CRIMINAL & FAMILY LAW: THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHERS

SUMMARY:

Thomas Aquinas believes that civil and penal laws are necessary. As a social animal, we need
civil law to determine on how we deal with others and we need penal law to keep us virtuous.
Punishment is needed to those who are deprived and prone to vice and also to be restrained from evil
by force or fear.

We have various tendencies and environment. As penal law exists in our society, it forces us to
do what is virtuous and resist us from doing unlawful act until it becomes our second nature. When
people conform to it, they will start living as if there is no law needed since there is already an agreement
with the law.

Aquinas defines two types of justice, Distributive justice and Rectificatory justice. For Aquinas
justice should be equitable treatment on what others deserves by natural or contractual/positive rights.
This doctrine is under the Equal protection clause.
Restitution and Retribution
Restitution is a commutative justice where giving back what is taken. This can be made either
repayment of the equivalent or by compensation. In the Revised Penal Code (RPC) Articles 104 to 107,
value of restitution is determined by court. Retribution is an exemplary punishment which is perceived
“evil” by the offenders so that they refrain from breaking the law to avoid the penalty. Although
punishment is perceived as evil but it is for the common good of the community.
Conditions of Criminal Liability
According to Aquinas, voluntary and involuntary of actions must be taken into consideration
when judging a liability. This principle is also followed by RPC under 3 and 4 where a criminal act
must be performed and not only intended. Also, according to Aquinas, violence and fear can cause
involuntariness of actions where violence is externally compelled contrary to one’s will and while fear
is to avoid the evil feared. Under Article 12 of RPC, irresistible force and uncontrollable fear is
considered as an exempting circumstance in criminal liability.

Ignorance also causes involuntariness but Aquinas specifically defined those three which are:
1. Antecedent ignorance, 2. Concomitant and 3. Consequent ignorance.
Karol Wojtyla’s Talk About Sex: On Love and Responsibility (Synopsis)
Love and Responsibility (LR) caused a sensation when it was first published in the original
Polish for discussing taboo topics on sensuality, unsatisfied wives faking orgasms, how to make natural
family planning work, and the importance of mutual sexual climax. To top it all, it was written by a
cleric. LR was written when Wojtyla, later Pope John Paul II, was a philosophy lecturer on
phenomenology and existentialism.

Pleasure is natural and good, but it is not the highest good. Love is the fullest realization of the
possibilities of man. Because of love, one expects and discovers more from oneself because of the
affirmation of the other. Wojtyla spoke of “altero-centrism,” saying that the sexual instinct moves the
“I” of the instinct of self-preservation to the “I” of another (L.R., 65).

A fully developed sexual relationship is only possible in a durable union where total self-giving
is encouraged. This is not the case in cohabitation and in “trial” marriages, which are conditional and
indicate that the couple is not ready for a long-term commitment. The commitment of monogamy in
marriage is necessary “to signify the maturity of the union between a man and a woman, to testify that
theirs is a love on which a lasting union and community can be based, a family can rightly be found
(L.R., 220).

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 Dovetailing of Church and State
The separation of church and state has always been a major issue in Philippine society and
politics. Given the strong influence of western culture, the tide of national consciousness has been
deviating from its neighbors. Hence, the separation of church and state is not just an idea known by
most schooled Filipinos. It is a mandate given by the constitution that the separation of church and state
shall be inviolable (Sec. 6, Art. II).

