LEONEN DIGESTS

1) DYNAMIC BUILDERS & CONSTRUCTION CO. (PHIL.), INC. v. HON. RICARDO P.

PRESBITERO, JR., G.R. No. 174202               April 7, 2015

LEONEN, J.:

Republic Act No. 8975 does not sanction splitting a cause of action in order for a party to avail
itself of the ancillary remedy of a temporary restraining order from this court. Also, this law
covers only national government infrastructure projects. This case involves a local government
infrastructure project.

For local government infrastructure projects, Regional Trial Courts may issue provisional
injunctive reliefs against government infrastructure projects only when (1) there are compelling
and substantial constitutional violations; (2) there clearly exists a right in esse; (3) there is a need
to prevent grave and irreparable injuries; (4) there is a demonstrable urgency to the issuance of
the injunctive relief; and (5) when there are public interest at stake in restraining or enjoining the
project while the action is pending that far outweighs (a) the inconvenience or costs to the party
to whom the project is awarded and (b) the public benefits that will result from the completion of
the project. The time periods for the validity of temporary restraining orders issued by trial courts
should be strictly followed. No preliminary injunction should issue unless the evidence to
support the injunctive relief is clear and convincing.

2) CRISANTO M. AALA, ROBERT N. BALAT, DATU BELARDO M. BUNGAD, CESAR

B. CUNTAPAY, LAURA S. DOMINGO, GLORIA M. GAZMEN-TAN, and JOCELYN P.
SALUDARES-CADAYONA v. HON. REY T. UY, in his capacity as the City Mayor of
Tagum City, Davao del Norte, January 10, 2017, G.R. No. 202781

LEONEN, J.:

GENERAL RULE:

Parties must comply with the doctrines on hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Otherwise, they run the risk of bringing premature cases before this Court, which may
result to protracted litigation and overclogging of dockets.

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The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy designed to restrain parties from
directly resorting to this Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts.  The logic
behind this policy is grounded on the need to prevent "inordinate demands upon the Court's time
and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction," as well
as to prevent the congestion of the Court's dockets.  Hence, for this Court to be able to
"satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter[,]" it must remain

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as a "court of last resort."  This can be achieved by relieving the Court of the "task of dealing
with causes in the first instance." 

As expressly provided in the Constitution, this Court has original jurisdiction "over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus." However, this Court
has emphasized in People v. Cuaresma that the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus does not exclusively pertain to this Court.  Rather, it is shared with the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts.  Nevertheless, "this concurrence of jurisdiction" does not
give parties unfettered discretion as to the choice of forum. The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is
determinative of the appropriate venue where petitions for extraordinary writs should be
filed. Parties cannot randomly select the court or forum to which their actions will be directed.

There is another reason why this Court enjoins strict adherence to the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts. As explained in Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, "[t]he doctrine that
requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of
the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner.

Consequently, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in the
lower courts.  This holds especially true when questions of fact are raised.  Unlike this Court,
trial courts and the Court of Appeals are better equipped to resolve questions of fact.  They are in
the best position to deal with causes in the first instance.

EXCEPTIONS:

However, the doctrine on hierarchy of courts is not an inflexible rule.  In Spouses Chua v. Ang, 
this Court held that “[a] strict application of this rule may be excused when the reason behind the
rule is not present in a case[.]”  This Court has recognized that a direct invocation of its original
jurisdiction may be warranted in exceptional cases as when there are compelling reasons clearly
set forth in the petition,  or when what is raised is a pure question of law. 

In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy
of courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed when any of the following grounds are
present:

(1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately;

(2) when the case involves transcendental importance;

(3) when the case is novel;

(4) when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court;

(5) when time is of the essence;

(6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ;

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(7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law;

(8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice;

(9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and

(10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy. 

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(NOTE: General rule:)

In Reyes v. Court of Appeals,  this Court declared the mandatory nature of Section 187 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 :

[T]he law requires that the dissatisfied taxpayer who questions the validity or legality of a tax
ordinance must file his appeal to the Secretary of Justice, within 30 days from effectivity thereof.
In case the Secretary decides the appeal, a period also of 30 days is allowed for an aggrieved
party to go to court. But if the Secretary does not act thereon, after the lapse of 60 days, a party
could already proceed to seek relief in court. These three separate periods are clearly given for
compliance as a prerequisite before seeking redress in a competent court. Such statutory periods
are set to prevent delays as well as enhance the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
functions. For this reason the courts construe these provisions of statutes as
mandatory.   (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Xx x

(NOTE, Exceptions:)

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, like the doctrine on hierarchy of courts, is
not an iron-clad rule. It admits of several well-defined exceptions. Province of Zamboanga del
Norte v. Court of Appeals has held that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
may be dispensed in the following instances:

(1) [W]hen there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5)
when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as
an alter ego of the President, bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount
to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11)
when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and unreasonable

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delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) when no administrative review is provided
by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies; and (14) when the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot. 

