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1.

Introduction of the international company: Established year, headquarter, branches


 Choose 1market to analyze international strategy  Brief Introduction of that
company in that market (2 POINTS)
1.1 Established year
Disneyland is a theme park in Anaheim, California. Opened in 1955, it was the first theme
park opened by The Walt Disney Company and the only one designed and constructed
under the direct supervision of Walt Disney.  
1.2 Headquarte

Headquartered in California, Disneyland is housed over an area of 34 ha and was popularised


using Disney characters like Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck. Disney Land is amongst the
world’s most visited theme parks and is a huge hit with kids.

1.3 Branches

The park which was initially built on fairyland theme currently has 8 Themed Lands:

1. Adventureland
2. Critter Country
3. Main Street
4. Fantasyland
5. Tomorrowland
6. Mickey’s Toontown
7. New Orleans Square
8. Frontierland

In addition to fun rides and movie based experiences, Disneyland also has hotels, character
experiences, spas and shopping. The characters popularised by Walt Disney have been
integral to the lives of most people across the globe and this has continued across
generations. Currently, Walt Disney Parks which are located in various top tourist
destinations across the world is one of the biggest providers of travel and leisure experiences
to families.

1.4 Market to analyze international strategy

Tokyo Disneyland is a 465,000 square metre amusement park located at Tokyo Disney
Resort, Urayasu, Chiba, Japan. This was the first Disneyland park built outside the United
States and opened on April 15, 1983. The park was built by Walt Disney Imagineering in
the same style as Disneyland in California and Magic Kingdom in Florida. The owner is
The Oriental Land Company, the licensee of The Walt Disney Company. Tokyo
Disneyland and Tokyo DisneySea, are Disneyland parks not owned by The Walt Disney
Company. This park has served nearly 13.65 million visitors a year, making it the third
largest theme park in the world, after two Disneyland parks in the US, Magic Kingdom
and Disneyland.
2) What is the target of a company? profitability (increase P) or profit growth (increase
quantity)?
2.1
As expected, America's Disneyland entertainment industry
We find it amazing how many individuals around the world have expressed interest in
Disneyland and we find this quite encouraging considering the growth plans into the
Japanese ToKyo market in the coming years. .
Thanks to an amazing creative team and a responsive and expansive branded and high-
quality entertainment library, we feel well-positioned to achieve our long-term goals.
Raise awareness about Disneyland, an amusement park in the high-end market that caters to
Tokyo Japanese youth between the ages of 18 and 25 and brings them special childhood and
fairy-tale memories. Offering a fresh, fairy-tale world experience, that's what sets
Disneyland apart from the competition. The increasing market penetration has resulted in it
becoming one of the most popular and popular tourist attractions of the City of Tokyo Japan.
Tokyo Japan has favorable conditions scattered throughout the city, so it is a promising
market for the development of the tourism service industry. When Disneyland decided to
enter the Japanese market, deciding where to develop was a decision that required extreme
caution. And for this "problem", the city of Tokyo is the best choice. Because Tokyo fully
converges the necessary elements for development and still fits the plans that Disneyland has
outlined.
Oriental Land Company, owner and operator of Disneyland Park in Japan, has held the
ground-breaking ceremony for the 250 billion yen (~$2.3 billion) Tokyo DisneySea
expansion, which is announced to have The name is Fantasy Springs. This includes
everything you need to know: possible opening dates, concept art, progress videos, test drive
photos, and answers to common questions. ( Updated September 13, 2022. )
Fiscal Year 2023 runs from April 1, 2023 to March 31, 2024. This means Fantasy Springs
could open as early as Tokyo Disneyland's 40th Anniversary Celebration on April 15, 2023
or at the latest in March 2024.
Tokyo Japan is a densely populated city of 13.96 million people and the most urbanized in
Japan. Moreover, with a GRDP per capita in 2021 of US$39,285.16/person and a high
standard of living compared to other regions, this region plays the role of the economic,
political, and economic center of Japan. Disneyland's decision to locate here will follow a
high-priced, value-based approach that it believes consumers deserve.
The Japanese city of Tokyo, which leads the country in terms of tourism potential, is
extremely promising. Except for the time when the Covid-19 pandemic had a negative
impact on the tourism industry of the country of Cherry Blossom in particular, the whole
country and even the whole world, from 2010 to 2017, the total number of domestic visitors
to Ho Chi Minh City. Tokyo increased by more than 2.6 times, reaching 73,200,000 visitors.
The total number of international visitors also increased equivalent to the increase of
domestic visitors, reaching 12,922,151 arrivals. This will greatly increase the influence of
Disneyland.

