BAR OPS 1: SET #1

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. LCL CAPITAL

G.R. No. 243396, September 14, 2021

FACTS:

In 1997, LCL Capital, Inc. (LCL) obtained a loan from Far East Bank & Trust Co. (FEBTC)
in the amount of P3,000,000.00 subject to 17% interest per annum and executed a deed of Real
Estate Mortgage over its two condominium units as security. In 2000, the Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI) merged with FEBTC. When LCL defaulted, BPI applied for extrajudicial foreclosure
of the real estate mortgage where BPI emerged as the highest bidder on May 21, 2003. After
almost two months, BPI executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership over the foreclosed
condominium units. Aggrieved, LCL filed an action against BPI for the annulment of the
certificates of title alleging that the consolidation of ownership is premature having been made
before the lapse of the redemption period. RTC declared the consolidation void. LCL asked the
RTC to determine the cost of redemption. BPI manifested that the redemption amount as of March
15, 2015 is P9,339,362.93. The RTC computed the redemption price at P2,513,583.15 where it
applied the interest rate of 6% per annum and excluded the real estate taxes that BPI paid. BPI
sought reconsideration claiming that the redemption price as of March 10, 2017 was already
P11,656,636.81 applying the stipulated interest rate of 17% per annum. RTC denied the motion.
The CA partly granted the petition and held that the valuation of the redemption price when the
creditor-mortgagee is a banking institution shall be governed by Section 78 of Republic Act No.
337 or the "General Banking Act" and that the RTC should have imposed the stipulated interest
rate of 17% per annum. The CA affirmed the exclusion of the real estate taxes from the
redemption price. The CA ruled that the liability to reimburse realty taxes arises only when the
mortgagor failed to redeem the foreclosed property within one year from registration of the
certificate of sale. However, BPI deprived LCL of its right of redemption considering the premature
consolidation of ownership.

ISSUE: Whether the real estate taxes should be excluded from the computation of the redemption
price and the proper interest rate.

RULING:

No. The real estate taxes that the BPI paid must be included as part of the redemption
price. At most, BPI's premature consolidation of ownership will only result in the reinstatement of
LCL's certificates of title. The effect cannot be extended to the forfeiture of BPI's right of
reimbursement for the real estate taxes paid, lest it undermines the principle of unjust enrichment.
To be sure, any unpaid real estate tax is chargeable against the taxable person who had actual,
or beneficial use and possession of the property regardless of whether he or she is the owner.
Here, LCL retained the use and control of the mortgaged properties and must be held liable for
real estate taxes. To impose the taxes upon BPI which is neither the owner nor the beneficial user
of the properties would not only be contrary to law but also unjust.
In sum, the redemption price must be computed based on the principal obligation of
P3,000,000.00 or the amount due under the mortgage deed with interest at the rate of 17% per
annum specified in the mortgage contract. In addition to the principal and interest, the redemption
price must include the expenses of foreclosure, i.e., Judicial Commission, Publication Fee, and
Sheriffs Fee. Lastly, LCL is ordered to reimburse BPI the amount representing the payment of
real estate taxes. Considering the absence of sufficient records to arrive at the exact figures, it is
proper to remand the case to the RTC for computation of the
redemption price and for reception of further evidence solely for such purpose.

FOR THESE REASONS, the petition in G.R. No. 243396 is GRANTED. The case is REMANDED
to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch CLXI (161), for the proper computation of the
redemption price with dispatch following the parameters set in this Decision. On the other hand,
the petition in G.R. No. 243409 is DENIED.

1
BAR OPS 1: SET #1

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARLO DIEGA Y ZAPICO

G.R. No. 255389, September 14, 2021

FACTS:

On April 14, 2013, at 8:00 p.m., AAA and her friend JJJ were walking home after tending
a grocery store. En route, a certain Ismael blocked the way and invited AAA to hang out.
Meantime, JJJ left and went home. Ismael then brought AAA to a nearby store and introduced
her to his friends' alias Obat, alias Kalbo, and Carlo. Obat suggested to have a drinking session.
AAA told them that she wanted to go home, but Ismael held her hand and dragged her along. The
group proceeded to a nearby riverbank where they started drinking. Obat offered AAA to drink.
After initially refusing, AAA drank the liquor. All the while, Ismael held AAA's hand. Later, the
group left the riverbank and went to a vacant lot near the store. Thereat, they continued the
drinking session. AAA felt dizzy and started to drowse off. AAA laid down and saw Carlo remove
her pants and underwear. AAA tried to kick him, but someone held her legs and spread them
apart and another held her hands. AAA then felt someone spitting on her vagina. Carlo went on
top of AAA, inserted his penis into her vagina, and made pumping motions. Afterwards, Kalbo,
Ismael, and Obat took turns in having carnal knowledge with AAA. At that time, AAA was crying
and shouting throughout, but no one came to her aid. Soon after, AAA fell asleep and the group
left her at the vacant lot.
Carlo denied the accusation and claimed that on April 14, 2013, he was engaged in a
drinking spree with AAA, Ismael, Obat, alias Caloy, and alias Jayson. At 10:00 p.m., Carlo went
home to change his clothes. Thereafter, Carlo went out and overheard a group of women looking
for AAA. Carlo returned to the drinking spree and told AAA that someone was looking for her
However, AAA did not want to go home because she was intoxicated and will be scolded. Around
11 :30 p.m., Carlo went home and slept. The next morning, Carlo was awakened by a loud
knocking on his door. A barangay tanod suddenly handcuffed Carlo and said, "Pasensiya ka na
kasi yung mga kasama mo ay tumakas. "Carlo was brought to the barangay hall where he was
accused of raping AAA.
The RTC found Carlo guilty of Rape and gave credence to the account of AAA which was
supported by medical findings. The RTC further held that Carlo and his three (3) companions
conspired with each other to commit the crime of Rape. Lastly, the RTC rejected Carlo's defense
of alibi considering the short distance between his house and the vacant lot where the crime was
committed. Aggrieved, Carlo elevated the case to the CA docketed as CA-G.R. CR HC No. 11398.
Carlo contended that AAA's testimony is incredible. CA affirmed the RTC's finding.

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of AAA is incredible.

RULING:
No. The CA and the RTC's assessment on the credibility of the prosecution witness and
the veracity of her testimony are given the highest degree of respect, especially if there is no fact
or circumstance of weight or substance that was overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied, which
could affect the result of the case.
Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of Rape are: (1) the offender
had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) such act was accomplished through the use of force,
threat, or intimidation. The above testimony is sufficient to establish that Carlo and his three
companions had carnal knowledge of AAA and that they employed force to consummate the
bestial acts.
Contrary to Carlos' theory, there was no inconsistency in AAA's testimony as to who raped
her. To be sure, there is proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt that Carlo and his three (3)
companions conspired and took turns in raping AAA. The rapes were committed in the following
order, first by Carlo, second by Kalbo, third by Ismael, and fourth by Obat. Thus, the victim was
raped four (4) times. In several cases, the Court held the accused-appellant responsible not only
for the Rape he committed but also for the other counts of Rape that his co-conspirators
perpetrated although they were unidentified or at large.

Appeal is dismissed.

2
BAR OPS 1: SET #1

HEIRS OF TEOFILO PACAÑA AND PEREGRINA APOSTOL vs. SPOUSES MASALIHIT

G.R. No. 215761, September 13, 2021

FACTS:

The instant controversy stemmed from an Amended Complaint for quieting of title,
recovery of ownership and possession, annulment of documents, and damages filed by the Heirs
of Teofilo Pacaña and Peregrina Apostol, namely: Anesia, Natividad, Olga, Manrico and Pedro,
all surnamed Pacaña (Pacaña heirs) against Tining, Elvira, Nonito, Elnor, Romulo, Florentino, Jr.,
and Prescila, all surnamed Masalihit (Masalihit heirs) before the RTC involving a portion of the
parcel of land situated at Brgy. Palengke, Caibiran, Biliran covered by Tax in the name of the
Heirs of Teofilo Pacafia, which is allegedly occupied by the Masalihit heirs.
The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
When the original records of the case were transmitted to the CA, no receipt evidencing proof of
payment of the docket and filing fees were attached. The Pacana heirs stated that when they filed
their Notice of Appeal, they already attached the subject PMOs, all in the name of the payee, "The
Clerk of Court, Court of Appeals," with address in Cebu City. Per Judicial Records Division
reports, however, the subject PMOs were not included in the original records forwarded on appeal
and in the transmittal.
While it found that the subject PMOs were indeed attached to the Notice of Appeal and duly
received by the RTC, it noted that the same were erroneously made payable to the CA Clerk of
Court, and not to the RTC Clerk of Court. It thus held that since the Pacafia heirs failed to pay to
the proper court the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period, the appeal was
not perfected, as the place of payment is not optional but a mandatory requirement for the
appellant. Consequently, it ruled that the appealed decision had become final and executory.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the appeal was not perfected despite the timely filing
of the Notice of Appeal as the PMOs intended as appellate docket and filing fees attached
therewith were addressed to an incorrect payee.

