Critical Theory and the

Challenge of Totalitarianism

Peter Uwe Hohendahl

I.
Throughout the twentieth century the concepts of the totalitarian state and
totalitarianism have functioned on a number of levels—political, moral,
religious, and theoretical. The terms have been used in a variety of contexts
in the political discourse, but also as more or less well-defined concepts
for theoretical analysis. Although theorists have sometimes tried to keep
these spheres entirely separate, such attempts have rarely been success-
ful, since the walls between them have been porous. Clearly, the political
and moral stakes have been too high to develop a purely theoretical and
detached approach. The urge for a more elaborate theory, grounded either
in political science, philosophy, or history, was closely related to the global
expansion of twentieth-century history and the need for a form of critical
knowledge that could be applied to the re-examination of violent political
and military phenomena. From the point of view of liberal democracies,
the totalitarian state and its relentless hostility towards liberal theory was
the ultimate challenge. Only through a comprehensive analysis, it was
believed, the political and military threat to liberal democratic societies
could be averted. It is this nexus that defines the urgency of the task.'
From the perspective of regimes labeled as totalitarian or authoritarian
by liberal theory, the urgency was of a different nature. Here, especially
in the case of Italian fascism and German National Socialism, the regimes

1. See Abbott H. Gleason, Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War (New
York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995), pp. 51-88,142-72; Wolfgang Wippermann, Totalita-
rismuslheorien. Die Entwicklung der Diskussion von den Anfangen bis heute (Darmstadt:
Primus, 1997), pp. 45-57.

8
 CRITICAL THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF TOTALITARIANISM 9

used the concept of the total state to describe the difference between their
new political order and the liberal democracy or constitutional monar-
chy that they attacked and superseded. In this context, the search for a
comprehensive examination is driven by the wish to affirm the radical
and revolutionary character of the new regimes. However, the connec-
tion between theory and practice is not, as we will see, a simple matter
of abstraction and application. The political practice of the regimes fre-
quently disregarded the work of the theorists, a factor that was not always
grasped by democratic responses, especially during the 1920s and 1930s.
It therefore characterizes later theories of totalitarianism, such as those of
Carl J. Friedrich and Hannah Arendt, that they paid less attention to the
theoretical self-understanding of the enemy and focused more on political
and social structures.^ In this respect, the theorists around the Zeitschriftfur
Sozialforschung are no exception. While their interventions of the 1930s
tend to engage fascist theory, the analyses of the 1940s, for instance Franz
Neumann's Behemoth (1942), define National Socialism in broader terms.
Theorists such as Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, and Ernst Forsthoff, are
no longer seen as the center or the cause of the Nazi regime.

IL
In the history of research on totalitarian regimes, the Frankfurt School
has a peculiar place. Although its members, especially Max Horkheimer,
Herbert Marcuse, Franz Neumann, and Otto Kirchheimer, are regularly
mentioned, their theoretical contributions are frequently regarded as pre-
liminary work, as part of an early phase that had not yet worked out all of
the essential categories. I believe that the real reason for this assessment
is the fact that the early Frankfurt School focused almost exclusively on
National Socialism and had less to say about the Soviet Union. The defm-
ing mark of the so-called mature theory of totalitarianism is, however,
that it is comparative and develops categories that can be equally applied
to fascist and communist regimes. Yet a closer scrutiny of their work will
show that this perception is not quite accurate, that the attempt to develop
a generalized theory of totalitarian regimes, as it occurs especially in the
work of Friedrich Pollock, Horkheimer, and Adomo, makes use of the
Soviet experience as well.

2. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and

Autocracy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1965); Hannah Arendt, The Origins of
Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 1985).
10 PETER UWE HOHENDAHL

In their classic study Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (1956),

Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski have set up a number of basic
criteria for the assessment of totalitarian dictatorships that had a major
impact on the later critical literature. Although they have been widely criti-
cized by later scholars as too mechanical and also too rigid, these criteria
are still useful as an entry to the theoretical work of the Frankfurt School
because they define the later standards of political science against which
earlier attempts were judged. Frieddch and Brzezinski emphasize the fol-
lowing six themes: (1) ideology, (2) the terror system, (3) control of the
economy by the state, (4) a one-party system, (5) information and com-
munication monopoly of the state, and (6) the weapons monopoly. This
rather heterogeneous list is based on empirical phenomena that can be
documented, although not strictly quantified. There is considerable over-
lap with the Frankfurt theorists, notably with respect to the importance of
ideology, the use of terror, and the organization of the party system. In the
case of the assessment of the totalitarian economy, there was a clear split.
While Pollock, Horkheimer, and Adomo also regarded complete state
control of the economy as essential for totalitarian systems, Neumann and
Marcuse favored a more balanced explanation in which state and private
business achieved close collaboration. However, this discrepancy does not
imply that there was no common ground. Rather, the difference in the
analysis of the character of the economy points to common basic assump-
tions about the importance of the economic system for the social order.
While they did not follow the standard explanation for the development
of fascist regimes used by the Third Intemational, they emphasized the
nexus between the economy and the political system, that is, they used a
Marxist frame of reference. However, this shared frame did not lead to a
monolithic theory. Characteristic for their work is a rather broad spectrum
of theoretical positions, ranging from political and legal theory to eco-
nomic and cultural theory. Also, we have to keep in mind that the response
to Hitler's Germany and the Soviet Union changed significantly between
1933 and 1945. What started out as a specific investigation of National
Socialist Germany in the 1930s turned into an indictment of Westem Civi-
lization and the process of enlightenment in 1944.
Dialectic of Enlightenment is not frequently mentioned in the critical
literature on totalitarianism, but the study is, I believe, part of the project
dealing with totalitarianism. In fact, it must be understood as the most
generalized theory of totalitarianism, a version in which the underlying
 CRITICAL THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF TOTALITARIANISM 11