2.2 Profitability (increase P) or profit growth (increase quantity)?


We know that Disney wants to focus on revenue and profit.
Disneyland tries to convey the idea that investors should focus on revenue and profit rather
than market volume.
Messaging Tokyo Japan market
To compete in the Japanese market, Disneyland can continue to rely solely on value-based
pricing because: very few competitors Particularly theme parks target the high-end segment
with high prices, There aren't many large-scale amusement parks in Tokyo today. Notably,
Disneyland in Japan has only two strong competitors, Universial Studios of Japan and Fuji Q
Highland. Distinctive brand identity Disney World is an integral part of the childhood of
many young generations of Japan. Therefore, the concept of "wonderland" continues to
influence the psychology and behavior of Japanese customers. Within the Disney ecosystem,
and Disneyland in particular, new games and events continue to make waves. of support on
social media Tokyo Japan.
Willingness to pay: 65% of Japanese consumers believe that high quality, not price, defines
luxury goods and services, and 50% say they come from Famous countries in the related
industry also contribute to the high-end. Disney in general and Disneyland with its brand
affirmation as the global "King of Entertainment" - a symbol of American culture, a
reputation for providing the highest quality services, and with brand affirmation as the "King
of Entertainment" ” in the world Players in Japan can still be convinced despite the high
price of Disneyland compared to its competitors by its benefits. Due to the lack of a
breakthrough in theme, amusement parks in Japan often follow the general trend of
combining experiential tourism with cultural exploration. This means that Disneyland can
easily make a difference from the image of "wonderland" and the character copyright.
When entering the Japanese market, the pressure to adapt:
Disneyland should be at the forefront with a value-based customer-centric strategy.
Instead of reducing costs, put pressure on businesses to adapt to the Japanese market, as
customer perception of value is a key factor in pricing. To convince customers that they are
worth the hefty fees, Disneyland should focus on creating the highest possible quality of
service.
Given the difficulty of adapting in Japan, in countries where it is still difficult to own
Disneyland, with a pricing strategy based on customer perceived value, customer loyalty
may be reduced. shot. Because loyal customers who are used to the old way of calculating
prices, it is difficult to accept price increases at peak times such as summer holidays,
weekends and major holidays. At the same time, because Western families often go on long
trips and prepare considerable financial resources for the trip, customers will not be willing
to go out on days that are not usually associated with resort tourism. Given the difficulty of
adapting in Japan, in countries where it is still difficult to own Disneyland, with a pricing
strategy based on customer perceived value, customer loyalty may be reduced. shot. Because
loyal customers who are used to the old way of calculating prices, it is difficult to accept
price increases at peak times such as summer holidays, weekends and major holidays. At the
same time, because Western families often go on long trips and prepare significant financial
resources for the trip, customers will not be willing to go out on days that are not usually
associated with resort tourism. Japan's mentality is somewhat different from that of the West.

Although summer vacation is the busiest time for travel and entertainment, Japan is less
crowded than the West because most Japanese students continue their studies during this
holiday and the school year is extremely cramped. Families in Japan also don't spend weeks
having fun. Instead, the whole family often goes out, going to entertainment spots on
Saturdays and Sundays, excluding holidays, Tet and major holidays. When entering the
Japanese market, Disneyland had to adapt to that practice while adopting a value-based
pricing philosophy. Only on weekends does Disneyland offer extra activities, special
products and services due to high prices during peak periods such as holidays, Tet and
weekends. Since then, Japanese customers, who enjoy the weekend, are willing to pay more
and show a higher level of satisfaction because they believe they will get more for the same
high price.

