HO 62 - Legal & Judicial Ethics - Chair's Cases

2020 BAR REVIEW LEGAL & JUDICIAL ETHICS
CHAIR’S CASES Handout No. 62

Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen
LEGAL ETHICS
Respondent merely posited that the notarized documents presented by complainant were
“tampered and adulterated” or were results of forgery, but he failed to present any proof.
Respondent also resorted to a sweeping and unsupported statement that he never notarized
any document. Accordingly, the reasonable conclusion is that respondent repeatedly notarized
documents without the requisite notarial commission.
Respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant’s allegations. Per Section 1, Rule
131 of the Rules of Court, the burden of proof is vested upon the party who alleges the truth of
his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services,
Office of the Court Administrator v. Gutierrez, 666 SCRA 29 (2012), where a party resorts to bare
denials and allegations and fails to submit evidence in support of his defense, the determination
that he committed the violation is sustained. Tenoso vs. Echanez, 696 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 8384 April
11, 2013
Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest
and that “a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State―the administration of justice―as an officer of the court.”
Accordingly, “[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but
also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.” Tenoso vs. Echanez, 696 SCRA 1, A.C. No.
8384 April 11, 2013
In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants, courts, other

lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary documents posing as public
instruments; Evidently, respondent’s conduct falls miserably short of the high standards of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers. It is proper that he be
sanctioned.
The duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.
“[N]otarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private document
to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary
proof of its authenticity and due execution.” Tenoso vs. Echanez, 696 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 8384 April
11, 2013
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In its ordinary sense, attorney’s fees “represent the reasonable compensation a client pays his
or her lawyer for legal service rendered.” In its extraordinary sense, attorney’s fees “are
awarded as indemnity for damages the losing party pays the prevailing party.”
The award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the rule. It is not awarded to the
prevailing party “as a matter of course.” Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney’s fees
cannot be recovered in the absence of stipulation, except under specific circumstances: (1) When
exemplary damages are awarded; (2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest; (3) In criminal
cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff; (4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action
or proceeding against the plaintiff; (5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith
in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim; (6) In actions for legal
support; (7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled
workers; (8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability
laws; (9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime; (10) When at least
double judicial costs are awarded; (11) In any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. Lui Enterprises,
Inc. vs. Zuellig Pharma Corporation, 719 SCRA 88, G.R. No. 193494 March 12, 2014
Practice of law is “any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience.”
It includes “[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession” or “[rendering
any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.” Work in
government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice of law. In Cayetano
v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 (1991), this court cited the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission and agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring
“[the use of] legal knowledge or legal talent” is practice of law. Lingan vs. Calubaquib, 727 SCRA
341, A.C. No. 5377 June 30, 2014
The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights (CHR) Regional
Director constitutes practice of law.
Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney — a member of the bar in good standing and
authorized to practice law. When the Regional Director loses this authority, such as when he or
she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a necessary
qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer must desist

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from holding the position of Regional Director. Lingan vs. Calubaquib, 727 SCRA 341, A.C. No.
5377 June 30, 2014
Performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights (CHR) Regional Director constituted
practice of law.
Atty. Baliga’s performance of generally managerial functions was not supported by the record. It
was also immaterial. He held the position of Commission on Human Rights Regional Director
because of his authority to practice law. Without this authority, Atty. Baliga was disqualified to
hold that position. All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director constituted practice of law. Atty. Baliga should have desisted from holding his position
as Regional Director. Lingan vs. Calubaquib, 727 SCRA 341, A.C. No. 5377 June 30, 2014
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a
superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.—A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. Lingan vs.
Calubaquib, 727 SCRA 341, A.C. No. 5377 June 30, 2014
The general rule is that errors of counsel bind the client.
The reason behind this rule was discussed in Building Care Corporation v. Macaraeg, 687 SCRA
643 (2012): It is however, an oft-repeated ruling that the negligence and mistakes of counsel bind
the client. A departure from this rule would bring about never ending suits, so long as lawyers
could allege their own fault or negligence to support the client’s case and obtain remedies and
reliefs already lost by operation of law. The only exception would be, where the lawyer’s gross
negligence would result in the grave injustice of depriving his client of the due process of law.
Stanley Fine Furniture vs. Gallano, 743 SCRA 306, G.R. No. 190486 November 26, 2014

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When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for
filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account
to the client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose,
he must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to
return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a
blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The lawyer’s failure to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that
he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed
in him by the client. San Pedro vs. Mendoza, 744 SCRA 203, A.C. No. 5440 December 10, 2014
Elements of a Valid Retaining Lien.
Respondent’s assertion of a valid lawyer’s lien is also untenable. A valid retaining lien has the
following elements: An attorney’s retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following
elements concur: (1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client’s funds,
documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. Further, the attorney’s
retaining lien is a general lien for the balance of the account between the attorney and his client,
and applies to the documents and funds of the client which may come into the attorney’s
possession in the course of his employment. Respondent did not satisfy all the elements of a valid
retaining lien. He did not present evidence as to an unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. The
enumeration of cases he worked on for complainants remains unsubstantiated. When there is
no unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees, lawyers cannot validly retain their client’s funds or
properties. San Pedro vs. Mendoza, 744 SCRA 203, A.C. No. 5440 December 10, 2014
The rule is that when there is a disagreement, or when the client disputes the amount claimed
by the lawyer . . . the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the
payment of his fees.
Assuming that respondent had proven all the requisites for a valid retaining lien, he cannot
appropriate for himself his client’s funds without the proper accounting and notice to the client.
San Pedro vs. Mendoza, 744 SCRA 203, A.C. No. 5440 December 10, 2014

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The agency created between a counsel and a client is a highly fiduciary relationship.
A counsel becomes the eyes and ears in the prosecution or defense of his or her client’s case.
This is inevitable because a competent counsel is expected to understand the law that frames
the strategies he or she employs in a chosen legal remedy. Counsel carefully lays down the
procedure that will effectively and efficiently achieve his or her client’s interests. Counsel should
also have a grasp of the facts, and among the plethora of details, he or she chooses which are
relevant for the legal cause of action or defense being pursued. It is these indispensable skills,
among others, that a client engages. Of course, there are counsels who have both wisdom and
experience that give their clients great advantage. There are still, however, counsels who wander
in their mediocrity whether consciously or unconsciously. Ong Lay Hin vs. Court of Appeals, 748
SCRA 198, G.R. No. 191972 January 26, 2015
The expectation to maintain a high degree of legal proficiency and attention remains the same
whether the represented party is a high-paying client or an indigent litigant.
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is “imbued with utmost trust and confidence.”
Lawyers are expected to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in managing cases
entrusted to them. They commit not only to review cases or give legal advice, but also to
represent their clients to the best of their ability without need to be reminded by either the client
or the court. The expectation to maintain a high degree of legal proficiency and attention remains
the same whether the represented party is a high-paying client or an indigent litigant. Ramirez
vs. Buhayang-Margallo, 749 SCRA 13, A.C. No. 10537 February 3, 2015
Respondent Atty. Margallo failed to exhaust all possible means to protect complainant
Ramirez’s interest, which is contrary to what she had sworn to do as a member of the legal
profession.
The lack of communication and coordination between respondent Atty. Margallo and her client
was palpable but was not due to the lack of diligence of her client. This cost complainant Ramirez
his entire case and left him with no appellate remedies. His legal cause was orphaned not because
a court of law ruled on the merits of his case, but because a person privileged to act as counsel
failed to discharge her duties with the requisite diligence. Her assumption that complainant
Ramirez was no longer interested to pursue the Appeal is a poor excuse. There was no proof that
she exerted efforts to communicate with her client. This is an admission that she abandoned her
obligation as counsel on the basis of an assumption. Respondent Atty. Margallo failed to exhaust
all possible means to protect complainant Ramirez’s interest, which is contrary to what she had

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sworn to do as a member of the legal profession. For these reasons, she clearly violated Canon
17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Ramirez vs.
Buhayang-Margallo, 749 SCRA 13, A.C. No. 10537 February 3, 2015
It is the lawyer that receives the notices and must decide the mode of appeal to protect the
interest of his or her client.
This information asymmetry is even more pronounced in an attorney-client relationship. Lawyers

are expected not only to be familiar with the minute facts of their cases but also to see their
relevance in relation to their causes of action or their defenses. The salience of these facts is not
usually patent to the client. It can only be seen through familiarity with the relevant legal
provisions that are invoked with their jurisprudential interpretations. More so with the intricacies
of the legal procedure. It is the lawyer that receives the notices and must decide the mode of
appeal to protect the interest of his or her client. Ramirez vs. Buhayang-Margallo, 749 SCRA 13,
A.C. No. 10537 February 3, 2015
Between the lawyer and the client, it is the lawyer that should bear the full costs of indifference
or negligence.
The relationship between a lawyer and her client is regarded as highly fiduciary. Between the
lawyer and the client, it is the lawyer that has the better knowledge of facts, events, and
remedies. While it is true that the client chooses which lawyer to engage, he or she usually does
so on the basis of reputation. It is only upon actual engagement that the client discovers the level
of diligence, competence, and accountability of the counsel that he or she chooses. In some
cases, such as this one, the discovery comes too late. Between the lawyer and the client,
therefore, it is the lawyer that should bear the full costs of indifference or negligence. Ramirez
It is the Supreme Court (SC) that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers;
The findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), however, can only be
recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers of the SC.
Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers.
Under the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory,

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consistent with the constitutional powers of this court. Its recommended penalties are also, by
its nature, recommendatory. Despite the precedents, it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
that recognizes that the severity of the infraction is worth a penalty of two-year suspension. We
read this as a showing of its desire to increase the level of professionalism of our lawyers. Ramirez
Respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra violated the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) in notarizing a document without requiring the presence of the affiants.
We agree and adopt the findings of fact of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent Atty.
Arturo B. Cefra violated the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility in notarizing
a document without requiring the presence of the affiants. The notarization of documents
ensures the authenticity and reliability of a document. As this court previously explained:
Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it
admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and
the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public
and appended to a private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it
engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires
preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing
upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally. Anudon vs. Cefra, 750 SCRA
231, A.C. No. 5482 February 10, 2015
The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice reiterates that acknowledgments require the affiant to
appear in person before the notary public.
Rule II, Section 1 states: SECTION 1. Acknowledgment.—“Acknowledgment” refers to an act in

which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and
presents and integrally complete instrument or document; (b) is attested to be personally known
to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as
defined by these Rules; and (c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the
instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument
or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and
voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the
authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis supplied) Rule IV, Section 2(b) states further: SEC. 2.
Prohibitions.—. . . (b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory
to the instrument or document — (1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the

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notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. Anudon vs.
Cefra, 750 SCRA 231, A.C. No. 5482 February 10, 2015
Notarization is the act that ensures the public that the provisions in the document express the
true agreement between the parties.
Transgressing the rules on notarial practice sacrifices the integrity of notarized documents. It is
the notary public who assures that the parties appearing in the document are the same parties
who executed it. This cannot be achieved if the parties are not physically present before the
notary public acknowledging the document. Anudon vs. Cefra, 750 SCRA 231, A.C. No. 5482
February 10, 2015
Lawyers must treat all information received from their clients with utmost confidentiality in
order to encourage clients to fully inform their counsels of the facts of their case.
The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client relationship.
Lawyers must treat all information received from their clients with utmost confidentiality in order
to encourage clients to fully inform their counsels of the facts of their case. In Hornilla v. Atty.
Salunat, 405 SCRA 220 (2003), this court explained what conflict of interest means: There is
conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an
issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.” This rule covers
not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which
no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof. Bernardino vs. Santos, 750 SCRA 637, A.C. No. 10584 February 18, 2015

