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(1998) The Necessity of Contingency - Some Notes
(1998) The Necessity of Contingency - Some Notes
(1998) The Necessity of Contingency - Some Notes
To cite this article: Gregory Elliott (1998): The Necessity of Contingency: Some
Notes, Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society, 10:3, 74-79
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Rethinking MARXISM Volume 10,Number 3 (Fall 1998)
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Gregory Elliott
Recent years have been marked by a strong revival of interest in Louis Althusser and
his legacy. The principal occasion for it was, of course, the simultaneous appearance
in France of the autobiographical writings (Althusser 1992) and the first installment
of a comprehensive biography, taking the story to 1956 (Moulier Boutang 1992).
These disclosed the existence of a hitherto largely unknown Althusser, something of
whose complexity is revealed by the further eight volumes to date in a posthumous
edition of his writings. (The latest-two papers from the seminar on Lacan and psy-
choanalysis held at the Ecole Normale Suptrieure in 1963-4-was released at the
end of last year [Althusser 1996al. A selection from the correspondence is promised
for 1998.) And this is to omit from the reckoning the philosopher’s substantial ar-
chives, deposited at the Institut MCmoires de I’Edition Contemporaine in Paris in
1991, which contain some book-length manuscripts.
Conventionally, Althusser’s career has been periodized into three main phases,
encompassing two decades or so. They might be summarized as follows. The first,
1960-6, is the period of the elaboration of the “structural Marxism” of For Marx
and Reading Capital-the phase in which, for hostile critics, the Althusserian stance
bears an uncanny resemblance to that of the German imperial bureaucracy, whose
mind-set could allegedly be resumed as follows: that’s all very well in practice, but
does it work in theory? The second, stretching from the “Philosophy Course for
Scientists” in 1967 up to the midseventies, witnesses the criticism and revision of
Althusserian Marxism (Althusser 1990). And third, in 1976-8, we have no longer
the self-criticism, but a veritable autodeconstruction of Althusserianism, most evi-
dent in the 1978 encyclopedia article “Marxism Today” (Althusser 1990, 268-80).
Althusser and Contingency 75
At the very least, this division must be chronologically supplemented by two fur-
ther phases of reflection and production, one antecedent and the other subsequent to
the conventional periodization. The former is a pre-Althusserian moment, circa
1945-51, comprising the “early writings,” which were published in French in 1994
and in English this spring (Althusser 1997). The philosophico-political adventure
recorded in them comprises an intricate, dual transition: on the one hand, from Ca-
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In the remainder of this paper, I would like to do two things. First, I hope to pro-
vide an indication of just how pervasive the topic of “necessity and contingency” is
in Althusser’s oeuvre, although it is not always explicitly formulated as such (but
then, we have good reason to suppose that the lack of particular words cannot auto-
matically be construed as tantamount to a conceptual absence). And second, follow-
ing what is in effect a plain enumeration of references, I want to pose some open-
ended questions, suggesting possible lines of future research.
The first explicit conjugation of the terms occurs, then, in the 1947 Master’s the-
sis on Hegel. Appropriately enough, perhaps, it implicates Spinoza, simply alerting
us to the “contingency (or necessity) of the circumstance that Spinozism as a doc-
trine made its appearance in history by way of a lens-grinder” (Althusser 1997, 102).
Possibly of more substance is the use of the oxymoron in an article on Roman Ca-
tholicism, dating from 1949, in which Althusser writes of the “contingent necessity
that appeared, in France, as a need for an ‘extra dash of religious spirit’ to compen-
sate the relative decline in the Church’s state role” (232).
Althusser and Contingency 77
I have already made reference to “On the Young Marx” of a decade or so later.
However, it is in his de facto philosophical manifesto of 1962, “Contradiction and
Overdetermination” (1965,87-128), that something like a theory of the necessary
contingency of history is adumbrated, prioritizing Lenin as the thinker par excel-
lence of the political conjuncture. Neither a transcription of historical necessity
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By way of conclusion, I would like to pose four questions, while stressing that
they are not rhetorical. (In other words, I genuinely do not know the answers.) The
first is this: Is Balibar right, for example in his essay “Structural Causality, Over-
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determination, and Antagonism” (Balibar 1996), where he cites some of the evidence
assembled here to perceive a recurrent tension---even a permanent contradiction-
in Althusser? A tension between the LeninistA4achiavellian thinker of the singular-
ity of conjunctures and the Marxist-structuralist theorist of invariant structures-or,
in bibliographical terms, a disjunction between two essays whose composition was
separated by a mere ten months: “Contradiction and Overdetermination” and “On
the Materialist Dialectic” (Althusser 1965, 161-218).
Second, if this (or something like it) is the case, confirming in part Laclau and
Mouffe’s (1985) diagnosis of an antagonism between necessity and contingency
throughout the history of Marxism-in Althusser’s case, between “overdetermination”
in For Murx and “structural causality” in Reading C a p i t a l d o Althusser’s later writ-
ings seek to resolve it in the direction of “post-Marxism,’’ as does Hegemony and
Socialist Strategy? Do they retrospectively confirm Perry Anderson’s charge, laid
against structuralism and poststructuralism in general, of a sheer “randomization of
history” (1983,40-55)? Do they fall foul of the criticism that the theorization of con-
tingency is (in the words of one commentator on post-Marxism) “explanatory capitu-
lation in the face of happenstance” (McLennan 1996,67)? If so, would “aleatory ma-
terialism’’ represent not only an “imaginary Marxism” but also a contradiction in
terms-as much of a “yellow logarithm” as Althusser latterly considered “dialectical
materialism” to be (Althusser 1994a, 32)?
A third order of question: Is there, as Alex Callinicos has suggested to me, a pre-
cedent for Althusser’s concerns in non-Marxist, Anglophone philosophy of history?
More especially, in the work of J. T. Bury, who seems to have drawn upon Cournot
for his conception of history as a “chapter of accidents”-for example, in the essay
“Cleopatra’s Nose,” whose starting point is Pascal’s celebrated observation that “if
it had been shorter, the whole face of the world would have been different” (Pascal
1966, 162). Were the contingent and the accidental to be synonymous, as Anderson
takes them to be and as Althusser’s rubric of “aleatory materialism” intimates, how
does his own position differ from the kind of empiricist common sense of English
historians, encapsulated in H. A. L. Fisher’s oft quoted view of history as “the inter-
play of the contingent and the unforeseen”? Alternatively, is Althusser’s appropria-
tion of Cournot closer to that said to have been made by a French Marxist thinker
whom, following Lenin’s repudiation of him as a “notorious muddler” in Muterial-
ism and Empirio-Criticism, he dismissed in For Marx-namely, Georges Sorel, whose
concern with the “logic of contingency” may, in fact, render him a native “precur-
sor”? Another subject for research.
Last but not least, a provocation posing as a question. With Althusser’s closing
thoughts on necessity and contingency, are we not present at the strangest of encoun-
Althusser and Contingency 79
ters, however brief? “Our whole age,” Foucault famously pronounced in 1970, “is
trying to escape Hegel. But any real escape. . . presupposes . . . that we know what
is still Hegelian in that which allows us to think against Hegel, and that we can as-
sess the extent to which our appeal against him is perhaps one more of the ruses he
employs against US” (1970,74-5). Insofar as the internal link between necessity and
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