously, the required notice to adverse claimants was not served. As correctly
pointed out by the trial court, investigation and verification should have been done only after the filing of
the application. Hence, it would have been highly anomalous for Recio to conduct his own investigation
and verification on December 27, 1998, a day before Felipe Alejaga Sr. filed the Application for Free
Patent. It must also be noted that while the Alejagas insist that an investigation was conducted, they do
not dispute the fact that it preceded the filing of the application.
Second, the claim of the Alejagas that an actual investigation was conducted is not sustained
by the Verification & Investigation Report itself, which bears no signature. Their reliance on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is thus misplaced. Since Recio’s signature
does not appear on the December 27, 1978 Report, there can be no presumption that an investigation and
verification of the parcel of land was actually conducted. Strangely, respondents do not proffer any
explanation why the Verification & Investigation Report was not signed by Recio. Even more important
and as will later on be explained, this alleged presumption of regularity -- assuming it ever existed -- is
overcome by the evidence presented by petitioner. Third, the report of Special Investigator Cartagena has
not been successfully rebutted. In that report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not actually
conducted an investigation and ocular inspection of the parcel of land. Cartagena’s statement on Recio’s
alleged admission may be considered as "independently relevant." A witness may testify as to the state
of mind of another person -- the latter’s knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith -- and the formers
statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without violating the hearsay rule.
Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to cross-examination, the
Investigation Report he had submitted to the Director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his
testimony. Those portions of the report that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and
conclusions are not hearsay. On the other hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio may
be considered as independently relevant.
The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations
communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their
truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not
secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant
to the existence of such fact. Since Cartagenas testimony was based on the report of the investigation
he had conducted, his testimony was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court.
E. HEARSAY EVIDENCE RULE (SECTIONS 37-49)
Section 37. Hearsay. – Hearsay is a statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
a trial or hearing, offered to prove the truth of the facts asserted therein.
A statement is:
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
(1) an oral or written assertion or
(2) a non-verbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him or her as an assertion.
Hearsay evidence is inadmissible except as otherwise provided in these Rules.
There are three requisites for the hearsay rule:
1. There must be an out of court statement or declaration;
2. That out of court statement or declaration was repeated in court; and
3. The purpose of repeating that in court is to prove the truth of the out of court declaration/the
fact at issue.
E.g, B killed A and then C saw B killing A, C told D of such fact. D will now testify as to the fact that he
heard from C that C saw B kill A, and such statement is used to prove the truth of the fact that B killed A.
Another, X is on the witness stand, and his testimony is as follows “Mr. A told me that it was B who killed
C”, so C is the victim, the case is about the murder of C, and X is on the witness stand and his testimony
says that “A, told him (X) that it was B who killed C”.
So, the out of court declaration here is the declaration A to X saying that it was B who killed C.
this is the first requisite.
Now, that statement is repeated in court, X is now on the witness stand stating that “A told him
that it was B who killed C”, now this is the second requisite.
Now, if the statement of X is NOT used to prove that it was B who killed C, then that is not
hearsay. The statement of X must be for the purpose to prove that it was really B who really killed C, then
that would be hearsay, that it is the last requisite.
If the statement of X is used to prove that A was still alive on May 5, 2020, then that is not
hearsay, because the statement is not used to prove the fact at issue, which is the fact that it was B who
killed C, this is what is known as the doctrine of independently relevant statement which is an out-of-
court statement which is relevant not for the truth of a matter asserted therein. Remember in is
independentLY not independent. This is the first exception to the hearsay rule.
Tanggalin mo ang isa dyan it is not hearsay; hence it is admissible, see par 2 of sec. 37
A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is:
(a) inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty
of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition;
(b) consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive; or
(c) one of identification of a person made after perceiving him or her. (n)
Query: Why is hearsay not admissible?
A: Because the declarant cannot be cross-examined. Because he is not in court.
Query: Why is cross-examination necessary
A: Because it is a right of and accused to confront witnesses against him. Without cross-
examination, there is no full satisfaction of testimonial evidence (later on when we go to R 132,
we will discuss the Doctrine of Incomplete Testimony)
Cases:
Patula vs. People, 669 SCRA
FIRST DIVISION / G.R. No. 164457 / April 11, 2012 / BERSAMIN, J.
ANNA LERIMA PATULA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
In all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution’s duty is to prove each and

every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any
other crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must further prove the participation of the
accused in the commission of the offense. In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of
its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The
burden of proof placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused
has no burden of proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not overcome
the presumption of innocence in his favor. In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the
accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged its burden
of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying the accused as the
malefactor responsible for it.
On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the various duties of petitioner as
Footlucker’s sales representative. On her part, Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the
amounts actually received by petitioner from the customers or remitted by petitioner to Footlucker’s .This
means that persons other than Guivencan prepared Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, and
that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly issued by petitioner
and in the ledgers held by Footlucker’s corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn
statements of some of the customers. Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries
effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the veracity and reliability
of the entries as evidence of petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination by
petitioner. The denial of that opportunity rendered the entire proof of misappropriation or conversion
hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
To elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy, and
thus devoid of probative value, reference is made to Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that
states that perception, except as otherwise provided, a witness can testify only to those facts that
she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own in the Rules of Court.
The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial
evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of
the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value
not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and
competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person
say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the information on the
facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of
such testimony then depends not upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the
other person giving the information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested
because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness and cannot, therefore, be cross-
examined. It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any
particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to
explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple
assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author.
Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant. The testimony may have been given under oath and before a court
of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the
witness, it is hearsay just the same.
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as
evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference,
and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand,
subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
346
BABY 520 notes
assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the
hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he
heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the
complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of
utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the
fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the
facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why
testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve
the right of the opposing party to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge
of the transaction or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant
is not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party’s witness,
being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to
the administration of justice. To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to
establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguarding a party’s right to cross-examine her adversary’s
witness, the Rules of Court offers two solutions. The first solution is to require that all the witnesses
in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in court under oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court formalizes this solution, viz:
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. - The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or
hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to
speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.
The second solution is to require that all witnesses be subject to the cross-examination
by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court ensures this solution thusly:
Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. – Upon the termination of the direct examination,
the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon
the issue. (8a)
Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept relevant to criminal
cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, which guarantees that: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall xxx enjoy the right xxx to meet the witnesses face to face xxx," the rule
requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party equally applies to non-criminal proceedings.
We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns about the
trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath or solemn
affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the
perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose
reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.
Court also ruled that lack of their proper authentication rendered Exhibits B to YY and their
derivatives inadmissible as judicial evidence. The nature of documents as either public or private
determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue
of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public
(except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because
it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no
further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document
is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of

a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or
set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities
prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the
Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The requirement of authentication of a
private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an
ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the
genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied under
oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been
admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or
has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be
given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by
the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
(Emphases supplied)
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the execution or signing
of the documents, the Prosecution surely did not authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
conformably with the aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, were
inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence.
People vs. Aguirre, 845 (independently relevant statement)
FIRST DIVISION / G.R. No. 219952 / November 20, 2017 / TIJAM, J.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JEHLSON AGUIRRE Y ARIDIDON, MICHAEL ARABIT
Y PACAMARA, JEFFERSON PARALEJAS Y PIGTAIN AND JEFFREY ROXAS Y ARAGONCILLO,
ACCUSED, JEHLSON AGUIRRE Y ARIDIDON, MICHAEL ARABIT Y PACAMARA AND JEFFERSON
PARALEJAS Y PIGTAIN, Accused-Appellants.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
True, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge,
i.e., which are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay. In this case,
however, the alleged statements were addressed to and directed at private complainants themselves.
Thus, private complainants testified to a matter of fact that had been derived from their own perception.
Indeed, it has been held that testimony of what one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It
is admissible in evidence, not to show that the statement was true, but that it was in fact made. If
credible, it may form part of the circumstantial evidence necessary to convict the accused.
Furthermore, the hearsay rule has been premised on the theory that "(a) person who
relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any
difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities;
and that she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden
entirely upon the absent author." In this case, accused-appellants were able to cross-examine private
complainants; in fact, CCC was even subjected to re-cross-examination. Thus, it cannot be said that
private complainants had not been obliged to answer any question or to explain obscurities or
contradictions, or that their testimonies had not been tested for veracity or truthfulness.
A witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and
remains consistent is a credible witness. Furthermore, it is settled that the issue of credibility is best
addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard the witness
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
347
BABY 520 notes
and observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. Through its observations
during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion,
whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters
will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.
Exceptions to hear say rule:
(1) Doctrine of independently relevant statement.
(2) Dying Declaration
Section 38. Dying declaration. – The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of
an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his or her death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. (37a)
Requisites:
(a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s
death;
(b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending
death;
(c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and
(d) the death of the declarant is the subject of the inquiry
(e) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the
declarant is a victim. (note: this last requisites is no longer applicable because the rule provides
that is applicable in ANY CASE, thus there are only 4 requisites)
Of these requisites the most important is the consciousness of an impending death. This is the
reason why it is admissible because of the consciousness of an impending death; one cannot lie anymore
if he is about to die.
Query: How can consciousness of an impending death be established?
A:
Query: Say, a person is confined at St. Lukes Hospital because he was diagnosed of having a
cancer, and he only has 6 weeks to live, is he not conscious of an impending death?
A: No, it is not, because the consciousness of death must be NOW, not tomorrow not after six
months, it must be now.
Query: Is a dying declaration available in civil cases?
A: Yes, because the rule provides that the declaration “may be received IN ANY CASE wherein
his or her death is the subject of inquiry”, provided that the subject of the inquiry is the death of the
declarant.
Pp vs. Calinawan, 817 SCRA 424
SECOND DIVISION / G.R. No. 226145 / February 13, 2017 / MENDOZA, J.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMEO D. CALINAWAN a.k.a "MEO",
Accused-Appellant.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Marigor's positive identification was further bolstered by the statement of Janice to Jonathan
that it was Calinawan who stabbed her. The courts a quo considered the said statement as an admissible
dying declaration. For a dying declaration to be deemed an exception to the hearsay rule, the
following conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant
was conscious of his impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the

declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is
the victim. In this case, the Court notes that in her affidavit, Janice said that she thought she could survive
the attack. She never thought that she was dying. In fact, she was optimistic of her recovery. In view of
this, there seems to be a doubt whether she was aware of her impending death. Granting there is such
doubt, Janice's statement, nevertheless, is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule for being part
of res gestae. In order for a statement to be considered part of res gestae, the following elements
must concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statement was
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statement concerns the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. All the foregoing elements
are present in the case at bench. First, the stabbing incident constituted the startling occurrence.
Second, Janice never had the opportunity to fabricate a statement implicating Calinawan because she
immediately identified him as her attacker when Jonathan saw her shortly after the assault took place.
Lastly, the statement of Janice concerned the circumstances surrounding her stabbing. Thus, Calinawan's
denial and alibi have no leg to stand. They are inherently weak as defenses, especially when faced with
the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witnesses identifying the accused as the perpetrator
of the crime.
(3) Statement of decedent or person of unsound mind/ Dead Man’s Statute
Section 39. Statement of decedent or person of unsound mind. – In an action against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a
claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind,
where a party or assignor of a party or a person in whose behalf a case is prosecuted testifies on a matter
of fact occurring before the death of the deceased person or before the person became of unsound mind,
any statement of the deceased or the person of unsound mind, may be received in evidence if the
statement was made upon the personal knowledge of the deceased or the person of unsound mind at a
time when the matter had been recently perceived by him or her and while his or her recollection was
clear. Such statement, however, is inadmissible if made under circumstances indicating its lack of
trustworthiness. (23a)
Already discussed in the disqualification of witness.
(4) Declaration against interest
Section 40. Declaration against interest. – The declaration made by a person deceased or unable to
testify against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was
made so far contrary to the declarant’s own interest that a reasonable person in his or her position would
not have made the declaration unless he or she believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against
himself or herself or his or her successors in interest and against third persons. A statement tending to
expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. (38a)
Pp vs. Bernal, 274 SCRA
SECOND DIVISION / G.R. No. 113685 / June 19, 1997 / ROMERO, J.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN DOE and
PETER DOE, accused-appellants.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the
perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence of facts from which it may be reasonably
inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
348
BABY 520 notes
Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal's wife is admissible in
evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so
far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-
in-interest and against third persons.
With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the present provision,
it is safe to assume that "declaration against interest" has been expanded to include all kinds of
interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit:
"(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of
the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same
was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and
believed such declaration to be true." Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be
called upon to testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since
his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence because no sane person will be
presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.
(5) Declaration about pedigree
Section 41. Act or declaration about pedigree. – The act or declaration of a person deceased or unable
to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him or her by birth[,] adoption, or marriage
or, in the absence thereof, with whose family he or she was so intimately associated as to be likely to have
accurate information concerning his or her pedigree, may be received in evidence where it occurred before
the controversy, and the relationship between the two [(2)] persons is shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration. The word “pedigree” includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also
facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. (39a)
Tizon vs. CA, 276 SCRA
SECOND DIVISION / G.R. No. 121027 / July 31, 1997 / REGALADO, J.
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Petitioners' evidence consists mainly of the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison, the baptismal,
death and marriage certificates, the various certifications from the civil registrar, a family picture, and
several joint affidavits executed by third persons all of which she identified and explained in the course
and as part of her testimony. The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between
the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece.
Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception
to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following
conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the
person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence
other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only

before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before
any controversy has arisen thereon. There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth
elements. What remains for analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the other documents
offered in evidence sufficiently corroborated the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her
lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present
evidence other than such declaration.
A distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the
very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported by
evidence aliunde. The rule is stated thus:
One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a claim through, but not from, the
declarant and to establish the admissibility of a declaration regarding claimant's pedigree, he may
not do by declarant's own statements as to declarant's relationship to the particular family. The
reason is that declarant's declaration of his own relationship is of a self-serving nature. Accordingly,
there must be precedent proof from other sources that declarant is what he claimed to be, namely,
a member of the particular family; otherwise, the requirement to admissibility that declarant's
relationship to the common family must appear is not met. But when the party claiming seeks to
establish relationship in order to claim directly from the declarant or the declarant's estate, the
situation and the policy of the law applicable are quite different. In such case, the declaration of the
decedent, whose estate is in controversy, that he was related to the one who claims his estate, is
admissible without other proof of the fact of relationship. While the nature of the declaration is then
disserving, that is not the real ground for its admission. Such declarations do not derive their evidential
value from that consideration, although it is a useful, if not an artificial, aid in determining the class to which
the declarations belong. The distinction we have note is sufficiently apparent; in the one case the
declarations are self-serving, in the other they are competent from reasons of necessity.
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a
relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the
declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by
the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the
requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship,
does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to
establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family. We
are sufficiently convinced that the present case is one instance where the general requirement on evidence
aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself.
Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is
admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no
other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of
the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is in the
present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent's
declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one case, where the subject of the declaration is the declarant's own
relationship to another person, it seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the admission of
the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary
proof would render the main evidence unnecessary. Applying the general rule in the present case
would nonetheless produce the same result. For while the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners
do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion that
the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection
thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
349
BABY 520 notes
(6) Family Reputation or tradition
Section 42. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. – The reputation or tradition existing in
a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received
in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity[,]
affinity, or adoption. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family
portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. (40a)
This has something to do with the attitude, practices of families of clans.
Jison vs. CA, 286 SCR
FIRST DIVISION / G.R. No. 124853 / February 24, 1998 / DAVIDE, JR., J.
FRANCISCO L. JISON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON, respondents.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
MONINA's reliance on the certification issued by the LCR concerning her birth is clearly
misplaced. It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the LCR is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child upon the information of a third person. Simply put, if the alleged father did not intervene
in the birth certificate, e.g., supplying the information himself, the inscription of his name by the mother or
doctor or registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the registrar without the signature of the father
is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the latter's part. In like manner, FRANCISCO's lack of
participation in the preparation of the baptismal certificates and school records renders these documents
incompetent to prove paternity, the former being competent merely to prove the administration of the
sacrament of baptism on the date so specified. However, despite the inadmissibility of the school records
per se to prove the paternity, they may be admitted as part of MONINA's testimony to corroborate her
claim that FRANCISCO spent for her education. We likewise disagree with the ruling of the CA that the
certificates issued by the LCR and the baptismal certificates may be taken as circumstantial evidence to
prove MONINA's filiation. Since they are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of such filiation, they
cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same. As to the various notes and
letters written by FRANCISCO's relatives allegedly attesting to MONINA's filiation, while their due
execution and authenticity are not in issue, as MONINA witnessed the authors signing the documents,
nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these documents may not be admitted, there
being no showing that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship
between the declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in question. As to the
admissibility of these documents under Rule 130, Section 40, however, this requires further elaboration.
Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing
in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be
received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family
portraits and the like may be received as evidence of pedigree.
It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing
the first underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents
in question may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and the
section containing the second underscored phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether
Exhibits S to V (statements expressly recognizing that MONINA was FRANCISCO's daughter), as private
documents, fall within the scope of the clause "and the like" as qualified by the preceding phrase "entries
in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rights and family portraits" We hold that the
scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem
generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as "family possessions," or those articles