The following three main categories will be the focus


+ Entertainment studio.
+ Disneyland & Resort Park.
+ Disney related merchandise such as comic books, magazines, and toys.
Disneyland has capitalized on this popularity by developing a wide variety of goods and
services, including entertainers, famous Animation Studio reconstructions, and merchandise
based on Disney characters to offer visitors. guests experience "wonderland". Walt Disney is
the forerunner of the globally famous Disneyland company with famous cartoon characters
that make up everyone's childhood.
To successfully enter the Japanese market, Disneyland must carefully assess consumer
preferences by capitalizing on their Disney Channel viewing trends: Analysis of recent
popular shows and characters making them market change
In this way, Disneyland develops accessible goods and services that are suitable for the
Japanese market. Therefore, the outreach strategy should capitalize on the USP by creating a
paradise in Disney land and doing customer research to understand the preferences of the
Japanese market.

Promotion:
As a new entrant to the market, Disneyland had to emphasize its unique selling points,
including high prices and a one-of-a-kind "wonderland" experience. The marketing strategy
for Disneyland will follow the main audience's point of view. We have the following, using
the Truth-Stress Dynamic model:
Fact: Young people love spending time with friends.
Stress: Overcrowded amusement parks offer a surprisingly similar game experience.
Motivation: Desire to try new and exciting things that are entertaining. From there, Draw
Insight went like this: "I love taking my friends to crowded amusement parks. However,
there's not much variation between theme parks these days. I wanted to build an amusement
park that brought to many new experiences that are rare elsewhere.
The main idea of the "Lost in Wonderland" campaign is: Use simulation
Disneyland offers visitors an original entertainment experience that makes visitors feel like
they are lost in a wonderland, different from the rest of the world, based on fairy tales with
famous cartoon characters. an ordinary amusement park

3.What is the international strategy of that company? (choose 1 market to explain) (2


