Submitted by:

Yogita Rathore 11-20/052

Batch: BA.LLB (2020-25)

Course Teacher
Prof. Vedashree Ma’am

Alliance School of Law

Alliance University, Bangalore
 Table of Contents

1. Lalita Kumari v State of U.P. (Literal Rule )

2. Dominion of India & Ors. v. Shrinbai A. Irani &Ors. (Literal Rule )

3. T.M.A Pai Foundation v State of Karnataka ( Harmonious

Construction )

4. The Sirsilk Ltd. And Others vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh

(Harmonious Construction )
 Lalita Kumari v. U.P. Govt. & Ors

Literal Construction

If the language of the legislation are plain and unambiguous and applying the terms' usual meaning
does not result in absurdity or inconsistency, the court must use the literal rule of construction in order
to express the legislator's intent.. Instead of following the literal rule, Purposive interpretation takes
into account a number of additional variables, such as the reason the provision was passed., enabling
the courts to deviate from the letter of the legislation.

.Facts

Lalita Kumari (minor), through her father, submitted a Writ Petition to the Supreme Court in
accordance with Article 32.. The major complaint cited in the Petition was that in 2008, after failing
to locate his daughter, the father filed a written missing person report at the police station in
Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh.. The police officer declined to record the FIR in accordance with Section
154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ("the Provision").Following that, the father approached the
Superintendent of Police, and the FIR was lodged on his orders.

The Supreme Court ruled in Lalita Kumari v. U.P. Govt. & Ors., admitted that the legislation
governing mandatory FIR registration was unclear due to contradictory court decisions.. This
ambiguity led to a referral to the Supreme Court's Constitutional Bench in the matter of Lalita Kumari
v. Govt. Uttar Pradesh.

Issues

There has been much debate and disagreement over whether the filing of the FIR is necessary under
the Provision or if the police officer has discretion to undertake a preliminary investigation prior to
the registration of the FIR. These differences gave rise to four significant interpretation problems for
the Court to resolve.

1. Whether the Provision should be construed purposefully, in light of the purpose and
circumstances surrounding its passage, while balancing the rights of both the guilty and the
victims?
2. Whether the terms of the Provision should be interpreted literally to suggest that the filing of
a FIR is required upon the discovery of a cognizable offence?
3. Is the word’ shall' in the Provision mandatory or discretionary?
 4. Whether the usage of the word "information" in the Provision indicated that the FIR could
only be recorded once the police officer was satisfied with the reliability or reasonableness of
the information exposing the cognizable offence?
5. Rules

To resolve the above-mentioned issues, the Court relied on the following rules of interpretation:

JUDGEMENT
In light of the foregoing observations, a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court ruled that
registration of a First Information Report is required under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure if the information reports the commission of a cognizable offence, and that no preliminary
inquiry is permitted in such a case.. If the received information does not record the commission of a
cognizable criminal but does disclose required causes for an investigation, a preliminary investigation
may be performed merely to assess whether or not a cognizable offence has been disclosed. The Court
established the following Guidelines for the filing of FIRs:
1. Section 154 of the Code requires the filing of a FIR if the information collected indicates the
commission of a cognizable offence, and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a case.
2If the information obtained does not disclose a cognizable offence but suggests the need for an
investigation, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted, but solely to assess whether or not a
cognizable criminal was committed.
3If the investigation reveals the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be filed. If the
preliminary investigation results in the closure of the complaint, a copy of the record of such closure
must be given to the informant immediately and no later than one week. It must provide concise
reasons for closing the complaint..

4. If the investigation reveals the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be filed. If the
preliminary investigation results in the closure of the complaint, a copy of the record of such closure
must be given to the informant immediately and no later than one week. It must provide concise
reasons for closing the complaint..

5. The facts and circumstances of each case will determine which cases will undergo preliminary
investigation. The following are the situations under which a preliminary investigation may be
conducted:
(a) Matrimonial disputes/ family disputes
(b) Commercial offences
(c) Medical negligence cases
(d) Corruption cases
(e) In cases where there is a questionable delay in initiating criminal prosecution, such as a 3-4 month
wait in reporting the incident with inadequate explanations,.

6. To secure and defend the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary investigation
should not last more than seven days. Such a delay must be noted in the General Diary entry.
7. Because all information received at the police station is recorded in the General Diary/Station
Diary/Daily Diary, all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in the
registration of a FIR or leading to a preliminary inquiry, must be mandatory reflected in the said
Diary, as must the decision to conduct the inquiry..