which represent, in effect, a family's joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person.
These have been described as objects "openly exhibited and well known to the family," or those
"which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition." Other examples of
these objects which are regarded as reflective of a family's reputation or tradition regarding pedigree
are inscriptions on tombstones, monuments or coffin plates. Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private
documents not constituting "family possessions" as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis
of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41
regarding common reputation, it having been observed that: The weight of authority appears to be in favor
of the theory that it is the general repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the common
reputation in community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. Thus,
matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the
neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved
by common reputation in the community.
(7) Common reputation
Section 43. Common reputation. – Common reputation existing previous to the controversy, as to
boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the community and reputation as to events of general history
important to the community, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence.
Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputation. (41a)
Query: What is something new here?
A: As to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the community and reputation as to events
of general history important to the community,
Alam niyo sa probinsya, mas lalo na sa rural areas, kung minsan walang titulo ang mag lupa
pero may common boundaries yan. So, these boundaries are common reputation.
So, when one testifies on common reputation and the subject matter is boundaries or customs
affecting lands of the community will be considered as admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
(8) Res gestae
Section 44. Part of the res gestae. – Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto[,] under the stress of excitement caused by the
occurrence with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae.
So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance,
may be received as part of the res gestae. (42a)
Res gestae is a statement made during or immediately before or after the startling occurrence.
Requisites:
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
(b) the statement was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statement concerns the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
Query: Why is this admissible?
A: This rule is for ordinary person, the reason why it is admissible as to ordinary person
because the element of trustworthiness is there, there is no more time to contrive. What one
may have stated is the truth because there is no time to contrive or to plan to tell a lie.
But, as I told, you the reaction to a startling occurrence differs as to different people.
Remember my example about a vehicular accident in EDSA witnessed by a lawyer, a doctor
and a priest. That may be a startling occurrence, but they reacted differently.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
350
BABY 520 notes
Startling occurrence is generally subjective, you may be startled but the other persons may
have not been startled. E.g., you are a member of the military and you were sent to Marawi during the
Marawi siege for 6 months na-assign ka sa canyon regimen, yung sound sayo ng canyon dina siya sayo
starling occurrence. Kapag bumaba ka ng manila nakarinig ka ng putok ng 45 caliber na baril, hindi na
siya starling occurrence.
Because of its suddenness, it is not limited to a startling occurrence, thus there are two kinds of res gestae:
1. Spontaneous Statements – Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof.
2. Verbal Acts – statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a
legal significance.
Note that in verbal acts there must be a statement accompanying an equivocal act,
say, you see two persons conversing, the other was handing over to the other an envelope,
saying “this is now the payment of my obligation to you”, otherwise if you hear the other saying
”eto, pasensiya kana ha, ito yung share mo doon sa drugs na binenta mo”, that is another thing.
The same rational, it is without contrivance.
Pp vs. Dimapilit, 836 SCRA
SECOND DIVISION / G.R. No. 210802 / August 9, 2017 / LEONEN, J.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, V. RENE BOY DIMAPILIT Y ABELLADO,
Accused-Appellant
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
A witness' inconsistency on minor details does not affect his or her credibility as long as there
are no material contradictions in his or her absolute and clear narration on the central incident and positive
identification of the accused as one of the main assailants. Any inconsistency, which is not relevant to the
elements of the crime, "is not a ground to reverse a conviction." It is already established that "assignment
of values to the testimony of a witness is virtually left, almost entirely, to the trial court which has the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness on the stand." Except for significant matters "that might
have been overlooked or discarded, the findings of credibility by the trial court will not generally be
disturbed on appeal."
The trial court explicitly stated that Magdalena's testimony was categorical and consistent.
Given that the trial court ruling on the credibility of Magdalena's testimony was also affirmed by the CA,
this Court does not see any reason to deviate from the general rule. Hence, this Court is persuaded that
Rene Boy participated in the killing since Magdalena has given a detailed account of the incident and has
positively identified him as one of the assailants. However, Rene Boy hinges on the purported
inconsistencies in Magdalena's testimony to assail her credibility.
The alleged inconsistencies in Magdalena's testimony only pertain to minor details. Hence, they
do not affect her credibility. What is essential is that there are no material contradictions in her "complete
and vivid narration on the principal occurrence and the positive identification" of the accused as one of the
main offenders. Admittedly, there were discrepancies between Magdalena's testimony before the court
and her sworn statement. While she mentioned in court that she went with Simeon to follow Diego at
Pastor's house, she failed to disclose this information in her sworn statement. This failure, however, does
not automatically cast doubt on her credibility as a witness. As explained in People v. Nelmida:
Inconsistencies between the sworn statement and direct testimony given in open court do not
necessarily discredit the witness. An affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is oftentimes incomplete and is
generally regarded as inferior to the testimony of the witness in open court. Judicial notice can be taken of
the fact that testimonies given during trial are much more exact and elaborate than those stated in sworn

statements, which are usually incomplete and inaccurate for a variety of reasons. More so, because of the
partial and innocent suggestions, or for want of specific inquiries. In addition, an extrajudicial statement or
affidavit is generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in
writing the affiant's statement, hence, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent.
Indeed, the prosecution witnesses' direct and categorical declarations on the witness stand are superior
to their extrajudicial statements.
Whether Magdalena was alone or with Simeon in following Diego to Pastor's house does not
really matter. "An inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is not a ground to
reverse a conviction.” Magdalena's confusion with the names of the accused also does not affect her
credibility as a witness. It is possible that she might have interchanged the name of "Junnel" to "Joel" due
to their vivid similarity. This Court cannot assume that Magdalena would deliver errorless narrations while
recalling the details of the harrowing killing incident. Instead of weakening her credibility, the trivial lapses
strengthen her statements as they indicate that she was not "coached or answers contrived." Moreover,
the fact that Magdalena did not ask for help is not contrary to human experience. She clearly saw how the
four (4) assailants took turns in beating Diego to death as the incident happened in broad daylight.
Similarly, she heard how Rene Boy threatened Simeon. Probably, out of fear for her life, Magdalena was
constrained to be mum and helpless. "Witnesses of startling occurrences react differently depending
upon their situation and state of mind, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response
when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience." Hence, the trivial
inconsistencies in Magdalena's testimony do not affect the fact that she witnessed how Rene Boy
participated in killing Diego.
Separately from these considerations, we entertain serious doubts about the validity of the
reasoning, made by both the trial and the appellate courts, that a widow's testimony — particularly, her
identification of the accused — should be accepted and held as credible simply because the defense failed
to show by evidence that she had reasons to falsify. Arguably, a widow who testifies about the killing
of her husband has no motive other than to see that justice is done so that her testimony should
be considered totally credible. This assumption, however, is not the same as the conclusion that
a witness is credible because the defense has not shown any ill motive that would motivate him or
her to falsely testify. Strictly speaking, this conclusion should apply only to third parties who are
detached from and who have no personal interest in the incident that gave rise to the trial. Because
of their presumed detachment, the testimonies of these detached parties can be presumed credible
unless impugned by the adverse party through a showing of an ill or ulterior motive on the part of
the witnesses. The presumed detachment that applies to third parties obviously cannot apply to a
widow whose husband has been killed, or for that matter, to a relative whose kin is the victim, when
the testimony of the widow or the relative is offered in the trial of the killer. The widow or the
relatives are not detached or disinterested witnesses; they are parties who suffered and
experienced pain as a result of the killing. Thus, the testimonies from aggrieved parties should not
simplistically be equated to or treated as testimonies from detached parties. Their testimonies should be
handled with the realistic thought that they come from parties with material and emotional ties to the subject
of the litigation so that they cannot be accepted and held as credible simply because the defense has not
adduced evidence of ill-motivation.
Contrary to Rene Boy's imputation, the trial court in this case did not automatically accept
Magdalena's testimony as credible on the ground that the defense failed to show any proof that Magdalena
had reasons to falsely testify against him.
Pp vs. Mercado, 883 SCRA, Oct. 2018
SECOND DIVISION / G.R. No. 218702 / October 17, 2018 / CAGUIOA, J.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
351
BABY 520 notes
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICK JOHN MERCADO Y ANTICLA,
Accused-Appellant.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Accused-appellant desperately tried to anchor his defense on denial but failed to prove the
same despite the presentation of an alleged eyewitness. His testimony failed to overcome the credibility
and probative value of the dying declarations and/or part of the res gestae of Evelyn Santos which were
recounted by several witnesses. Time and again, this Court has ruled that denial is the weakest of all
defenses. It easily crumbles in the face of positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime. A denial, like other defenses, remains subject to the strength of the prosecution evidence which is
independently assessed. When the evidence for the prosecution convincingly connects the crime and the
culprit, the probative value of the denial is negligible.
As an exception to the hearsay rule, a dying declaration is admissible as evidence
because it is "evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person
aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation." Accordingly, Section
37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 37. Dying declaration. —The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of
the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.
For a "dying declaration" to be admissible m court, the following requisites must concur:
(a) That the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death;
(b) That at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of
an impending death;
(c) That the declarant is competent as a witness; and
(d) That the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in
which the declarant is the victim.
First, the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death. This refers not only to the facts of the assault itself, but also to matters both
before and after the assault having a direct causal connection with it. Statements involving the
nature of the declarant's injury or the cause of death; those imparting deliberation and willfulness
in the attack, indicating the reason or motive for the killing; justifying or accusing the accused; or
indicating the absence of cause for the act are admissible. Second, at the time the declaration was
made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending death. The rule is that, in
order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must
be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of
death in point of fact that renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that the
approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of the deceased. The test is whether the
declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly impending. Third,
the declarant is competent as a witness. The rule is that where the declarant would not have been
a competent witness had he survived, the proffered declarations will not be admissible. Thus, in
the absence of evidence showing that the declarant could not have been competent to be a witness
had he survived, the presumption must be sustained that he would have been competent. Fourth,
the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide; murder, or parricide, in which the
declarant is the victim.
The first and fourth requisites are undoubtedly present in this case. With regard to the third requisite,
since there was no evidence presented to show that Evelyn could not have been competent to be a witness

had she survived, the presumption that she would have been competent would be sustained. The Court
holds, therefore, that the third requisite is sufficiently met. With regard to the second requisite, the Court
considered the severity of the declarant's wounds to reasonably presume that she uttered her
words under the belief that her own death was already imminent. The Court held that "there is ample
authority for the view that the declarant's belief in the imminence of her death can be shown by the
declarant's own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of her wounds,
statements made in her presence, or by the opinion of her physician. In the present case, Evelyn
made the declarations just as she was pulled out of the fire, with blood coming out of her forehead, when
she was having difficulty breathing, and with second- and third-degree burns affecting 74% of the total
surface area of her body. Considering the foregoing facts, the Court is convinced that the second requisite
for a dying declaration is sufficiently met.
Without doubt, therefore, the dying declarations of Evelyn to numerous witnesses that it was Mercado
who had attacked her and her partner and eventually set their house on fire are admissible in evidence. In
any event, even if the statements of Evelyn would not qualify as dying declarations, they are
nevertheless admissible in evidence because they are part of the res gestae. Section 42, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae.— Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given
in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the
res gestae when (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. The Court clarified when a
statement may be deemed part of the res gestae:
The term "res gestae" comprehends a situation which presents a startling or unusual
occurrence sufficient to produce a spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during which interval
certain statements are made under such circumstances as to show lack of forethought or
deliberate design in the formulation of their content. Whether a declaration is a part of the res
gestae depends upon whether the declaration was the facts talking through the party or the party
talking about the facts. While as a general rule the declaration sought to be proved as part of the
res gestae must be contemporaneous with the event established as the principal act, no fixed time
from the main occurrence can be arbitrarily set in order to determine what shall be part of the res
gestae. The factual situation in each instance will set its own pattern of time in this respect. "The
marked trend of decisions is to extend, rather than narrow, the scope of the doctrine admitting declarations
as part of the res gestae. Whether specific statements are admissible as part of the res gestae is a
matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, the determination of which is ordinarily
conclusive upon appeal, in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion."
The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either
the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after
the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as
a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of
admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
352
BABY 520 notes
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
Applying the foregoing to the present case, the statements of Evelyn were clearly part of the
res gestae. The fire – which caused severe injuries on her body, destroyed her house, and killed her live-
in partner – was undeniably a startling occurrence. Evelyn's statements were made immediately after she
was rescued, and when she was clearly suffering from the pain caused by her injuries, thereby negating
any possibility of her contriving or manufacturing a lie. The statements were also undoubtedly about the
startling occurrence as Evelyn repeatedly claimed that Mercado was the one who attacked her and Alicia,
and thereafter set the house on fire. Bearing in mind that a dying declaration is considered as "evidence
of the highest order," and that, in any event, the statements were part of the res gestae, as well as the
principle that denial is an inherently weak defense, the Court thus holds that the CA did not err in affirming
Mercado's conviction, as his guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is well to stress that the positive
identification of the eyewitnesses carries more weight than an accused's defense of denial.
(9) Records of regularly conducted business activity (formerly, entries in the course of
business)
Section 45. Records of regularly conducted business activity. – A memorandum, report, record or
data compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by writing, typing, electronic,
optical or other similar means at or near the time of or from transmission or supply of information by a
person with knowledge thereof, and kept in the regular course or conduct of a business activity, and such
was the regular practice to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation by electronic,
optical or similar means, all of which are shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified
witnesses, is excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence. (43a)
This is formerly known as entries in the course of business. But it is now Records or receipts
of regularly conducted business activity.
If you try to analyze the provision, it is a copy of rule 8 of electronic document rule. Thus, it has
something to do with the electronic document rule.
Most of businesses now are covered by records, memoranda, reports which are electronically
produced.
That is the rationale for the amendments.
In this case of Phil. Airlines vs Ramos, 207 SCRA 461, will this still fall as an exception notwithstanding
the amendments? YES, it still applicable.
FIRST DIVISION / G.R. No. 92740 / March 23, 1992 / MEDIALDEA, J.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. JAIME M. RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA ILANO,
MILAGROS ILANO, DANIEL ILANO AND FELIPA JAVALERA, respondents.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
In the absence of any controverting evidence, the documentary evidence presented to
corroborate the testimonies of PAL's witnesses are prima facie evidence of the truth of their
allegations. The plane tickets of the private respondents (with emphasis on the printed condition of the
contract of carriage regarding check-in time as well as on the notation "late 4:02" stamped on the flight
coupon by the check-in clerk immediately upon the check-in of private respondents), and the passenger
Manifest of Flight PR 264 (which showed the non-accommodation of Capati and Go and the private
respondents) are entries made in the regular course of business which the private respondents failed
to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than their testimonies. Consequently, they
carry more weight and credence. A writing or document made contemporaneously with a
transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those

facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative force than the oral
testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory and recollection. Spoken words could
be notoriously unreliable as against a written document that speaks a uniform language. This
dictum is amply demonstrated by the diverse allegations of the private respondents in their complaint
(where they claimed that no one was at the counter until 30 minutes before the published departure time
and that the employee who finally attended to them marked them late) and in their testimonies (where they
contended that there were 2 different PAL personnel who attended to them at the check-in counter). Private
respondents' only objection to these documents is that they are self-serving cannot be sustained. The
hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly
connected with the main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify
or characterize the act, are admissible as a part of the res gestae. When the private respondents
purchased their tickets, they were instantaneously bound by the conditions of the contract of carriage
particularly the check-in time requirement. Their failure to come on time for check-in should not militate
against PAL. Their non-accommodation on that flight was the result of their own action or inaction and the
ensuing cancellation of their tickets by PAL is only proper.
(10) Entries in Official Records
Section 46. Entries in official records. – Entries in official records made in the performance of his or her
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. (44a)
Requisites of entries in official records to be exempted under the hearsay rule:
1. The entries must have been made in official records.
2. The entries must have been made by a public officer of the Philippines in the performance of
his duty or by a person in the performance of a duty enjoined by law.
3. The entrant must have personal knowledge of the facts stated by him or such facts were
acquired by him from reports made by person under a legal duty to submit the same.
In official record the one who gave the info must have Personal Knowledge and the one who
entered must be duty bound.
Official government records. If it is an official entry of private company, it not an entry of official
records. So, do not confuse this with section 45.
Example – a baptismal certificate it is not an entry of an official record.
Remember we are not talking about the admissibility of the entries or documents in this rule, but those
which are exception to the hearsay rule.
Query: Is baptismal certificate admissible?
A: Depende on how it is presented, it may or may not, however it is not part of the entry or
official record.
Be careful with your answer. It may be admissible if brought by the parish priest who entered it
officially but not as entry of official record. Kaya nga settled is the rule – entries in the baptismal certificate
are not evidence of the birth of the child but admissible to show the date of the baptism of the child.
Query: Is baptismal certificates entries in official records which can be an exception to the hearsay
rule?
A: No, because the baptismal priest or minister is not public officers.
Public officers are qualified by a duty to make entries in a document. E.g., a police officer in a
police report.
Take note of the concept of double hearsay.
Query: Double hearsay in entries of record and the subject matter was a police blotter? What is
double hearsay with respect to the police blotter?
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
353
BABY 520 notes
Double/Multiple hearsay – When a hearsay declaration is embedded in another with the result
that there are two or more levels of hearsay.
Police blotter given by persons who have no personal knowledge are known as hearsay on
hearsay, that is why it is called as double hearsay and it is not considered as entries in official records,
therefore inadmissible.
Exception: When it is given to the police by someone who has personal knowledge about the
occurrence. That would be an exception to the hearsay rule.
Eg., There is a Vehicular accident in commonwealth avenue, araw araw jan may accident, in front of INC
church, you saw it, kapag ikaw mismo ang pumunta sa police precinct and report it sa police officer on
duty and entered it in the police blotter the entry in the police blotter is admissible, because ang nagreport
may personal knowledge sa accident.
Halimbawa, papauwi ka nakasalubong mo yung kaibigan mong police sinabe mo may accident
dun tatlo yung patay, paki-blotter na lang, so he put it in the police blotter, not admissible. Ang tawag jan
double hearsay.
So, generally, police blotters are admissible because they are entries in the official records, the
only way to contest it is through its authenticity or if it is double hearsay.
Pp vs. Corpuz, 856 SCRA 610
THIRD DIVISION / G.R. No. 215320 / February 28, 2018 / MARTIRES, J.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MANUEL CORPUZ, Accused-Appellants.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Manuel argues that his conviction was based mainly on the testimony of Leonilo who, however,
is not a credible witness. He points out that the police blotter clearly contradicts Leonilo's testimony that
he actually saw Manuel hack Leonila and Romana. Thus, there is reasonable doubt on Leonilo's
identification of Manuel as the person responsible for the deaths of the two victims. The Court is not
persuaded. Entries in the police blotter are not evidence of the truth thereof but merely of the fact
that the entries were made. Affidavits executed before the police or entries in such police blotters
cannot prevail over the positive testimony given in open court. The entry in the police blotter is not
necessarily entitled to full credit for it could be incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either
partial suggestions or for want of suggestions or inquiries. Without the aid of such the witness
may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the
first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that pertain to the subject. It
is understandable that the testimony during the trial would be lengthier and more detailed than the
matters stated in the police blotter. Clearly, Leonilo had no part in the apparent inconsistencies caused
by the contents of the police blotter. Indeed, he merely reported what he witnessed; whether the police
officer accurately recorded his report is beyond his control. Thus, the statement in the said police blotter
to the effect that the suspect was unknown could in no way prevail over his positive identification
of the accused-appellant as the person who hacked and killed Leonila and Romana.
Sabili vs. COMELEC, 670 SCRA
EN BANC / G.R. No. 193261 / April 24, 2012 / SERENO, J.
MEYNARDO SABILI, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA,
Respondents.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
The COMELEC did not consider in the first instance the Certification issued by Pinagtong-ulan
Brgy. Capt. Honrade that petitioner had been residing in Brgy Pinagtong-ulan since 2007. When this
oversight was raised as an issue in petitioner’s MR, the COMELEC brushed it aside on the ground that
the said Certification was not sworn to before a notary public and, hence, "cannot be relied on."

Subsequently, petitioner presented another, substantially identical, Certification from the said Pinagtong-
ulan Brgy. Capt., save for the fact that it had now been sworn to before a notary public.
We disagree with the COMELEC’s treatment of the Barangay Captain’s Certification and find
the same tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Even without being sworn to before a notary public,
Honrade’s Certification would not only be admissible in evidence, but would also be entitled to due
consideration. Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 44. Entries in official records. —Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
We explained that the 3 requisites must concur for entries in official records to be
admissible in evidence:
(a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
so;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which
facts must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
As to the first requisite, the Brgy. Sec. is required by the LGC to "keep an updated record of all
inhabitants of the barangay." Regarding the second requisite, we have explicitly recognized that "it is the
business of a Punong Brgy. to know who the residents are in his own barangay." Anent the third requisite,
the Brgy. Capt.’s exercise of powers and duties concomitant to his position requires him to be privy to
these records kept by the Brgy. Sec. Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the COMELEC for its failure to
consider Honrade’s Certification on the sole ground that it was initially not notarized.
Cercado-Siga, 752 SCRA
FIRST DIVISION / G.R. No. 185374 / March 11, 2015 / PEREZ, J.
SIMPLICIA CERCADO-SIGA AND LIGAYA CERCADO-BELISON, Petitioners, v. VICENTE
CERCADO, JR., MANUELA C. ARABIT, LOLITA C. BASCO, MARIA C. ARALAR AND VIOLETA C.
BINADAS, Respondent.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
The CA correctly ruled that it is a private document. It has been settled that church registries
of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68
and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized
public officials. They are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all
other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence.
Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in
evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom
its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after
its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the
instruments had previously confessed execution thereof. As observed by the CA, petitioners failed to
present any one of such witnesses. In fact, only Simplicia testified that her mother gave her the marriage
contract. Unfortunately however, she was not present during its execution nor could she identify Benita’s
handwriting because Simplicia admitted that she is illiterate.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
354
BABY 520 notes
Petitioners insist on the admissibility of the marriage contract on the ground that it is a duplicate
original, hence, the original need not be produced. We do not agree. We had previously ruled that “ a
signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the original is known
as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non-
production of the original. But, an unsigned and uncertified document purporting to be a carbon
copy is not competent evidence. It is because there is no public officer acknowledging the
accuracy of the copy.”
Next, while petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they now
argue that it is an ancient document which need not be authenticated. Petitioners’ argument still has no
merit. Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2)
is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished
by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. The marriage contract was executed on 9
October 1929, hence it is clearly more than 30-years old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence of
alteration. The marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement. Ancient documents
are considered from proper custody if they come from a place from which they might reasonably
be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin or if the
circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. If a document is found
where it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily
accounted for. Were it not for its antiquity, and the presumption that consequently arises that evidence of
its execution cannot be obtained, it would have to be proven. It is not that any one particular place of
deposit can have more virtue in it than another, or make that true which is false; but the fact of its coming
from the natural and proper place, tends to remove presumptions of fraud, and strengthens the
belief in its genuineness. "It is not necessary that they should be found in the best and most proper
place of deposit. If documents continued in such custody, there never would be any question as
to their authenticity; but it is when documents are found in other than their proper place of deposit,
that the investigation commences whether it was reasonable and natural under the circumstances
in the particular case, to expect that they should have been in the place where they are actually
found; for it is obvious, that while there can be only one place of deposit strictly and absolutely proper,
there may be many and various that are reasonable and probable, though differing in degree; and in those
cases the proposition to be determined is, whether the actual custody is so reasonably and probably
accounted for, that it impresses the mind with the conviction, that the instrument found in such custody
must be genuine." Some authorities hold, that the antiquity of the document is alone sufficient to
entitle it to be read, and that the other circumstances only go to its effect in evidence.
The Court ruled that the requirement of proper custody was met when the ancient document in
question was presented in court by the proper custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who
would naturally keep it. In this case however, we find that Simplicia also failed to prove her filiation to
Vicente and Benita. She merely presented a baptismal certificate which has long been held “as evidence
only to prove the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
declarations therein stated with respect to her kinsfolk. “The same is conclusive only of the baptism
administered, according to the rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized subject child, but it
does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate concerning the
relationship of the person baptized.” As such, Simplicia cannot be considered as an heir, in whose custody
the marriage contract is expected to be found. It bears reiteration that Simplicia testified that the marriage
contract was given to her by Benita but that Simplicia cannot make out the contents of said document
because she cannot read and write
(11) Commercial lists
Section 47. Commercial lists and the like. – Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is

admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for
use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. (45)
Meralco vs. Quisumbing, 336 SCRA
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION / G.R. No. 127598 / February 22, 2000 / YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. Hon. SECRETARY OF LABOR LEONARDO
QUISUMBING and MERALCO EMPLOYEES and WORKERS ASSOCIATION (MEWA), respondent.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
An increase in the prices of electric current needs the approval of the appropriate regulatory
government agency and does not automatically result from a mere increase in the wages of petitioner's
employees. Besides, this argument presupposes that petitioner is capable of meeting a wage increase.
The All-Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its position regarding the wage issue
cannot be an accurate basis and conclusive determinant of the rate of wage increase. Section 45 of Rule
130, Rules of Evidence provides:
Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an
occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending
to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons
engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein.
Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical, may be admitted only "if
that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used
and relied upon by them therein." As correctly held in our Decision, the cited report is a mere newspaper
account and not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive
weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither did anybody
testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in their
occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication was regularly prepared by a person
in touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof
of their accuracy, these reports are not admissible. In the same manner, newspapers containing stock
quotations are not admissible in evidence when the source of the reports is available. With more
reason, mere analyses or projections of such reports cannot be admitted.
(12) Learned treatises
Section 48. Learned treatises. – A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law,
science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial
notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical
or pamphlet is recognized in his or her profession or calling as expert in the subject. (46a)
(13) Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding
Section 49. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. – The testimony or deposition of a
witness deceased or out of the Philippines or who cannot, with due diligence, be found therein, or is
unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who
had the opportunity to cross-examine him or her. (47a)
Do not confuse this with judicial notice under rule 129, and take note that among those which
can be taken judicial notice of would-be testimonies at a former trial. But that would fall under the
exception on hearsay rule. On what conditions? Commonality on interests, in other words the party to
the case are of the same interest. Not identical on bodies but commonality of interest, e.g., by succession,
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
355
BABY 520 notes
they are dealing with the same subject matter a parcel of land, and the testimonies in the former
proceedings may be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule.
So, watch out for that, do not confuse it with court records, isa lang yung exception sa court
records which we have studied in judicial notice, and that exception is consolidation under the case of
Republic vs Sandiganbayan.
Pp vs. Ortiz-Miyako, 279 SCRA
SECOND DIVISION / G.R. No. 115338-39 / September 16, 1997 / REGALADO, J.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LANIE ORTIZ-MIYAKE accused-appellant.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
He cites the pertinent provision of Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled:
xxx
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of
its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot, with due diligence be found in
the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having had the opportunity
to cross-examine him.
It will be noted that the principle embodied in the foregoing rule is likewise found in the following
provision of Rule 130:
Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. - The testimony or deposition of a witness
deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him.
Under the aforecited rules {section 49 under the new ruels], the accused in a criminal case is
guaranteed the right of confrontation. Such right has two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of cross-
examination; and, second, to allow the judge to observe the deportment and appearance of the witness
while testifying. This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes
impossible to recall or produce a witness who has already testified in a previous proceeding, in
which event his previous testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of
exception to the hearsay rule. The previous testimony is made admissible because it makes the
administration of justice orderly and expeditious. Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati RTC
of the facts stated in the decision of the Paranaque RTC does not fall under the exception to the right of
confrontation as the exception contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies of absent
witnesses made in previous proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous decisions
or judgments.
In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the testimonies made by the complainants in
the previous estafa case. Instead, what was offered, admitted in evidence, and utilized as a basis for the
conviction in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale was the previous decision in the estafa case.
A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an
accused was previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty
of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission
of the crime, as said previous decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for
conviction in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to confront
the witnesses against him.

The Makati court’s utilization of and reliance on the previous decision of the Paranaque court
must be rejected. Every conviction must be based on the findings of fact made by a trial court
according to its appreciation of the evidence before it. A conviction may not be based merely on
the findings of fact of another court, especially where what is presented is only its decision sans
the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who testified therein and upon which the decision
is based.
Go vs. People, 677 SCRA
THIRD DIVISION / G.R. No. 185527 / July 18, 2012 / PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO, Petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL., Respondents.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is Covered
Under Section 15, Rule 119. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open
court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a
public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most
satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through his
manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court
recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial
evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of conditional examination
of witnesses – both for the benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution. For purposes of taking the
deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would foreseeably be
unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before
the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads thus:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for
the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court
where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after
reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the same
manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after
notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the
accused.
Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place
than the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion
to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia. The
condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the provision of Section
15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the language of
Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the parties to present testimony at the hearing
through live witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding
at the hearing, rather than by means of deposition. Nowhere in the said rule permits the taking of
deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not. Certainly, to take the
deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court where the
case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
356
BABY 520 notes
but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment
and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness' testimony is
crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused. While we recognize the prosecution's right to
preserve the testimony of its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot disregard the rules which are
designed mainly for the protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during
trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an
exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.
The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat the Rights of the
Accused to Public Trial and Confrontation of Witnesses. The CA took a simplistic view on the use of
depositions in criminal cases and overlooked fundamental considerations no less than the Constitution
secures to the accused, i.e., the right to a public trial and the right to confrontation of witnesses. Section
14(2), Article III of the Constitution provides as follows:
Section 14. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production
of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Underscoring
supplied)
The CA opined that petitioners would still be accorded the right to cross-examine the deponent witness
and raise their objections during the deposition-taking in the same manner as in a regular court trial. We
disagree. There is a great deal of difference between the face-to- face confrontation in a public criminal
trial in the presence of the presiding judge and the cross-examination of a witness in a foreign place outside
the courtroom in the absence of a trial judge. "The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness
to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-
examination. "The opponent", according to an eminent authority, "demands confrontation, not for the idle
purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross
examination which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining
immediate answers." There is also the advantage of the witness before the judge, and it is this – it enables
the judge as trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness'
deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. It
is only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance,
manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly,
the physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory,
and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can only be
observed by the judge if the witness testifies orally in court.”
(14) Child Witness Rule**
Section 28. Hearsay exception in child abuse cases. - A statement made by a child describing any act
or attempted act of child abuse, not otherwise admissible under the hearsay rule, may be admitted in
evidence in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding subject to the following rules:
(a) Before such hearsay statement may be admitted, its proponent shall make known to the adverse party
the intention to offer such statement and its particulars to provide him a fair opportunity to object. If the
child is available, the court shall, upon motion of the adverse party, require the child to be present at the
presentation of the hearsay statement for cross-examination by the adverse party. When the child is
unavailable, the fact of such circumstance must be proved by the proponent.

(b) In ruling on the admissibility of such hearsay statement, the court shall consider the time, content and
circumstances thereof which provide sufficient indicia of reliability. It shall consider the following factors:
(1) Whether there is a motive to lie;
(2) The general character of the declarant child;
(3) Whether more than one person heard the statement;
(4) Whether the statement was spontaneous;
(5) The timing of the statement and the relationship between the declarant child and witness;
(6) Cross-examination could not show the lack of knowledge of the declarant child;
(7) The possibility of faulty recollection of the declarant child is remote; and
(8) The circumstances surrounding the statement are such that there is no reason to suppose
the declarant child misrepresented the involvement of the accused.
(c) The child witness shall be considered unavailable under the following situations:
(1) Is deceased, suffers from physical infirmity, lack of memory, mental illness, or will be
exposed to severe psychological injury; or
(2) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure
his attendance by process or other reasonable means.
(d) When the child witness is unavailable, his hearsay testimony shall be admitted only if corroborated by
other admissible evidence.
Section 29. Admissibility of videotaped and audiotaped in-depth investigative or disclosure
interviews in child abuse cases. - The court may admit videotape and audiotape in-depth investigative
or disclosure interviews as evidence, under the following conditions:
(a) The child witness is unable to testify in court on grounds and under conditions established under section
28 (c).
(b) The interview of the child was conducted by duly trained members of a multidisciplinary team or
representatives of law enforcement or child protective services in situations where child abuse is
suspected so as to determine whether child abuse occurred.
(c) The party offering the videotape or audiotape must prove that:
(1) the videotape or audiotape discloses the identity of all individuals present and at all times
includes their images and voices;
(2) the statement was not made in response to questioning calculated to lead the child to make
a particular statement or is clearly shown to be the statement of the child and not the product
of improper suggestion;
(3) the videotape and audiotape machine or device was capable of recording testimony;
(4) the person operating the device was competent to operate it;
(5) the videotape or audiotape is authentic and correct; and
(6) it has been duly preserved.
The individual conducting the interview of the child shall be available at trial for examination by
any party. Before the videotape or audiotape is offered in evidence, all parties shall be afforded an
opportunity to view or listen to it and shall be furnished a copy of a written transcript of the proceedings.
The fact that an investigative interview is not videotaped or audiotaped as required by this
section shall not by itself constitute a basis to exclude from evidence out-of-court statements or testimony
of the child. It may, however, be considered in determining the reliability of the statements of the child
describing abuse.
People vs. Ibanez, 706 SCRA
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
People vs. Esugon, 759
FIRST DIVISION / G.R. No. 195244 / June 22, 2015 / BERSAMIN, J.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
357
BABY 520 notes
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA, Accused-
Appellant.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
This appeal turns on whether or not the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the
robbery with homicide was credible and competent considering that the identifying witness was Carl, a 5-
year-old lad, whose sole testimony positively pointed to and incriminated the appellant as the person who
had entered their home, robbed the family, and killed his mother.
The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate to others the acts and
events witnessed. Towards that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court makes clear who may and may not
be witnesses in judicial proceedings, to wit:
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons
who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwis e
provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following persons cannot
be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting
which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and
can communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age,
religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social status are not necessary to qualify a
person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as listed the
rules. The generosity with which the Rules of Court allows people to testify is apparent, for religious beliefs,
interest in the outcome of a case, and conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law are not
grounds for disqualification.
That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The
dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long
been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December
2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden
of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only when substantial doubt exists
regarding the ability of the child to perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish truth from
falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion
of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.
The appellant did not object to Carl’s competency as a witness. He did not attempt to adduce
evidence to challenge such competency by showing that the child was incapable of perceiving events and
of communicating his perceptions, or that he did not possess the basic qualifications of a competent
witness. After the Prosecution terminated its direct examination of Carl, the appellant extensively tested
his direct testimony on cross-examination. All that the Defense did was to attempt to discredit the testimony
of Carl, but not for once did the Defense challenge his capacity to distinguish right from wrong, or to
perceive, or to communicate his perception to the trial court. Consequently, the trial judge favorably
determined the competency of Carl to testify against the appellant.
The appellant points to inconsistencies supposedly incurred by Carl. That is apparently not
disputed. However, it seems clear that whatever inconsistencies the child incurred in his testimony did not
concern the principal occurrence or the elements of the composite crime charged but related only to minor

