160
BABY 520 notes
Section 3. When powers of special administrator cease. Transfer of effects. Pending suits. — When
letters testamentary or of administration are granted on the estate of the deceased, the powers of the
special administrator shall cease, and he shall forthwith deliver to the executor or administrator the goods,
chattels, money, and estate of the deceased in his hands. The executor or administrator may prosecute
to final judgment suits commenced by such special administrator.
Rule 86; Section 8. Claim of executor or administrator against an estate. — If the executor or
administrator has a claim against the estate he represents, he shall give notice thereof, in writing, to the
court, and the court shall appoint a special administrator, who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have
the same power and be subject to the same liability as the general administrator or executor in the
settlement of other claims. The court may order the executor or administrator to pay to the special
administrator necessary funds to defend such claim.
NOTES:
Special administrators may be appointed in either testate or intestate proceedings. The rules do not
distinguish.
In the case of Lee vs. RTC of Q.C., 423 SCRA, February 2004, there is a very long delay in
the appointment of administrator. The court appointed a special administrator, the point in this case is such
that a special administrator is even chastised and reprimanded by the SC because he did something wrong
which is to sell a part of the estate without the authority of the settlement court. The principle here is that
during the pendency of the settlement of the estate, all disposal of the property of the estate must always
be under the direct control and supervision of the court. In other words, there can be no disposition of the
property of the estate without the direct and express permission of the court. The sale only valid if it is with
the permission of the court BEFORE, DURING, and AFTER the sale.
Query: How do you explain these time frames, before, during and after the sale?
A: BEFORE- means that before the sale, one must have to go to court to file a motion for authorization,
then the court will issue an order authorizing sale of the specific property to be sold.
DURING- means that a report must be submitted to the court immediately after the sale or disposal of the
property. Note that this is not limited to sale, it also extends to mortgage encumbrance if what is involved
is a real property.
AFTER- accounting, which is 1 year after appointment, however the court can always ask for accounting
at any time. And this is an instance where the court requires accounting which is every time there is a
disposal of the properties belonging to the estate.
Note: I am emphasizing this because similar din siya sa guardianship when it comes to sale of property of
the ward, may time frame din yun, ibig sabihin the order of the court is only good for 1 yr in guardianship,
but not here in settlement of the estate.
Note: the closest procedural provisions in the rules of court are settlement of estate and guardianship.
Madami sila mag kapareho.
THIRD DIVISION / G.R. No. 146006 / February 23, 2004 / CORONA, J.
JOSE C. LEE, ET. AL., petitioners vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 85 ET.
AL., respondents.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, representing Philinterlife and FLAG, assail before us
not only the validity of the writ of execution issued by the intestate court dated July 7, 2000 but also the
validity of the August 11, 1997 order of the intestate court nullifying the sale of the 2,029 Philinterlife shares
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
of stock made by Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez, in their personal capacities and without court
approval, in favor of petitioner FLAG.
We cannot allow petitioners to reopen the issue of nullity of the sale of the Philinterlife shares
of stock in their favor because this was already settled a long time ago by the Court of Appeals in its
decision dated June 23, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342. This decision was effectively upheld by us in our
resolution dated October 9, 1998 in G.R. No. 135177 dismissing the petition for review on a technicality
and thereafter denying the motion for reconsideration on January 13, 1999 on the ground that there was
no compelling reason to reconsider said denial. Our decision became final on February 23, 1999 and was
accordingly entered in the book of entry of judgments. For all intents and purposes therefore, the nullity of
the sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock made by Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez in favor of petitioner
FLAG is already a closed case. To reopen said issue would set a bad precedent, opening the door wide
open for dissatisfied parties to relitigate unfavorable decisions no end. This is completely inimical to the
orderly and efficient administration of justice.
What we have here is a situation where some of the heirs of the decedent without securing
court approval have appropriated as their own personal property the properties of [the] Estate, to the
exclusion and the extreme prejudice of the other claimant/heirs. In other words, these heirs, without
court approval, have distributed the asset of the estate among themselves and proceeded to
dispose the same to third parties even in the absence of an order of distribution by the Estate
Court. As admitted by petitioner’s counsel, there was absolutely no legal justification for this action by the
heirs. There being no legal justification, petitioner has no basis for demanding that public respondent [the
intestate court] approve the sale of the Philinterlife shares of the Estate by Juliana and Jose Ortañez in
favor of the Filipino Loan Assistance Group
From the above decision, it is clear that Juliana Ortañez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael
and Antonio, all surnamed Ortañez, invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement
extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite their knowledge that
there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the
intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortañez and her children (Jose,
Rafael and Antonio Ortañez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party
(FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void.
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration
under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed
transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent. However, an
heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by
the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid or the
devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. This means that an heir may only sell his ideal
or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the present case, Juliana
Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in
Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of
the estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the
estate, as what happened in the present case.
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval.
It is well-settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent’s
estate. In the early case of Godoy vs. Orellano, we laid down the rule that the sale of the property of
the estate by an administrator without the order of the probate court is void and passes no title to
the purchaser.
And in the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that:
When the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or
intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it
without prior approval of the probate court.

Only recently, in Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, It being settled that property under
administration needs the approval of the probate court before it can be disposed of, any
unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void the disposition of the
property under administration, made by private respondent, the same having been effected without
authority from said court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve the
sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null and void for
as long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold petitioner’s contention
that the probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render meaningless the power
pertaining to the said court. (Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). (emphasis ours)
Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an
administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any
unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no
need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.
The question now is: can the intestate or probate court execute its order nullifying the invalid sale?
We see no reason why it cannot. The intestate court has the power to execute its order with
regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the
unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate property would be meaningless. In other words,
enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate court’s power to annul unauthorized
or fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of estate property before final adjudication.
Petitioners Jose Lee, Alma Aggabao and FLAG, however, contend that the probate court could
not issue a writ of execution with regard to its order nullifying the sale because said order was merely
provisional:
The only authority given by law is for respondent judge to determine provisionally
whether said shares are included or excluded in the inventory… In ordering the execution of
the orders, respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction and grossly violated settled law
and jurisprudence, i.e., that the determination by a probate or intestate court of whether a
property is included or excluded in the inventory of the estate being provisional in nature, cannot
be the subject of execution. (emphasis ours)
Petitioners’ argument is misplaced. There is no question, based on the facts of this case,
that the Philinterlife shares of stock were part of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez from the very start as
in fact these shares were included in the inventory of the properties of the estate submitted by Rafael
Ortañez after he and his brother, Jose Ortañez, were appointed special administrators by the intestate
court.
We are not dealing here with the issue of inclusion or exclusion of properties in the inventory
of the estate because there is no question that, from the very start, the Philinterlife shares of stock were
owned by the decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortañez. Rather, we are concerned here with the effect of the
sale made by the decedent’s heirs, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez, without the required
approval of the intestate court. This being so, the contention of petitioners that the determination of the
intestate court was merely provisional and should have been threshed out in a separate proceeding is
incorrect
The petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao next contend that the writ of execution should not
be executed against them because they were not notified, nor they were aware, of the proceedings
nullifying the sale of the shares of stock.
We are not persuaded.
The title of the purchaser like herein petitioner FLAG can be struck down by the intestate court after a clear
showing of the nullity of the alienation. This is the logical consequence of our ruling in Godoy and in several
subsequent cases. The sale of any property of the estate by an administrator or prospective heir
without order of the probate or intestate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
161
BABY 520 notes
POWERS, DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ADMINISTRATOR
Note: that this powers, duties and responsibilities are not chronologically provided for in the RoC, thus we
shall summarize it as follows:
1. Posting of a bond (R81)
2. Inventory (R83)
3. Accounting (R85)
4. Sale, mortgage, and encumbrance (R89)
5. Payment of debts (R88)
6. Partition and distribution (R90)
So, this are the fundamental rights and obligations.
Query: Why rights?
A: Because these rights are at the same time obligations.
Example: You are obliged to post a bond, just as you have the right to post the bond, whether
as a special or regular administrator. And that bond is conditioned to answer for administration which is
initially inventory and accounting.
After which, you try to find out if there are debts to be paid. And if the assets of the estate are
not enough to answer for the estate, you have to ask the court to sell certain properties of the estate to
support the expenses of the estate as well as to pay off debts.
Then you start the payment of debts.
Now, if there is a balance or residue, that is now subjected to partition and distribution.
Query: When does the settlement of the estate ends?
A: Upon an order of the court terminating the estate proceeding. Without such order, jurisdiction
remains with the court, and this is not residual jurisdiction it is actual jurisdiction.
Example is one of the cases assigned the case of Sabidong vs. Solas, 699 SCRA, June 2013,
yung property dito binenenta kasi tapos na daw yung settlement proceedings, the SC said that the
settlement case is not yet terminated, thus the disqualification would still remain. Dito ang bumili ng
property was the clerk of court, although, in some cases you will note, the disqualification of the judge and
members of the court is limited only to that court that handles the proceeding. There is this case that we
have discussed in R39 of the settlement of an estate somewhere in Bulacan, and the property was bought
by the clerk of court in Pamapangga, the SC said ang disqualified lang yung member ng staff of the court
where the case is pending. This is similar to this case in sabidong, if ever what was violated is not the rule
on prohibition but on judicial ethics, it may be allowed but it is unethical.
EN BANC / A.M. No. P-01-1448 / June 25, 2013 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-664-P) / VILLARAMA, JR.,
J.
RODOLFO C. SABIDONG, Complainant, vs. NICOLASITO S. SOLAS (Clerk of Court IV),
Respondent.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Under Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such as clerks of court
from acquiring property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of their courts
The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view
of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control
exercised by these persons. "In so providing, the Code tends to prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends
not to give occasion for fraud, which is what can and must be done."
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during
the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Where the property is acquired after the
termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the
Decision in Civil Case No. 14706 which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final.