RULING:

Yes. The established rule is that the payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed
period is mandatory. However, notwithstanding the mandatory nature of such requirement, the
Court had also recognized that its strict application is qualified by the following: first, the failure to
pay appellate court docket fees within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not
automatic, dismissal; and second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction with its
exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with
a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances.
It is undisputed that the subject PMOs representing payment of the appellate docket and
filing fees were attached to the Notice of Appeal filed with the RTC within the reglementary period,
leading to the transmittal of the case records to the CA in January 2006.
There was good faith attempt to comply with the requirements of the Rules regarding the
manner of appeal from the RTC's decision. The subject PMOs which were intended for the
payment of the appellate docket fees were actually sent to the RTC within the reglementary period
to appeal, and duly received by the RTC which thereafter transmitted the case records to the CA.
Thus, it cannot be disputed that petitioners clearly intended to file an appeal.
Admittedly, this Court has allowed the filing of an appeal in some cases where a narrow
and stringent application of the rules would have denied it. Indeed, the allowance thereof would
fully serve the demands of substantial justice in the exercise of the Court's equity jurisdiction. The
emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
After all, court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of
the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way
to ferret out such truth.36 Hence, it would be more in accord with justice and equity to allow the
appeal by the Pacana heirs to enable the CA to review the RTC's decision.
The petition is granted.

3
BAR OPS 1: SET #1

EDGARDO I. MABALOT, vs. MAERSK - FILIPINAS CREWING, INC. and/or A.P. MOLLER
A/S,
G.R. No. 224344, September 13, 2021

FACTS:
Mabalot was deployed as Able Seaman by Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. to its foreign
principal A.P. Moller A/S on board “Maersk Stepnica" on March 4, 2011.
In July 2011, he complained to the ship master that he was experiencing pain on his left
shoulder. He was thus advised to seek medical treatment upon the ship's arrival at the port of
Japan. Mabalot underwent medical examination where he was diagnosed with "Omarthritis." He
was medically repatriated. In October 2011, Dr. Alegre, the company-designated doctor,
assessed Mabalot to be suffering from “Frozen Shoulder” and recommended physical therapy but
Mabalot informed Dr. Alegre that he wished to seek a second opinion from a doctor of his choice
and asked to postpone his treatment. On February 2, 2012, Dr. Alegre issued a Grade 11 interim
disability assessment on Mabalot. The doctor noted Mabalot's inability to raise his arm more than
halfway from horizontal to perpendicular and recommended that his physical therapy should
continue. Mabalot was again told to consult a Rehabilitation Medicine Specialist.
Mabalot consulted Dr. Manuel C. Jacinto, Jr. (Dr. Jacinto) who issued a Medical Certificate
declaring him to be suffering from permanent total disability and unfit to go back to work. Mabalot
filed his Complaint with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for payment of permanent
total disability compensation. He averred that he was entitled to permanent total disability
compensation because despite the continuous medical treatment provided for by the company-
designated physician for more than 120 days, he was still unfit to work as a seafarer as he could
no longer raise his left arm and shoulder.
The Labor Arbiter held Mabalot to be entitled only to disability benefits corresponding to
Grade 11 as assessed by Dr. Alegre, giving more weight to the diagnosis of the company-
designated physician. The NLRC found Mabalot's disability to be total and permanent since more
than 120 days had already lapsed from the time of his repatriation yet he still had limited range of
movement on his left shoulder and arm and was still under the medical treatment of the company-
designated physician and his own physician. The CA reversed the NLRC Decision and reinstated
the ruling of the arbiter adjudging Mabalot entitled only to Grade 11 partial disability benefits and
opined that the assessment of a seafarer's disability is lodged with the company-designated
physician who has a better knowledge of a seafarer's condition.

ISSUE: Whether Mabalot is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

RULING:
No. Mabalot is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits. The entitlement of a
seafarer on overseas employment to disability benefits is governed by law, the parties' contracts,
and the medical findings of the company-designated physician, the seafarer's physician of choice
and the opinion of the third doctor.
The POEA-SEC provides that the company-designated physician must issue a final
medical assessment within the 120-day period. The failure of Dr. Alegre to issue a complete and
definite medical assessment within the 120-day period did not automatically render Mabalot's
disability as total and permanent. To reiterate, the February 2, 2012 Medical Report stated that
Mabalot needed to continue physical therapy and seek consultation with a Rehabilitation Medicine
Specialist. Thus, Mabalot remained in need of medical attention, a sufficient justification for the
extension of the 120-day period to the maximum period of 240 days in order for the company-
designated physician to make a complete assessment of his injury and recommend the
appropriate disability rating. Mabalot cannot rely on the Medical Certificate issued by his physician
of choice, Dr. Jacinto. The rule is that while a seafarer has the right to seek the opinion of other
doctors, such right may be availed of on the presumption that the company-designated doctor
had already issued a definite declaration on the medical condition of the seafarer, and the seafarer
finds it disagreeable. Given the lack of certification from the company-designated doctor, Mabalot
cannot rely on the assessment made by his own doctor.
Hence, the appellate court was correct in reinstating the ruling of the LA which awardecl
Mabalot compensation corresponding only to Grade 11 disability rating.
The petition is denied.

4
BAR OPS 1: SET #1

SPOUSES ISIDRO DULAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 215132, September 13, 2021

FACTS:

Sometime in January 1999, Marilou, the daughter-in-law of the spouses Dulos, private
complainants, met petitioner Elena who proposed to sell the subject property to either Marilou or
her in laws. When complainants inquired why a different name was indicated in the title, i.e.,
Virginia Dulay instead of Elena, the latter explained that she and Virginia are one and the same
person. Consequently, the spouses Dulos confirmed their interest to purchase the subject
property, subject to inspection prior to finalizing the sale
.
When the spouses Dulos' monthly payments reached the total amount of P707,000.00
without receiving the promised title or a copy thereof from petitioners, they made further inquiries
on the subject property and learned that: (1) the registered owners indicated in the TCT i.e., Isidro
and Virginia Dulay, are different persons from petitioners; (2) the Isidro Dulay named in the TCT
is petitioner Isidro's uncle and namesake; and (3) the long deceased spouses Isidro and Virginia
Dulay has a daughter, Carmencita. Forthwith, the spouses Dulos stopped paying the monthly
installments.

In refutation, petitioners avowed varying defenses regarding their alleged ownership over
the subject property. On the title thereto, petitioners vacillated in their assertions: (1) the title
remained under reconstitution and has yet to be transferred in their names ·which thus precluded
them from handing over title to the complainants, and (2) petitioner Isidro Dulay is the lawful owner
of the subject property as he is the adopted son of Maria Dulay, the predecessor-in-interest of the
spouses Isidro and Virginia Dulay.

The RTC found petitioners guilty of Estafa. The CA affirmed the petitioner's conviction.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners are guilty of estafa when private complainants were aware that the
subject property was not in their names at the time of the transaction.

RULING:

Yes. As found by the lower courts, petitioners are not the owners, more so registered
owners, of the subject property. Yet they brazenly sold the property to the spouses Dulos which
they do not own under any color of title. In fact, petitioners' deceit is emphasized by the vacillating
defenses they invoked.