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Lawyers are expected to be honest in all their dealings.
As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to uphold the rule of law. In doing so, lawyers are
expected to be honest in all their dealings. Unfortunately, respondent was far from being honest.
With full knowledge that Rufina Turla had another heir, he acceded to Mariano Turla’s request
to prepare the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Bernardino vs. Santos, 750 SCRA 637, A.C. No.
10584 February 18, 2015
The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is based on Rule 139-B, Section
1 of the Rules of Court, which provides that “[p]roceedings for the disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court (SC) motu proprio, or by the IBP . . .
upon the verified complaint of any person.”
However, this authority is only to assist this court with the investigation of the case, to determine
factual findings, and to recommend, at best, the penalty that may be imposed on the erring
lawyer. Bernardino vs. Santos, 750 SCRA 637, A.C. No. 10584 February 18, 2015
In issuing the worthless checks, Atty. De Vera did not only violate the law, but she also broke
her oath as a lawyer and transgressed the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera violated the following provisions:
Cannon [sic] 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03 – A
lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. Enriquez vs. De Vera, 753 SCRA 235, A.C. No. 8330 March 16, 2015
In De Jesus v. Collado, 216 SCRA 619 (1992), this court found respondent lawyer guilty of serious
misconduct for issuing postdated checks that were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
In the case at bar, no conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has as yet been obtained against
respondent Collado. We do not, however, believe that conviction of the criminal charges raised

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against her is essential, so far as either the administrative or civil service case or the disbarment
charge against her is concerned. Since she had admitted issuing the checks when she did not have
enough money in her bank account to cover the total amount thereof, it cannot be gainsaid that
the acts with which she was charged would constitute a crime penalized by B.P. Blg. 22. We
consider that issuance of checks in violation of the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes serious
misconduct on the part of a member of the Bar. Enriquez vs. De Vera, 753 SCRA 235, A.C. No.
8330 March 16, 2015
A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in
a public or private capacity.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. . . . . CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. . . . . Rule
7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession. Enriquez vs. De Vera, 753 SCRA 235, A.C. No. 8330 March 16, 2015
A lawyer “may be removed or otherwise disciplined ‘not only for malpractice and dishonesty in
his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which
showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the
law confer to him.’”
Membership in the bar requires a high degree of fidelity to the laws whether in a private or
professional capacity. “Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his
reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public’s faith in the Legal Profession as a whole.”
Enriquez vs. De Vera, 753 SCRA 235, A.C. No. 8330 March 16, 2015
Recording every notarial act in the notarial register is required under Rule VI the Notarial Rules.
Respondent is administratively liable for his negligence in keeping and maintaining his notarial
register. Recording every notarial act in the notarial register is required under Rule VI the Notarial
Rules. Pitogo vs. Suello, 753 SCRA 360, A.C. No. 10695 March 18, 2015

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Failure to properly record entries in the notarial register is also a ground for revocation of
notarial commission.
SECTION 1. Revocation and Administrative Sanctions.—. . . . (b) In addition, the Executive Judge
may revoke the commission of, or impose appropriate administrative sanctions upon, any notary
public who: . . . . (2) fails to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning
his notarial acts. Pitogo vs. Suello, 753 SCRA 360, A.C. No. 10695 March 18, 2015
All notaries public are duty-bound to protect the integrity of notarial acts by ensuring that they
perform their duties with utmost care.
Notarial acts give private documents a badge of authenticity that the public relies on when they
encounter written documents and engage in written transactions. Hence, all notaries public are
duty-bound to protect the integrity of notarial acts by ensuring that they perform their duties
with utmost care. Pitogo vs. Suello, 753 SCRA 360, A.C. No. 10695 March 18, 2015
When respondent negligently failed to enter the details of the three (3) documents on his
notarial register, he cast doubt on the authenticity of complainant’s documents.
Hence, when respondent negligently failed to enter the details of the three (3) documents on his
notarial register, he cast doubt on the authenticity of complainant’s documents. He also cast
doubt on the credibility of the notarial register and the notarial process. He violated not only the
Notarial Rules but also the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to
promote respect for law and legal processes. Pitogo vs. Suello, 753 SCRA 360, A.C. No. 10695
March 18, 2015
The notarial commission is a license held personally by the notary public. It cannot be further
delegated. It is the notary public alone who is personally responsible for the correctness of the
entries in his or her notarial register.
Respondent’s secretary cannot be blamed for the erroneous entries in the notarial register. The
notarial commission is a license held personally by the notary public. It cannot be further
delegated. It is the notary public alone who is personally responsible for the correctness of the
entries in his or her notarial register. Respondent’s apparent remorse may assuage the injury

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done privately, but it does not change the nature of the violation. Pitogo vs. Suello, 753 SCRA
360, A.C. No. 10695 March 18, 2015
Jurisprudence reiterates that “[l]itigants who are represented by counsel should not expect that
all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their cases.”
This court has held that “equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights[,]” and a
party should “periodically keep in touch with his counsel, check with the court, and inquire about
the status of the case.” Bracero vs. Arcelo, 754 SCRA 45, G.R. No. 212496 March 18, 2015
The distance from counsel’s office to the court should not be used as an excuse by counsel from
keeping himself updated with the status of the cases he is handling.
Equally unconvincing and disappointing is the submission of petitioner’s counsel that even if he
received a copy of the motion for execution, “to require undersigned counsel to verify the
existence of the decision with the Regional Trial Court is to unfairly burden the undersigned
counsel and to unduly exonerate the clerk of court who was remiss in his duty in sending a copy
of the Decision to the undersigned counsel,” and that the court in Danao is 30 kilometers away
from his office in Mandaue. Counsels have the duty to serve their clients with competence and
diligence. The distance from counsel’s office to the court should not be used as an excuse by
counsel from keeping himself updated with the status of the cases he is handling. Bracero vs.
Arcelo, 754 SCRA 45, G.R. No. 212496 March 18, 2015
Lawyers should maintain, at all times, “a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four (4)-fold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in
the Code [of Professional Responsibility] (CPR).”
Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in all
their dealings. Lawyers should maintain, at all times, “a high standard of legal proficiency,
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the
legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied
in the Code [of Professional Responsibility].” Members of the bar took their oath to conduct
themselves “according to the best of [their] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to [their] clients[,]” and to “delay no man for money or malice[.]” These

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mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients considering the highly fiduciary
nature of their relationship. Clients entrust their causes — life, liberty, and property — to their
lawyers, certain that this confidence would not be abused. Luna vs. Galarrita, 762 SCRA 1, A.C.
No. 10662 July 7, 2015
The Rules of Court requires lawyers to secure special authority from their clients when entering
into a compromise agreement that dispenses with litigation.
Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that “[s]pecial powers of attorney are necessary in the
following cases: . . . (3) To compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right
to appeal from a judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a
prescription already acquired[.]” The Rules of Court thus requires lawyers to secure special
authority from their clients when entering into a compromise agreement that dispenses with
litigation: SEC. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients.—Attorneys have authority to bind their
clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing and in taking appeals,
and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority,
compromise their client’s litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client’s claim but the full
amount in cash. Luna vs. Galarrita, 762 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 10662 July 7, 2015
Members of the bar must always conduct themselves in a way that promotes “public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.”
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Members of the bar must always conduct
themselves in a way that promotes “public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.”
Even though complainant Luna effectively abandoned the issue on respondent Atty. Galarrita’s
lack of authority to compromise the civil case when he demanded the payment of the settlement
proceeds, this does not erase his acts of abusing the trust and confidence reposed in him by
complainant Luna. Luna vs. Galarrita, 762 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 10662 July 7, 2015
The Supreme Court (SC) has held that “any money collected for the client or other trust property
coming into the lawyer’s possession should promptly be reported by him [or her].”
Worse, respondent Atty. Galarrita not only failed to promptly inform complainant Luna of the
former’s receipt of the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds but also refused to turn over the

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amount to complainant Luna. This court has held that “any money collected for the client or other
trust property coming into the lawyer’s possession should promptly be reported by him [or her].”
Rule 16.03 under Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that: CANON 16 –
A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession. . . . . Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. Luna vs. Galarrita,
762 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 10662 July 7, 2015
In several cases, the Supreme Court (SC) has disciplined lawyers who failed or refused to remit
amounts received for and on behalf of their clients.
“The penalty for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility usually ranges
from suspension for six months, to suspension for one year, or two years, and even
disbarment[,]”depending on the circumstances of each case. Luna vs. Galarrita, 762 SCRA 1, A.C.
No. 10662 July 7, 2015
Later jurisprudence clarified that this rule excluding civil liability determination from
disciplinary proceedings “remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in
nature — for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client
in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement.”
In Ronquillo v. Atty. Cezar, 491 SCRA 1 (2006), the parties entered a Deed of Assignment after
which respondent received P937,500.00 from complainant as partial payment for the townhouse
and lot. However, respondent did not turn over this amount to developer Crown Asia, and no
copy of the Contract to Sell was given to complainant. This court suspended Atty. Cezar from the
practice of law for three (3) years, but did not grant complainant’s prayer for the return of the
P937,500.00. Ronquillo held that “[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial
of an action, but rather investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its officers.” Thus,
disciplinary proceedings are limited to a determination of “whether or not the attorney is still fit
to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.” Later jurisprudence clarified that this rule
excluding civil liability determination from disciplinary proceedings “remains applicable only to
claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature — for instance, when the claim involves moneys
received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not

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intrinsically linked to his professional engagement.” This court has thus ordered in administrative
proceedings the return of amounts representing legal fees. This court has also ordered restitution
as concomitant relief in administrative proceedings when respondent’s civil liability was already
established: Although the Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding primarily
to exact the ethical responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court’s silence about
the respondent lawyer’s legal obligation to restitute the complainant will be both unfair and
inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning the client’s funds or property
should be required to still litigate in another proceeding what the administrative proceeding has
already established as the respondent’s liability. That has been the reason why the Court has
required restitution of the amount involved as a concomitant relief in the cited cases of Mortera
v. Pagatpatan, supra, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, supra, Small v. Banares, supra. Luna vs. Galarrita,
762 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 10662 July 7, 2015
Lawyers are not entitled to unilaterally appropriate their clients’ money for themselves by the
mere fact that the clients owe them attorney’s fees.
They must give prompt notice to their clients of any receipt of funds for or on behalf of their
clients. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for a lawyer’s duty to
“account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.” Respondent Atty.
Galarrita refused to comply with these duties, warranting his suspension from the practice of
law. Luna vs. Galarrita, 762 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 10662 July 7, 2015
Elements Required for Full Recognition of Attorney’s Lien.
The elements required for full recognition of attorney’s lien are: “(1) lawyer-client relationship;
(2) lawful possession of the client’s funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for
attorney’s fees.” Respondent Atty. Galarrita must prove the existence of all these elements.
However, this is not the main issue in this disbarment case against him, and the validity of his
retaining lien defense was not established. Counter evidence even exists such as respondent Atty.
Galarrita’s Letter dated August 12, 2003 waiving any compensation for his services in the
foreclosure case. Complainant Luna also raises respondent Atty. Galarrita’s negligence in
handling the case, and lack of supporting receipts for the incurred expenses respondent Atty.
Galarrita seeks to reimburse. Luna vs. Galarrita, 762 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 10662 July 7, 2015

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The Supreme Court (SC) has defined contempt of court as: a willful disregard or disobedience
of a public authority.
In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a
legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent
language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect
due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising
of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing
within its legal signification a variety of different acts. (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
In this case, respondents committed acts that are considered indirect contempt under Section 3
of Rule 71. In addition, respondents disregarded the Code of Professional Responsibility when
they retained the name of respondent Revilla in their firm name. Canon 3, Rule 3.02 states: Rule
3.02. In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall be used. The
continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates
in all its communications that said partner is deceased. Kimteng vs. Young, 765 SCRA 410, G.R.
No. 210554 August 5, 2015
Maintaining a disbarred lawyer’s name in the firm name is different from using a deceased
partner’s name in the firm name.
Canon 3, Rule 3.02 allows the use of a deceased partner’s name as long as there is an indication
that the partner is deceased. This ensures that the public is not misled. On the other hand, the
retention of a disbarred lawyer’s name in the firm name may mislead the public into believing
that the lawyer is still authorized to practice law. The use of a deceased partner’s name in the
firm name was the issue in the consolidated cases Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the
Firm Name “Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo” and In the matter of the Petition for
Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name “Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, 92
SCRA 1 (1979).” Petitioners prayed that they be allowed to continue including Atty. Alexander
Sycip’s and Atty. Herminio Ozaeta’s names in their firm names. This court denied the petitions,
explaining that there is a possibility of deception in the use of a deceased partner’s name. Also,
Article 1815 of the Civil Code shows that the partners in a partnership should be “living persons
who can be subjected to liability.” Further, the use of a deceased partner’s name is not a custom
in the Philippines. On the contrary, the local custom shows that the firm name usually identifies
the senior members or partners of a law firm. Kimteng vs. Young, 765 SCRA 410, G.R. No. 210554
August 5, 2015