and peripheral matters. As such, their effect on his testimony was negligible, if not nil, because the
inconsistencies did not negate the positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator
(15) Residual exception
Section 50. Residual exception. – A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions, having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is admissible if the court
determines that:
(a) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(b) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and
(c) the general purposes of these [R]ules and the interests of justice will be best served by
admission of the statement into evidence.
However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent makes
known to the adverse party, sufficiently in advance of the hearing, or by the pre-trial stage in the case of a
trial of the main case, to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the
proponent’s intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant. (n)
This is a NEW exception. Because of this, it has given the court a wide discretion on the part
of the trial judge to admit, so the principle of liberality or liberalization applies in the rule of evidence,
especially in the exception to hearsay rule because of this residual exception.
From this you will note that practically EVERYTHING will be considered as falling under the
residual exception.
Just remember two elements:
1. Trustworthiness; and
2. Advance Notice
E.g., if one testifies that the Lopez’s of Iloilo city are philanthropists, this will fall under residual
exception.
That this particular person is very thrifty. This can be taken as a residual exception.
Filipinos, are clannists or regionalist, e.g., ah ilokano yan, kuripot yan. So, may mga reputations.
These matters can fall under residual exception.
This new exception opens the entire world to admission of hearsay evidence.
“The statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts;” who will determine this? It is totally at the
mercy of the trial judge.
J. OPINION RULE (SECTIONS 51-53)
Section 51. General rule. – The opinion of a witness is not admissible, except as indicated in the following
sections. (48)
The general rule is that opinion of a witness is not admissible. They are not admissible because
one must testify only on his or her own personal knowledge and opinion is not of personal knowledge.
EXCEPTIONS to opinion rule:
1. Expert Witness
Section 52. Opinion of expert witness. – The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, which he or she is shown to possess, may be received
in evidence. (49a)
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
358
BABY 520 notes
If you are to present an expert witness, be careful, such that you always have to lay the basis
because of this opinion rule. If you have not qualified your witness as an expert witness then he cannot
give his opinion.
Query: How do you qualify him as expert witness?
A: Biodata, Diploma, certificate of training etc.
Dapat admitted siya by court
Note: If you have not laid your basis as a general rule the statements are not admissible because of the
opinion rule. However, if the opinion has not been objected to on the ground of opinion rule and there was
a cross-examination made upon the witness then it becomes admissible. Curative rule, when you cross
examine you waive the defect in the testimony.
TIP: When an expert witness is presented the general rule is never cross examine, kasi lulubog ka lang
expert yan eh. The exception is if you are also an expert on that filed the expert is testifying to.
So, how do you contest the testimony of an expert witness? Present also an expert witness and let the
trial judge decide who is more expert.
Note: of the latest jurisprudence on expert witness on annulment of marriage, hindi na yan, bago na yung
rule, it no longer requires a psychologist or psychiatrist to take the witness stand to prove psychological
incapacity. Before under an administrative matter by the SC in case of annulment or declaration of nullity
of marriage it is mandatory to present a psychologist or psychiatrist if your ground is Article 36
psychological incapacity.
Lavarez vs. Guevarra, 822 SCRA 130
SECOND DIVISION / G.R. No. 206103 / March 29, 2017 / PERALTA, J.
LYDIA LAVAREZ, MARGARITA LAVAREZ, WILFREDO LAVAREZ, GREGORIO LAV AREZ,
LOURDES LAV AREZSAL V ACION, NORLIE LAVAREz,* G.J. LAVAREZ, GIL LAV AREZ, and GAY
NATALIE LA VAREZ, GODOFREDO LAV AREZ, LETICIA LAV AREZ, LUIS LAV AREZ, REMEDIOS
V. ZABALLERO, JOSEPHINE V. ZABALLERO FERNANDO V. ZABALLERO, VALENTA V.
ZABALLERO, MILAGROS Z. VERGARA, VALETA Z. REYES, AMADO R. ZABALLERO, EMMANUEL
R. ZABALLERO, and FLORENTINO R. ZABALLERO, Petitioners vs. ANGELES S. GUEVARRA,
AUGUSTO SEVILLA, JR., ASTERIA S. YRA, ANTONIO SEVILLA, ALBERTO SEVILLA, ADELINA S.
ALVAREZ, ARISTEO SEVILLA and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LUCENA CITY, Respondents
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
It is settled that the testimony of expert witnesses must be construed to have been
presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court in the
determination of the issue before it. Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert
testimonies, they may place whatever weight they may choose upon such testimonies in
accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is
peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of
the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which
he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact
that he might be a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and observation of the matters
about which he testifies, and any other matters which deserve to illuminate his statements. The
opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the
facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be
given controlling effect. The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his

testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling on such is not reviewable in the
absence of abuse of discretion.
Avelino vs. People, 701 SCRA
FIRST DIVISION / G.R. No. 181444 / July 17, 2013 / VILLARAMA, J.
BOBBY "ABEL" AVELINO y BULAWAN, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Case records reveal that Cabamongan was presented as an ordinary witness. Hence, his
opinion regarding the location of the gunman in relation to the place where the empty shells were found is
immaterial. Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that requires
expertise, and (b) the witness has been qualified as an expert. In this case, counsel for the petitioner
failed to make the necessary qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during trial.
2. Ordinary Witness
Section 53. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. – The opinion of a witness, for which proper basis is given,
may be received in evidence regarding –
(a) [T]he identity of a person about whom he or she has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he or she has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he or she is sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his or her impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or
appearance of a person. (50a)
Opinion of an ordinary witness is limited only to those enumerated in section 53.
(a) [T]he identity of a person about whom he or she has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he or she has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he or she is sufficiently acquainted.; and
(d) impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person
Just a note on letter (d) impression, you always, when he is an ordinary witness, never ask
“what do you think” because that calls for an opinion. But if you ask “what is your impression about the
behavior or attitude of Mr. X?”, then that would be an exception.
But note that for all of them, the ordinary witness must always have a basis. E’g. a testimony
as to sanity, “witness what can you say about the mental sanity of the Mr. X?”, “he is not in good mental
sanity”, “how do you say so?”, “because I was with him in the mental hospital, I just left ahead of him”. (di
ko alma kung joke to or totoo T_T hahahahha)
Pp vs. Duranan, 349 SCRA
SECOND DIVISION / G.R. No. 134074-75 / January 16, 2001 / MENDOZA, J.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMILIANO DURANAN, a.k.a "Kalbo,",
accused-appellant.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Rule 130, Section 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be received
in evidence regarding ---
a. the identify of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
b. a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
c. the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
359
BABY 520 notes
Discussing this provision of the Rule on Evidence, Sen. Vicente J. Francisco writes in his
treatise: The mother of an offended party in case of rate, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows
the physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and
what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter.
….
It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental
condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech,
manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is required that the witness
details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what
it is. "A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when based
upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or
upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness' own knowledge and
observation, he having first testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other
observed facts, as the basis for his opinion.
K. CHARACTER EVIDENCE (SECTION 54)
Section 54. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions. – Evidence of a person’s
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith
on a particular occasion, except:
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable
degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
(2) The accused may prove his or her good moral character[,] pertinent to the moral trait
involved in the offense charged. However, the prosecution may not prove his or her bad moral
character unless on rebuttal.
(b) In Civil Cases:
Evidence of the moral character of a party
(c) In Criminal and Civil Cases:
Evidence of the good character of a witness is not admissible until such character has been
impeached.
In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof
may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-
examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a
charge, claim or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of that person’s conduct. (51a; 14,
Rule 132)
General Rule: Character evidence is inadmissible
Exception: Whether the character is relevant to the fact at issue in the case
Query: When is it relevant?
There must be some logical connection between it (character) and the fact it's offered to prove or disprove
Example – theft. Is it relevant? Maybe. When? Kleptomaniac Character is admissible as form of
impeachment.
There are two kinds of character:
1. Good; and
2. Bad
After making a distinction between good and bad, you make another distinction whose bad or
good character, is it? Is it the:
 360
BABY 520 notes
1. Offended party; Accused-appellant argues that these are Jehovah’s Witnesses, and as such, they are God-
2. Offender; or fearing people who would never lie as to his whereabouts at the time in question. This argument is as
3. The witness puerile as the first. We quote once more, and with approval, the pertinent portion of the RTC’s ruling on
As to the witness the good and bad character is irrelevant. this point - it is so easy for witnesses to get confused as to dates and time. The precision with which the
After determining that it is the witness whose character is at issue, is the witness likewise a witnesses for the defense, who are his co-members in the Jehovah’s Witnesses, quoted the respective
party to the case? hours when the participants in the Bible sharing session supposedly arrived is, at best, self-serving and
If the witness is also a party to the case you next determine what is this case? deserves scant consideration because of the facility with which it may be concocted and fabricated.
Is it a criminal or a civil?
After that has been determined, you can now apply the rule on character evidence which is the
exception:
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable
degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
(2) The accused may prove his or her good moral character[,] pertinent to the moral trait
involved in the offense charged. However, the prosecution may not prove his or her bad moral
character unless on rebuttal.
(b) In Civil Cases:
Evidence of the moral character of a party
(c) In Criminal and Civil Cases:
Evidence of the good character of a witness is not admissible until such character has been
impeached.
In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof
may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-
examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim or
defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of that person’s conduct

In this case of People vs. Deopita, 436 SCRA 794, what is applicable here is the relevancy of
the character, it is irrelevant because the issue here is not the character. It is not an element of the crime
of rape or act of lasciviousness.

SECOND DIVISION / G.R. No. 130601 / December 4, 2000 / BELLOSILLO, J.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN, accused-
appellant.

RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court

He tenaciously maintains that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime charged
since he is a person of good moral character, holding as he does the position of "Ministerial Servant" in
the congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a responsible
family man and a good Christian who preaches the word of God. We are not impressed. The fact that
accused-appellant is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies the conclusion that he is
innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the position of "Ministerial Servant" in his faith
is no guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed, religiosity is
not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the
impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous
good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must
be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his
guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more
than sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of accused-appellant is unavailing.

“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial


D. BURDEN OF PROOF, BURDEN OF EVIDENCE AND PRESUMPTIONS (Rule 131, Sections 1-6)
1. BURDEN OF PROOF VS. BURDEN OF EVIDENCE
Section 1. Burden of proof and burden of evidence. – Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his or her claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law. Burden of proof never shifts.
Burden of evidence is the duty of a party to present evidence sufficient to establish or rebut a
fact in issue to establish a prima facie case. Burden of evidence may shift from one party to the other in
the course of the proceedings, depending on the exigencies of the case. (1a)
Query: In this case of FEBTC vs. Chante, 707 SCRA why did justice Bersamin used the terms
burden of persuasion and burden of production instead of burden of proof and burden of evidence,
respectively?
A: There are a lot of misconception between these two concepts, akala nila one is separate
from the other in the sense na kapag natapos yung isa tapos na, NO, remember that these terms are very
informative and instructive. Dito sa Pilipinas naka ugalian na ang nanliligaw lalaki, kaya nga gusto kong
pumunta sa Korea kasi doon babae ang nanliligaw. Dito sa Pilipinas the duty to persuade is with the man
(proponent), but it should not end there, it should move forward and that is already the burden of
production. Ang obligasyon nandoon sa lalake, but you do not see the obligation shopping at SM mall, this
is abstract, makikita mo lang yan when it becomes actual. And how is the burden of proof actualized thru
the burden of evidence.
It is the burden of persuasion because it must convince, in other words, the duty to convince.
But such duty convince must not end there it must be actualized. One must accomplish the duty, comply
with the duty. And how do you do that? Through the burden of evidence.
So, kapag yung lalaki sinabihan yung babae na mahal siya, dapat ipakita niya, yung babae
naman “sabi ka ng sabi”, ngayon yung lalake sasabihin “bakit may admission ka na, di ka sumasagot,
admission by silence”. HAHAHA
Kaya tama si Justice Bersamin, very informative, kaya burden of persuasion because it is the
burden of proof, it is the duty to convince. But to persuade does no end there the persuasion never shifts,
it is always upon the lalake it never shifts to the woman [it is upon the proponent trying to persuade and it
is not upon the other party].
It is the burden of evidence that shifts to the woman [the other party]. That is why there are
rulings which states that burden of proof is fallacious because the burden is shifted to the other side and
that is wrong, that is a fallacy.
If you look at section 1 R131, as amended, if you look at the definition pareho ang subject [ng
dalawang cocnepts] Burden of proof is the “duty to present evidence”, now if you look at Burden of
evidence it is also the “duty to present evidence”, oh diba pareho lang, so where lies the difference? It
is in the succeeding words; in Burden of proof, it is the duty of a party to present evidence “on the facts
in issue necessary to establish his or her claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law.” Doon na nag kakadiperesya on the other hand, Burden of evidence is the duty to present evidence
“sufficient to establish or rebut a fact in issue to establish a prima facie case”. Yung rebuttal yan
ang counter yung sinsabi ko kanina, that is why it can shift and the burden of proof cannot.
E.g., The duty to establish the guilt of the accused continues, it never shifts, that is the burden
of proof. Even when the accused puts up an affirmative defense which is an admission, the burden of proof
does not shift it remains with the proponent (the prosecution). What shifts is the burden of evidence, why?
To rebut. But if it is an affirmative defense, is it for the purpose of rebuttal? NO, it is not, because affirmative
defenses amount to hypothetical admissions of the charge.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
361
BABY 520 notes
Thus, Burden of Evidence is just a continuation [of burden of proof]. The duty lies with the
claimant to convince, but in order to convince put forward the evidence and that is the burden of evidence.
Kaya very significant yung isnabi ni Justice Bersamin, which is production of evidence, ano ba ang
production? Ilalalbas mo, produce. Pero yung persuasion, mailalabas mo ba yan? No, it lies with the
claimant or proponent, it is his or her duty. But after knowing that you have duty to convince, how do you
accomplish such duty? Put forward the evidence. And once you have put forward the evidence, the other
party will counter the evidence. So, hindi burden of proof yung sa other party but rather burden of evidence.
Kasi di claimant has already produced the evidence, so the other party has to counter it. And the claimant
will have to re-produce something that is contrary to the counter of the other party.
G.R. No. 170598 / October 9, 2013 / BERSAMIN, J.
FAR EAST BANK TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. ROBERTO MAR CHANTE, a.k.a. ROBERT MAR
G. CHAN, Respondents.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Although there was no question that Chan had the physical possession of the Card at the time
of the withdrawals, the exclusive possession of the card alone did not suffice to preponderantly establish
that he had himself made the withdrawals, or that he had caused the withdrawals to be made. In his
answer, he denied using the card to withdraw funds from his account on the dates in question, and averred
that the withdrawals had been an “inside job.” His denial effectively traversed FEBTC’s claim of his direct
and personal liability for the withdrawals, that it would lose the case unless it competently and sufficiently
established that he had personally made the withdrawals himself, or that he had caused the withdrawals.
In other words, it carried the burden of proof.
Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts,
namely:
(a) the risk of non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply persuasion burden; and
(b) the duty of producing evidence, or the burden of going forward with the evidence, or simply
the production burden or the burden of evidence.
In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the truth of a given proposition or issue by such
a quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case at which the issue arises.
In its other concept, it is the duty of producing evidence at the beginning or at any subsequent
stage of trial in order to make or meet a prima facie case. Generally speaking, burden of proof in its second
concept passes from party to party as the case progresses, while in its first concept it rests throughout
upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue. The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the
burden of proving it because mere allegation of the fact is not evidence of it. Verily, the party who asserts,
not he who denies, must prove.
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence
is given on either side. This is because our system frees the trier of facts from the responsibility
of investigating and presenting the facts and arguments, placing that responsibility entirely upon
the respective parties. The burden of proof, which may either be on the plaintiff or the defendant,
is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner
required by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the essential
allegations but raises an affirmative defense or defenses, that, if proved, would exculpate him from
liability.
Sec. 1, Rule 133 sets the quantum of evidence for civil actions, and delineates how
preponderance of evidence is determined. As the rule indicates, preponderant evidence refers to
evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing, than the evidence offered in opposition to
it. It is proof that leads the trier of facts to find that the existence of the contested fact is more
probable than its nonexistence.