Jurisprudence has long established the elements of Estafa by means of deceit as defined
under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC: (1) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means; (2) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made
or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) that the offended party
must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced
to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means; and (4) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

Here, petitioners deceived private complainants and misrepresented to them that: (a) TCT
No. T-2135 covering the subject property is registered in their names; (b) the Virginia indicated in
TCT No. T-2135 is the same person as petitioner Elena; and (c) they are simply reconstituting
their lost title, TCT No. T-2135.

The appeal is dismissed.

5
BAR OPS 1: SET #1

PATRICIO G. GEMINA, ET AL. vs. HEIRS OF GERARDO V. ESPEJO, JR.,

G.R. No. 232682, September 13, 2021

FACTS:
The present controversy involved a property in Quezon City. According to Gemina, he
purchased, owned, occupied with his family, and possessed the subject property openly,
continuously, peacefully, and in the concept of an owner since 1978. On the other hand, the heirs
of Espejo averred that they are co-owners of the subject property. When Gerardo died in 1975,
he was survived by his wife Ma. Teresa Espejo and children Jaime Gerardo Francisco and
Rhodora Patrice, collectively referred to as the heirs of Espejo.
The Espejos filed an action for recovery of possession and prayed for the trial court to
order Gemina and all persons claiming in his behalf to vacate and surrender possession of the
subject property, and to pay reasonable compensation from the time that their possession have
become unlawful, among others.
Gemina’s counsel failed to attend the pre-trial schedule multiple times. The trial court
granted the withdrawal of Gemina's counsel and directed Gemina to secure the services of a new
counsel. However, the trial court regarded the motion for reconsideration as a mere scrap of paper
since it lacked the requisite notice of hearing. Meantime, the heirs of Espejo's ex parte
presentation of evidence proceeded as scheduled.
The trial court ruled in favor of the heirs of Espejo based on preponderance of evidence.
It held that the latter have the better right to possess the subject property. The CA affirmed the
ruling of the trial court and held that held that Gemina could no longer question the propriety of
the trial court's Order allowing the Espejos to present evidence ex parte since he already filed a
motion for reconsideration albeit it was denied by the court a quo for lack of notice of hearing.
Since the Withdrawal of Counsel with Attached Motion for Reconsideration failed to comply with
the mandatory requirement under the rules, Gemina is bound by the Order of the trial court
allowing ex parte presentation of evidence.

ISSUE: (1) Whether CA erred in affirming the court a quo’s Order allowing the respondents to
present their evidence ex parte due to the absence of the petitioner’s counsel during the pre-trial.
Thereby denying petitioner the right to present evidence in violation of his right to due process;
and (2) whether CA erred in affirming the ruling against the petitioner despite respondents’ failure
to prove the identity of the land.

RULING:

1. Yes. When the party-defendant is present, the absence of his counsel during pre-trial shall
not ipso facto result in the plaintiff's ex parte presentation of evidence. Pre-trial serves a significant
purpose in court proceedings. It simplifies, abbreviates and expedites the trial, if not the entire
process of administering and dispensing justice. For this reason, the parties and their counsels
cannot take this stage for granted as it is more than just a part of procedural law or its technicality.
The then Section 5, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court gives the impression that only
the failure of the plaintiff or the defendant to appear in pre-trial would bring about the dismissal of
the action or the eventual ex parte presentation of evidence by the plaintiff, respectively. Taking
the cue from such plain reading, Gemina's counsel argued that his non-appearance during the
pre-trial should not have worked to his client's prejudice as the latter had been prudent in attending
hearings in the proceedings. Simply, Gemina's cause of action should not have been prejudiced
by the non-appearance of his counsel, particularly since on record, the former had been religiously
appearing in the course of the proceedings, including dμring the pre-trial.

2. Yes. The identity of the property and the title of the claimant must be ascertained in an
action to recover; possession of real property pursuant to Article 434 of the Civil Code.
In view of the procedural infirmities of this case to the prejudice of Gemina, We deem it
appropriate to remand the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, to hear and receive
evidence. If only to shed light on a few questions of law to serve as guide, Article 434 of the Civil
Code is controlling in this case. It provides that "[i]n an action to recover, the property must be
identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant's claim. The Petition is granted.

6
BAR OPS 1: SET #1

EMILIANO JOVEN AND CICERO GARCIA VS. SPOUSES TULIO

G.R. No. 204567, August 4, 2021

FACTS:

On August 14, 1997, respondents executed a contract of lease over the property of the
petitioners for a period of 15 years. Thereafter, petitioners constructed a two-storey commercial
building under the name and style of J-G Shopping Mall, purportedly at a cost of P22 Million.
Between November 1999 and June 2000, petitioners defaulted for a balance of
P1,000,000.00.
Respondents served a Notice of Eviction upon the petitioners. Afterwards, respondents
barricaded the entrance. They also issued a notice to the tenants and stallholders stating, inter
alia, that they have reassumed possession, control, and management of J-G Shopping Mall with
immediate effect.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against respondents. The MTCC
declared that respondents did not commit any acts of forcible entry but must be reimbursed the
advance rentals in the amount of P2,250,000.00, as well as one-half of the cost of the
improvements introduced by petitioners. The RTC declared that respondents no longer had any
obligation to reimburse one-half of the cost of the improvements introduced by the latter since by
virtue of a clause in the parties' contract of lease, respondents as lessors did not have any
obligation to refund petitioners. The CA dismissed the petition on technical considerations such
as the failutre of the notary public to indicate his notarial commission number and the defect of
the Verification and Certification against forum shopping.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing outright petitioner’s Rule 42 Petition for Review.

RULING:

At the outset, courts are guided by the precept that technical rules of procedure should be
rules enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice. Imperative justice requires the
correct observance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper
dispensation. Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if we are to expect
fair results therefrom.
Nevertheless, there are times when strict adherence to the rules of procedure must yield
to the search for truth and the demands of substantial justice. When strict application of the rules
would result in irreparable damage, if not grave injustice to a litigant, the Court is compelled to
relax the rules in the higher interest of substantial justice.
Petitioners' Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping substantially complies
with the procedural requirements. Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one
who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs
the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true
and correct. On the other hand, the certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the
plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to
the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all .the plaintiffs or
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the
signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies
with the Rule.
The Court finds that the above verification and certification substantially complies with the
most basic procedural requirements laid down. It cannot be denied that both petitioners share a
common interest in the subject property, as well as common claims and defenses, and a common
cause of action raising the same arguments in support thereof.
As much as possible, cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to
all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some
procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. It is a far better
and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties
a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal
of cases while actually resulting in more delay - which is now the case here - if not a miscarriage
of justice.
The petition is granted.

7
BAR OPS 1: SET #1

ARTURO DACQUEL vs. SPOUSES SOTELO

G.R. No. 203946, August 4, 2021

FACTS:
Subject of the case is a parcel of land located in Malabon City in the names of
respondents-spouses Ernesto and Flora Sotelo (the Sotelos), later registered under the name of
petitioner Arturo Dacquel (Dacquel). In 1994, the Sotelos began the construction of a 7-door
apartment on the subject land. Due to budget constraints, the Sotelos had to borrow the amount
of P140,000.00 from Dacquel, who was Flora Sotelo's (Flora) brother. The construction of the
apartment was completed in 1997.
The Sotelos claimed that the debt of P140,000.00 was agreed to be payable in double the
said amount or P280,000.00, to be collected from the rental income of four out of the seven
apartment units. There was no agreed period within which to pay the loan and the interests.
Dacquel also required the Sotelos to cede to him the subject land as security for the loan.
Consequently, on September 1, 1994, the parties executed a Deed of Sale in
consideration of the amount of P140,000.00, constituting Dacquel as the new registered owner of
the subject land. In March 2000, when Dacquel had collected the full amount of P280,000.00 in
rental income from the four apartment units, the Sotelos asked for the return of the subject lot.
Dacquel, however, allegedly held on to the title and refused to yield the subject lot to the Sotelos.
Thus, on May 29, 2000, the Sotelos filed a Complaint for annulment of title and reconveyance
against Dacquel. According to the former, the title to the subject property should not and could
not have been transferred to Dacquel 's name since the latter was a foreigner despite having
misrepresented his nationality as a Filipino in the disputed Deed of Sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Dacquel. It held that there was no evidence that Dacquel was
of foreign citizenship who was disqualified to own lands in the Philippines as of the date of sale.
The CA reversed the RTC applying the provisions of Articles 1602 and 1604 of the Civil Code and
declaring the September 1, 1994 Deed of Sale to be one of equitable mortgage. It found two
badges of fraud: gross inadequacy of the price and the continued possession by the Sotelos of
the subject property.

