Dasti & McGuckin Motion To Dismiss

MON-L-002412-22 12/09/2022 4:18:46 PM Pg 1 of 3 Trans ID: LCV20224178738
DASTI, MURPHY, McGUCKIN, ULAKY,

KOUTSOURIS & CONNORS
Patrick F. Varga, Esq. (306502020)
620 West Lacey Road
Post Office Box 1057
Forked River, New Jersey 08731
(609) 971-1010 FAX (609) 971-7093
Attorneys for Defendants, Gregory McGuckin, Esq. and Jerry Dasti, Esq.
OCEAN COUNTY REPUBLICAN SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

ORGANIZATION, a juridical entity existing LAW DIVISION
under N.J.S.A. 19:5-3; GEORGE GILMORE, MONMOUTH COUNTY
OCEAN COUNTY REPUBLICAN
ORGANIZATION CHAIRMAN; CIVIL ACTION
RUTHANNE SCATURRO, OCEAN
COUNTY REPUBLICAN ORGANIZATION DOCKET NO. MON-L-2412-22
VICE CHAIRWOMAN; AND CARMEN
MEMOLI, FINANCE COMMITTEE
TREASURER OF THE OCEAN COUNTY Notice of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to R.
REPUBLICAN ORGANIZATION, 4:6-2 and Strike Pursuant to 4:6-4.
Plaintiffs,
v.
FRANK HOLMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND

AS FORMER CHAIRMAN, OCEAN
COUNTY REPUBLICAN
ORGANIZATION; PATRICIA LANE;
NORIKO KOWALEWSKI; GREGORY P.
McGUCKIN, JERRY J. DASTI, KEVIN
RIORDAN, ERIC ARPERT, JOHN DOES 1-
10 AND JANE DOES 1-10, persons presently
unknown and unidentified.
Defendants.
TO: John M. Carbone, Esq.

Carbone and Faasse
401 Goffle Road
Ridgewood, New Jersey 07450
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on Friday, January 6, 2023 at 9:00 in the forenoon or
as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, the undersigned, attorneys for defendant, Jerry J. Dasti,
Esq. and Gregory P. McGuckin, Esq will move before the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Monmouth County at the Monmouth County Courthouse, Freehold, New Jersey, for an
order dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice pursuant to 4:6-2(e) and strike the scandalous
pleadings pursuant to R. 4:6-4.
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that in support of this motion, reliance will
be placed upon the Certification attached hereto.
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that pursuant to Rule 1:6-2(d) the
undersigned requests oral argument in the even that opposition to this motion is filed.
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that a proposed form of order is attached.
Dasti, Murphy, McGuckin, Ulaky, Koutsouris, and

Connors
Attorneys for Defendant Jerry J. Dasti, Esq.
Dated: December 9, 2022 By /s/ Patrick F. Varga

Patrick F. Varga, Esq.
For the Firm

Connors
Attorneys for Defendant Gregory P. McGuckin, Esq
Dated: December 9, 2022 By /s/ Kelsey McGuckin-Anthony, Esq

Kelsey McGuckin-Anthony, Esq.
For the Firm
2
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that the original of the within Notice of Motion, Certification and proposed
form of Order were filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court and a copy was served on all parties
hereto via Ecourts.

Connors
Attorneys for Defendants
Dated: December 9, 2022 By /s/ Patrick F. Varga

Patrick F. Varga, Esq.
For the Firm

Connors
Attorneys for Defendant Gregory P. McGuckin, Esq
Dated: December 9, 2022 By /s/ Kelsey McGuckin-Anthony, Esq

Kelsey McGuckin-Anthony, Esq.
For the Firm
3

Patrick F. Varga, Esq. (306502020)
620 West Lacey Road
Post Office Box 1057
(609) 971-1010 FAX (609) 971-7093
Attorneys for Defendants, Gregory McGuckin, Esq. and Jerry Dasti, Esq.

under N.J.S.A. 19:5-3; GEORGE GILMORE, MONMOUTH COUNTY
OCEAN COUNTY REPUBLICAN
ORGANIZATION CHAIRMAN; CIVIL ACTION
RUTHANNE SCATURRO, OCEAN
COUNTY REPUBLICAN ORGANIZATION DOCKET NO. MON-L-2412-22
VICE CHAIRWOMAN; AND CARMEN ORDER
MEMOLI, FINANCE COMMITTEE
TREASURER OF THE OCEAN COUNTY
REPUBLICAN ORGANIZATION,
Plaintiffs,
v.

COUNTY REPUBLICAN
ORGANIZATION; PATRICIA LANE;
NORIKO KOWALEWSKI; GREGORY P.
McGUCKIN, JERRY J. DASTI, KEVIN
RIORDAN, ERIC ARPERT, JOHN DOES 1-
10 AND JANE DOES 1-10, persons presently
DASTI, MURPHY
McGUCKIN, ULAKY,
unknown and unidentified.
COUNSELLORS AT LAW
Defendants.
620 WEST LACEY ROAD
P.O. BOX 1057
FORKED RIVER, N.J. 08731
THIS MATTER being opened to the Court by Dasti, Murphy, McGuckin, Ulaky,
Koutsouris and Connors, P.C., attorneys for Defendant, Jerry. J. Dasti and Gregory P.
1
McGuckin, Kelsey McGuckin-Anthony and Patrick F. Varga, Esq appearing; in the presence
of Carbone and Faasse, attorneys for Plaintiffs, John Carbone, Esq appearing; and the Court
having reviewed the pleadings, and Certifications filed on behalf of the parties; and for good
cause shown,
IT IS on this _____ day of January 2023;
ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:
1. The Plaintiff’s Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice, and with costs as it
applies to Defendant Jerry J. Dasti, and Gregory P. McGuckin.
2. Pursuant to R. 4:6-4, paragraphs 32-33 and 38-48 are stricken and Plaintiff is
instructed to file a revised complaint removing these scandalous and impertinent pleadings.
3. Pursuant to R. 4:6-4 Gregory P. McGuckin is awarded attorney fees and costs of
suit.
4. Counsel for Gregory P. McGuckin shall file the appropriate certification for
services within ____ days of the date of this Order.
5. A copy of this Order shall be served upon all parties within ____ days of the date
of this Order.
DASTI, MURPHY
McGUCKIN, ULAKY,
____________________________________________
KOUTSOURIS & CONNORS J.S.C.
COUNSELLORS AT LAW
620 WEST LACEY ROAD

P.O. BOX 1057
2
DASTI, MURPHY
McGUCKIN, ULAKY,
COUNSELLORS AT LAW
620 WEST LACEY ROAD

P.O. BOX 1057
3

KELSEY McGUCKIN-ANTHONY [ID #244842017]
PATRICK F. VARGA, ESQ. [ID No. 306502020]
620 West Lacey Road
(609) 971-1010 FAX (609) 971-7093
Attorneys for Defendants, Jerry J. Dasti, Esq. and Gregory P. McGuckin

under N.J.S.A. 19:5-3; GEORGE GILMORE, CIVIL PART
OCEAN COUNTY REPUBLICAN OCEAN COUNTY
ORGANIZATION CHAIRMAN; RUTHANNE
SCATURRO, OCEAN COUNTY DOCKET NO.: OCN-L-1777-19
REPUBLICAN ORGANIZATION VICE
CHAIRWOMAN; AND CARMEN MEMOLI,
FINANCE COMMITTEE TREASURER OF CIVIL ACTION
THE OCEAN COUNTY REPUBLICAN
ORGANIZATION,
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
v.