Being the plaintiff, FEBTC must rely on the strength of its own evidence instead of upon the
weakness of Chan’s evidence. Its burden of proof thus required it to preponderantly demonstrate that his
ATM card had been used to make the withdrawals, and that he had used the ATM card and PIN by himself
or by another person to make the fraudulent withdrawals. Otherwise, it could not recover from him any
funds supposedly improperly withdrawn from the ATM account. FEBTC failed discharge its burden of
proof.
• To start with, FEBTC’s very own Systems Analyst, admitted that the bug infecting the bank’s
computer system had facilitated the fraudulent withdrawals.
• Secondly, the RTC’s deductions on the cause of the withdrawals were faulty. Chan’s
subsequent acts could have been impelled by so many reasons and motivations, and cannot
simply be given the meaning that the lower court attributed to them, and, instead, were even
consistent with the purpose and nature of his maintaining the current account deposit with
FEBTC, rendering the acts not unusual nor illegal.
• Thirdly, the RTC ignored the likelihood that somebody other than Chan familiar with the bug
infection of FEBTC’s computer system at the time of the withdrawals and adept with the
workings of the computer system had committed the fraud. This likelihood was not far-fetched
considering that FEBTC had immediately adopted corrective measures upon its discovery of
the system bug, by which FEBTC admitted its negligence in ensuring an error-free computer
system; and that the system bug had affected only the account of Chan.
• Fourthly, and perhaps the most damaging lapse, was that FEBTC failed to establish that the
PNB-Megalink’s ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel had actually dispensed cash in the
very significantly large amount alleged during the series of questioned withdrawals. For sure,
FEBTC should have proved the actual dispensing of funds from the ATM facility as the factual
basis for its claim against Chan. The omission left a yawning gap in the evidence against Chan.
• And lastly, Chan’s allegation of an “inside job” accounting for the anomalous withdrawals should
not be quickly dismissed as unworthy of credence or weight. FEBTC employee revealed that
FEBTC had previously encountered problems of bank accounts being debited despite the
absence of any withdrawal transactions by their owners. He attributed the problems to the
erroneous tagging of the affected accounts as somebody else’s account, allowing the latter to
withdraw from the affected accounts with the use of the latter’s own ATM card, and to the
former’s account being debited. The revelation tended to support Chan’s denial of liability, as it
showed the possibility of withdrawals being made by another person despite the PIN being an
exclusive access number known only to the cardholder.
2. PRESUMPTIONS
Presumptions are assumptions of facts resulting from a rule of law which requires such facts
to be assumed from another fact or sets of facts.
Presumptions are based on logical inferences. An underlying fact gives rise to a reasonable
inference that another fact (the presumption) exists, since there is a logical connection between the fact
in existence and the fact presumed. (Riguera 2020)
It is based on logic or syllogism you start with a major premise, minor premise, then conclusion.
Yung conclusion yan yung inference yan ang presumption. But where is such presumption based? It is
based on a major premise and the minor premise before you arrive at the conclusions.
Thus, presumptions are based on ACTUAL facts, realities, but these realities are of two kinds,
one of it is a reality which is known and the other is a reality which is unknown. You start with a known fact
and then from that you derive an unknown fact and you arrive at a conclusion, and that is the presumption.
E.g., all students who studies are Arellano between 5 pm to 9 pm are all law students, that is a
known fact. And unknown fact is that X is studying at Arellano from 7 pm to 9 pm. So, you arrive at the
conclusion that X is a law student.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
362
BABY 520 notes
Conclusive presumptions vs Disputable presumptions
A conclusive presumption (also known as a non-rebuttable presumption) is one which no
evidence, however strong, no argument, of consideration will be permitted to overcome. Thus, it is
irrebuttable.
On the other hand, a disputable presumption is one which is satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. It is disputable or rebuttable by other evidence.
There are only 2 conclusive presumptions provided for under Section 2 of R 131, while there
are 37 presumptions provided for under Section 3 of R 131.
Note: If the presumptions are wrong, they are presumed to be correct or right and it is called disputable
presumptions and may be controverted by other evidence. But if the presumption is correct, then it is a
conclusive presumption and you cannot contradict that.
Conclusive presumptions are the highest quantum of evidence, which is overwhelming
evidence. This cannot be overturned; it is even higher than proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Presumption is a belief that something is true. When that belief is likely, then conclusive. When
it is unlikely or uncertain, it is disputable.
a. Conclusive presumptions
Section 2. Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his or her own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he or she
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify
it; and
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his or her landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (2a)
Two kinds of conclusive presumptions:
1. Estoppel in pais; and
2. Presumption based on relationship between the tenant and the land lord.
That the tenant cannot deny the title of his land lord.
In this case of University of Mindanao vs. BSP, 778 SCRA (1/11/16) there were two cases
involved here one filed in Iligan City and the other CDO, and these cases are foreclosure of real estate
mortgage. The RTCs ruled in favor of UM. The CA reversed the RTC. The estoppel in pais was at issue
here. That the conclusive presumption was applied to acts of the Corporation in relation to ultra vires acts.
When corporations enter into contracts, the presumption is that they are duly authorized. And the
authorization here is that there must be a valid board resolution. And the board resolution here is the
secretary’s certificate, who in the course of trial in the lower court was countered or objected to. That is
why there is no application here of conclusive presumption. Ang sinasabi ng BSP, conclusive ang
presumption dito, sabi ng SC, the presumption here is not conclusive but rather disputable, wala ditong
estopel in pais because ultra vires yung act ng corporation. malalim yung doctrine dito, otherwise I would
not have given that as a case to be read. So, revisit this case, I might ask on this. May kahabaan to but to
summarize it, the presumption which was applied by BSP which was applied by the CA was overturned
by the SC because the argument of BSP is wrong, it was not a conclusive presumption but rather a
disputable presumption. And in the lower court there was sufficient evidence to counter that presumption.
PInapalabas ng BSP na alam ng mga board, nung nakipag contrata sila, by mortgaging a property, there
are the same stockholders of this bank. Sabi ni Justice Leonen ang educational institution is not for the
purpose of securing loans of third parties. Even if there is a certification that is not conclusive but only
disputable.
Possible question. Since sa facts ng case dito namatay yung president, will the dead man statute apply?

SECOND DIVISION / G.R. No. 194964-65 / January 11, 2016 / LEONEN, J.
UNIVERSITY OF MINDANAO, INC., Petitioner, v. BANGKO SENTRAL PILIPINAS, ET AL.,
Respondents.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Petitioner argues that the execution of the mortgage contract was ultra vires. As an educational
institution, it may not secure the loans of third persons. Securing loans of third persons is not among the
purposes for which petitioner was established.
Petitioner, is correct.
Petitioner does not have the power to mortgage its properties in order to secure loans of other
persons. As an educational institution, it is limited to developing human capital through formal instruction.
It is not a corporation engaged in the business of securing loans of others.
Securing FISLAI's loans by mortgaging petitioner's properties does not appear to have even
the remotest connection to the operations of petitioner as an educational institution. Securing loans is not
an adjunct of the educational institution's conduct of business. It does not appear that securing third-party
loans was necessary to maintain petitioner's business of providing instruction to individuals.
This court upheld the validity of corporate acts when those acts were shown to be clearly within
the corporation's powers or were connected to the corporation's purposes.
This court has, in effect, created a presumption that corporate acts are valid if, on their
face, the acts were within the corporation's powers or purposes. This presumption was explained as
early as in 1915 in Coleman v. Hotel De France, where this court ruled that contracts entered into by
corporations in the exercise of their incidental powers are not ultra vires.
Coleman involved a hotel's cancellation of an employment contract it executed with
a gymnast. One of the hotel's contentions was the supposed ultra vires nature of the contract.-
It was executed outside its express and implied powers under the articles of incorporation.
In ruling in favor of the contract's validity, this court considered the incidental powers
of the hotel to include the execution of employment contracts with entertainers for the purpose
of providing its guests entertainment and increasing patronage.
This court ruled that a contract executed by a corporation shall be presumed valid if on
its face its execution WAS NOT beyond the powers of the corporation to do. Thus:
When a contract is not on its face necessarily beyond the scope of the power of the
corporation by which it was made, it will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be presumed
to be valid. Corporations are presumed to contract within their powers. The doctrine of ultra
vires, when invoked for or against a corporation, should not be allowed to prevail where it would
defeat the ends of justice or work a legal wrong.
However, this should not be interpreted to mean that such presumption applies to
all cases, even when the act in question is on its face beyond the corporation's power to do or
when the evidence contradicts the presumption.
Presumptions are "inference[s] as to the existence of a fact not actually known, arising
from its usual connection with another which is known, or a conjecture based on past experience
as to what course human affairs ordinarily take." Presumptions embody values and revealed
behavioral expectations under a given set of circumstances
Presumptions may be conclusive or disputable.
Conclusive presumptions are presumptions that may not be overturned by evidence,
however strong the evidence is. They are made conclusive not because there is an established uniformity
in behavior whenever identified circumstances arise. They are conclusive because they are declared as
such under the law or the rules. Rule 131, Section 2 of the Rules of Court identifies two (2) conclusive
presumptions: xxx xxx
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
363
BABY 520 notes
On the other hand, disputable presumptions are presumptions that may be overcome by
contrary evidence. They are disputable in recognition of the variability of human behavior. Presumptions
are not always true. They may be wrong under certain circumstances, and courts are expected to apply
them, keeping in mind the nuances of every experience that may render the expectations wrong.
Thus, the application of disputable presumptions on a given circumstance must be based on
the existence of certain facts on which they are meant to operate. "[Presumptions are not allegations, nor
do they supply their absence[.]"Presumptions are conclusions. They do not apply when there are no facts
or allegations to support them.
If the facts exist to set in motion the operation of a disputable presumption, courts may accept
the presumption. However, contrary evidence may be presented to rebut the presumption.
Courts cannot disregard contrary evidence offered to rebut disputable presumptions.
Disputable presumptions apply only in the absence of contrary evidence or explanations. This court
explained in Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. v. Usec. Trinidad-Lichauco:
We do not doubt the existence of the presumptions of "good faith" or "regular
performance of official duty," yet these presumptions are disputable and may be contradicted
and overcome by other evidence. Many civil actions are oriented towards overcoming any
number of these presumptions, and a cause of action can certainly be geared towards such
effect. The very purpose of trial is to allow a party to present evidence to overcome the
disputable presumptions involved. Otherwise, if trial is deemed irrelevant or unnecessary,
owing to the perceived indisputability of the presumptions, the judicial exercise would be
relegated to a mere ascertainment of what presumptions apply in a given case, nothing more.
Consequently, the entire Rules of Court is rendered as excess verbiage, save perhaps for the
provisions laying down the legal presumptions.
If this reasoning of the Court of Appeals were ever adopted as a jurisprudential rule,
no public officer could ever be sued for acts executed beyond their official functions or authority,
or for tortious conduct or behavior, since such acts would "enjoy the presumption of good faith
and in the regular performance of official duty." Indeed, few civil actions of any nature would
ever reach the trial stage, if a case can be adjudicated by a mere determination from the
complaint or answer as to which legal presumptions are applicable. For-example, the
presumption that a person is innocent of a wrong is a disputable presumption on the same level
as that of the regular performance of official duty. A civil complaint for damages necessarily
alleges that the defendant committed a wrongful act or omission that would serve as basis for
the award of damages. With the rationale of the Court of Appeals, such complaint can be
dismissed upon a motion to dismiss solely on the ground that the presumption is that a person
is innocent of a wrong. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In this case, the presumption that the execution of mortgage contracts was within petitioner's
corporate powers does not apply. Securing third-party loans is not connected to petitioner's purposes as
an educational institution.
Petitioner argues that it did not authorize Saturnino Petalcorin to mortgage its properties on its
behalf. There was no board resolution to that effect. Thus, the mortgages executed by Saturnino Petalcorin
were unenforceable.
The mortgage contracts executed in favor of respondent do not bind petitioner. They were
executed without authority from petitioner.
Being a juridical person, petitioner cannot conduct its business, make decisions, or act in any
manner without action from its Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees must act as a body in order to
exercise corporate powers. Individual trustees are not clothed with corporate powers just by being a
trustee. Hence, the individual trustee cannot bind the corporation by himself or herself.
The corporation may, however, delegate through a board resolution its corporate powers or
functions to a representative, subject to limitations under the law and the corporation's articles of
incorporation.

The relationship between a corporation and its representatives is governed by the general
principles of agency.
Hence, without delegation by the board of directors or trustees, acts of a person—including
those of the corporation's directors, trustees, shareholders, or officers—executed on behalf of the
corporation are generally not binding on the corporation.
Contracts entered into in another's name without authority or valid legal representation are
generally unenforceable. he unenforceable status of contracts entered into by an unauthorized person on
behalf of another is based on the basic principle that contracts must be consented to by both parties.115
There is no contract without meeting of the minds as to the subject matter and cause of the obligations
created under the contract.
Consent of a person cannot be presumed from representations of another, especially if
obligations will be incurred as a result. Thus, authority is required to make actions made on his or her
behalf binding on a person. Contracts entered into by persons without authority from the corporation shall
generally be considered ultra vires and unenforceable against the corporation.
Two trial courts found that the Secretary's Certificate and the board resolution were either non-
existent or fictitious. The trial courts based their findings on the testimony of the Corporate Secretary,
Aurora de Leon herself. She signed the Secretary's Certificate and the excerpt of the minutes of the alleged
board meeting purporting to authorize Saturnino Petalcorin to mortgage petitioner's properties. There was
no board meeting to that effect. Guillermo B. Torres ordered the issuance of the Secretary's Certificate.
Aurora de Leon's testimony was corroborated by Saturnino Petalcorin.
Even the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial courts' decisions, recognized that "BSP
failed to prove that the UM Board of Trustees actually passed a Board Resolution authorizing Petalcorin
to mortgage the subject real properties[.]"
Unauthorized acts that are merely beyond the powers of the corporation under its articles of
incorporation are not void ab initio.
Thus, even though a person did not give another person authority to act on his or her behalf,
the action may be enforced against him or her if it is shown that he or she ratified it or allowed the other
person to act as if he or she had full authority to do so.
Ratification is a voluntary and deliberate confirmation or adoption of a previous unauthorized
act. It.converts the unauthorized act of an agent into an act of the principal. It cures the lack of consent at
the time of the execution of the contract entered into by the representative, making the contract valid and
enforceable. It is, in essence, consent belatedly given through express or implied acts that are deemed a
confirmation or waiver of the right to impugn the unauthorized act. Ratification has the effect of placing the
principal in a position as if he or she signed the original contract.
Implied ratification may take the form of silence, acquiescence, acts consistent with approval
of the act,, or acceptance or retention of benefits. However, silence, acquiescence, retention of benefits,
and acts that may be interpreted as approval of the act do not by themselves constitute implied ratification.
For an act to constitute an implied ratification, there must be no acceptable explanation for the act-other
than that there is an intention to adopt the act as his or her own. "[It] cannot be inferred from acts that a
principal has a right to do independently of the unauthorized act of the agent."
No act by petitioner can be interpreted as anything close to ratification. It was not shown that it
issued a resolution ratifying the execution of the mortgage contracts. It was not shown that it received
proceeds of the loans secured by the mortgage contracts. There was also no showing that it received any
consideration for the execution of the mortgage contracts. It even appears that petitioner was unaware of
the mortgage contracts until respondent notified it of its desire to foreclose the mortgaged properties.
Ratification must be knowingly and voluntarily done. Petitioner's lack of knowledge about the
mortgage executed in its name precludes an interpretation that there was any ratification on its part.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
364
BABY 520 notes
Respondent further argues that petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of its transactions
with respondent because its officers, the Spouses Guillermo and Dolores Torres, participated in obtaining
the loan.
Indeed, a corporation, being a person created by mere fiction of law, can act only through
natural persons such as its directors, officers, agents, and representatives. Hence, the general rule is that
knowledge of an officer is considered knowledge of the corporation.
However, even though the Spouses Guillermo and Dolores Torres were officers of both the
thrift banks and petitioner, their knowledge of the mortgage contracts cannot be considered as knowledge
of the corporation.
The rule that knowledge of an officer is considered knowledge of the corporation applies only
when the officer is acting within the authority given to him or her by the corporation
Thus, knowledge should be actually communicated to the corporation through its authorized
representatives. A corporation cannot be expected to act or not act on a knowledge that had not been
communicated to it through an authorized representative. There can be no implied ratification without
actual communication. Knowledge of the existence of contract must be brought to the corporation's
representative who has authority to ratify it. Further, "the circumstances must be shown from which such
knowledge may be presumed."
The Spouses Guillermo and Dolores Torres' knowledge cannot be interpreted as knowledge of
petitioner. Their knowledge was not obtained as petitioner's representatives. It was not shown that they
were acting for and within the authority given by petitioner when they acquired knowledge of the loan
transactions and the mortgages. The knowledge was obtained in the interest of and as representatives of
the thrift banks.
Respondent argues that Satnrnino Petalcorin was clothed with the authority to transact
on behalf of petitioner, based on the board resolution dated March 30, 1982 and Aurora de Leon's
notarized Secretary's Certificate. According to respondent, petitioner is bound by the mortgage
contracts executed by Saturnino Petalcorin.
This court has recognized presumed or apparent authority or capacity to bind corporate
representatives in instances when the corporation, through its silence or other acts of recognition, allowed
others to believe that persons, through their usual exercise of corporate powers, were conferred with
authority to deal on the corporation's behalf.
The doctrine of apparent authority does not go into the question of the corporation's
competence or power to do a particular act. It involves the question of whether the officer has the
power or is clothed with the appearance of having the power to act for the corporation. A finding
that there is apparent authority is not the same as a finding that the corporate act in question is
within the corporation's limited powers.
The rule on apparent authority is based on the principle of estoppel.
A corporation is estopped by its silence and acts of recognition because we recognize that
there is information asymmetry between third persons who have little to no information as to what happens
during corporate meetings, and the corporate officers, directors, and representatives who are insiders to
corporate affairs.
There can be no apparent authority and the corporation cannot be estopped from denying the
binding affect of an act when there is no evidence pointing to similar acts and other circumstances that
can be interpreted as the corporation holding out a representative as having authority to contract on its
behalf. In Advance Paper Corporation v. Arma Traders Corporation,147 this court had the occasion to say:
The doctrine of apparent authority does not apply if the principal did not commit any
acts or conduct which a third party knew and relied upon in good faith as a result of the exercise
of reasonable prudence. Moreover, the agent's acts or conduct must have produced a change
of position to the third party's detriment. (Citation omitted)
Saturnino Petalcorin's authority to transact on behalf of petitioner cannot be presumed based
on a Secretary's Certificate and excerpt from the minutes of the alleged board meeting that were found