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(NOTE: Distinction: In cases where the validity or legality of a tax ordinance is questioned,
the rule that real property taxes must first be paid before a protest is lodged does not apply.)

Under Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991, aggrieved taxpayers who question
the validity or legality of a tax ordinance are required to file an appeal before the Secretary of
Justice before they seek intervention from the regular courts. Section 187 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 provides:

SECTION 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue
Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. - The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and
revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public
hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided,
further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue
measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the
Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of
the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the
effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied
therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of
the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party
may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.

In Reyes v. Court of Appeals,  this Court declared the mandatory nature of Section 187 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 :

[T]he law requires that the dissatisfied taxpayer who questions the validity or legality of a tax
ordinance must file his appeal to the Secretary of Justice, within 30 days from effectivity thereof.
In case the Secretary decides the appeal, a period also of 30 days is allowed for an aggrieved
party to go to court. But if the Secretary does not act thereon, after the lapse of 60 days, a party
could already proceed to seek relief in court. These three separate periods are clearly given for
compliance as a prerequisite before seeking redress in a competent court. Such statutory periods
are set to prevent delays as well as enhance the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
functions. For this reason the courts construe these provisions of statutes as
mandatory.   (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

To question the validity of the ordinance, petitioners should have first filed an appeal before the
Secretary of Justice. However, petitioners justify direct resort to this Court on the ground that
they are entangled in a "catch- 22 situation."  They believe that filing an appeal before the
Secretary of Justice would merely delay the process and give the City Government of Tagum
ample time to collect real property taxes. 

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The questioned ordinance was published in July 2012.  Had petitioners immediately filed an
appeal, the Secretary of Justice would have had enough time to render a decision. Section 187 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 gives the Secretary of Justice 60 days to act on the appeal.
Within 30 days from receipt of an unfavorable decision or upon inaction by the Secretary of
Justice within the time prescribed, aggrieved taxpayers may opt to lodge the appropriate
proceeding before the regular courts. 

The "catch-22 situation" petitioners allude to does not exist. Under Section 166 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, local taxes "shall accrue on the first (1st) day of January of each
year." When the questioned ordinance was published in July 2012, the City Government of
Tagum could not have immediately issued real property tax assessments. Hence, petitioners had
ample time within which to question the validity of the tax ordinance.

In cases where the validity or legality of a tax ordinance is questioned, the rule that real property
taxes must first be paid before a protest is lodged does not apply. Taxpayers must first receive an
assessment before this rule is triggered.  In Jardine, this Court ruled that prior payment under
protest is not required when the taxpayer is questioning the very authority of the assessor to
impose taxes:

Hence, if a taxpayer disputes the reasonableness of an increase in a real estate tax assessment, he
is required to "first pay the tax" under protest. Otherwise, the city or municipal treasurer will not
act on his protest. In the case at bench, however, the petitioners are questioning the very
authority and power of the assessor, acting solely and independently, to impose the assessment
and of the treasurer to collect the tax. These are not questions merely of amounts of the increase
in the tax but attacks on the very validity of any increase.  (Emphasis and citation omitted)

Given the serious procedural errors committed by petitioners, we find no genuine reason to dwell
on and resolve the other issues presented in this case. The factual issues raised by petitioners
could have been properly addressed by the lower courts had they adhered to the doctrines of
hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of administrative remedies. These rules were established for a
reason. While petitioners' enthusiasm in their advocacy may be admirable, their overzealousness
has further delayed their cause.

3) DEVIE ANN ISAGA FUERTES v. THE SENATE OF PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 208162,
January 07, 2020

Section 14 , paragraph 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law, which provides that an accused's presence
during a hazing is prima facie evidence of his or her participation, does not violate the
constitutional presumption of innocence. This disputable presumption is also not a bill of
attainder.
 
This Court resolves a Petition for Certiorari seeking to declare unconstitutional Sections 5 and 14
of the Anti-Hazing Law— specifically, paragraph 4 of Section 14. The paragraph provides that
one's presence during the hazing is prima facie  evidence of participation as a principal, unless
proven to have prevented or to have promptly reported the punishable acts to law enforcement

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authorities if they can, without peril to their person or their family.
 