COUNTY REPUBLICAN ORGANIZATION;
PATRICIA LANE; NORIKO KOWALEWSKI;
GREGORY P. McGUCKIN, JERRY J. DASTI,
KEVIN RIORDAN, ERIC ARPERT, JOHN
DOES 1-10 AND JANE DOES 1-10, persons
presently unknown and unidentified.
Defendants.
DEFENDANTS JERRY J. DASTI AND GREGORY P. McGUCKIN BRIEF IN

SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS OR ALTERNATIVELY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Of Counsel and On the Brief: Kelsey McGuckin-Anthony, Esq. (244842017)

Of Counsel and On the Brief: Patrick F. Varga, Esquire (306502020)
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................ i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... ii
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY ................................................................................. 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................................... 4
STANDARD OF REVIEW ...................................................................................................... 12
LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 17
POINT ONE
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the allegations contained in
¶¶32-33 and 38-48 of the Plaintiffs’ Complaint.………………………………… 17
POINT TWO
Due to the fact that this Court does no have jurisdiction to consider the allegations
asserted in ¶¶32-33 and 38-48 the same must be stricken from the Complaint pursuant
to R. 4:6-4(b), the complaint thereafter must be refiled by Plaintiffs and Mr. McGuckin
must be awarded counsel fees and costs of suit………………………………………. 23
POINT THREE
Plaintiff has failed to allege a cause of action against Gregory P. McGuckin, Esq. which
can withstand scrutiny .................................................................................................. 26
POINT FOUR
Plaintiff has failed to plead a claim against Jerry J. Dasti, Esq. or alternatively he is
DAS TI, MUR P HY
entitled to Summary Judgment. .................................................................................... 27
Mc GUCKIN, ULAKY,
KOUTS OUR IS & CONNOR S
COUNS E LLORS AT LAW

POINT FIVE
6 2 0 WE S T LACEY ROAD
FORKED RIVE R, N.J . 0 8 7 3 1
Plaintiffs have improperly filed this action and continued to pursue it in bad faith against
Mr. Dasti and Mr. McGuckin, knowing that neither Mr. McGuckin or Mr. Dasti had the
authority to make the alleged improper transactions .................................................... 30
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 31
i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
A. Kaplan and Son v. Housing Authority of Passaic, 42 N.J. Super. 230 (App. Div. 1956)…14
Abbott v. Beth Israel Cemetery Ass'n of Woodbridge, 13 N.J. 528 (1953)………...…….…17
Adams v. Delmonte, 309 N.J. Super. 572 (App. Div. 1998). ………………………………..19
All State New Jersey v. Lajara, 222 129 (2015)……………………………………………….29
Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 183 (2005)…………………………………12
Brill v. The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, et al, 142 N.J. 520 (1995)…….15
Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576 (1975)……………………………………19
Callari v. Sugar, 180 N.J. Super. 423 (Ch. Div. 1980)…………………………………………23
Chew v. Eagan, 87 N.J. Eq. 80, 81 (Ch. 1916)……………………………………………..….23
DeGroot v. Muccio, 115 N.J.Super. 15 (Law Division 1971) …………………………….…23
Edwards v. Prudential Property & Casualty Co., 357 N.J. Super. 196, 202 (App. Div.
2003)………………………………………………………………………………………….12
F.G. v. MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550, 556 (1997). …………………………………………...….12
Garrow v. Elizabeth General Hospital & Dispensary, 79 N.J. 549, (1979)…………..……..19
Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 261 (2015)…………………………….…….19
DAS TI, MUR P HY Heljon Management Corp. v. Dileo, 55 N.J. Super.306 (App. Div. 1959)………….…….…14
Mc GUCKIN, ULAKY,
Judson v. People's Bank and Trust Company of Westfield, 71 N.J. 67 (1954)……..……….13
Lay Faculty Ass'n of Regional Secondary Schools of Archdiocese of Newark v. Roman

Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, 122 N.J.Super. 260 supplemented 124 N.J.Super. 369
(App.Div.1973), cert. den. 64 N.J. 153 (1973)……………………………………………….18
Markwardt v. New Beginnings, 304 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 1997)………………………21
ii
McKeeby v. Arthur, 7 N.J. 174 (1951)………………………………………………………..18
Monmouth Lumber Co. v. Indemnity Insurance Company of America, 21 N.J. 441 (1955)..13
N.J. Civil Service Ass’n v. State, 88 N.J. 605, 613 (1982)……………………………………19
New Jersey Mortgage and Investment v. Calvetti, 68 N.J. Super.18 (App. Div. 1961)…...…14
O'Neill v. Lerner, 154 N.J. Super. 317, 325 (App. Div. 1977)………………………………..22
P & J Auto Body v. Miller, 72 N.J. Super. 207, 211 (App. Div. 1962)…………………..…. 12
Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 65–66 (1978)………………………….18

Petersen v. Falzarano, 6 N.J. 447, 453 (1951)……………………………………………17,18
Port-O-San Corp. v. Teamsters, Local Union No. 863 Welfare & Pension Funds, 363 N.J.
Super. 431, 438 (App. Div. 2003)…………………………………………………………….30
Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)………...…12
Rieder v. State, Dept. of Transportation, 221 N.J. Super. 547, 549 (App. Div. 1987)…….....13
Roa v. Lafe, 200 N.J. 555, 562 (2010)………………………………………………..…...…12
Robbins v. Jersey City, 23 N.J. 229 (1957)…………...…………………………………….. 14
Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 297
(2005)……………………………………………………………………………..………….13
Sokolay v. Edlin, 65 N.J. Super 112 (App. Div. 1961)……………………………………….14

DAS TI, MUR P HY
Mc GUCKIN, ULAKY,
State v. Osborn, 32 N.J. 117, 122 (1960)……………………………………………………..17

U.S. Pipe and Foundry Co. v. American Arbitration Association, 67 N.J. Super 384 (App.
Div. 1961)…………………………………………………………………………………….14
NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION
N.J. Const. art. VI, 2, ¶ 3…………………………………………………………………… 20
iii
STATUTES
N.J.S.A. 19:44A-1…………………………………………………….……………………...21
N.J.S.A. 19:44A-6…………………………………………………………………………….21
N.J.S.A. 19:25-7.3………………………………………………………………….…………28
N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.1………………………...…………………………………………….18, 21
N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.4…………………………………………………………………………..18
COURT RULES
R. 1:20-1....................................................................................................................................20
R. 1:20-2....................................................................................................................................20
R. 4:5-1………………………………………………………………………………………..27
R. 4:5-8…………………………………….….………………………………………………29
R. 4:6-2…………………………………………………………………………………..passim
R. 4:6-4…………………………………………………………………………………..passim
R. 4:37-2………………………………………………………………………………………25
R. 4:46-2………………………………………………………………………………………13
R. 4:69-5………………………………………………………………………………………19
DAS TI, MUR P HY