Be that as it may, it cannot be said that the property is no longer "in litigation" at that time
considering that it was part of the Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc. No.
1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in
court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. A
property forming part of the estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation
until the probate court issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated.
The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the
probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated. The probate court loses jurisdiction of
an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. Since there is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc.
No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed and terminated at the time of the
execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in
litigation" subject to the operation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not violate
the rule on disqualification to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then pending
before another court (RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.
BONDS
Sec. 1 2 and 4 is in the table above.
Section 3. Bonds of joint executors and administrators. — When two or more persons are appointed
executors or administrators the court may take a separate bond from each, or a joint bond from all.
The reason why, when you file an action or a petition for appointment of administrator or probate
of the will, you have to state there the assessed value of the properties, is to determine the amount of
bond.
INVENTORY
RULE 83: Inventory and Appraisal. Provision for Support of Family
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. — Within three (3) months
after his appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal
of all real and personal estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the
appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his
or their assistance.
Section 2. Certain article not to be inventoried. — The wearing apparel of the surviving husband or
wife and minor children., the marriage bed and bedding, and such provisions and other articles as will
necessarily be consumed in the substinence of the family of the deceased, under the direction of the court,
shall not be considered as assets, nor administered as such, and shall not be included in the inventory.
Section 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom, under the direction of the
court, such allowance as are provided by law.
NOTES:
Inventory takes place with in a period of 3 months from.
Now let us go back to what we have studied on limited jurisdiction, for purposes of inclusion
and exclusion of properties belonging to the estate, the court can decide provisionally.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
162
BABY 520 notes
For the allowance of to widow and family illustrative of the this is the case of Heirs of Hilario
Ruiz vs. Edmond Ruiz, 252 SCRA.
Fun Fact: this case is handled by Atty. Lolo Bronds. He is the lawyer of Edmond Ruiz.
SECOND DIVISION / G.R. No. 118671 / January 29, 1996 / PUNO, J.
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ,
CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, respondents.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the
estate's debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the
estate for the support of the testator's grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to certain
heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the
direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
Petitioner contends that the testator's three granddaughters do not qualify for an allowance
because they are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal age, married and gainfully
employed. In addition, the provision expressly states "children" of the deceased which excludes the latter's
grandchildren.
It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to
the "minor or incapacitated" children of the deceased. Article 188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
substantive law in force at the time of the testator's death, provides that during the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil
status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate. The
law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even
beyond the age of majority.
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of
the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend
it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error, therefore, for the
appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the
testator pending settlement of his estate.
Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the
bequeathed properties to private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to
creditors.
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be
made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and
estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them
gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property
and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of
first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to creditors, not payment
of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had
not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid
before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make

such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance.
Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and
appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months
after admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and
extrinsic validity and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Questions as to the intrinsic
validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised
even after the will has been authenticated.
The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the
probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release of funds and his motion for
reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court. Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive
shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's will included the estate of his mother and
allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules provide that if there is a
controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the
probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases.
Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to
take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or
administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the
deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of
the debts and expenses of administration,” Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly
provides:
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate
not willed. — An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and
management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses for administration.
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he had
been previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on
the properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved again for
the release of additional funds for the same reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the probate
court to require him to submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before releasing
any further money in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a portion
of the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents
after renewal of the lease. Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely
inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. As executor, he is a mere trustee
of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and
responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all
his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real
and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of
administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by
the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.
ACCOUNTING
RULE 85: ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPENSATION OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
Section 1. Executor or administrator chargeable with all estate and income. — Except as otherwise
expressly provided in the following sections, every executor or administrator is chargeable in his account
with the whole of the estate of the deceased which has come into his possession, at the value of the
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
163
BABY 520 notes
appraisement contained in the inventory; with all the interest, profit, and income of such estate; and with
the proceeds of so much of the estate as is sold by him, at the price at which it was sold.
Section 2. Not to profit by increase or lose by decrease in value. — No executor or administrator shall
profit by the increase, or suffer loss by the decrease or destruction, without his fault, of any part of the
estate. He must account for the excess when he sells any part of the estate for more than the
appraisement, and if any is sold for the less than the appraisement, he is not responsible for the loss, if
the sale has justly made. If he settles any claim against the estate for less than its nominal value, he is
entitled to charge in his account only the amount he actually paid on the settlement.
Section 3. When not accountable for debts due estate. — No executor or administrator shall be
accountable for debts due the deceased which remain uncollected without his fault.
Section 4. Accountable for income from realty used by him. — If the executor or administrator uses
or occupies any part of the real estate himself, he shall account for it as may be agreed upon between him
and the parties interested, or adjusted by the court with their assent; and if the parties do not agree upon
the sum to be allowed, the same may be ascertained by the court, whose determination in this respect
shall be final.
Section 5. Accountable if he neglects or delays to raise or pay money. — When an executor or
administrator neglects or unreasonably delays to raise money, by collecting the debts or selling the real or
personal estate of the deceased, or neglects to pay over the money he has in his hands, and the value of
the estate is thereby lessened or unnecessary cost or interest accrues, or the persons interested suffer
loss, the same shall be deemed waste and the damage sustained may be charged and allowed against
him in his account, and he shall be liable therefor on his bond.
Section 6. When allowed money paid as cost. — The amount paid by an executor or administrator for
costs awarded against him shall be allowed in his administration account, unless it appears that the action
or proceeding in which the costs are taxed was prosecuted or resisted without just cause, and not in good
faith.
Section 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor or administrator. Not to charge for services
as attorney. Compensation provided by will controls unless renounced. — An executor or
administrator shall be allowed the necessary expenses the care, management, and settlement of the
estate, and for his services, four pesos per day for the time actually and necessarily employed, or a
commission upon the value of so much of the estate as comes into his possession and is finally disposed
of by him in the payment of debts, expenses, legacies, or distributive shares, or by delivery to heirs or
devisees, of two per centum of the first five thousand pesos of such value, one per centum of so much of
such value as exceeds five thousand pesos and does not exceed thirty thousand pesos, one-half per
centum of so much of such value as exceed one hundred thousand pesos. But in any special case, where
the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has required a high
degree of capacity on the part of the executor or administrator, a greater sum may be allowed. If objection
to the fees allowed be taken, the allowance may be re-examined on appeal.
If there are two or more executors or administrators, the compensation shall be apportioned
among them by the court according to the services actually rendered by them respectively.
When the executors or administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against the estate any
professional fees for legal services rendered by him.
When the deceased by will makes some other provision for the compensation of his executor,
that provision shall be a full satisfaction for his services unless by a written instrument filed in the court he
renounces all claim to the compensation provided by the will.

Section 8. When executor or administrator to render account. — Every executor or administrator shall
render an account of his administration within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters testamentary
or of administration, unless the court otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims
against, or paying the debts of, the estate, or for disposing of the estate; and he shall render such further
accounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly settled.
Section 9. Examinations on oath with respect to account — The court may examine the executor or
administrator upon oath with respect to every matter relating to any account rendered by him, and shall so
examine him as to the correctness of his account before the same is allowed, except when no objection is
made to the allowance of the account and its correctness is satisfactorily established by competent proof.
The heirs, legatees, distributees, and creditors of the estate shall have the same privilege as the executor
or administrator of being examined on oath on any matter relating to an administration account.
Section 10. Account to be settled on notice. — Before the account of an executor or administrator is
allowed, notice shall be given to persons interested of the time and place of examining and allowing the
same; and such notice may be given personally to such persons interested or by advertisement in a
newspaper or newspapers, or both, as the court directs.
Section 11. Surety on bond may be party to accounting. — Upon the settlement of the account of an
executor or administrator, a person liable as surety in respect to such account may, upon application, be
admitted as party to such accounting.
NOTE:
On accounting of the estate, malimit ang mga oppositors dito.
SALES, MORTGAGES, AND OTHER ENCUMBRANCES OF PROPERTY OF DECEDENT
RULE 89
Section 1. Order of sale of personalty. — Upon the application of the executor or administrator, and on
written notice to the heirs and other persons interested, the court may order the whole or a part of the
personal estate to be sold, if it appears necessary for the purpose of paying debts, expenses of
administration, or legacies, or for the preservation of the property.
Section 2. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of realty to pay debts
and legacies through personalty not exhausted. — When the personal estate of the deceased is not
sufficient to pay the debts, expenses of administration, and legacies, or where the sale of such personal
estate may injure the business or other interests of those interested in the estate, and where a testator
has not otherwise made sufficient provision for the payment of such debts, expenses, and legacies, the
court, on the application of the executor or administrator and on written notice of the heirs, devisees, and
legatees residing in the Philippines, may authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or
otherwise encumber so much as may be necessary of the real estate, in lieu of personal estate, for the
purpose of paying such debts, expenses, and legacies, if it clearly appears that such sale, mortgage, or
encumbrance would be beneficial to the persons interested; and if a part cannot be sold, mortgaged, or
otherwise encumbered without injury to those interested in the remainder, the authority may be for the
sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of the whole of such real estate, or so much thereof as is necessary
or beneficial under the circumstances.
Section 3. Persons interested may prevent such sale, etc., by giving bond. — No such authority to
sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real or personal estate shall be granted if any person interested in
the estate gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned to pay the debts, expenses of
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
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BABY 520 notes
administration, and legacies within such time as the court directs; and such bond shall be for the security
of the creditors, as well as of the executor or administrator, and may be prosecuted for the benefit of either.
Section 4. When court may authorize sale of estate as beneficial to interested persons. Disposal of
proceeds. — When it appears that the sale of the whole or a part of the real or personal estate, will be
beneficial to the heirs, devisees, legatees, and other interested persons, the court may, upon application
of the executor or administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees who are
interested in the estate to be sold, authorize the executor or administrator to sell the whole or a part of said
estate, although not necessary to pay debts, legacies, or expenses of administration; but such authority
shall not be granted if inconsistent with the provisions of a will. In case of such sale, the proceeds shall be
assigned to the persons entitled to the estate in the proper proportions.
Section 5. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of estate to pay debts
and legacies in other countries. — When the sale of personal estate, or the sale, mortgage, or other
encumbrance of real estate is not necessary to pay the debts, expenses of administration, or legacies in
the Philippines, but it appears from records and proceedings of a probate court in another country that the
estate of the deceased in such other country is not sufficient to pay the debts, expenses of administration,
and legacies there, the court here may authorize the executor or administrator to sell the personal estate
or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber the real estate for the payment of debts or legacies in the
other country, in same manner as for the payment of debts or legacies in the Philippines.
Section 6. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of realty acquired on
execution or foreclosure. — The court may authorize an executor or administrator to sell mortgage, or
otherwise encumber real estate acquired by him on execution or foreclosure sale, under the same
cicumstances and under the same regulations as prescribed in this rule for the sale, mortgage, or other
encumbrance of other real estate.
Section 7. Regulation for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate. —
The court having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to
sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these
rules and when it appears necessary or beneficial under the following regulations.
(a) The executor or administrator shall file a written petition setting forth the debts due from the
deceased, the expenses of administration, the legacies, the value of the personal estate, the
situation of the estate to be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered, and such other facts
as show that the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance is necessary or beneficial.
(b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for hearing such petition, and cause notice
stating the nature of the petition, the reasons for the same, and the time and place of hearing,
to be given personally or by mail to the persons interested, and may cause such further notice
to be given, by publication or otherwise, as it shall deem proper;
(c) If the court requires it, the executor or administrator shall give an additional bond, in such
sum as the court directs, conditioned that such executor or administrator will account for the
proceeds of the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance;
(d) If the requirements in the preceding subdivisions of this section have been complied with,
the court, by order stating such compliance, may authorize the executor or administrator to sell,
mortgage, or otherwise encumber, in proper cases, such part of the estate as is deemed
necessary, and in case of sale the court may authorize it to be public or private, as would be
most beneficial to all parties concerned. The executor or administrator shall be furnished with
a certified copy of such order;
(e) If the estate is to be sold at auction, the mode of giving notice of the time and place of the
sale shall be governed by the provisions concerning notice of execution sale;