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The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that the use of the name of a person who is not authorized
to practice law constitutes contempt of court.
The use of a deceased partner’s name in a law firm’s name was allowed upon the effectivity of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, with the requirement that “the firm indicates in all its
communications that said partner is deceased.” On the other hand, this court has ruled that the
use of the name of a person who is not authorized to practice law constitutes contempt of court.
Kimteng vs. Young, 765 SCRA 410, G.R. No. 210554 August 5, 2015
In certifying through his or her signature that he or she has read the pleading, that there is
ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay, a lawyer asserts his or her
competence, credibility, and ethics.
A counsel’s signature on a pleading is neither an empty formality nor even a mere means for
identification. Through his or her signature, a party’s counsel makes a positive declaration. In
certifying through his or her signature that he or she has read the pleading, that there is ground
to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay, a lawyer asserts his or her competence,
credibility, and ethics. Signing a pleading is such a solemn component of legal practice that this
court has taken occasion to decry the delegation of this task to nonlawyers as a violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Intestate Estate of Jose Uy vs. Maghari III, 768 SCRA 384,
A.C. No. 10525 September 1, 2015
A counsel’s signature is such an integral part of a pleading that failure to comply with this
requirement reduces a pleading to a mere scrap of paper totally bereft of legal effect.
Thus, faithful compliance with this requirement is not only a matter of satisfying a duty to a court
but is as much a matter of fidelity to one’s client. A deficiency in this respect can be fatal to a
client’s cause. Apart from the signature itself, additional information is required to be indicated
as part of a counsel’s signature: (1) Per Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a counsel’s address
must be stated; (2) In Bar Matter No. 1132, this court required all lawyers to indicate their Roll
of Attorneys number; (3) In Bar Matter No. 287, this court required the inclusion of the “number
and date of their official receipt indicating payment of their annual membership dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the current year”; in lieu of this, a lawyer may indicate his or
her lifetime membership number; (4) In accordance with Section 139 of the Local Government
Code, a lawyer must indicate his professional tax receipt number; (5) Bar Matter No. 1922
required the inclusion of a counsel’s Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of
Compliance or Certificate of Exemption; and (6) This court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC

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required the inclusion of a counsel’s contact details. Intestate Estate of Jose Uy vs. Maghari III,
768 SCRA 384, A.C. No. 10525 September 1, 2015
The inclusion of a counsel’s Roll of Attorneys number, professional tax receipt number, and
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) receipt (or lifetime membership) number is intended to
preserve and protect the integrity of legal practice.
They seek to ensure that only those who have satisfied the requisites for legal practice are able
to engage in it. With the Roll of Attorneys number, parties can readily verify if a person purporting
to be a lawyer has, in fact, been admitted to the Philippine bar. With the professional tax receipt
number, they can verify if the same person is qualified to engage in a profession in the place
where he or she principally discharges his or her functions. With the IBP receipt number, they
can ascertain if the same person remains in good standing as a lawyer. These pieces of
information, in the words of Galicto v. Aquino III, 667 SCRA 150 (2012), “protect the public from
bogus lawyers.” Paying professional taxes (and the receipt that proves this payment) is likewise
compliance with a revenue mechanism that has been statutorily devolved to local government
units. Intestate Estate of Jose Uy vs. Maghari III, 768 SCRA 384, A.C. No. 10525 September 1,
2015
The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or exemption from) Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seeks to ensure that legal practice is reserved only for those
who have complied with the recognized mechanism for “keeping abreast with law and
jurisprudence, maintaining the ethics of the profession, and enhancing the standards of the
practice of law.”
The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or exemption from) Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seeks to ensure that legal practice is reserved only for those
who have complied with the recognized mechanism for “keep[ing] abreast with law and
jurisprudence, maintain[ing] the ethics of the profession[,] and enhanc[ing] the standards of the
practice of law.” Intestate Estate of Jose Uy vs. Maghari III, 768 SCRA 384, A.C. No. 10525
September 1, 2015

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Any claim that the error was committed by a secretary is inconsequential.
As this court has stated in Gutierrez v. Zulueta, 187 SCRA 607 (1990): The explanation given by
the respondent lawyer to the effect that the failure is attributable to the negligence of his
secretary is devoid of merit. A responsible lawyer is expected to supervise the work in his office
with respect to all the pleadings to be filed in court and he should not delegate this responsibility,
lock, stock and barrel, to his office secretary. If it were otherwise, irresponsible members of the
legal profession can avoid appropriate disciplinary action by simply disavowing liability and
attributing the problem to the fault or negligence of the office secretary. Such situation will not
be countenanced by this Court. Intestate Estate of Jose Uy vs. Maghari III, 768 SCRA 384, A.C.
No. 10525 September 1, 2015
In failing to accurately state his professional details, respondent already committed punishable
violations.
Here, respondent violated Bar Matter No. 287, Section 139(e) of the Local Government Code, Bar
Matter No. 1132, and Bar Matter No. 1922, a total of seven (7) times. The sheer multiplicity of
instances belies any claim that we are only dealing with isolated errors. Regardless whether
isolated or manifold, these inaccuracies alone already warrant disciplinary sanctions. However,
as shall be discussed, respondent also acted with dishonest, deceitful, and even larcenous intent.
Respondent is not only accountable for inaccuracies. This case is far from being a matter of
clerical errors. He willfully used false information. In so doing, he misled courts, litigants — his
own client included — professional colleagues, and all others who may have relied on the records
and documents on which these false details appear. Respondent’s act of filing pleadings that he
fully knew to contain false information is a mockery of courts, chief of which is this court,
considering that this court is the author of all but one of the regulations that respondent violated.
It is this court that requires respondent to indicate his Roll of Attorneys number, IBP official
receipt number, and MCLE compliance number. Intestate Estate of Jose Uy vs. Maghari III, 768
SCRA 384, A.C. No. 10525 September 1, 2015
In using false information in his pleadings, respondent unnecessarily put his own client at risk.
In using false information in his pleadings, respondent unnecessarily put his own client at risk.
Deficiencies in how pleadings are signed can be fatal to a party’s cause as unsigned pleadings
produce no legal effect. In so doing, respondent violated his duty to his clients. It is tempting to
think that the only thing respondent did was to deviate from required formalities. Respondent
was, himself, quite dismissive, stating that he did nothing more than “cursorily [go] over . . .

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without giving any . . . attention to details . . . that . . . are matters of record and are easily
verifiable.” It is equally tempting to think it would be excessive of this court to engage in an overly
rigid, pedantic emphasis on formalistic niceties. Intestate Estate of Jose Uy vs. Maghari III, 768
SCRA 384, A.C. No. 10525 September 1, 2015
It is axiomatic that when a client is represented by counsel, notice to counsel is notice to client.
Manaya v. Alabang Country Club, Inc., 525 SCRA 140 (2007), involved the dismissal of an appeal
before the National Labor Relations Commission due to its late filing. Respondent Alabang
Country Club filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals and argued that its lawyer
abandoned it, thus, it was “not effectively represented by a competent counsel.” The Court of
Appeals granted the Petition for Certiorari. Petitioner Fernando G. Manaya then filed a Petition
for Review on Certiorari before this court, which was granted. This court explained that: It is
axiomatic that when a client is represented by counsel, notice to counsel is notice to client. In
the absence of a notice of withdrawal or substitution of counsel, the Court will rightly assume
that the counsel of record continues to represent his client and receipt of notice by the former is
the reckoning point of the reglementary period. As heretofore adverted, the original counsel did
not file any notice of withdrawal. Neither was there any intimation by respondent at that time
that it was terminating the services of its counsel. Francisco vs. Flores, 782 SCRA 13, A.C. No.
10753 January 26, 2016
Respondent’s failure to immediately update his clients and act upon the denial of the Motion
for Reconsideration, which resulted in the expiration of the period for filing a Petition for Relief
from Judgment, clearly points to negligence on his part.
In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo, 749 SCRA 13 (2015), this court found Atty. Mercedes
Buhayang-Margallo guilty of violating Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
because she failed to file the appellant’s brief within the reglementary period that resulted in the
loss of available remedies for her client. Assuming that the Finezas learned about the denial of
the Motion for Reconsideration only on June 29, 2009, this would further support the allegations
in the Complaint that respondent violated Canon 18. Respondent alleges that he learned about
the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration when he received a copy of the Motion for Issuance
of Writ of Execution. While he did not state the exact date when he received a copy of the
Motion, the record shows that he received it on June 3, 2009. If it were true that the Finezas
learned about the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on June 29, 2009, then it shows that
respondent did not immediately inform his clients about the status of the forcible entry case. It
took him more than 20 days to inform his clients on the matter. Respondent’s failure to

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immediately update his clients and act upon the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, which
resulted in the expiration of the period for filing a Petition for Relief from Judgment, clearly points
to negligence on his part. Francisco vs. Flores, 782 SCRA 13, A.C. No. 10753 January 26, 2016
The Supreme Court (SC) finds rude and disrespectful the utterances made by respondent against
complainant, who was already seventy (70) years old at that time.
The tenor of the message cannot be taken lightly. It was meant to annoy and humiliate
complainant. Not only was it ill mannered; it was also unbecoming of a lawyer, considering that
he did it to an elderly and in front of co-litigants and National Labor Relations Commission
employees. Elderly people have, in our society, occupied a revered stature. We teach our children
to treat elders with utmost respect. A special week is dedicated to the elderly every year to give
them recognition and honor in order to raise the people’s level of awareness of the important
role senior citizens play in society. Canlapan vs. Balayo, 784 SCRA 135, A.C. No. 10605 February
17, 2016
Respondent’s display of improper attitude and arrogance toward an elderly constitute conduct
unbecoming of a member of the legal profession and cannot be tolerated by the Supreme Court
(SC).
As servants of the law, lawyers must be model citizens and set the example of obedience to law.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal
proficiency and morality. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expresses the
lawyer’s fundamental duty to “uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land[,] and promote
respect for law[.]” Respondent’s display of improper attitude and arrogance toward an elderly
constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession and cannot be tolerated by
this court. Respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Canlapan
vs. Balayo, 784 SCRA 135, A.C. No. 10605 February 17, 2016
Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 requires a lawyer to employ respectful and restrained language in keeping
with the dignity of the legal profession.
Although the remark was allegedly made in response to undue provocation and pestering on the
part of complainant, respondent should have exercised restraint. Notwithstanding his personal

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opinion on the merits of complainant’s claims (in light of the defective notarization in the
Memorandum of Agreement dated June 7, 2014), it was improper for respondent to state that
even if complainant brought 10 (or as many) lawyers as he wanted, he would not prosper in his
claims against the Mayon Council. Careless remarks such as this tend to create and promote
distrust in the administration of justice, undermine the people’s confidence in the legal
profession, and erode public respect for it. “Things done cannot be undone and words uttered
cannot be taken back.” Canlapan vs. Balayo, 784 SCRA 135, A.C. No. 10605 February 17, 2016
Ill feelings between litigants may exist, but they should not be allowed to influence counsels in
their conduct and demeanor towards each other or towards suitors in the case.
As officers of the court and members of the bar, lawyers are expected to be always above
reproach. They cannot indulge in offensive personalities. They should always be temperate,
patient, and courteous both in speech and conduct, not only towards the court but also towards
adverse parties and witnesses. Canlapan vs. Balayo, 784 SCRA 135, A.C. No. 10605 February 17,
2016
The withdrawal of any case, when it has been duly filed and docketed with a court, rests upon
the discretion of the court, and not at the behest of litigants.
Respondent filed multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer. All
the elements necessary for the commission of forum shopping are present. The Court of Appeals
correctly held that respondent could have easily filed a manifestation that the other petitioners
had yet to verify the First Petition. Respondent’s reason that the failure of other petitioners to
verify the First Petition may imperil the issuance of a temporary restraining order cannot justify
the willful violation of the rule against forum shopping. Respondent must be reminded that the
withdrawal of any case, when it has been duly filed and docketed with a court, rests upon the
discretion of the court, and not at the behest of litigants. Once a case is filed before a court and
the court accepts the case, the case is considered pending and is subject to that court’s
jurisdiction. Thus, it was incumbent upon respondent to inform the court or division where he
subsequently filed his Second Petition that he had already filed the First Petition. The Court of
Appeals correctly held that courts cannot take judicial notice of actions that have been filed either
before their courts or before other courts. Re: Decision dated August 19, 2008, 3rd Division,
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 79904 vs. Ferrer, 784 SCRA 118, A.C. No. 8037 February
17, 2016