Mc GUCKIN, ULAKY,
iv
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Defendants, Jerry J. Dasti and Gregory P. McGuckin, are long-time members of the Ocean
County Republican Organization. Mr. Dasti has served over 25 years as Chairman of the OCGOP
Finance Committee, while Mr. McGuckin has served in the New Jersey General Assembly for the
last 11 years, and in local office prior thereto. These Defendants are also law partners in the law
firm of Dasti, Murphy, McGuckin, Ulaky, Koutsouris & Connors, which was a competitor of
Plaintiff, Gilmore’s law firm, prior to its dissolution following his criminal conviction on three
counts in the United States District Court. US v. Gilmore, Docket No. 3-19-cr-00029-001. In fact,
upon the dissolution of Mr. Gilmore’s law firm, his former partner, Thomas Monahan, Esq.,
became affiliated with this office while this firm was also retained to represent a number of former
clients of Mr. Gilmore.
In addition thereto, these Defendants, specifically Jerry Dasti and Gregory McGuckin,
were amongst those party leaders who called upon Mr. Gilmore to resign following his criminal
convictions in 2019. They each also opposed his return as County Chairman during the recent
Chairman’s election and instead supported his opponent.
With this background, it is not surprising that Mr. Gilmore would use his new founded
access to party funds to pursue retribution against these Defendants. What is surprising however,
is how thinly veiled his attempts to use the Courts for this purpose have become, particularly as to
these Defendants. Even the most cursory review of the Plaintiff’s intentionally vague Complaint,
reveals how Plaintiff has not pled a single cognizable cause of action against either Jerry J. Dasti
or Gregory P. McGuckin. Instead, they are named in a “Complaint”, which reads suspiciously like
a press release in the hopes of damaging the names and reputations of two individuals who opposed
his return as Chairman. The speciousness of Plaintiff’s Complaint as to Mr. Dasti is evident by its
2
only reference to him is that he was the Chairman of the OCGOP Finance Committee, a fund-
raising arm of the County Republican Organization. His Complaint fails to assert a single statute,
regulation or case law, which Mr. Dasti is alleged to have violated, yet he is named as a Defendant
for obvious political purposes.
Likewise, with respect to Mr. McGuckin, the intentional vagueness of the allegations is
equally deceptive. In Paragraph 47, Plaintiffs assert this Defendant and Mr. Riordan “may”
implicate violations of the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct, something this Court has
no jurisdiction to review, that Mr. McGuckin maybe violated the New Jersey Local Government
Ethics Law, again something this Court has no authority to adjudicate, and that his campaign,
along with County Sheriff, Mike Mastronardy, and County Commissioners, John Kelly and
Virginia Haines, received donations by the prior chairman during his term of office. Of course,
although Plaintiffs Verified Complaint and Order to Show Cause seeks a return of all of these
donations, only Mr. McGuckin is named as a Defendant.
It is the anathema of our jurisprudence to knowingly permit maliciously and improperly
filed complaints. Plaintiffs are intentionally and maliciously misusing the judicial system to wage
a feebly attempted war of attrition through political attacks against Mr. McGuckin and Mr. Dasti.
However, Plaintiffs’ understanding of the law is woefully lacking, and unlike President Theodore
Roosevelt, who walked with a big stick, the Plaintiffs have no stick. They have no facts. They have
no cause of action.
Rather, the Plaintiffs have deliberately, through entirely meritless claims against Mr.
McGuckin intentionally included factual allegations that are unequivocally scandalous,
impertinent, and befuddlingly filed with knowledge that this Honorable Court lacks the jurisdiction
3
to review their validity. Plaintiffs’ repeat this assault against Mr. Dasti, and plead simply that he
was the former chairman of the Finance Board. That’s it.
As we will demonstrate below, the Plaintiffs in this case include a long-term public attorney
and pardoned felon, and these Plaintiffs are represented by a well-seasoned attorney, who tossed
aside the rules of our profession to pursue a political vendetta. This vendetta includes making
various allegations that this Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over, and thus are not only subject
dismissal by virtue of R. 4:6-2(a) but must also be stricken from the Complaint pursuant to R. 4:6-
4(b).
These litigants have remained as defendants in this case for far too long. Plaintiffs have
failed to assert a viable cause of action against them, whether in tort or otherwise and they are
entitled to a dismissal from this proceeding.
4
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The Plaintiffs in this case include:
a. the Ocean County Republican Organization, a juridical entity existing under
N.J.S.A. 19:5-3;
b. George Gilmore, individually and as the Ocean County Republican Organization
Chairman, 15 Cranmoor Drive. Township of Toms River, Ocean County, NJ
08753;
c. Ruthanne Scaturro, individually and as the Ocean County Republican
Organization Vice-Chairwoman, 7 Thames Place, Township of Brick, Ocean
County, NJ 08723; and
d. Carmen Memoli, 921 Stamler Drive, Township of Toms River, Ocean County,
New Jersey08753, as Township of Toms River County Committee member and
the Treasurer Finance Committee of the Ocean County Republican Organization.
(Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶1).
2. Defendants include: Frank Holman in his prior official capacity as Chairperson of the
Ocean County Republican Organization and individually; (“Mr. Holman”); Patricia Lane
is named individually and as the former Executive Director of the Ocean County
Republican Organization (“Ms. Lane”); Defendant Noriko Kowalewski, is named
individually (“Ms. Kowalewski”); Defendant Gregory P. McGuckin, Individually (“Mr.
McGuckin”); Jerry J. Dasti, as the former Ocean County Republican Organization Finance
Committee Chair and individually (“Mr. Dasti”); Kevin Riordan (“Mr. Riordan”); and Eric
Arpert (“Mr. Arpert”). (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶¶ 2-9).
5
3. Plaintiffs alleged that the Ocean County Republic Committee (“OCGOP Committee”) is a
juridical entity existing under N.J.S.A. 19:5-3. (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶11).
4. Plaintiffs assert on June 16, 2022 Brick Township County Committee member Mary Lou
Powner forwarded a letter to Mr. Holman and Ms. Lane requesting a copy of the balance
sheet showing all assets and liabilities pursuant to N.J.S.A. 19:5-3.1. (Varga Cert. Exhibit
A ¶ 17).
5. Plaintiff’s assert that Mr. Holman and Ms. Lane failed to provide the requested records
within 48 hours of the receipt of the request. (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶ 18).
6. On July 7, 2022 a meeting was held to elect a new Chairman and Vice-Chairperson. (Varga
Cert. Exhibit A ¶ 19).
7. At that meeting, Mr. Gilmore was elected the new Ocean County Republican Organization
Chairman and Ruthanne Scaturro was elected the Ocean County Republican Organization
Vice-Chair. (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶ 20).
8. At that same meeting, Plaintiff Memoli asserts she asked Ms. Lane and Mr. Arpert for the
keys to the OCGOP Committee’s Headquarters and were denied the keys and further
refused an opportunity to arrange access. (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶ 20).
9. Plaintiffs assert Ms. Lane and Commissioner Ginny Haines 1 were unlawfully at the
OCGOP Headquarters, trespassing, taking and removing files and various records. (Varga
Cert. Exhibit A ¶ 22).
10. Plaintiffs assert that Ms. Lane “with the aid, and believed with the assistance [] of some of
the defendants and others …” denied access to the OCGOP Committee website, deleted
1
Baffling, Mr. Gilmore and his companions, accuse Commissioner Haines of tortious conduct with Ms. Lane, yet do
not include Commissioner Haines as a Defendant.
6
emails and communications, and refused to disclose passwords. (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶¶
23-26).
11. Plaintiffs assert that Ms. Lane refused to provide them access to the OCGOP Google email
account. (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶ 27).
12. On July 13, 2022 a cease and desist notice was served on Ms. Lane, Commissioner Virginia
Haines and Ms. Kowalewski, demanding they stop destroying records. On July 18, 2022 a
litigation hold notice was served on these same individuals. (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶¶ 28-
29).
13. Plaintiffs assert that while Mr. Dasti was the chair of the finance committee and upon the
formation of the “new Ocean County Republican Organization” the treasury and monies
of the organization were depleted and a total transfer of $23,109.83 was made on July 6,
2022 and July 7, 2022. (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶ 31).
14. Other then introducing Mr. Dasti as a party, this is the first and only allegation against Mr.
Dasti, as “Chair of the finance committee.” (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶¶ 7 & 31).
15. Plaintiffs assert this transfer was “tortious, unlawful and unauthorized” Plaintiffs further
assert that the funds were distributed immediately prior to the scheduled election of Mr.
Gilmore to:
a. Committee to Re-Elect Commissioners Kelly & Haines $5,500.00;
b. Committee to Re-Elect Mastronardy for Sheriff $5,500.00
c. McGuckin for Assembly $4,000.00
d. Jackson Republican Leadership Fund $5,000.00;
e. Kevin B. Riordan, Esq. LLC $3,109.83.
(Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶ 32-33).
7
16. Plaintiff’s assert that the failure to allocate these funds could result in fine and sanctions
on the OCGOP Committee, its officials and other candidates receiving disbursements.
(Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶ 34).
17. Plaintiffs allege they are “informed and believed that at all times mentioned in this
complaint, defendants worked together in concert, cooperation, and conspiracy against the
Plaintiffs as cooperating parties and agents of their defendants. (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶
35).
18. Paragraphs 37-48 assert in full as follows:
37. Justin Lamb was elected and on January 1, 2022, commenced a term of service
representing Ward One in the Township of Toms River, New Jersey.
38. Defendant Gregory McGuckin is an attorney at law of the State of New Jersey,
subject to the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct ("RPC") and amongst
other clients has and continues to serve as the attorney for the Township of Toms
River.
39. Defendant Kevin Riordan is an attorney at law of the State of New Jersey,
subject to the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct (''RPC") and amongst
other clients is believed that he serves as a special or contract counsel for the
Township ·of Toms River.
40. Defendant Riordan on April 8, 2022, had a discussion with On Target Law
Enforcement & Security Consultants LLC and contracted with and authorized the
commencement of the investigation of Justin Lamb, according to the invoice from
On Target Law Enforcement and Security Consultants LLC and the submitted
report.
41. On or about April 18, 2022, Defendants McGuckin, Holman, Riordan and other
defendants surreptitiously, clandestinely, and unlawfully used and disbursed funds
of the Ocean County Republican Organization Finance Committee through a series
of sham transactions and conspiracy to conduct an investigation and surveillance
of Justin Lamb.
42. Defendant Holman did not want the public disclosure and knowledge of the
members of the Republican Party and the public that the "OCGOP" would retain
an investigator and thus sought to conceal such engagements with a conduit and
questionable use of Defendant Riordan.
8
43. Defendants McGuckin and Holman in furtherance of this tortious and wrongful
conduct, directed the Ocean County Republican Organization Finance Committee
Treasurer to disburse to Defendant Riordan on April 26, 2022, a check in the
amount of "$5,500.00" made payable to the "Law Offices of Kevin Riordan."
44. Defendant Riordan in ·concert and cooperation with the Defendants agreed to
secretly engage the services of "On Target Law Enforcement & Security
Consultants LLC" of Brielle, New Jersey to conduct an investigation and
surveillance of Justin Lamb.
45. Defendants McGuckin and Holman in continuation of this tortious and