However, separation is not absolute. In most cases, the church and the state exist
interdependently in pursuit of the common good. The Philippine Constitution advocates the second
profane autonomy model, which affirms that there is a demarcation line between the church and the
state, geared towards independent co-existence. While this is mostly acceptable by Filipino Christians,
Muslim Filipinos hardly accept this because it has no widely acceptable hierarchy of politics nor
organized clergy. Nevertheless, Eastern philosophy, from which both Islam and Christianity take root,
dovetails the church and state by weaving together matter and spirit. This explains why in all affairs of
the state through the years, whether in lawmaking or execution, the church remained as the state’s
greatest counterpart, advocate, and interpellator.
Separation of Church and State
The separation of the Church and State in the Philippines has been wanting because the Filipino
consciousness has started with the belief of gods or anitos as manifested by their animistic practices.
Such lack of separation has been subsequently strengthened by foreign influences from the Spanish and
Americans, which introduced formal religions in the country. The first Philippine government which
was established by the Katipuneros did not consider to separate the Church and State but they desired
to establish a Filipinized church. During the drafting of the first Filipino Constitution in Malolos,
Bulacan, the framers had a long debate on the proposal of separation of the Church and State. The
separation was approved by a margin of only one vote.

The U.S. Supreme Court first used the words “separation of Church and State” in a case in 1879
by Chief Justice Warren Burger. Such separation actually means “neutrality” or specifically,
“benevolent neutrality”. The separation clause enshrined in the First Amendment in order to limit the
government from following European countries that established official religions. However, the
Amendment has misinterpreted the separation clause as a way to limit religion such that there are people
who use this principle in order to censor morality in the U.S. government. Philip Hamburger, columnist
of the New Yorker, contended that the separation and union of the Church and State are
overgeneralizations between which lies much middle ground.

Both the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions of the Philippines have adopted the doctrine of the
separation of Church and State. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, said that the separation clause means (1) the government will not establish any religion,
and (2) every citizen shall enjoy freedom of conscience. The Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution in
Article III, Section 5 provides that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” These Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses show the
limitation forced upon the government to not to impose a religion or not to impose on religion. The
popular opinion for Church and State “indifference” is not the intention of the Constitution. Jorge
Coquia, an International Law authority, proposed a more realistic concept of “the distinction and
cooperation of Church and State” because the principle of separation is loaded and invites hostility
between the Church and State, instead of engaging these two entities to cooperate and work together
for the common good and general welfare of the Filipino people.
Reporters: Sources:

Alic, Alvin Kris B. Philawsophia: Philosophy and Theory of Law by

Castro, Zion May Y. Nicolo Fernando and Oscar Bernardo
Entila, Rosenri V. Cases: eSCRA, pdfcoffee.com
Marañon, Carlo C.

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ANALYSIS:

1. What do you think is the most important contribution of this theory in the conception and
development of laws (in general)?

a. Thomas Aquinas has explained the need for penal laws in order to either positively
reinforce people to obey the laws or to punish those who opt not to follow such laws. He
also defined justice which also has been adopted especially in equal protection clause of
the Constitution.
b. The contribution of the late Philosopher-Theologian Karol Wojtyla concerning the Family
Law in the eyes of Christian teachings. He pointed out to the profound spirituality that
embody the teachings of the Church concerning Love, Responsibility, Family, Sexual
Relationship, and anti-life approaches of contraceptives, divorce and abortion.
c. The dovetailing of the Church and the State makes the development of the law socially
constructive and culturally relevant. The development and impairment of the law are
related to the development and decline of the people. There is therefore a mutual
relationship between the people and the laws. While the separation must remain
inviolable, the state should always recognize the church’s involvement in the
development of laws for the good of society.
d. The doctrine of the separation of Church and State has influenced the application of the
free exercise of religion to the treatment of criminal liabilities. Though the right to
freedom of religion cannot be used in order to avoid compliance with the penal laws, this
right cannot be ignored in resolving cases which involve a conflict between religious
liberty and a general law that imposes a burden in the exercise of such right.