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In an administrative case against a lawyer, the complainant has the burden of proof to show
by preponderance of evidence that the respondent lawyer was remiss of his or her duties and
has violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Here, it is established that respondent was engaged as counsel for complainant to represent her
in various collection cases and that he received P61,500.00 from her as attorney’s fees.
Respondent also admitted withdrawing from the cases allegedly due to complainant’s
uncooperative demeanor. However, there is no showing that complainant agreed to the
withdrawal, or that respondent filed the proper motion before the courts where the cases were
pending. Chang vs. Hidalgo, 788 SCRA 474, A.C. No. 6934 April 6, 2016
Respondent simply opted to withdraw from the cases without complying with the requirements
under the Rules of Court and in complete disregard of his obligations towards his client.
In Layos v. Villanueva, 743 SCRA 334 (2014), this Court reiterated that a “lawyer must constantly
keep in mind that his [or her] actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his [or
her] client.” Due to respondent’s withdrawal as complainant’s counsel for the cases, he did not
anymore attend any of the hearings. Since the withdrawal was without the conformity of
complainant, new counsel was not engaged. This necessarily resulted in the summary dismissal
of the collection cases as alleged by complainant. Complainant could have obtained the services
of another lawyer to represent her and handle her cases with the utmost zeal and diligence
expected from officers of the court. However, respondent simply opted to withdraw from the
cases without complying with the requirements under the Rules of Court and in complete
disregard of his obligations towards his client. Chang vs. Hidalgo, 788 SCRA 474, A.C. No. 6934
April 6, 2016
The offensive attitude of a client is not an excuse to just disappear and withdraw from a case
without notice to the court and to the client, especially when attorney’s fees have already been
paid.
Respondent admittedly withdrew from the cases but he failed to provide any evidence to show
that complainant, his client, agreed to the withdrawal or, at the very least, knew about it. The
offensive attitude of a client is not an excuse to just disappear and withdraw from a case without
notice to the court and to the client, especially when attorney’s fees have already been paid.
Chang vs. Hidalgo, 788 SCRA 474, A.C. No. 6934 April 6, 2016

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There is no reason for respondent to retain the professional fees paid by complainant for her
collection cases when there was no showing that respondent performed any act in furtherance
of these cases.
Restitution of acceptance fees to complainant is proper. Respondent failed to present any

evidence to show his alleged efforts for the cases. He failed to attend any of the hearings before
the Commission on Bar Discipline. There is no reason for respondent to retain the professional
fees paid by complainant for her collection cases when there was no showing that respondent
performed any act in furtherance of these cases. Chang vs. Hidalgo, 788 SCRA 474, A.C. No. 6934
April 6, 2016
Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading.
In the context of this case, his surreptitious actuations reveal illicit intent. Not only did he do
unauthorized practice, his acts also show badges of offering to peddle influence in the Office of
the Ombudsman. Fajardo vs. Alvarez, 790 SCRA 520, A.C. No. 9018 April 20, 2016
Under Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Memorandum Circular No. 17,
Series of 1986, government officials or employees are prohibited from engaging in private
practice of their profession unless authorized by their department heads.
More importantly, if authorized, the practice of profession must not conflict nor tend to conflict
with the official functions of the government official or employee. Fajardo vs. Alvarez, 790 SCRA
520, A.C. No. 9018 April 20, 2016
By assisting and representing complainant in a suit against the Ombudsman and against
government in general, respondent put himself in a situation of conflict of interest.
In this case, respondent was given written permission by the Head of the National Center for
Mental Health, whose authority was designated under Department of Health Administrative
Order No. 21, Series of 1999. However, by assisting and representing complainant in a suit against
the Ombudsman and against government in general, respondent put himself in a situation of
conflict of interest. Respondent’s practice of profession was expressly and impliedly conditioned
on the requirement that his practice will not be “in conflict with the interest of the Center and

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the Philippine government as a whole.” Fajardo vs. Alvarez, 790 SCRA 520, A.C. No. 9018 April
20, 2016
By appearing against the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent is going against the same
employer he swore to serve.
There is basic conflict of interest here. Respondent is a public officer, an employee of

government. The Office of the Ombudsman is part of government. By appearing against the
Office of the Ombudsman, respondent is going against the same employer he swore to serve. In
addition, the government has a serious interest in the prosecution of erring employees and their
corrupt acts. Under the Constitution, “[p]ublic office is a public trust.” The Office of the
Ombudsman, as “protectors of the [P]eople,” is mandated to “investigate and prosecute . . . any
act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.” Fajardo vs. Alvarez, 790 SCRA 520, A.C.
No. 9018 April 20, 2016
A conflict of interest exists when an incumbent government employee represents another

government employee or public officer in a case pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
The incumbent officer ultimately goes against government’s mandate under the Constitution to
prosecute public officers or employees who have committed acts or omissions that appear to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Furthermore, this is consistent with the constitutional
directive that “[p]ublic officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the [P]eople,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.” Fajardo vs. Alvarez, 790 SCRA 520, A.C. No. 9018 April 20, 2016
In disbarment or disciplinary cases pending before this Court, the complainant must prove his
or her allegations through substantial evidence.
In Advincula v. Macabata, 517 SCRA 600 (2007), this Court dismissed a complaint for disbarment
due to the lack of evidence in proving the complainant’s allegations: As a basic rule in evidence,
the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations — ei incumbit probation, qui
decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit. In the case at
bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of her. A mere

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charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.
Fajardo vs. Alvarez, 790 SCRA 520, A.C. No. 9018 April 20, 2016
Lawyers should not be hastily disciplined or penalized unless it is shown that they committed a
transgression of their oath or their duties, which reflects on their fitness to enjoy continued
status as a member of the bar.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear
cases of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer
of the court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should
merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral
character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to
such extent as to clearly show the lawyer’s unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The
dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced the lawyer to
commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also
be considered. Fajardo vs. Alvarez, 790 SCRA 520, A.C. No. 9018 April 20, 2016
Respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) when
he communicated to or, at the very least, made it appear to complainant that he knew people
from the Office of the Ombudsman who could help them get a favorable decision in
complainant’s case.
We find that respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
when he communicated to or, at the very least, made it appear to complainant that he knew
people from the Office of the Ombudsman who could help them get a favorable decision in
complainant’s case. Lawyers are mandated to uphold, at all times, integrity and dignity in the
practice of their profession. Respondent violated the oath he took when he proposed to gain a
favorable outcome for complainant’s case by resorting to his influence among staff in the Office
where the case was pending. Fajardo vs. Alvarez, 790 SCRA 520, A.C. No. 9018 April 20, 2016

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Respondent’s act of ensuring that the case will be dismissed because of his personal
relationships with officers or employees in the Office of the Ombudsman is unlawful and
dishonest.
Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules 1.01, and 1.02
prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
Respondent’s act of ensuring that the case will be dismissed because of his personal relationships
with officers or employees in the Office of the Ombudsman is unlawful and dishonest. Canon 7
of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to always “uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession.” In relation, Canon 13 mandates that lawyers “shall rely upon the
merits of his [or her] cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives
the appearance of influencing the court.” A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain
influence and receive a favorable outcome for his or her client violates Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. This act of influence peddling is highly immoral and has no place in
the legal profession. Fajardo vs. Alvarez, 790 SCRA 520, A.C. No. 9018 April 20, 2016
In the interest of ridding itself of corrupt personnel who encourage influence peddling, and in
the interest of maintaining the high ethical standards of employees in the judiciary, the
Supreme Court (SC) did not hesitate in dismissing its own employee from government service
when she peddled influence in the Court of Appeals (CA).
What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often the actuations of a few erring court
personnel peddling influence to party-litigants, creating the impression that decisions can be
bought and sold, ultimately resulting in the disillusionment of the public. This Court has never
wavered in its vigilance in eradicating the so-called “bad eggs” in the judiciary. And whenever
warranted by the gravity of the offense, the supreme penalty of dismissal in an administrative
case is meted to erring personnel. Fajardo vs. Alvarez, 790 SCRA 520, A.C. No. 9018 April 20,
2016
In cases involving influence peddling or bribery, “[t]he transaction is always done in secret and
often only between the two (2) parties concerned.”
In response to his alleged text messages, respondent claims that complainant must have
confused him with her other contacts. Respondent found it “mesmerizing” that complainant was
able to save all those alleged text messages from two (2) years ago. Moreover, assuming these
messages were “true, still they [were] not legally admissible as they [were] covered by the
lawyer-client privileged communication as those supposed texts ‘[had been] made for the

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purpose and in the course of employment, [were] regarded as privileged and the rule of exclusion
[was] strictly enforced.’” In cases involving influence peddling or bribery, “[t]he transaction is
always done in secret and often only between the two parties concerned.” Nevertheless, as
found by the Investigating Commissioner and as shown by the records, we rule that there is
enough proof to hold respondent guilty of influence peddling. Fajardo vs. Alvarez, 790 SCRA 520,
A.C. No. 9018 April 20, 2016
Lawyers who offer no skill other than their acquaintances or relationships with regulators,
investigators, judges, or Justices pervert the system, weaken the rule of law, and debase
themselves even as they claim to be members of a noble profession.
Practicing law should not degenerate to one’s ability to have illicit access. Rather, it should be
about making an honest appraisal of the client’s situation as seen through the evidence fairly and
fully gathered. It should be about making a discerning and diligent reading of the applicable law.
It is foremost about attaining justice in a fair manner. Law exists to temper, with its own power,
illicit power and unfair advantage. It should not be conceded as a tool only for those who cheat
by unduly influencing people or public officials. Fajardo vs. Alvarez, 790 SCRA 520, A.C. No. 9018
April 20, 2016
Even assuming Atty. Roxas pursued Republic Real Estate Corporation’s (RREC’s) case at his
firm’s expense and on a contingent basis, the Supreme Court (SC) cannot allow such an
agreement. An agreement of this nature is champertous and void for being against public
policy.
Atty. Roxas claims that he was RREC’s lawyer for more than 20 years. He shouldered its litigation
expenses “at all levels of the judiciary” amounting to hundreds of millions, provided the company
with an office space for several years, paid the allowance of former RREC President Atty.
Francisco Candelaria and his staff, and sustained the company’s continued operations. Atty.
Roxas did not furnish proof to back up his allegations. Under the March 15, 2000 letter-
agreement between RREC and RGR & Associates, a decision in RREC’s favor would entitle Atty.
Roxas’ firm to at least 3.5 hectares of land or a minimum of P175 million from the judgment
award, depending on the land or amount to be awarded by this Court. However, the letter-
agreement is silent on reimbursement of RGR & Associates’ advanced payment. Even assuming
Atty. Roxas pursued RREC’s case at his firm’s expense and on a contingent basis, we cannot allow
such an agreement. An agreement of this nature is champertous and void for being against public
policy. In Nocom v. Camerino, 578 SCRA 390 (2009): A champertous contract is defined as a
contract between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit, whereby the stranger pursues the party’s

