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Design Procedures and Details For Reinforced CR in ES
Design Procedures and Details For Reinforced CR in ES
DESIGN
AND CONSTRUCTIONOF PROTECTIVE
STRUCTURES
DESIGN PROCEDURES AND DETAILS FOR
REINFORCED CONCRETE STRUCTURES UTILIZED
IN EXPLOSIVE STORAGE A N D MANUFACTURING FACILITIES*
INTRODUCTION
Over the last 60 years, criteria and methods based upon the results of catas-
trophic events, have been used for the design of high explosive storage and
manufacturing facilities. These criteria and methods did not include a detailed
or reliable quantitative basis for assessing the degree of protection afforded by
the protected facility and, therefore, extensive research and development pro-
grams have been undertaken to establish adequate procedures for current and
future design requirements.
Modern methods of manufacturing and storing explosives and explosive mate-
rials which include many common and exotic chemicals, fuels, and propellants,
allow less space for a given quantity of material than previously permitted. Such
concentrations of explosive materials increases the possibility of propagation,
where one accidental explosion initiates detonatoin of other explosive materials.
It is evident that a requirement for more accurate design techniques has become
essential. This paper describes a rational method of design for structural protec-
tion and corroboratory test data.
This method accounts for the close-in effects of a detonation, including asso-
ciated high pressures and nonuniformity of the blast loading on a protective
structure or barrier. The dynamic response of reinforced concrete structures is
calculated and details developed to provide the properties necessary to supply
the proper strength and ductility. Development of these procedures was directed
primarily towards blast load analysis and protective barrier design for explosive
systems contained in cubicle-t) pe structures. However, this approach is general
and has application to design for other explosive environments as well. Addi-
tional testing and analysis is presently underway to more fully define the blast
environment and/or the structural response.
EXPLOSIVE PROTECTIVE SYSTEM
The three components of an explosive protective system that must be defined
in order to assess the safety of the overall system (FIGURE1 ) include: ( 1 ) the
donor system (explosive material) which produces the damaging output; (2) the
protective structure, walls and/or distances which reduce the donor output to
a tolerable level; and, (3) the acceptor system, which may be personnel, valuable
equipment, or other explosives.
The potential output of the donor system includes blast pressures, primary
missiles from the casing, and secondary effects, consisting of heat and electro-
magnetic pulse. The pressures are the most significant factor in the design of a
protective structure. However, fragmenp may be of equal importance in the
The design techniques reported here have been developed by Ammann & Whitney under
Contract DA-28-017-AMC423(A) with Picatinny Arsenal as part of their Supporting Safety
Studies Program for the Armed Services Explosive Safety Board.
452
Cohen & Dobbs: Design Procedures and Details 453
0 BARRIERS
& STRUCTURE
maowm ACCLPTOR
LWlPYtNl CWOZ
454 Annals New York Academy of Sciences
design of the entire system. Secondary effects are seldom governing factors in
a design.
Depending upon the mass of the intervening concrete, high-velocity, heavy-
primary fragments may penetrate or be ricocheted to the acceptor side of a
barrier. Lightweight fragments seldom penetrate through a concrete barrier,
although in many cases they may ricochet beyond the barrier and thereby
damage the acceptor systems. Therefore, to provide protection against primary
missiles, sufficient concrete thickness must be provided to prevent full penetra-
tion, and the configuration of the facility must be designed to prevent fragments
from ricocheting in the direction of the acceptor.
Analytical treatment of blast effects varies with the location of the structure
relative to the explosion. For close-in effects, where the pressures acting on the
protective structure are extremely high and are further amplified due to their
reflection by the barrier, the structure may be designed for dynamic impulse
loading rather than for the peak pressures, as required for the relatively long-
duration associated with nuclear explosions. Protective structures more distant
from an explosion (far-range) may be sensitive to both the pressures and im-
pulse associated with the blast output or to pressure alone. The structural sensi-
tivity will depend on the magnitude and duration of the applied blast loads, and
on the response of the structure to these loads. The dynamic characteristics of
individual elements of a structure may differ. Therefore, some elements of the
structure may be affected by both the pressures and impulse whereas other
elements are sensitive to the pressure only. Pressure-sensitive protective struc-
tures may be designed using procedures developed for structures to resist the
effects of a nuclear explosion.
Protective structures may be classified as: (1) shelters, and (2) barriers. Pro-
tective shelters are used to house personnel and/or valuable equipment, while
barriers are used for protection of explosives and other items against direct
effects of missiles and pressures.
Shelters are defined as structures enclosing the personnel or other items that
require protection. Entrances and other openings may be sealed with blast door,
blast valves, and shields, and, depending on the traffic flow, they may require
blast locks. Criteria for protected openings will depend on the magnitude of the
pressure acting on the structure, the location of the openings in the structure
relative to the explosion, the size of the openings, the pressure fill-time within the
structure, and the sensitivity of the inhabitants and equipment.
Barriers may be either simple barricades (cantilever walls) or cubicles where
one or more surfaces of the structure are open to the atmosphere or frangible.