principle and the dialectical theoretical process are more important than
the totalitarian regimes in Russia or Germany. Ultimately, the indictment
of Horkheimer and Adomo includes the very democracies that the later
orthodox theory of the total state meant to defend. The contrast between
a liberal and a totalitarian position is not denied but integrated into a his-
torical logic derived from a Hegelian Marxism that undercuts any static
opposition.
Not all members of the group followed Adomo and Horkheimer in their
propensity toward a generalized metaphysical approach to the problem of
totalitarianism. Especially the social scientists, such as Neumann and Pol-
lock and the legal scholar Kirchheimer, remained closer to the orthodox
distinction between democratic and totalitarian systems; Marcuse, on the
other hand, explored the undemocratic elements of democracies in his
later work without blurring the line between the political systems to the
same extent as Dialectic of Enlightenment.
The primary interest of the Frankfurt School in German fascism had,
of course, personal reasons. The group found itself in political exile in
1933 and threatened as enemies of the new regime. The analysis of the
Communist state in the Soviet Union, on the other hand, required a process
of distancing that began during the mid-thirties and was completed by the
mid-forties, although this growing detachment was not articulated with
the same force and clarity as the critical diagnosis of National Socialism.
We will have to examine the reasons for this more cautious attitude when
we look at the development of their position. Since a fully articulated
comparative analysis was never developed, later theorists tended to view
their work primarily as a theory of fascism.^ A theory of fascism does
not necessarily emphasize the totalitarian element, as we know from more
recent attempts to define the Nazi regime. However, in the case of the
Frankfurt School the concept of totalitarianism plays a crucial role. In fact,
in his first response to the new regime, published in the Zeitschrift fur
Sozialforschung in 1934, Marcuse places the emphasis on the totalitarian
moment of the fascist concept of the state in the works of Carl Schmitt,
Arthur Moller von den Bruck, Emst Forsthoff, and others.'' In order to

3. See for instance Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frank-
furt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950 (Berkeley: Univ. of Califomia
Press, 1996), pp. 143-72.
4. Herbert Marcuse, "The Struggle against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the
State," in Marcuse, Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 3-42.
 12 PETER UWE HOHENDAHL

understand National Socialism, Marcuse turns to their critique of liberal

political theory, which was so outspoken during the Weimar Republic.
The direction of Marcuse's assessment and critique is worth noting.
His analysis follows the historical path from nineteenth-century liberal
theory to its slow but almost inevitable demise after World War I. This
development is characterized as the path from rationalism to irrationalism
or from rational individualism to the existential collective community, a
model that Lukacs would pick up two decades later.^ The loss of reason
as a central critical theme would play a major role in the later analysis
of the group, especially in the work of Adorno and Horkheimer, but the
contrast is subsumed under a historical dialectic of far greater complexity.
In 1934 Marcuse wanted to show how the new theory of the total state
could evolve out of a critique ofthe liberal model and what direction this
critique would take. But, equally important, he meant to demonstrate the
hidden continuity from the liberal social structure to the social order ofthe
new regime. In other words, he wanted to draw attention to different levels
of the conflict. While the new theory of the totalitarian state (der totale
Staat) attacked the liberal model of democracy as outmoded and useless
for the masses, it left the given economic order, i.e., advanced capitalism,
intact. As Marcuse notes: "We can already discern the reason why the total
authoritarian state diverts its struggle against liberalism into a struggle of
'weltanschauungen,' why it bypasses the social structure basic to liberal-
ism: it is itself largely in accord with this basic structure."'
For Marcuse it is crucial to understand that the totalitarian state is by
all means compatible with a capitalist economy. The concept of a natural
economic order (used by liberal theory to establish the notion of afreemar-
ket) is shared but interpreted differently. For the fascist state, the advanced
capitalist mode of production is useful as a way of employing the masses.
What has changed, according to Marcuse, is the ideology used for the
continuation of the existing economic order. The new theory of the state
employs concepts such as nature, Blut undBoden, existential situations, and
totality as the supposed ground of reason. In short, political irrationalism
serves economic rationality. The transition from a liberal to a totalitarian
state seems to be a revolutionary break, but it conceals the moment of
continuity, which leads Marcuse to the conclusion: "With regard to the
unity of this economic base, we can say it is liberalism that 'produces' the

5. Georg Lukacs, Die Zerstorung der Vernunft (Berlin: Aufbau, 1954).

6. Marcuse, "The Struggle against Liberalism," p. 10.
 CRITICAL THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF TOTALITARIANISM 13

total-authoritarian state out of itself, as its own consummation at a more

advanced stage of development."' We have to note that Marcuse's critique
of the totalitarian state does not imply a defense of the liberal model, since
for him the latter is based on a mode of economic production that does
not support and enable the values of liberalism (individualism, freedom,
democracy). For Marcuse, the new regime offers a solution to the real
problem of economic liberalism, yet it is the false one.
Does it matter under these conditions what kind of ideology defines
the political system? While from Marcuse's perspective this question is
not a fundamental problem, it still deserves attention because the theory
of the totalitarian state contains elements that are of interest for a better
solution to the problem of liberalism. As we will see, Marcuse's discus-
sion of fascist ideology under the headings of universalism, naturalism,
and existentialism transcends the concept of the totalitarian state. It cov-
ers a much broader range of topics, most of them actually in the field
of social anthropological theory. Although Marcuse gives his analysis
different headings, the underlying philosophical and anthropological per-
spective is the critique of rationalism (Descartes) in phenomenology and
existentialism as it was carried out by Husserl and Heidegger. Moreover,
Marcuse reads Carl Schmitt's theory as political existentialism in which
the approach to the theory of the state has significantly changed. Instead of
building abstract theoretical models, the new political scientist recognizes
his/her existential involvement, an engagement that demands a decision,
especially the fundamental distinction between friend and foe.* According

7. Ibid., p. 19.
8. For Marcuse, Schmitt's distinction between the political and the state, as well as
the definition of the political as the distinction between friend and foe (as a fundamental
enemy), marks him as a decisionist supporter of the Third Reich, a reading that Schmitt
himself favored between 1933 and 1936. Whether his pre-1933 writings were actually
compatible with the National-Socialist understanding of the state and the role of law, is a
separate question. Obviously Schmitt was highly critical of Weimar-style parliamentary
democracy and liberal constitutional theory in general. At the same time, he wanted to
strengthen state power over a disorganized civil society. In this attempt he believed to find
support in Hitler and his movement and argued that the state is central but not the ultimate
ground of the political. Power has to be derived from the leader {Fuhrer), who defines
the people. In the long essay Slaat, Bewegung, Volt Die Dreigliedermg der politischen
Einheit of 1933, Schmitt therefore moves from the distinction between state and people
to a tripartite solution in which the movement is assigned a crucial role. It takes over the
function that Schmitt had previously assigned to the nation. There can be no doubt that in
1933 Schmitt affirmed the Nazi regime and thereby a totalitarian interpretation of his basic
 14 PETER UWE HOHENDAHL