ISSUE: (1) Whether the September 1, 1994 Deed of Sale between petitioner and respondents-
spouses constituted an equitable mortgage; and (2) whether petitioner's title to the subject
property should be nullified and reconveyed to respondents-spouses.

RULING:

1.
The transaction between petitioner and respondent spouses was an equitable mortgage.
Decisive for the proper determination of the true nature of the transaction between the parties is
their intent, shown not merely by the contract's terminology but by the totality of the surrounding
circumstances. When in doubt, courts are generally inclined to construe a transaction purporting
to be a sale as an equitable mortgage, which involves a lesser transmission of rights and interests
over the property in controversy.

2.
Title may be nullified and real property may be reconveyed m case of equitable mortgage.
As the transaction between the parties herein was demonstrated to be one of equitable mortgage,
petitioner did not become owner of the subject property but a mere mortgagee thereof. As such,
petitioner was bound by the prohibition against pactum commissorium as embodied in Article
2088 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2088. The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or mortgage,
or dispose of them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.

The mortgagor's default does not operate to automatically vest on the mortgagee the
ownership of the encumbered property. This Court has repeatedly declared such arrangements
as contrary to morals and public policy and thus void. If a mortgagee in equity desires to obtain
title to a mortgaged property, the mortgagee's proper remedy is to cause the foreclosure of the
mortgage in equity and buy it at a foreclosure sale.

Petition is granted in part.

8
BAR OPS 1: SET #1

CARDINEZ, ET AL vs. SPOUSES CARDINEZ

G.R. No. 213001, August 4, 2021

FACTS:

The late Simeona Cardinez owned a 1,950-square meter parcel of land in Bacnotan, La
Union. Upon her demise, her sons, Prudencio, Florentino, and Valentin inherited the land and
equally divided it among themselves. In 1994, Valentin requested Prudencio to donate the ten-
square meter portion of his land being encroached by the fonner's balcony. Prudencio agreed to
Valentin's request out of his love and trust for his brother. Valentin then asked Prudencio and his
wife Cresencia Cardinez (Cresencia) to sign a document that was written in English. Prudencio
and Cresencia were unable to understand the contents. Valentin told the Cardinez couple that
the purported document was for the partition of the inherited land and transfer of their shares in
their respective names. As they were convinced by Valentin's explanation and trusted him,
Prudencio and Cresencia signed the document without even reading and understanding its
contents. The spouses Cardinez were not given a copy of the document after it was signed.
On June 8, 2008, Prudencio found out that a survey of the land was being conducted. He
then inquired if his inherited portion of the land was still in his name. To Prudencio's surprise,
Valentin's children, Lauro Cardinez (Lauro), Isidro Cardinez (Isidro), Jesus Cardinez, Virgie
Cardinez, Flora Laconsay, and Aida Dela Cruz (Aida), (collectively, petitioners) informed him that
he already donated his inherited portion to them through the document that he allegedly executed
with Cresencia.
Henry discovered that TCT No. T-26701 no longer bore his father's name as one of the
co-owners. Instead, it bore the name of Lauro, Valentin's son, by virtue of the Deed of Donation.
Respondents thus filed a complaint against petitioners. Prudencio took the witness stand and
strongly asserted that he did not donate his land to petitioners. Prudencio attested that he and
Cresencia only finished Grade 3 elementary education. On cross-examination, he also admitted
that he appeared before the notary public for notarization of the document. However, the latter
did not explain to him the contents thereof.
The RTC found respondents’ evidence sufficient to prove that the Deed of Donation was
executed through fraudulent means. The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC that petitioners did
not freely give their land to petitioners by virtue of a Deed of Donation.

ISSUE: Whether the donation is valid.

RULING:

No. Deed of Donation is void ab initio in the absence of respondents' consent. Donation
is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another,
who accepts it. An agreement between the donor and the donee is essential like in any other
contract. As such, the requisites of a valid contract under Article 1318 of the Civil Code must
concur, namely: (1) consent of the contracting parties, that is consent to donate the subject land
to petitioners; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; (3) cause of the
obligation which is established.
Consent is absent in the instant case. Consent, to be valid, must have the following
requisites: (1) intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) free; and (3)
spontaneous. The parties' intention should be clear; otherwise, the donation is rendered void in
the absence thereof or voidable if there exists a vice of consent.
We agree with the appellate court that respondents did not give their consent to the
donation of their land to petitioners. Hence, no valid donation had transpired between the parties.
Prudencio categorically and firmly stated that he did not know that the document which
Valentin asked him to sign was a Deed of Donation. In fact, Prudencio did not read the document
before affixing his signature because he trusted his brother that it was for the partition of their
inherited land and the cancellation of its title. Valentin neither read the contents of the document
to respondents nor gave them a copy thereof. The notary public likewise did not explain its
contents to respondents and only asked them to affix their signatures therein.
It is therefore clear that respondents did not donate their land to petitioners. They never
understood the full import of the document because it was neither shown to them nor read by
either Valentin or the notary public. Considering that they did not give their consent at all to the
Deed of Donation, it is therefore null and void.

9
BAR OPS 1: SET #1

ELIDAD AND VIOLETA KHO vs. SUMMERVILLE GENERAL MERCHANDISING & CO., INC.,
G.R. No. 213400, August 4, 2021

FACTS:

Petitioners Elidad Kho (Elidad) and Violeta Kho (Violeta) were charged with Unfair
Competition by respondent Summerville General Merchandising & Co., Inc., (Summerville): That
on January 10, 2000, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one
another, then engaged in a business known as KEC Cosmetic Laboratory in an unfair competition,
and for the purpose of deceiving/defrauding the public in general and the Summerville General
Merchandising and Co. (Summerville) which is engaged in the importation and distribution of
facial cream products with the trademark known as Chin Chun Su sold to the public facial cream
products using tools, implements and equipments in its production, labeling and distribution,
which give and depict the general appearance of the Chin Chun Su facial cream products and
likely influence the purchasers to believe that the same are those of the said Summerville.

The RTC finds no probable cause to hold petitioners for trial. The CA found that RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it found
no probable cause to indict petitioners for unfair competition.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred when it found probable cause to indict petitioners for Unfair
Competition.

RULING:

No. We find that the acts complained of constituted probable cause to charge them with
Unfair Competition. Section 168 (3a) of the Intellectual Property Code provides:

(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance
of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves
or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices
or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be
likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a
manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who
otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public
and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such
goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like
purpose; x x x

The essential elements of an action for unfair competlt10n are: (1) confusing similarity in
the general appearance of the goods, and (2) intent to deceive the public and defraud a
competitor. Here, petitioners' product which is a medicated facial cream sold to the public is
contained in the same pink oval-shaped container which had the mark "Chin Chun Su," as that of
respondent. While petitioners indicated in their product the manufacturer's name, the same does
not change the fact that it is confusingly similar to respondent's product in the eyes of the public.
As aptly found by the appellate court, an ordinary purchaser would not normally inquire about the
manufacturer of the product.

Petitioners' product and that solely distributed by respondent are similar in the following
respects "1. both are medicated facial creams; 2. both are contained in pink, oval-shaped
containers; and 3. both contain the trademark "Chin Chun Su" x x x The similarities far outweigh
the differences. The general appearance of (petitioners') product is confusingly similar to
(respondent)." Verily, the acts complained of against petitioners constituted the offense of Unfair
Competition and probable cause exists to hold them for trial, contrary to the findings of the lower
court.

The Petition is denied.

