G.R. No.

L-67842 September 24, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PABLO MOLERO, defendant-appellant.

Facts:
On February 5, 1976 at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning, Pablo Molero, father of Pacita
Molero, a 17-year-old and she was the third among the seven children of Pablo. She was then
told by her father to go with him to the Siaton River, about a kilometer away from their house to
catch shrimp and fish. As they reached the river and while walking, Pacita was hugged from
behind by her father, and she staggered and fell to the ground face up. She tried to struggle but
he unsheathed his harp bolo and placed it along her side. He then proceeded to pull up her
dress and remove her short pants and panty. Then he unbuttoned his pants, let out his penis
and lay on top of her and did the push and pull movement in sexual intercourse. She tried to
kick him but he again held the unsheathed bolo which was placed on her side and afraid that he
might do her harm with the bolo and by means of moral ascendancy, her father succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her and told her not to tell anyone. But Pacita told her mother
about the incident, and on February 11, 1976, Pacita Molero and her mother went to the office
of the Station Commander of Pamplona, Negros Oriental, to report the incident. It was found out
that the original complaint of Pacita Molero, dated March 22, 1977, charged her father with the
crime of rape allegedly committed "on or about the 13th day of February,1976." Except for the
date which is "on or about the 5th day of February, 1976" in the March 30, 1978 complaint, the
facts alleged in the two complaints were exactly the same. The assistant provincial fiscal filed a
motion for leave to amend the complaint but it was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court erred in denying the amendment in the information.
Ruling:
Yes, the Court erred in denying the amendment of the information. Our law provides that
it is the information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court,
at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of
form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice
to the rights of the defendant. In the case at bar, the precise time of the commission of the crime
is not an essential element of the offense of rape. The amendment of the complaint changing
the date of the commission of the crime of rape from February 13, 1976 to February 5, 1976, a
difference of eight (8) days was only a matter of form under the facts of this case and did not
prejudice the rights of the appellant. All told, the Court finds that the guilt of the accused was
established beyond reasonable doubt by the clear and convincing testimony of the complainant,
Pacita Molero. Although at times during her testimony she got confused as to dates, this is
understandable considering that she is illiterate and this did not in any way affect the vivid
portrayal of the heinous act committed on her by her father.
 G.R. No. 118649 March 9, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JAIME REYES y AROGANSIA,
Accused-Appellant.

Facts:
At about 7:00 o’clock in the evening of February 15, 1990, in the municipality of Santa
Cruz, province of Laguna, Prosecution witness Iluminado Broas and the victim, Meynardo “Jun
Boy” Altobar, Jr., together with another prosecution witness, Joel Apundar, were seated in front
of the sari-sari store of Edwin Laborde at M.H. del Pilar Street, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They were
talking with each other when suddenly a “bemoustached” man approached them and asked
Altobar, Jr., “Ikaw ba si Jun Boy?” When the latter replied by nodding his head, the man, who
was later identified as herein appellant, immediately pulled out a gun from something which
looked like a book tightly held under his left armpit and shot the victim, hitting him in the neck,
and the cause of death was shock due to hemorrhage due to penetrating wound. The trial court
find the accused guilty of Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the attendant
generic circumstance of nocturnity. The accused appealed to the Supreme Court contending
that the lower court erred in (1) finding that treachery attended the killing of the victim Meynardo
Altobar, Jr.; (2) in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation to qualify
the crime to murder; (3) in appreciating nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance in the
commission of the crime; and (4) in convicting him of the crime charged despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in accepting treachery, evident premeditation to
qualify the crime to murder and in appreciating nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance in the
commission of the crime.
Ruling:
In relation to treachery, no, the lower court did not err. The prosecution evidence meets
the requisites for appreciating alevosia in the commission of the crime, viz.: (1) at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) appellant consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of the attack employed by him. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting
victim, depriving the letter of any real chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its
commission without risk to himself. In connection to nocturnity, yes, the lower court erred. The
rule is that the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity is ordinarily deemed absorbed in
treachery because it forms part of the treacherous means and manner specifically employed by
the accused to insure the execution of his criminal act creating a single circumstance qualifying
the killing as murder. In accepting immediate premeditation as a qualifying circumstance in this
case, yes the lower court erred. The prosecution failed to prove (a) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his
determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and execution of
the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. In the case at bar, treachery
has been used to qualify the killing to murder, nocturnity has been absorbed by treachery, and
evident premeditation has not been proved.