Devie Ann Isaga Fuertes (Fuertes) is among the 46 accused in Criminal Case No. 2008-895,
pending before Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City. She and her co-accused
had been charged with violating the Anti-Hazing Law, or Republic Act No. 8049, for the death
of Chester Paolo Abracia (Abracia) due to injuries he allegedly sustained during the initiation
rites of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. Fuertes is a member of the fraternity's sister sorority, Tau
Gamma Sigma, and was allegedly present at the premises during the initiation rites.
 
Abracia died on or about August 2, 2008 in Tayabas City, Quezon. An Information was filed on
October 20, 2008, charging the 46 members of Tau Gamma Phi and Tau Gamma Sigma for
violation of Republic Act No. 8049.

XXX

(NOTE: GEN. RULE)

Petitioner's direct resort to this Court, when there is a perfectly competent trial court before
which she may raise her constitutional question, abrogates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.  
 
"The doctrine of hierarchy of courts ensures judicial efficiency at all levels of courts.

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A motion to quash an information may be filed at any time before a plea is entered by the
accused. The accused may move to quash an information on constitutional grounds, based on
the theory that there can be no crime if there is no law, the law being invalid (nullum crimen
sine lege).

Xxx

To justify the filing of this Petition before this Court absent any intermediary decision,
resolution, or order by any lower court, petitioner argues that this Court is "the final arbiter
whether or not a law violates the Constitution , particularly the rights of citizens under the Bill of
Rights." 
 
Indeed, this Court is the final arbiter of the constitutionality of any law-but we are not the sole
and exclusive forum before which constitutional questions may be posed. We are the court of last
resort, not the first.  
 
Regional trial courts, including the one before which Criminal Case No. 2008-895 is pending,
are vested with judicial power, which embraces the power to determine if a law breaches the
Constitution

Xxx

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(EXCEPTION) Nonetheless, regardless of petitioner's remedial errors, this Court acknowledges
that the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not ironclad, especially when pressing constitutional
matters are at stake.

Xxx

Here, there is transcendental interest in determining whether a penal statute with grave
consequences to the life and liberty of those charged under it is consistent with our constitutional
principles. In the interest of judicial economy, this Court shall resolve this case on the merits.  

(Petitioner’s arguments on the unconstitutionality of sec. 4 of hazing law)

While petitioner purports to assail the constitutionality of both Sections 5 and 4 of the Anti-
Hazing law, all her arguments are focused on paragraph 4 of Section 14. In her Petition, she
states:

It is most respectfully submitted that the provision of RA No. 8049 in so far as it penalizes a
mere member not of the fraternity or sorority, who was merely present on the occasion of the so-
called initiation rites but had not witnessed, much less participated in any wrong doing, is
presumed/considered as principal, for whatever acts committed by any member or members,
considered as "hazing" punishable sections 3 and 4 of the law, RA 8049, and is
presumed/considered to have failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring, as in
this case, where petitioner under the circumstances, was immediately indicted as principal for the
acts of people albeit members of a fraternity, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and
non-bailable[.]

The pertinent portion of Section 14 provides:

The presence of any person , even if such person is not a member of the fraternity, sorority, or
organization, during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation therein as a principal
unless such person or persons prevented the commission of the acts punishable herein or
promptly reported the same to the law enforcement authorities if they can do so without peril to
their person or their family.

SC Ruling:

This Court has upheld the constitutionality of disputable presumptions in criminal laws. The
constitutional presumption of innocence is not violated when there is a logical connection
between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed. When such prima facie evidence is
unexplained or not contradicted by the accused, the conviction founded on such evidence will be
valid. However, the prosecution must still prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The existence of a disputable presumption does not preclude the presentation of contrary
evidence

(NOTE: Other instances when laws provide for disputable presumptions were UPHELD)

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People v. Baludda, this Court affirmed the constitutionality of the disputable presumption that
the finding of a dangerous drug in the accused's house or premises, absent a satisfactory
explanation, amounts to knowledge or animus possidendi:

Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1612, which provides that the
mere possession of stolen goods is prima facie evidence of fencing

In fact, the constitutionality of Section 14, paragraph 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law has already been
discussed—and upheld—by this Court. In Dungo v. People, this Court acknowledged that the
secrecy and concealment in initiation rites, and the culture of silence within many organizations,
would make the prosecution of perpetrators under the Anti-Hazing Law difficult: 

Secrecy and silence are common characterizations of the dynamics of hazing. To require the
prosecutor to indicate every step of the planned initiation rite in the information at the inception
of the criminal case, when details of the clandestine hazing are almost nil, would be an arduous
task, if not downright impossible. The law does not require the impossible (lex non cognit ad
impossibilia).