2. How did this theory affect or influence the formation and development of the current Philippine
legal system?

a. The principles laid down by Thomas Aquinas such as restitution and retribution, defining
and treating criminal liabilities among others have influenced the framers of the penal
laws in the Philippines.
b. The theory of Karol Wojtyla about the sacredness of human life from conception up to the
time of natural death, has influenced even our framers of the 1987 Philippine Constitution,
that guaranteed the protection of the life of both the mother and the unborn from the time
of conception up to its natural death.
c. Today when the Philippine Law has repealed the Death Penalty, our Law also reflects that
of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, that says, although death penalty has been in the
teachings of the Catholic Church since the early times, yet, if it is possible not to impose it
through modern means of containing and reforming those who have committed serious
crimes, then, be it so. It is consistent with the pro-life and pro-family moral teachings of
the Catholic Church.
d. To a high extent, the formation and development of the Philippine legal system have been
highly influenced by the dovetailing of the church and the state. During the passage of R.H.
Law (RA 10354) and even the classic case of the Rizal Law (RA 1425), the church has
played an essential role in developing the bill into a law that conforms with the moral values
of the people. Moreover, numerous judicial precedents justify the dovetailing of the church
and the state, for as much as its separation is inviolable, its interdependence is unavoidable.
e. The Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution in Article III, Section 5 provides for the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses in accordance with the doctrine of the separation
of Church and State. The government has been limited to intervene in the religious liberty
of the people since then as well as providing exemptions in certain cases where the
government is prohibited from imposing undue burden on the exercise of religion.

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CASE DIGESTS

LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998

FACTS :

On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse’s ten year
old daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the constitutionality of RA 7659 “
The Death Penalty Law”, and the imposition of death penalty for the crime of rape. The motions were
denied with the court finding no reason to declare it unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress
compliant with the requirements for its imposition.

Act 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The
mode of execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice
promulgated the rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and directed the Director of Bureau of
Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of Justice
and Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending that RA 8177 and its
implementing rules are unconstitutional and void. The Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City and
Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104 were later impleaded to enjoin them from setting a date of
execution.

On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the parties to
mantain status quo . Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status quo and to request for TRO
until resolution of the petition.

The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the RA in
question is unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his contention. CHR filed a motion
for Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae alleging that the death penalty is cruel
and degrading citing applicable provisions and statistics showing how other countries have abolished
the death penalty and how some have become abolitionists in practice . Petitioner filed a reply stating
that lethal injection is cruel, degrading , inhuman and violative of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.

ISSUE :

Whether or not R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules are violative of the unconstitutional
proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment, violative of international treaty and
obligations , discriminatory and an undue delegation of legislative powers.

RULING :

I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER

SECTION 19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes the imposition of "cruel,
degrading or inhuman" punishment. This is the challenge thrown at RA 8177 and its implementing rules
and regulations.

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 Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs and dosage to be used in
carrying out lethal injection and the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering
the drugs rendering lethal injection inherently cruel.
The court explains that any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the
execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give
pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all
punishments are cruel. The Constitution, however, does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go
unpunished."

II.REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL

TREATY OBLIGATIONS

Petitioner disputes that the reimposition of the death penalty law violates the International
Covenant on Civil And Political Rights, which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on December 16, 1996, signed and ratified by the Philippines on December 19, 1966 and
October 23, 1986, respectively.

Although Article 6 of said covenant highlights an individual’s right to life, it also particularly
recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to life, subject to the limitation
that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".
The petitioner's assertion of our obligation under the Second Optional Protocol has gone astray since
dates and circumstances related to its adoption prove that the Philippines neither signed nor ratified said
document.

III. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION
19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.

The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system of government and each
department has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. A consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation
of powers. In Latin maxim, the rule is : potestas delegata non delegari potest." (what has been delegated,
cannot be delegated). There are however exceptions to this rule and one of the recognized exceptions
is “ Delegation to Administrative Bodies “

The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal
injection.

The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity
of the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.

The court denied the petition to declare RA 8177 unconstitutional but declared Sections 17 and
19 invalid for being in contravention with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
25 of the Republic Act No. 7659. Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal
Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential, hence
unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict and counsel.