G.R. No. 169509 June 16, 2006

JOCELYN E. CABO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FOURTH DIVISION, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR OF THE
OMBUDSMAN and THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REGION XIII, Respondents.

Facts:
That on or about 08 August 2000 in the Municipality of Barobo, Surigao del Sur,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
BONIFACIO C. BALAHAY, then Mayor of the Municipality of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, a high
ranking public official, with the use of his influence as such public official, committing the offense
in relation to his office, together with JOCELYN CABO, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously receive and accept the amount of ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND 31/100 (P104,162.31) from said JOCELYN CABO,
Business Manager of Orient Integrated Development Consultancy, Inc. (OIDCI), a consultancy
group charged with conducting a feasibility study for the Community-Based Resource
Management Project of the Municipality of Barobo, with accused Cabo giving and granting the
said amount to accused Balahay in consideration of the said accused having officially
intervened in the undertaking by the OIDCI of such contract for consultancy services with the
Municipality of Barobo. The prosecution filed an amended information which incorporated all the
essential elements of the crime charged.
Issue:
Whether or not an amended information is valid after a plea.
Ruling:
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in
form or in substance, without leave court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After
the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and
when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. In the case at bar,
while certain elements of the crime charged were missing in the indictment, the amended
information did not change the nature of the offense which is for violation of Section 3(b), R.A.
No. 3019. The amended information merely clarified the factual averments in the accusatory
portion of the previous information, in order to reflect with definiteness, the essential elements of
the crime charged. If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon
the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 11, Rule 119,
provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. The prosecution did not commit a mistake
in charging the proper offense; rather, it merely failed to file an information sufficient to charge
the offense it intended to charge, namely, violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. Section 14,
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure apparently relied upon by accused Cabo
contemplates a situation where the accused will be charged with an offense different from or is
otherwise not necessarily included in the offense charged in the information to be dismissed by
the Court. In the case at bar, however, accused Cabo will not be charged with a different
offense or with an offense that is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the original
information, but with the very same offense that the prosecution intended to charge her in the
first place, that is, violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.

G.R. No. L-31665 August 6, 1975

LEONARDO ALMEDA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as presiding judge of the Circuit Criminal Court,
Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Rizal, and HON. GREGORIO PINEDA, City Fiscal of Pasay
City, respondents.

Facts:
The petitioner Leonardo Almeda (alias Nardong Paa) was charged, together with five
others, with the crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle in the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig,
Rizal, presided by the respondent Judge Onofre Villauz. The respondent city fiscal, thru his
assistant, reiterated his oral motion made at a previous hearing for amendment of the
information so as to include allegations of recidivism and habitual delinquency in the particular
case of Almeda. The latter vigorously objected, arguing that (a) such an amendment was
premature since no copies of prior conviction could yet be presented in court, (b) the motion to
amend should have been made in writing in order to enable him to object formally, and (c) the
proposed amendment would place him in double jeopardy considering that he had already
pleaded not guilty to the information.
Issue:
Whether or not the amendment to the information, after a plea of not guilty thereto, was
properly allowed in both substance and procedure.
Ruling:
Under section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the trial court has discretion to allow
amendments to the information on all matters of form after the defendant has pleaded and
during the trial when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
What are prohibited at this stage of the proceedings are amendments in substance. And the
substantial matter in a complaint or information is the recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.
The additional allegations of habitual delinquency and recidivism do not have the effect of
charging another offense different or distinct from the charge of qualified theft (of a motor
vehicle) contained in the information. Neither do they tend to correct any defect in the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter of the case. The said new allegations relate
only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction. They do
not alter the prosecution's theory of the case nor possibly prejudice the form of defense the
accused has or will assume. Consequently, in authorizing the amendments, the respondent
judge acted with due consideration of the petitioner's rights and did not abuse his discretion. It is
clear that the petitioner Almeda has not yet been convicted nor acquitted of the charge of
qualified theft of a motor vehicle contained in the original information. Neither has the case
against him been dismissed or otherwise terminated. The mere amendment of the information
to include allegations of habitual delinquency and recidivism does not have the effect of a
dismissal of the criminal action for qualified theft alleged in the original information.