10
BAR OPS 1: SET #1

ARTURO RADAZA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 201380, August 4, 2021

FACTS:

In 2006, the Province of Cebu was designated as the venue for the 12th Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit that was to be held on January 9-15, 2007.
Beautification projects then commenced in preparation for the event. Among such projects were
the acquisition and installation of street lighting facilities and decorative lampposts in the focal
thoroughfares of Cebu, Mandaue, and Lapu-Lapu cities (hereafter, the street lighting project).
Several groups such as Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, Panaghugpong sa Kabus sa
Dakbayan-KADAMAY wrote the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas alleging anomalies in pricing
and called for the investigation of the transactions entered into by the DPWH in connection to the
street lighting project. The Ombudsman-Visayas found prima facie evidence of overpricing
resulting from the purported collusion between the winning bidders, the private contractors, and
the City Governments of Mandaue and Lapu-Lapu and recommended the institution of criminal
charges and administrative cases against the persons and government officials allegedly involved
in the street lighting project irregularities. Among the respondents was herein petitioner Arturo
Radaza (Radaza), then the City Mayor of Lapu-Lapu City. He was initially recommended to be
indicted for violation of Paragraph (e), Section 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, as well as for administrative liability for Dishonesty/Grave Misconduct.
Radaza moved to quash the Amended Information, which allegedly was the result of the
reinvestigation concluded by the Ombudsman-Visayas in its May 4, 2009 Supplemental
Resolution. Radaza theorizes that the Amended Information cannot be issued ahead of the Joint
Resolution, which contained the preliminary investigation conducted on the charge of Section 3
(e) of RA 3019 against him.
The Sandiganbayan resolved Radaza's Motion to Quash Amended Information in the
negative. It held that the absence or lack of preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the
Amended Information charging Radaza with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, nor does it
render the Amended Information defective as to affect jurisdiction over the same which the
Sandiganbayan has already assumed.

ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash the Amended Information.

RULING:

No. Denials of a motion to quash are improper subjects of a petition for certiorari before
the Supreme Court.
Foremost in our rules of criminal procedure is that motions to quash are interlocutory
orders that are generally unreviewable by appeal or by certiorari. If the motion to quash is denied,
it means that the criminal Information remains pending with the court, which then must proceed
with the trial to determine whether the accused is innocent or guilty of the crime charged against
him. Only when the court promulgates a final judgment of conviction can the accused question
the deficiencies of the Information by raising them as errors by the trial court and as an additional
ground for his exoneration in his appeal.
Jurisprudence explains the reason for the rule:
The reason of the law in permitting appeal only from a final order or judgment, and
not from interlocutory or incidental one, is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action,
which must necessarily suspend the hearing and decision on the merits of the case during
the pendency of the appeal. If such appeal were allowed, the trial on the merits of the case
should necessarily be delayed for a considerable length of time, and compel the adverse
party to incur unnecessary expenses; for one of the parties may interpose as many
appeals as incidental questions may be raised by him and interlocutory orders rendered
or issued by the lower court.
More importantly, certiorari is a remedy of last resort. The special civil action of certiorari will not
lie unless its petitioner has no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. The fact that another remedy - to proceed to trial - is ready, available, and at the full disposal
of the accused herein post-denial of his motion to quash already bars his remedial refuge in
certiorari.
The petition for certiorari is dismissed.

11
BAR OPS 1: SET #1

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. UNIOIL CORPORATION

G.R. No. 204405, August 4, 2021

FACTS:

On January 26, 2009, respondent received a Formal Letter of Demand and Final
Assessment Notice (FAN) finding it liable for deficiency withholding tax on compensation and
deficiency expanded withholding tax for the year ending December 31, 2005.
Unioil filed its protest to the FAN on February 25, 2009 and submitted its supporting
documents on April 24, 2009. Thereafter, [Unioil] filed the instant Petition for Review on November
20, 2009, considering that [the CIR] failed to act on its protest and the one hundred' eighty (180)
day period had already expired.
On December 14, 2009, the CIR filed her Answer, where she raised the following Special
and Affirmative Defenses: (1) All presumptions are in favor of the correctness of the
Assessments; (2) Unioil was fully apprised of the facts and the law on which the Final Assessment
was issued; (3) Contrary to the allegations of [Unioil], not all supporting documents were x x x
submitted to completely support or rebut ~he assessment issued against [it]; (4) The [CIR] had
acted on the protest of the subject taxpayer. However, [she] failed to issue its final resolution on
the protest at the time the instant Petition was filed before this Honorable Court; and (5) The right
to collect the withholding tax liability of [Unioil] has not prescribed.
The CTA Third Division no longer discussed the other issues and arguments raised by the
parties considering its finding that the CIR did not issue a PAN which consequently avoided the
assessment against Unioil for deficiency withholding taxes in the total amount of P536,801.10.
The CIR moved for partial reconsideration 13 and contended that Unioil did receive a PAN since
it was able to file a Protest thereon.
The CTA En Banc rendered the assailed Decision affirming in toto the CTA Third Division.
The CTA En Banc framed the core issue as turning on the CIR' s duty to issue the PAN and the
consequent validity of the deficiency withholding tax (on compensation and expanded)
assessments against Unioil.

ISSUE: Whether CTA erred in finding that respondent was denied its right to due process based
on the purported failure to receive a preliminary Assessment notice.

RULING:

No. The existence and validity of the PAN was the threshold and only issue decided by
the CTA, in Division and En Banc, when it cancelled and set aside the CIR' s assessment for
deficiency withholding taxes ( on compensation and expanded) against Unioil. To stress, the CIR
did not proffer this proof of Unioil's receipt of the PAN in their petition for review before the CTA
En Banc.
Since it was not offered as evidence, there is nothing for this Court to consider. Otherwise
stated, the CIR failed to establish the fact of issuance of the PAN to Unioil. The CIR's failure to
comply with the notice requirements under Section 228 of the 1997 NIRC effectively denied Unioil
of its right to due process. Consequently, the CIR' s assessment was void.
Tax collection must be preceded by a valid assessment to allow the taxpayer to protest
the assessment, present their case and adduce supporting evidence. Without complying with the
unequivocal mandate of first informing the taxpayer of the government's claim, there can be no
deprivation of property, because no effective protest can be made.
The CIR's lack of adherence to due process in its failure to demonstrate issuance of the
PAN is the pith of the CTA's uniform rulings in this case. In fine, We rule that the assessment is
void for not stating the factual and legal bases therefor and the three-year period for assessment
has already prescribed.
Indeed, while the government cannot be estopped by the negligence or omission of its
agents, the mandatory provisions on Sections 20339 and 22840 of the NIRC cannot be rendered
nugatory by the mere act of the CIR. Article 5 of the Civil Code is explicit: "[a]cts executed against
the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes
their validity."
In affirming the CTA's holding that the assessment against Unioil is void, we emphasize
the import of an assessment as containing not only a computation of tax liabilities but also a
demand for payment within a prescribed period. The issuance of an assessment is vital in
determining the period of limitation regarding its proper issuance and the period within which
to protest it.

12
BAR OPS 1: SET #1

PINEDA vs. MIRANDA

G.R. No. 212126, August 4, 2021

FACTS:

On October 27, 1997, herein respondents Abelardo, Elias Carmencita Miranda

(respondents) filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against petitioners. On December 15, 1998,
the MTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, holding the latter to be the registered
owners of 24 parcels of land located in San Fernando, Pampanga which petitioners surreptitiously
and arbitrarily occupied without respondents' consent and knowledge.
On January 6, 2000, respondents, filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution which
was granted by the MTC on February 14, 2000. On May 9, 2006, respondents filed a Complaint
for Revival of Judgment, holding that the Writ of Execution issued on February 14, 2000 was not
implemented within five years from the finalization of the decision. Respondents held that the
judgment was not yet barred by the statute of limitations.
Petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution with the MTC for failure
of respondents to implement the Writ of Execution within five years from the time of its issuance.
Thus, the MTC issued an Order quashing the Writ of Execution.
RTC Branch 43 rendered its Decision in the Complaint for Revival of Judgment in favor of
herein respondents, holding that the RTC Branch 42 Decision dated May 17, 1999 can still be
revived because the filing of the Complaint for Revival of Judgment was still within the 10-year
period.
CA dismissed petitioners' Petition for Annulment of Judgment and ruled that it had no
jurisdiction to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions issued by the MTC. Furthermore,
the CA held that petitioners failed to show why no appeal was first taken from the RTC Branch 42
Decision which affirmed with modification the MTC Decision.