(f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province in which the real estate thus
sold, mortgage, or otherwise encumbered is situated, a certified copy of the order of the court,
together with the deed of the executor or administrator for such real estate, which shall be as
valid as if the deed had been executed by the deceased in his lifetime.
Section 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased contracted to convey.
Notice. Effect of deed. — Where the deceased was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed
real property, or an interest therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on application for that
purpose, authorize the executor or administrator to convey such property according to such contract, or
with such modifications as are agreed upon by the parties and approved by the court; and if the contract
is to convey real property to the executor or administrator, the clerk of court shall execute the deed. The
deed executed by such executor, administrator, or clerk of court shall be as affectual to convey the property
as if executed by the deceased in his lifetime; but no such conveyance shall be authorized until notice of
the application for that purpose has been given personally or by mail to all persons interested, and such
further notice has been given, by publication or otherwise, as the court deems proper; nor if the assets in
the hands of the executor or administrator will thereby be reduced so as to prevent a creditor from receiving
his full debt or diminish his dividend.
Section 9. When court may authorize conveyance of lands which deceased held in trust. — Where
the deceased in his lifetime held real property in trust for another person, the court may after notice given
as required in the last preceding section, authorize the executor or administrator to deed such property to
the person, or his executor or administrator, for whose use and benefit it was so held; and the court may
order the execution of such trust, whether created by deed or by law.
NOTES:
The basic things that you must remember is that you can only mortgage and encumber REAL
properties, you cannot do that with personal properties.
Query: What are the purposes for the sale, mortgage or encumbrance of the real properties of the
estate.
A:
1. To pay for the debts of the decedent;
2. Reservation, as when they are devoted for crop production. So, the crops produced must
be sold. Example, if it is Riceland or a coconut plantation;
3. If it is necessary under the circumstances. There are times when it is more feasible to sell
and keep the proceeds of the sale rather than keeping and maintaining the property.
In no. 3 as for example is the case ruiz vs ruiz, yung property dito yung valle verde, and yung
olivas antagal naming nabenta yan. Etong property sa olivas, the main purpose of selling it was becasue
it is very expensive to maintain. It was so big, pag nag paparty si late Edmund Ruiz, gianganap sa kwarto
lang niya and we can have at least 20 to 30 visitors.
PAYMENT OF THE DEBTS OF THE ESTATE
RULE 88
Section 1. Debts paid in full if estate sufficient. — If, after hearing all the money claims against the
estate, and after ascertaining the amount of such claims, it appears that there are sufficient assets to pay
the debts, the executor or administrator pay the same within the time limited for that purpose.
Section 2. Part of estate from which debt paid when provision made by will. — If the testator makes
provision by his will, or designates the estate to be appropriated for the payment of his debts, the expenses
of administration, or the family expenses, they shall be paid according to the provisions of the will; but if
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
165
BABY 520 notes
the provision made by the will or the estate appropriated, is not sufficient for that purpose, such part of the
estate of the testator, real or personal, as is not disposed of by will, if any shall be appropriated for that
purpose.
Section 3. Personalty first chargeable for debts, then realty. — The personal estate of the deceased
not disposed of by will shall be first chargeable with the payment of debts and expenses; and if said
personal estate is not sufficient for tat purpose, or its sale would redound to the detriment of the participants
for the estate, the whole of the real estate not dispose of by will, or so much thereof as is necessary, may
be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered for that purpose by the executor or administrator, after
obtaining the authority of the court therefor. Any deficiency shall be met by contributions in accordance
with the provisions of section 6 of this rule.
Section 4. Estate to be retained to meet contingent claims. — If the court is satisfied that a contingent
claim duly filed is valid, it may order the executor or administrator to retain in his hands sufficient estate to
pay such contingent claim when the same becomes absolute, or if the estate is insolvent, sufficient to pay
a portion equal to the dividend of the other creditors.
Section 6. Court to fix contributive shares where devisees, legalitees, or heirs have been
possession. — Where devisees, legalitees, or heirs have entered into possession of portions of the estate
before the debts and expenses have been settled and paid, and have become liable to contribute for the
payment of such debts and expenses, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that
purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities, and order how much and in what
manner each person shall contribute, and may issue execution as circumstances require.
Section 7. Order of payment if estate insolvent — If the assets which can be appropriated for the
payment of debts are not sufficient for that purpose, the executor or administrator shall pay the debts
against the estate, observing the provisions of Articles 1059 and 2239 to 2251 of the Civil Code.
Section 8. Dividends to be paid in proportion to claims. — If there are no assets sufficient to pay the
credits of any once class of creditors after paying the credits entitled to preference over it, each creditor
within such class shall be paid a dividend in proportion to his claim. No creditor of any one class shall
receive any payment until those of the preceding class are paid.
Section 9. Estate of insolvent non-resident, how disposed of. — In case administration is taken in the
Philippine of the estate of a person who was at the time of his death an inhabitant of another country, and
who died insolvent, hi estate found in the Philippines shall, as far as practicable, be so disposed of that
his creditors here and elsewhere may receive each an equal share, in proportion to their respective credits.
Section 10. When and how claim proved outside the Philippines against insolvent resident's estate
paid. — If it appears to the court having jurisdiction that claims have been duly proven in another country
against the estate of an insolvent who was at the time of his death an inhabitant of the Philippines, and
that the executor or administrator in the Philippines had knowledge of the presentation of such claims in
such country and an opportunity to contest their allowance, the court shall receive a certified list of such
claims, when perfected in such country, and add the same to the list of claims proved against the deceased
person in the Philippines so that a just distribution of the whole estate may be made equally among all its
creditors according to their respective claims; but the benefit of this and the preceding sections shall not
be extended to the creditors in another country if the property of such deceased person there found is not
equally apportioned to the creditors residing in the Philippines and the other creditor, according to their
respective claims.

Section 11. Order for payment of debts. — Before the expiration of the time limited for the payment of
the debts, the court shall order the payment thereof, and the distribution of the assets received by the
executor or administrator for that purpose among the creditors, as the circumstances of the estate require
and in accordance with the provisions of this rule.
Section 12. Orders relating to payment of debts where appeal is taken. — If an appeal has been taken
from a decision of the court concerning a claim, the court may suspend the order for the payment of the
debts or may order the distributions among the creditors whose claims are definitely allowed, leaving in
the hands of the executor or administrator sufficient assets to pay the claim disputed and appealed. When
a disputed claim is finally settled the court having jurisdiction of the estate shall order the same to be paid
out of the assets retained to the same extent and in the same proportion with the claims of other creditors.
Section 13. When subsequent distribution of assets ordered. — If the whole of the debts are not paid
on the first distribution, and if the whole assets are not distributed, or other assets afterwards come to the
hands of the executor or administrator, the court may from time to time make further orders for the
distributions of assets.
Section 14. Creditors to be paid in accordance with terms of order. — When an order is made for the
distribution of assets among the creditors, the executor or administration shall, as soon as the time of
payment arrives, pay the creditors the amounts of their claims, or the dividend thereon, in accordance with
the terms of such order.
Section 15. Time for paying debts and legacies fixed, or extended after notice, within what periods.
— On granting letters testamentary or administration the court shall allow to the executor or administrator
a time for disposing of the estate and paying the debts and legacies of the deceased, which shall not, in
the first instance, exceed one (1) year; but the court may, on application of the executor or administrator
and after hearing on such notice of the time and place therefor given to all persons interested as it shall
direct, extend the time as the circumstances of the estate require not exceeding six (6) months for a single
extension not so that the whole period allowed to the original executor or administrator shall exceed two
(2) years.
Section 16. Successor of dead executor or administrator may have time extended on notice within
certain period. — When an executor or administrator dies, and a new administrator of the same estate is
appointed, the court may extend the time allowed for the payment of the debts or legacies beyond the time
allowed to the original executor or administrator, not exceeding six (6) months at a time and not exceeding
six (6) months beyond the time which the court might have allowed to such original executor or
administrator; and notice shall be given of the time and place for hearing such application, as required in
the last preceding section.
NOTES:
Query: How do you pay debts?
A:
1. From the portion or property designated in the will;
2. From the personal property, if no such designation in the will or there is no will; and
3. From the real property, if personal properties are insufficient.
Thus, the process would be the property to pay off debts would be that designated in the will.
There is no distinction here whether the property is real or personal. Thus, it is not subjected to the
provision that the personal property will have to be paid first.
In the absence of any provision, the personal property will have to be paid first, and in its
absence or insufficiency the real properties.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
166
BABY 520 notes
Note that this is subject to the laws on legitime in wills and succession.
Note on the preference of credit, this is more substantial than procedural. In a labor case, it
was held that earned income of laborers are preferred over taxes.
With regards to the debts of the estate, this is different from funeral expenses, expenses of
administration. These debts of the estate must be settled first before partition and distribution.
DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION
RULE 90
Section 1. When order for distribution of reside made. — When the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the
estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue
of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each
is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been
made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
Section 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. — Questions as to advancement made,
or alleged to have been made, by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on
the person raising the questions and on the heir.
Section 3. By whom expenses of partition paid. — If at the time of distribution the executor or
administrator has retained sufficient effects in his hands which may lawfully be applied for the expenses
of partition of the properties distributed, such expenses of partition may be paid by such executor or
administrator when it appears equitable to the court and not inconsistent with the intention of the testator;
otherwise, they shall be paid by the parties in proportion to their respective shares or interest in the
premises, and the apportionment shall be settled and allowed by the court, and, if any person interested
in the partition does not pay his proportion or share, the court may issue an execution in the name of the
executor or administrator against the party not paying the sum assessed.
Section 4. Recording the order of partition of estate. — Certified copies of final orders and judgments
of the court relating to the real estate or the partition thereof shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of
the province where the property is situated.
Query: Suppose the estate consists of 100M, an there are 5 children, and in the will, it is stated that
each will receive 20M. But 50M was used for payment of debts, how will the distribution be?
A: They will share pro rata in the residue, which means that their share will be reduce
proportionately to the paid debts and from the amount that they should supposed to receive.
Example. Of pro rata sharing: yung doon sa 100M, 1 child was given 30M, another 30M was
given to the 2nd child, the 3rd child received 20M, and the last two children received 10M each. The debt
was 50M, the residue will be distributed as follows: the first 2 children will receive 15 million, and then 10M
and 5M respectively.
But in practice it is not as simple as that, it will still be subjected to collation, the giving of
allowances and support.