G.R. No. 103102 March 6, 1992

CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:
That on or about the 13th day of July 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while
armed with a handgun, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Maureen Navarro
Hultman on the head, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would have caused
the death of said Maureen Navarro Hultman, thereby performing all the acts of execution which
would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce
it by reason of cause or causes independent of her will, that is, due to the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to said Maureen Navarro Hultman which prevented her death.
Consequently, private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an omnibus motion for leave of court
to file an amended information and to admit said amended information.
Issue:
Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without
preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may
legally and validly be admitted.
Ruling:
 Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at
any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form,
by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the
rights of the accused. In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in
both the original and the amended information. What is involved here is not a variance in the
nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of execution of the same
offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This is being the case, we hold that an
amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the
amended information for murder is proper.

G.R. No. L-51513 May 15, 1984

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELICIANO GOROSPE and RUFINO BULANADI, accused-appellants.

Facts:
A complaint filed on October 8, 1974, with the Municipal Court of Pulilan, Bulacan,
ANASTACIA DE JESUS accused GERARDO FAJARDO, RUFINO BULANADI and FELICIANO
GOROSPE of the crime of forcible abduction with rape. On October 25, 1974, the Complaint
was amended. Rufino Bulanadi and Feliciano Gorospe were again named but Gerardo Fajardo
was dropped and OSCAR ALVARAN was named instead. The date when the crime was said to
have been committed was changed from September 30, 1974, to September 25, 1974. The
Court finds both the herein accused Gorospe and Bulanadi guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
rape committed against Anastacia de Jesus as charged in the information.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the accused Gorospe and Bulanadi guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Ruling:
No. The Solicitor General states that Gerardo Fajardo, the discharged state witness,
also committed rape hence the appellants should each be found guilty of three (3) rapes
because in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. We cannot agree in respect of the
participation of Fajardo. Since Fajardo was dropped from the complaint his guilt had not been
established. However, We agree with the Solicitor General's observation that a motor vehicle
was used to bring her Anastacia de Jesus from Plaridel, Bulacan, where she was first deceived
and drugged, and then taken to an isolated uninhabited place at a nipa hut, near an irrigation
pump at Calipahan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, where she was abused, 2 aggravating
circumstances are present, namely use of motor vehicle and uninhabited place so that death is
the proper penalty. However, for lack of the necessary number of votes the death penalty
cannot be imposed.
G.R. No. 107898 December 19, 1995
MANUEL LIM and ROSITA LIM, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:
Manuel and Rosita Lim, spouses, and president and treasurer respectively of Rigi Bilt
Industries, Inc., allegedly issued 7 Solidbank checks as payment for goods purchased from and
delivered by Linton Commercial Company, Inc. When deposited with Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation, said checks were dishonored for “insufficiency of funds” with the additional notation
“payment stopped” stamped thereon. Despite demand, spouses Lim refused to make good the
checks or pay the value of the deliveries. The RTC held spouses Lim guilty of estafa and
violation of BP22. On appeal, the CA acquitted accused-appellants of estafa on the ground that
the checks were not made in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of their issuance
but affirmed the finding that they were guilty of having violated B.P. Blg. 22. In the present case,
petitioners maintain that the prosecution failed to prove that any of the essential elements of the
crime punishable under B.P. Blg. 22 was committed within the jurisdiction of RTC-Malabon
claiming that what was proved was that all the elements of the offense were committed in
Kalookan City.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case; they could not be held liable
for estafa because the seven (7) checks were issued by them several weeks after the deliveries
of the goods; neither could they be held liable for violating B.P. Blg. 22 as they ordered payment
of the checks to be stopped because the goods delivered were not those specified by them,
besides they had sufficient funds to pay the checks.
Ruling:
Under Sec. 191 NIL, the term “issue” means the first delivery of the instrument complete in form
to a person who takes it as a holder. On the other hand, the term “holder” refers to the payee or
indorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it or the bearer thereof. Although LINTON sent
a collector who received the checks from petitioners at their place of business in Kalookan City,
they were actually issued and delivered to LINTON at its place of business in Balut, Navotas.
The receipt of the checks by the collector of LINTON is not the issuance and delivery to the
payee in contemplation of law. The collector was not the person who could take the checks as a
holder, i.e., as a payee or endorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer title thereto. Neither could
the collector be deemed an agent of LINTON with respect to the checks because he was a
mere employee. The prima facie evidence has not been overcome by petitioners in the cases
before us because they did not pay LINTON the amounts due on the checks; neither did they
make arrangements for payment in full by the drawee bank within five (5) banking days after
receiving notices that the checks had not been paid by the drawee bank. In People v. Grospe
citing People v. Manzanilla we held that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the
check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused
be within one territory or another.” Consequently, venue or jurisdiction lies either in the RTC of
Kalookan City or Malabon. Moreover, we ruled in the same Grospe and Manzanilla cases as
reiterated in Lim v. Rodrigo that venue or jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
Information. The Informations in the cases under consideration allege that the offenses were
committed in the Municipality of Navotas which is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction
upon the Regional Trial Court of Malabon. We therefore sustain likewise the conviction of
petitioners by RTC-Malabon for violation of BP22.