to Marcuse, this emphasis on the decision amounts to a radical devaluation

ofthe logos, that is, knowledge that enables human decisions.
This is the moment when he breaks with his teacher Heidegger and his
interpretation ofthe new regime. "A secularized theological image of his-
tory emerges. Every folk receives its historical mandate as a 'mission' that
is the first and last, the unrestricted obligation of existence."' Heidegger's
support ofthe Volk and the Bewegung turns into a support ofthe totalitar-
ian state as it was conceived in the theory of Carl Schmitt.'" Schmitt's total
state demands the complete adherence and submission of the individual
without allowing any discussion of the imposed obligations. Quoting
Schmitt's disciple Ernst Forsthoff, Marcuse concludes that the total state
has left behind the idea of individual freedom. When Heidegger's existen-
tialism becomes political, it becomes compatible with and supportive of
the Nazi state.
Marcuse's passionate critique of existentialism forces him to recon-
sider the place and function of reason as a line of defense against fascist
irrationalization. For this reason ideological conflicts matter, although
they are not autonomous. It is, however, characteristic of Marcuse's posi-
tion that he invokes not only the great tradition of German idealism (Kant,
Hegel) but also the movement ofthe working class. He recuperates Marx
for the fight against totalitarianism.

III.
Although Marcuse emphasized the smooth transition from the Weimar
economy to that of the Nazis, at the same time he stressed the dominant
role ofthe total state. The state integrates the social forces by making the
leader the focal point ofthe political system." Still, his argument con-
tained the tension between an economy-driven explanation of National
Socialism and a political interpretation in which the total state takes center

concepts. More recent interpretations, however, have tried to show that his political theory
is also open to different readings and therefore still relevant for contemporary political
theory. See The Challenge of Carl Schmitt, ed. Chantal MoufFe (London and New York:
Verso, 1999).
9. Marcuse, "The Struggle against Liberalism," p. 35.
10. Marcuse refers to Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Con-
cept of Sovereignty (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988); Carl Schmitt, Der Begriffdes
Politischen, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1963).
11. Marcuse, "The Struggle against Liberalism," pp. 35-36.
 CRITICAL THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF TOTALITARIANISM 15

Stage, as Schmitt and Forsthoff insisted.'^ It is noteworthy that Marcuse

invoked the concept of reason to combat the ideal of the volkisch com-
munity and heroic realism. It is in the work of Pollock and Horkheimer
during the early 1940s that this tension is treated more seriously. Based on
Pollock's theory of state capitalism, Horkheimer would develop a theory
of the totalitarian state (which he called the authoritarian state) that takes
into account the dominant position of the state—not only vis-a-vis the
social forces but also vis-a-vis the economy. In Horkheimer's 1942 theory
the tension between an economic and a political explanation of National
Socialism has disappeared because the two aspects have become almost
indistinguishable.
Pollock, the economist of the group, who had done important work
on the Soviet Economy (1929),'' shared Marcuse's belief that the eco-
nomic structures of industrial societies were in transition, but he offered
a more complex and also more radical model.'" Private capitalism, he
claims, is transformed into state capitalism. But this new mode of pro-
duction is not exclusively linked to a specific political system. Pollock
argues that there is a fascist-totalitarian and a democratic version of state
capitalism, for instance, in the United States. Pollock's approach com-
plicates the assessment of totalitarian systems for two reasons. First, he
decouples the economic and the political system. The transformation of
the economy does not logically lead to a specific political regime (such
as fascism). Second, his use of the concept of state capitalism is, as we
will see, ethically neutral. It becomes a pragmatic question of advantages
and disadvantages. This greater detachment allows him to examine the
probability of success for the Nazi economy compared with the outlook in
Western democracies.
Like Marcuse, Pollock is convinced that a liberalfree-marketeconomy
was no longer feasible after the crash of 1929 and the subsequent Depres-
sion. The available models were either state capitalism or Soviet-style
state socialism. Since his essay places the emphasis on the comparison
between totalitarian and democratic forms of state capitalism, the socialist
model remains outside the parameters of the exploration.
12. See Ernst Forsthoff, Der totale Staat (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt,
1933).
13. Friedrich Pollock, Die planwirtschaftlichen Versuche in der Sowjetunion 1917-
/P27 (Leipzig: C. L. Hirschfeld, 1929).
14. Friedrich Pollock, "State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations," Zeitschrift
far Sozialforschung 9 (1941): 200-25.
16 PETER UWE HOHENDAHL

For Pollock state capitalism is defined by the disappearance of the free

market or, to be more precise, by the fact that the economy is no longer
at the center. Instead, the state takes over the regulation of the economy
through regular and radical interventions. "Freedom of trade, enterprise
and labor are subject to governmental interference of such a degree that
they are practically abolished. With the autonomous market the so-called
economic laws disappear."" Pollock assumes that the market economy has
already been replaced by a planned economy in which "the direction for
production, consumption, saving, and investment" are the result of cen-
tral political interventions.'* This means that the relationship between the
economic and the political system is reversed. To overstate the case, the
economy becomes the appendix of the state. What Pollock recognizes as
typical of state capitalism is not only the command structure in the sphere
of production and consumption but also the transition to scientific manage-
ment, i.e., the exclusion of "guesswork and improvisation."" Hence state
capitalism can claim a higher form of rationality than liberal market econo-
mies with their chronic inability to eliminate irrational factors (for example,
the imbalance between production and consumption). The advantage of the
state-planned economy, then, is the chance to achieve full employment, a
crucial element in the intemational discussion of the 1930s and 1940s. In
other words, the greater separation of social relations from the market can
be seen as an advantage for democratic governments, but also as an oppor-
tunity for fascist regimes to achieve total mobilization of the work force.
State capitalism, according to Pollock, amounts to the abolition of
central features of capitalism, among them the regulative power of the
market, the role and fiinction of entrepreneurs, and the significance of pri-
vate property. We have to note that his discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of the new economic regime focuses primarily on economic
arguments that were available in the existing critical literature. When he
tums to non-economic aspects he mentions social antagonisms as a threat
to the rationally planned economy. He notes: "Since totalitarian state
capitalism is the expression of an antagonistic society at its worst, the will
to dominate from above and the counter-pressure from below cut deeply
into the pseudo-liberty of the state capitalist planners."" Once he looks