XXX

The petitioners attempted to attack the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049 before the
CA, but did not succeed. "[A] finding of prima facie evidence ... does not shatter the
presumptive innocence the accused enjoys because, before prima facie evidence arises, certain
facts have still to be proved; the trial court cannot depend alone on such evidence, because
precisely, it is merely prima facie.  It must still satisfy that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Neither can it rely on the weak defense the latter may
adduce."  
 
Penal laws which feature prima facie evidence by disputable presumptions against the offenders
are not new, and can be observed in the following: (1) the possession of drug paraphernalia gives
rise to prima facie evidence of the use of dangerous drug; (2) the dishonor of the check for
insufficient funds is prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit;
and (3) the possession of any good which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall
be prima facie evidence of fencing.  

Xxx

Res inter alios acta 

Res inter alios acta provides that a party's rights generally cannot be prejudiced by another's act,
declaration, or omission. However, in a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, rendering all
conspirators as co-principals "regardless of the extent and character of their
participation[.]" Under Rule 130, Section 30 of the Rules of Court, an exception to the res inter

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alios acta rule is an admission by a conspirator relating to the conspiracy:  

SECTION 30. Admission by  conspirator. - The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

As noted in Dungo, hazing often involves a conspiracy among those involved, be it in the

planning stage, the inducement of the victim, or in the participation in the actual initiation
rites.  The rule on res inter alios acta, then, does not apply.  

Xxx

Petitioner further claims that the Anti-Hazing Law imposes cruel and unusual punishments
on those charged under it, as the offense is punishable with reclusion perpetua,  a non-
bailable offense. She also argues that Sections 5 and 14 of the Anti-Hazing Law are a bill of
attainder for immediately punishing members of a particular group as principals or co-
conspirators, regardless of actual knowledge or participation in the crime.
Both these arguments are without merit.  

Xxx

SC RULING:
Petitioner here fails to show how the penalties imposed under the Anti Hazing Law would be
cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment, when they are similar to those imposed for the same
offenses under the Revised Penal Code, albeit a degree higher. To emphasize, the Anti-Hazing
Law aims to prevent organizations from making hazing a requirement for admission.  The
increased penalties imposed on those who participate in hazing is the country's response to a
reprehensible phenomenon that persists in schools and institutions. The Anti-Hazing Law seeks
to punish the conspiracy of silence and secrecy, tantamount to impunity, that would otherwise
shroud the crimes committed.

Xxx

BILL OF ATTAINDER

Moreover, contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Anti-Hazing Law is not a bill of attainder.  
 
Bills of attainder are prohibited under A11icle III, Section 22 of the Constitution, which states: 

SECTION 22. No ex post facto  law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
 
A bill of attainder is rooted in the historical practice of the English Parliament to declare certain
persons—such as traitors—attainted, or stained, and that the corruption of their blood extended
to their heirs, who would not be allowed to inherit from the "source" of the corruption. These
attainted persons and their kin were usually so declared without the benefit of judicial process.

9
 
In modern times, a bill of attainder is generally understood as a legislative act which inflicts
punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial.

Xxx

A bill of attainder encroaches on the courts' power to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused and to impose the corresponding penalty, violating the doctrine of separation of
powers. 
 
For a law to be considered a bill of attainder, it must be shown to contain all of the following:
"a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a
punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial." The most essential of these
elements is the complete exclusion of the courts from the determination of guilt and imposable
penalty.
  
  In  People v. Ferrer,  this Court delved into the question of whether the Anti-Subversion Act,
which declared illegal the Communist Party of the Philippines and any other organizations
that constitute an "organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and place
the Government under the control and domination of an alien power[,]" was a bill of
attainder.  

Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it
become a bill of attainder . It is upon this ground that statutes which disqualified those who had
taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the United States during the Civil War from
holding office, or from exercising their profession, or which prohibited the payment of further
compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that they had engaged in
subversive activities, or which made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as
an officer or employee of a labor union, have been invalidated as bills of attainder.  
 
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as
to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not
needed fairly to make such determination.(Citations omitted)

4) BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No.