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claim in consideration of receiving part or any of the proceeds recovered under the judgment; a
bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit, by which such third person undertakes to carry on
the litigation at his own cost and risk, in consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the
proceeds or subject sought to be recovered. An Agreement whereby the attorney agrees to pay
expenses of proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is champertous. Such agreements are
against public policy especially where as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the
action at its own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute.
The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his
client, for which the former must incur administrative sanction. Roxas vs. Republic Real Estate
Corporation, 792 SCRA 31, G.R. No. 208205, G.R. No. 208212 June 1, 2016
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) prohibits a lawyer from “lend[ing]
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he [or she] has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he [or she] is handling for the client.”
As officers of the court, lawyers should not exploit nor take advantage of their client’s
weaknesses. Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a lawyer from
“lend[ing] money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he [or she] has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he [or she] is handling for the client.” Bautista v. Gonzales,
182 SCRA 151 (1990), has settled that “[a]though a lawyer may, in good faith, advance the
expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement.” Thus, absent a
reimbursement agreement, the champertous contract is void. Lawyers who obtain an interest in
the subject matter of litigation create a conflict-of-interest situation with their clients and
thereby directly violate the fiduciary duties they owe their clients. Roxas vs. Republic Real Estate
Corporation, 792 SCRA 31, G.R. No. 208205, G.R. No. 208212 June 1, 2016
A lawyer may be dismissed at any time, with or without cause.
Despite Siguion Reyna’s Entry of Appearance dated November 4, 2009 with RREC’s conformity,
RGR & Associates refused to accept its discharge as counsel. Atty. Roxas is fully aware that RREC’s
Board of Directors already voted to terminate RGR & Associates’ legal services. The termination
of RGR & Associates’ services is not subject to this Court’s review. A lawyer may be dismissed at
any time, with or without cause. In Lim, Jr. v. Villarosa, 490 SCRA 494 (2006): [A client] may
discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause and thereafter employ another lawyer
who may then enter his appearance. Thus, it has been held that a client is free to change his
counsel in a pending case and thereafter retain another lawyer to represent him. That manner
of changing a lawyer does not need the consent of the lawyer to be dismissed. Nor does it require

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approval of the court. (Citation omitted, emphasis supplied) An experienced lawyer such as Atty.
Roxas is expected know that a counsel’s services can be withdrawn at any time. There is no such
thing as an irrevocable attorney-client relationship. As stated in Busiños v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407
(1997), “the relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a
very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring high degree of fidelity and good
faith.” Thus, when the client itself no longer wants its attorney’s services, the counsel cannot
continue to desperately cling on to it. Roxas vs. Republic Real Estate Corporation, 792 SCRA 31,
G.R. No. 208205, G.R. No. 208212 June 1, 2016
Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals by certiorari before this Court may
be had only by the party to the case. Atty. Roxas is neither a party nor a counsel for any of the
parties here. He cannot claim legal fees by filing a petition for review on behalf of a non-client,
which has moved to dismiss/expunge his petition pro hac vice.
Atty. Roxas is not a party-litigant under Section 1. Only RREC, as the party seeking for the
execution of judgment, and the Republic, as the party opposing RREC’s claims, stand to be
benefited or injured by the pending case. Atty. Roxas is not a party-in-interest under Section 2.
He has no valid interest in this case as his contingency fee agreement with RREC is champertous
and, therefore, void. Likewise, Atty. Roxas is not a party representative under Section 3 as he is
no longer RREC’s lawyer. Thus, insofar as RREC and the Republic are concerned, Atty. Roxas is a
complete stranger to this case. Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals by
certiorari before this Court may be had only by the party to the case. Atty. Roxas is neither a party
nor a counsel for any of the parties here. He cannot claim legal fees by filing a petition for review
on behalf of a non-client, which has moved to dismiss/expunge his petition pro hac vice. The
action he pursued before this Court is not an available recourse under applicable laws or the
Rules of Court. He is pursuing the wrong remedy. Roxas vs. Republic Real Estate Corporation,
792 SCRA 31, G.R. No. 208205, G.R. No. 208212 June 1, 2016
Rule 14.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) provides that “[a] lawyer who
accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees shall observe the same
standard of conduct governing his relations with paying clients.”
This Court notes that accused was represented by the Public Attorney’s Office. Notwithstanding
their heavy case workload and the free legal assistance they provide to indigents and low-income
persons, however, counsels from the Public Attorney’s Office are still obliged to pursue their
cases with competence and diligence. This is consistent with their commitment to public service.
Rule 14.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer who accepts the

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cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees shall observe the same standard of conduct
governing his relations with paying clients.” Tuano vs. People, 804 SCRA 319, G.R. No. 205871
September 28, 2016
Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) explicitly states that “a lawyer shall
make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner compatible with the
independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession.”
Counsels for accused have shown inefficiency in the performance of their duties. Relying on their
representations in their pleadings, this Court was led to believe that the criminal action against
accused subsisted. Consequently, this Court issued a resolution even after accused’s death. Had
counsels for accused informed this Court earlier of the death of their client, this Court would have
been saved precious time, effort, and resources, which could have been devoted to other
pending cases that call for this Court’s resolution and judgment. Likewise, the parties need not
have filed the pleadings calling for the resolution of accused’s Motion for Reconsideration. Given
these circumstances, counsels for accused are directed to show cause why no disciplinary action
should be taken against them in light of their failure to inform this Court of accused’s death.
Tuano vs. People, 804 SCRA 319, G.R. No. 205871 September 28, 2016
Gross misconduct is defined as an “inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct” in

administering justice, which prejudices the parties’ rights or forecloses a just determination of
the cause.
Respondent’s actions shatter the dignity of his profession. He exhibited disdain for court orders
and processes, as well as a lack of fidelity to the court. In “taking his sweet time to effect”
compliance with the Court of Appeals Resolutions, he sends the message that he is above the
duly constituted judicial authorities of this land, and he looks down on them with condescension.
This Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that his acts constitute gross misconduct and
insubordination or disrespect of court. Gross misconduct is defined as an “inexcusable, shameful
or flagrant unlawful conduct” in administering justice, which prejudices the parties’ rights or
forecloses a just determination of the cause. As officers of the court, lawyers themselves should
be at the forefront in obeying court orders and processes. Respondent failed in this regard. His
actions resulted in his client’s prejudice. In Re: Resolution dated August 14, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 94656 vs. Mortel, 798 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 10117 July 25, 2016

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The lawyer’s incompetence, neglect, and failure to update his client, in addition to his
misappropriation of his client’s money, led to his disbarment from the practice of law.
In Ong v. Atty. Grijaldo, 402 SCRA 1 (2003), this Court found that the lawyer violated his duty to
his client in failing to update the client on the status of the case. The lawyer’s incompetence,
neglect, and failure to update his client, in addition to his misappropriation of his client’s money,
led to his disbarment from the practice of law. Here, respondent blindsided his client on the real
status of Bank of Philippine Islands. He failed to diligently attend to the legal matter entrusted to
him. The case, instead of being closed and terminated, came back to life on appeal due to his
neglect and lack of diligence. As the Court of Appeals correctly found: Failure of Atty. Mortel to
comply with the Resolutions of [the Court of Appeals] has prejudiced the right of his client, herein
respondent-oppositor-appellant, to a just determination of her cause. His failure or obstinate
refusal without justification or valid reason to comply with [the Court of Appeal’s] directives
constitutes disobedience or defiance of the lawful orders of [the Court of Appeals], amounting
to gross misconduct and insubordination or disrespect. The foregoing acts committed by Atty.
Mortel are sufficient cause for his suspension pursuant to Sec. 28, in relation to Section 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Respondent’s “negligence shows a glaring lack of the competence
and diligence required of every lawyer.” In Re: Resolution dated August 14, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 94656 vs. Mortel, 798 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 10117 July 25, 2016
Respondent’s failure to timely and diligently deliver on his professional undertaking justifies
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ (IBP’s) conclusion that he must restitute complainant the
amount of P80,000.00.
It is evident from the records that respondent failed to deliver on the services that he committed
to complainant despite receiving the amount of P80,000.00 as acceptance fee. Although
respondent asserted that he did not actively solicit this amount from complainant, it remains, as
Commissioner Funa underscored, that respondent accepted this amount as consideration for his
services. Moreover, following complainant’s engagement of his services, respondent failed to
communicate with complainant or update her on the progress of the services that he was
supposed to render. Not only did he fail in taking his own initiative to communicate; he also failed
to respond to complainant’s queries and requests for updates. Respondent’s failure to timely and
diligently deliver on his professional undertaking justifies the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’
conclusion that he must restitute complainant the amount of P80,000.00. Murray vs. Cervantes,
817 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 5408 February 7, 2017

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The competence of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is only recommendatory. Under
Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court (SC) has the power to
actually rule on disciplinary cases of lawyers, and to impose appropriate penalties.
We emphasize that, during the proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
respondent acknowledged his duty to compensate complainant for the amount of P80,000.00.
He then made a commitment to return that sum to her. To date, however, he has failed to deliver
on the commitment made almost twelve and a half years ago. We clarify that the oral instruction
given to respondent in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ August 18, 2004 hearing was not a
juridically binding order. Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court sanctions and spells out the terms of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ involvement in cases involving the disbarment and/or
discipline of lawyers. The competence of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is only
recommendatory. Under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, only this Court has
the power to actually rule on disciplinary cases of lawyers, and to impose appropriate penalties.
Rule 139-B merely delegates investigatory functions to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. With
the exercise of its delegated investigatory power, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines refers
proposed actions to this Court. Recognizing the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ limited
competence in disciplinary cases impels a concomitant recognition that, pending favorable action
by this Court on its recommendations, its determinations and conclusions are only provisional.
Therefore, rulings on disciplinary cases attain finality and are enforceable only upon this Court’s
own determination that they must be imposed. Murray vs. Cervantes, 817 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 5408
February 7, 2017
That he has failed to adhere to his own freely executed commitment after more than a decade
speaks volumes of how he has miserably failed to live up to the “high standard of. . . morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing” that is apropos to members of the legal profession.
The oral instruction given to respondent in the August 18, 2004 hearing has, thus, not attained
such a degree of finality as would immutably require him to comply, such that failure to comply
justifies additional or increased penalties. Penalizing him for noncompliance is premature.
Nevertheless, respondent acknowledged his duty to compensate complainant for the amount of
P80,000.00 and made his own commitment to make this compensation. He may not have been
bound by a juridical instruction, but he was certainly bound by his own honor. That he has failed
to adhere to his own freely executed commitment after more than a decade speaks volumes of
how he has miserably failed to live up to the “high standard of . . . morality, honesty, integrity
and fair dealing” that is apropos to members of the legal profession. For this reason, we exact
upon respondent a penalty more severe than that initially contemplated by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Board of Governors. Moreover, to impress upon respondent the urgency of finally
returning to complainant the amount he received, we impose on him an additional penalty

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corresponding to the duration for which he fails to make restitution. We adopt the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors’ position in Resolution No. XVI-2004-481 that an
additional period of suspension must be imposed on respondent for every month (or fraction)
that he fails to pay in full the amount he owes complainant. However, instead of a three (3)-
month suspension for every month (or fraction) of nonpayment or incomplete payment, he is to
be suspended for one (1) month for every such period of failure to make full payment. Murray
vs. Cervantes, 817 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 5408 February 7, 2017
Disbarment proceedings are covered by what is known as the confidentiality rule.
This is laid down by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, which provides: Section 18.
Confidentiality.—Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the
final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases. Law is a
profession and not a trade. Lawyers are held to high standards as officers of the court, and subject
to heightened regulation to ensure that the legal profession maintains its integrity and esteem.
As part of the legal profession, lawyers are generally prohibited from advertising their talents,
and are expected to rely on their good reputation to maintain their practice. Roque, Jr. vs.
Catapang, 818 SCRA 16, G.R. No. 214986 February 15, 2017
A good reputation is among a lawyer’s most valuable assets.
In Santiago v. Calvo, 48 Phil. 919 (1926): The success of a lawyer in his profession depends almost
entirely on his reputation. Anything which will harm his good name is to be deplored. The
confidentiality rule is intended, in part, to prevent the use of disbarment proceedings as a tool
to damage a lawyer’s reputation in the public sphere. Thus, the general rule is that publicly
disclosing disbarment proceedings may be punished with contempt. Roque, Jr. vs. Catapang, 818
SCRA 16, G.R. No. 214986 February 15, 2017
The confidentiality in disciplinary actions for lawyers is not absolute. It is not to be applied
under any circumstance, to all disclosures of any nature.
As a general principle, speech on matters of public interest should not be restricted. This Court
recognizes the fundamental right to information, which is essential to allow the citizenry to form
intelligent opinions and hold people accountable for their actions. Accordingly, matters of public
interest should not be censured for the sake of an unreasonably strict application of the