15. Ibid., p. 201.

16. Ibid., p. 204.
17. Ibid., p. 206.
18. Ibid., p. 219.
 CRITICAL THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF TOTALITARIANISM 17

more closely at the practice of totalitarian regimes, the notion of increased

economic rationality, compared with advanced private capitalism (Ford-
ism), becomes less persuasive, since the political order ofthe totalitarian
state is based on a logic of terror and atomization ofthe masses. Here his
economic analysis reaches its limits precisely because the economy is no
longer self-enclosed and autonomous. For this reason, in the final section
ofthe essay Pollock is forced to introduce non-economic categories. The
most important of them is the concept of a new ruling class consisting
of bureaucrats, military officers, party officers, and business leaders. He
perceives totalitarian regimes as antagonistic class societies divided into
leaders, privileged Gefolgschaften, and the masses. In this sketch there is,
surprisingly, no place for the charismatic leader, the dictator, at the top.
Pollock's theory received a mixed response within the group. While
Neumann remained basically unconvinced and offered a different under-
standing of the fascist economy in Behemoth, Horkheimer was strongly
influenced by Pollock." His 1942 essay "The Authoritarian State" is based
on Pollock's theory and expands the political and social dimensions that
had remained undertheorized in Pollock's essay. What Horkheimer shares
with Pollock is the attempt to create a broader framework for the assessment
of National Socialism; in his case, however, this framework is historically
more differentiated. His analysis goes back as far as the French Revolu-
tion, in particular to the terror phase under Robespierre. Put differently, the
concept of the authoritarian state is by no means limited to German fas-
cism. Rather, Horkheimer is also willing to glance at versions on the left,
for instance the cooperation between Lasalle and Bismarck conceming the
organization and role ofthe working class. While the Soviet Union is not

19. Basically, Neumann argues that the economic structure ofthe Weimar Republic
anticipated many ofthe features found in the Third Reich. There was no need for the new
state to appropriate completely the means of production. Instead, the existing intermediate
organizations and the cartels functioned as privately controlled public organs. At the same
time, Neumann stresses that the state (and not the Party) regularly intervened in the process
of production, distribution, and consumption in order to achieve specific goals, for instance,
full employment or the preparation for war. Of course, he completely agrees with Pollock
that Hitler's Germany had abolished the free-market economy and established controls at
different levels and various sections ofthe economy. According to Neumann, the result is
a monopolistic system determined by state control and without the freedom of contract.
The state is needed to avoid disturbances caused by cyclical changes. But for Neumann
the economy ofthe Third Reich did not abolish profits as a form of private appropriation.
See Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933-1944,
2nd ed. (New York and London: Oxford UP, 1944), pp. 255-361.
18 PETER UWE HOHENDAHL

explicitly mentioned, there are hints and suggestions in the essay that can
be interpreted as references to the Soviet Union under Stalin. By 1942 the
Soviet Union had pretty much lost its function as a positive social model
for the Frankfurt School.^"
Horkheimer's basic argument takes from Pollock the category of
state capitalism and tries to unfold its political and social logic where the
authoritarian state appears as the necessary conclusion. "State capital-
ism is the authoritarian state of the present."^^ Unlike Pollock, however,
Horkheimer still holds on to a traditional class model in which the fun-
damental conflict is that between bourgeoisie and working class. In this
interpretation of social history, state capitalism provides the bourgeoisie
with time to stabilize its domination. Yet Horkheimer differentiates three
versions of the authoritarian state: a right-wing form with totalitarian
features; a bourgeois version that stays within the limits of authoritarian
forms of government; and a left concept, first visible in the French Revo-
lution and more recently in the development of the Russian Revolution.
Without explicit reference Horkheimer notes: "Whether revolutionaries
pursue power as one pursues loot or criminals, is revealed only in the
course of the action. Instead of dissolving in the end in the democracy
of the councils, the group can maintain itself as an authoritarian leader-
ship."^^ Horkheimer concludes that the Russian revolutionaries followed
a path of imitating the Western industrialized nations that had yielded to
fascism in order to accommodate the need for a planned economy. Accord-
ing to Horkheimer, the Russian Revolution failed to solve the fundamental
problem of a socialist revolution; it did not overcome the historical con-
tradiction between freedom and rational planning and therefore ended up
with the authority of the Party and a model of technological progress. In
short, it followed the path to state socialism. This means, however, that
state socialism has overcome the capitalist mode of production under the
umbrella of the authoritarian state.
How do fascist regimes such as Italy and Germany fit into this pic-
ture? According to Horkheimer, they are a Mischform: "Though here too
surplus value is brought under state control and distributed, it flows under
20. See Helmut Dubiel, Theory and Politics: Studies in the Development of Critical
Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), pp. 39-48, 69-80.
21. Max Horkheimer, "The Authoritarian State," in Andrew Arato and Eike Geb-
hardt, eds.. The Essential Frankfurt School Reader (New York: Urizen Books, 1978), p. 96
(emphasis in the text).
22. Ibid., p. 99 (translation modified).
 CRITICAL THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF T0TALITARL4NISM 19

the old name of profits in great amounts to the industrial magnates and
landowners."^^ Although this statement suggests a more orthodox under-
standing of the link between big industry and the fascist state (thus closer
to that of Neumann), his ultimate assessment, following Pollock, empha-
sizes the qualitatively different direction of state capitalism. Its centrally
planned economy provides, at least for the near future, stability when the
competition of the trusts had increased the volatility of a market economy.
For this reason, Horkheimer concedes that the authoritarian state has cer-
tain advantages compared with the weak model of liberalism. At the same
time, he insists that the authoritarian state is by defmition repressive and
violates human freedom. While the authoritarian state can increase "the
principle of control as a permanent mobilization," it does not stimulate or
guarantee emancipation.^"*
As much as Horkheimer is indebted to Pollock's argument, their
political interpretations differ significantly. While Pollock seems to favor
a democratic version of state capitalism (possibly something like the New
Deal in the United States), Horkheimer's perspective remains focused on a
socialist solution within a non-antagonistic society. From this perspective
the authoritarian state is at best an interim form of government and at its
worst, namely in its fascist and totalitarian version, Raub and exploitation.
To put it differently, for Horkheimer the future is not simply the choice
between totalitarian fascist states and Westem democracies under state
capitalism. He wants to keep open the possibility of a classless society.
As he notes: "Dread in the expectation of an authoritarian epoch does
not hinder the resistance."^' Clearly, the goal is that of a non-antagonistic
democracy, a goal that is not present in Pollock's essay.
It goes without saying that "The Authoritarian State" is a critique of
fascist regimes and, to a lesser degree, of state socialism; yet these moments
do not exhaust the essay. There is a broader question that comes to the
foreground toward the end when Horkheimer discusses the conditions of
a future post-authoritarian society. If anarchy is the only imaginable solu-
tion after the fall of the authoritarian state, then there is no hope because
the new state would repeat the repression of the old one. Real democracy,
Horkheimer suggests, is not only threatened by National Socialism. He
clearly hints at the dangers coming from authoritarian socialism and also