213581, September 19, 2017

Due process in administrative proceedings does not require the submission of pleadings or a
trial-type of hearing. However, due process requires that a party is duly notified of the
allegations against him or her and is given a chance to present his or her defense.

xxx

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Respondent itself prescribed the documentary requirements which should accompany a request
for relief from accountability. Commission on Audit Memorandum No. 92-751 requires the
submission of a basic notice of loss "with the Auditor concerned or the Commission" and a copy
of the investigation report by the proper Commission on Audit Personnel. The accountable
officer is also required to submit a sworn statement, while the agency head and Commission on
Audit Director are expected to submit their respective comment or recommendation on the
request for relief. Likewise, documentary evidence on the total missing amount and a categorical
determination from the director or auditor concerned on the lack of negligence on the part of the
accountable officer should accompany the request for relief.

None of these documents accompanied petitioner's request for opinion. Instead, the request for
opinion was meant ''to seek guidance from Public Respondent [Commission on Audit], with
regard to the proper booking of the Accounts Receivable by Ms. Yap, in relation to [the Office
of] the Ombudsman's dismissal of the administrative case against her."

Clearly, respondent erred in treating the request for opinion as a request for relief from
accountability.

Xxx

The 2009 Rules have expanded the Commission Proper's original jurisdiction provided for under
the 1997 Rules by authorizing it to act not only on money claims but also on several kinds of
request. These requests are (a) for hiring of legal retainers, (b) for write-offs of unliquidated cash
advances and dormant amounts, and (c) for relief from accountability for losses due to acts of
man. Nonetheless, despite the Commission Proper's expanded jurisdiction, the Commission on
Audit's 2009 Rules still prescribe the proper procedure to be followed for the resolution of the
original case.

Money claims against the government continue to require the submission of a petition and an
answer, with the petitioner having the option to file a reply at his or her discretion. On the other
hand, a request of a government agency to hire a legal retainer is to be filed with the Commission
on Audit Office of the General Counsel, who shall then act on the request in respondent's behalf

Xxx

It is beyond dispute that Yap, Dequita, and the other bank officials of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, Cotabato Branch were denied due process with the issuance of the assailed
Commission on Audit Decision.

Respondent rendered its assailed Decision in blatant disregard to its own rules, treating the
request for opinion as a request for relief from accountability even if the former did not include
the required documents and comments or recommendations needed under either the 1997 Rules
or 2009 Rules. Furthermore, the request for opinion was filed by petitioner alone, yet the assailed

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Decision found Yap, Dequita, and other bank officers of the Cotabato Branch jointly and
solidarily liable, even if they were never parties to the request for opinion or request for relief
from accountability.

It was an error amounting to grave abuse of discretion to hold Yap liable, and Dequita and the
other bank officers of the Cotabato Branch jointly and solidarity liable with Yap for the cash
shortage without an actual complaint being filed and without giving them the chance to defend
themselves. Thus, the assailed Decision violated the basic tenets of due process and must be
annulled and set aside, However, in the absence of a complaint, this Court cannot grant
petitioner's prayer for this Court to render judgment relieving Yap, Dequita, and the other bank
officers from accountability over the cash shortage. Nonetheless, the Office of the Ombudsman
has already rendered judgment on Yap and Dequita's liability by dismissing the administrative
and criminal charges against them.

5)REYNALDO S. ZAPANTA, PETITIONER, EDILBERTO U. LAGASCA v. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS AND ALFRED J. ZAPANTA; EDILBERTO U. LAGASCA, G.R. No.
233016, Mar. 5, 2019

In a multi-slot office, all votes cast in favor of the nuisance candidate whose name is confusingly
similar to a bona fide candidate shall not be automatically credited in the latter's favor. If the
ballot contains one (1) vote for the nuisance candidate and no vote for the bona fide candidate,
that vote will be counted in the latter's favor. However, if the nuisance candidate and the bona
fide candidate each gets a vote, only one (1) vote will be counted in the latter's favor.

Xxx

The Commission declared Reynaldo S. Zapanta (Reynaldo) as a nuisance candidate and

ordered that the votes he received be added to the votes received by Alfred J. Zapanta (Alfred).