Query: What do you mean by allowance and support, how does it affect the distribution of the
estate?
A: This is support pendente lite pending the settlement of the estate. This shall be considered
as advances from the estate.
GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
RULE 84
Section 1. Executor or administrator to have access to partnership books and property. How right
enforced. — The executor or administrator of the estate of a deceased partner shall at all times have
access to, and may examine and take copies of, books and papers relating to the partnership business,
and make examine and make invoices of the property belonging to such partnership; and the surviving
partner or partners, on request, shall exhibit to him all such books, papers, and property in their hands or
control. On the written application of such executor or administrator, the court having jurisdiction of the
estate may order any such surviving partner or partners to freely permit the exercise of the rights, and to
exhibit the books, papers, and property, as in this section provided, and may punish any partner failing to
do so for contempt.
Section 2. Executor or administrator to keep buildings in repair. — An executor or administrator shall
maintain in tenantable repair the houses and other structures and fences belonging to the estate, and
deliver the same in such repair to the heirs or devisees when directed so to do by the court.
Section 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate
not willed. — An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the
real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts
and the expenses of administration.
REVOCATION OF ADMINISTRATION, DEATH, RESIGNATION, AND REMOVAL OF EXECUTORS OR
ADMINISTRATORS
RULE 82
Section 1. Administration revoked if will discovered. Proceedings thereupon. — If after letters of
administration have been granted on the estate of a decedent as if he had died intestate, his will is proved
and allowed by the court, the letters of administration shall be revoked and all powers thereunder cease,
and the administrator shall forthwith surrender the letters to the court, and render his account with such
time as the court directs. Proceeding for the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under
the will shall be as hereinbefore provided.
Section 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceeding upon
death, resignation, or removal. — If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and
settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly
provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to
discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or in its discretion, may permit him to resign. When an
executor or administrator dies, resign, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may
administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no
remaining executor or administrator, administration may be made to any suitable person.
Section 3. Acts before revocation, resignation, or removal to be valid. — The lawful acts of an
executor or administrator before the revocation of his letters testamentary or of administration, or before
his resignation or removal, shall have the like validity as if there had been no such revocation, resignation,
or removal.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
167
BABY 520 notes
Section 4. Powers of new executor or administrator. Renewal of license to sell real estate. — The
person to whom letters testamentary or of administration are granted after the revocation of former letters,
or the death, resignation, or removal of a former executor or administrator, shall have the like powers to
collect and settle the estate not administered that the former executor or administrator had, and may
prosecute or defend actions commenced by or against the former executor or administrator, and have
execution on judgments recovered in the name of such former executor or administrator. An authority
granted by the court to the former executor or administrator for the sale or mortgage of real estate may be
renewed in favor of such person without further notice or hearing.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE
RULE 86
Section 1. Notice to creditors to be issued by court. — Immediately after granting letters testamentary
or of administration, the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons having money claims against the
decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court.
Section 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the notice provided in the preceding section,
the court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve
(12) and not less than six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any
time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim
within the previously limited time, the court may, for cause shown and, on such terms, as are equitable,
allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one (1) month.
Section 3. Publication of notice to creditors. — Every executor or administrator shall, immediately after
the notice to creditors is issued, cause the same to be published three (3) weeks successively in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province, and to be posted for the same period in four public places
in the province and in two public places in the municipality where the decedent last resided.
Section 4. Filing of copy of printed notice. — Within ten (10) days after the notice has been published
and posted in accordance with the preceding section, the executor or administrator shall file or cause to
be filed in the court a printed copy of the notice accompanied with an affidavit setting forth the dates of the
first and last publication thereof and the name of the newspaper in which the same is printed.
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. — All claims
for money against the decent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not
due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expense for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise, they
are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or
administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an action,
or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by
answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as
herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment
is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance
against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration
proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
Section 6. Solidary obligation of decedent. — Where the obligation of the decedent is solidary with
another debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he were the only debtor, without prejudice
to the right of the estate to recover contribution from the debtor. In a joint obligation of the decedent, the
claim shall be confined to the portion belonging to him.

Section 9. How to file a claim. Contents thereof. Notice to executor or administrator. — A claim may
be filed by delivering the same with the necessary vouchers to the clerk of court and by serving a copy
thereof on the executor or administrator. If the claim be founded on a bond, bill, note, or any other
instrument, the original need not be filed, but a copy thereof with all indorsements shall be attached to the
claim and filed therewith. On demand, however, of the executor or administrator, or by order of the court
or judge, the original shall be exhibited, unless it be lost or destroyed, in which case the claimant must
accompany his claim with affidavit or affidavits containing a copy or particular description of the instrument
and stating its loss or destruction. When the claim is due, it must be supported by affidavit stating the
amount justly due, that no payments have been made thereon which are not credited, and that there are
no offsets to the same, to the knowledge of the affiant. If the claim is not due, or is contingent, when filed,
it must also be supported by affidavits stating the particulars thereof. When the affidavit is made by a
person other than the claimant, he must set forth therein the reason why it is not made by the claimant.
The claim once filed shall be attached to the record of the case in which the letters testamentary or of
administration were issued, although the court, in its discretion, and as a matter of convenience, may order
all the claims to be collected in a separate folder.
Section 10. Answer of executor or administrator. Offsets —Within fifteen (15) days after service of a
copy of the claim on the executor or administrator, he shall file his answer admitting or denying the claim
specifically, and setting forth the admission or denial. If he has no knowledge sufficient to enable him to
admit or deny specifically, he shall state such want of knowledge. The executor or administrator in his
answer shall allege in offset any claim which the decedent before death had against the claimant, and his
failure to do so shall bar the claim forever. A copy of the answer shall be served by the executor or
administrator on the claimant. The court in its discretion may extend the time for filing such answer.
Section 11. Disposition of admitted claim. — Any claim admitted entirely by the executor or
administrator shall immediately be submitted by the clerk to the court who may approve the same without
hearing; but the court, in its discretion, before approving the claim, may order that known heirs, legatees,
or devisees be notified and heard. If upon hearing, an heir, legatees, or devisee opposes the claim, the
court may, in its discretion, allow him fifteen (15) days to file an answer to the claim in the manner
prescribed in the preceding section.
Section 12. Trial of contested claim. — Upon the filing of an answer to a claim, or upon the expiration
of the time for such filing, the clerk of court shall set the claim for trial with notice to both parties. The court
may refer the claim to a commissioner.
Section 13. Judgment appealable. — The judgment of the court approving or disapproving a claim, shall
be filed with the record of the administration proceedings with notice to both parties, and is appealable as
in ordinary cases. A judgment against the executor or administrator shall be that he pay, in due course of
administration, the amount ascertained to be due, and it shall not create any lien upon the property of the
estate, or give to the judgment creditor any priority of payment.
Section 14. Costs. — When the executor or administrator, in his answer, admits and offers to pay part of
a claim, and the claimant refuses to accept the amount offered in satisfaction of his claim, if he fails to
obtain a more favorable judgment, he cannot recover costs, but must pay to the executor or administrator
costs from the time of the offer. Where an action commenced against the deceased for money has been
discontinued and the claim embraced therein presented as in this rule provided, the prevailing party shall
be allowed the costs of his action up to the time of its discontinuance.
NOTES:
Claims that maybe made against the estate:
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
168
BABY 520 notes
1. All claims for money against the decent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent,
2. All claims for funeral expenses;
3. Expense for the last sickness of the decedent, and
4. Judgment for money against the decent (this is Sec 20 R3)
In relation to this is Sec 20 of R3, otherwise known as CONTRACTUAL MONEY CLAIM:
Section 20. Action and contractual money claims. — When the action is for recovery of
money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in
the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall
instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff
therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against
the estate of a deceased person. (21a)
This rule provides that when a person dies during the pendency of a contractual money claim
it will not be dismissed but it will be continued until judgment is rendered. Once judgment has been entered
you cannot satisfy such judgment pursuant to R39 but rather you file it as a claim against the estate.
That is one of those claimable against the estate.
Query: If for example Mr. X was hospitalized in St. Lukes, and he stayed there for 10 days until he
died due to covid. He left a debt in the hospital; those are his expenses for his last sickness. How
can St. Lukes claim that?
A: If there is no settlement of the estate proceeding pending before the courts, St. Luke may
initiate the settlement of the estate the latter being a creditor who has an interest in the estate
of Mr. X.
Then after the court orders the publication of the notice to creditors and the same
was published, St. Lukes may claim the debt against the estate by filing the claim with the clerk
of court together with the necessary vouchers and also by serving a copy of the claim to
executor or administrator. (Sec. 9)
Note: Now if there is already a pending settlement of the estate, mas madali na for St. Lukes they only
need to file the same with the clerk of court after notice to creditor has been ordered and published. St.
Lukes only needs to present before the clerk of court the receipts mga resibo lang ang I fifile nila, no need
for a petition. Parang sulat lang yan, or parang manifestation lang yan, or di kaya if they have a lawyer,
ilalagay lang ng lawyer entry of appearance.
Query: Once that is received what happens now?
A: (Sec 10-12) Within fifteen (15) days after service of a copy of the claim on the executor or
administrator, he shall file his answer admitting or denying the claim specifically, and setting forth the
admission or denial.
Now the executor or administrator in his answer shall allege any offset that the decedent had
against the claimant, and his failure to do so shall bar the claim forever.
A copy of the answer shall be served by the executor or administrator on the claimant. The
court in its discretion may extend the time for filing such answer.
Now, If the claim is admitted entirely, the claim shall then be submitted to the court for
approval. The court may approve the same. But the court instead of approving may order that known heirs,
legatees, or devisees be notified and heard.
If upon hearing, an heir, legatees, or devisee opposes the claim, the court may, in
its discretion, allow him fifteen (15) days to file an answer to the claim.
If the claim is disputed, either by executor, administrator or the heirs, the clerk of court upon
the filing of an answer to a claim, or upon the expiration of the time for such filing, shall set the claim for
trial with notice to both parties.