23. Ibid., p. 102.

24. Ibid., p. 103.
25. Ibid., p. 112.
20 PETER UWE HOHENDAHL

envisions problems stemming from highly bureaucratized democratic

regimes where the concept of freedom is considered a Utopian nuisance:
"Everyone agrees today that the word 'freedom' should only be used as a
phrase; to take it seriously is considered Utopian."^*
In the final analysis, the target of Horkheimer's critique is the prag-
matism of those who believe that after the demise of liberalism and the
market economy, the transition to state capitalism is the only rational and
politically responsible answer. Yet it is precisely this pragmatism that
prevents humanity from reaching freedom. This makes the dichotomy
between the Westem democracies and the fascist regimes, which defmed
the war efforts of the Anglo-American alliance, problematic. It is notewor-
thy that the logic of history, on which Hegel and his radical disciples had
counted, is called into question. The last sentence of the essay reads: "As
long as world history follows its logical course, it fails to fulfill its human
destiny."^' It is important, however, not to misunderstand this statement
as a critique of democracy but as a critique of its inevitable compromise
with the authoritarian state. In its final, radical stance the essay prefigures
Dialectic of Enlightenment of 1944.

IV.
In the contemporary philosophical discourse. Dialectic of Enlightenment
functions as a radical critique of reason from its early manifestations to
the present. The book's dark pessimism is sometimes ascribed to the fact
that it was written during the atrocities of World War 11.^* Moreover, the
chapter "Elements of Anti-Semitism," added in 1947, makes the link to the
racism of National Socialism explicit. But at the same time, it is obvious
that the work does not offer a local theory of fascism or even a general-
ized political theory, as "The Authoritarian State" did in 1942. Instead,
Horkheimer and Adomo radicalize the theory of the authoritarian state in
such a way that its totalitarian ends become fully visible. This radical ver-
sion departs from the last sentence of the Horkheimer essay: the logic of
history is fundamentally questioned. Progressive thought, on which liber-
alism had relied in the nineteenth century, tumed into its opposite: "Yet the

26. Ibid., p. 115 (translation modified).

27. Ibid., p. 117.
28. See for instance Jiirgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), pp. 366-99.
 CRITICAL THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF TOTALITARIANISM 21

fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant."^' By abstracting from

the concrete conditions of state capitalism or state socialism, the authors
reinterpret the dilemma of true democracy and freedom as the accumu-
lated failure of human history under the aegis of rationality and progress,
traditionally seen as intrinsically linked. In this broader perspective, the
difference between totalitarian and democratic regimes becomes less
important than the dialectic of reason itself, a dialectic in which the path
from myth to reason celebrated by liberalism, is always already marked
by the entwinement of progress and regression. It is the flawed process
of enlightenment that brings about the return of mythic unfreedom under
National Socialism: "Myth tums into enlightenment, and nature into mere
objectivity. Men pay for the increase of their power with alienation from
that over which they exercise their power "^^
It is worth noting that the authors pursue a strategy of abstraction,
which is itself of course a principle of the Enlightenment, in different
forms, most radically in the introduction and the first chapter (the concept
of enlightenment) and to a lesser degree in the treatment of the culture
industry, a chapter that remains much closer to specific historical devel-
opments. Its discussion of the underlying economic structure emphasizes
the transition from liberal to monopoly capitalism and ultimately (fascist)
state capitalism. In this chapter the earlier, Marxist approach of the authors
is still fairly visible, although it is integrated into the larger argument about
the intemal dialectic of rationality. The historical specificity and particu-
larity of the cultural space (Germany and the United States) is connected
with the examination of the authoritarian state. Hence the cultural phe-
nomena grasped under the category of the culture industry are marked by
the very repression that characterizes the authoritarian state and its more
radical variants, such as totalitarian regimes. Independent of Horkheimer,
Adomo had already focused on this element as early as 1938 in his essay
on popular music.^'
Commonly the chapter on the culture industry has been read as an
indictment of American mass culture, and charges of (European) elitism
have been voiced by some American critics. Yet the opposition between

29. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment., trans.

John Cumming (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), p. 3.
30. Ibid., p. 9.
31. Theodor W. Adomo, "On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of
Listening," in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, pp. 270-99.
22 PETER UWE HOHENDAHL

American mass culture and European high culture fails to address the
method of Horkheimer and Adomo's assessment. They place the empha-
sis on the very transition from liberal to organized capitalism that plays a
crucial role in the analysis of the authoritarian state. As the authors note:
"The decorative industrial management buildings and exhibition centers
in authoritarian countries are much the same as anywhere else."-*^ This
assertion could be read either as an affirmation of the authoritarian char-
acter of the culture industry or, more cautiously, as a comparison between
authoritarian and democratic states, with the (unexpected) conclusion
that in spite of the political differences the aesthetic forms of industrial
management are identical. In the first reading, one assumes a direct link
between the authoritarian state and the culture industry; in the latter the
rise of the culture industry is seen as an independent phenomenon that
occurs both in authoritarian and democratic regimes. Insofar as the authors
assume that the emergence of the culture industry is, in economic terms,
the result of the transition from liberal to organized capitalism (Taylorism)
and place the emphasis on the centralization and industrialization of mass
culture, the culture industry seems to precede the crucial transition to state
capitalism, respectively, to state socialism. In this interpretation the link
between the culture industry and the authoritarian state is non-essential.
Their coexistence is not a necessary one. At the same time, however, we
have to note that Horkheimer and Adomo strongly suggest that modem
mass culture is not compatible with tme democracy because, despite its
claim to a broad appeal, it manipulates the masses. The charge against the
culture industry is not that it undermines good taste but that it destroys
human freedom. It is a repressive false totality that defines the power of
the culture industry: "But what is new is that the irreconcilable elements
of culture, art and distraction, are subordinated to one end and subsumed
under one false formula: the totality of the culture industry. It consists of
repetition.""
It is hard to overlook the authoritarian element in Horkheimer and
Adomo's description of the culture industry. The culture industry is not
only planned culture but also completely rational in its calculation of the
impact. The recipients are the atomized subjects of the mass, whose status
as self-reliant and responsible individuals has been cancelled. If one fol-
lows this argument, the link between the culture industry and authoritar-

32. Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 120.