POINTS)
High cost reduction pressure:
In December 1983, the two parties reached a licensing agreement that saw OCLC take all
the risks involved while Disney Co. would remain safe. Disney Co. licensed OLCL to use
intellectual property, trademarks as well as technical design for rides (Misawa 15). For its
part, Disney Co. will earn royalties of 10% on school income and an additional 5% on the
sale of beverages, food, and souvenirs while providing ongoing technical help to OLCL.
Although Tokyo Disneyland will borrow heavily from the American style, it will be a
Japanese product to a greater extent. The Tokyo theme park will be owned by a local
Japanese company and adhere almost perfectly to local Japanese regulations and customs
(Anton 75). In this regard, the Tokyo Disneyland licensing entry strategy does not raise
typical challenges. of other international operations and the entry into the Japanese market is
largely a seamless process. Considering that Disney Co. has no knowledge of the local
Japanese market, using a licensing agreement with a local company is the most suitable
international entry strategy. In approving the licensing agreement, Disney Co.'s senior
management was aware of the risks associated with entering foreign markets. There are
significant cultural differences between the familiar American business environment and the
completely foreign Japanese market. From the Power Gap Index (PDI) perspective, the
Japanese are willing to assume higher levels of decentralized power than the United States
(Anton 84). This aspect became apparent when Tokyo Disneyland made an amendment
requiring employees to display their last names on personal ID badges as opposed to names
as is the case with U.S. theme parks. Therefore, from a cultural point of view, settling the
licensing agreement because of the method of entering the Japanese market was the right
decision on the part of Disney Co. considering the company's lack of a local Japanese market
and the significant cultural differences between the two countries (Gupta 87). In essence, a
licensing agreement as an international entry strategy is typified by low risk and
development costs. Disney Co.'s senior management made the right call to choose this
method to avoid any tangible risks. This is special because it can be argued that the entry and
construction strategies for Tokyo Disneyland are expected to be set entirely in OLCL
(Misawa 61). In fact, the licensing agreement as a kind of non-equity entry method has given
Disney Co. significant ownership advantages as it allows the company to make the most of
its unique resources in a relatively risk-free manner and at a significantly low cost.
However, the Tokyo Disneyland joint venture forced Disney Co. to lose its
internationalization advantage due to little exposure to international business mechanisms.
Disney Co. does not have many entry mode options in this case as a different licensing
agreement with OLCL to successfully realize in the Japanese local market. The company
tried to compensate for this limitation by sending Disnoids, a small American management
group as consultants and consultants to set fire to the new Tokyo theme park with Disney
doctrine (Misawa 63).
The licensing agreement as a method of entry also caused Disney Co. to lose money on
location advantages due to the lack of direct operation of the new investment in Japan. All
the advantages created from strong market demand coupled with customers' willingness to
pay for entertainment services belong to the licensee while Disney receive a small portion of
the advantage in the form of royalties (Misawa 70). It was on this basis that Disneyland
decided to adopt an ownership position in the next Disneyland Paris venture to directly
exploit its unique resources without having to share revenue. Disney Co. will transition from
its initial licensing agreement entry strategy in Japan to its direct foreign investment
approach.
The move is in line with the Uppsala Internationalization Model which states that companies
often develop their international operations in small steps instead of making large foreign
investments at the same time. This is a suitable strategy in view of the high spiritual distance
between Japan and the United States as well as the Disney Company's lack of exposure to
the region (Misawa 76).
Due to the relatively low cost of ex-ante (contract negotiation) as well as the old
(supervision) costs associated with engaging with a developed country like Japan (which has
high contracts and ownership awareness), it's fair to say that Disney's senior management
appropriately opted for the mode of accession to the licensing agreement rather than the
structure. governance of higher levels of control (Misawa 79). This decision helped save the
company's costs in relation to complexity and oversight, which would be staggeringly higher
for such a company that was just beginning the process of internationalization.
To gain a competitive advantage, an organization's resources need to be rare, valuable,
irreplaceable and perfectly inimitable. According to Resource-based theory, a company's
ability to transfer capabilities and resources is much easier when equity-based accession
strategies are used than non-equity-based regimes. The majority of accession strategies are
effective in keeping the value of the capabilities and resources transferred; change only with
the level of effectiveness on the part of the partner (Gupta 98). Considering that The Disney
Company has found a committed Japanese partner who can transfer the company's value-
creating resources while making significant local adjustments without compromising value is
testament to the licensing agreement strategy that has paid off.
Việc mở rộng tiếp thị ở Tokyo Disneyland có liên quan chặt chẽ đến thói quen tiêu dùng, nền
kinh tế và văn hóa địa phương. Do đó, bản địa hóa và tuân thủ từ sự quản lý chiến lược toàn
cầu của Disneyland ban đầu là những công cụ chính cho sự thành công của Tokyo
Disneyland (Tokyo Disneyland, 2016). Công viên giải trí thích nghi với nền văn hóa mới có
các bảng hiệu và sổ tay bằng cả tiếng Nhật và tiếng Anh.
And the prices tickets entry Disneyland Tokyo is lowest than the word in all picture:

So Disneyland Tokyo is localization cause


low ticket prices than all Disneyland in the

world

4) What is the lesson of international


business strategy you can learn in the case of
1. DisneyLand overview: The birth of Disneyland Paris
a. Overview
- Disney's success in California gave Disney confidence that theme parks would be a
good source of growth for the company. Of course, looking at things from today's
perspective, they were absolutely right with this., Disney proved the Japanese also have an
affinity for Mickey Mouse with the successful opening of Tokyo Disneyland. Having wooed
the Japanese, Disney executives in 1986 turned their attention to France and, more
specifically, to Paris, the self-proclaimed capital of European high culture and style.
b. The birth of Disneyland Paris
- “Why did they pick France?”
When word first got out that Disney wanted to build another international theme park,
officials from more than 200 locations all over the world descended on Disney with pleas
and cash inducements to work the Disney magic in their hometowns. But Paris was chosen
because of demographics and subsidies. About 17 million Europeans live less than a two-
hour drive from Paris. Another 310 million can fly there in the same time or less.
Also, the French government was so eager to attract Disney that it offered the company more
than $1 billion in various incentives, all in the expectation that the project would create
30,000 French jobs. From the beginning, cultural gaffes by Disney set the tone for the
project.
- The loss of Disney Paris
About 15 million visitors to Disneyland Paris in the fiscal year 2012-2013, approximately
the total number of visitors to the Eiffel Tower and Louvre Museum. However, the number
of tourists has decreased by more than one million since the fiscal year 2011-2012.
The GAS President blamed the euro crisis and the bad weather, while still confirming that
Euro Disney "tried to promote guests' spending". No matter what, Mr. Gas cannot deny that
Euro Disney has lost money continuously since 2008, last year losing about 78 million EUR.
Disneyland Paris since its opening in 1992 has often suffered losses rather than profit
production
While Disney succeeded in getting close to 9 million visitors a year through the park gates,
in line with its plans, most stayed only a day or two. Few stayed the four to five days that
Disney had hoped for. It seems that most Europeans regard theme parks as places for day
excursions. A theme park is just not seen as a destination for an extended vacation. This was
a big shock for Disney. The company had invested billions in building luxury hotels next to
the park hotels that the day-trippers didn’t need and that stood half-empty most of the time.
To make matters worse, the French didn’t show up in the expected numbers. In 1994, only
40 percent of the park’s visitors were French. One puzzled executive noted that many
visitors were Americans living in Europe or, stranger still, Japanese on a European vacation!
As a result, by the end of 1994 Euro-Disneyland had cumulative losses of $2 billion. Since
its establishment in 1992 until 2013, Disneyland Paris has fallen into financial crisis 14 times
and the business cloud has not been dispelled. In November 2013, shares of Disneyland Paris
also lost 8.4% of their value. As of September 30, 2013, Disneyland Paris's revenue fell 1%,
to €1.3 billion.
Euro Disney CEO Philippe Gas attributed the drop to too few visitors in France as well as
southern European countries. Since Philippe Gas took the helm in September 2008, Euro
Disney has lost €350.5 million. Euro Disney also borrowed 1.7 billion euros to build resorts
and has yet to repay (Vanhoa, 2013).
In the fiscal year as of September, Disneyland Paris's revenue has decreased by 6.91%, to
1.27 billion euros due to a 10% reduction in tourists. In adverse conditions, Disneyland
Paris's income fell 7%.Disneyland Paris announced a net loss of 705 million euros, many
times higher than 84.2 million euros of the previous year. Meanwhile, the total net loss was
858 million euros, including 565 million costs for repairing damage. (TTXVN, 2016)
2. The reasons failed DisneyLand encountered
a. Before opening Disneyland Paris
- First Disney ended up buying a lot of land around the area of Mariner Valley,
essentially First Disney ended up buying a lot of land around the area of Mariner Valley,
essentially isolating the park from the rest of Europe, which in turn isolated support from
outside businesses. Now this kind of strategy might have worked in the 70s when Walt
secretly bought 43 square miles of land in Florida, knowing he businesses would come to his
park but it seemed greedy to buy up all the land for Euro Disneyland since only Disney could
benefit from the park.isolating the park from the rest of Europe, which in turn isolated
support from outside businesses. Now this kind of strategy might have worked in the 70s
when Walt secretly bought 43 square miles of land in Florida, knowing he businesses would
come to his park but it seemed greedy to buy up all the land for Euro Disneyland since only
Disney could benefit from the park.
- Quality and design standards of U.S. parks deemed inadequate for the European
marketplace.
As the park was being constructed, Disney became concerned that the original plans, based
on the Magic Kingdom in California, were too spurious for this land of real castles, kings,
and queens. As a result, enhancements were ordered, and the park, originally budgeted at