to have been simulated. These documents cannot be considered as the corporate acts that held out
Saturnino Petalcorin as petitioner's authorized representative for mortgage transactions. They were not
supported by an actual board meeting.
Respondent argues that it may rely on the Secretary's Certificate issued by Aurora de Leon
because it was notarized.
The Secretary’s Certificate was void whether or not it was notarized. Notarization creates a
presumption of regularity and authenticity on the document. This presumption may be rebutted by “strong,
complete and conclusive proof” to the contrary. While notarial acknowledgment “attaches full faith and
credit to the document concerned,” it does not give the document its validity or binding effect. When there
is evidence showing that the document is invalid, the presumption of regularity or authenticity is not
applicable.
Since the notarized Secretary’s Certificate was found to have been issued without a
supporting board resolution, it produced no effect. It is not binding upon petitioner. It should not
have been relied on by BSP especially given its status as a bank.
i. Ibaan Rural bank vs. CA, 321 SCRA
G.R. No. 123817 December 17, 1999 / QUISUMBING, J.
IBAAN RURAL BANK INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MR. and MRS. RAMON
TARNATE, respondents.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
When the Bank received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Lipa City, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its contents. For two
years, it did not object to the 2-year redemption period provided in the certificate. Thus, it could be said
that the Bank consented to 2 two-year redemption period specially since it had time to object and did not.
When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an obligation is
proposed, his silence can be construed as consent. By its silence and inaction, the Bank misled
Sps. Tarnate to believe that they had 2 years within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse
of 2 years, the Bank is estopped from asserting that the period for redemption was only 1 year and
that the period had already lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations
or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and
acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of
such facts.
ii. Alcaraz vs. Tangga-an, 401 SCRA
THIRD DIVISION / G.R. No. 128568 / April 9, 2003 / CORONA, J.
SPOUSES REYNALDO ALCARAZ and ESMERALDA ALCARAZ, petitioners, vs. PEDRO M.
TANGGA-AN, MENAS R. TANGGA-AN, ET. AL. and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
There is no need to disturb and analyze the applicability of the principle invoked because Sps.
Alcaraz are estopped from raising the same. Both parties knew that their contract pertained only to the
lease of the house, without including the land. The contract states: “1. That the lessor is the owner of a
building of mixed materials situated at Premier St., Mabolo, Hipodromo, Cebu City.” At the time of the
perfection of the contract, Sps. Alcaraz, as lessees, were aware that the NHA, and not Virginia, the lessor,
owned the land on which the rented house stood yet they signed the same, obliged themselves to comply
with the terms thereof for five years and performed their obligations as lessees for two years. Now they
assume a completely different legal position. They claim that the lease contract ceased to be effective
because Virgilio’s assumption of ownership of the land stripped the respondents of ownership of the
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
365
BABY 520 notes
building. They argue that, under Art. 440 of the Civil Code, Virgilio’s title over the lot necessarily included
the house on the said lot, thus automatically canceling the contract.
Sec. 2(a), Rule 131 provides as a conclusive presumption that: “whenever a party has,
by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a
particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.”
After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, Sps. Alcaraz are barred from
alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the respondents lost ownership of
the house after Virgilio acquired title over the lot.
b. Disputable presumptions
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his or her voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his or her concerns;
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
(g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter;
(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later one is produced;
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and
the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership
over, are owned by him or her;
(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself or herself for the payment of the money, or the
delivery of anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly;
(l) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful
exercise of jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it;
and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid
before the arbitrators and passed upon by them;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
(t) That an indorsement of a negotiable instrument was made before the instrument was overdue and at
the place where the instrument is dated;
(u) That a writing is truly dated;
(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail;
(w) That after an absence of seven [(7)] years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he
or she is considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his or her succession
until after an absence of ten [(10)] years. If he or she disappeared after the age of seventy-five [(75)] years,
an absence of five [(5)] years shall be sufficient in order that his or her succession may be opened.

The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate among the
heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft which is missing, who
has not been heard of for four [(4)] years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been missing
for four [(4)] years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose existence
has not been known for four [(4)] years; and
(4) If a married person has been absent for four [(4)] consecutive years, the spouse present
may contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already dead. In case of disappearance, where there is a danger of death [, under]
the circumstances hereinabove provided, an absence of only two [(2)] years shall be sufficient
for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any case, before marrying
again, the spouse present must institute summary proceeding[s] as provided in the Family
Code and in the rules for declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse [;]
(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or
fact;
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary nature habits of
life;
(z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of copartnership;
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other and who live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife[,] without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
has been obtained by their joint eff orts, work or industry[;]
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other
and who have acquired property through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry, such
contributions and their corresponding shares[,] including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit[,]
are equal[;]
(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred
[(300)] days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof
to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty (180) days after the solemnization of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been conceived during [the former] marriage, [provided] it be
born within the three hundred [(300)] days after the termination of the former marriage; and
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty (180) days following the celebration of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born
within the three hundred [(300)] days after the termination of the former marriage[;]
(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
(gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority, was so
printed or published;
(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting to contain reports of cases adjudged in tribunals of the
country where the book is published, contains correct reports of such cases;
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
366
BABY 520 notes
(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular person has
actually conveyed it to him or her when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such person
or his or her successor in interest;
(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two [(2)] persons perish in the same calamity, such as
wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances
from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the
strength and the age of the sexes, according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen [(15)] years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age of sixty [(60)], the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen [(15)] and the other above sixty [(60)], the former is deemed to have
survived;
4. If both be over fifteen [(15)] and under sixty [(60)], and the sex be different, the male is
deemed to have survived, if the sex be the same, the older; and
5. If one be under fifteen [(15)] or over sixty [(60)], and the other between those ages, the latter
is deemed to have survived;
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two [(2)] or more persons who are called to succeed each other,
as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in
the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time. (3a)
Query: Itong disputable presumption, kaya siya disputable because you can overturn them, by
what evidence, by what quantum of evidence can you overturn this evidence?
A: These disputable presumptions can be overturned by clear and convincing evidence, except
paragraph (a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong, this is an exception because it is constitutional,
which must be overturned by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Query: If you read section 5 second paragraph it says “If presumptions are inconsistent, the
presumption that is founded upon weightier considerations of policy shall apply. If considerations
of policy are of equal weight, neither presumption applies.” where would the second paragraph
apply in section 3?
A: In order two illustrate the second paragraph of section 5 there must be two or more
presumptions involved.
e.g., my example here is in the very case of Rosaroso vs. Soria, 699 SCRA what was used here was (p)
That private transactions have been fair and regular; (q) That the ordinary course of business has been
followed; (r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract. Which runs inconsistently with each
other, but there was WEIGHTIER CONSIDERATION OF POLICY, and what was upheld here is (r)
sufficient consideration of a contract.
Note: But don’t put it this way, if you are given a problem between a conclusive presumption and a
disputable presumption, there is no question in that, conclusive will prevail.
THIRD DIVISION / G.R. No. 194846 / June 19, 2013 / MENDOZA, J.
*HOSPICIO D. ROSAROSO, ET. AL., Petitioners, vs. LUCILA LABORTE SORIA, SPOUSES HAM
SOLUTAN and **LAILA SOLUTAN, and MERIDIAN REALTY CORPORATION, Respondents.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Petitioners argue that the second deed of sale was null and void because Luis could not have
validly transferred the ownership of the subject properties to Meridian, he being no longer the owner after
selling them to his children. No less than Atty. William Boco, the lawyer who notarized the first deed of

sale, appeared and testified in court that the said deed was the one he notarized and that Luis and his
second wife, Lourdes, signed the same before him. He also identified the signatures of the subscribing
witnesses. Thus, they invoke the finding of the RTC which wrote:
In the case of Heirs of Joaquin Teves, Ricardo Teves versus Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. No. 109963, October 13, 1999, the Supreme Court held that a public document
executed [with] all the legal formalities is entitled to a presumption of truth as to the recitals
contained therein. In order to overthrow a certificate of a notary public to the effect that a grantor
executed a certain document and acknowledged the fact of its execution before him, mere
preponderance of evidence will not suffice. Rather, the evidence must (be) so clear, strong and
convincing as to exclude all reasonable dispute as to the falsity of the certificate. When the
evidence is conflicting, the certificate will be upheld x x x .
A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. (Ramirez
vs. Ner, 21 SCRA 207). As such it … must be sustained in full force and effect so long as he
who impugns it shall not have presented strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or
nullity on account of some flaw or defect provided against by law (Robinson vs. Villafuerte, 18
Phil. 171, 189-190)
The fact that the first deed of sale was executed, conveying the subject properties in favor of
petitioners, was never contested by the respondents. What they vehemently insist, though, is that the said
sale was simulated because the purported sale was made without a valid consideration.
Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable
presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of
business has been followed; and (3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract. These
presumptions operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut them. They create the
necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie case they created, and which, if no proof to the
contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is but, by the
presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in
support of the averment, because the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted.
In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said presumption. Aside from their bare
allegation that the sale was made without a consideration, they failed to supply clear and convincing
evidence to back up this claim. It is elementary in procedural law that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the Rules of Court.
The CA decision ran counter to this established rule regarding disputable presumption. It relied
heavily on the account of Lourdes who testified that the children of Luis approached him and convinced
him to sign the deed of sale, explaining that it was necessary for a loan application, but they did not pay
the purchase price for the subject properties. This testimony, however, is self-serving and would not
amount to a clear and convincing evidence required by law to dispute the said presumption. As such, the
presumption that there was sufficient consideration will not be disturbed.
Granting that there was no delivery of the consideration, the seller would have no right to sell
again what he no longer owned. His remedy would be to rescind the sale for failure on the part of the buyer
to perform his part of their obligation pursuant to Article 1191 of the New Civil Code. In the case of Clara
M. Balatbat v. Court Of Appeals and Spouses Jose Repuyan and Aurora Repuyan, it was written:
The failure of the buyer to make good the price does not, in law, cause the ownership
to revest to the seller unless the bilateral contract of sale is first rescinded or resolved pursuant
to Article 1191 of the New Civil Code. Non-payment only creates a right to demand the
fulfillment of the obligation or to rescind the contract. [Emphases supplied
ii. Heirs of Trazona vs. Heirs of Canada, 712 SCRA
FIRST DIVISION / G.R. No. 175874 / December 11, 2013 / SERENO, CJ.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
367
BABY 520 notes
HEIRS OF CIPRIANO TRAZONA, Namely: FRANCISCA T. MATBAGON, ET. AL., Petitioners, vs.
HEIRS OF DIONISIO CANADA, Namely: ROSITA C. GERSALINA, ET. AL.; PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR
of Cebu and MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR of Minglanilla, Cebu, Respondents.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
The assailed deed is a forgery. It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary
weight as regards their due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the
presumption of regularity, this presumption is disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence
that is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant. Here, there is clear and convincing
evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of regularity of the assailed deed.
• First, the document examiner determined that the signature of Cipriano in the assailed deed
had been forged. No issue has been raised about his expertise. In concluding that the signature
of Cipriano in the assailed deed was a forgery, the document examiner found that there were
“significant differences in letter formation, construction and other individual handwriting
characteristics” between the assailed and the standard signatures of Cipriano.
• Second, the RTC did not just rely on expert testimony in ruling that the signature was forged. It
likewise supported its finding that the signature was forged through independent observation.
• Third, it has been established that Lot No. 5053-H is in the name of Cipriano, who bought it
from the government in 1940. Thus, only Cipriano had the right to dispose of the property, or
portions thereof.
• Fourth, Cipriano had cultivated the property and paid taxes thereon since the time he acquired
it from the government, and even after its purported sale to Dionisio, until his death. Petitioners
continued paying the taxes thereon even after Cipriano had died. Respondents started paying
taxes on the property only after the Tax Declaration was issued in Dionisio’s name in 1997. It
would be absurd for petitioners to pay taxes on a property they do not own.
• Fifth, as admitted by Gorgonio himself, petitioners were the ones enjoying the fruits of the
property from 1960 until the present controversy. Again, it is incongruous for petitioners to enjoy
the fruits if respondents owned the property.
• Sixth, there was an irregularity regarding the place of issuance of Cipriano’s residence
certificate indicated in the assailed deed, as compared with the residence certificates of the
other persons indicated on the same page of the notarial register.
• Finally, when the record management analyst from the Bureau of Archives presented the
assailed deed, the paper was noted to be white, while its supposed contemporaries in the bunch
from where it was taken had turned yellow with age.
iii.Uy vs. Lacsamana, 767 SCRA
SECOND DIVISION / G.R. No. 206220 / August 19, 2015 / CARPIO, J.
LUIS UY, SUBSTITUTED BY LYDIA UY VELASQUEZ AND SHIRLEY UY MACARAIG, Petitioner, v.
SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND ROSAURA* MENDOZA, SUBSTITUTED BY CORAZON BUENA,
Respondents.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca alone is
anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a presumption established in our
Rules "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage." Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume
marriage. However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other
evidence.

Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda v. Trias, we held
that testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, as well as
the person who officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove
the fact of marriage.
Documentary evidence may also be shown. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, we held that the
best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself. Under Act No. 3613 or the
Marriage Law of 1929, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114, which is applicable to the present
case being the marriage law in effect at the time Uy and Rosca cohabited, the marriage certificate, where
the contracting parties state that they take each other as husband and wife, must be furnished by the
person solemnizing the marriage to (1) either of the contracting parties, and (2) the clerk of the Municipal
Court of Manila or the municipal secretary of the municipality where the marriage was solemnized. The
third copy of the marriage contract, the marriage license and the affidavit of the interested party regarding
the solemnization of the marriage other than those mentioned in Section 5 of the same Act shall be kept
by the official, priest, or minister who solemnized the marriage.
Here, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have
sourced from his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where the marriage
allegedly took place. Even the findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single relevant evidence
that he was actually married to Rosca. On the contrary, the documents Uy submitted showed that he and
Rosca were not legally married to each other.
Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, their property
relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple living together
were not incapacitated from getting married.
The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-
owned unless there is proof to the contrary. We agree with both the trial and appellate courts that
Rosca was able to prove that the subject property is not co-owned but is paraphernal.
First, in the Resolution dated 7 November 1979 of the LRC in LRC Consulta No. 1194, Rosca
was recognized as the sole registered owner of the property.
Second, in the Deed of Sale dated 29 January 1964 between Spouses Manuel and Rosca
covering the 484 square meter land, Uy served as a mere witness to Rosca's purchase of the land as
evidenced by his signature under "signed in the presence of." This could only mean that Uy admitted the
paraphernal nature of Rosca's ownership over the property.
Third, in the Affidavit of Ownership dated 27 September 1976 executed by Rosca in support of
her real estate loan application with PBC in the amount of P5 0,000, Rosca stated that she was the sole
and lawful owner of the subject property and that the land was registered under her name and that the
phrase "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" in TCT No. T-24660 was merely a description of her status.
Last, the title to the property in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" was notice to
the world, including her heirs and successors-in-interest, that such belonged to Rosca as her paraphernal
property. The words "married to" were merely descriptive of Rosca's status at the time the property was
registered in her name. Otherwise, if the property was conjugal, the title to the property should have been
in the names of Luis Uy and Petra Rosca.
Based on the evidence she presented, Rosca was able to sufficiently overcome the
presumption that any property acquired while living together shall be owned by the couple in equal shares.
The house and lot were clearly Rosca's paraphernal properties and she had every right to sell the same
even without Uy's consent.
iv. Diaz vs. People, 776 SCRA 43
FIRST DIVISION / G.R. No. 208113 / December 02, 2015 / PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
DOLORES DIAZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LETICIA S. ARCILLA,
Respondents.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
368
BABY 520 notes
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Petitioner's claim that she was required to sign two (2) one-half sheets of paper and a trust
receipt in blank during her transactions with respondent, which she allegedly failed to retrieve after paying
her obligations, is a bare allegation that cannot be given credence. It is well-settled that "[h]e who alleges
a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence."
On the contrary, the CA correctly found that respondent was able to prove by preponderance
of evidence the fact of the transaction, as well as petitioner's failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of
the merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to return the same to respondent in case such merchandise were
not sold. This was established through the presentation of the acknowledgment receipt dated February 20,
1996, which, as the document's name connotes, shows that petitioner acknowledged receipt from
respondent of the listed items with their corresponding values, and assumed the obligation to return the
same on March 20, 1996 if not sold.
In this relation, it should be pointed out that under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court, the legal presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case
law dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first
informing himself of its contents and consequences. Further, under Section 3 (p) of the same Rule,
it is equally presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves every
contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he signs and delivers it. The effect
of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome
the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail. In this case,
petitioner failed to present any evidence to controvert these presumptions. Also, respondent's possession
of the document pertaining to the obligation strongly buttresses her claim that the same has not been
extinguished. Preponderance of evidence only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than
the opposing evidence. All things considered, the evidence in this case clearly preponderates in
respondent's favor.
WHAT PRESUMPTIONS TO STUDY
For purposes of the Bar, we are only going to study: paragraphs (e) (j) (m) (p) (q) (r) (v)
(w) (aa) (bb) (cc) (dd) (jj)
Presumption on Suppression
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
In this case of People vs. Padrigone, 382 SCRA on appeal one of the issues raised was the
prosecutions failure to present the victim as a witness was a suppression of evidence, and the disputable
presumption is paragraph (e) evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced, that is why
Padrigone is arguing that “hindi niya nilabas yun eh, pag nialbas niyo yun mai-establish ko that there was
no rape”. The SC ruled that held that there are four requisites before this presumption apply:
1. The evidence is not at the disposal of the parties;
2. The suppression must be willful;
3. That the evidence is not merely corroborative or cumulative; and
4. The suppression is not an exercise of privilege.
In this case, the presumption is not applicable, first, the evidence is available to both parties, it
was at the disposal of both parties, the defense can subpoena the victim. There is suppression of evidence,
only if such evidence is available only to one party, kasi kung available to both yan there is no suppression
of evidence. Second, the alleged suppression was never willful because the witness cannot stand public
trial. And third, the testimony of the victim is merely corroborative.
Another point that I want you to remember in this case, is that don’t limit evidence here to
testimonia. The evidence which maybe suppressed is not limited to testimonial evidence, it can be
documentary evidence.