33. Ibid., p. 136.
 CRITICAL THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF TOTALITARIANISM 23

ian forms of govemment takes on a more dramatic character. The culture

industry itself is described as essentially authoritarian, independent of
the political regime. In this respect the German example is instructive.
The authors argue that the culture industry of Nazi Germany was already
prefigured in the mass culture of the Weimar Republic. To put it differ-
ently, mass democracies with a flourishing culture industry contain an
authoritarian element that can subvert the democratic regime. Therefore,
Horkheimer and Adorno attribute the survival of culture and Bildung to
the lack of democratic control: "In Germany the failure of democratic con-
trol to permeate life had led to a paradoxical situation. Many things were
exempt from the market mechanism which had invaded the Western coun-
tries. The German educational system, universities, theaters with artistic
standards, great orchestras, and museums enjoyed protection."^"
This historical defense of high culture under the protection of a pre-
democratic state deserves closer scrutiny. If the pre-modem state that
preserves high culture is typically defined by historians as authoritarian,
we need a distinction between two versions of the authoritarian state, a
pre- and a post-liberal form. While the pre-liberal form, such as monarchy,
appears to be grounded in pre-modem social structures, the post-demo-
cratic form appears to be aligned with a weakening of democratic rule
and the rise of the strong (charismatic) leader. It contains the proclivity
towards a totalitarian regime that simply embodies the radical conclu-
sions. It seems that for Horkheimer and Adomo the expansion of modem
mass culture serves as an index for the decline of individual freedom and
the potential rise ofthe all-embracing total state.
In this historical argument, one would have expected a stronger empha-
sis on the transition from monopoly to state capitalism, which played a
decisive role in Horkheimer's essay on the authoritarian state. The fact
that the discussion of mass culture takes its material primarily from the
United States ofthe 1930s and 1940s, with only a cursory look to Ger-
many, discouraged this move since Hollywood remained solidly focused
on business and profit. In this environment it is difficult to emphasize
the centrality of state-planned mass culture. Instead, the authors shift the
analysis to the intemal side and argue that modem industrial mass culture
is intrinsically authoritarian and ultimately anti-democratic.
Following the dialectic of enlightenment, industrial mass culture and
the principle of democracy (individual freedom) cannot be aligned. It is
34. Ibid., p. 132.
24 PETER UWE HOHENDAHL

not the element of equality that prohibits this alignment but the insistence
on a non-antagonistic society, that is, a Utopian conception of democracy.
More broadly speaking, the dialectic of reason remains caught in a double
bind. The very rationality that enables humans to overcome the fatality
of myth also contains the regression to mythic unfreedom. Thus, in the
culture industry the second half of this dialectic manifests itself. In the
context of such an extended historical perspective, the totalitarian element
can already be discerned long before Hitler came to power, since the meth-
odology of the Enlightenment is already proto-totalitarian.
This is obviously the point where Horkheimer and Adomo differ from
a typical liberal view that would perceive the Enlightenment and National
Socialism as incompatible. By insisting on the ultimately totalitarian nature
of the Enlightenment project, they undermine the notion of progress as
a signpost for the defense of Westem democracies. Their critique of the
Enlightenment and liberalism propels them in the direction of Heidegger
and Carl Schmitt, a politically most unwelcome proximity. They have to
acknowledge the totalitarian moment as part of modem (intellectual) his-
tory and at the same time offer a dialectical solution in which the concept
of human freedom (emancipation) can be preserved. In 1944 orthodox
socialism does no longer qualify as the preordained path because it has
capitulated to a scientific understanding of the world. What remains is
critical theory itself
By uncovering the totalitarian principle in the method of human ratio-
nality itself and in particular in its modem history, Horkheimer and Adomo
shift the emphasis from the political enemy, the totalitarian regime, to a
more profound danger residing in the formation of the human subject in
its alienation from nature. Differently put, the political critique has tumed
into a philosophical critique for which National Socialism and Stalinism
provide the horrifying examples. The philosophical bent may have been
one of the reasons why Dialectic of Enlightenment did not play a major
role in the postwar discussion of totalitarianism, since this discussion
was motivated and propelled by the ideological needs of the Cold War.
Friedrich's theory provided the clear demarcations between good and evil
political systems that were in demand during the late 1940s and 1950s.^^

35. See Wippermann, Totalitarismustheorien, pp. 21-34; Achim Siegei, "Carl

Joachim Friedrichs Konzeption der totalitaren Diktatur: eine Neuinterpretation," in Totali-
tarismustheorien nach dem Ende des Kommunismus, ed. Achim Siegei (Koln and Weimar:
Bohlau, 1998), pp. 273-307.
 CRITICAL THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF TOTALITARIANISM 25

The political potential of Horkheimer's theory of the authoritarian state

and Dialectic ofEnlightenment were only rediscovered in the 1960s by the
Neo-Left and the student revolution, but now as a critique of late-capitalist
democracies rather than the Soviet Union. It was specifically Horkheimer's
essay "The Authoritarian State" that was invoked for an analysis of the
political development of the Federal Republic.^^ The first generation of
the Frankfurt School did not appreciate this shift because they shared the
prevailing conservative assessment of the Eastem Bloc and perceived the
Soviet Union and its satellites as a major threat.

V.
In Dialectic of Enlightenment the theory of totalitarianism had reached its
most radical form by detaching itself from the concrete political situation.
But how would this theory help with the interpretation of the Cold War?
Was it necessary to abandon the Marxist categories that had influenced the
work of the group? Horkheimer's 1968 introduction to his early writings
clarifies this crucial point. Horkheimer rejects the logic of anti-Commu-
nism that attacks Marxist theory because of the dangers of Stalinism. At
the same time, he emphasizes the limitations of the doctrine. He differenti-
ates between a critical and a dogmatic use of Marx and underscores the
need to examine the Eastem Bloc with the same concepts as capitalist
countries. As he notes, "Socialism, the idea of democracy realized in its
true meaning, has long been perverted into an instrument of manipulation
in the Diamat countries, just as the Christian message was perverted dur-
ing the blood-bath centuries of Christendom."^' This position, very much
a continuation of the 1942 essay, undercuts the then prevalent division into
camps between which the political subject has to choose. The introduction
also retums to a comparative approach to the problem of totalitarianism.
Horkheimer refers explicitly to the Nazi State as a prime example of a
state that was characterized by perfection of technology, increase of move-
ment and communication, and planned growth of the population under the
mle of the total state.^* Of course, part of this catalog could also be applied
to advanced capitalist societies, however, with the decisive difference that