$2.0 billion ended up costing $3.8 billion.This pushed Euro Disney's break-even parameters
sharply higher, perhaps beyond its ability to deliver.
- Disney appreciates too much for the number of customers will go to the park.
The main reason behind this is that Disney totally overestimated how many guests would
attend the park on both a daily, monthly and annual basis, as well as how much cash each
person would spend when inside the park. Based on reports of expected attendance, the
government was worried that the roads would be chaotic, so the French radio warned of
traffic. People staying home due to the warning and a one-day strike that cut a railway
connection from the center of Paris contributed to a paltry attendance, estimated to be less
than 25,000 visitors, on the opening day of Euro Disneyland.
- The big issue, though, was an untimely recession and a collapse in the French
property market, which left the financial plans of Disney and its partners in the Euro
Disneyland project in ruins.
b. After opening
- Cultural distinction
+ Food culture: The problem is that what Disney thinks is different from what the French
do.
. Disney's policy of serving no alcohol in the park. Euro Disneyland did not serve
alcohol when it first opened, this decision was ridiculed and scorned by European
consumers, since reversed caused astonishment in a country where a glass of wine for lunch
is a habitual.
. Disney thought that the French don't value breakfast as much as Americans do,
Disney thought that Monday would be a light day for visitors and Friday a heavy one and
allocated staff accordingly, but the reality was the reverse. But the truth is that the French
value breakfast and lunch and care less about dinner.
. Moreover, the French didn’t want the typical French breakfast of croissants and
coffee, which was our assumption. They wanted bacon, eggs and self-service American
style.
. Disney serves lunch from 11 am to 2 pm, but in France, every school rushes to eat at
12:30 pm, making the restaurant crowded.
+ Culture of entertainment:
. European concept of park: One of the biggest problems, however, was that
Europeans didn’t stay at the park as long as Disney expected. While Disney succeeded in
getting close to 9 million visitors a year through the park gates, in line with its plans, most
stayed only a day or two. Few stayed the four to five days that Disney had hoped for. It
seems that most Europeans regard theme parks as places for day excursions. A theme park is
just not seen as a destination for an extended vacation. This was a big shock for Disney. The
company had invested billions in building luxury hotels next to the park hotels that the day-
trippers didn’t need and that stood half-empty most of the time. To make matters worse, the
French didn’t show up in the expected numbers. In 1994, only 40 percent of the park’s
visitors were French.
. Pricing policy: Disney thinks that the French will be like Americans, will spend a
large amount of money on entertainment, but with Europeans in general and the French in
particular, they are quite reserved in spending money on entertainment or otherwise. is that
they are not willing to pay 40 frac/1 entry.
+ Customer psychology: Euro Disneyland received many complaints from the visitors that
Euro Disneyland is too Americanized. Some of the associations and the media in France
have expressed cruel criticisms condemning the risk of cultural imperialism by Euro Disney.
The appearance of Americanized Disneyland in Europe would encourage damaging the
American brand of consumerism. For some others, Euro Disney became the symbol of
America and even of anti-American parties. The problem laid in the fact that most French
and Europeans in general have no desire to be treated as Americans, and they do not want to
attend a park that caters to the American persona.
+ Corporate culture :
. One of the challenges that Disney faced was convincing the French cast members to
break their cultural hatred of smiling and of impoliteness to visitors. While EuroDisney
successfully trained cast members, more than 1,000 employees left their jobs within the first
nine weeks of the opening of Euro Disneyland. The main reason why they left was the long
working hours at the park. And managers couldn’t understand the European habits and ethics
of work, and the working style was not the Europeans were used to in the past.
. Standards of judgment for the jobs : Euro Disney insisted on a strict dress code that
was much stricter than other jobs such as a ban on facial hair and colored stockings,
standards for neat hair and fingernails, and even a policy of appropriate undergarments. So
applicants felt that requirements were unnecessary for a job like a cast member of the theme
park.
- Had a bad marketing strategy
+ Problematic Naming :
As Americans the word euro is believed to mean glamorous or exciting for Europeans it
turned out to be a term that they associated with business currency and commerce
+ Advertisement
Disney essentially treated the park a an American view of Europe rather than the native view
causing a rift in the culture and not only that but the advertising campaign was mostly
American
This may work in the US where Disney parks are associated with happiness and childhood
memories but in Europe theme parks are unestablished requiring the marketing to convince
everyone that the park would surpass everyone's expectations
+ European's just don't share the same values as most Americans