The court may hear the same and approve or disapprove it. But the court may also refer the
claim to a commissioner, the court then will still have the final say and may approve or disapprove the
report of the commissioners.
Query: Now assuming that the claim of St. Lukes is admitted by the executor or administrator, how
shall the latter pay of the hospital bills?
A: A judgment against the executor or administrator shall be that he pay, in due course of
administration, the amount ascertained to be due, and it shall not create any lien upon the
property of the estate, or give to the judgment creditor any priority of payment. (Sec 13)
Note: If the claim is approved, it does not mean that the creditor will have a priority to be paid, the
preference of credit would still be followed. Yan ang ibig-sabihin ng “payment in due course of
administration” there is no prioritization simply because the court has approved the claim. But the court
here must already set aside a portion of the estate to pay of that debt in accordance with preference of
credit.
Statute of Non-claims vs Statute of Limitations
Statute of non- claims is the period fixed by the court for the filling of the claim against the
estate, such that, claims that are not filed within the said period are barred forever. The period to be fixed
by the court must not be less than 6 months nor more than 12 months FROM THE DATE OF THE FIRST
PUBLICATION.
There are however, two exceptions to the statutes of non-claims:
1. on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within period provided for by the
court, the court may, for cause shown and, on such terms, as are equitable, allow such claim
to be filed within a time not exceeding one (1) month FROM NOTICE OF THE ORDER
ALLOWING SUCH CLAIM TO BE FILED. (sec 2) (also known as tardy claims, Riguerra 2019);
AND
2. the creditor may set up his claim as a counter claim in an action filed by the executor or
administrator against him. (Sec 5)
On the other hand, Statute of limitations are the period provided for by law within which a claim must
be filed, other-wise they are barred forever.
Note: The statue of non-claims starts to run from the date of the first publication, it is not from the notice
of such publication. Magakiaba ang notice sa publication, the latter is jurisdictional. But don’t confuse this
publication in R86 form publication required in petition for settlement of the estate. In R86 what is published
is the notice of the hearing of the claim against the estate, on the other hand, R75, 76, and R79 the notices
and publication there are differences, you will note here that upon the issuance of letters testamentary or
letters of administration, rule 86 sec 1 the court will have to issue an order requiring the appointed
administrator or executor to have it published. Ang publication diyan will refer to possible claims against
the estate. What is published here is “NOTICE TO THE CREDITORS”.
After publication, which is also once a week for 3 consecutive weeks, the period provided there
is must not be less than 6 months nor more than 12 months from the date of the first publication. The
publication for once a week for three consecutive weeks means that there must be publication for 3
times but readable for 21 days. It does not mean publication for 21 days. The illustration of that if you
recall, is that if the first publication is 7th of the month, the second cannot be on any other dates except the
14th and the third will be on the 21st of the same month. And thus, the statute of non-claims, which is not
less than 6 mons nor more than 12 mons, will start to run from the first publication which is the 7th, lest say
January 7, if it was published January.
The notice is called statutes of non-claims, which is quite ironic, because it requires you to file
a claim but it is called non-claims.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
169
BABY 520 notes
Query: What is the rationale behind the statute of non-claims, remember that prescription in civil
cases is for 10 years from accrual, so if an action accrued in January 1, 2010, that will prescribe
only on December 31, 2020, but if it is in the statute of non-claims it cannot go beyond 1 year (not
less than 6 mons nor more than 12mons) from the date of the first publication, bakit ganun, what
is the rationale?
A: It is for the speedy settlement of the estate. Jurisprudence provides that the court must settle
the estate as much as possible, realizing that settlement of the estate takes so much time. It is of judicial
notice. The very process itself will take so much time.
Note: The statue of non-claims precedes the statute of limitations. The former is favored over the latter.
If for example, there is a counter-claim, which falls in the exception, but take note that this
counter-claim is within the claim, that is why it is with in the prescriptive period. So, if the heirs for example,
filed a claim against St. Lukes beyond the 10-year period, eh di wala narin yung counter-claim.
Under sec 5, we said that it is not limited to funeral expenses, last sickness and judgment for
money, it includes also money claims, and the latter is not limited to those claims which have already
matured, this is either due or not due, and even contingent claims will also be barred by the statute of non-
claims.
Contingent claim refers to those clams in which liability depends on some future event that may
or may not happen and which makes it uncertain whether there will ever be any liability. What is important
here is the dependency of the claim upon a condition, such that if the condition has not been complied
with the claimant has no right yet.
Example: if a X promises to give something to Y on the condition that Y passes the CPA board
examination, and while awaiting the results of the examination within a period of 6mons, and X died. That
promise will be barred, if Y fails to file the claim.
Thus, it is not limited to mature debts. Halimbawa, the debt will mature June 2022, and this
year april 2021, namatay, you do not have to wait for the maturity of the obligation, you have to file the
claim against the estate, otherwise it will be barred.
Enforcement of contingent claims
Rule 88; Section 5. How contingent claim becoming absolute in two years allowed and paid. Action
against distributees later. — If such contingent claim becomes absolute and is presented to the court,
or to the executor or administrator, within two (2) years from the time limited for other creditors to present
their claims, it may be allowed by the court if not disputed by the executor or administrator and, if disputed,
it may be proved and allowed or disallowed by the court as the facts may warrant. If the contingent claim
is allowed, the creditor shall receive payment to the same extent as the other creditors if the estate retained
by the executor or administrator is sufficient. But if the claim is not so presented, after having become
absolute, within said two (2) years, and allowed, the assets retained in the hands of the executor or
administrator, not exhausted in the payment of claims, shall be disturbed by the order of the court to the
persons entitled to the same; but the assets so distributed may still be applied to the payment of the claim
when established, and the creditor may maintain an action against the distributees to recover the debt,
and such distributees and their estates shall be liable for the debt in proportion to the estate they have
respectively received from the property of the deceased.
Query: What happens if the estate is the mortgagor?
A: Section 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. — A creditor holding a claim against the deceased
secured by mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the
manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may
foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator
a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or
the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his

deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section or he may rely upon his mortgage or
other security alone, and foreclosure the same at any time within the period of the statute of limitations,
and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the
other assets of estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from
redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as security, under
the direction of the court, if the court shall adjudge it to be for the best interest of the estate that such
redemption shall be made.
Options of the Creditor-Mortgagee:
1. Abandon the security and prosecute his claim against the estate by filing the claim with the
clerk of court together with the vouchers or receipts;
2. Foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or
administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, he may claim his
deficiency judgment by filing a claim with the clerk of court, provided that the same is still within
the statute of non-claims; OR
3. Rely on the solely on the mortgage and foreclose the same (judicial or extrajudicial) at any time
even beyond the statue of non-claims but may not be beyond the statutes of limitations, but the
mortgagee here waives any deficiency.
Note: These remedies are alternative, and not cumulative, once a choice is made the others are barred.
Note: This is different from R87, in the latter the estate is the mortgagee. The estate has no option but to
foreclose which may either be judicial or extra judicial.
ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR
RULE 87
Section 3. Heir may not sue until share assigned — When an executor or administrator is appointed
and assumes the trust, no action to recover the title or possession of lands or for damages done to such
lands shall be maintained against him by an heir or devisee until there is an order of the court assigning
such lands to such heir or devisee or until the time allowed for paying debts has expired.
Section 4. Executor or administrator may compound(compromise) with debtor. — Within the
approval of the court, an executor or administrator may compound with the debtor of the deceased for a
debt due, and may give a discharge of such debt on receiving a just dividend of the estate of the debtor.
Section 5. Mortgage due estate may be foreclosed. — A mortgage belonging to the estate of a
deceased person, as mortgagee or assignee of the right or a mortgage, may be foreclosed by the executor
or administrator.
Section 6. Proceedings when property concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed. — If an
executor or administrator, heir, legatee, creditor or other individual interested in the estate of the deceased,
complains to the court having jurisdiction of the estate that a person is suspected of having concealed,
embezzled, or conveyed away any of the money, goods, or chattels of the deceased, or that such person
has in his possession or has knowledge of any deed, conveyance, bond, contract, or other writing which
contains evidence of or tends or discloses the right, title, interest, or claim of the deceased, the court may
cite such suspected person to appear before it and may examine him on oath on the matter of such
complaint; and if the person so cited refuses to appear, or to answer on such examination or such
interrogatories as are put to him, the court may punish him for contempt, and may commit him to prison
until he submits to the order of the court. The interrogatories put any such person, and his answers thereto,
shall be in writing and shall be filed in the clerk's office.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
170
BABY 520 notes
Section 7. Person entrusted with estate compelled to render account. — The court, on complaint of
an executor or administrator, may cite a person entrusted by an executor or administrator with any part of
the estate of the deceased to appear before it, and may require such person to render a full account, on
oath, of the money, goods, chattels, bonds, account, or other papers belonging to such estate as came to
his possession in trust for such executor or administrator, and of his proceedings thereon; and if the person
so cited refuses to appear to render such account, the court may punish him for contempt as having
disobeyed a lawful order of the court.
Section 8. Embezzlement before letters issued — If a person, before the granting of letters testamentary
or of administration on the estate of the deceased, embezzles or alienates any of the money, goods,
chattels, or effects of such deceased, such person shall be liable to an action in favor of the executor or
administrator of the estate for double the value of the property sold, embezzled, or alienated, to be
recovered for the benefit of such estate.
Section 9. Property fraudulently conveyed by deceased may be recovered. When executor or
administrator must bring action. — When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an executor or
administrator for the payment of debts and expenses of administration, and the deceased in his lifetime
had conveyed real or personal property, or a right or interest therein, or an debt or credit, with intent to
defraud his creditors or to avoid any right, debt, or duty; or had so conveyed such property, right, interest,
debt or credit that by law the conveyance would be void as against his creditors, and the subject of the
attempted conveyance would be liable to attachment by any of them in his lifetime, the executor or
administrator may commence and prosecute to final judgment an action for the recovery of such property,
right, interest, debt, or credit for the benefit of the creditors; but he shall not be bound to commence the
action unless on application of the creditors of the deceased, nor unless the creditors making the
application pay such part of the costs and expenses, or give security therefor to the executor or
administrator, as the court deems equitable.
Section 10. When creditor may bring action. Lien for costs. — When there is such a deficiency of
assets, and the deceased in his lifetime had made or attempted such a conveyance, as is stated in the
last preceding section, and the executor or administrator has not commenced the action therein provided
for, any creditor of the estate may, with the permission of the court, commence and prosecute to final
judgment, in the name of the executor or administrator, a like action for the recovery of the subject of the
conveyance or attempted conveyance for the benefit of the creditors. But the action shall not be
commenced until the creditor has filed in a court a bond executed to the executor or administrator, in an
amount approved by the judge, conditioned to indemnify the executor or administrator against the costs
and expenses incurred by reason of such action. Such creditor shall have a lien upon any judgment
recovered by him in the action for such costs and other expenses incurred therein as the court deems
equitable. Where the conveyance or attempted conveyance had been made by the deceased in his lifetime
in favor of the executor or administrator, the action which a creditor may bring shall be in the name of all
the creditors, and permission of the court and filing of bond as above prescribed, are not necessary.
NOTE:
So, outside those claims under section 5 rule 86, any claims that is outside the 4 therein, must
be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate as separate action.
Distinguish Sec. 5 R86 from Sec 1 of R87
Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be BROUGHT AGAINST executor or
administrator. — No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon
shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to

recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced
against him.
Sec 1 is recovery actions:
1. Recovery of real or personal property;
2. interest there in;
3. enforcement of a lien there on; or
4. actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal
These actions must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate.
Note: Sec 1 are actions AGAINST the executor or administrator.
On the other hand, there are also actions BY the executor or administrator.
Section 2. Executor or administrator may bring or defend actions which survive. — For
the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased, an executor or administrator
may bring or defend, in the right of deceased, actions for causes which survive.
Actions that may be brought here are also the same as those in sec 1, it goes both ways, that
is why the title of R87 is actions by and against the executor or administrator.
And regarding the counterclaim in sec 5 R86 which is not barred by the statute of non-claims,
that is also an action by the executor or administrator of the estate.
CASES NOT DISCUSSED IN CLASS:
2. Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen, 702 SCRA, 7/31/13
SECOND DIVISION / G.R. No. 189121 / July 31, 2013 / PEREZ, J.
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners, vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at
the time of his death
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should
be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
– residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still
it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the
same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than
a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for
affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly
laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of
his estate may be laid in the said city. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been
living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his
death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition
of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
171
BABY 520 notes
is void for being bigamous. That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the
courts of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with
Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’
findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken
place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally.
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the
death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the
validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has
a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and
the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not shown
any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who
are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration
must be filed by an interested person.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate
proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such
that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributee.
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution
of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the
findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of
Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled
to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution of
Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party
within the purview of the law.
7. Unionbank vs. Santibanez, 452 SCRA, February 2005 (R-86)
SECOND DIVISION / G.R. No. 149926 / February 23, 2005 / CALLEJO, SR., J.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE
SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in the
Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs’ assumption of the
indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the
obligation of the deceased.
The petition is bereft of merit.
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine
all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in