Interpretation of the word ‘shall.’

The Court interprets the word’ shall' in the Provision using subsidiary rules as guiding principles. The
usage of the word'shall' is not necessarily indicative of the absence of discretion, as confirmed by
legal precedents, nor can the word'shall' be assigned a final interpretation that will then apply in all
circumstances. The use of precedents as an external help in legislative interpretation contributes to
consistency and uniformity in the process of interpretation by relying on how the Courts have
previously understood the word'shall.'

The Court relies on secondary principles of interpretation through the use of Harmonious
Construction, which allows the Court to harmoniously construe two sections within the Code without
changing the meaning of one or making one superfluous.

3. Interpretation of the word ‘Information.’

To interpret 'information' appearing within the Provision, there is a presumption that the purposeful
omission on the part of the Legislature is not a mistake and that the legislator intended to express what
is written in the legislation. There is also an application of the casus omissus concept. According to
this, the Court is not competent to supply an omission for the purpose of constituting law-making..
The basic goal of the courts is jus dicere non facere, or to proclaim or decide the law.

5. Conclusion
The Court's use of numerous norms and aids to interpretation is a clever manner of respecting the
Legislature's objective while providing ordinary sense to the words of the Provision.. The Court is
aware that relying only on interpretation yields undesirable conclusions.. External aids, main
principles of interpretation, and presumptions are employed for help in order to harmoniously
construe all variables that are relevant to determining the interpretation of Section 154 of the Code.

As a consequence, the outcome is consistent with the purpose of the Provision, which is to quickly
register the FIR, which can initiate the investigation into the crime. If any of the regulations were
misapplied or misplaced, the consequences may have been disastrous, infringing the rights of those
impacted.
 Case Study- Dominion of India & Ors. v. Shrinbai A. Irani &Ors.

INTRODUCTION

1. Literal Rule:

This rule stipulates that a legal requirement must be interpreted literally and grammatically. If the
meaning of an enactment is plain and unambiguous, it must be accorded its natural meaning. Clause 3
of the Ordinance's wording could only have one meaning on its simple and grammatical reading,
which would result in the continuation of all requisition Orders, notwithstanding their inherent
instability..

Facts:

1. The First Respondent had three stores on the bottom level of the 'Irani Manzil' building..
2. In accordance with Defence of India Rules Rule 75-A and Government Notification No.
1336/OR/1/42, the Collector of Bombay requisitioned this property.
3. The location served as Government Grain Shop Number 176.

List of Events:

1. 30.07.1946/17.08.1946: The First Respondent received a letter from the Controller of

Government Grain Shops in Bombay requesting permission to remain as her tenant after the
requisition expired on September 30, 1946.
2. 27.08.1946: Even though the department rejected the conditions of the first respondent's offer
of rent to them, they continued to occupy the space beyond September 30, 1946.
3. 29.08.1947First Respondent believed that the department was considering turning over
custody of the property to a private party without consulting her, therefore she issued
the collector a letter giving her two months to leave the property.
4. 1.10.1947: The First Respondent was advised by the Controller that the Second Respondent
would now have control of the property.
5. 15.01.1948: The Collector informed the First Respondent that because the requisition had
continued after September 30, 1946, she was not eligible for vacant possession.
6. The Department justified maintaining the requisition beyond the allotted time by citing
maintenance of vital supplies as the justification for subletting the shops to Second
Respondent.
Issue:

1. Did the Requisitioned Land (Continuance of Powers) Ordinance, 1946's Clause 3 permit the
Government Grain Shop's continued requisition after September 30, 1946?
2. Could the non-obstante clause in Clause 3 of the Ordinance be read to mean that only
requisitioning orders that were about to expire because the Defence of India Act, 1939, and its
rules had expired, and not orders that were about to expire because of a flaw in the orders
themselves, were to be continued??

JUDGEMENT

All requisition orders issued in accordance with Section 75A of the Defence of India Act,
1939, would have come to an end on September 30, 1946, freeing up all immovable
properties requisitioned under that Act..

To continue these requests, the Ordinance was passed.

Lower Courts accepted the incorrect argument: The non-obstante provision strengthened the claim
that only those Orders will continue to be in effect when the Act and Rules expire under Clause 3 of
the Ordinance.. On the other hand, Orders that were about to expire because of a flaw in them (i.e.,
Orders that had an expiration date rather than solely because the Act had expired) will not be
prolonged.

