DOJ OPINION NO. 063, s.
2006 For these reasons, and considering that the PNP and/or the DILG are better
September 11, 2006
Congressman Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon
Rm. S-506 House of Representatives
Batasan Pambansa Complex
Quezon City
Sir:
This refers to your request for opinion on the effectivity and validity of Letter of
Instructions (LOI) No. 1264 banning the importation, manufacture, distribution,
sale and display of certain types of toy firearms and explosives and on the manner
of repealing an LOI. AaSTIH
Your request, it appears, relates to the Implementing Rules and Regulations
governing the sale, possession and carrying of air rifles/pistols, dated January 29,
1992, which, you claim, have been amended by the Philippine National Police-
Firearms and Explosives Division.
We take it that you want to be advised on the effect of said amendment on the
implementation of LOI No. 1264.
With regret, this Department has to decline to render the opinion requested. In the
instant case, we note that both the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), who exercise
administrative control and/or supervision over the office that allegedly issued the
amendment to subject IRR, have yet to issue or express any ruling or opinion on the
issues herein presented. While this Department is willing to give legal assistance to
the Honorable Congressman in the resolution of difficult questions, official courtesy
and sound administrative practice demand that the above-named government
officials should first be accorded the opportunity to consider and pass upon the
issues raised. Apart from the fact that the Secretary of Justice does not have
administrative supervision over the PNP, hence, revisory authority over the acts or
omissions thereof, the issues herein raised involves matters which are within the
policy-sphere and jurisdiction of said offices IcHDCS
situated to translate or transcribe the intent and policy behind this enactment and,
thus, can give proper meaning and effect to such intent and policy, 1 it is suggested
that the matters raised herein be first elevated to the PNP Chief and/or the DILG
Secretary.
Nevertheless, for your information and guidance only, the Supreme Court, in the
case Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 2 stated:
Letters of Instructions are the orders by the President to specific government
officials directing or authorizing the doing of certain things, or laying guidelines to
be complied with for the effective implementation of a law. Examples are Letters of
Instructions No. 2 ordering the Secretary of National Defense to take over the
management, control and operation of public utilities, and No. 65 directing
compliance with certain guidelines for the full implementation of the tax amnesty
on previously untaxed income under Presidential Decree No. 23, as amended.
ACETSa
They have also been issued to announce and order designations to certain positions
(e.g., L.I. No. 87) and to announce the approval and effectivity of programs, plans
(e.g., L.I. No. 64, 66), or recommendations (e.g., L.I. No. 91 approving NEDA
recommendation for the salary structure of the staffing pattern of the NEDA)
requiring the approval of the President . . . . They have also been issued to repeal
modify or amend laws (e.g., L.I. No. 1054 which amended Sec. 268 of the National
Internal Revenue Code by deleting bowling alleys as among those subject to tax). 3
In the case of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, 4 the same Court, resolving the issue of
whether a presidential issuance under the 1973 Constitution may be considered a
law, also clarified:
To form part of the law of the land, the decree, order or LOI must be issued by the
President in the exercise of his extraordinary power of legislation as contemplated
in Section 6 of the 1976 Amendments to the Constitution, whenever in his
judgment there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or
whenever the interim Batasan Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or
is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment
requires immediate action . . . . Verily, not all LOI issued by the President should be
dignified into forming part of the law of the land. 5

Moreover, in the earlier cited Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. case,
the Court even reiterated that "(u)nlike Presidential Decrees which by usage have
gained acceptance as laws promulgated by the President, Letters of Instruction are
presumed to be mere administrative issuances except when the conditions set out
in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile exist." 6 And, in the more recent consolidated case of
Polland Industrial Limited vs. National Development Company, 7 the Court stressed
— Finally, on the issue of repeal of a presidential issuance, DOJ Opinion No. 47, s.
Only when issued under any of the two circumstances will a decree, order or letter
be qualified as having the force and effect of law. The decree or instruction should
have been issued either when there existed a grave emergency or threat or
imminence or when the Legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on the
matter. The qualification that there exists a grave emergency or threat or
imminence thereof must be interpreted to refer to the prevailing peace and order
conditions because the particular purpose the President was authorized to assume
legislative powers was to address the deteriorating peace and order situation
during the martial law period. TDcAaH
Under the 1987 Constitution, the status of said LOI, among others, is clear, thus:
SEC. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked. 8
Likewise, in the case of Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113, it was held:
In terms of their duration and effect, statutes may be permanent and indefinite or
temporary. Temporary statutes are those that, according to their provisions, are in
force only for a limited period, and they terminate upon the expiration of the term
therein stated or upon the occurrence of certain events. No repealing statute is
necessary to bring a temporary law to an end. IEaCDH
The vast majority of the statutes are permanent and indefinite. Unless a statute is
by its provisions for a limited period only, it continues in force until changed or
repealed by the legislature. It has been held that "law once established continues
until changed by some competent legislative power. It is not changed by change of
sovereignty," except that of a political nature. "There can be no break or
interregnum in law. From the time law comes into existence with the first-felt
corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the final disappearance of
human society. Once created, it persists until a change takes place, and when
changed it continues in such changed condition, until the next change, so forever.
Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of
constitution, the law continues unchanged until the new sovereign by legislative act
creates a change. 9
2004, may be relevant to your query:
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent
law is a question of legislative intent. The lawmaker may expressly repeal a law by
incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites
the particular law or laws, portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed.
However, where the legislative intent is not to work a repeal of specific laws, it
provides for a general repealing provision the effect of which is to repeal by
implication all inconsistent provisions of extant laws. It is said that an implied
repeal takes place when a new law contains some provisions which are contrary to,
but do not expressly repeal, those of a former law (School District No. 45 v. Bd. of
County of Comira, 141 Kan. 108). cCAIDS
Implied repeals or repeals by implication are not favored. Only in cases where the
laws or provisions involved are found to be irreconcilably inconsistent with each
other may a repeal of the earlier law by a later enactment be presumed. Otherwise,
it is the task of the implementers of the law to harmonize the conflicting laws or
provisions so as to give effect to both, because laws are presumed to have been
passed with full knowledge on the part of the lawmaker of all existing laws on the
subject (U.S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil. 208).
However, it has been held that an implied repeal may also result even if the two
laws are not repugnant whenever a statute (old law) is revised and the revised
statute (new law) purports to cover the entire subject matter of the old law and
there is a clear legislative intent to substitute the new law for the old law
(Crawford, Statutory Construction, p. 673; Joaquin v. Navarro, 81 Phil 373). In such
a case, provisions in the old law which were not reenacted in the new law will be
deemed repealed (Op., Sec. of Justice, No. 78, s. 1988, citing Agpalo, Statutory
Construction, p. 239)." EScIAa
Very truly yours,

(SGD.) RAUL M. GONZALEZ

Secretary