the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the
administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after
the will has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until
after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires
it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a
person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will
decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of
a will.
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same
properties embraced in the will. In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibañez, left a
holographic will which contained an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left
by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other
properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being
so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement
executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so
since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late
father’s holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over
all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way
without the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court
cannot allow. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction. Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in
the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs
cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent. In the instant
case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the
decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the court and the
latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent
Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial
to the other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness
of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the
heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use the
above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken
as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp." The assumption of liability was
conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their
respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that
they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The
partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It
follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly
a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court
in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is
mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
172
BABY 520 notes
… This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased
by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed.
The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the
deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law
strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's
estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and
distribute the residue.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S.
Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father.
As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go
after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of
course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
8. Heirs of Maglasang vs. MBC, 706 SCRA 235
SECOND DIVISION / G.R. No. 171206 / September 23, 2013 / PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES FLAVIANO MAGLASANG and SALUD ADAZA-MAGLASANG, ET.
AL., Petitioners, vs. MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, now substituted by FIRST SOVEREIGN
ASSET MANAGEMENT SPV-AMC, INC. FSAMI, Respondent.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s award of the deficiency amount in
favor of respondent.
Petitioners assert that it is not Act No. 3135 but Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules which applies
in this case. The latter provision provides alternative and exclusive remedies for the satisfaction of
respondent’s claim against the estate of Flaviano. Corollarily, having filed its claim against the estate
during the intestate proceedings, petitioners argue that respondent had effectively waived the remedy of
foreclosure and, even assuming that it still had the right to do so, it was precluded from filing a suit for the
recovery of the deficiency obligation.
Likewise, petitioners maintain that the extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject properties was
null and void, not having been conducted in the capital of the Province of Leyte in violation of the
stipulations in the real estate mortgage contract. They likewise deny any personal liability for the loans
taken by their deceased parents.
The petition is partly meritorious.
Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement proceedings of
their estate. Such proceedings are primarily governed by special rules found under Rules 73 to 90 of the
Rules, although rules governing ordinary actions may, as far as practicable, apply suppletorily. Among
these special rules, Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules (Section 7, Rule86) provides the rule in dealing with
secured claims against the estate:
SEC. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. – A creditor holding a claim against the deceased
secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and
prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution
of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security,
by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a
judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged,
in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his
deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely
upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose the same at any time within the
period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor,

and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing
herein contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the property
mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as security, under the direction of
the court, if the court shall adjudged it to be for the best interest of the estate that such
redemption shall be made. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As the foregoing generally speaks of "a creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured
by a mortgage or other collateral security" as above-highlighted, it may be reasonably concluded that
the aforementioned section covers all secured claims, whether by mortgage or any other form of
collateral, which a creditor may enforce against the estate of the deceased debtor. On the contrary,
nowhere from its language can it be fairly deducible that the said section would – as the CA interpreted –
narrowly apply only to mortgages made by the administrator over any property belonging to the estate of
the decedent. To note, mortgages of estate property executed by the administrator, are also governed by
Rule 89 of the Rules, captioned as "Sales, Mortgages, and Other Encumbrances of Property of Decedent."
Jurisprudence breaks down the rule under Section 7, Rule 86 and explains that the secured
creditor has three remedies/options that he may alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his
indebtedness. In particular, he may choose to:
(a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor
as an ordinary claim;
(b) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim;
OR
(c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and foreclose the same before
it is barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim for any deficiency.
It must, however, be emphasized that these remedies are distinct, independent and
mutually exclusive from each other; thus, the election of one effectively bars the exercise of the
others.
With respect to real properties, the Court in Bank of America v. American Realty
Corporation pronounced:
For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or
upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the
provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure,
such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with
any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be
made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act
No.4118. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the third remedy, it must be mentioned that the same includes the option of extra-
judicially foreclosing the mortgage under Act No. 3135, as availed of by respondent in this case.
However, the plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his
right to recover any deficiency from the estate.
To obviate any confusion, the Court observes that the operation of Act No. 3135 does not
entirely discount the application of Section 7, Rule 86, or vice-versa. Rather, the two complement each
other within their respective spheres of operation. On the one hand, Section 7, Rule 86 lays down the
options for the secured creditor to claim against the estate and, according to jurisprudence, the availment
of the third option bars him from claiming any deficiency amount. On the other hand, after the third option
is chosen, the procedure governing the manner in which the extra-judicial foreclosure should proceed
would still be governed by the provisions of Act No. 3135.
Simply put, Section 7, Rule 86 governs the parameters and the extent to which a claim
may be advanced against the estate, whereas Act No. 3135 sets out the specific procedure to be
followed when the creditor subsequently chooses the third option – specifically, that of extra-
judicially foreclosing real property belonging to the estate. The application of the procedure under
Act No. 3135 must be concordant with Section 7, Rule 86 as the latter is a special rule applicable
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
173
BABY 520 notes
to claims against the estate, and at the same time, since Section 7, Rule 86 does not detail the
procedure for extra-judicial foreclosures, the formalities governing the manner of availing of the
third option – such as the place where the application for extra-judicial foreclosure is filed, the
requirements of publication and posting and the place of sale – must be governed by Act No. 3135.
In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage of the properties
previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore, availed of the third option.
Lest it be misunderstood, it did not exercise the first option of directly filing a claim against the
estate, as petitioners assert, since it merely notified the probate court of the outstanding amount of its
claim against the estate of Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring the account. Thus, having
unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-judicial foreclosure under Section 7, Rule 86,
respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed.
11. Aranas vs. Mercado, 713 SCRA
FIRST DIVISION / G.R. No. 156407 / January 15, 2014 / BERSAMIN, J.
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner, v. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO,
CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, AND
FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Petitioner Thelma contends that the resort to the
special civil action for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC by Teresita and her co–respondents was
not proper.
Thelma’s contention cannot be sustained.
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the
assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the
inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were
interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final
determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant
determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were
provisional and subject to revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.
In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, the Court, in affirming the decision of the CA
to the effect that the order of the intestate court excluding certain real properties from the inventory was
interlocutory and could be changed or modified at anytime during the course of the administration
proceedings, held that the order of exclusion was not a final but an interlocutory order “in the sense that it
did not settle once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots.” The Court observed there that:
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title
thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties. (Bold
emphasis supplied)
To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals, where the Court declared that a “probate
court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title provisionally,” and
reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, that the “patent reason is the probate court’s limited
jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or

exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action.” Indeed, in
the cited case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, the Court pointed out:
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine whether
they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered
by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties
and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. (Bold emphasis
supplied
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the
possibility that material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the special
proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances in which
multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. – An interested person may appeal in
special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share
of the estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased
person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower
court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from
the appointment of a special administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights
of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new
trial or for reconsideration.
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come under any of the
instances in which multiple appeals are permitted.
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
for including properties in the inventory notwithstanding their having been transferred to Mervir Realty by
Emigdio during his lifetime, and for disregarding the registration of the properties in the name of Mervir
Realty, a third party, by applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its conclusion,
ignored the law and the facts that had fully warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted
at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the
person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC
becomes duty–bound to direct the preparation and submission of the inventory of ALL the
properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and
responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of
administration pursuant to Section 1 Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and
personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the phrase
which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be
known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator.
Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
174
BABY 520 notes
belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate
of the decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the
executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the
estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate.” Hence, the RTC that presides
over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what
properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA cannot impose
its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included
or excluded from the inventory in the absence of “positive abuse of discretion,” for in the
administration of the estates of deceased persons, “the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers
and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them,
unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion.” As long as the RTC commits
no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of
its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and
limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed
to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right
of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised.
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive for the
inclusion of the properties in question in its assailed order of March 14, 2001. The RTC strictly followed
the directives of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for preparing the
inventory by the administrator. The explanations indicated that the directive to include the properties in
question in the inventory rested on good and valid reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or arbitrary,
or capricious.
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina Mercado should be
included in the inventory because Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact about the shares being inherited
by Emigdio.
Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code in August 3, 1988, their property regime was the conjugal partnership of gains. For purposes of the
settlement of Emigdio’s estate, it was unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in the conjugal
partnership of gains. The party asserting that specific property acquired during that property regime did
not pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains carried the burden of proof, and that party must prove the
exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical, and convincing evidence. In the absence of or
pending the presentation of such proof, the conjugal partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be
provisionally liquidated to establish who the real owners of the affected properties were, and which of the
properties should form part of the estate of Emigdio. The portions that pertained to the estate of Emigdio
must be included in the inventory.
Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the name of Mervir Realty,
the RTC made findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB–12692, a dispute that had involved
the ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of Emigdio, and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in Emigdio’s name. Indeed, the RTC noted in the order of March 14,
2001, or ten years after his death, that Lot 3353 had remained registered in the name of Emigdio.
Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No. CEB–12692. Such lack of
interest in Civil Case No. CEB–12692 was susceptible of various interpretations, including one to the effect
that the heirs of Emigdio could have already threshed out their differences with the assistance of the trial
court. This interpretation was probable considering that Mervir Realty, whose business was managed by