Many of the initial logos featured images of the American southwest and tried to promote the
ideas of attending a park that is suited for Americans. The problem lies in the fact that most
French and Europeans in general have no desire to be treated as Americans, and they do not
want to attend a park that caters to the American persona.
3. Disney Land's resolution At this point, Euro-Disney changed its strategy.
a. The company changed the name to Disneyland Paris in an attempt to strengthen the
park’s identity.
b. Food and fashion offerings changed. To quote one manager, “We opened with
restaurants providing French-style food service, but we found that customers wanted self
service like in the US parks. Similarly, products in the boutiques were initially toned down
for the French market, but since then the range has changed to give it a more definite Disney
image.”
c. The prices for day tickets and hotel rooms were cut by one-third. The result was an
attendance of 11.7 million in 1996, up from a low of 8.8 million in 1994.
d. Localization: The localization has taken into account the different customer habits
across the continent to come up with a suitable standard for the whole of Europe.
e. Marketing offices were opened in Milan, London, Amsterdam,... each responsible
for advertising and budgeting for each locality.
4. The Lessons
- Multinational companies should target markets accurately
Even in the same country or regional market, the traditional culture gives different control
power to different people. Multinational companies should be fully based on detailed market
research to find the weak links in the market and make a breakthrough, using the “point to an
area” model to expand.
- Multinational enterprises should pay full attention to the importance of the
influence of cultural differences on marketing face to the new multiple culture
environment
The multinational enterprise should take an objective acknowledge about the cultural
differences of the consumer demand and behavior and respect it, abandoning the prejudice
and discrimination of culture completely. Moreover, multinational enterprises should be
good at finding out and using the base point of communication and collaboration of different
cultures and regard this base point as the important consideration factor when planning to
enter the target country market. After all, the fundamental criterion for a successful business
enterprise is whether it can integrate into the local social and cultural environment. The
multinational enterprises should improve the sensitivity and adaptability to the different
culture environment.
- Multinational enterprises should make full use of the competitive advantages of
cultural differences and promote international marketing.
The objective of international cultural differences can also be the basic demand points of
different competitive strategies. In the international market, launching culture marketing
activities and highlighting the exotic culture and cultural differences in the target market can
open the market quickly. Companies should strive to build cross-cultural “two-way”
communication channels, it is necessary to adapt to the host’s cultural environment and
values and carry out the business strategy of localization to make it can be widely accepted
by the host country's local government, local partners, consumers and other relevant
stakeholders. Effective cross-cultural communication on the one hand contributes to cultural
integration, but also can create a harmonious internal and external human environment for
corporate management.
- Listen to customers' opinions, their suggestions or complaints, so that they can
promptly make appropriate policy changes, thereby improving the management and service
system.
5. Kết luận
- The Case of Euro Disneyland can represent a lack of cultural focus and awareness of
the concept which was a globalization of the Disney Corporation. Cultural differences
between the US and France have been ignored by Disney. Difficulties that Disney
Corporation met are typical for a multinational corporation that has not implemented cross-
cultural management and strategies. In fact, Disney Corporation failed to adapt to the French
environment and to foresee the influences of foreign and domestic factors. Organization and
management relied mostly on American cultures, experiences, and understanding. By not
identifying certain cultural differences, Euro Disneyland created an environment that was not
acceptable by European culture itself.
- Based on the above changes, the number of visitors increased from 8.8 million in
1994 to 11.7 million in 1996. In 2015, the number of people visiting Disneyland Paris
reached 14.8 million. In this case, we can understand how strong the impact of culture on
international business. If you do not learn about the culture of the host country in advance,
there is a very high risk of failure.

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