FIRST DIVISION / G.R. No. 137664 / May 9, 2002 / YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO PADRIGONE a.k.a. "ROBERTO
SAN MIGUEL", accused-appellant.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Appellant assails the procedural irregularities committed by the prosecution and by the trial
court. He claims that the prosecution suppressed evidence by not presenting Rowena, the victim, when
the latter should have had her sane moments. As a consequence, the trial court deprived appellant of the
opportunity to cross-examine her when she allegedly declared before the Chief of Police of Buhi that it
was only appellant who raped her which declaration became the basis for the latter's conviction.
Appellant's contention is misplaced if not misleading. The basis of his conviction was not
Rowena's declaration before the Chief of Police but rather Nimfa's testimony before the trial court that it
was him who raped Rowena, among others.
Besides, the non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as
suppression of evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that "evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" does not apply if (couched in the negative):
(a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties;
(b) the suppression was not willful;
(c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and
(d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. First, the defense had the
opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a witness. Instead, the
defense failed to call her to the witness stand. Second, Rowena was certified to be suffering from "Acute
Psychotic Depressive Condition" and thus "cannot stand judicial proceedings yet." The non-presentation,
therefore, of Rowena was not willful. Third, in any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also
present and in fact witnessed the violation committed on her sister.
In this case of Metrobank vs. CA, 333 SCRA there is suppression of documentary evidence.
SECOND DIVISION / G.R. No. 122899 /June 8, 2000 / BUENA, J.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and G.T.P.
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Just as decisive is petitioner METROBANK's failure to bring before respondent Court of
Appeals the current statement evidencing what it claims as "other unliquidated past due loans" at the
scheduled hearing of 8 March 1995. It was a golden opportunity, so to speak, lost for Metrobank to defend
its non-release of the real estate mortgage.
It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which
imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very
nature must overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to
produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced, would operate to
his prejudice, and support the case of his adversary. No rule of law is better settled than that a party
having it in his power to prove a fact, if it exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it
must be taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist. Where facts are in evidence affording legitimate
inferences going to establish the ultimate fact that the evidence is designed to prove, and the party to be
affected by the proof, with an opportunity to do so, fails to deny or explain them, they may well be taken
as admitted with all the effect of the inferences afforded. The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge
peculiarly within his own control, and refuses to divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the most
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
369
BABY 520 notes
unfavorable construction upon his silence, and infers that a disclosure would have shown the fact to be as
claimed by the opposing party.
Verily, Metrobank’s omission to present its evidence only created an adverse inference against
its cause. Therefore, it cannot now be heard to complain since the CA extended a reasonable opportunity
to Metrobank that it did not avail.
Presumption of Possession of a thing
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and
the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership
over, are owned by him or her;
Presumption on official duty
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
I think we have discussed this already thoroughly, just refresh your memory about the cases in
the chain of custody rule.
De los Santos vs. COA, 703 SCRA;
EN BANC / G.R. No. 198457 / August 13, 2013 / PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FILOMENA G. DELOS SANTOS, JOSEFA A. BACALTOS, NELANIE A. ANTONI, AND MAUREEN A.
BIEN, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONERS,
Respondent.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
By way of defense, petitioners nonetheless argue that VSMMC was merely a passive entity in
the disbursement of funds under the TNT Program and, thus, invoke good faith in the performance of their
respective duties, capitalizing on the failure of the assailed Decisions of the CoA to show that their lapses
in the implementation of the TNT Program were attended by malice or bad faith.
The Court is not persuaded.
Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must
fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated. For instance, in Reyna v. CoA(Reyna), the
Court affirmed the liability of the public officers therein, notwithstanding their proffered claims of good faith,
since their actions violated an explicit rule in the Landbank of the Philippines’ Manual on Lending
Operations. In similar regard, the Court, in Casal v. CoA (Casal), sustained the liability of certain officers
of the National Museum who again, notwithstanding their good faith participated in approving and
authorizing the incentive award granted to its officials and employees in violation of Administrative Order
Nos. 268 and 29 which prohibit the grant of productivity incentive benefits or other allowances of similar
nature unless authorized by the Office of the President. In Casal, it was held that, even if the grant of the
incentive award was not for a dishonest purpose, the patent disregard of the issuances of the President
and the directives of the CoA amounts to gross negligence, making the [“approving officers”] liable for the
refund [of the disallowed incentive award].
Just as the foregoing public officers in Reyna and Casal were not able to dispute their
respective violations of the applicable rules in those cases, the Court finds that the petitioners herein have
equally failed to make a case justifying their non-observance of existing auditing rules and regulations,
and of their duties under the MOA. Evidently, petitioners’ neglect to properly monitor the disbursement of
Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the validation and eventual payment of 133 falsified prescriptions and fictitious
claims for anti-rabies vaccines supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy, despite the patent
irregularities borne out by the referral slips and prescriptions related thereto. Had there been an internal
control system installed by petitioners, the irregularities would have been exposed, and the hospital would

have been prevented from processing falsified claims and unlawfully disbursing funds from the said PDAF.
Verily, petitioners cannot escape liability for failing to monitor the procedures implemented by the TNT
Office on the ground that Cuenco always reminded them that it was his money. Neither may deviations,
from the usual procedure at the hospital, such as the admitted bypassing of the VSMMC social worker in
the qualification of the indigent-beneficiaries, be justified as “a welcome relief to the already overworked
and undermanned section of the hospital.”
In this relation, it bears stating that Delos Santos’ argument that the practices of the TNT Office
were already pre-existing when she assumed her post and that she found no reason to change the same
remains highly untenable. Records clearly reveal that she, in fact, admitted that when she was installed
as the new Medical Center Chief of VSMMC sometime “in the late 2003,” Antoni disclosed to her the
irregularities occurring in the hospital specifically on pre-signed and forged prescriptions. Hence, having
known this significant information, she and Antoni should have probed into the matter further, and, likewise,
have taken more stringent measures to correct the situation. Instead, Delos Santos contented herself with
giving oral instructions to resident doctors, training officers, and Chiefs of Clinics not to leave pre-signed
prescriptions pads, which Antoni allegedly followed during the orientations for new doctors. But, just the
same, the falsification and forgeries continued, and it was only a year after, or in December 2004, that
Delos Santos ordered a formal investigation of the attendant irregularities. By then, too much damage had
already been done.
All told, petitioners’ acts and/or omissions as detailed in the assailed CoA issuances and as
aforedescribed reasonably figure into the finding that they failed to faithfully discharge their respective
duties and to exercise the required diligence which resulted to the irregular disbursements from Cuenco’s
PDAF. In this light, their liability pursuant to Sections 104 and 105 of the Auditing Code, as well as Section
16 of the 2009 Rules and Regulations on Settlement of Accounts, as prescribed in CoA Circular No. 2009-
006, must perforce be upheld. Truly, the degree of their neglect in handling Cuenco’s PDAF and the
resulting detriment to the public cannot pass unsanctioned, else the standard of public accountability be
loosely protected and even rendered illusory.
Pp vs. Barte, 819 SCRA
THIRD DIVISION / March 1, 2017 / G.R. No. 179749 / BERSAMIN, J.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee Vs EDDIE BARTE y MENDOZA, Accused-Apellant
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Courts are cognizant of the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of public
officers. This presumption can be overturned if evidence is presented to prove either of two things, namely:
(1) that they were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired by any improper
motive. This case sprang from the buy-bust operation conducted by several police officers against the
accused-appellant based on the tip from a caller whose identification was only through the alias
of Ogis. Surveillance was made following such tip, but the same was unrecorded and no other proof was
presented to corroborate the policemen's conclusion that the man known as Ogis was the same man they
were looking for during the surveillance.
It is a matter of judicial notice that buy-bust operations are "susceptible to police abuse, the
most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion." The high possibility of abuse was precisely the
reason why the procedural safeguards embodied in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 have been put up as a
means to minimize, if not eradicate such abuse. The procedural safeguards not only protect the innocent
from abuse and violation of their rights but also guide the law enforcers on ensuring the integrity of the
evidence to be presented in court.
Here, the RTC’s position that the absence of proof showing the compliance by the arresting
lawmen with the procedure outlined under Sec. 21 of RA 9165 was not fatal to the entrapment is
unwarranted. Such noncompliance with the procedural safeguards under Sec. 21 was fatal because it cast
doubt on the integrity of the evidence presented in court and directly affected the validity of the buy-bust
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
370
BABY 520 notes
operation. It put into serious question whether the sachet of shabu had really come from Barte, and
whether the sachet of shabu presented in court was the same sachet of shabu obtained from Barte at the
time of the arrest. Testimonies provided by the police officers and the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties did not override the noncompliance with the procedural safeguards instituted
by our laws. Indeed, anything short of observance and compliance by the arresting lawmen with what the
law required meant that the former did not regularly perform their duties. The presumption of regularity in
the performance of their duties then became inapplicable. As such, the evidence of the State did not
overturn the presumption of innocence in favor of Barte.
Further, the State’s agents who entrapped Barte and confiscated the dangerous drug from him
did not tender any justifiable ground for the noncompliance with the requirement of establishing each link
in the chain of custody from the time of seizure to the time of presentation. The conclusion that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the shabu confiscated were consequently not preserved became unavoidable.
The failure to prove the chain of custody should mean, therefore, that the Prosecution did not establish
beyond reasonable doubt that the sachet of shabu presented during the trial was the very same one
delivered by Barte to the poseur-buyer.
People vs. Candidia, 707 SCRA
SECOND DIVISION / G.R. No. 191263 / October 16, 2013 / PEREZ, J.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA, Accused-Appellant.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
In People v. Unisa, this Court held that "in cases involving violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the
contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police officers."
In this case, the prosecution witnesses were unable to show ill-motive for the police to impute
the crime against Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her regular duty as an airport frisker when she handled the
accused who entered the x-ray machine of the departure area. There was no pre-determined notice to
particularly search the accused especially in her private area. The unusual thickness of the buttocks of the
accused upon frisking prompted Trayvilla to notify her supervisor SPO3 Appang of the incident. The
subsequent search of the accused would only show that the two female friskers were just doing their usual
task when they found the illegal drugs inside accused’s underwear. This is bolstered by the fact that the
accused on the one hand and the two friskers on the other were unfamiliar to each other. Neither could
they harbour any ill-will against each other. The allegation of frame-up and denial of the accused cannot
prevail over the positive testimonies of three prosecution witnesses who corroborated on circumstances
surrounding the apprehension.
For (p) (q) (r)it is already illustrated in rosarosa case.
Presumption on Private transactions
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
Presumption on ordinary course of business
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
Presumption of Sufficient Consideration
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
Presumption of a Letter
(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail;

Presumption of Absence
(w) That after an absence of seven [(7)] years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he
or she is considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his or her succession
until after an absence of ten [(10)] years. If he or she disappeared after the age of seventy-five [(75)] years,
an absence of five [(5)] years shall be sufficient in order that his or her succession may be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate among the
heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft which is missing, who
has not been heard of for four [(4)] years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been missing
for four [(4)] years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose existence
has not been known for four [(4)] years; and
(4) If a married person has been absent for four [(4)] consecutive years, the spouse present
may contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already dead. In case of disappearance, where there is a danger of death [, under]
the circumstances hereinabove provided, an absence of only two [(2)] years shall be sufficient
for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any case, before marrying
again, the spouse present must institute summary proceeding[s] as provided in the Family
Code and in the rules for declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse [;]
Query: Bakit kapag pag aasawa two years lang? why? What is the rationale?
A: My reason perhaps is biblical for that matter, taken from the book of Genesis, it is not good
for a man or a woman to be alone.
Pag single ka madali lang for you ang mabuhay mag isa. (kasakit sir ah huhuuhu) Pero kapag
may-asawa ka tapos nawala or namatay, hindi madaling mabuhay ng mag isa. This is in all
aspects ha, hindi lang yung iniisip niyo (hahahaah luh sir, la naman ako iniisip hahaha).
Presumption of Marriage
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage;
Presumption Joint efforts, work or industry
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other and who live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife[,] without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry[;]
Presumption of Cohabitation
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other
and who have acquired property through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry, such
contributions and their corresponding shares[,] including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit[,]
are equal[;]
People vs. Edualino, 271 SCRA
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
371
BABY 520 notes
EN BANC / G.R. No. 119072 / April 11, 1997 / PADILLA, J.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelee, vs. JESUS EDUALINO, accused-appellant.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Accused-appellant contends that the testimony of the complainant tends to show "that there
was foreplay before the alleged rape whereby the accused allegedly kissed her, caressed her breast and
bit her nipple; that the accused was on top of her and inserted his penis in her vagina and did the push
and pull movement, that she cannot remember how long it lasted but she knew [accused] had an orgasm
after which the accused stood up and left, all this bear the earmarks of a voluntary and mutual coition, a
consensual intercourse. There was no rape."
Finally, accused-appellant raises the issue of the character of complainant Rowena Nantiza.
It is argued that a responsible and decent married woman, who was then three (3) months pregnant, would
not be out at two (2) o'clock in the morning getting drunk much less would a decent Filipina ask a man to
accompany her to drink beer. It is contended that complainant merely concocted the charge of rape to
save her marriage since her husband had found out that she was using drugs and drinking alcohol and
even made a spectacle of herself when she tried to seduce accused-appellant on 11 May 1994 while she
was under the influence of drug and alcohol.
At the outset of this discussion, it should be pointed out that the moral character of a rape victim
is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused. The Court has ruled that prostitutes can be
the victims of rape.
In the present case, even if accused-appellant's allegations that the victim was drunk and under
the influence of drugs and that she (the victim) cannot be considered a decent and responsible married
woman, were true, said circumstances will not per se preclude a finding that she was raped.
Accused-appellant cannot successfully argue that no rape occurred because no medical
examination was conducted to confirm the presence of spermatozoa in her private parts.
The Court has repeatedly held that a medical examination of the victim is not a prerequisite in
prosecutions for rape.
A person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim provided the
testimony is credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the course of
things.
After a careful and thorough study of the records of the case, the Court is convinced that the
constitutional presumption of accused-appellant's innocence has been overcome by proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
On accused-appellant's contention that the presence of force and intimidation was not proven,
the Court has consistently ruled that force and intimidation should be viewed in the light of the victim's
perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the offense.
Indeed, there can be no hard and fast rule on the matter specially in a situation like the present
case where the victim testified to being in a state of semi-consciousness after drinking a glass of beer
given to her by accused-appellant.
Besides, the testimony of the victim is supported by the findings in the aforequoted medical
certificate which shows that the injuries suffered by the victim are consistent with the charges of rape and
contrary to the theory of the defense that the injuries were inflicted by the victim's mother when she was
trying to quiet her daughter who was hysterical.
The allegation that accused-appellant's identity has not been established deserves scant
consideration. It is to be noted that accused-appellant was known to the victim and prosecution witness
Aileen Yayen long before the incident. Both witnesses positively identified the accused as the perpetrator
of the rape. There is nothing to show that these two (2) witnesses would or did falsely implicate accused-
appellant.