The non-obstante phrase was viewed as an exception to the operative section in the aforementioned
argument. Observations made on the non-obstante clause in the judgement:

a. The non-obstante clause and the section's operative part often need to be closely
related, though they are not necessarily coextensive..
b. The non-obstante clause cannot narrow the meaning of the operative section of a law
if its terms are plain and can be understood in only one specific way..
c. In this situation, it must be presumed that the non-obstante provision clarifies the
whole phrase. The legislature must have included it in the clause with great care, not
only to restrict the application of the statute.
 The Court refused to speculate on the legislature's intent when establishing the Ordinance,
saying that Clause 3 read with Clause 2(3) (definition of a requisitioned property) gave it a
very clear meaning..

The Supreme Court ruled that the clause must be taken literally and must be accorded
its grammatical and clear sense. It must be viewed in the context of the Ordinance's
preamble.. It was decided that it was irrelevant whether the requisition Orders were
terminating as a result of the Defence of India Act (1939) and its regulations coming to an
end or as a result of their own inherent inadequacy .Due to the Ordinance's entry into force,
both of these properties had to remain under requisition.

In addition, Justice Bhagwati stated that courts are unable to address the merits of specific
instances. Anyone who is unhappy with the requisition's continued existence can appeal to
the relevant government, which may then release the property.

Conclusion:

It had been incorrectly interpreted by the Trial Court and Court of Appeal. All properties that were
subject to government requisition shall remain so according to Clause 3 of the Ordinance, according
to the legal interpretation of the provision.. By virtue of the non-obstante clause, a distinction between
Orders based on them expiring due to the end of the Act or expiring due to their own flaw, cannot be
drawn. The non-obstante clause was included just to give the Ordinance an overriding effect over the
operation of the Defence of India Act, 1939.

The Supreme Court reverted the matter back to the Court of Appeals, so that it may deal with the
other issues dealt by the Trial Court as well.
 TMA PAI FOUNDATION V STATE OF KARNATAKA

Introduction

Harmonious Construction

The harmonic construction criterion must be applied where there is a conflict between two or
more statutes or portions of a legislation.. The rule is founded on the fundamental idea that
every law has a purpose and has to be studied in its entirety.. All of the provisions of the Act
should be interpreted in a way that is consistent with that interpretation.

FACTS

Doctor TMA Pai established the Academy of General Education as an educational

organisation in 1942. at Madras. The institution, however, became a part of the state of
Karnataka once the states were reorganised..

Later subservient institutions, such as the Manipal Engineering College Trust for
Establishment and Administration of Manipal Institute of Technology, were established using
the name of these institutions. The trust wanted to spread awareness of Konkani. In order to
motivate the Konkani-speaking students,. Later, the Engineering College trustee gave the
TMA Pai Trust control of the institution. which was established in honour of Dr. TMA Pai.

The Karnataka Governor. issued a regulation, caught the Karnataka Educational Institution
Ordinance, 1984, The state government also established legislation setting a certain
percentage of seats as government seats and regulating the total number of students allowed
to enrol in order to prevent educational institutions from charging exorbitant sums in the
name of fees. Due to the fact that it did not receive any funding from the state, the
engineering college held by the TMA Pai Trust came under the category of minority-only
unaided private educational institutions.

The petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the 1984 Ordinance and state order on the
grounds that the government's regulations in the management of the minority educational
institution violate the rights of minorities. establishing and managing educational
establishments.

Issues.

The supreme court was asked to rule on a number of matters. The major issues were.
Is there any legislation that allows one to establish and manage an educational institution?

How the minorities? Whether it is religious or linguistic will be decided on the basis of the
state or the whole country.

Whether or not the government's rules on minority-aided and unassisted institutions infringe
Article 30.

To what degree may the government place limits on minority, aided, and unaided institutions'
administration??

Judgement.

In this instance, the 11-judge bench conducted discussions with the server about the
autonomy of private minority educational organisations..

According to the Supreme Court, all people have the right to construct and govern educational
institutions under Article 19, (1) (g),26 and minorities under Article 30, although these are not
absolute rights. While dealing with the issue of how it would be decided who are minorities,
as there is no definition of minorities in the Constitution, the Court held that minorities would
be decided on the basis of states, the Court regarding the issue of whether states interference
in the administration of the aided minority private educational institutions. Is violative of
Article 30 (1) held that the constitutional right under Article 30. Subclause one. It is not
required to run a school of their choosing. Militate against the states' claim. insisting that the
state can impose reasonable rules to assure the institutions' quality in order to award aid
Regulations enforced by the state in the case of unassisted minority institutions should be
modest. Recruitment of academic and non-academic employees, as well as administrative and
fee structure, would be outside the government's purview.. For institutions that support
minorities. The government may apply limits, but they must be reasonable limitations.
Additionally, the government is not allowed to meddle with the day-to-day management of
assisted minority private educational institutions. When it comes to admission, minority- and
government-funded educational institutions are free to choose the students they choose to
enrol, but the selection process must be impartial and open.

