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Bruce Bienenstock

Tamy Chapman

Documented Essay

5 July 2016

We Are Not Alone

What makes a human, a human? Are we a completely unique kind of being compared to

other animals in the world? Are we well served to think this is so, and, that we are surrounded

by beasts whose nature is cruel and frightening? Are other animals only driven by what have

been termed instincts and lack an essence which makes us distinctive in comparison to them?

Though indeed in many ways we do indeed seem to be quantitatively singular, this essay will

support the thesis that virtually all of the qualities that been in the past been thought to be only

found in humans can be challenged by science. Although every notable trait shared between

humans and other animals cannot be focused up in an essay of this length, it will show that these

hypotheses about Homo sapiens are either baseless, can be disproven, or are untestable. In the

midst of the essay we will take an evolutionary psychological viewpoint. We will see the

wonder of evolutionary development, with its overwhelming beauty and complexity. The essay

will show how many of our characteristics are shared by our primate cousins.

While speech and language are certainly most richly developed in humans how do other

animals compare to us? No other species exhibits the verbal and non-verbal dexterity of which

we are capable. Human language may well have first been spoken, that is the first kind(s) of

speech, or even chanted. When those early benchmarks were achieved, they likely gave those

who possessed them, a competitive advantage in food gathering, and subsequently in social as

well as generative superiority. How then, given this achievement, can the abilities of other
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animals be taken seriously. We must begin with other primates (a mammal group that includes

lemurs, bush babies, tarsiers, marmosets, monkeys, apes and humans) to see if they exhibit the

key characteristics of human language. Thus, Fedureck and Slocombe reported that “many of the

cognitive capabilities involved in language processing are much older than language itself, with

their phylogenetic roots deep in the primate lineage” and they also referenced (Hauser). They

stated that using a “comparative approach is vital for identifying the homologous, shared

elements of language which appear to have evolved gradually from a common primate ancestor

and those which have no clear evolutionary path and thus may be the “novel” elements which

were instrumental to human language evolving into its current uniquely complex state” (Hauser).

Further, “Although no other primate is equipped with speech apparatus as sophisticated as the

one found in humans, comparative data from nonhuman primates have been central to furthering

our understanding of speech evolution (Fitch, Ghazanfar and Hauser, Riede et al.). They note

further that “It is important to highlight that facial expressions, body postures, manual gestures,

and olfaction play important roles in primate communication and that communication signals are

often composites of two or more of these different modalities. In this way focusing exclusively

on vocal communication is telling only part of the story.” Again, putting human speech and

language into perspective they observe that “Comparative data on primate gestural and vocal

communication are often used to argue whether the origin of human language was vocal or

gestural (Arbib, Riede, Tomasello, Zuberbühler). Tomasello wrote, “Both modalities

demonstrate some aspects of continuity with language, with great apes being learnt, generative,

and intentional signals,” while Zuberbühler described how “monkey vocalizations [were]

functioning referentially and [were] being combined into sequences.” Thus, while undoubtedly
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human language is profoundly more elaborated, in terms of words, phrases, sentences all

carrying meaning, other primates show evidence of an ancestry from which both descended.

Perhaps as a short aside, on the other hand, speech and language, though often treated

synonymously, indeed are not. Birds, and seals show the ability to mimic words, while our

genetically closest relatives, the great apes, never show this ability. In the evolution of our

species, the confluence of speech and its place in language abilities is distinctly impressive.

Writing of the vocal learning of birds, Pfenning and colleagues reported that “Song-

learning birds and humans share independently evolved similarities in brain pathways for vocal

learning that are essential for song and speech and are not found in most other species.

Comparisons of brain transcriptomes [RNA] of song-learning birds and humans’ relative to vocal

non-learners identified convergent gene expression specialization in specific song and speech

brain regions in avian vocal learners and humans. The strongest shared profiles relate bird motor

and striatal song-learning nuclei, respectively, with human laryngeal motor cortex and parts of

the striatum that control speech production and learning. Thus, convergent behavior and neural

connectivity for a complex trait are associated with convergent specialized expression of

multiple genes.” In the journal Science, Sarah C. Williams described how neurobiologists were

attempting to understand why different birds, including parrot’s songbirds and hummingbirds,

pick up new songs and mimic them. She wrote that in the study, birds showed that a specific

gene was involved with specific nuclei of their brains. At times one aspect of the nucleus was

active, at another, the other or inner shell of the nucleus. She found that the larger the outer shell

of the nucleus, the greater the ability of imitating sounds. Further, even Mustached bats show

“acoustic elements and syntax in communication” (Kanwal, et al). Therefore, we see that while

the ability of humans to use speech, both verbal and non-verbal in its many manifestations is
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unique in regard to all other animals, it both mirrors in some ways the behavior of other animals

and in addition seems to have evolutionary antecedents visible in our closest primate relatives.