respondent Richard, was headed by Teresita herself as its President. In other words, Mervir Realty
appeared to be a family corporation.
Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of assignment of January 10,
1991, such lots should still be included in the inventory to enable the parties, by themselves, and with the
assistance of the RTC itself, to test and resolve the issue on the validity of the assignment. The limited
jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court might have constricted the determination of the rights to the
properties arising from that deed but it does not prevent the RTC as intestate court from ordering the
inclusion in the inventory of the properties subject of that deed. This is because the RTC as intestate court,
albeit vested only with special and limited jurisdiction, was still “deemed to have all the necessary powers
to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective.”
Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the
important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs. Article
1061 of the Civil Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself,
to “bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she) may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.”
Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by the decedent on
the legitime of an heir “may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
questions and on the heir.” Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the
RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent
by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any
compulsory heir by the decedent.
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the
inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an
intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded
under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the possession of the
administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude
properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC
commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular
performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi–judicial
power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that
the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial
or quasi–judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction
12. Silverio Sr. vs. Silverio Jr., 733 SCRA 183, (8/13/14)
FIRST DIVISION / G.R. Nos. 208828-29 / August 13, 2014/ VILLARAMA, JR., J.
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., Petitioner, vs. RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC.,
MONICA P. OCAMPO and ZEE2 RESOURCES, INC., Respondents.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (petitioner) filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration contending that
the CA committed a reversible error in upholding the validity of the Intsia and Cambridge properties upon
the ground that the intestate court cannot annul the sales as it has a limited jurisdiction only and which
does not include resolving issues of ownership. It is asserted that the CA should not have stopped there
and looked into the nature of the properties sold, which formed part of the conjugal partnership of Ricardo
Silverio, Sr. and Beatriz S. Silverio.
In their Comment, respondents Silverio, Jr., Monica Ocampo and Citrine Holdings, Inc. argued
that the intestate court should not have ruled on the validity of the sale of the subject properties to third
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
175
BABY 520 notes
parties after it itself had authorized their disposal in partial settlement of the estate, especially so when
separate actions assailing the new titles issued to said third parties were already instituted by petitioner.
At the outset, we emphasize that the probate court having jurisdiction over properties
under administration has the authority not only to approve any disposition or conveyance, but also
to annul an unauthorized sale by the prospective heirs or administrator.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void the disposition of the
property under administration, made by private respondent, the same having been effected without
authority from said court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve the sale
(Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null and void for as long as
the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold petitioner’s contention that the probate
court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render meaningless the power pertaining to the said court.
(Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). (italics ours) Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any
disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication
requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled
by the probate court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized
disposition. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed by respondent Silverio, Jr. with
prior approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006. Subsequently,
however, the sale was annulled by the said court on motion by petitioner.
In reversing the intestate court’s order annulling the sale of the subject properties, the
CA noted that said ruling is anchored on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed at the time
when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still in effect.
It then concluded that the eventual decision in the latter case making the writ of preliminary injunction
permanent only with respect to the appointment of petitioner as administrator and not to the grant of
authority to sell mooted the issue of whether the sale was executed at the time when the TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction were in effect.
We affirm the CA.
It bears to stress that the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order was issued by the intestate court
acting upon pending motions filed by petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr., father and son, respectively,
who are the central figures in the now decade-old controversy over the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz
S. Silverio. The intestate court flip-flopped in appointing as administrator of the estate petitioner and
respondent Silverio, Jr., their personal conflicts becoming more evident to the intestate court as the
proceedings suffered delays. At the hearing of the urgent motion filed by Edmundo Silverio to sell the
subject properties and partially settle the estate, the much awaited opportunity came when the heirs
represented by their respective counsels interposed no objection to the same.
While it is true that petitioner was eventually reinstated as Administrator pursuant to the August
28, 2008 decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 (petition for certiorari filed by Nelia Silverio-Dee), we agree
with the CA that the permanent injunction issued under the said decision, as explicitly stated in its fallo,
pertained only to the portions of the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of
administration to and taking of an oath of administration by respondent Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA
would have expressly set aside as well the directive in the same Omnibus Order allowing the sale of the
subject properties. Moreover, the CA Decision attained finality only on February 11, 2011 when this Court
denied with finality respondent Silverio, Jr.’s motion for reconsideration of the February 11, 2009
Resolution denyinghis petition for review (G.R. No. 185619).1âwphi1
9. Pilapil vs. Heirs of M. Briones, 514 SCRA, February 2007
THIRD DIVISION / G.R. No. 150175 / February 5, 2007 / CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES, ET. AL., Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF
MAXIMINO R. BRIONES, E.T AL., Respondents.

RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had surviving
siblings and so the court was not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of the
intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or
intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the
application and of the date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a
notice to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and
time indicated in the publication. The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is
precisely for the purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the
existence of the settlement proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs or
creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or involuntarily
made.
This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the result of the intestate proceedings
instituted by Donata before the trial court. As this Court pointed out in its earlier Decision, the manner by
which the CFI judge conducted the proceedings enjoys the presumption of regularity, and encompassed
in such presumption is the order of publication of the notice of the intestate proceedings. A review of the
records fails to show any allegation or concrete proof that the CFI also failed to order the publication in
newspapers of the notice of the intestate proceedings and to require proof from Donata of compliance
therewith. Neither can this Court find any reason or explanation as to why Maximino’s siblings could have
missed the published notice of the intestate proceedings of their brother.
14. Leriou, et al. Vs. Longa, et al.
FIRST DIVISION / G.R. No. 203923 / October 8, 2018/ LEONARDO-DE CASTRO J.
IONA LERIOU, ELEPTHERIOS L. LONGA, and STEPHEN L. LONG A, Petitioners, - versus -
YOHANNA FRENESI S. LONGA (Minor) and VICTORIA PONCIANA S. LONGA (Minor), represented
by their mother MARY JANE B. STA. CRUZ,
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Petitioners allege that respondents failed to adduce evidence, i.e., Return of Service, to show
that petitioners were furnished with the Petition for Letters Administration and the RTC Order dated July
4, 2007. Petitioners assert that the e-mails between respondent-administratrix and petitioner Elephterios,
and the stamp "RECEIVED" of the DFA Records Division, do not prove that they actually received the
Petition for Letters of Administration and the RTC Order dated July 4, 2007. Petitioners contend that,
without the mandatory and jurisdictional requirement on notice to the known heirs of the decedent, all
proceedings before the RTC relative to the Petition for Letters Administration are null and void.
We are not convinced.
Contrary to Petitioners' argument that personal notice under Section 4 of Rule 76 is (NOT)
a jurisdictional requirement, the Court, in Alaban v. Court of Appeals, explained that it is just a matter of
personal convenience. Thus:
Assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported
infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a
matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite. (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted.)
Moreover, it should be emphasized that a testate or intestate settlement of a deceased's estate
is a proceeding in rem, such that the publication under Section 3 of the same Rule, vests the court with
jurisdiction over all persons who are interested therein.
In the instant case, the Order dated July 4, 2007 was published for three consecutive weeks in
Balita, a newspaper of general circulation, on the following dates: July 27, 2007, August 3, 2007, and
August 10, 2007.30 By such publication which constitutes notice to the whole world, petitioners are
deemed notified about the intestate proceedings of their father's estate.
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
176
BABY 520 notes
The instant case is analogous to Pilapil v. Heirs of Maximina R. Briones where some of the
heirs did not receive any personal notice about the intestate proceedings, yet they were deemed notified
through publication since the intestate proceeding is in rem. The Court in Pilapil adjudged:
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximina still had surviving
siblings and so the court was not able to order that these sibling be given personal
notices of the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the settlement of
estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the publication in
the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the
same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the existence
of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication.
The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of
informing all interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the
settlement proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors
in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or involuntarily
made. (Emphasis supplied.)
As to whom the Letters of Administration should be issued, the Court, in Gabriel v. Court of
Appeals, gave emphasis on the extent of one's interest in the decedent's estate as the paramount
consideration for appointing him/her as the administrator. The Court pronounced:
In the ·appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the
principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed
as administrator. This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account
in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The
underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy
and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of
waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive
to administer the estate correctly.
Here, petitioners cannot assert their preferential right to administer the estate or that their
choice of administrator should be preferred because they are the nearest of kin of the decedent. It is worth
emphasizing that the preference given to the surviving spouse, next of kin, and creditors is not
absolute, and that the appointment of an administrator greatly depends on the attendant facts and
circumstances of each case. In Uy v. Court of
Appeals, the Court decreed:
The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the
attendant facts and circumstances. In Sioca v. Garcia, this Court set aside the order of
preference, to wit:
It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without sufficient reason
disregard the preferential rights of the.surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of
the deceased spouse. But, if the person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable
the court may appoint another person. The determination of a person's suitability for the
office of administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court
exercising the power of appointment and such judgment will not be interfered with on
appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below was in error. (Citation omitted.)
In the instant case, petitioners are non-residents of the Philippines, which disqualify them from
administering the decedent's estate pursuant to Rule 78, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. We are mindful
that respondents are also disqualified by reason of their minority. In view of the evident disqualification of
petitioners and respondents and the lack of any known creditors, the parties have no choice but to have
somebody else administer the estate for them. Petitioners nominated Juan Manuel Elizalde (Elizalde) but
failed to give adequate justification as to why Letters of Administration should be issued in Elizalde's favor.
We fully agree with the ruling of the trial and appellate courts in choosing respondent-administratrix over
Elizalde. Compared to Elizalde whose interest over the decedent's estate is unclear, respondent-
 177
BABY 520 notes
administratrix's interest is to protect the estate for the benefit of her children with Enrique. Indeed, it is
respondents who would directly benefit from an orderly and efficient management by the respondent-
administratrix. In the absence of any indication that respondent administratrix would jeopardize her
children's interest, or that of petitioners in the subject estate, petitioners' attempts to remove her as
administratrix of Enrique's estate must fail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.

