CaseDig: Ombudsman vs.

De Chavez
G.R. No. 172206; July 3, 2013
FACTS:
On August 18, 2005, the Batangas State University Board of Regents (BSU-BOR)
received an Order from the Ombudsman. The order directed BSU-BOR to enforce the
Office of the Ombudsman's Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution, finding herein
respondents guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and imposing the penalty of
dismissal from service with its accessory penalties, despite the fact that the same are
pending appeal before the CA. Pursuant to said Order, BSU-BOR issued a Resolution
resolving to implement the Order of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Respondents filed a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction before the RTC but was denied. Respondents
filed their notice of appeal and Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Injunction with the CA which granted its petition. Thereafter, the Office of the
Ombudsman filed a Motion to Intervene. It questioned the Order of the CA granting the
injunctive relief prayed for by the respondents. It contended that under the Ombudsman
Rules of Procedure, an appeal does not stay the execution of decisions, resolutions or
order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondents are entitled to injunctive relief.
2. Whether or not decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately executory.
HELD:
1. The respondents are not entitled to injunctive relief.
For a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the following requisites must concur:
(1)That the invasion of the right is material and substantial;
(2)That the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;
(3)That there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.
In the present case, the right of the respondents cannot be said to be clear and
unmistakable, because the prevailing jurisprudence is that penalty of dismissal from the
service meted on government employees or officials is immediately executor in
accordance with the valid rule of execution pending appeal uniformly observed in
administrative disciplinary cases.
2. The decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately executor.
The Constitution authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of
procedure. For the CA to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty
imposed by the Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to encroach on the
rule-making powers of the Office of the Ombudsman under the Constitution and RA
6770 as the injunctive writ will render nugatory the provision of Section 7, Rule III of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Clearly, said Rules of Procedure
supersedes the discretion given to the CA in Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
when a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case if appealed to the CA.
The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman that a decision
is immediately executor is a special rule that prevails over the provisions of the Rules of
Court.

University of the Immaculate Conception vs Sec of Labor

OCTOBER 23, 2012 ~ VBDIAZ
University of the Immaculate Conception vs Sec of Labor
GR 151379
Facts:
This case stemmed from the collective bargaining negotiations between petitioner
University of Immaculate Concepcion, Inc. (UNIVERSITY) and respondent The UIC
Teaching and Non- Teaching Personnel and Employees Union (UNION). The UNION,
as the certified bargaining
agent of all rank and file employees of the UNIVERSITY, submitted its collective
bargaining proposals to the latter on February 16, 1994. However, one item was left
unresolved and this was the inclusion or exclusion of some positions in the scope of the
bargaining unit.
The UNION it filed a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and ULP.
During the thirty (30) day cooling-off period, two union members were dismissed by
petitioner. Consequently, the UNION went on strike.
On January 23, 1995, the then Secretary of Labor, Ma. Nieves R. Confessor, issued an
Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
On March 10, 1995, the UNION filed another notice of strike, this time citing as a reason
the UNIVERSITY’s termination of the individual respondents. The UNION alleged that
the UNIVERSITY’s act of terminating the individual respondents is in violation of the
Order of the Secretary of Labor.
On March 28, 1995, the Secretary of Labor issued another Order reiterating the
directives contained in the January 23, 1995 Order. Hence, the UNIVERSITY was
directed to reinstate the individual respondents under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to the labor dispute.
The UNIVERSITY filed a MR. In the Order dated August 18, 1995, then Acting
Secretary Jose S. Brilliantes denied the MR, but modified the two previous Orders by
adding:
Anent the Union’s Motion, we find that superseding circumstances would not warrant
the physical reinstatement of the twelve (12) terminated employees.
Hence, they are hereby ordered placed under payroll reinstatement until thevalidity of
their termination is finally resolved.
Issue: WON payroll reinstatement, instead of actual reinstatement, is proper.
Held:
With respect to the Secretary’s Order allowing payroll reinstatement instead of actual
reinstatement for the individual respondents herein, an amendment to the previous
Orders issued by her office, the same is usually not allowed. Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code aforementioned states that all workers must immediately return to work and all
employer must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing
before the strike or lockout. The phrase “under the same terms and conditions” makes it
clear that the norm is actual reinstatement. This is consistent with the idea that any work
stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be detrimental to the national
interest.
In ordering payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement, then Acting Secretary of
Labor Jose S. Brillantes said:
Anent the Union’s Motion, we find that superseding circumstances would not warrant
the physical reinstatement of the twelve (12) terminated employees. Hence, they are
hereby ordered placed under payroll reinstatement until the validity of their termination
is finally resolved.
As an exception to the rule, payroll reinstatement must rest on special circumstances
that render actual reinstatement impracticable or otherwise not conducive to attaining
the purposes of the law.
The “superseding circumstances” mentioned by the Acting Secretary of Labor no doubt
refer to the final decision of the panel of arbitrators as to the confidential nature of the
positions of the twelve private respondents, thereby rendering their actual and physical
reinstatement impracticable and more likely to exacerbate the situation. The payroll
reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement ordered in these cases, therefore, appears
justified as an exception to the rule until the validity of their termination is finally
resolved. This Court sees no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Acting
Secretary of Labor in ordering the same. Furthermore, the issue has not been raised by
any party in this case.
Petition denied.