We could not see without eyes and the brain tracts leading from them to the occipital

cortex. We could not hear, without the elaborate structures of our ears and the neural tracts

leading from them to the primary auditory cortex. We could not speak, without having the

elaborate vocal musculature but also the Broca area in the frontal lobe of our brains. We could

not perceive the complexities of our environment without the associative cortex of the human

brain. What about ethics and morality? Judao-Christian-Islamic religions suggest that without

them, we could not be empathic, nor ethical, nor moral. Is there evidence that our closest genetic

relatives, other primates, without the benefit of organized religions show evidence of these traits?

If there were an evolutionary underpinning to empathy and morality, we might expect it in our

primate relatives. So, for instance, do chimpanzees show generosity towards other chimps?

Apparently so, as in an article by Helen Fields who reported on research at Emory University,

using experimental models based on the chimpanzee perspective. “Chimps picked the token [in a

token choosing experiment] that gave them and their partners a piece of banana between 53%

and 67% of the time [significantly more frequently if they only wanted the banana for

themselves].” The conclusion which was drawn from this experiment so briefly described here,

was that “this kind of generosity isn’t a uniquely human trait.” In fact, the primary researcher

“thinks humans should get over the idea that we have abilities that no other animals have.” An

aspect of empathy, ethics and morality it the ability to cooperate. In a study at the Yerkes

National Primate Research Center involving 11 untrained and unconstrained chimpanzees, the

result was that “the chimpanzees in this study spontaneously solved the cooperation tasks and

were extremely successful under both dyadic and triadic conditions. The high success rate, with a
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total of 3,565 completed cooperative acts (an average of 36 per one-hour session), confirms

observations in our complex open environments that typically tested (Suchak). Further, using the

common behavioral measure of contagious yawning as a measure of involuntary empathy,

Campbell and de Waal found that chimpanzees responded to familiar and unfamiliar humans at

the same rate as with in-group or familiar chimpanzees. The animals did not have this reaction to

a species of baboon, leading to the conclusion that there was no positive social interaction with

those familiar humans and chimpanzees. Further, a group of unfamiliar chimpanzees also did not

elicit this spontaneous reaction. The authors concluded that “The different responses to the

familiar stimuli further support the idea that CY (contagious yawning) is socially modulated, and

thus serves as a measure of empathic engagement with the stimulus” (Campbell and de Waal).

Interestingly, in his book review of Pfaff’s The Altruistic Brain: How we are Naturally Good, de

Waal stated that “Science is increasingly looking at the prosocial side of human behavior,

realizing that it must be more than a product of education, culture, and religion. Instead of a thin

veneer that we risk losing at any moment, it seems that the seeds of morality may be contained in

human nature.” In addition, he wrote, “As moral tendencies have been documented in human

babies as well as our primate relatives, they don’t seem to require language, or religious

dogmas.” Lastly, in his response to Atheistic Critics of his work, de Waal wrote movingly that

“Morality promotes cooperation, it asks us to put our personal interests on the back-burner and

work for the common good. It is a complex system that religion and philosophy have tried to

capture in simple rules (such as the Golden Rule or the Ten Commandments), but these rules

provide only imperfect summaries. We like to think of morality as top down, but this is merely a

left-over of the story of God on the mountain top. There is no evidence that it started as a top

down system, only as part of belief systems. Science is, rather, coming around to the Humean
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view of morality guided by intuitions and passions. Looking at other primates, we recognize

many of the same tendencies that underlie our morality, such as rules of reciprocity, empathy and

sympathy, a sense of fairness, and the need to get along. Monkeys, for example, object to unfair

distribution of resources, and chimpanzees do each other favors even if there is nothing in it for

themselves. Bonobos are probably the most empathetic animals of all, and the recent genome

data places them extremely close to us. Therefore, just from these few among hundreds of

studies, there is support that there appears to be an evolutionary element to empathy, sympathy

and morality, whose manifestations appears in our closest primate relatives.

Are humans the only animals who show evidence of acculturation? Obviously,

whomever one has as a friend, acquaintance, or loved-one, it is known that the other person grew

up in a particular social milieu with many unique characteristics. What can science tell us about

this issue in other primates? Vogel described work several studies in this area, in the midst of

delineating how the word culture is used. Thus, “Most people think of culture as encompassing

such uniquely human skills as language, music, art, and clothing style. But some biologists have

a simpler definition: any behaviors common to a population that are learned from fellow group

members rather than inherited though genes. By this generous definition, bird song dialects and

the calls of whales qualify as animal “culture.” Many anthropologists stick to a narrower

definition, requiring culture to include language and whole systems of behavior. But in the past

decade, a growing number of primatologists and psychologists have sought to have it potentially

changed, and then seek these behaviors observed in the wild, and in labs. They are turning up

increasing evidence that nonhuman primates, in particular chimpanzees, may have a particular

type of culture that bridges the gap between the two definitions. Their argument rests on two

main kinds of evidence: examples in which one chimp learns from another, and the results of
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such learning-the seemingly arbitrary differences in habits between chimpanzee groups at

different sites. Although most examples of “culture” among animals involve just one or two

behaviors, chimpanzees have dozens of learned behaviors involving tool use, social customs, and

calls. However, this all has to be put into context before conceding to the allegations,” he wrote.