Xxx

Petitioner argues that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when it: (1)
declared petitioner as a nuisance candidate; (2) directed the proclamation of private respondent
as the winning candidate; and (3) declared void the proclamation of petitioner-intervenor as
councilor of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Antipolo City. 52

Petitioner contends that having the same nickname as private respondent does not automatically
translate to an insincere candidacy. He maintains that the affidavits prove that he was known as
"Alfred" and stresses his affiliation with a political party. He again argues that there can be no
confusion in an automated election. Moreover, private respondent actively introduced himself
during the campaign period as "21. ZAPANTA, ALFRED (AKSYON)" in the official ballots;
thus, the electorate was aware of his identity, and there could be no confusion between them.

Xxx

(Reasons why NUISANCE candidates are abhorred)

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In Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,83 this Court thoroughly discussed
the reasons why nuisance candidates are abhorred:

In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as in the case at bar, the law contemplates the
likelihood of confusion which the similarity of surnames of two (2) candidates may generate. A
nuisance candidate is thus defined as one who, based on the attendant circumstances, has
no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed,
his sole purpose being the reduction of the votes of a strong candidate, upon the expectation that
ballots with only the surname of such candidate will be considered stray and not counted for
either of them.

In elections for national positions such as President, Vice-President and Senator, the sheer
logistical challenge posed by nuisance candidates gives compelling reason for the Commission to
exercise its authority to eliminate nuisance candidates who obviously have no financial capacity
or serious intention to mount a nationwide campaign. Thus we explained in Pamatong v.
Commission on Elections:

"The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of
candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The
State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and
orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting
elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for
logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation
for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the
conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available
to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly
election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our
democratic institutions. . . .

. . . .

"The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance
candidates" to run in the elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates
for public office, such as watchers in every polling place, watchers in the board of canvassers, or
even the receipt of electoral contributions. Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the
formulations of which are dependent on the number of candidates in a given election.

"Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more
galling. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough.
To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign
would actually impair the electoral process. . . .

....

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Given the realities of elections in our country and particularly contests involving local positions,
what emerges as the paramount concern in barring nuisance candidates from participating in the
electoral exercise is the avoidance of confusion and frustration of the democratic process by
preventing a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate, more than the practical
considerations mentioned in Pamatong. A report published by the Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism in connection with the May 11, 1998 elections indicated that the tactic
of fielding nuisance candidates with the same surnames as leading contenders had become one
(1) "dirty trick" practiced in at least 18 parts of the country. The success of this clever scheme by
political rivals or operators has been attributed to the last-minute disqualification of nuisance
candidates by the Commission, notably its "slow-moving" decision-making. 84 (Emphasis in the
original, citations omitted)

Xxx

With the recent promulgation of Santos, this Court clarified how the votes of nuisance candidates
in a multi-slot office should be treated:

In a multi-slot office, such as membership of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, a registered voter

may vote for more than one candidate. Hence, it is possible that the legitimate candidate and
nuisance candidate, having similar names, may both receive votes in one ballot. The Court
agrees with the OSG that in that scenario, the vote cast for the nuisance candidate should no
longer be credited to the legitimate candidate; otherwise, the latter shall receive two votes from
one voter.

Therefore, in a multi-slot office, the COMELEC must not merely apply a simple mathematical
formula of adding the votes of the nuisance candidate to the legitimate candidate with the similar
name. To apply such simple arithmetic might lead to the double counting of votes because there
may be ballots containing votes for both nuisance and legitimate candidates.

As properly discussed by the OSG, a legitimate candidate may seek another person with the
same surname to file a candidacy for the same position and the latter will opt to be declared a
nuisance candidate. In that scenario, the legitimate candidate shall receive all the votes of the
nuisance candidate and may even receive double votes, thereby, drastically increasing his odds.

At the same time, it is also possible that a voter may be confused when he reads the ballot
containing the similar names of the nuisance candidate and the legitimate candidate. In his
eagerness to vote, he may shade both ovals for the two candidates to ensure that the legitimate
candidate is voted for. Similarly, in that case, the legitimate candidate may receive two (2) votes
from one voter by applying the simple arithmetic formula adopted by the COMELEC when the
nuisance candidate's COC is cancelled.

Thus, to ascertain that the votes for the nuisance candidate is accurately credited in favor of the
legitimate candidate with the similar name, the COMELEC must also inspect the ballots. In those
ballots that contain both votes for nuisance and legitimate candidate, only one count of vote must
be credited to the legitimate candidate.

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While the perils of a fielding nuisance candidates against legitimate candidates cannot be
overemphasized, it must also be guaranteed that the votes of the nuisance candidate are properly
and fairly counted in favor of the said legitimate candidate. In that manner, the will of the
electorate is upheld.