36. See Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theory, and Political
Significance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), pp. 609-36.
37. Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays., trans. Matthew J. O'Connell
and others (New York: Continuum, 1992), p. vi.
38. Ibid., pp. vii-viii.
26 PETER UWE HOHENDAHL

the totalitarian state is marked by violence. Here violence comes in two

forms, as bureaucratic violence in socialist states, on the one hand, and as
terrorist violence in right-vk'ing regimes, on the other.
Horkheimer is aware that after the war critical theory is faced with a
structural transformation, certainly in Western societies and possibly also
in communist countries. This transformation makes it difficult to discuss
totalitarianism simply in terms of existing dictatorships and personal ter-
ror. He argues: "Society is in a new phase. The upper stratum is typically
represented no longer by competing entrepreneurs but by managements,
combines, committees. The material situation of the dependent classes
give rise to political and psychological tendencies which are different from
those of the earlier proletariat. Individuals, like classes, are now being
integrated into society."-" Clearly, this description fits Western societies as
much if not better than communist regimes. It is not accidental, therefore,
that Horkheimer admonishes "the so-called free world" to live up to and
defend the norms of democracy that it invokes.
If it is true that democratic societies in the West are threatened by the
totally administered society, then it might be necessary to rethink the prob-
lem of totalitarianism, since according to Horkheimer these bureaucratic
structures that strangle the individual are part of both political systems.
Did such a revision take place? Did the new postwar structure encourage
Horkheimer and Adomo to break with the foundations of their theory? It
appears that both Horkheimer and Adomo made adjustments without radi-
cally breaking with their fundamental presuppositions and their dialectical
method. This continuity did not exclude, of course, shifts in their political
position, in accordance with changing historical conditions. With respect
to totalitarian communist regimes, the crucial questions were the changes
after the death of Stalin. Could the post-Stalinist Soviet Union still be
defined as a totalitarian regime?^" As we know, Friedrich felt compelled
to modify his theory in order to affirm the basic continuity of Commu-
nist Russia."' Given the static and empirical nature of his theory, this was
the only viable response to significant historical transformations. Critical
Theory, on the other hand, had underscored from the very beginning the

39. Ibid., p. ix.

40. See Gieason, Totalitarianism, pp. 167-98; Wippermann, Totalitarismustheorien,
pp. 95-118. See also Bilanz und Perspektiven der DDR-Forschung, ed. Rainer Eppelmann,
Bemd Faulenbach, and Ulrich Mahler (Paderbom: Schoningh, 2003).
41. See Siegel, "Carl Joachim Friedrichs Konzeption."
 CRITICAL THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF TOTALITARIANISM 27

historical dialectic by examining the demise of liberalism and its political

consequences and by looking carefully at the development of organized
capitalism.
As we have seen, the two-pronged approach enabled the group to
develop a general theory of totalitarianism based on economic as well as
philosophical-political assessments. How does the theory of the totally
administered society fit in? If we go back to Pollock's theory of state capi-
talism and Horkheimer's political interpretation, the planned society of
1942 has significant similarities with the totally administered society of
the postwar era. This, however, would mean that the end of World War II
was structurally less decisive than Horkheimer claimed in 1968. In this
interpretation the totally administered society would be authoritarian with
a totalitarian potential. Yet one could also argue that the authoritarian traits
of the postwar state-socialist society must be viewed as post-totalitarian,
a stage when terror and intense personal manipulation have more or less
disappeared without touching the bureaucratic centralized structure. This
interpretation is supported by Horkheimer's notes from the later 1950s,
where he speaks of recent decentralizations within state socialism that
might individualize the apparatus. "Hence," as he notes, "subsequently
and in a new manner, a liberal, qualitatively transformed element would
be inserted into the totalitarian totality.'"*^
Thus, under these conditions state socialism with a human face
becomes conceivable. Horkheimer therefore suggests that the opposition
to the Eastem Bloc organized in NATO is both legitimate and a lie that
conceals material interests. Especially the existing alliances with right-
wing dictators (totalitarian regimes) undermine the democratic cause."^
Theoretically, this critique is weaker than the theory of state capitalism
developed in the 1940s, since it merely states the alliance of democratic
regimes and dictators without examining the intemal development of
these democracies. This tendency in the work of the late Horkheimer is
linked to his growing distance from Marx and an increasing retum to lib-
eral theory. In his late interview with Der Spiegel, Horkheimer makes this
shift explicit when he argues that liberal theory is the strongest proponent
of human freedom and, in addition, suggests that the idea of competition in

42. Max Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 6 (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1991), p. 331
(translation mine).
43. Ibid., p. 332.
28 PETER UWE HOHENDAHL

the capitalist economy also encourages individual development.'^ He has

indeed abandoned essential insights that were still in place in the 1940s.
The concept of competition has been taken out of its historical context and
turned into an anthropological category. Moreover, the cmcial difference
between instrumental and practical reason, on which Dialectic of Enlight-
enment hinges, has vanished. At the same time, he defends in strong terms
the need for military interventions in dealing with totalitarian regimes,
that is to say, the dialectical method has turned into abstract moralism. In
this line of argument, the distinction between the critique of totalitarian
regimes and the support of NATO, which was still clearly marked in 1951,
has become diffuse.
Unlike the late Horkheimer, Adomo emphasized in his postwar
sociological writings the problematic and potentially harmful nature of
advanced capitalism as a mode of production that reproduces social antag-
onisms (between classes). At best it can balance, and only for a limited
time, the needs of the workers and the dynamic of industrial production.
However, he qualifies the character of this antagonism by underscoring
the static character of postwar capitalism. By this he means the greater
importance of administrative bureaucracies and state intervention. Put
differently, in a slightly revised form, the theory of state capitalism, which
had been cmcial for the formation of the theory of the authoritarian state
in the 1940s, resurfaces. Again, Adomo points out that Marx's contention
that the rational development of the forces of production would prepare
the way for a just and humane society tumed out to be too optimistic.
The contemporary form of state capitalism had succeeded in integrating
technology without changing the relations of production, i.e., the social
stmcture.**' Drawing specifically on the concepts of culture and con-
sciousness industries, Adomo underscores the systemic lack of a political
consciousness and the impotence of social theory. Late capitalism seems
to mn like a machine on autopilot. According to Adomo, the administered
society can regulate itself but not qualitatively change. This insight would
suggest dangerous political consequences when the precarious balance
breaks down. In this case, the state would be forced to use stronger means

44. Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 7, p. 347.