wrongful conduct, directed the Ocean County Republican Organization Finance
Committee to disburse additional monies to Defendant Riordan on July 6, 2022, for
an additional check in the amount of "$3,109.83" made payable to the "Kevin B.
Riordan, Esq., LLC." Thus, Defendant Riordan received the sum of $8,609.83.
46. Defendant Riordan received an "invoice" for "investigative services" which

were identified as "RE: SURVEILLANCE AND Address verification of Justin
Lamb" conducted "FROM April 7, 2022 to May I 0, 2022," showing receipt of a
retainer of "$5,500.00" and a balance due of "$3,109.83," the exact amounts
received by Defendant Riordan from the Ocean County Republican Organization
Finance Committee.
47. The actions and inactions of Defendants McGuckin and Riordan may implicate
violations of the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct ("RPC") both as a
conflict of interest and other standards in that Justin Lamb was their client through
their association with the Township of Toms River, and no conflict of interest can
be waived in public matters. (R.P.C. 1.7(b)(l)
48. By this conduct, actions, and inactions, the Defendants who were subject to the
Local Government Ethics Law (N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22. l et seq) which seeks to ensure
high standards of conduct and to provide a method of assuring and penalizing those
who transgress or violate these standards of ethical conduct of public officials,
appointed persons, and officers, violated these provisions and standards.
(Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶¶ 37-48)
19. As result of the aforementioned conduct, Plaintiffs in Count One seek injunctive relief and
assert that Defendants must return and restore certain records; (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶
54-56); declare Plaintiffs are the sole owners of the “Google Accounts” and “ESI” and
other records; (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶ 57).
20. Plaintiffs thereafter demand judgment, requiring the Defendants:
9
a. Comply with the cease-and-desist and litigation hold notices;
b. Prepare a written accounting for disbursements from January 1, 2022 until present;
c. Defendants restore all documents, emails and deleted “ESI”;
d. Give Plaintiffs the passwords;
e. Declare Mr. Gilmore and Ms. Scaturro the owners of the “Google Accounts.”
f. Demands Mr. McGuckin and those named in ¶¶ 32-33 cited supra in ¶ 14 herein,
return the funds received to them by the OCGOP Committee prior to Mr. Gilmore’s
election;
g. Compensatory and punitive damages, against the individual defendants, including
all counsel fees.
21. The Complaint is signed by Ruthanne Scaturro, as “a plaintiff in the above captioned
matter.”
22. A review of the OCGOP filings with the New Jersey Election Law Enforcement
Commission, reveals that at the time of the subject improper transactions neither Mr.
McGuckin or Mr. Dasti had authority to sign checks or otherwise make transaction. (Varga
Cert. Exhibit B).
23. In fact, OCGOP annual filing with the ELEC reveals that a Mr. Jerry W. Conaty, who was
treasurer of the OCGOP Finance Committee, had the sole authority to sign checks or
otherwise make transactions. (Varga Cert. Exhibit B).
24. Plaintiffs Gilmore and Memoli were expressly aware of this fact. (Varga Cert. Exhibit C).
25. As demonstrated by the OCGOP 2022-2023 filing, which was filed and received by the
ELEC Commission on July 30, 2022. Mr. Gilmore and Mr. Memoli changed the list of
10
names of authorized persons from Mr. Conaty to Mr. Gilmore and Mr. Memoli. (Varga
Cert. Exhibit C).
11
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss under R. 4:6-2(e) must be based on the pleadings themselves. Roa v.
Lafe, 200 N.J. 555, 562 (2010). The test for determining the adequacy of a pleading is whether a
cause of action is “suggested” by the facts, as at this preliminary stage of the litigation the court is
not concerned with the ability of Plaintiff to prove the allegations contained in the Complaint. See
Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (quoting Velantzas
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)). That said, under New Jersey law, while a
motion to dismiss “is based upon the content of the pleading in and of itself,” it is also true that
“[i]n evaluating motions to dismiss, courts consider allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached
to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim.” Banco
Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 183 (2005)(emphasis supplied).
Pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e) the court limits its inquiry to the legal sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint. P & J Auto Body v. Miller, 72 N.J. Super. 207, 211 (App. Div. 1962).
All allegations pled in a complaint are assumed true and a plaintiff is entitled to “all reasonable
factual inferences that those allegations support.” F.G. v. MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550, 556 (1997).
The court “searches the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament
of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being
given to amend if necessary.” Printing Mart-Morristown, supra, 116 N.J. at 746 (quoting
DiCristofaro v. Lauren Grove Memorial Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)).
“Nevertheless, the motion should be granted if even a generous reading of the allegations does not
reveal a legal basis for recovery.” Edwards v. Prudential Property & Casualty Co., 357 N.J. Super.
196, 202 (App. Div. 2003).
12
In fact, “dismissal is mandated where the factual allegations are palpably insufficient to
support a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Rieder v. State, Dept. of Transportation, 221
N.J. Super. 547, 549 (App. Div. 1987) (emphasis supplied). Specifically, in the context of a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the law is clear that “a court must dismiss the plaintiff's
complaint if it has failed to articulate a legal basis entitling plaintiff to relief.” Sickles v. Cabot
Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 297 (2005). See also County
of Warren v. State, 409 N.J. Super. 495, 503 (App. Div. 2009) (recognizing that where a complaint
states no basis for relief and discovery would not provide one, dismissal of the complaint under
R. 4:6-2 is appropriate), certif. denied, 201 N.J. 153 (2010) (emphasis supplied).
In the event this Honorable Court relies upon matters outside of the complaint, R.: 4:6-2
permits the Motion to be converted to that of a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Rule 4:46-2 states:
The motion for summary judgment shall be served with briefs and with or without
supporting affidavits. The judgment or order sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admission on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter
of law.
The summary judgment procedure, introduced in New Jersey in the Practice Act of 1912,
is intended to provide a method for the prompt and businesslike disposition of actions which
involve no dispute of a central fact. This proceeding seeks to cut through sham and frivolous
allegations interposed merely for the purpose of harassment or delay, and to present the matter to
the Court in its true light. Litigants are thereby saved the time and expense of protracted suits, and
judicial manpower and facilities, always short in supply, are reserved for meritorious causes.
Judson v. People's Bank and Trust Company of Westfield, 71 N.J. 67 (1954); Monmouth Lumber
Co. v. Indemnity Insurance Company of America, 21 N.J. 441 (1955). It is well settled that one
13
of the primary functions of this procedural device (summary judgment) is to protect parties against
"groundless claims and frivolous defenses(s)." Robbins v. Jersey City, 23 N.J. 229 (1957). The
summary judgment procedure pierces the pleadings to show the facts are otherwise as alleged.
Sokolay v. Edlin, 65 N.J. Super 112 (App. Div. 1961).
Where, as here, the moving party demonstrates a prima facie right to summary judgment,
the adverse party or parties must come forth with competent evidential material in opposition to
show a genuine issue as to material fact. Robbins v. Jersey City, supra; Heljon Management Corp.
v. Dileo, 55 N.J. Super.306 (App. Div. 1959). Bare conclusions in pleadings, opposition letters or
briefs, without factual support in affidavits will not defeat a deserving application for summary
judgment. A. Kaplan and Son v. Housing Authority of Passaic, 42 N.J. Super. 230 (App. Div.
1956); U.S. Pipe and Foundry Co. v. American Arbitration Association, 67 N.J. Super 384 (App.
Div. 1961). Nor are sworn assertions of ultimate fact based on information and belief sufficient
where neither the source of information or the material basis of the belief is stated. New Jersey
Mortgage and Investment v. Calvetti, 68 N.J. Super.18 (App. Div. 1961). Moreover, New Jersey
does not adhere to the "scintilla of evidence" rule.
Even if there is a denial of essential fact, a motion for summary judgment should be granted
if the rest of the record, including depositions and interrogatories, demonstrates the absence of a
material and genuine factual dispute. Rankin v. Sowinski, 119 N.J. Super.393 (App. Div. 1972).
If the facts introduced by the opponent of the motion are of an "insubstantial nature, a mere
scintilla, fanciful, frivolous, gauzy or merely suspicious," relief in the form of summary judgment
should be awarded in favor of the moving party. Judson v. People's Bank and Trust Company of
Westfield, supra.
14
This standard of review was affirmed and encouraged by the New Jersey Supreme Court
itself in the decision of Brill v. The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, et al, 142 N.J.
520 (1995). In that case, the Court held that when the evidence in favor of the moving party is "so
one-sided" that one party must prevail as a matter of law, the trial court "should not hesitate to
grant summary judgment." Brill v. The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America et al, 142
N.J. 520 533, citing to Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). The Brill Court
explicitly stated that:
If there exists a single, unavoidable resolution of the alleged