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 LEOUEL SANTOS
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019. January 4, 1995

FACTS:

First Lieutenant Leouel Santos, of the Philippine Army, met Julia. On September 20, 1986, the
two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court of Iloilo City. It was then followed by a church
wedding. The couple lived in Julia’s parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On July 18,
1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. Due to the frequent
interference of Julia’s parents in their affairs, Leouel averred. Frequently, the couple would also start a
“quarrel” over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living
independently from Julia’s parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel’s spending
a few days with his own parents.

On May 18, 1988, Julia finally left for the US to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s disagreement
to her decision. Seven months after her departure, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long
distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She
never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, from April up to August 1990, he
desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros
Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for “Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code”
(docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Negros Oriental.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with
him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts that there is no leave and there
is no affection for him because Julia failed all these years to communicate with him. A wife who does
not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is
psychologically incapacitated.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the failure to communicate and inform her husband about her whereabouts for
a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.

Relationally, whether or not the definition of the church (Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of
the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila [Branch 1]) on psychological incapacity conforms to the intent of
the family code and its implementation in the case at hand.

RULING:

Art. 36 of the Family code affirms that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.

More so, the definition of psychological incapacity which must be characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability and that it must be grave or serious does not coincide with the
facts of the case at bench.

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 The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the
specific answers to every individual problem. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR

A.M. No. P-02-1651. June 22, 2006

Puno, J.:

FACTS:

In a sworn-letter complaint dated July 27, 2000, complainant Alejandro Estrada requested
Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, for
an investigation of respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, for living with a man
not her husband, and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor
is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to
remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Consequently, respondent
was charged with committing “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI,
Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code.

Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a
widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio,
Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but
living with another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. But as a member of the
religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society,
respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has
the approval of her congregation. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28,
1991, a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.” For Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Declaration allows
members of the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations.
The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the
world except in countries where divorce is allowed.

As laid out by the tenets of their faith, the Jehovah’s congregation requires that at the time the
declarations are executed, the couple cannot secure the civil authorities’ approval of the marital
relationship because of legal impediments. Only couples who have been baptized and in good standing
may execute the Declaration, which requires the approval of the elders of the congregation. As a matter
of practice, the marital status of the declarants and their respective spouses’ commission of adultery are
investigated before the declarations are executed. Escritor and Quilapio’s Declarations were executed
in the usual and approved form prescribed by the Jehovah’s Witnesses. These were approved by elders
of the congregation and recorded in the Watch Tower Central Office.

Moreover, the Jehovah’s congregation believes that once all legal impediments for the couple
are lifted, the validity of the Declarations ceases, and the couple should legalize their union. In Escritor’s
case, although she was widowed in 1998, thereby lifting the legal impediment to marry on her part, her
mate was still not capacitated to remarry. Thus, their Declarations remained valid. In sum, therefore,
insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement
between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the congregation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the Separation of Church and
State Doctrine are applicable in the case involving “disgraceful and immoral conduct” of a Jehovah’s
Witness.

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RULING:

Yes, the “disgraceful and immoral conduct” case of a Jehovah’s Witness can be resolved by
applying the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. In the Supreme Court’s (SC) decision dated
August 4, 2003, it remanded the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), and ordered
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to intervene in the case so it can: examine the sincerity and
centrality of respondent’s claimed religious belief and practice; present evidence on the State’s
“compelling interest” to override respondent’s religious belief and practice; and show that the means
the State adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent’s religious freedom.

After a long and arduous scrutiny into the origins and development of the religion clauses in
the United States (U.S.) and the Philippines, the Court held that in resolving claims involving religious
freedom (1) benevolent neutrality or accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit,
intent and framework underlying the religion clauses in our Constitution; and (2) in deciding
respondent’s “plea of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause” (from the law with which the
respondent is administratively charged), it is the compelling State interest test, the strictest test, which
must be applied.