45. Theodor Adomo, "Late Capitalism or Industrial Society?" in Modern German
Sociology, ed. Volker Meja, Dieter Misgeld, and Nico Stehr (New York: Columbia UP,
1987), p. 243.
 CRITICAL THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF TOTALITARIANISM 29

and become authoritarian. However, in 1968 Adorno does not draw this
conclusion, primarily because he places his social analysis within the con-
text of the Cold War and its potential for material destruction. Advanced
technology, instead of helping humanity, is used to threaten its existence.
Adomo's critique of this irrational political behavior is equally addressed
to the West and the East: "The bourgeois concept of socially useful labor,
which is being satanically parodied in both of these political systems, was
originally measured by the yardstick of the marketplace, and not ever in
terms of plain usefulness for the people themselves, let alone in terms of
human happiness.'"**
We have to note that in 1968 for Adomo late capitalism is still deter-
mined by the profit motive. In this respect his analysis differs from that
of Pollock in 1942. At the same time, the similarities are remarkable. The
moment of subjugation characterizes both late capitalism and (late) state
socialist societies. But in contrast to Horkheimer, Adomo focuses his
attention on late capitalism and its inability to overcome social antago-
nisms. The planned society {formative Gesellschaft) can only repress these
tensions and conflicts. In comparison with the concept of the authoritarian
state from the 1940s, Adomo's notion of the planned society of the 1960s
is clearly less marked by tendencies towards totalitarian solutions. For this
reason he would disagree with the assessment that West Germany had to
be seen as a neo-fascist regime as the student movement asserted.
In Adomo's thought after 1960, the concept of the totalitarian state and
the interpretation of German fascism became increasingly separate proj-
ects. While the analysis of fascism evolved into the study of the Holocaust
(in Negative Dialectics), the notion of the totalitarian state was mostly
reserved for the Eastem Bloc, although the concept itself remained more
inclusive. Adomo's reflections on the Final Solution in Negative Dialec-
tics explore less the political than the metaphysical conditions of life, the
failure of human culture in general.'" When Adomo asserts that all culture
after Auschwitz is trash {Mull), the difference between political regimes
seems to be secondary. Still, the dialectic of culture after the Holocaust
has its own political momentum. It is especially the affirmation of (high)
culture by communist regimes that betrays the meaning of culture and
tums it into the very barbarism that it wants to overcome. In other words,

46. Ibid., p. 243.

47. Theodor W. Adomo, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Con-
tinuum, 1987), p. 357.
30 PETER UWE HOHENDAHL

administered culture tied to the state is by definition unable to keep its

promise and heal the wound of the Holocaust. This is the point where the
two projects touch each other again, which demonstrates that they are part
of Adomo's more fundamental metaphysical concems.

VI.
It is not accidental that the New Left went back to Horkheimer's essay
"The Authoritarian State" to prove their claim. Jurgen Habermas, on the
other hand, wamed against attempts to interpret the Federal Republic
of the 1960s as a proto-fascist and potentially totalitarian system. In his
argument with the Left (some of them students of Adomo), he especially
criticized the belief of the Left in an impending social revolution."** In clear
contrast to Adomo, however, he emphasized not only the need for social
and political change in advanced industrial societies but also believed in
its feasibility. The notion of a static late capitalism in Adomo's thought
was reinterpreted as a depoliticized public sphere that provides a weak and
unstable legitimation basis for political action. This assessment shares with
that of his teachers a historically specific critique of liberalism. For Haber-
mas, as for Marcuse and Neumann, the emergence of mass democracy
under the conditions of organized capitalism threatened the liberal state.
But in Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962), Habermas
focused on the postwar welfare state rather than the totalitarian state of
the 1930s and 1940s. For Habermas the depoliticized welfare state defines
the parameters of the postwar era—both in America and Westem Europe.
While its bureaucratic structure undermines democracy, it is not, according
to Habermas, in imminent danger of transforming itself into a totalitarian
regime as the New Left believed in 1968. As a result, the totalitarian vision
remains marginal in his social theory. Instead, the trajectory of Habermas's
theoretical development leads to the more detached and abstract problem
of political legitimation, especially legitimation problems of the modem
state."' In this context, Habermas defines the move towards democratic
forms of govemment as a self-induced and self-controlled leaming pro-
cess. Put differently, Habermas's interest follows the process of potential
change rather than the stasis of bureaucratic stmctures. Still, it is worth

48. Jurgen Habermas, "Die Scheinrevolution und ihre Kinder," in Die Linke antwor-
tet Jurgen Habermas (Frankfurt am Main: Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1968), pp. 5-15.
49. See Habermas, Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus (Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976), pp. 271-303.
 CRITICAL THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF TOTALITARIANISM 31

noting that in Habermas's work the concept of totalitarianism does not

play a major role because for him the urgent question is the intemal legiti-
mation of democracy rather than the communist threat.

VII.
My analysis has traced the development of the concept of totalitarianism
from the 1930s to the 1960s. While during the 1930s and 1940s the mem-
bers of the Frankfurt School focused primarily on a critical examination
of National Socialism, in the postwar era their attention shifted more to
the analysis of Stalinist regimes. This focus brought them closer to more
orthodox theories of totalitarianism, for which the difference between fas-
cist and communist regimes was either negligible or secondary. However,
what sets Critical Theory apart from the liberal perspective is the convic-
tion that liberalism itself, as a specific historical ideological fonnation,
contained the social contradictions that could lead to totalitarian solutions.
Hence the critique of totalitarianism was not identical with an affirmative
defense of liberalism but had to arrive at the concept of a non-antagonis-
tic society. Put differently, the political system had to be examined and
evaluated in the context of its socio-economic environment. After 1945
the emphasis on this link became less pronounced but never disappeared.
Even for the early Habermas this connection was still significant. Their
analysis took for granted two historically specific moments: first, the secu-
lar nature of the modem state, and, second, the atomization of the modem
masses as the result of the decline of social classes. In both respects they
converged with Hannah Arendt's analysis. This understanding would dis-
courage the possibility of applying their categories to religious fanaticism
and terrorism. While there can be no doubt that they would have opposed
terrorist violence, they would have insisted on the need for a historically
specific analysis instead of subscribing to a dichotomy between Westem
civilization and (Eastem) fanaticism. The correct response would be the
dialectical method rather than a mechanical application of concepts and
terms.