ISSUE: Whether CA erred in denying the appeal pursuant to the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

The Court denies the Petition for Review on Certiorari. Despite the several petitions and
motions filed by the petitioners in different courts throughout the course of the proceedings, the
Court emphasizes that the case at bar is simply a review of the CA and RTC Decisions granting
respondents' Complaint for Revival of Judgment.
An action for revival of judgment is an action with the exclusive purpose of enforcing a
judgment which could no longer be enforced by a motion. The action is best explained in Rule 39,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is
barred by the statute of limitations. (Emphasis supplied)
The revival action is a new action altogether; it is different and distinct from the original
judgment sought to be revived or enforced. It is a new and independent action, wherein the cause
of action is the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to
be enforced is rendered. The Court agrees with the CA especially when it ruled that revival of
judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be revived, either by motion or by
independent action, is already final and executory.
In this case, the RTC Branch 42 Decision dated May 17, 1999 became final and executory
when no further legal action was undertaken by herein petitioners concerning the RTC Branch 42
Decision. Thus, on January 6, 2000 or less than a year after the RTC Branch 42 Decision became
final, respondents filed a motion for the issuance of a Writ of Execution. The Motion was granted
on February 14, 2000. However, seven years later, the RTC Branch 42 Decision had not yet been
executed. Thus, on May 9, 2006, the respondents filed a Complaint for Revival of Judgment in
accordance with the above legal provisions. On the premise that the RTC Branch 42 Decision
was already final and executory, respondents filed a revival suit as a procedural means of
securing the execution of the RTC Branch 42 Decision which had become dormant after the
passage of several years. The revival suit filed by respondents did not intend to re-open any issue
affecting the merits of the case or the propriety or correctness of the first judgment.

13
BAR OPS 1: SET #1

HEIRS OF ELISEO BAGAYGAY vs. HEIRS OF ANASTACIO PACIENTE

G.R. No. 212126, August 4, 2021

FACTS:

On October 8, 1953, Anastacio Paciente, Sr. (Anastacio) was granted a homestead patent
over a parcel of land with an aggregate area of 7.9315 hectares situated in Bafiga, Province of
Cotabato. Thereafter, by virtue of a Deed of Sale allegedly executed by Anastacio in favor of his
brother-in-law, Eliseo Bagaygay (Eliseo), the latter took possession of the subject land,
transferred the title under his name, and later caused the subdivision of the entire land into three
(3) lots. Anastacio and Eliseo passed away.
On December 21, 1999, the heirs of Anastacio filed before the RTC an action for
Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale and the titles, Recovery of Ownership and Possession,
Accounting and Damages against the heirs of Eliseo (petitioners). Respondents alleged that
sometime in 1956, Eliseo, taking advantage of the financial distress of Anastacio, was able to
obtain the latter's title and take possession of his land; that despite repeated demands by
Anastacio, Eliseo refused to return the title and possession of the land; that Eliseo caused the
cancellation of Anastacio's title through a fictitious Deed of Sale; that Anastacio never sold the
subject land; and that the said Deed of Sale was likewise void as it was executed during the five
(5)-year period of prohibition under Section 118 of the Public Land Act.
The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of petitioners and their witnesses that
Anastasio sold the land to Eliseo to defray the expenses for the wedding of respondent Meregildo
in June 1958 and that the Deed of Sale was notarized by Judge Rendon in 1958 or beyond the
5-year prohibitory period. Thus, the RTC ruled that the land was validly transferred to Eliseo. The
CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. The CA gave more weight to the documentary
evidence presented by respondents than to the testimonies of petitioners and their witnesses.
The CA found the latter unreliable, lacking material corroboration, self-serving, and insufficient to
overcome the documentary evidence presented by respondents.

ISSUE: Whether CA seriously erred in not giving weight on the factual findings of the court a quo
that the deed of sale f the subject land was executed on November [28], 1958 as duly proved by
testimonial evidences by reversing the same and declaring that said deed of sale was executed
on November [28], 1956 based on the entry of the primary entry book, but overlooking the fact of
marriage of [respondent] Meregildo Paciente in year 1958 as the primodial reason for the sale of
the subject property in the same year 1958.

RULING:

No. Documentary evidence prevails over testimonial evidence. Section 5, Rule 130 of the
ROC allows the presentation of secondary evidence when the original document has been lost or
destroyed and its unavailability has been duly established. In such a case, a party "may prove its
contents by a copy or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony
of witnesses in the order stated.”
In this case, respondents presented as witness the Registrar of Deeds of South Cotabato
to testify that the original of OCT No. V-2423 as well as the copy of the Deed of Sale executed by
Anastacio in favor of Eliseo had been lost and could no longer be produced, to identify the Primary
Entry Book as secondary evidence, and to prove that the Deed of Sale was executed on
November 28, 1956.
To refute the date of execution stated in the Primary Entry Book, petitioners presented
testimonies declaring that the Deed of Sale was notarized by Judge Rendon on November 28,
1958 and that purchase price was used by Anastacio to defray the wedding expenses of his son,
respondent Meregildo, in June 1958. To corroborate these testimonies, petitioners submitted as
evidence the Marriage Contract of respondent ·Meregildo to show that his marriage was
celebrated on June 6, 1958 and the bio-data of Judge Rendon to show that he was admitted to
the bar only in 1957, and thus, could not have notarized the document in 1956.
Regrettably, the testimonial evidence of petitioners cannot prevail over the documentary
evidence presented by respondents. As a rule, documentary evidence takes precedence over
testimonial evidence as the latter can easily be fabricated. It also cannot be denied that the human
memory on dates is frail and thus, there is no reasonable assurance of its correctness unless the
date is an extraordinary or unusual one for the witness.
Petition is denied for lack of merit.

14
BAR OPS 1: SET #1

SPOUSES EUGENIO PONCE AND EMILIANA NEROSA vs. JESUS ALDANESE

G.R. No. 216587, August 4, 2021

FACTS:

Under dispute is a parcel of unregistered land which consists of 3.9030 hectares that is
located in Dugoan, Sibonga, Cebu. In 1973, respondent Jesus Aldanese (Jesus) inherited the lot
from his father, Teodoro Aldanese, Sr. He diligently paid its real property taxes from that time on
under a Tax Declaration which is in his name.

Jesus stayed in the city because of his business. In August 1996, he was surprised when
he discovered that the Spouses Ponce encroached upon the entire portion of his lot. He
immediately demanded that they vacate his land and to return it to him. However, the Spouses
Ponce refused to heed Jesus' demand on the ground that the said lot is part of the land that they
bought from his brother Teodoro Aldanese, Jr. Jesus then asked his brother Teodoro Jr. about
the purported sale of his land. However, Teodoro Jr. denied selling his brother's land to the
Ponces. He explained to Jesus that what he sold to the Spouses Ponce was a parcel of land that
he owned in Masa, Dumanjung, Cebu. Jesus filed a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages with receivership against the spouses.

The RTC held that Jesus sufficiently established that he owned the said lot so as to be
entitled to its possession. The Spouses Ponce appealed before the CA on the ground that the
complaint should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription, and that Jesus failed to
sufficiently prove his ownership over the subject land to be entitled to its possession but to no
avail. It held that prescription has not yet set in since the complaint was filed within the 30-year
prescriptive period for real actions over immovable properties. It also held that the land sold to
the Ponces does not include the lot of Jesus since it was specifically stated in the Deed of
Absolute Sale that it only covers the land in Masa, Dumanjug, Cebu. Lastly, Jesus sufficiently
proved his ownership over the subject land as shown by the tax declaration in his name.

ISSUE: Whether Jesus is the absolute owner of Lot No. 6890 to be entitled of possession thereof.