“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial


B. ESCHEATS (R-91)
Already incorporated in Settlement of Estate
OTHER CASES IN ESCHEAT NOT DISCUSSED:
2. Maltos vs. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo, 770 SCRA 397
SECOND DIVISION / G.R. No. 172720 / September 14, 2015 / LEONEN, J.
ELISEO MALTOS AND ROSITA P. MALTOS, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF EUSEBIO BORROMEO,
Respondents.
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Decision of the trial court and ordering the
reconveyance of the property from petitioners Spouses Eliseo Maltos and Rosita Maltos to respondents
heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
The five-year period prohibiting the sale of land obtained under homestead or free patent is
provided under Section 118 of the Public Land Act, which states:
SECTION 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions,
or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of
the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance1 of the patent
or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged] or
pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
The reason for prohibiting the alienation or encumbrance of properties covered by patent or
grant was explained in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Viray.
In Metropolitan Bank, Edgardo D. Viray and his wife contracted several loans with Metrobank
which they failed to pay. Metrobank filed a Complaint for sum of money before the Regional Trial Court in
Manila.72 In 1982, during the pendency of the case, free patents over three parcels of land were issued in
favor of Viray.73 The Complaint for sum of money was decided in 1983 in favor of Metrobank.74 In 1984,
the trial court issued a writ of execution over the parcels of land. An auction sale was held, and Metrobank
emerged as the winning bidder.76 Viray filed an action for annulment of sale.77 This court ruled that the
auction sale was made within the five-year prohibitory period78 and explained that:
[T]he main purpose in the grant of a free patent of homestead is to preserve and keep in
the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State has given to
him so he may have a place to live with his family and become a happy citizen and a
useful member of the society.
In Jocson v. Soriano, we held that the conservation of a family home is the purpose
of homestead laws. The policy of the state is to foster, families as the foundation of society,
and thus promote general welfare. . . .
Section 118 of CA 141, therefore, is predicated on public policy. Its violation gives
rise to the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land and its improvements to the
government at the instance of the latter. The provision that "nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to that expiration of the five-year period" is mandatory
and any sale made in violation of such provision is void and produces no effect whatsoever,
just like what transpired in this case. Clearly, it is not within the competence of any citizen to
barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve. (Citations omitted)
The effect of violating the five-year prohibitory period is provided under Section 124 of the
Public Land Act, which provides:
SECTION 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or
executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one
hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
178
BABY 520 notes
hundred and twenty-three of this. Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and
shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally
issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the
property and its improvements to the State.
In this case, Section 101 of the Public Land Act is applicable since title already vested in
Eusebio Borromeo's name. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the sale was
made within the five-year prohibitory period. Thus, there is sufficient cause to revert the property
in favor of the state. However, this court cannot declare reversion of the property in favor of the
state in view of the limitation imposed by Section 101 that an action for reversion must first be filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General.
Reversion is a remedy provided under Section 101 of the Public Land Act:
SECTION 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor-General or the officer acting in his
stead, in the proper courts, in the name of Commonwealth of the Philippines.
The purpose of reversion is "to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to
private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain."
The general rule is that reversion of lands to the state is not automatic, and the Office of the Solicitor
General is the proper party to file an action for reversion.
In Cawis, the validity of a sales patent and original certificate of title over a parcel of land in Baguio was
questioned.145 This court denied the Petition146 and ruled that the Complaint was actually a reversion suit,
which can be filed only by the Office of the Solicitor General or a person acting in its stead.147
It was also discussed in Cawis that:
The objective of an action for reversion of public land is the cancellation of the
certificate of title an|l the resulting reversion of the land covered by the title to the State| This is
why an action for reversion is oftentimes designated asj an annulment suit or a cancellation
suit.148
We clarify that the remedy of reversion is not the same as the remedy of declaration of nullity
of free patents and certificate of title. In reversion, the "allegations in the complaint would admit State
ownership of the disputed land[,]"149 while in an action for the declaration of nullity of free patent and
certificate of title, the allegations would include "plaintiffs ownership of the contested lot prior to the
issuance of [the] free patent and certificate of title[.]"150
Since an action for reversion presupposes that the property in dispute is owned by the state, it
is proper that the action be filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, being the real party-in-interest.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that reversion is not automatic. Section 29 of the
Public Land Act provides:
SECTION 29. After the cultivation of the land has begun, the purchaser, with the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, may convey or encumber his rights to
any person, corporation, or association legally qualified under this Act to purchase agricultural
public lands, provided such conveyance or encumbrance does not affect any right or interest
of the Government in the land: And provided, further, That the transferee is not delinquent in
the payment of any installment due and payable. Any sale and encumbrance made without the
previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be null and void and
shall produce the effect of annulling the acquisition and reverting the property and all rights to
the State, and all payments on the purchase price theretofore made to the Government shall
be forfeited. After the sale has been approved, the vendor shall not lose his right to acquire
agricultural public lands under the provisions of this Act, provided he has the necessary
qualifications. (Emphasis supplied)

In Francisco v. Rodriguez, et al,151 this court differentiated reversion under Sections 29 and
101 of the Public Land Act.152 This court explained that reversion under Section 29 is self-operative, unlike
Section 101 which requires the Office of the Solicitor General to institute reversion proceedings. 153 Also,
Section 101 applies in cases where "title has already vested in the individual[.]"154 The Director of Lands
sought to execute the Decision in Francisco v. Rodriguez which petitioner Ursula Francisco opposed,
arguing that only 29 hectares were reverted to the state since she was in possession of the remaining four
hectares.155 This court held that the entire property reverted to the state.
This court also explained why Francisco v. Rodriguez was covered by Section 29 and not
Section 101 of the Public Land Act:
By transgressing the law, i.e., allowing herself to be a dummy in the acquisition of
the land and selling the same without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, plaintiff-appellant herself [referring to Ursula Francisco] has eliminated the
very source (Sales Application) of her claim to Lot No. 595, as a consequence of which, she
cannot later assert any right or interest thereon. This is the imperative import of the
pronouncements in G.R. No. L-8263 and in G.R. No. L-15605 that the invalidity of the
conveyance by plaintiff-appellant "produced as a consequence the reversion of the property
with all rights thereto to the State." As a matter of fact, Section 29 of the Public Land Law
(Commonwealth Act No. 141) expressly ordains that any sale and encumbrance made without
the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources "shall be null and
void and shall produce the effect of annulling the acquisition and reverting property and all
rights thereto to the State, and all payments on the purchase price theretofore made to the
Government shall be forfeited.”
In fact, even if a sales application were already given due course by the Director of
Lands, the applicant is not thereby conferred any right over the land covered by the application.
It is the award made by the Director to the applicant (if he is the highest bidder) that confers
upon him a certain right over the land, namely, "to take possession of the land so that he could
comply with the requirements prescribed by law." It is at this stage, when the award is made,
that the land can be considered "disposed of by the Government," since the aforestated right
of the applicant has the effect of withdrawing the land from the public domain that is
"disposable" by the Director of Lands under the provisions of the Public Land Act. . . . However,
the disposition is merely provisional because the applicant has still to comply with the
requirements prescribed by law before . . . . any patent is issued. After the requisites of the law
are complied with by the applicant to the satisfaction of the Director [of] Lands, the patent is
issued. It is then that the land covered by the application may be considered "permanently
disposed of by the Government."157 (Citations omitted)
In this case, a free patent over the subject parcel of land was issued to Eusebio Borromeo. This
shows that he already had title to the property when he sold it to petitioner Eliseo Maltos. Thus, Section
101 of the Public Land Act applies.
3. Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc. 831 SCRA 319, July 2017
THIRD DIVISION / July 19, 2017 / G.R. No. 196888 / TIJAM, J.
AURELIA NARCISE, ET. AL., Petitioners vs. VALBUECO, INC., Respondent
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
Whether or not the instant case is actually a reversion case, and not a case for annulment of
free patents and certificates of title
The petition is denied.
An action for reversion, a remedy provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141, seeks to cancel
the original certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate of title, including the transfer of
certificate of title of the successors-in-interest because the same were all procured through fraud and
“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial
179
BABY 520 notes
misrepresentation. In cancelling and nullifying such title, it restores the public land fraudulently awarded
and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain. Such action is filed by
the OSG pursuant to its authority under the Administrative Code.
On the other hand, an action for annulment of free patents and certificates of title also seeks
for the cancellation and nullification of the certificate of title, but once the same is granted, it does not
operate to revert the property back to the State, but to its lawful owner. In such action, the nullity arises
not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the director of the Land Management Bureau had no
jurisdiction to bestow title; hence, the issued patent or certificate of title was void ab initio
Thus, the difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of
the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the
complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land, while in an action for annulment of patent
and certificate of title, pertinent allegations deal with plaintiff's ownership of the contested land prior to the
issuance of the same as well as defendant's fraud or mistake in successfully obtaining these documents
of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff
We hold that the action is one of annulment of patents and titles. The allegations in the
complaint show that respondent asserts its ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive
prescription.
Without going into the merits of the case, We hold that the allegations in the complaint
sufficiently show that respondent claims its ownership right by expounding on its uninterrupted possession
of the same for a period of at least 35 years. Also, respondent's claim of its possession in a public, peaceful
and uninterrupted manner constitutes an allegation of ownership by acquisitive prescription.
Being an action for annulment of patents and titles, it is the respondent who is the real party-
in-interest for it is the one claiming title or ownership adverse to that of the registered owner.
4. Republic vs. Heirs of Menardo Cabrera, 884 SCRA (2017)
SECOND DIVISION / November 8, 2017 / G.R. No. 218418 / CAGUIOA, J.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR,
REGION IV, MANILA, Petitioner vs. THE HEIRS OF MEYNARDO CABRERA, ET. AL., Respondent
RULING and DOCTRINE as written by the court
In this Petition, the Republic maintains that the Court's ruling in Animas did not have the effect
of making a positive executive act a necessary requirement for the purpose of proving the reclassification
of alienable and disposable land. Instead, the Republic posits that Animas affirms its right to institute
reversion proceedings in instances where portions of forest land are erroneously included within the scope
of land patents. Moreover, the Republic argues that in reversion proceedings, the State should not be
made to bear the burden of proving that the land in question constitutes public domain (i.e., forest land).
In any case, the Republic posits that the documentary and testimonial evidence it had presented
sufficiently proved such fact.
The Petition should be denied for lack of merit.
The CA did not err when it affirmed the RTC Decision, as the Republic failed to establish that
the Roxas Properties were classified as forest land at the time Free Patent No. 516197 was issued.
The Court's ruling in Animas does not apply to the present case.
While the Animas ruling upholds the State's right to seek reversion with respect to fraudulently
or erroneously registered lands, it does not, in any manner, lay down the facts that must be established
for an action for reversion to prosper. Undoubtedly, the RTC and CA's reliance on the Animas ruling is
misplaced.
Nevertheless, such erroneous reliance on Animas, as will be discussed below, does not
advance the Republic's cause, since the principle which serves as basis for the decisions of the
RTC and CA remains correct, albeit attributed to the wrong case.
 180
BABY 520 notes
In reversion proceedings, the State bears the burden of proving that the property in question
was inalienable
at the time it was decreed or adjudicated in favor of the defendant.
A land registration proceeding is the manner through which an applicant confirms title to real
property. In this proceeding, the applicant bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of State
ownership. Accordingly, the applicant is bound to establish, through incontrovertible evidence, that the
land sought to be registered had been declared alienable or disposable through a positive act of the State.
Conversely, reversion proceeding is the manner through which the State seeks to revert land
to the mass of the public domain;50 it is proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of
in favor of private individuals or corporations,51 or when a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act
which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system as they form
part of the public domain.52
Owing to the nature of reversion proceedings and the outcome which a favorable decision
therein entails, the State bears the burden to prove that the land previously decreed or adjudicated in favor
of the defendant constitutes land which cannot be owned by private individuals.
Thus, in Republic v. Espinosa55 (Espinosa), the Court held that the dismissal of the Republic's
action for reversion is proper since the Republic failed to establish that the land subject thereof was
classified as forest land at the time the cadastral decree in favor of the defendant was issued:
In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud nor
misrepresentation in the cadastral proceedings and in the issuance of the title in Espinosa's
favor. The argument for the State is merely that the property was unlawfully included in the
certificate of title because it is of the public domain.
Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration, the burden is
on the State to prove that the property was classified as timberland or forest land at the time it
was decreed to Espinosa. To reiterate, there is no burden on [the present owner] to prove that
the property in question is alienable and disposable land. At this stage, it is reasonable to
presume that Espinosa, from whom [the present owner] derive[s] her title, had already
established that the property is alienable and disposable land considering that she succeeded
in obtaining the OCT over it. In this reversion proceeding, the State must prove that there was
an oversight or mistake in the inclusion of the property in Espinosa's title because it was of
public dominion. This is consistent with the rule that the burden of proof rests on the party who,
as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an
issue.56 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, to resolve this Petition, the Court must determine whether the documentary and
testimonial evidence offered by the Republic are sufficient to sustain its cause.
The Complaint should be dismissed
Ultimately, the Republic failed to prove that the Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-A) were
classified as forest land when they were decreed in Meynardo's favor in 1971. Thus, in accordance with
the Court's ruling in Development Resources Corporation and Espinosa, the present Petition must be, as
it is hereby, denied.

“I am cruel to you only to be kind”-Atty. Brondial