Here, the Santos doctrine must be applied: the votes for petitioner alone should be counted in
favor of private respondent; if there are votes for both petitioner and private respondent in the
same ballot, then only one (1) vote should be counted in the latter's favor. This will not only
discourage nuisance candidates, but will also prevent the disenfranchisement of voters.

On the third issue, petitioner-intervenor contends that he was denied his right to due process
since he was not impleaded in the Nuisance Petition, nor was he furnished with public
respondent's processes or private respondent's pleadings.

The legal standing of unaffected candidates in a nuisance petition has already been settled
in  Santos:

The Court finds that in a petition for disqualification of a nuisance candidate, the only real
parties in interest are the alleged nuisance candidate, the affected legitimate candidate, whose
names are similarly confusing. A real [party-in-interest] is the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

In Timbol v. COMELEC (Timbol), it was stated that to minimize the logistical confusion caused
by nuisance candidates, their COC may be denied due course or cancelled by the petition of a
legitimate candidate or by the COMELEC. This denial or cancellation may be motu proprio or
upon a verified petition of an interested party, subject to an opportunity to be heard. It was
emphasized therein that the COMELEC should balance its duty to ensure that the electoral
process is clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful with the right of an alleged nuisance candidate to
explain his or her bona fide intention to run for public office before he or she is declared a
nuisance candidate.

Thus, when a verified petition for disqualification of a nuisance candidate is filed, the real
parties-in-interest are the alleged nuisance candidate and the interested party, particularly, the
legitimate candidate. Evidently, the alleged nuisance candidate and the legitimate candidate
stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. The outcome of the nuisance case
shall directly affect the number of votes of the legitimate candidate, specifically, whether the
votes of the nuisance candidate should be credited in the former's favor.

Glaringly, there was nothing discussed in Timbol that other candidates, who do not have any
similarity with the name of the alleged nuisance candidate, are real parties-in-interest or have the
opportunity to be heard in a nuisance petition. Obviously, these other candidates are not affected
by the nuisance case because their names are not related with the alleged nuisance
candidate. Regardless of whether the nuisance petition is granted or not, the votes of the
unaffected candidates shall be completely the same. Thus, they are mere silent observers in
the nuisance case.

15
As a mere observer, petitioner-intervenor is not required to be impleaded in the Nuisance
Petition. Hence, his right to due process could not have been violated. Records also show that
petitioner-intervenor did not deny private respondent's allegation that it received a copy of public
respondent's August 8, 2017 Resolution. Despite receipt, petitioner-intervenor did not take action
to protect his interest.

6) CEZAR YATCO REAL ESTATE SERVICES, INC., GRD PROPERTY RESOURCES,

INC., GAMALIEL PASCUAL, JR., MA. LOURDES LIMJAP PASCUAL, AND AURORA
PIJUAN v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT ANTONIO GUERRERO, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, G.R. No.
211780, November 21, 2018

In contract interpretation, courts must first determine whether a stipulation is ambiguous or

susceptible of multiple interpretations. If no ambiguity is found and the terms of the contract
clearly reflect the intentions of the contracting parties, the stipulation will be interpreted as it is
written.

Xxx

In Abad v. Goldloop Properties, Inc., this Court ruled:

The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is embodied in the first paragraph of Article
1370 of the Civil Code: "[i]f the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control." This
provision is akin to the "plain meaning rule" applied by Pennsylvania courts, which assumes
that the intent of the parties to an instrument is "embodied in the writing itself, and when the
words are clear and unambiguous the intent is to be discovered only from the express language
of the agreement." It also resembles the "four corners" rule, a principle which allows courts in
some cases to search beneath the semantic surface for clues to meaning. A court's purpose in
examining a contract is to interpret the intent of the contracting parties, as objectively manifested
by them. The process of interpreting a contract requires the court to make a preliminary inquiry
as to whether the contract before it is ambiguous. A contract provision is ambiguous if it is
susceptible of two reasonable alternative interpretations. Where the written terms of the contract
are not ambiguous and can only be read one way, the court will interpret the contract as a matter
of law. If the contract is determined to be ambiguous, then the interpretation of the contract is
left to the court, to resolve the ambiguity in the light of the intrinsic evidence.

Xxx

Read as a whole, the Deed Restrictions as a restrictive covenant was intended for the "sanitation,
security and the general welfare of the community," providing the rules and regulations for the
lot owners' privacy and continued enjoyment of their property.