RULING:

Yes. While the tax declaration is not conclusive proof of ownership of Jesus over the
subject land, it is an indication however that he possesses the property in the concept of an owner
for nobody in his or her right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his or her
actual or constructive possession. As stressed all too well in Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of
Santiago:

Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept
of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim
of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property
and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but
also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act
strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

Interestingly, the Ponces failed to present any proof of ownership such as payment of real
property taxes or a certificate of title in their names over Lot No. 6890. True, the Spouses Ponce
presented TD 22-006688 to support their claim over the land. However, it did not state the lot
number of the land for which it was issued. Moreover, a careful perusal of the declaration reveals
that the land for which it was issued is located in Masa, Dumanjug, Cebu and has different
boundaries compared to Lot No. 6890.

Petition is denied.

15
BAR OPS 1: SET #1

IGNACIO S. DUMARAN vs. TERESA LLAMEDO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 217583, August 4, 2021

FACTS:

Ignacio S. Dumaran (Dumaran) is an authorized dealer of Pilipinas Shell Philippines

operating two gasoline stations within General Santos City, namely Linmax Shell Station and
Lagao Traveller Shell Station. In September 2009, Sharon Magallanes (Magallanes), a former
employee of Linmax Shell Station, introduced Teresa Llamedo (Llamedo) and Ginalyn Cubeta
(Cubeta) to DumararL They proposed for Dumaran to supply them diesel and gasoline fuel. They
all agreed that Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta will pay in cash. Although they initially paid in
cash, they subsequently paid for the purchase of the fuel using Llamedo's personal checks.

On November 23, 2009, Dumaran filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against Llamedo,
Magallanes and Cubeta alleging, among others that Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta opened a
joint account in Peninsula Rural Bank and with post-dated checks from that account, purchased
on credit diesel and gasoline fuel from him; that they incurred an outstanding obligation of
P7,416;918,55 in October and November 2009 alone; that the post-dated checks Llamedo,
Magallanes and Cubeta issued to pay the obligation were dishonored for insufficient
funds/account closed; and despite demands, they failed to pay the total outstanding obligation.

RTC denied Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta's Motion to Quash Writ of Attachment.
However, CA set aside the Order of the RTC and held that the applicant for a writ of preliminary
attachment, in this case Dumaran, did not sufficiently show factual circumstances of the alleged
fraud.

ISSUE: Whether CA erred when it held that the allegations of fraud in the complaint and the
affidavit do not meet the requirements of the law to sustain the issuance of a writ of attachment.

RULING:

The CA rightfully held that Dumaran' s allegations in both his Complaint and Affidavit failed
to show that Dumaran was defrauded into accepting the offer of Llamedo, Magallanes and
Cubeta; and that Llarnedo, Magallanes and Cubeta intended from the beginning to not pay their
obligations. The Complaint and Affidavit did not specifically show wrongful acts or willful omissions
that Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta knowingly committed to deceive Dumaran to enter into the
contract or to perform the obligation. The pleadings filed lacked the particulars of time, persons
and places to support the serious assertions that Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta were
disposing of their properties to defraud Dumaran.

Non-payment of a debt or nonperformanceof an obligation does not automatically equate

to a fraudulent act. Being a state of mind, fraud cannot be merely inferred from a bare allegation
of non-payment of debt or non-performance of obligation. Dumaran failed to prove with sufficient
specificity the alleged fraudulent acts of Llamedo, Magallanes and Cubeta.

The petition is denied.

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BAR OPS 1: SET #1

HEIRS OF BARTOLOME SANCHEZ vs. HELDELITA ABRANTES, ET AL.

G.R. No. 234999, August 4, 2021

FACTS:

A Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Confirmation of Absolute Sale and

Reconveyance (First Complaint) was filed on March 19, 2002 by Horacio C. Abrantes (Horacio)
against the heirs of Bartolome J. Sanchez, Jr. (Bartolome), namely: Edna, Gary, David, Ernesto,
all surnamed Sanchez; Bernadette S. Tan; Christine S. Belanger; and Marissa S. Bensurto
(petitioners). Subject of the complaint is a registered parcel of land situated in Poblacion,
Municipality of Butuan, Province of Agusan del Norte. Bartolome's heirs moved to dismiss the
First Complaint, but before the RTC could act on the motion, Horacio died on April 27, 2003 which
moved for the dismissal of the case.
More than four years after the death of Horacio, his heirs: respondents, together with Mae
Abrantes Rhoades and Maria Louella Abrantes Torres, filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity
of Sale, Reconveyance, and Damages (Second Complaint) against petitioners. The Second
Complaint pertains to the same disputed property.
Notably, the two complaints involve the same subject matter, substantially the same
parties, the same causes of action, and the same underlying objectives, or reliefs sought, i.e.,
nullification of sale executed by the late Horacio in favor of Bartolome covering the disputed
property. RTC dismissed the Second Complaint on the ground of res judicata relative to the First
Dismissal Order. The CA affirmed the Second Dismissal Order on the ground of litis pendentia,
not res judicata, relative to the First Complaint.

ISSUE: (1) Whether the CA committed reversible error in ruling that the First Dismissal Order was
a nullity; and (2) whether the CA gravely erred in dismissing the Second Complaint on the ground
of litis pendentia.

RULING:

The requisites of litis pendentia are: "(a) the identity of parties, or at least such as
representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that
judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other. On the other hand, the elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new
action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits;
and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action. Undoubtedly, the second and fourth elements attend in the case.
Controversy lies with respect to the first and third elements, i.e., whether the First Dismissal Order
is final and whether it is an adjudication on the merits.
The rule on substitution by the heirs in case of death of a party· is not a matter of
jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. It is designed to preserve the representation of the
deceased party in the suit through his/her heirs or the duly appointed legal representative of
his/her estate. Noncompliance with this rule results in the "denial of the right to due process for
the heirs who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, would be substantially affected by the
decision rendered therein.
After gaining knowledge off the First Dismissal Order, respondents retained Atty. Battad
as their counsel in opting to file the Second Complaint. Respondents' action· is tantamount to an
implied ratification of Atty. Battad's actions. Indeed, respondents' inaction against the First
Dismissal Order, notwithstanding the lack of formal substitution of parties under Section 3, Rule
16 which could have otherwise given rise to violation of due process, gives validity to the
dismissal, as well as its final and executory character. Furthermore, having established that the
First Dismissal Order is valid and final, there is a need to characterize whether the dismissal was
an adjudication on the merits, and/or one without prejudice.
The First Dismissal Order is valid and final, thus there is no pending action to speak of as
would constitute litis pendentia to the filing of the Second Complaint with the RTC Branch 3; and
the First Dismissal Order, albeit final, is not an adjudication on the merits and is one without
prejudice, thus negating the applicability of res judicata.
The petition is denied.

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BAR OPS 1: SET #1

TUAZON, ET AL vs. FUENTES

G.R. No. 241699, August 4, 2021

FACTS:

The case involves a complaint for declaration of nullity/annulment of contracts of lease

executed by a husband without the written consent of his wife. Dennis T. Uy Tuazon (Tuazon)
and Myra V. Fuentes (Fuentes) are the registered co-owners of two parcels of land Pasay City
where a building constructed thereon known as DM Building (subject property).

Pending the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Tuazon and
Fuentes, the RTC authorized Fuentes to sell the subject property, along with the other common
properties of the estranged spouses, in order to pay for the support pendente lite of Fuentes and
their adoptive daughter. The subject property was then sold to Philippine Coast Guard Savings
and Loan Association, Inc. (PCGSLAI) pursuant to the court order. The judgment declaring their
marriage null and void attained finality and the liquidation of the subject property was included.

The subject property was occupied by two companies owned by Tuazon and his family:
World Wiser International, Inc. (World Wiser) and Jerzon Manpower and Trading, Inc. (Jerzon).
Fuentes sent a notice to vacate the subject property to World Wiser. At that time, Jerzon was
already ordered closed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and thus, no
longer in the subject property. RTC approved the contract to sell between Fuentes mid PCGSLAl
and further directed the execution of a contract of sale. Subsequently, Fuentes was compelled to
file an unlawful detainer suit against World Wiser for its refusal to vacate the subject property. In
its defense, World Wiser presented the contracts of lease executed by Tuazon in its favor for the
period of July 1, 2012 to July 1, 2022. World Wiser further presented contracts of lease between
Tuazon and Jerzon. Fuentes filed a complaint for declaration of nullity/annulment of contract. The
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Fuentes which declared the contracts of lease null and void.
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the findings of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether CA committed reversible error declaring the questioned contracts of lease as
void.