disputed issue of fact, that issue should be considered insufficient to
constitute a "genuine" issue of material fact for purposes of Rule
4:46-2.
Id. at 540.
In evaluating whether the evidence of record presents a sufficient disagreement so as to
require submission to a jury, the Supreme Court in Brill rejected a mechanical application of the
Judson standard of review, finding instead that it is incumbent on the motion judge to engage in
an analysis and sifting of the evidential materials presented against the motion to determine
whether they create a real issue for trial. Id. at 541-42.
Here, this is the perfect set of circumstances to warrant a dismissal as a matter of law.
Thus, when this Honorable Court reviews Paragraph 32-33 and 37-48 of Plaintiffs
Complaint. (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶¶ 37-48). Three unalienable truths are revealed:
First, they pertain to allegations of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
However, as Point One identifies, this Honorable Court is not the correct forum, and moreover,
the Jurisdiction for these claims rests with the Officer of the Attorney Ethics;
Second, these paragraphs further pertain to an alleged violation of the Local Government
Ethics Law. However, a simple cursory review of the relevant statute reveals that jurisdiction to
investigate such allegations is vested with the Local Finance Board in the Division of Local
15
Government Services in the Department of Community Affairs (“DCA”). This demonstrates that
Plaintiffs either reviewed the relevant law and disregarded it thereby filing the claim in bad faith,
or more probably, Plaintiffs’ shot from the hip, intentionally included the claim, not because it had
any relevance, but because they wanted to impugn the political reputation of Mr. McGuckin.
Third, paragraphs 32-33 of the Complaint Plaintiff assert that the OCGOP and Mr. Holman
wrongfully and unlawfully dispersed funds to the:
(a) Committee to Re-Elect Commissioners Kelly & Haines $5,500.00;
(b) Committee to Re-Elect Mastronardy for Sheriff $5,500.00
(c) McGuckin for Assembly $4,000.00
(d) Jackson Republican Leadership Fund $5,000.00;
(e) Kevin B. Riordan, Esq. LLC $3,109.83.
[Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶¶ 32-33].
Plaintiff thereafter demands judgment in the form restitution and the repayment of those
fees by the entities that received them. (Varga Cert Exhibit A p. 14 of 22). This includes Mr.
McGuckin and Mr. Dasti. However, in cyclical fashion, in order to grant Plaintiff this requested
relief, this Honorable Court would have to first make a finding that the payments were unlawful,
which it most respectfully does not have the jurisdiction to do so. As a review of the controlling
statutes reveals the ELEC Commission is the sole entity vested with the authority to investigate
and determine whether these contributions were unlawful, and only thereafter, could a
person/entity bring a lawsuit for reimbursement of the same.
Again, as we will develop below, this is not something unknown to Counsel who prides
himself on his knowledge of election law. This is not unknown to a Plaintiff who served as County
Chairman of municipal committee until he was forced to step down for a criminal conviction for
tax evasion, and only just recently re-elected after former President Trump pardoned him for his
crimes.
16
These conclusions are revealed by the most cursory review of the controlling statutes. This
demonstrates again, one of two things, either the Plaintiffs are aware this Honorable Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider these charges and thus were filed with bad faith. However, and more likely,
Plaintiffs’ shot from the hip, intentionally included the claim, not because they had any relevance,
but because they wanted to impugn the political reputation of Mr. McGuckin.
However to go further with respect to Mr. Dasti. His nexus to the allegations pertain to his
chairmanship of the Finance Committee, as if to insinuate that Mr. Dasti as chairman issued the
checks himself. Mr. Dasti through his certification demonstrates that he has never written a check
on the Finance Committee account, nor has ever been authorized to sign a check. (Certification of
Jerry J. Dasti, Esq., ¶7(d)). Further investigation reveals that only the OCGOP Finance Committee
Treasurer Jerry W. Conaty had authority to sign checks at the time of Mr. Dasti’s chairmanship.
(Varga Cert. Exhibit B). Today, Mr. Gilmore maintains that authority. (Varga Cert. Exhibit C).
Therefore, as we will demonstrate below Plaintiffs’ Complaint against both Mr. Dasti, and
Mr. McGuckin must be dismissed with prejudice.
POINT ONE
THIS COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