Aided minority educational institutions are permitted to accept students from their community
based on merit, but they must also accept a sufficient proportion of non-minority students.
The relevant states would determine what was an acceptable amount. The Court also held that
on the basis of the harmonious construction rule that :
1. It is impossible to read the laws separately.

2. If the rule makes one of the laws unnecessary, it cannot be applied.

Conclusion.

The interpretation of the scope of minorities' rights to create and run educational institutions
depends heavily on Articles 29 and 30..

A major decision was made in the case of TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka. That
has provided answers to a number of queries.. relating to the rights of minorities and
governmental rules for running educational institutions. The application of Article 29 (2) to
Article 30 has been made clear by this instance (1)
 The Sirsilk Ltd. And Others vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh

“THE COURT INTERPRETED THIS CASE BY APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF

HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION.”
FACTS OF THE CASE
Few disagreements between the employer and the Workmen occur in this instance. Therefore, on June
6, 1956, a request for a decision was filed to the Andhra Pradesh Industrial Tribunal.. In 1957, the
tribunal decided to send the government an award after a year of consideration.. The competent
government is required under the Industrial Dispute Act 14 of 1947 to publish the award, and the
deadline for this is 30 days after the date of receipt.t. This was provided in accordance with Section 17
of the Industrial Conflict Act. However, on October 1, 1957, all parties to the issue chose to reach a
settlement before the government published the judgement under Section 17.. The disputing party thus
made the decision to submit this settlement to the government. The government is not required to
disclose the award since they have reached a settlement, according to a document that was written and
signed by both the employer and the employee. The administration wouldn't agree to delay the
announcement of the award, though. The government cites section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act 14
of 1947 as the legal justification for this requirement that the judgement be made public by that date.
Additionally, they are unable to stop it after the government makes a decision..
Later, the appellant chose to use Article 226 of the Indian Constitution to find a route petition to the
High Court. They argued that since the disputed party had previously reached a settlement, the
Industrial Tribunal's judgement should not be made public by the government..

ISSUES RAISED :

In this case, the question of whether the government must suspend the publishing of the award under
Section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act or whether they can choose to do so is at stake.

HIGH COURT DECISION.

In this instance, the High Court ruled that the government must publicise the award that was delivered
to them since doing so is required of it by section 17 of the Industrial Dispute Act. The decision to
retain the honour is not up to them.. According to the High Court, a court cannot compel the
government to withhold publication of an award when the law mandates that it must be done.
Consequently, the petition was denied. Then, the Supreme Court is requested by the party in dispute.

THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT

According to KN Wanchoo J., the government is required to publish the award that the Industrial
Tribunal sends to them, even if section 17(1) stipulates that doing so is essential for the government.
However, the disagreement that developed in this instance is unique. It is necessary to reconcile or
pacify sections 18(1) and 18. (3). Only after the parties to the dispute have achieved a binding
agreement may these two portions be reconciled by holding publication of the award.
So, the Supreme Court ordered the government that the award will not be published as the aggrieved
party reached a settlement that is binding on them, according to section 18, one of the Industrial
Dispute Act.

EXPLAINING HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION THROUGH THIS CASE

The Industrial Dispute Act of 1947, as its name implies, resolved the many disputes that arose in the
industry.. The Indian dispute settlement process is governed by this statute. The goal of this
legislation is to settle the conflict that may arise between the employer and the Workmen, as can be
seen if we view the act as a whole. Therefore, in this instance, since there is no longer any issue to be
resolved and the disputed party has already reached a settlement of the dispute, which is what the Act
is intended to achieve, it is not essential nor important for the government to publicise the decision.

CONCLUSION

We may thus conclude from the verdict that there is a probability that the legislation created by the
legislature would be ambiguous. Therefore, the idea of harmonious structures, which has been used in
many situations, plays a crucial role in understanding how to interpret sculptures.. Applying them will
simplify the conflicts and make it much easier to give verdicts. It is one of the most effective
instruments the judiciary has at its disposal. The concept of harmonious construction will aid the
judiciary in providing more harmonious justice to society whenever there is a contradiction between
two laws of a statute.