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confidentiality rule. Thus, in Palad v. Solis, 804 SCRA 422 (2016), this Court dismissed claims that
the confidentiality rule had been violated, considering that the lawyer therein represented a
matter of public interest: A person, even if he was not a public official or at least a public figure,
could validly be the subject of a public comment as long as he was involved in a public issue.
Petitioner has become a public figure because he is representing a public concern. We explained
it, thus: But even assuming . . . that [the person] would not qualify as a public figure, it does not
necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment even if he was not
a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as he was involved in a public
issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so
merely because a private individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did not
voluntarily choose to become involved. The public’s primary interest is in the event; the public
focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct,
not the participant’s prior anonymity or notoriety. As a general rule, disciplinary proceedings are
confidential in nature until their final resolution and the final decision of this Court. However, in
this case, the disciplinary proceeding against petitioner became a matter of public concern
considering that it arose from his representation of his client on the issue of video voyeurism on
the internet. The interest of the public is not in himself but primarily in his involvement and
participation as counsel of Halili in the scandal. Indeed, the disciplinary proceeding against
petitioner related to his supposed conduct and statements made before the media in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility involving the controversy. Roque, Jr. vs. Catapang, 818
SCRA 16, G.R. No. 214986 February 15, 2017
The confidentiality rule requires only that “proceedings against attorneys” be kept private and
confidential.
It is the proceedings against attorneys that must be kept private and confidential. This would
necessarily prohibit the distribution of actual disbarment complaints to the press. However, the
rule does not extend so far that it covers the mere existence or pendency of disciplinary actions.
Some cases are more public than others, because of the subject matter, or the personalities
involved. Some are deliberately conducted in the public as a matter of strategy. A lawyer who
regularly seeks attention and readily welcomes, if not invites, media coverage, cannot expect to
be totally sheltered from public interest, himself. Roque, Jr. vs. Catapang, 818 SCRA 16, G.R. No.
214986 February 15, 2017

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Contempt power is not designed to insulate a lawyer from any publicity he may deem
undesirable.
On indirect contempt, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 3. Indirect Contempt to
be Punished After Charge and Hearing.—After charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by
the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may
be punished for indirect contempt: (a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of
his official duties or in his official transactions; (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed
or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent
jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for
the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the
possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; (c) Any abuse of or any unlawful
interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under
Section 1 of this Rule; (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; (e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of
a court, and acting as such without authority; (f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; (g) The
rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an
order or process of a court held by him. But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to
prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him
in custody pending such proceedings. Roque, Jr. vs. Catapang, 818 SCRA 16, G.R. No. 214986
February 15, 2017
The power of contempt is exercised to ensure the proper administration of justice and maintain
order in court processes.
In Re: Kelly, 35 Phil. 944 (1916), provides: The summary power to commit and punish for
contempt, tending to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as
essential to the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority, is a part of
the law of the land. (Ex parte Terry, supra) Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be
vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their
presence and submission to their lawful mandates, and as a corollary to this provision, to
preserve themselves and their officers from the approach of insults and pollution. (Anderson v.
Dunn, 6 Wheaton [U. S.], 204, 226; Ex parte Terry, supra) The existence of the inherent power of
courts to punish for contempt is essential to the observance of order in judicial proceedings and
to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due
administration of justice. (Ex parte Robinson supra; Ex parte Terry supra; In re Durant, 80 Conn.,
140; In re Davies, 93 Pa. St., 116; The People v. Goodrich, 79 Ill., 148; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wallace

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[U. S.], 335; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S., 265; In re Duncan, 64 S. C., 461; Fields v. State, 18 Tenn.,
168; Brooks v. Fleming, 66 Tenn., 331, 337) Roque, Jr. vs. Catapang, 818 SCRA 16, G.R. No.
214986 February 15, 2017
When determining whether to declare as contumacious alleged violations of the confidentiality

rule, we apply a restrictive interpretation.
The power to punish for contempt should be invoked only to ensure or promote the proper
administration of justice. Accordingly, when determining whether to declare as contumacious
alleged violations of the confidentiality rule, we apply a restrictive interpretation. Roque, Jr. vs.
Catapang, 818 SCRA 16, G.R. No. 214986 February 15, 2017
Generally, the Supreme Court (SC) defers from taking cognizance of disbarment complaints
against lawyers in government service arising from their administrative duties, and refers the
complaint first either to the proper administrative body that has disciplinary authority over the
erring public official or employee or the Ombudsman.
Generally, this Court defers from taking cognizance of disbarment complaints against lawyers in
government service arising from their administrative duties, and refers the complaint first either
to the proper administrative body that has disciplinary authority over the erring public official or
employee or the Ombudsman. Fuji vs. Dela Cruz, 819 SCRA 602, A.C. No. 11043 March 8, 2017
Lawyers in government service should be more conscientious with their professional

obligations consistent with the time-honored principle of public office being a public trust; In
this case, respondent’s negligence evinces a failure to cope with the strict demands and high
standards of public service and the legal profession.
Lawyers in government service should be more conscientious with their professional obligations
consistent with the time-honored principle of public office being a public trust. The ethical
standards under the Code of Professional Responsibility are rendered even more exacting as to
government lawyers because they have the added duty to abide by the policy of the State to
promote a high standard of ethics, competence, and professionalism in public service. In this
case, respondent’s negligence evinces a failure to cope with the strict demands and high
standards of public service and the legal profession. Fuji vs. Dela Cruz, 819 SCRA 602, A.C. No.
11043 March 8, 2017

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Parties who appear before a Notary Public should not be prejudiced by the failure of the Notary
Public to follow rules imposed by the Notarial Law. They are not obliged to ensure that the
Notary Public submits his or her notarial reports.
In any case, the Notary Public’s failure to submit his or her notarial report does not affect the act
of notarization. Rule 132, Section 30 of the Rules of Court provides that: Section 30. Proof of
notarial documents.—Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided
by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment
being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. When a
private document is notarized, the document is converted to a public document which is
presumed regular, admissible in evidence without need for proof of its authenticity and due
execution, and entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. To overturn the presumption in favor
of a notarized document, the party questioning it must present “clear, convincing, and more than
merely preponderant evidence.” Thus, parties who appear before a Notary Public should not be
prejudiced by the failure of the Notary Public to follow rules imposed by the Notarial Law. They
are not obliged to ensure that the Notary Public submits his or her notarial reports. The Spouses
Aboitiz failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overturn the presumption. The
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po is, thus, presumed regular
and authentic. Aboitiz vs. Po, 825 SCRA 457, G.R. No. 208450, G.R. No. 208497 June 5, 2017
Clerks of Court are at the forefront of judicial administration because of their indispensable role
in case adjudication and court management.
They are the models for the court employees “to act speedily and with dispatch on their assigned
task[s] to avoid the clogging of cases in court and thereby assist in the administration of justice
without undue delay.” Moreover, as public officers, they should discharge their tasks with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency guided by the principle that “public office is a
public trust.” Rapsing vs. Walse-Lutero, 296, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1894 April 4, 2017
The rule is that negligence of a counsel binds the client except: when counsel exhibits reckless
or gross negligence that deprives the client of due process; when the outright application of the
rule results in the deprivation of liberty and property through a technicality; or when it serves
the interests of justice.
Petitioner alleges that Atty. Musico negligently failed to attend scheduled hearings before the
trial court, conduct cross-examination of the witnesses, and present evidence on his behalf.
Records, however, show that petitioner’s counsel was not prevented from objecting to the

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presentation of the counterfeit credit card during trial, which he repeatedly did and even offered
continuing objection. Atty. Musico was also able to cross-examine Lim and Redentor Quejada,
the two witnesses petitioner claimed had inconsistent testimonies. Atty. Musico even filed a
Demurrer to Evidence after the prosecution made its formal offer. Cruz vs. People, 826 SCRA 561,
G.R. No. 210266 June 7, 2017
While counsels for respondents are expected to serve their clients to the utmost of their ability,
their duty to their clients does not include disrespecting the law by scheming to impede the
execution of a final and executory judgment.
The extent of the insidious machinations employed by respondents and their counsels were
highlighted when they assailed petitioners’ motion for execution for purportedly being filed
beyond the prescriptive period of 10 years, when they themselves were part of the reason for
the delay in execution. Counsels for respondents are reminded that as officers of the law, they
are mandated by Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to “not unduly delay a
case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.” While counsels for
respondents are expected to serve their clients to the utmost of their ability, their duty to their
clients does not include disrespecting the law by scheming to impede the execution of a final and
executory judgment. As members of the Bar, counsels for respondents are enjoined to represent
their clients “with zeal within the bounds of the law.” Thus, counsels for respondents are given a
stern warning to desist from committing similar acts which undermine the law and its processes.
Any similar infractions in the future from counsels for respondents will be dealt with more
severely. Piedad vs. Bobilles, 846 SCRA 576, G.R. No. 208614 November 27, 2017
In ordinary circumstances, “[n]otarization of a private document converts the document into a

public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.”
To enable this conversion, Rule 132, Section 19 of the Revised Rules of Evidence specifically
requires that a document be “acknowledged before a notary public.” Orbe vs. Filinvest Land,
Inc., 839 SCRA 72, G.R. No. 20818 September 6, 2017

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Even if respondent’s notarization by jurat and not by acknowledgment were to be condoned,

respondent’s jurat was not even a valid jurat executed according to the requirements of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice took effect on August 1, 2004. It governed respondent’s
October 4, 2004 notice, which was notarized on October 6, 2004. As Rule II, Section 6 of these
Rules clearly states, the person signing the document must be “personally known to the notary
public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity.” Rule II, Section
12, in turn, defines “competent evidence of identity.” As originally worded, when the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice came into effect on August 1, 2004, Rule II, Section 12 read: Section 12.
Competent Evidence of Identity.—The phrase “competent evidence of identity” refers to the
identification of an individual based on: (a) at least one current identification document issued
by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual; or (b) the oath or
affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is
personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two
credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each
personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification. Orbe
vs. Filinvest Land, Inc., 839 SCRA 72, G.R. No. 20818 September 6, 2017
Where notarization serves merely to convert a private document into a public document,
notaries public have been admonished about faithfully observing the rules governing notarial
acts: “Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of an oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.”
In ordinary circumstances, where notarization serves merely to convert a private document into
a public document, notaries public have been admonished about faithfully observing the rules
governing notarial acts: “Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of an oath
in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.” It is with greater reason that the diligent
observance of notarial rules should be impressed in cases concerned with a seller’s exercise of a
statutory privilege through cancellations under the Maceda Law. Respondent’s failure to
diligently satisfy the imperatives of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice constrains this Court to
consider its notice as an invalid notarial act. This amounts to respondent’s failure to satisfy the
second requisite for valid cancellations under Section 4, ultimately rendering its cancellation of
the purchase agreement ineffectual. Orbe vs. Filinvest Land, Inc., 839 SCRA 72, G.R. No. 20818
September 6, 2017