RULING:

No. The law requires that the disposition of common property by the husband as an
administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the
disposition is void. The law requires written consent of the other spouse, otherwise, the disposition
of common property is void. The requirement under the law is clear, categorical, unambiguous,
and makes no room for interpretation. Under the rules on statutory construction, where the law is
clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice
but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.

The lower courts aptly declared the lease contracts executed without the written consent
of Fuentes as void. The subject of the contracts of lease involved common property; hence, for
the contracts to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. It is immaterial
whether Fuentes had knowledge of the questioned transactions as the latter admittedly did not
give her written consent to the contracts. Significantly, Tuazon himself admitted that Fuentes did
not participate nor sign the contracts of lease. Unfortunately for petitioners, knowledge or being
merely aware of a transaction is not consent.

The petition is denied.

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BAR OPS 1: SET #1

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YYY

G.R. No. 252865, August 4, 2021

FACTS:

On January 24, 2007, victims, AAA and BBB, two years old and eight years old
respectively, were in the house of accused-appellant, their uncle, being the first cousin of their
father. While they were on the second floor of accused-appellant's house, accused-appellant
removed his clothes as well as BBB 's shorts and panty. Accused-appellant then placed himself
on top of BBB, and inserted his penis into her vagina. BBB kept on pushing accused-appellant
until the latter stopped. Thereafter, accused-appellant went to AAA, undressed her, and laid on
top of her. BBB tried to pull accused-appellant from AAA, who was already crying. Then, accused-
appellant left.
On January 25, 2007, while the victims' parents were away harvesting copra, accused-
appellant entered their house. Thereafter, accused-appellant proceeded to undress BBB and
again laid on top of her. He spread BBB's legs and inserted his penis into her vagina. BBB felt
pain when the penis touched her vagina. BBB kicked accused appellant. Accused-appellant
proceeded towards AAA, undressed her, and laid on top of her. BBB kicked accused-appellant
when the latter tried to insert his penis into AAA's vagina. Accused-appellant then left. The next
day, or on January 26, 2007, BBB was at accused-appellant's house looking for the latter's
mother. When BBB entered the door, accused-appellant pushed her inside the house and placed
her on top of the table. Accused-appellant removed BBB's shorts and panty, spread her legs, and
inserted his penis into her vagina. Accused-appellant was not able to fully penetrate his penis as
BBB kept on pushing him until he got up and left. After several days, AAA informed her mother
what accused appellant did to them. AAA testified that accused-appellant inserted his penis into
her vagina which caused pain, but declared that the incident happened only once. The victims'
mother also testified and affirmed that AAA was the one who informed her of the incident.
In defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations against him. He insisted that on
January 24, 25, and 26, 2007, he was working as a stay in store helper for a certain. Accused-
appellant argued that the reason for filing the instant criminal cases against him is the quarrel
between his parents and the victims' parents over a parcel of land. The RTC found the accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of Statutory Rape. The CA affirmed
accused-appellant's conviction.

ISSUE: Whether CA erred in affirming accused-appellant’s conviction.

RULING: No.

First, accused-appellant's claim of minority is purely self-serving. In the case at bench, the
Court finds that the defense failed to show that there was an absence of any document or other
satisfactory evidence showing accused-appellant's minority or that the pertinent documents
enumerated in the IRR of RA 9344 cannot be obtained for the trial court. Neither could the Court
give weight to the testimonial evidence of the defense claiming minority. It is well to stress that
aside from accused-appellant's claim that he was 17 years old at the time of the commission of
the act, there was no other corroborating evidence to prove his date of birth.

Second, the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of accused appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. Records disclose that accused appellant is guilty of Statutory Rape committed
against BBB and Qualified Statutory Rape committed against AAA. Statutory Rape under Article
266-A of the RPC 1s committed when: (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (2)
the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat, or
intimidation, whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness, or whether it was done
through fraud or grave abuse of authority. In Statutory Rape, it is enough that the age of the victim
is proven and that there was sexual intercourse, for the absence of free consent is conclusively
presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. At that age, the law presumes that the victim
does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. In
the case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, found that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all elements of Statutory Rape. Undeniably, BBB was eight years old, while
AAA was only two years old when they were raped by accused-appellant. AAA was born on March
8, 200436 while BBB was born on October 7, 1998.

The appeal is denied.

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BAR OPS 1: SET #1

PS1 DINO WALLY COGASI, SPO2 JERRY SILAWON, SPO1 REYNALDO BADUA, AND
PO2 GEOFFREY BANTULE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 249002, August 4, 2021

FACTS:

On July 16, 2012, private respondents were gathered at the house of Juliet T. Arcita,
waiting for their 2:00 p.m meeting at the Tuba Municipal Police Station, to settle the case of
robbery with violence filed by Sonny against Nobren Nagen, Ian Gabriel, and Oliver Gabriel.
However, Juliet received a text message from the sister of Nobren requesting the meeting to push
through at 3:00 p.m. instead. Hence, at about 2:00 p.m, while private respondents are seated in
front of the house of Juliet, five men in civilian clothing approached them and asked who among
them is Sonny. Sonny identified himself. Thereafter, the group announced that they are arresting
Sonny for selling illegal drugs that same morning of July 16, 2012. When asked, the five men
were not able to produce their identification and warrant of arrest but merely introduced
themselves as policemen from Station 10 and from the NBI. Because of this, private respondents
blocked the five men from arresting Sonny. When the five men could not get hold of Sonny, they
drew their pistols. Two of them fired their firearms in the air before pointing the same to private
respondents while saying, "apay kayat yu nga agayos ti dara dituy?" (Why, do you want that blood
will flow here?). Because it was then a holiday, the neighbors of private respondents came out of
their houses to see what the commotion was all about. Seeing that more people are gathered,
the five men picked up the empty shells of bullets they fired and left the place. Immediately after
the shots were fired, Mencio ran to the nearest police outpost to call for assistance from SPO2
Rufino Dagdagan. Together, they went immediately to the house of Juliet, but they were not able
to see the five men who had already left. The following day, private respondents found an empty
shell of a caliber 9mm firearm and a bunch of car keys in the vicinity where the commotion
happened. On July 31, 2012, private respondents were arrested by virtue of warrants of arrest
issued against them in relation to the charges for violation of R.A. No. 9165 and direct assault.
According to petitioners, private respondents retaliated by filing criminal and administrative cases
against them, including this case for grave threats.
The MCTC convicted petitioners for the crime of grave threats. The RTC rendered its
Decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. The RTC concurred with the factual findings of
the MCTC and held that petitioners' act of firing their guns in the air and shouting, "apay kayat
yun nga agayos ti dara ditoy" constitutes grave threats. However, the CA reversed and set aside
the judgment of acquittal issued by the RTC for having been made with grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners claim that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in acquitting them. Hence, the reversal of petitioners' acquittal violates their
right against double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether the CA violated petitioners' constitutional right against double jeopardy when it
reversed the RTC's judgment of acquittal for grave threats.

RULING:

Yes. A judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final,
unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation. This iron clad rule has only one
exception: grave abuse of discretion that is strictly limited whenever there is a violation of the
prosecution's right to due process such as when it is denied the opportunity to present evidence
or where the trial is sham or when there is a mistrial, rendering the judgment of acquittal void.
Here, in setting aside, petitioners' acquittal, the CA reviewed the evidence presented by
the parties before the MCTC. The CA held that the RTC mistakenly ruled that there were
inconsistencies in the testimony of one of the prosecution witnesses which belie the theory of the
prosecution that petitioners pointed their guns at private respondents and uttered threatening
words. The CA based its reversal of the acquittal of petitioners on the RTC's alleged
misappreciation of evidence. It is a settled rule that misappreciation of the evidence is a mere
error of judgment that does not qualify as an exception to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine. An error
of judgment is not correctible by a writ of certiorari.
The fact remains that petitioners' right against double jeopardy already attached when the
RTC acquitted them. Hence, no amount of error of judgment will constitute an error of jurisdiction
that would have allowed the CA to review the same through a petition for certiorari.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari is granted.

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