Petitioners' interpretation of limiting amendments to so-called restrictions, then declaring that the
term is not a restriction, cannot be upheld. A plain reading of Part VI, or the Term of

16
Restrictions, would show that the term of effectivity was not set in stone, and that private
respondent was empowered to cancel it altogether, through its members' majority vote. The
contracting parties' clear intention was to give the lot owners freedom to establish rules and
regulations, under which they could best use their properties and protect their interests. This is
apparent from the second sentence: "However, the Association may, from time to time, add new
ones, amend or abolish particular restrictions [or] parts thereof by majority rule."

7) ATTY. HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR. v. ARMED FORCES OF THE

PHILIPPINES (AFP) G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017

We resolve a Petition to Cite for Indirect Contempt filed by petitioner Atty. Herminio Harry L.
Roque, Jr. against respondents Gen. Gregorio Pio Catapang, Brig. Gen. Arthur Ang, and Lt. Col.
Harold Cabunoc, for violating Rule 139-B, Section18 of the Rules of Court.

Xxx

Thus, a good reputation is among a lawyer's most valuable assets. In Santiago v. Calvo:

The success of a lawyer in his profession depends almost entirely on his reputation. Anything
which will harm his good name is to be deplored.
The confidentiality rule is intended, in part, to prevent the use of disbarment proceedings as a
tool to damage a lawyer's reputation in the public sphere.

Thus, the general rule is that publicly disclosing disbarment proceedings may be punished with
contempt.

(EXCEPTION)

The confidentiality in disciplinary actions for lawyers is not absolute. It is not to be applied
under any circumstance, to all disclosures of any nature.

As a general principle, speech on matters of public interest should not be restricted. This Court
recognizes the fundamental right to information, which is essential to allow the citizenry to form
intelligent opinions and hold people accountable for their actions. Accordingly, matters of public
interest should not be censured for the sake of an unreasonably strict application of the
confidentiality rule. Thus, in Palad v. Solis, this Court dismissed claims that the confidentiality
rule had been violated, considering that the lawyer therein represented a matter of public interest:

17
A person, even if he was not a public official or at least a public figure, could validly be the
subject of a public comment as long as he was involved in a public issue. Petitioner has become
a public figure because he is representing a public concern. We explained it, thus:

But even assuming ... that [the person] would not qualify as a public figure, it does not
necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment even if he was
not a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as he was involved in a
public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become
less so merely because a private individual is involved or because in some sense the
individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is
in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and
significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.

As a general rule, disciplinary proceedings are confidential in nature until their final resolution
and the final decision of this Court. However, in this case, the disciplinary proceeding against
petitioner became a matter of public concern considering that it arose from his representation of
his client on the issue of video voyeurism on the internet. The interest of the public is not in
himself but primarily in his involvement and participation as counsel of Halili in the scandal.
Indeed, the disciplinary proceeding against petitioner related to his supposed conduct and
statements made before the media in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
involving the controversy.

Indeed, to keep controversial proceedings shrouded in secrecy would present its own dangers. In
disbarment proceedings, a balance must be struck, due to the demands of the legal profession.

In Fortun v. Quinsayas, despite recognizing that the disbarment complaint was a matter of public
interest, it still declared the complainant therein in contempt for violating the confidentiality rule:

Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as a complainant
in the disbarment case against petitioner and as a lawyer. As a lawyer and an officer of the Court,
Atty. Quinsayas is familiar with the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. However,
instead of preserving its confidentiality, Atty. Quinsayas disseminated copies of the disbarment
complaint against petitioner to members of the media which act constitutes contempt of court.
In Relativo v. De Leon, the Court ruled that the premature disclosure by publication of the filing
and pendency of disbarment proceedings is a violation of the confidentiality rule. In that case,
Atty. Relativo, the complainant in a disbarment case, caused the publication in newspapers of
statements regarding the filing and pendency of the disbarment proceedings. The Court found
him guilty of contempt.47

The complainant in Fortun bears the distinction of having distributed the actual disbarment
complaint to the press. This case is different.

The confidentiality rule requires only that "proceedings against attorneys" be kept private and
confidential. It is the proceedings against attorneys that must be kept private and confidential.

18
This would necessarily prohibit the distribution of actual disbarment complaints to the press.
However, the rule does not extend so far that it covers the mere existence or pendency of
disciplinary actions.

Some cases are more public than others, because of the subject matter, or the personalities
involved. Some are deliberately conducted in the public as a matter of strategy. A lawyer who
regularly seeks attention and readily welcomes, if not invites, media coverage, cannot expect to
be totally sheltered from public interest, himself.

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