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Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial Rules), an individual who appears before a
notary public to take an oath or affirmation of a document must, among others, be personally
known to or be identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity.
As pointed out by private respondents, the petition’s Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping is improperly notarized, there being no statement that the affiants were either
personally known to the notary public or that competent evidence of their identities was
presented. Lao, Jr. vs. LGU of Cagayan de Oro City, 839 SCRA 466, G.R. No. 187869 September
13, 2017
Notaries public who fail to indicate in notarized documents that the affiants are personally
known to them or have presented competent evidence of their identities violate not only the
Notarial Rules, but also Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Notaries public must observe “the highest degree of care” in ensuring compliance with the basic
requirements of the Notarial Rules. Notaries public who fail to indicate in notarized documents
that the affiants are personally known to them or have presented competent evidence of their
identities violate not only the Notarial Rules, but also Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility: A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and
faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they
should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal transactions. In line with this
mandate, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same
is the very person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and the truth of what are stated therein. By failing in this regard, the notary public permits a
falsehood which does not only transgress the Notarial Rules but also Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Verily, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face; and it is for this reason that a notary public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the public’s
confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined. Lao, Jr. vs. LGU of
Cagayan de Oro City, 839 SCRA 466, G.R. No. 187869 September 13, 2017
A lawyer's payment of financial obligations is part of his duties.
In Lao v. Medel, this Court stressed that: Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must
promptly pay their financial obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms

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of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these

considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private
misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor — or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.
It is equally disturbing that respondent remorselessly issued a series of worthless checks,

unmindful of the deleterious effects of such act to public interest and public order. This Court
continues to state that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct and
violates Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates all members of the
bar "to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law." Issuance of worthless checks also
violates Rule 1.01 of the Code, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Lehnert vs. Dino, A.C. No. 12174 August 28, 2018
The practice of law is a privilege, and lawyers who fail to meet the strict standards of legal
proficiency, morality, and integrity will have their names stricken out of the Roll of Attorneys.
Del Mundo v. Atty. Capistrano emphasized the exacting standards expected of law practitioners:
To stress, the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity[,] and fair dealing. They must perform their
fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts[,] and their clients, in accordance with
the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Falling short of this standard, the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring
lawyer by imposing an appropriate penalty based on the exercise of sound judicial discretion in
consideration of the surrounding facts.
This Court expects an officer of the court to strictly adhere to the "rigid standards of mental
fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality[,] and faithful compliance with the rules
of the legal profession[.]" Undoubtedly, respondent lacks the essential requirements of "probity
and moral fiber," which are needed for his continued membership in the legal profession.
Angeles vs. Lina-ac, A.C. No. 12063 January 8, 2019
The burden of proof lies on the party making the allegation. In a disbarment complaint, the
allegations of the complainant must be proven with substantial evidence.
It is well-established that the allegations in a disbarment complaint must be proven with

substantial evidence. Spouses Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr. defines the standard of substantial
evidence for an administrative complaint: The standard of substantial evidence required in

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administrative proceedings is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. While rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, the obvious purpose being to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of
matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order, this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not
go so far as to justify orders without basis in evidence having rational probative force. Buntag vs.
Toledo, A.C. No. 12125 February 11, 2019
JUDICIAL ETHICS
Under Section 9(1), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision
or order is a less serious charge punishable by either suspension from office without salary or
benefits, or a fine.
Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates lower courts to decide or resolve cases or
matters for decision or resolution within three (3) months from date of submission. Section 5 of
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that judges should perform all judicial
duties efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. The same principle is embodied in
Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that a judge should dispose of
the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Judges are to be held
at a higher standard in the performance of their duties, and the failure to fulfill this duty would
not only violate every litigant’s constitutional right to the speedy disposition of cases, but will
also hold the erring judge administratively liable for the offense. Under Section 9(1), Rule 140 of
the Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is a less serious charge
punishable by either suspension from office without salary or benefits, or a fine. Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Andaya, 699 SCRA 340, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181 June 25, 2013
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries public. They
may notarize documents, contracts, and other conveyances only in the exercise of their official
functions and duties.
This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross
ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries public.
However, they may do so only in their ex officio capacities. They may notarize documents,

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contracts, and other conveyances only in the exercise of their official functions and duties. Tupal
vs. Rojo, 717 SCRA 236, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842 February 24, 2014
Judges of municipal trial courts may act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries
public are lacking in their courts’ territorial jurisdiction. They must certify as to the lack of
lawyers or notaries public when notarizing documents ex officio.
They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their
courts’ territorial jurisdiction. They must certify as to the lack of lawyers or notaries public when
notarizing documents ex officio: However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there
are still municipalities which have neither lawyers nor notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC
judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in the
capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform any act within the competency of a regular notary
public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and
turned over to the municipal treasurer (Lapena, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June
29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and, (2) certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to
the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit. Tupal vs. Rojo, 717 SCRA
236, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842 February 24, 2014
Affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the judge’s official function and
duty to solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty
to examine the parties’ requirements for marriage.
Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary, the person who notarizes the contracting parties’ affidavit of cohabitation cannot be
the judge who will solemnize the parties’ marriage. As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty
involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived
together for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state
that the judge can notarize the parties’ affidavit of cohabitation. Thus, affidavits of cohabitation
are documents not connected with the judge’s official function and duty to solemnize marriages.
Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties’
requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he
cannot objectively examine and review the affidavit’s statements before performing the
marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of
cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that he solemnized the marriage
despite the irregularity or false allegation. Tupal vs. Rojo, 717 SCRA 236, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842
February 24, 2014

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Judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they will
solemnize.
Affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with their official function and duty to
solemnize marriages. Judge Rojo admitted that he notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties
“on the same day [he solemnized their marriages].” He notarized documents not connected with
his official function and duty to solemnize marriages. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary does not expressly prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation. Thus, he
cannot be prohibited from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation. Tupal vs. Rojo, 717 SCRA 236,
A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842 February 24, 2014
An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until notarized.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document, “[rendering the document]
admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.” The affidavit of cohabitation, even
if it serves a “public purpose,” remains a private document until notarized. Thus, when Judge
Rojo notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he notarized nine private documents. As discussed,
affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judge’s official duty to solemnize marriages.
Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90. Tupal vs. Rojo, 717 SCRA 236, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842
February 24, 2014
That other judges have notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriages they
solemnized does not make the practice legal.
That other judges have notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriages they
solemnized does not make the practice legal. Violations of laws are not excused by practice to
the contrary. Tupal vs. Rojo, 717 SCRA 236, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842 February 24, 2014

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For violating Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice nine times, Judge Rojo
is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the signatory is not
personally known to him.
Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the
signatory is not personally known to him. Otherwise, the notary public must require the signatory
to present a competent evidence of identity: SEC. 2. Prohibitions.—x x x x (b) A person shall not
perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document — (1) is
not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally
known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. Tupal vs. Rojo, 717 SCRA 236, A.M. No. MTJ-14-
1842 February 24, 2014
Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct on integrity, “[j]udges shall ensure that not only is their
conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.”
If the law involved is basic, ignorance constitutes “lack of integrity.” Violating basic legal
principles and procedure nine times is gross ignorance of the law. Tupal vs. Rojo, 717 SCRA 236,
Judges are to be reminded that it is the height of incompetence to dispense cases callously and
in utter disregard of procedural rules.
Whether the resort to shortcuts is borne out of ignorance or convenience is immaterial. Judges
took an oath to dispense their duties with competence and integrity; to fall short would be a
disservice not only to the entire judicial system, but more importantly, to the public.
Respondent’s failure must not be brushed aside. We find the imposition of suspension for six (6)
months to be justified. Chua Keng Sin vs. Mangente, 750 SCRA 262, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1851
February 11, 2015

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Morality may be religious, in which case what is good depends on the moral prescriptions of a
high moral authority or the beliefs of a particular religion.
Morality refers to what is good or right conduct at a given circumstance. In Estrada v. Escritor,
408 SCRA 1 (2003), this court described morality as “‘how we ought to live’ and why.” Morality
may be religious, in which case what is good depends on the moral prescriptions of a high moral
authority or the beliefs of a particular religion. Religion, as this court defined in Aglipay v. Ruiz,
64 Phil. 201 (1937), is “a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his
Creator.” A conduct is religiously moral if it is consistent with and is carried out in light of the
divine set of beliefs and obligations imposed by the active power. Morality may also be secular,
in which case it is independent of any divine moral prescriptions. What is good or right at a given
circumstance does not derive its basis from any religious doctrine but from the independent
moral sense shared as humans. Perfecto vs. Esidera, 763 SCRA 323, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417 July
22, 2015
To be guilty of “immorality” under the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), a lawyer’s

conduct must be so depraved as to reduce the public’s confidence in the Rule of Law.
This court may not sit as judge of what is moral according to a particular religion. We do not have
jurisdiction over and is not the proper authority to determine which conduct contradicts religious
doctrine. We have jurisdiction over matters of morality only insofar as it involves conduct that
affects the public or its interest. Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of
lawyers and judges, “immoral conduct” should relate to their conduct as officers of the court. To
be guilty of “immorality” under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer’s conduct must
be so depraved as to reduce the public’s confidence in the Rule of Law. Religious morality is not
binding whenever this court decides the administrative liability of lawyers and persons under this
court’s supervision. At best, religious morality weighs only persuasively on us. Therefore, we
cannot properly conclude that respondent judge’s acts of contracting a second marriage during
the subsistence of her alleged first marriage and having an alleged “illicit” affair are “immoral”
based on her Catholic faith. This court is not a judge of religious morality. Perfecto vs. Esidera,
763 SCRA 323, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417 July 22, 2015
Respondent judge’s act of participating in the marriage ceremony as governed only by the rules
of her religion is not inconsistent with our law against bigamy.
What the law prohibits is not second marriage during a subsisting marriage per se. What the law
prohibits is a second marriage that would have been valid had it not been for the subsisting

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marriage. Under our law, respondent judge’s marriage in 1990 was invalid because of the
solemnizing officer’s lack of authority. Marriages entered into in accordance with the law may or
may not include marriages recognized in certain religions. Religious marriages are recognized in
and may be governed by our laws only if they conform to legal requirements. Religious marriages
that lack some or all the requirements under the law are invalid. They are not considered to have
been entered into. They do not enjoy the benefits, consequences, and incidents of marriage
provided under the law. Perfecto vs. Esidera, 763 SCRA 323, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417 July 22, 2015
Respondent judge may have disobeyed the law, particularly Article 350 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), which prohibits knowingly contracting marriages against the provisions of laws.
The lack of authority of the officer that solemnized respondent judge’s marriage in 1990 renders
such marriage invalid. It is not recognized in our law. Hence, no second marriage can be imputed
against respondent judge while her first marriage subsisted. However, respondent judge may
have disobeyed the law, particularly Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code, which prohibits
knowingly contracting marriages against the provisions of laws. Article 350 of the Revised Penal
Code provides: ART. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws.—The penalty of prisión
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person who,
without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall contract marriage
knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is
in disregard of a legal impediment. (Emphasis supplied) Respondent judge knew that the
solemnizing officer during her and her husband’s marriage in 1990 had no civil authority to
solemnize marriages. It is clear from her Comment that she and her husband’s only consideration
for their 1990 marriage was the recognition from the Roman Catholic Church. She stated that: Fr.
David Tither had no license to solemnize marriage from the National Archives or from the civil
government. Hence, he was not under obligation to register our marriage. It was a purely
sacramental marriage rite, without legal effect but definitely valid and recognized by the Roman
Catholic Church. It is called “matrimoña de conciencia.” Perfecto vs. Esidera, 763 SCRA 323, A.M.
No. RTJ-15-2417 July 22, 2015
Unless respondent judge’s act of participating in a marriage ceremony according to her

religious beliefs violates other peoples’ rights or poses grave and imminent danger to the
society, the Supreme Court (SC) cannot rule that respondent judge is administratively liable for
her participation in her religious marriage ceremony.
In Estrada, this court ruled that in religious freedom cases, the test of benevolent neutrality
should be applied. Under the test of benevolent neutrality, religious freedom is weighed against