G.R. Nos. 140576-99. December 13, 2004

JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division), ALBANO & ASSOCIATES and the
ASSOCIATION OF GENERALS & FLAG OFFICERS, INC., respondents.

Facts:
Jose S. Ramiscal Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and Jesus Garcia
were charged with Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents before the
Sandiganbayan. The Information alleged that Ramiscal, et. al. misappropriated and converted
the amount of P250,318,200.00 for their personal use from the funds of AFP-RSBS. Ramiscal
filed with the Sandiganbayan an “Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of Information and to Defer
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.” He argued, that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the
case because the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. The said Urgent Motion was later adopted by
Alzaga and Satuito. The Urgent Motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Ramiscal, et. al.
filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution issued, the Sandiganbayan sustained
Ramiscal, et. al.’s contention that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. Hence, it reconsidered its
earlier Resolution and ordered the dismissal of their criminal case. Upon denial of its Motion for
Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the present special civil action for certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the AFP-RSBS is not a government entity.
Ruling:
No, the AFP-RSBS is a government entity. It was created by Presidential Decree 361. Its
purpose and functions are akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the system that
manages the retirement and pension funds of those in the military service. Members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police are expressly excluded from
the coverage of The GSIS Act of 1997. Therefore, soldiers and military personnel, who are
incidentally employees of the Government, rely on the administration of the AFP-RSBS for their
retirement, pension and separation benefits. Its enabling law further mandates that the System
shall be administered by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines through an
agency, group, committee or board, which may be created and organized by him and subject to
such rules and regulations governing the same as he may, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of National Defense, promulgate from time to time. Moreover, the investment of funds
of the System shall be decided by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with
the approval of the Secretary of National Defense. The funds of the AFP-RSBS, except for the
initial seed money, come entirely from contributions and that no part thereof come from
appropriations. While it may be true that there have been no appropriations for the contribution
of funds to the AFP-RSBS, the Government is not precluded from later on adding to the funds in
order to provide additional benefits to them. The above considerations indicate that the
character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest. As such, we hold
that the same is a government entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds.