TO CONSIDER THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN ¶¶
32-33 AND 38-48 OF THE PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT.
R. 4:6-2(a) permits the dismissal of an action by demonstrating the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over the cause of action.
The principle is well established that a court cannot hear a case as to which it lacks subject
matter jurisdiction even though all parties thereto desire an adjudication on the merits. State v.
Osborn, 32 N.J. 117, 122 (1960); Abbott v. Beth Israel Cemetery Ass'n of Woodbridge, 13 N.J.
528, 537 (1953); Petersen v. Falzarano, 6 N.J. 447, 454 (1951). Such jurisdiction must be granted
to the court by the Constitution or by valid legislation, as it “cannot be vested by agreement of the
parties.” Id. Likewise, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver resulting from a
17
party's failure to interpose a timely objection to the assumption of jurisdiction. Lay Faculty Ass'n
of Regional Secondary Schools of Archdiocese of Newark v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of
Newark, 122 N.J.Super. 260 supplemented 124 N.J.Super. 369 (App.Div.1973), cert. den. 64 N.J.
153 (1973). Objection to jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is effective whenever
made. McKeeby v. Arthur, 7 N.J. 174 (1951). Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J.
55, 65–66 (1978).
Accordingly, our Supreme Court has defined “jurisdiction” as
The right to adjudicate concerning the subject matter in the given case. To
constitute this there are three essentials: (1) the court must have cognizance of the
class of cases to which the one to be adjudicated belongs; (2) the proper parties
must be present, and (3) the point to be decided must be, in substance and effect,
within the issue.
[Petersen v. Falzarano, 6 N.J. 447, 453 (1951)].
Here, Plaintiffs asserts three sets of factual allegations which the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over to consider.
The first is with respect to the purported violations of the Local Government Ethics Law.
The Ethics Law is codified in N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.1, et seq.
N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.4 provides in pertinent part that:
The Local Finance Board in the Division of Local Government Services in the
Department of Community Affairs shall have jurisdiction to govern and guide the
conduct of local government officers or employees regarding violations of the
provisions of this act who are not otherwise regulated by a county or municipal
code of ethics promulgated by a county or municipal ethics board in accordance
with the provisions of this act.
[N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.4 emphasis supplied].
Thus, by virtue of the compulsory language of N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.4, the Local Finance
Board in the Division of Local Government Services in the Department of Community Affairs
(“DCA”) retains jurisdiction for all complaints filed in reference to violations of the Ethics Law.
18
Here, Plaintiffs have failed to comply with N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.4, and thus, this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ claims for Plaintiffs failure to first exhaust administrative
remedies and file a complaint containing those specific factual allegations with the DCA.
Consequently, it is well settled that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies fatally
wounds a cause of action. As our Court Rules impose a duty to exhaust administrative remedies
before initiating actions at law “[e]xcept where it is manifest that the interest of justice requires
otherwise.” Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 261 (2015) (quoting R. 4:69-5). Thus,
“the exhaustion of remedies requirement is a rule of practice designed to allow administrative
bodies to perform their statutory functions in an orderly manner without preliminary interference
from the courts.” Griepenburg, supra, 220 N.J. at 261 (quoting Brunetti v. Borough of New
Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 588 (1975)). Therefore, there is “a strong presumption favoring the
requirement of exhaustion of remedies.” Id. The requirement of exhaustion is not absolute and
“[e]xceptions are made when the administrative remedies would be futile, when irreparable harm
would result, when jurisdiction of the agency is doubtful, or when an overriding public interest
calls for a prompt judicial decision.” Griepenburg, supra, 220 N.J. at 261 (quoting N.J. Civil
Service Ass’n v. State, 88 N.J. 605, 613 (1982); Garrow v. Elizabeth General Hospital &
Dispensary, 79 N.J. 549, 561 (1979)).
Put differently, the exhaustion rule set forth in R. 4:69-5 is intended to ensure that claims
will initially be heard by a body with expertise in the area, permit administrative resolution to
eliminate the need for suit, and create a factual record for appellate review. Adams v. Delmonte,
309 N.J. Super. 572, 579 (App. Div. 1998).
As a result of this well settled precedent, any reference to a violation of the Ethics Law and
any collateral consequences of the same must be dismissed from this instant matter, as this Court
19
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the matters. This pertains specifically to the
allegations:
¶¶ 32-33 alleging Mr. McGuckin wrongfully misappropriated $4,000.00;
¶¶38-48 alleging Mr. McGuckin violated the Ethics Law for his alleged involvement in the
investigation of Justin Lamb and the direct allegation in ¶ 48 asserting that the foregoing statements
in violate the Local Government Ethics Law.
Second, Plaintiff maintains various inferences of violations of the rules of professional
conduct. Such violations are subject to the jurisdiction of the Office of Attorney Ethics, an
administrative agency of the Supreme Court, and not the Superior Court. This jurisdiction was
explicitly reserved in the Supreme Court by virtue of Article 6, § 2, ¶ 3 of the New Jersey
Constitution, which provides in full: [t]he Supreme Court shall make rules governing the
administration of all courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure in all
such courts. The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law
and the discipline of persons admitted.” N.J. Const. art. VI, 2, ¶ 3.
As consequence of this inherent authority, the Supreme Court promulgated the Court rules
and R. 1:20-1 et seq., thereby creating the Office of Attorney Ethics and retaining in that office the
jurisdiction to review and investigate allegations of Attorney Misconduct. See R 1:20-1; R. 1:20-
2. Thus, because this Honorable Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the allegations which are
subject to the jurisdiction of the Office of the Attorney Ethics, they must be dismissed. These
include specifically the following:
¶ 38 Alleging Mr. McGuckin is an attorney at law in the State of New Jersey, subject to
the new Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”) and amongst other clients has and
continues to serve as the attorney for the Township of Toms River.
20
¶¶ 39-47 alleging that Mr. McGuckin violated the RPC by improperly waving a non-
waivable conflict of interest in violation of RPC 1.7(b)(1), for his alleged involvement in the
investigation of Justin Lamb.
Third and finally, as stated above, Plaintiffs asserts the OCGOP and Mr. Holman
wrongfully and unlawfully dispersed funds to the:
(f) Committee to Re-Elect Commissioners Kelly & Haines $5,500.00;
(g) Committee to Re-Elect Mastronardy for Sheriff $5,500.00
(h) McGuckin for Assembly $4,000.00
(i) Jackson Republican Leadership Fund $5,000.00;
(j) Kevin B. Riordan, Esq. LLC $3,109.83.
[Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶¶ 32-33].
Plaintiff thereafter demands judgment in the form restitution and the repayment of those
fees by the entities that received them. (Varga Cert. Exhibit A p. 14 of 22). However, it is well
settled that when a challenge is made regarding the lawfulness of expenditures made by a political
committee, the same are subject to N.J.S.A. 19:44A-1 et seq. commonly known as the New Jersey
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Reporting Act (the “Act”). Pursuant to the Act’s
provisions, the New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission (ELEC) is charged with
administering the provisions of the Act and imposing sanctions for violations. N.J.S.A. 19:44A-6;
see also Markwardt v. New Beginnings, 304 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 1997)
However, while it is true that in 1993, the Legislature added N.J.S.A. 19:44A–22.1, which
affords an aggrieved candidate the right to institute a summary action in the Superior Court for
injunctive relief, it does not extend that right to any other member of the committee or its elected
official. That section states:
21
If a political committee or continuing political committee, having been established

or consisting of members or having received contributions in violation of this act,
shall have made any contribution or expenditure in opposition to, or in furtherance
of the defeat of, a candidate, that candidate may, in a summary action in the
Superior Court, apply for an order directing that political committee or continuing
political committee to show cause why the court should not grant such injunctive
relief as the candidate may seek. The court shall decide the application within 48
hours of the filing thereof and, upon a proper demonstration of the candidate's
entitlement thereto, shall grant appropriate injunctive relief against that political
committee or continuing political committee.
Rather, it appears that members of a county political committee have standing to bring an
action against a committee’s disbursing and managing officers seeking to recover on behalf of the
committee funds alleged to have been disbursed by defendants, only after a complaint and finding
of misconduct is made to and by the ELEC. O'Neill v. Lerner, 154 N.J. Super. 317, 325 (App. Div.
1977).
Here, there has been no such finding of impropriety by the ELEC. Moreover, Plaintiffs
have utterly failed to file a complaint with the ELEC and exhaust their administrative remedies to
vest themselves with the appropriate standing to recover the purportedly unlawfully distributed
funds. As a consequence of Plaintiffs’ failure to first file an action with the ELEC for a
determination that the Defendants unlawfully disbursed funds, Plaintiffs complaint with respect to
the same must be dismissed.
22
POINT TWO
DUE TO THE FACT THAT THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE

JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE ALLEGATIONS ASSERTED IN ¶¶
32-33 AND 38-48, THE SAME MUST BE STRICKEN FROM THE
COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO R. 4:6-4(b), THE COMPLAINT
THEREAFTER MUST BE REFILED BY PLAINTIFFS AND MR.
McGUCKIN MUST BE AWARDED COUNSEL FEES AND COSTS OF
SUIT.
R. 4:6-4(b) permits a party to move to dismiss or strike any part of pleading that is
“scandalous, impertinent or the nature of the cause of action, abusive of the court or another
person.” Moreover, this same rule permits a party to strike any such part of a pleading or any part
thereof that is immaterial or redundant.” R. 4:6-4(b).
The Court in DeGroot v. Muccio, 115 N.J.Super. 15 (Law Division 1971) and Callari v.
Sugar, 180 N.J. Super. 423 (Ch. Div. 1980), made clear that in order to trigger the application of
the rule, the test did not go to the nature of the complained-of allegations or the manner in which
they are expressed, rather, the question turned on the relevance of the plead allegations to the cause
of action. id. See also Chew v. Eagan, 87 N.J. Eq. 80, 81 (Ch. 1916) (“‘impertinence,’ in equity
pleading, signifies that which is irrelevant and which does not, in consequence, belong to the
pleading.”).
In that vein, Plaintiffs in Count One concoct their own cause of action and demands
“disclosure, accounting, recovery, restoration, and restitution.” (Varga Cert. Exhibit A Page 13 of
22). This count very simply demands that the Defendants return “’digital assets’ of the Ocean
County Republican Committee” (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶54); a finding that the Plaintiffs’ are the
“sole, exclusive and rightful owners of the Google Accounts, the ESI, digital assets and other
records and documents to the current exclusion of all others.” (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶57).
Plaintiffs thereafter lump an array of various judgment demands which include:
23
1. Defendants comply with the Cease-and-Desist notice and file affidavits of

compliance and their actions and inactions;
2. Defendants comply with the Litigation Hold Notice and file affidavits of
compliance and their actions and inactions;
3. Defendants prepare and submit a written accounting, specifically for all receipts,
uses, expenditures, or disbursements of the funds of the Ocean County Republican
Committee from January 1, 2022 to date to the Plaintiffs for all money,
disbursements, accounts, written authorization and under whose direction, or
authorization each action was taken;
4. Defendants restore and turn over all deleted documents, emails, and ESI;
5. Defendants supply access and passwords to Plaintiffs for the Ocean County
Republican website, emails and other “Digital Communications;”
6. That the Court declare that the new Chairperson and Vice Chairperson are alone
entitled to access, the use, and possession of the “Google Accounts,” emails, and
associated systems;
7. Plaintiffs demand judgment against the Defendants requiring Defendants to