On whether the acts of accused-appellant constitute rape, the victim Rowena Nantiza's
testimony was sufficiently clear to show that the carnal knowledge was without her consent and with force
and intimidation. There is no doubt that the crime committed by accused-appellant is rape.
Accused-appellant in a final attempt to absolve himself argues that the charge of rape was
concocted by the victim to save her marriage.
The Court cannot believe that a married woman would invent a story that she was raped in an
attempt to conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her marriage. We fail to understand how
a false rape story can save a marriage under the circumstances averred by accused-appellant.
Presumption of conception
(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred
[(300)] days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof
to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty (180) days after the solemnization of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been conceived during [the former] marriage, [provided] it be
born within the three hundred [(300)] days after the termination of the former marriage; and
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty (180) days following the celebration of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born
within the three hundred [(300)] days after the termination of the former marriage[;]
Ang titignan niyo dito ay 180 and 300. Yan ang time frame dito, between 180 to 300. Because
of the months of pregnancy. Minimum 6 months maximum 10 months. Those born before 6 mons mamatay
ang bata, premature. Pagdatin naman sa 300 beyond 10 months.
Tie this up with section 4, no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy, will it go in conflict with
that provision? No, because under (dd) 300 days dito. Beyond 300 days.
Requisites:
1. Termination of marriage
2. Mother re-marries within 300 days after termination of the first marriage
Presumption on the conception of the child:
1. Child is conceived in the prior marriage if born BEFORE 180 days from/after the
SOLEMNIZATION of the 2nd marriage. Provided that it be born with in 300 days from
TERMINATION of the first marriage.
e.g., Marriage terminated January 1, 2020, mother remarries January 2, 2020, child was born June 2,
2020. The child is presumed to be conceived in the prior marriage.
On the other hand, if the mother remarries June 1, 2020, and the child was born, December 31, 2020, it is
still within the 180 days from solemnization and, it is with in 300 days from termination, thus the child is
presumed conceived in the prior marriage.
2. Child is conceived in the second marriage if born after 180 days from solemnization of marriage.
Even if born within 300 days from termination of the prior marriage.
e.g., Marriage terminated January 1, 2020, mother remarries January 2, 2020, child was born June 3,
2020. The child is presumed to be conceived in the prior marriage.
On the other hand, if the mother remarries May 1, 2020, and the child was born, December 2, 2020, it is it
was born after 180 days from solemnization and, it is within 300 days from termination, thus the child is
presumed conceived in the second marriage.
Presumption of Survivorship
(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two [(2)] persons perish in the same calamity, such
as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
372
BABY 520 notes
circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting
from the strength and the age of the sexes, according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen [(15)] years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age of sixty [(60)], the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen [(15)] and the other above sixty [(60)], the former is deemed to
have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen [(15)] and under sixty [(60)], and the sex be different, the male is
deemed to have survived, if the sex be the same, the older; and
5. If one be under fifteen [(15)] or over sixty [(60)], and the other between those ages, the
latter is deemed to have survived;
Query: For what purpose is the presumption here?
A: For purposes of succession only.
3. LEGITIMACY OR ILLEGITIMACY (SECTION 4)
Section 4. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. – There is no presumption of legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred [(300)] days following the dissolution of the marriage or the
separation of the spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such child must prove his or
her allegation. (4a)
Co-related above with presumption of conception.
4. PRESUMPTIONS IN CIVIL ACTIONS/CRIMINAL ACTIONS (SECTIONS 5 & 6)
Section 5. Presumptions in civil actions and proceedings. – In all civil actions and proceedings not
otherwise provided for by the law or these Rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption.
If presumptions are inconsistent, the presumption that is founded upon weightier considerations
of policy shall apply. If considerations of policy are of equal weight, neither presumption applies. (n)
Already co-related with sec 3 above.
Section 6. Presumption against an accused in criminal cases. – If a presumed fact that establishes
guilt, is an element of the offense charged, or negates a defense, the existence of the basic fact must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt and the presumed fact follows from the basic fact beyond reasonable
doubt. (n)
E.g., “If a presumed fact that establishes guilt, is an element of the offense charged,” and the
offense charged is estafa, deceitfulness is one of the element of estafa. “, or negates a defense, the
existence of the basic fact must be proved beyond reasonable doubt” ano naman tong phrase na to? The
element of deceit in estafa must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. “and the presumed fact” That he for
example, transacted fraudulently, “follows from the basic fact beyond reasonable doubt.” that is the effect.
The effect of deceitfulness.

E. PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE (Rule 132, Sections 1-40)
This rule is divided into three parts:
1. Presentation of evidence (Sections 1 to 18)
2. Authentication of Document (Sections 19-33); and
3. Offer and Objection of Evidence (Sections 34-40)
Note: As a basic rule, what do you authenticate? Only private document.
We have already covered the essence of the subject matter here, when we were discussion
the requisites of admissibility thru the definition of evidence. The words in the definition “means”
symbolizes relevance, “sanctioned” symbolizes competency, “ascertaining” symbolizes authentication,
which means to make sure that it is the real things. “respecting” symbolizes offering, the court will only
consider evidence which is offered.
Under rule 132 eto na yung specifics ng authentication and offer.
1. EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES (SECTIONS 1-18)
General Provisions
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. – The examination of witnesses presented in a trial
or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated
to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given
orally. (1)
Trial must be conducted in open court, here testimonies are given.
What constitutes trial? It is the presentation of evidence.
What kind of evidence? Testimonia, Object or Documentary.
But it says here in section 1 trial must be in open court. What is the opposite court trial? Trial
in chambers. It’s not close trial.
Section 1 is a compliance with the constitutional rights of parties in a case to have a fair, public
and impartial trial.
But is trial necessary? Yes. But can there be judgment without trial? Yes.
Query: So, when is there no necessity for trial?
A: in case of judgment on the pleadings (rule 34), summary judgment (rule 35), judgment by
default (rule 9). There are no trial in these cases, but note that judgment here are still judgment
on the merits
So, trial is necessary to become on the merits. Because what is a judgement on
the merit? It is a judgement where all of the parties are given the opportunity to present their
positions.
Query: What is the exception to open court testimonies?
A: Depositions
So, remember that Rules 23 and 24 are exceptions to open court testimonies.
And so further, that even if there is already a deposition, one can still testify because of the
open court testimony rule.
Section 2. Proceedings to be recorded. – The entire proceedings of a trial or hearing, including the
questions propounded to a witness and his or her answers thereto, and the statements made by the judge
or any of the parties, counsel, or witnesses with reference to the case, shall be recorded by means of
shorthand or stenotype or by other means of recording found suitable by the court.
A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or
recorder and certified as correct by him or her, shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of such
proceedings. (2a)
How are proceedings recorded? It is through transcript of stenographic notes (TSN).
Note: even if mag take down notes ka that is not official, even if you record the proceeding that is not
official. The official records of proceedings are the TSN. That is why be careful when you get a copy of the
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
373
BABY 520 notes
TSN when you are in practice. When you are going to trial every hearing that is recorded you get a copy
of the TSN and under section 2 this TSN is prima facie correct. Thus, if what is recorded in the TSN is not
contested or objected to it becomes conclusive.
Practical advice: before going into the next trial basahin niyo muna ang TSN ng precedent trial. I’m 101%
sure that there is an error there which is material or substantial to your case.
“a lawyer who does not go into practice is only half a lawyer”
Section 3. Rights and obligations of a witness. – A witness must answer questions, although his or her
answer may tend to establish a claim against him or her. However, it is the right of a witness:
(1) To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from harsh or insulting
demeanor;
(2) Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
(3) Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
(4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him or her to a penalty for an offense unless
otherwise provided by law; or
(5) Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his or her reputation, unless it be to the
very fact at issue or to a fact from which the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness
must answer to the fact of his or her previous final conviction for an offense. (3a)
Note: The witness here may be a party or not. This is just a reading matter.
Emphasis on right against self-incrimination. Remember rule 115 one of the rights of the accused the right
against self-incrimination and this right refers to testimonial compulsion.
Section 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. – The court, motu proprio or upon motion, shall
order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses. This rule does not
authorize exclusion of (a) a party who is a natural person, (b) a duly designated representative of a juridical
entity which is a party to the case, (c) a person whose presence is essential to the presentation of the
party’s cause, or (d) a person authorized by a statute to be present.
The court may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from conversing
with one another, directly or through intermediaries, until all shall have been examined. (15a)
Note: This is new, and remember that trial must be open to the public, but the court can exclude certain
persons in court, under section 15.
If you compare this with the old rule you will note that many who may be excluded can no longer
be excluded now. E.g., in the old rule, parties cannot be excluded, so in a criminal case, the private
complainant can be excluded because he is not a party to the criminal case. But, because of this new rule
he can no longer be excluded because he has substantial interest in the case.
Order of Presentation of Evidence vs Order of examination of witness
Section 4. Order in the examination of an individual witness. – The order in which an individual witness
may be examined is as follows:
(a) Direct examination by the proponent;
(b) Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c) Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d) Re-cross[-]examination by the opponent. (4)
Note: this is not the order of TRIAL but rather the order of the EXAMINATION OF WITNESS
Query: What is the order of trial?
A: It refers to the order of presentation of evidence, which general rule provides that it is the
plaintiff or the prosecution who must present evidence first, followed by the
defendants/accused, as the case may be.
Query: after re-cross what is next?

A: as a general rule no more.
The only exception is recall:
Section 9. Recalling witness. – After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded,
the witness cannot be recalled without leave of the court. The court will grant or withhold leave in its
discretion, as the interests of justice may require. (9)
Note: recall is only a matter of discretion and not a matter of right. And under the new rules on civil
procedure recall is now a litigated motion, because it is prejudicial. This is not enumerated under rule 15,
but it is an example of a litigious motion, because it might prejudice the substantial right of a party.
You write down an inverted triangle in your notes. Then draw three horizontal lines crossing the inverted
triangle.
1. direct
2. cross
3. re-direct
4. re-
cross
This is the graphic is the representation of Section 4. Explain why this is the representation?
Section 5. Direct examination. – Direct examination is the examination-in-chief of a witness by the party
presenting him or her on the facts relevant to the issue. (5a)
It has the largest part because it set precedent to the following examination.
Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. – Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party on any relevant matter, with
sufficient fullness and freedom to test his or her accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or
bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue. (6a)
Cross examination has the smaller portion because one can only be cross examined on what
is asked on direct examination or any relevant matter there to.
Section 7. Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent. – After the cross-examination of the witness
has been concluded, he or she may be re-examined by the party calling him or her to explain or supplement
his or her answers given during the cross-examination. On re-direct examination, questions on matters
not dealt with during the cross-examination may be allowed by the court in its discretion. (7a)
This is smaller than cross, because a witness may only be asked on matters asked in cross
examination.
Section 8. Re-cross[-]examination. – Upon the conclusion of the re-direct examination, the adverse party
may re-cross-examine the witness on matters stated in his or her re-direct examination, and also on such
other matters as may be allowed by the court in its discretion. (8a)
The tip is smallest because it a witness may only be asked on matters asked in re-direct.
Query: Is those absolute? NO, what are the exceptions?
A: in case of an expert witness. Matters which are relevant in the case may be asked.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
374
BABY 520 notes
Note: lalo na sa cross, may leeway yan
Query: What is the purpose of cross examination?
A: to test the accuracy and bias or prejudice of the witness
Sa cross examination talaga nag oobserve ang judge, especially now, because direct examination is now
constituted in a judicial affidavit. It is now mandatory in civil cases, irrespective of whether it is the MTC or
the RTC.
People vs Fabre, 385 SCRA
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Leading and Misleading Questions.
Section 10. Leading and misleading questions. – A question which suggests to the witness the answer
which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:
(a) On cross-examination;
(b) On preliminary matters;
(c) When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is
ignorant, a child of tender years, is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public
or private corporation[,] or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness,
or contrary to that which he or she has previously stated. It is not allowed. (10a)
Leading A question which suggests to the witness the answer which the examining party desires is a
leading question. In other words, questions which are generally answerable by yes or no.
Example of leading question:
“Mr. Witness is this the murder weapon that you found in the crime scene?”
Objection sustained reform the question counsel:
“While you were investigating, what happened?” o “when you were investigating who were
around?” there were three of us in there, “what this this one do?”, did nothing, “how about the other one?”,
none, “how about you what did you do?” I was the one investigating, “while investigating what happened?”
I found the murder weapon.
Take note of the exceptions:
(a) On cross-examination;
Leading question are allowed here because the witness is presented by the other
party and generally, he or she will not be cooperative and thus you cannot suggest an answer.
(b) On preliminary matters;
Leading questions are allowed here because you are only laying the basis.
(c) When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who
is ignorant, a child of tender years, is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
Leading questions are allowed for the same reason as in cross, the witness is not
cooperative as well.

(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a
public or private corporation[,] or of a partnership or association which is an adverse
party.
Same reason with cross and willing.
Adverse witness vs Hostile witness
Adverse witness is a witness of the adverse party, on the other hand, hostile witness is a witness of the
proponent but is un-cooperative
Note: to be hostile or unwilling witness, the witness must be qualified, e.g, “your honor, I am calling this
witness as a hostile and unwilling witness”
Misleading A question which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness, or contrary to that
which he or she has previously stated.
When you get to practice, misleading questions are used on purpose to test the adverse
counsel if he is really listening.
E.g., in a direct testimony, the witness says “On may 5 at 7 o’clock in the morning I was walking along
Avenida St.” during cross the counsel asks “Mr. witness you just testified that on may 5 at 7 o’clock in the
evening you were walking along Avenida St.”.
See the misleading question, the witness did not testify that it was 7 o’clock in the evening. If
the other counsel is listening he will object, and if objected to, mag sorry ka nalang, ahhahahaha eh pag
nakalusot, tapos ang sagot ng witness “yes”, mag pause ka onti “are you sure of that answer on may 5 at
that hour?”, “YES”, “very very sure”, “yes”, tatlong beses mo itanong, para masira yung direct testimony
niya. You get how shroud you are in a trial. HAHAHAHAH
People vs. Perez, 397 SCRA
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
**FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE [Section 14. Evidence of good character of witness. Previously in rule
132 now it is (Incorporated in Section 54, Rule 130)]
Impeachment
Section 11. Impeachment of adverse party’s witness. – A witness may be impeached by the party
against whom he or she was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his or her general
reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he or she has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his or her present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts,
except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or record of the judgment, that he or she
has been convicted of an offense. (11a)
Note: Do not confuse section 11 from section 29, the latter is impeachment of official records.
Note: As a general rule you cannot impeach you own witness. You impeach the witness of the other party.
Exception: Hostile, Unwilling or Adverse witness.
Section 13. Party may not impeach his or her own witness. – Except with respect to witnesses referred
to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10 of this Rule, the party presenting the witness is not allowed to
impeach his or her credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon
adequate showing of his or her adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his or her having misled
the party into calling him or her to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be
impeached by the party presenting him or her in all respects as if he or she had been called by the adverse
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
375
BABY 520 notes
party, except by evidence of his or her bad character. He or she may also be impeached and cross-
examined by the adverse party, but such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his or
her examination-in-chief. (12a)
Query: How do you impeach a witness?
1. by contradictory evidence,
2. by evidence that his or her general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or
3. by evidence that he or she has made at other times statements inconsistent with his or her
present testimony
Note: Be careful with impeaching a witness under number 2, because you might fall into trap with character
evidence, because character evidence is generally prohibited.
By contradictory evidence
Query: Illustrate
A:
Query: Is contradictory evidence the same as that which is given or offered or presented during
the trial? Or is it one where you present another evidence to contradict that evidence? So, ano
yung contradictory evidence diyan, is it the same evidence? Say it is a testimonial evidence, is the
contradictory evidence that same witness where you have to impeach by contradictory evidence?
Is it the same witness which is impeached by his own testimony? (dami follow up)
A: No, it should be another evidence not same evidence. Do not confuse it with the term
inconsistent statement. Because that inconsistent statement is limited to actions, documents, but other.
But itong contradictory evidence pag testimonial, iba to, yung inconsistent statement yung witness mismo.
That is how you distinguish it.
And a good example is that of an expert witness:
How do you impeach an expert witness by contradictory evidence? You present your own
expert witness.
Note: Contradictory evidence is not limited to testimonial evidence. It can be any kind of evidence.
By reputation
Section 12. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime. – For the purpose of impeaching a
witness, evidence that he or she has been convicted by final judgment of a crime shall be admitted if (a)
the crime was punishable by a penalty in excess of one [(1)] year; or (b) the crime involved moral turpitude,
regardless of the penalty.
However, evidence of a conviction is not admissible if the conviction has been the subject of
an amnesty or annulment of the conviction. (n)
By inconsistent statement
Section 14. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. – Before a witness can
be impeached by evidence that he or she has made at other times statements inconsistent with his or her
present testimony, the statements must be related to him or her, with the circumstances of the times and
places and the persons present, and he or she must be asked whether he or she made such statements,
and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing [,] they must be shown to the witness
before any question is put to him or her concerning them. (13a)
Impeachment by inconsistent statement refers to the same witness.
Example: the witness on the witness stand was describing the accused, and you are counsel for the
accused, the fiscal asked the witness “how would you describe the accused that you saw?”, witness
answers “I was 10 meters away and I saw the accused, he stands at about 5 ft 4’, he has a chinky eyes,
fair complexion, at that time he was wearing maong pants and Lacoste t-shirt colored violet, and he was