G.R. No. L-56612 August 18, 1988

ELISEO B. YUSAY and AIDA O. YUSAY, Spouses, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, as Presiding Judge, Branch II, CFI of ILOILO, THE PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF OF ILOILO and IGMEDIO SUMBANON. respondents.

Facts:
On 5 September 1979, a cargo truck or log loader driven by Rodolfo Guillen figured in a
traffic mishap in Jaro, Iloilo City with another cargo truck owned by Igmedio Sumbanon.
Thereafter, Guillen was charged in a criminal case for less serious physical injuries and damage
to property through reckless imprudence. A writ of execution was issued against the accused. It
was returned unsatisfied on the ground of accused's insolvency. Igmedio Sumbanon then filed a
motion for execution of owner/ employer's subsidiary civil liability. The respondent court issued
an order granting the motion and forthwith ordered the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution
against the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Eliseo Yusay. Eliseo B. Yusay received a copy of the motion
but did not file any objection thereto.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses should be held liable.
Ruling:
Yes. In the instant case, the spouses Yusay do not deny that, while the cargo truck in
question was not registered in their names but in the name of the Calinog-Lambunao Sugarmill,
Inc. by virtue of a contract to sell between the spouses, as vendees, and the latter, as vendor,
with reservation of ownership on the part of the vendor until final payment has been made, yet
the contract provides that responsibility for any and all damages arising from the operation of
the vehicle is for the account of the petitioners, the spouses Yusay. The latter cannot, therefore,
escape subsidiary liability under the law. It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a
party to the criminal case instituted against his employee but in substance and in effect he is
considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. It is his concern, as well as of his
employee, to see to it that his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking virtual
participation in the defense of his employee. He cannot leave him to his own fate because his
failure is also his. And if because of his indifference or inaction the employee is convicted and
damages are awarded against him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if brought to court for
the enforcement of his subsidiary liability, that he was not given his day in court.

G.R. No. 73836 August 18, 1988

ANTOLIN T. NAGUIAT, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THIRD SPECIAL CASES DIVISION,
TIMOG SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION RATION AND MANUEL P. LAZATIN,
respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner Antolin T. Naguiat purchased, on installment basis, four lots from TSDC,
identified as Lots Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16, of Block 26 of Timog Park. The four lots have a total
area of 1,200 square meters, with a price of P60.00 per square meter, as alleged by petitioner.
On the same date above-mentioned, 7 February 1983, petitioner made a down payment of
P7,200.00, representing 10% of the alleged total price of P72,000.00 for the four lots. A
corresponding receipt for the down payment was issued by TSDC to the petitioner. The
Contract to Sell between TSDC and the petitioner stipulated a two-year period within which to
pay the total contract price, the latter made substantial payments in the months of June to
August 1983. That petitioner made a full payment for the four lots and a receipt was issued to
the petitioner. Under their agreement, petitioner must complete the furnishing of the house for a
period of 6 months, failing to do this petitioner will not be entitled to 10% rebate and all the
payment that he made will not amount to full payment. Petitioner filed a case for specific
performance with damages, and petitioner’s counsel filed a motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration for two times, but it was denied for the second time.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in denying the motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration.
Ruling:
 In the case of Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, has ruled that:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced
that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed
with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate
Appellate Court. In the case at bar, the petitioner filed his motions for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration on 30 October 1985 and 15 November 1985, both within the periods
sought to be extended. Hence the Habaluyas ruling did not yet apply to bar said motions for
extension.

G.R. No. L-38352 August 19, 1982

ADELA J. CAÑOS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. E.L. PERALTA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur and ROLANDO
APAS, respondents.