“Of course, no primate society can build a mud hut or do any other of a number of other tasks

that are relatively easy for humans to master. Some researchers argue that that is because our

primate cousins do not learn as we do, by imitation and instruction. And most agree that primates

don’t seem to be able to build on previous inventions, an ability that is the hallmark of human

culture. Therefore, again, in this short exploration of whether our primate cousins show the

rudiments of what were thought to be solely human characteristics, we do in fact see that they

share more than was ever thought of, in the past.

When we think about language as an aspect of culture, we are faced with similar

questions and a new set of questions and data. In 1992 Vogel noted that primatologist John

Mitani of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, reported that different chimpanzee groups

have distinct pant-hoot patterns and pitch, suggesting the possibility of learning chimpanzee

“dialects.” But Pepper and Mitani reported in 1999 that those differences correlated with such

factors as average body size, and so might be genetic rather than “cultural” in origin. To clarify

this, Whiten and colleagues studied calls in two captive groups where chimps from a mix of wild

populations live together. In spite of the mixture of genetic backgrounds, each colony had a style

of pant-hoot. As part of that group, Wringham stated, “This is some of the best evidence of

learning vocalization.” Indeed, he noted, “it is difficult to think of an alternative hypothesis

here.” Also, other scientists have studied the extent to which chimpanzees learn their grunts.

Using the summary of Watson, et al findings, Wrangham wrote, “One standout feature of human
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language is our ability to reference external objects and events with socially learned symbols, or

words. Exploring the phylogenetic origins of the capacity is therefore key to a comprehensive

understanding of the evolution of language. While non-human primates can produce

vocalizations that refer to external objects in the environment, it is generally accepted that their

acoustic structure is fixated and a product of arousal states. Indeed, it has been argued that the

apparent lack of flexible control over the structure of referential vocalizations represents a key

discontinuity with language. Here, we demonstrate vocal learning in the acoustic structure of

referential grunts in captive chimpanzees. We found that, following the integration of two groups

of adult chimpanzees, the acoustic structure of referential food grunts produced for a specific

food converged over 3 years. Acoustic convergence arose independently of preference for food,

and social network analyses indicated this only occurred after strong affiliative relationships

were established between the original subgroups. We argue that these data represent the first

evidence of non-human animals actively modifying and socially learning the structure of a

meaningful referential vocalization from conspecifics. Our findings indicate that primate

referential call structure is not simply determined by arousal and that the socially learned nature

of referential words in humans likely has ancient evolutionary origins.

To summarize, this essay supports the thesis that by using an evolutionary psychological

viewpoint we can view underlying components of human behavior in several animals, most

commonly our primate cousins. This essay uses the work of many scientist’s work, to support

the thesis. In an arena so broad, it is impossible to discuss any one aspect in depth, but only to

support arguments made by the author of this essay. The essay is not meant to contradict belief

systems, but to suggest scientific arguments and data in support of them which are testable.
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Works Cited

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Anthropology. 2008. 49(6): 1053-1076. Web. 28 June 2016.

Campbell, M.W., and de Waal, F.B.M. Chimpanzees empathize with group mates and humans,

but not with baboons or unfamiliar chimpanzees. Proceedings of the Royal Society Biological

Sciences. 11 March 2014. Web. 20 June 2016.

de Waal, F.B.M. Primatologist Frans de Waal Responds to His New Atheist Critics. THIS VIEW

OF LIFE. 30 March 2013. Web. 8 May 2016.

Fedureck, P., and K.E. Slocombe. Primate Vocal Communication: A Useful Tool for

Understanding Human Speech and Language Evolution? Human Biology. 2011.83(2):153-

173.Web. 1 July 2016.

Fields, H. Lab Chimps Extend a Helping Hand. Science. 8 Aug. 2011. Web. 23 June 2016
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Fitch, W.T. The Evolution of Speech: a comparative review. Trends in cognitive sciences. 2000.

Web. 28 June 2016.

Ghazanfar, A.A. and M.D. Hauser. The neuroethology of primate vocal communication:

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Hauser, M.D. The Evolution of Nonhuman Primate Vocalizations: Effects of Phylogeny, Body

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Kanwal, J.S. et al. Analysis of acoustic elements and syntax in communication sounds emitted by

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Mitani, JC et al. Dialects in Wild Chimpanzees? American Journal of Primatology. 3 June 2005.

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Pfenning, A.R. et al. Convergent transcriptional specializations in the brains of humans and

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Riede, T. et al. Vocal production mechanisms in non-human primate: morphological data and a

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