disgorge and repay all these funds together with interest thereon; and to impose a
judgment, lien, and equitable lien upon the accounts of McGuckin for Assembly,
and all others who have received funds or monies from actions of the
Defendants; 2
8. Plaintiffs be awarded damages, compensatory, and punitive damages against the
individual Defendants’ jointly and severally;
9. Plaintiff’s be awarded Plaintiffs’ filing fees, counsel fees and costs of suit; and
10. The Court grant Plaintiffs such other and further relief as may just, equitable, proper
and necessary.
(Please see Plaintiff’s Complaint pages 13-14).
Accordingly, R. 4:6-4(b) was designed to prohibit a Plaintiff, such as the Plaintiffs here
from pleading scandalous and impertinent allegations, when they are entirely irrelevant to the
Cause of Action at hand.
2
Please note that in ¶ 32, Plaintiffs claim that Commissioner Kelly & Haines and Sheriff Mastronardy unlawfully
received campaign donations, yet neither are included in this Complaint. Despite this irregularity, Plaintiffs request
this Court require these individuals return the funds or have a lien imposed upon them.
24
Here, the sole cause of action as it relates to the funds dispersed in ¶¶ 32-34 and 38-48, is
whether Mr. Holman, while Chairman of the OCGOP had the authority to make campaign
donations, or if the OCGOP had the authority to investigate candidates and adversaries. The
inclusion of purported ethical violations has absolutely nothing to do with that determination and
is clearly designed and pled in this complaint in an attempt to maliciously impugn the reputations
of the Mr. McGuckin.
As a result of lack of any nexus between the relevance of the Plaintiffs Cause of Action
and the demonstratively scandalous factual allegations, the same must be stricken from the
Complaint pursuant to R. 4:6-4(b).
However, R. 4:6-4(b) provides in full:
Impropriety of Pleading. On the court's or a party's motion, the court may either
(1) dismiss any pleading that is, overall, scandalous, impertinent, or, considering
the nature of the cause of action, abusive of the court or another person; or (2) strike
any such part of a pleading or any part thereof that is immaterial or redundant. The
order of dismissal shall comply with R. 4:37-2(a) and may expressly require,
as a condition of the refiling of a pleading asserting a claim or defense based
on the same transaction, the payment by the pleading party of attorney's fees
and costs incurred by the party who moved for dismissal.
As this rule indicates Plaintiffs should be required to reimburse Mr. McGuckin his
attorney’s fees and costs incurred moving for this dismissal. As indicated above, one of the
Plaintiffs in this case is Mr. George Gilmore. Mr. Gilmore is the former law partner of Gilmore &
Monahan P.C. and only seized practicing after his criminal conviction. Mr. Gilmore for the
majority of his several decade career was deeply rooted in politics, and for approximately 24 years
was the Chairman of the Republican Party for the County of Ocean. Despite that fact, being well
versed in the law, and well versed in election law specifically, Mr. Gilmore joined as a plaintiff,
both “individually and as the Ocean County Republican Organization Chairman” (Varga Cert.
25
Exhibit A ¶1), to deliberately charge these intentionally malicious, unorthodox, and scandalous
allegations knowing quite well, that this Honorable Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the same.
More egregious, is Plaintiff’s Counsel. Defendants would respectfully directly Your
Honors attention to ¶¶ 1, 11, 14, 15, 16 34, Varga Cert. Exhibit A, Plaintiff’s Exhibits A and B at
page 16-17 of 22. As Your Honor will discern, Counsel for Plaintiffs has a firm grasp on Title 19,
yet despite this grasp, him and Plaintiffs consciously chose to include these ridiculous allegations
that waste this Honorable Court’s time. Counsel is a well-respected member of the bar, and
seasoned attorney in the realm of election law. Depending the table you sit at, one might call him
an expert. Despite his notoriety, his signature appears as trial counsel supporting these
demonstratively frivolous claims. They are scandalous. They are impertinent. They are irrelevant.
Thus, if Plaintiff choses to refile the complaint against Mr. McGuckin for claims of which this
Honorable Court may have jurisdiction over, 3 pursuant to R. 4:6-4(b) reasonable counsel fees must
be imposed.
POINT THREE
PLANTIFF HAS FAILED TO ALLEGE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

GREGORY P. McGUCKIN, ESQ., WHICH CAN WITHSTAND
SCRUTINY.
Plaintiff asserts one lone cause of action against all defendants seeking the demand for
disclosure, accounting, recovery, restoration and restitution. (Varga Cert. Exhibit A Count One).
In conjunction with this broadly painted count, Plaintiff demands judgment against Mr. McGuckin
and demands “he disgorge and repay all funds together with interest thereon; and to impose
judgment, lien and equitable lien upon the accounts of McGuckin for Assembly, and all others
3
Not withstanding the fact that a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint will be required to be filed.
26
who have received funds or monies from the actions of the Defendants.” (Varga Cert. Exhibit A
Count One, p. 14 ¶ 7).
That is the only cause of action, and demand for relief against Mr. McGuckin in this
Complaint. However, as demonstrated in Point One Supra, the factual allegations that support this
cause of action this Honorable Court lacks jurisdiction to consider. As a consequence, Plaintiff’s
Complaint against Mr. McGuckin must be dismissed with prejudice.
POINT FOUR
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO PLEAD A CLAIM AGAINST JERRY J.

DASTI, ESQ. OR ALTERNATIVELY HE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
What Mr. Dasti did wrong in this matter is an enigma not pled in accordance with R. 4:5-
1 et. seq. However, notwithstanding that fact, based off the allegations in the remainder of the
complaint it is clear that what Plaintiffs are attempting to claim not only lacks justiciability but is
without factual foundation and thus is subject to dismissal.
In that vein, the complaint generally asserts in Paragraph 31:
The new Ocean County Republican Organization has learned that the treasury and
monies of the organization were improperly depleted and converted by the transfer
of $23,109.83 out of the Ocean County Republican Organization Finance
Committee account the day before and on the afternoon of the Chairman’s election,
which was left a balance of only $2,045.34 to pay bills and expenses previously
incurred which exceeds the $2,045.34 balance. Defendant Jerry J. Dasti was the
chair of the Finance Committee. (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶31).
Paragraph 32 thereafter loosely asserts that the expenditures of funds was “tortious,
unlawful and [an] unauthorized depletion of the monies and funds of the Ocean County Republican
Organization and the Ocean County Republican Organization. (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶ 32). The
Plaintiffs allege that these funds were used to pay various political candidates and Mr. Riordan for
27
services. 4 Paragraph 33 of the Complaint continues to assert that “These defendants and their
campaign committee have improperly, without authority, and wrongfully converted, usurped,
expended, and misappropriated the funds of the Ocean County Republican Organization and the
Ocean County Organization Finance Committee.” (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶34). Based off the
foregoing acts, Plaintiffs’ claim that the Defendants actions interfere with their statutory
obligations pursuant to N.J.S.A. 19:25-7.3. (Varga Cert. Exhibit A ¶34).
Thus, while reviewing Plaintiffs complaint with the most generous eyes, it appears that the
Plaintiffs assert that Mr. Dasti authorized or participated in the misappropriation of these funds
and payments to the political committees. However, this theory of liability against Mr. Dasti is
fatally flawed. First, to call out the elephant in the room. Point One supra renders certain that this
Honorable Court most respectfully lacks jurisdiction to evaluate whether the distribution of funds
were lawful or not. That authority is vested strictly with the ELEC committee. However, second,
lets assume for one moment that strict statutory mandate that all disbursements be regulated by the
ELEC committee did not exist.
Thus, the question is whether Mr. Dasti misappropriated funds. Misappropriation is simply
another form of fraud governed by the heightened pleading standard of R. 4:5-8. Significantly,
when the complaint alleges Fraud, our Court rules impose a heightened pleading requirement. In
that vein, R. 4:5-8 provides: “[i]n all allegations of misrepresentation, fraud, mistake, breach of
trust, willful default or undue influence, particulars of the wrong, with dates and items if necessary,
shall be stated insofar as practicable. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a
person may be alleged generally.” R. 4:5-8.
4
Plaintiffs have not identified how payment to Mr. Riordan was unlawful, nor as of todays date, to these Defendants
knowledge have the Plaintiffs served Mr. Riordan with a complaint.
28
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint is woefully inadequate with respect to this standard and the
allegation of misappropriation.
Notwithstanding that fact, to adequately plead a complaint involving Fraud, the following
elements must be satisfied: (1) a knowing falsehood or misrepresentation made; (2) with the
intention that the other person relies thereon; (3) that his or her intention was that the plaintiff rely
upon that statement; (4) plaintiff’s reliance was reasonable; and (5) that the plaintiff was
consequently damaged as a result of that reliance. All State New Jersey v. Lajara, 222 129, 147
(2015).
Here, Plaintiff at a minimum would have to allege how Mr. Dasti misappropriate funds,
what his involvement in the misappropriation was, how he authorized the signing of checks, and
why reliance on his authorization was reasonable. However, this theory is flawed by the reality of
how the OCGOP operates. First, Mr. Dasti, has certified that he has never been authorized to sign
a check, nor has ever signed a check from the Finance Committee Account or from any other
Ocean County GOP account. (Dasti Cert. ¶7(d)). Mr. Dasti further certified that he was not
involved with the decisions to distribute funds asserted in paragraph 32 of the Plaintiffs’ complaint.
(Dasti Cert. ¶7(e). Second, a review of OCGOP ELEC filings reveals that the only person at the
time who was authorized to sign checks was Mr. Conaty. (Varga Cert. Exhibit B). Today, that
privilege is retained by Mr. Gilmore and Mr. Memoli. (Varga Cert. Exhibit C).
Plaintiffs in this matter, do not possess a shred of factual evidence, because they cannot
possess any, that Mr. Dasti or Mr. McGuckin misappropriated funds because they were incapable
of performing the conduct required to condemn them.
29
Consequently, even had Plaitniff satisfied R. 4:5-8 and asserted fraud against Mr. Dasti for
misappropriation of funds, the allegation could not survive summary judgment and thus is ripe for
dismissal as a matter of law.
POINT FIVE
PLAINTIFFS HAVE IMPROPERLY FILED THIS ACTION AND