Facts:
On December 23, 1971, petitioner Adela C. Caños was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Davao del Sur with violation of Section 3[a] of Rep. Act No. 602, for alleged non-
payment of the minimum wage to her employee, respondent Rolando Apas. On August 4, 1972,
respondent Apas instituted an action against petitioner for collection of differential, overtime and
termination pay, plus damages. The complaint averred that respondent Apas had been
employed by petitioner as cashier in her gasoline station since August 1965 up until he was
illegally dismissed on January 15, 1971; that during his employment, he was not paid the
minimum wage or the overtime pay prescribed by law, neither was he given termination pay
after his dismissal. Petitioner contends that after the institution of Criminal Case No. 326, the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 558 should be suspended until final judgment in the criminal
action has been rendered.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil proceeding should be suspended first.
Ruling:
No. Civil Case No. 558 is a separate and distinct action from Criminal Case No. 326.
The former is based upon a contract of services entered into by the parties, not upon the civil
liability arising from the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 326, i.e., non-payment of the
minimum wage, punishable under Section 3 (a) of Rep. Act 602, as amended, in relation to
Section 15 (a) of the same Act. Being essentially an action for enforcement of an obligation ex-
contractu the civil case can proceed independently of the latter, in accordance with Article 31 of
the Civil Code.

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.

Facts:
Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on February 4, 1992 due to
cardio respiratory arrest. The Solicitor General then submitted a comment stating that the death
of the accused does not excuse him from his civil liability (supported by the Supreme Court’s
decision in People vs Sendaydiego). On the other hand, the counsel of the accused claimed
that in the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs Castillo, civil liability is extinguished if
accused should die before the final judgement is rendered.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his
civil liability.
Ruling:
The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of Castillo and Sendaydiego.
In the Castillo case, the Court said that civil liability is extinguished only when death of the
accused occurred before the final judgement. Judge Kapunan further stated that civil liability is
extinguished because there will be “no party defendant” in the case. There will be no civil liability
if criminal liability does not exist. Further, the Court stated “it is, thus, evident that… the rule
established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be
predicated on the sources of obligations other than delict. In the Sendaydiego case, the Court
issued Resolution of July 8, 1977 where it states that civil liability will only survive if death came
after the final judgement of the CFI of Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the Civil Code could
not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by
the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. The Court also gave a summary on
which cases should civil liability be extinguished, to wit: Death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
Therefore, Bayotas’s death extinguished his criminal and civil liability based solely on the act
complained of.
 G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA,
BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN,
respondents.

Facts:
An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on January 23,
1979 with the lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz
Abayan. Before the petitioner’s arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that
Paz consented to entering into the marriage which was Donato’s second since she had no
previous knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June
30, 1978. Donato defensed that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without
a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by
private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of
the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband and wife without the
benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26,
1978 for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76
of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their
home upon learning that Donato already previously married.
Issue:
Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be suspended
in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic
relations court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question.
Ruling:
Petitioner Leonilo Donato can’t apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for
annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case
against the accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained
by means of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must
be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. Accordingly,
there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent
judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992

ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168,
Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner, in a case of rage road, shot the victim and fled the scene. After establishing
that the petitioner was probably the assailant, the police launched a manhunt. Six days after the
shooting, petitioner presented himself before the police to verify the news report that he was
being hunted by the police. He was immediately detained.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s warrantless arrest was valid.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner’s arrest took place 6 days after the shooting of Maguan. The arresting
officer obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time the petitioner
had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the arrest effect 6 days after the shooting be
reasonably regarded as effected when the shooting had in fact just been committed within the
meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the arresting officers had any personal knowledge
of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. Petitioner is ordered
released upon posting of a cash bail bond without prejudice to any lawful order that the trial
court may issue, should the provincial prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion
of preliminary investigation.