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a compelling state interest: Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest
extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated
by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. (Emphasis in the original) We find
that there is no compelling state interest that may limit respondent judge’s right to participate
in religious and merely ceremonial acts that are non-violative of other people’s rights and with
no legally binding effect. The institution of marriage is not threatened when we accommodate
respondent judge’s freedom to participate in such ceremonies even if they have secular
counterparts under our laws. Perfecto vs. Esidera, 763 SCRA 323, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417 July 22,
2015
In finding respondent judge administratively liable for a violation of her marriage obligations
under our laws, this court protects the credibility of the judiciary in administering justice.
Respondent judge, as a lawyer and even more so as a judge, is expected to abide by the law.
Her conduct affects the credibility of the courts in dispensing justice. Thus, in finding
respondent judge administratively liable for a violation of her marriage obligations under our
laws, this court protects the credibility of the judiciary in administering justice. In the words of
Justice Carpio in his dissenting opinion in Estrada: Court employees, from the highest
magistrate to the lowliest clerk, are expected to abide scrupulously with the law. They are held
to a higher standard since they are part of the judicial machinery that dispenses justice. . . .
[T]here exists a compelling state interest to hold Escritor to the same standards required of
every court employee. If unsanctioned, Escritor’s unlawful conduct would certainly impair the
integrity and credibility of the judiciary. Perfecto vs. Esidera, 763 SCRA 323, A.M. No. RTJ-15-
2417 July 22, 2015
When the law is basic and the rules are elementary, the duty of a judge is simply to apply it.
Failure to do so constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
We take this opportunity to remind judges and justices of their solemn duty to uphold and defend
the Constitution and the principles it embodies. This duty is so basic that it appears in the Oath
of Office of every public officer and employee and is stated only in the third whereas clause of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct. When the law is basic and the rules are elementary, the duty
of a judge is simply to apply it. Failure to do so constitutes gross ignorance of the law. It entails
additional expenses on the part of the party-litigants and creates an undeserved public

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impression of the lack of competence of the entire judiciary. Philippine National Bank vs. Heirs
of the Late Ireneo and Caridad Entapa, 802 SCRA 392, G.R. No. 215072 September 7, 2016
The acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be
civilly, criminally, or administratively liable for his official acts, no matter how erroneous,
provided he acts in good faith.
“[A]n administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a Judge deemed
aberrant or irregular where a judicial remedy exists and is available[.]” It must be underscored
that “the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action.” He cannot
be civilly, criminally, or administratively liable for his official acts, “no matter how erroneous,”
provided he acts in good faith. In this case, it is apparent that the assailed orders relate to
respondent judge’s acts in her judicial capacity. These alleged errors, therefore, cannot be the
proper subject of an administrative proceeding, but is only correctible through judicial remedies.
Hence, what complainants should have done was to appeal the assailed orders to the higher
court, for review and not to file an administrative complaint against respondent judge.
“Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions do not complement, supplement or substitute
judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary.” Biado vs. Brawner-Cualing, 817 SCRA 447,
To be liable for gross ignorance of the law, the assailed orders of a judge, who acts in his official
capacity, should not only be erroneous; it must be established that his actuation was attended
by “bad faith, dishonesty, hatred” or other similar motive.
The complainants’ imputation of gross ignorance of the law must also fail. “Gross ignorance
transcends a simple error in the application of legal provisions. In the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.” To be liable for gross ignorance of the
law, the assailed orders of a judge, who acts in his official capacity, should not only be erroneous;
it must be established that his actuation was attended by “bad faith, dishonesty, hatred” or other
similar motive. In this case, complainants failed to do establish this. Biado vs. Brawner-Cualing,
817 SCRA 447, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1891 February 15, 2017

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Manifest partiality pertains to “a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor

one side rather than the other.”
Complainants’ assertion of respondent judge’s manifest partiality against them cannot prosper.
Manifest partiality pertains to “a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one
side rather than the other.” Thus, a mere imputation of bias and partiality against a judge is
insufficient because “bias and partiality can never be presumed.” Since “bad faith or malice
cannot be inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a party,” it is incumbent upon the
complainants to prove that respondent judge was manifestly partial against them. Their failure
to prove this is fatal to their cause. Apart from their bare allegations, complainants offered no
other independent proof to validate this allegation. Complainants’ failure to substantiate their
claims in an administrative proceeding can cause the dismissal of the case for lack of merit. “In
the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that a judge has regularly performed
his duties will prevail.” Biado vs. Brawner-Cualing, 817 SCRA 447, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1891
February 15, 2017
The Code of Judicial Conduct instructs that judges “should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities.”
This Court adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Office of the Court
Administrator. The Code of Judicial Conduct instructs that judges “should avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all activities.” Judges must at all times conduct themselves in a
manner beyond reproach to ensure the public’s continued confidence in the judiciary. Mendoza
vs. Diasen, Jr., 835 SCRA 612, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1900 August 9, 2017
Judge Diasen’s act of attempting to sell rice to his employees and to employees of other
branches was highly improper. For his improper acts, Judge Diasen is found guilty of conduct
unbecoming a judge.
Judge Diasen’s act of attempting to sell rice to his employees and to employees of other branches
was highly improper. As a judge, he exercised moral ascendancy and supervision over these
employees. If the sale had pushed through, he would have profited from his position. As the
Office of the Court Administrator observed: [Judge Diasen] cannot also deny that his position did
not influence the “would-be buyers” to actually partake in the sale of rice. If employees of the
other court branches and offices of the Makati City Hall could be persuaded to buy the subject
rice because a judge asked them to, what more with the employees of his own branch[?] For his
improper acts, Judge Diasen is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge. This Court, however,

0917 – 894 53 56
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finds that a modification of the recommended penalty of reprimand is in order. Under Rule 140
of the Rules of Court, conduct unbecoming a judge is considered a light charge, punishable by
the following sanctions: C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following
sanctions shall be imposed: 1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00;
and/or 2. Censure; 3. Reprimand; 4. Admonition with warning. Mendoza vs. Diasen, Jr., 835 SCRA
612, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1900 August 9, 2017
A judge not assigned to the province, city, or municipality where the case is pending but
approves an application for bail filed by an accused not arrested is guilty of gross ignorance of
the law.
The last sentence of Rule 114, Section 17(a) is clear that for purposes of determining whether or
not the accused is in custody of the law, the mode required is arrest, not voluntary surrender,
before a judge of another province, city, or municipality may grant a bail application. In the same
vein, it is gross ignorance of the law if a judge grants an application for bail in a criminal case
outside of his or her jurisdiction without ascertaining the absence or unavailability of the judge
of the court where the criminal case is pending. Tejano vs. Marigomen, 840 SCRA 564, A.M. No.
RTJ-17-2492 September 26, 2017
Withdrawal of an administrative complaint does not divest the Supreme Court (SC) of its
disciplinary authority over court personnel.
While it is true that Tejano filed an Affidavit withdrawing her Complaint against Judge
Marigomen, withdrawal of an administrative complaint “does not divest [this Court] of [its]
disciplinary authority over court personnel.” This Court “cannot be bound by the unilateral
decision of a complainant to desist from prosecuting a case involving the discipline of parties
subject to its administrative supervision.” As elaborated in Nones v. Ormita, 390 SCRA 519 (2002):
[T]he faith and confidence of the people in their government and its agencies and
instrumentalities need to be maintained. The people should not be made to depend upon the
whims and caprices of complainants who, in a real sense, are only witnesses. To rule otherwise
would subvert the fair and prompt administration of justice, as well as undermine the discipline
of court personnel. This doctrine applies especially in this case where respondent is not just any
other court personnel. Respondent is a judge, who is supposedly knowledgeable of the law but
has been found grossly ignorant of it, not just once but twice. Tejano vs. Marigomen, 840 SCRA
564, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2492 September 26, 2017

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As the presiding judge, it was respondent’s responsibility to know which cases or motions were
submitted for decision or resolution.
While the Branch Clerk of Court was remiss in not calling respondent’s attention to the pending
incident in Civil Case No. 06-35758, this does not completely exculpate respondent from liability.
As the presiding judge, it was respondent’s responsibility to know which cases or motions were
submitted for decision or resolution. Judges are expected to closely follow the development of
cases and in this respect, “to keep [their] own record of cases so that [they] may act on them
promptly.” In RE: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
55, Malabon City, 594 SCRA 492 (2009), this Court held that “[j]udges and branch clerks of court
should conduct personally a physical inventory of the pending cases in their courts and examine
personally the records of each case [not only] at the time of their assumption to office, [but]
every semester thereafter on 30 June and 31 December.” “[T]he regular and continuing physical
inventory of cases enable[s] the judge to keep abreast of the status of the pending cases and to
be informed that everything in the court is in proper order.” Responsibility rests primarily on the
judge and he or she “cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his
personnel.” Rapsing vs. Walse-Lutero, 296, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1894 April 4, 2017
As a frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should at all times maintain professional
competence and observe the high standards of public service and fidelity.
While respondent’s domestic concerns deserve some consideration from this Court, such
circumstances could only mitigate her liability. Judges have the duty to administer justice without
delay. Judge Walse-Lutero should bear in mind that those charged with the task of dispensing
justice carry a heavy burden of responsibility. As a frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge
should at all times maintain professional competence and observe the high standards of public
service and fidelity. Her dedication to duty is the least she could do to sustain the public’s trust
and confidence not only in her but more importantly in the institution she represents. Had
respondent Judge Walse-Lutero physically inventoried her cases on a semestral basis as
prescribed, she could have discovered the unresolved pending incidents earlier, instead of two
(2) years later. The resolution of two (2) fairly simple motions dragged on for more than two (2)
years — thereby prolonging the resolution of the ejectment case — because of respondent’s
lapse. Rapsing vs. Walse-Lutero, 296, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1894 April 4, 2017

0917 – 894 53 56
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Whether or not to voluntarily inhibit from hearing a case is a matter within the judge’s
discretion.
Absent clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will dispense
justice in accordance with law and evidence, this Court will not interfere. On the inhibition of
judges, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Disqualification of judges.—No judge
or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according
to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or
counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject
of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon
the record. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in
a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. Chavez vs. Marcos, 868 SCRA
251, G.R. No. 185484 June 27, 2018
Allowing a judge to inhibit without concrete proof of personal interest or any showing that his
bias stems from an extrajudicial source will open the floodgates to abuse.
Since the second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1 was introduced, this Court has periodically
repeated that it shall always presume that a judge will decide on the merits of the case without
bias. Allowing a judge to inhibit without concrete proof of personal interest or any showing that
his bias stems from an extrajudicial source will open the floodgates to abuse. No concrete proof
of Judge Pampilo’s personal interest in the case was presented. There was no showing that his
bias stems from an extrajudicial source. Not only that, but none of his acts, as shown on the
record, was characterized by any error. Chavez vs. Marcos, 868 SCRA 251, G.R. No. 185484 June
27, 2018

0917 – 894 53 56
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HO 62 - Legal &amp; Judicial Ethics - Chair&#39;s Cases

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2020 BAR REVIEW LEGAL & JUDICIAL ETHICS

CHAIR’S CASES Handout No. 62

In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants, courts, other

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

The general rule is that errors of counsel bind the client.

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Elements of a Valid Retaining Lien.

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

This information asymmetry is even more pronounced in an attorney-client relationship. Lawyers

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Rule II, Section 1 states: SECTION 1. Acknowledgment.—“Acknowledgment” refers to an act in

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Lawyers are expected to be honest in all their dealings.

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Elements Required for Full Recognition of Attorney’s Lien.

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Any claim that the error was committed by a secretary is inconsequential.

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Restitution of acceptance fees to complainant is proper. Respondent failed to present any

Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading.

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

There is basic conflict of interest here. Respondent is a public officer, an employee of

A conflict of interest exists when an incumbent government employee represents another

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

A lawyer may be dismissed at any time, with or without cause.

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Gross misconduct is defined as an “inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct” in

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Disbarment proceedings are covered by what is known as the confidentiality rule.

A good reputation is among a lawyer’s most valuable assets.

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

When determining whether to declare as contumacious alleged violations of the confidentiality

Lawyers in government service should be more conscientious with their professional

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

In ordinary circumstances, “[n]otarization of a private document converts the document into a

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Even if respondent’s notarization by jurat and not by acknowledgment were to be condoned,

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

A lawyer's payment of financial obligations is part of his duties.

HO 62 - Legal & Judicial Ethics - Chair's Cases

HO 62 - Legal & Judicial Ethics - Chair's Cases