IT is very difficult for Pakistan to be delinked from Afghanistan,

because of reasons of geography and history. Yet a strategically

mature and realistic policy is needed to manage relations cordially
with Pakistan’s western neighbour.

At a recent consultative dialogue in Islamabad, former generals, diplomats

and other experts put their heads together to discuss the situation, made all
the more critical following the banned TTP’s rescinding of the ceasefire with
the state. There was wide consensus that a reorientation or reformulation of
Pakistan’s Afghan policy was required. But the million-dollar question
remains: how?

Over the last four decades, Pakistan has played a central role in Afghan affairs,
primarily after this country jumped on the Afghan jihad bandwagon with the
Americans and the Saudis. Following the USSR’s 1979 invasion of
Afghanistan, Pakistan was front and centre in helping the mujahideen bring
down the Soviet ‘evil empire’, to use Ronald Reagan’s term. This period, under
Ziaul Haq’s watch, was one when drugs and the ‘Kalashnikov culture’ started
entering Pakistan, as did millions of Afghan refugees, many of whom remain
in the country.

Somewhere during the Afghan jihad, the support for the mujahideen morphed
into ‘strategic depth’, a policy through which primarily the military
establishment sought to maintain a friendly regime in Kabul.

This continued till the Taliban’s first government was sent packing by the US
in 2001, though many foreign critics claimed that Pakistani support for the
Taliban continued.

Fast forward to August 2021, when the Afghan Taliban rolled into Kabul,
ending the US-backed government of Ashraf Ghani. Strategic depth, it
seemed, had finally delivered, as the Taliban were now masters of their
domain. Yet the presence of the TTP in Afghanistan and IS-K prove that the
security threat from Afghanistan continues.

It is for parliament, with input of the security establishment and foreign policy
experts, to decide what the new Afghan policy should be. However, there are
some points that can be considered.

For starters, Afghanistan should not be seen as part of our ‘sphere of

influence’, and there should be no efforts to politically control Kabul. For two
decades, the US tried a grandiose nation-building scheme in Afghanistan, and
failed as the Ghani administration melted away as soon as the Taliban were
within striking distance of Kabul.

Therefore, Pakistan, as well as other foreign powers, should help facilitate an

intra-Afghan dialogue, but by no means should they try and manipulate
Afghan politics. Secondly, the message to Kabul’s rulers should be clear: no
anti-Pakistan terrorists or hostile foreign elements should find refuge on
Afghan soil.

With the TTP rearing its ugly head, this message must be crystal clear. An
Afghanistan at peace with itself and the world is in Pakistan’s interest, and this
should be the goal of our Afghan policy.

Terror nexus in Afghanistan

In another incident the same day, unidentified militants detonated a car bomb
and tried to storm the headquarters of Hezb-i-Islami, headed by Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, in the Afghan capital. The former Afghan prime minister was
unhurt. It is not clear whether the two incidents were linked.

The attack on the Pakistan embassy has given a dangerous twist to the
terrorist threat from Afghanistan.

Curiously, the assault on the Pakistani embassy came with the TTP’s calling off
a tenuous ceasefire with Pakistan. The outlawed militant group based in
Afghanistan has intensified its terrorist actions in Pakistan’s former tribal
regions since then.

There has also been a marked escalation in cross-border attacks on Pakistani

security forces. The return of the conservative Islamic regime in Afghanistan
has emboldened Pakistani militant groups taking shelter in that country.

Predictably, the so-called peace negotiations that the Afghan Taliban

facilitated have collapsed, with the TTP refusing to lay down their arms.
Instead, the group had presented its own conditions that virtually call for a
surrender of Pakistan’s control over the former tribal regions.

It is evident that the Afghan Taliban administration seeks to use the TTP as
leverage to put pressure on Pakistan. Besides, it is also apparent that some
factions of the TTP are part of the transnational militant group whose origins
lie in the Middle East.

The two cannot be separated. It seems that the Taliban officials deliberately
want to focus on the Islamic State, sparing the TTP that continues to enjoy the
administration’s support.

It may be true that the Taliban are serious about fighting the Islamic State but
refuse to recognise the close connection between the TTP and IS-K. It is well
known that many IS-K fighters have come from the ranks of the TTP.

Also, some other foreign militant groups with sanctuaries in Afghanistan, such
as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), have forged alliances under
the IS banner.

It is well known that the first chief of the Islamic State in Afghanistan, Hafiz
Saeed, was a former commander of the TTP who had fled to Afghanistan after
the militants were driven out of the former tribal regions by the military
operation.

The Pakistani militant group formed the nucleus of the IS when it emerged on
the scene in Afghanistan in 2015. The group has been operating mostly in
eastern Afghanistan where the TTP has taken refuge.

After having been driven out of North Waziristan, IMU fighters moved to
northern Afghanistan expanding IS operations, which also caused serious
concern to neighbouring Iran and the Central Asian states. The emergence of
the IS-K presented a significant challenge to the Afghan Taliban then fighting
the US-led forces.

There had not been any major defections to the IS from their ranks, but the
very existence of the transnational militant group threatened Afghan Taliban
control. Curiously, there has been a marked increase in IS terrorist attacks
after the return of Taliban rule.

According to an official American report, the ranks of the IS-K have swelled
exponentially since August last year, bringing the estimated number of
fighters to 4,000.

Most IS attacks have targeted the minority Shia community. The growing
strength of transnational militant groups and foreign fighters gaining space in
the country, present a serious security threat not only to Afghanistan but also
to neighbouring countries, mainly Pakistan.

A major reason for the resurgence of the terrorist networks are the ideological
linkages the Afghan Taliban have had with foreign militant groups like the
TTP and IMU. Their connection with transnational terrorist outfits is evident.

The Afghan Taliban’s support for global terrorists casts huge doubts over their
commitment to the international community to not allow any terrorist group
to use Afghan soil for its activities.

According to a recent UN Security Council report, “Terrorist groups enjoy

greater freedom in Afghanistan than at any time in recent history.” The TTP is
certainly the most lethal of them with its close ties to Al Qaeda and IS-K.

Meanwhile, the latest attack on the Pakistan embassy has given a new and
dangerous twist to the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan.

Such incidents could further strain relations between Islamabad and Kabul.
The increasing number of incidents of cross-border attacks and the Afghan
Taliban administration’s refusal to take action against the TTP has already
affected relations between the two.

Interestedly, the firing on the Pakistani embassy took place within days of the
visit to Kabul of Hina Rabbani Khar, Pakistan’s minister of state for foreign
affairs.

This was the first official-level contact between the two countries in months.
Besides other issues, the Taliban administration’s failure to act against the
TTP operating from Afghan territory has also been taken up in meetings
between the two sides.

The daring attack on the embassy has exacerbated an already perilous

environment, endangering the lives of Pakistani officials based in Kabul and
other Afghan cities. It is imperative that the Afghan Taliban cut off all ties with
the TTP and other transnational militant networks if they are sincere about
meeting their commitments to the international community.