CONTINUED TO PURSUE IT IN BAD FAITH AGAINST MR. DASTI AND
MR. McGUCKIN, KNOWING THAT NEITHER MR. McGUCKIN OR MR.
DASTI HAD THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE THE ALLEGED IMPROPER
TRANSACTIONS.
The concept of bad faith in relation to the pursuit of a complaint means “that the harm was
inflicted intentionally without a justification or excuse. Port-O-San Corp. v. Teamsters, Local
Union No. 863 Welfare & Pension Funds, 363 N.J. Super. 431, 438 (App. Div. 2003).
Here, as this litigation thus far has demonstrated, this case was initiated by disgruntled
plaintiffs seeking to retaliate against those who opposed his return to party chairman and to harm
their reputations. This case was inexcusably filed by an attorney with many decades of election
law experience in Superior Court, when the case law is clear that only the ELEC commission has
authority to investigate plaintiffs’ allegations. More shocking is the fact that one of the Plaintiffs
is a long time chairman of the OCGOP, with an even longer tenure as an attorney. Practicing in
the realm of municipal law, and serving on the Board of Elections.
The Plaintiffs, and their Attorney, armed with knowledge from their respective extensive
experienced commenced this action against Mr. Dasti and Mr. McGuckin with one goal in mind,
to harm them. There is no fact which Plaintiffs could concoct to demonstrate that either Mr. Dasti
or Mr. McGuckin had the means to misappropriate any funds or perform the improper conduct
attributed to them. Let alone a fact that is alleged. Moreover, even if they could, there is no law
30
which Plaintiffs could rely upon to demonstrate that this Honorable Court had the authority to
evaluate such a contention.
In fact, and most shocking is the realty that Mr. Gilmore and Mr. Memoli, both plaintiffs,
on July 30, 2022 changed the list of names of those persons authorized to make any form of
financial transactions on behalf of the Organization, from Mr. Conaty—who is not even a party of
this suit; to themselves. (Varga Cert. Exhibit B; Varga Cert. Exhibit C). They knew that neither
Mr. Dasti or Mr. McGuckin had the authority to initiate transactions, yet they plead that they did.
More egregiously these Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Dasti and Mr. McGuckin someway, somehow,
misappropriated funds.
It is curiously obvious the reason why Plaintiffs’ complaint is scant with any factual
justification for the inclusion of Mr. Dasti and Mr. McGuckin as parties to this suit. The answer is
quite simply because Plaintiffs lack any justification.
This is a shocking case, that is demonstratively the poster boy of bad faith litigation, aimed
by one isle of the same political party against the other.
CONCLUSION
This case, quite simply, is little more than the quintessential example of a sham purposely
intended to impugn the reputation of two men. Consequently, for the aforementioned reason,
Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice.
Dasti, Murphy, McGuckin, Dasti, Murphy, McGuckin,

Ulaky, Koutsouris, & Connors Ulaky, Koutsouris, & Connors
Attorneys for Defendant Attorneys for Defendant,
Jerry J. Dasti, Gregory P. McGuckin
By /s/ Patrick F. Varga___ By /s/ Kelsey McGuckin-Anthony

Patrick F. Varga Esq. Kelsey McGuckin-Anthony Esq.
Dated: December 9, 2022 Dated: December 9, 2022
31

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MON-L-002412-22 12/09/2022 4:18:46 PM Pg 1 of 3 Trans ID: LCV20224178738

DASTI, MURPHY, McGUCKIN, ULAKY,

OCEAN COUNTY REPUBLICAN SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

FRANK HOLMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND

TO: John M. Carbone, Esq.

pleadings pursuant to R. 4:6-4.

be placed upon the Certification attached hereto.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that pursuant to Rule 1:6-2(d) the

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that a proposed form of order is attached.

Dasti, Murphy, McGuckin, Ulaky, Koutsouris, and

Dated: December 9, 2022 By /s/ Patrick F. Varga

Dasti, Murphy, McGuckin, Ulaky, Koutsouris, and

Dated: December 9, 2022 By /s/ Kelsey McGuckin-Anthony, Esq

hereto via Ecourts.

Dasti, Murphy, McGuckin, Ulaky, Koutsouris, and

Dated: December 9, 2022 By /s/ Patrick F. Varga

Dasti, Murphy, McGuckin, Ulaky, Koutsouris, and

Dated: December 9, 2022 By /s/ Kelsey McGuckin-Anthony, Esq

DASTI, MURPHY, McGUCKIN, ULAKY,

OCEAN COUNTY REPUBLICAN SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

FRANK HOLMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND

IT IS on this _____ day of January 2023;

ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:

applies to Defendant Jerry J. Dasti, and Gregory P. McGuckin.

3. Pursuant to R. 4:6-4 Gregory P. McGuckin is awarded attorney fees and costs of

services within ____ days of the date of this Order.

620 WEST LACEY ROAD

620 WEST LACEY ROAD

DASTI, MURPHY, McGUCKIN, ULAKY,

OCEAN COUNTY REPUBLICAN SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

FRANK HOLMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND

DEFENDANTS JERRY J. DASTI AND GREGORY P. McGUCKIN BRIEF IN

Of Counsel and On the Brief: Kelsey McGuckin-Anthony, Esq. (244842017)

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................ i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... ii

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY ................................................................................. 2

STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................................... 4

STANDARD OF REVIEW ...................................................................................................... 12

LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 17

COUNS E LLORS AT LAW

Abbott v. Beth Israel Cemetery Ass'n of Woodbridge, 13 N.J. 528 (1953)………...…….…17

All State New Jersey v. Lajara, 222 129 (2015)……………………………………………….29

Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 183 (2005)…………………………………12

Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576 (1975)……………………………………19

Callari v. Sugar, 180 N.J. Super. 423 (Ch. Div. 1980)…………………………………………23

Chew v. Eagan, 87 N.J. Eq. 80, 81 (Ch. 1916)……………………………………………..….23

DeGroot v. Muccio, 115 N.J.Super. 15 (Law Division 1971) …………………………….…23

F.G. v. MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550, 556 (1997). …………………………………………...….12

Garrow v. Elizabeth General Hospital & Dispensary, 79 N.J. 549, (1979)…………..……..19

Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 261 (2015)…………………………….…….19

Lay Faculty Ass'n of Regional Secondary Schools of Archdiocese of Newark v. Roman

McKeeby v. Arthur, 7 N.J. 174 (1951)………………………………………………………..18

N.J. Civil Service Ass’n v. State, 88 N.J. 605, 613 (1982)……………………………………19

Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 65–66 (1978)………………………….18

Roa v. Lafe, 200 N.J. 555, 562 (2010)………………………………………………..…...…12

Robbins v. Jersey City, 23 N.J. 229 (1957)…………...…………………………………….. 14

Sokolay v. Edlin, 65 N.J. Super 112 (App. Div. 1961)……………………………………….14

COUNS E LLORS AT LAW

NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION

Dasti & McGuckin Motion To Dismiss

Dasti & McGuckin Motion To Dismiss

Dasti & McGuckin Motion To Dismiss