The Solicitor General argued against respondent’s religious freedom on the basis of morality,
i.e., that “the conjugal arrangement of respondent and her live-in partner should not be condoned
because adulterous relationships are constantly frowned upon by society”; and “that State laws on
marriage, which are moral in nature, take clear precedence over the religious beliefs and practices of
any church, religious sect or denomination on marriage. Verily, religious beliefs and practices should
not be permitted to override laws relating to public policy such as those of marriage.”

In the said Decision, the Supreme Court noted that Justice Ynares-Santiago’s dissenting opinion
dwelt more on the standards of morality, without categorically holding that religious freedom is not in
issue. The SC, therefore, went into a discussion on morality, in order to show that among others: the
public morality expressed in the law is necessarily secular rather than religious. The religion clauses
prohibit the State from establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions; and although the
morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling State interests.

With the settled jurisprudence, the respondent’s conduct constitutes “disgraceful and immoral
conduct”. However, the case at bar involves the defense of religious freedom, therefore none of the
cases cited by Justice Ynares-Santiago apply.

There is no jurisprudence in Philippine jurisdiction holding that the defense of religious

freedom of a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses under the same circumstances as respondent will not
prevail over the laws on adultery, concubinage or some other law. The Court cannot summarily
conclude therefore that her conduct is likewise so “odious” and “barbaric” as to be immoral and
punishable by law. In this case, the government’s conduct may appear innocent and nondiscriminatory
but in effect, it is oppressive to the minority. In the interpretation of a document, such as the Bill of
Rights, designed to protect the minority from the majority, the question of which perspective is
appropriate would seem easy to answer.

As previously discussed, our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, in
arguing that respondent should be held administratively liable as the arrangement she had was “illegal
per se because, by universally recognized standards, it is inherently or by its very nature bad, improper,
immoral and contrary to good conscience,” the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to appreciate that
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does
not offend compelling State interests.

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 Finally, even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling State interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the State has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not
infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the State, i.e., it has chosen a way
to achieve its legitimate State end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties. Again, the
Solicitor General utterly failed to prove this element of the test. Thus, the Supreme Court find that in
this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement
cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental
right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that State interests must be upheld in order that
freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. Therefore, the administrative complaint
against Soledad Escritor involving disgraceful and immoral conduct was dismissed.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TEODORO DE LA CRUZ Y TOJOS, ET AL.,

No. L-52. February 21, 1946

FACTS:
At about 8:30PM, on July 25, 1945, Dr. Gregorio was about to close his drug store when 4
armed men with revolvers got near him, stuck a revolver over his ribs and pushed him inside and
instructed everyone to lie down while facing the floor. One remained to watch the door, the other one
remained to kept watch of the persons lying down instructing the people that anyone who will raise
their head will be shot and while the remaining 2 robbers went upstairs and were able to get 200 from
the cash registrar, 7,000 pesos in bills, 500 in silver coins and a diamond ring worth 300 pesos.
The appellant denies the crime since he said that can’t remember where he was during the
time of robbery whether he was at home or at Felix Huertas. He mentioned that he lives by selling
bread, shoes, pomade and other things in the market and admits that he gambles.
Dr. Gregorio Sison and his wife Luz Mendoza Sison identified and singled out the appellant
amongst of the 4 offenders. Even Detective Alejandro Eugenio testified after the re-enactment has
been made at the drug store bringing the appellant, Dr. Gregorio Sison and Luz Mendoza Sison was
still able to identify the appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty should be imposed is higher than prision correctional.
RULING:
The Supreme Court cited Aquinas theory on this ruling. With the elimination of the penalty of
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, as recommended by the prosecution (case 3, article 39,
Penal Code), we affirm the decision of the lower court. The correction of form suggested by the
Solicitor General to the effect that the designation of prisión correccional used in the lower court's
decision must be read as prisión mayor, being an evident lapsus plumae. does not need from us any
specific pronouncement. The costs in this instance 'shall be taxed against appellant.

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