A.M. No. RTJ-00-1522. January 20, 2000

ROMULO SJ TOLENTINO, State Prosecutor, complainant, vs. JUDGE POLICARPIO S.
CAMANO, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Tigaon, Camarines Sur, Respondent.
Facts:
Respondent Judge is being charged with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
discretion, grave abuse of authority, violation of Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics and incompetence in connection with granting bail to the accused in a criminal case for
child abuse.

The complaint alleges that respondent Judge granted bail while pending the holding of a
preliminary investigation. The defense moved to quash the information against the accused on
the alleged absence of a preliminary investigation. Consequently, respondent Judge ordered
that a preliminary investigation be had by the state prosecutor. During the pendency of this, he
granted bail in favor of the defendant after several notices of hearing to the state prosecutor to
which the latter failed to appear. After such grant, complainant herein now accuses respondent
of denying the prosecution the chance to adduce evidence to show that the guilt of the accused
was strong and that bail should not have been granted in his favor.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a denial of due process.
Ruling:
There was no denial of due process. It was not necessary to hold hearing so that the
prosecution could show that evidence of guilt of the accused was strong since a preliminary
investigation had been ordered by the court. At that point, bail was still a matter of right.
Respondent judge, knowing that bail was indeed a matter of right at that stage, nevertheless set
the hearing for the petition for bail four times. However, complainant failed to appear and
present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused was strong. It thus appears that
complainant is actually the one who was remiss in the performance of his duties. Considering
that the case was referred to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary investigation,
the accused could be considered as entitled to bail as a matter of right. Thus, respondent
judge’s decision granting bail to the accused was proper and in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.

G.R. No. 85468 September 7, 1989

QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, OMBUDSMAN AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.

Facts:
 Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec.
3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal
International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of
electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or
NMYC). An information was then filed by the “Tanodbayan” against Doromal for the said
violation and a preliminary investigation was conducted. The petitioner then filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the “Tanodbayan” to file the information
without the approval of the Ombudsman.

The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the
1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties not given to the
Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the
filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman.
Subsequently annulling the information filed by the “Tanodbayan”. A new information, duly
approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal, a
public officer, being then a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully, participate in a business through the
Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the President,
and which company participated in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and the National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is
prohibited by law and the constitution. The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on
the ground that it was invalid since there had been no preliminary investigation for the new
information that was filed against him. The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that
another preliminary investigation is unnecessary because both old and new informations involve
the same subject matter.

Issue:

Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both informations involve

the same subject matter.

Ruling:

The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one. Its denial
over his opposition is a prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law provided by the Constitution. Since the first information
was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that time shall also be considered as
void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted. The absence of
preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair
the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no preliminary
investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to
their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information should conduct such
investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the
preliminary investigation may be conducted.
 Judge Melvin Calvos vs CA

G.R. No. 140863 August 22, 2000

SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,

vs.

HON. ROLANDO HOW, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch
257 of Parañaque and MA. FE F. BARREIRO, respondents.

Facts:

On May 28, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Parañaque filed an Information for estafa
against Ma. Fe Barreiro (private respondent) based on the complaint filed by the petitioner. The
scheduled arraignment reset the arraignment of private respondent on the ground that private
respondent had filed an appeal with the Department of Justice. Respondent court issued an
Order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order that previously reset the
arraignment of private respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent court erred in defying section 12, rule 116 of the revised
rules on criminal procedure.

Ruling:

Section 12. Suspension of Arraignment. – The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the

time thereof:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the case against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In
such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for
such purpose.

(b) The court finds the existence of a valid prejudicial question."

There is nothing in the above-quoted provision that expressly or impliedly mandates that the
suspension of arraignment shall be limited to the cases enumerated therein. Moreover,
jurisprudence has clearly established that the suspension of arraignment is not strictly limited to
the two situations contemplated in said provision. In fine, no grave abuse of discretion attended
the issuance of the assailed order suspending the arraignment of private respondent until her
petition for review with the Secretary of Justice is resolved.