UNDURAN v. ABERASTURI
LOLOY UNDURAN, et. al., petitioners VS. RAMON ABERASTURI, et. al., respondents
G.R. No. 181284
April 18, 2017
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court’s En Banc Decision dated October 20, 2015, which the
petition was denied and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision. In the petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration, they maintain their contention believing that it is the
National Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) not the regular courts, which has
jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving ancestral domain of the
Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICC’s) and Indigenous Peoples (IP’s) regardless of
the parties involved.
In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that:
The NCIP and not the regular courts has jurisdiction over the case under the principle
that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint, and pursuant to jurisprudence allowing exemptions thereto;
The jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case rests upon the NCIP as conferred by
the IPRA;
The IPRA is a social legislation that seeks to protect the IPs not so much from
themselves or fellow IPs but more from non-IPs;
The IPRA created the NCIP as the agency of government mandated to realize the rights
of IPs;
In the exercise of its mandate, the NCIP was created as a quasi-judicial body with
jurisdiction to resolve claims and disputes involving the rights of IPs;
The jurisdiction of the NCIP in resolving claims and disputes involving the rights of IPs is
not limited to IPs of the same tribe;
Harmonizing the related provisions of the IPRA supports the argument that the NCIP
has jurisdiction over cases involving IP rights whether or not the parties are IPs or non-
ICCs/IPs;
The NCIP as quasi-judicial agency provides IPs mechanisms for access to justice in the
fulfillment of the State's obligations to respect, protect and fulfill IP's human rights;
The NCIP has the competence and skill that would greatly advance the administration
of justice with respect to protection and fulfillment of ICC/IP rights/human rights; and
(Recognition and enforcement of customary laws and indigenous justice systems fulfill
the State's obligations as duty bearers in the enforcement of human rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has the jurisdiction over the disputes and
controversies involving the ancestral domain of the ICC and IP regardless of the parties
involved not the NCIP.
HELD:
Yes. It is the court of general jurisdiction has the power or authority to hear and
decide cases whose subject matter does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of any court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. In contrast, a
court of limited jurisdiction, or a court acting under special powers, has only the
jurisdiction expressly delegated. An administrative agency, acting in its quasi-judicial
capacity, is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction which could wield only such powers that are
specifically granted to it by the enabling statutes. Limited or special jurisdiction is that
which is confined to particular causes or which can be exercised only under limitations
and circumstances prescribed by the statute.
Meanwhile, the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited under customary laws presents two
important issues: first, whether it is legally possible to punish non-ICCs/IPs with
penalties under customary laws; and second, whether a member of a particular ICC/IP
could be punished in accordance with the customary laws of another ICC/IP.
Therefore, the Court finds no merit in petitioners' contention that jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter of a case is not merely based on the allegations of the
complaint in certain cases where the actual issues are evidenced by subsequent
pleadings. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend
on the defenses raised by the defendant in the answer or a motion to dismiss;
otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant.
Suffice it also to state that the Court is unanimous in denying the petition for review on
certiorari on the ground that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of the original
and amended complaint based on the allegations therein is within the jurisdiction of the
RTC.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Eugenio Dalauta

G.R. No. 190004 August 8, 2017
PONENTE: JusticeJose Catral Mendoza
FACTS:
Eugenio Dalauta (Dalauta) was the registered owner of an agricultural land in Florida,
Butuan City. The land was placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under
compulsory acquisition of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Thus,
Dalauta received on February 7, 1994 a Notice of Coverage notifying him that his land
was subject of expropriation. Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered ₱192,782.59
as compensation for the land, but Dalauta rejected such valuation for being too low.
The case was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). A summary
administrative proceeding was conducted to determine the appropriate just
compensation for the subject property. In its Resolution, the PARAD affirmed the
valuation made by LBP in the amount of ₱192,782.59.
Dalauta filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting as
Special Agrarian Court (SAC).
Dalauta argued that the valuation of his land should be determined using the formula in
DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, which was Land Value (LV) = Capitalized Net Income
(CNI) x 0.9 + Market Value (MV) per tax declaration x 0.1, as he had a net income of
₱350,000.00 in 1993 from the sale of the trees that were grown on the said land to
Norberto C. Fonacier.
On May 30, 2006, the SAC rendered its decision pegging the just compensation in the
amount of ₱2,639,557.00, higher than the value made by LBP. Unsatisfied, LBP filed a
motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the SAC.
Hence, LBP filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the
CA, arguing, among others that the SAC erred in taking cognizance of the case when
the DARAB decision sustaining the LBP valuation had long attained finality and that the
SAC violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 and DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, in fixing
the just compensation.
The CA ruled that the SAC correctly took cognizance of the case. It ruled that the SAC
had original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation.
ISSUES
Whether or not the trial court had properly taken jurisdiction over the case despite the
finality of the PARAD Resolution.
Whether or not the trial court correctly computed the just compensation of the subject
property.
RULING:
Yes. It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has
"original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners." This "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC
would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original
jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review
of administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the
decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from
Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the
RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the
original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57
and therefore would be void.
Thus, direct resort to the SAC by private respondent is valid.
No. On Just Compensation
Upon an assiduous assessment of the different valuations arrived at by the DAR, the
SAC and the CA, the Court agrees with the position of Justice Francis Jardeleza that
just compensation for respondent Dalauta's land should be computed based on the
formula provided under DAR-LBP Joint Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 2003
(JMC No. 11 (2003). The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5,
Butuan City, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, for purposes of computing just
compensation in accordance with JMC No.11.