Igloos (earth covered magazine) and below-ground silos with open or frangible
roofs may also be classified as barriers. Because these structures are usually used
in the storing, manufacturing, or processing of explosives or explosive materials,
they will be subjected to the close-in loadings of the blast output.
In this paper, primary consideration will be given to the response of protective
structure to close-in blast effects of high-explosive detonations, with particular
emphasis towards explosions in cubicle-type structures. The donor and acceptor
systems are discussed only as they relate to the protective structure portion of the
explosive system.
Blast Environment of Explosive Materials
Explosive materials may be classified according to their physical state, as (1)
solids, ( 2 ) liquids, and ( 3 ) gases. Solid explosives are primarily high-explosives,
although other materials such as fertilizers, chemicals, propellants, etc., may
Cohen & Dobbs: Design Procedures and Details 455
also be classified as potential explosive materials. Liquids and gaseous explosives
will encompass a wide variety of materials used in the manufacture of chemicals,
fuels, pharmaceutical products, propellants, etc. The blast environments will
not only vary among the different materials but may also differ for any one par-
ticular material. Such factors as methods and procedures used for the manu-
facture, storage and handling, in addition to specific individual physical and
chemical characteristics may alter the blast output of an explosive material.
Of all, the blast environment for solid materials is best known. This is particu-
larly true for high-explosive materials. Here, the blast pressures, impulse, dura-
tions and other parameters of the blast output have been well established. These
parameters are contained in many references, of which Reference 1 is one.
Unlike high-explosive materials, other solid, liquid and gaseous explosive
materials will exhibit a variation of their explosive output environment. A deto-
nation of these materials will in many cases be incomplete, with the initial reac-
tion not proceeding throughout the material. This discontinuance is produced by
physical and chemical properties of the material, including its bimolecular struc-
ture, combining of the various physical states, ineffective combining of the fuel
and oxidizer, etc. Tests of some propellant liquids and hydrocarbon mixtures
have indicated that the equivalent concentrated yield is approximately constant
except for the close-in ranges, where it decreases for the peak pressure variation
and may increase for the total positive phase impulse variation.
Quite often, only a small amount of the mass of an explosive material will be
involved in the detonation process, the remainder being consumed by deflagra-
tion. Therefore, a large amount of the material's chemical energy will be dissi-
pated as thermal energy, resulting in the formation of a large fireball.
In general, no clear-cut high-explosive equivalent may be utilized to define
the blast output of explosive materials other than high-explosives. Each material,
in its own environment, should be analyzed and then related to the output of a
high-explosive at the range of interest to obtain its equivalent. For blast-resistant
design, the equivalent should be based on a pressure-impulse relationship.
DESIGN
BASISFOR STRUCTURAL
Modes of Structural Response
The response and the required dynamic resistance of a protective structure
and its elements to an explosive loading depends on, (1) the properties of the
donor system, (2) the sensitivity of the acceptor system, and (3) the physical
properties and configuration of the structure itself. The donor system determines
the loading on the structure's surfaces, whereas the acceptor system and the
physical characteristics of the structure govern. the required resistance to the
applied loads. The protective capabilities can be expressed in terms of two modes
of response of the structure: (1) the ability to deflect under the applied loads
(ductile mode), and (2) a brittle mode, which is awociated with partial or total
failure of the structure.
Examination of the results of previous t e ~ t s ~of, ~conventionally
,~ reinforced
concrete full- and scale-model cubicles and slabs indicated that the individual
elements were able to undergo deflections of less than one-fiftieth of their spans
with well defined cracking (FIGURE 2a) before collapse and fragmentation (FIG
URES 2a and b). The magnitude of the deflection prior to failure (FIGURE 3) and
the type of failure were found to be a function of the type, amount, and details
of the reinforcing steel. It was observed that when the elements involved rein-
456 Annals New York Academy of Sciences
.I
t
I I ,
DLTUCKWI
FIGURE
3. Resistance-deflection curve.
FIGURE
4. Undeveloped reinforcement.
458 Annals New York Academy of Sciences
(2) to maintain the integrity of the reinforced concrete cross section despite
severe cracking of the concrete, (3) to restrain the compression reinforcement
from buckling, ( 4 ) to resist high-shear stresses at the supports, ( 5 ) to prevent
local shear failure, and (6) to reduce the quantity and velocities of fragments.
The lacing reinforcement accomplished the first three of the above items
by tying together the straight bar flexural reinforcement on the two (tension
and compression) faces of the wall. Disengagement and outward buckling of
the flexural reinforcement is prevented by the lacing, which also confiines the
cracked concrete between the two outer layers of steel. This confinement of
the concrete also prevents inward buckling of the reinforcement in the com-
pression region of the elements after yield in the later stages of distortion.
The idealized Resistance-Deflection curve shown in FIGURE 3 illustrates the
results of installing lacing reinforcement to prevent premature failure.
The element is able to deflect, without loss of strength, until failure occurs
by rupture of the flexural reinforcement. With Standard Wall reinforcement,
cracking separation and dislodgment of the concrete from between the rein-
forcement layers and buckling of the compression steel produces failure of the
Cohen & Dobbs: Design Procedures and Details 46 1
element long before the ultimate strength of the reinforcement and the maximum
energy is attained. Minor reduction in the strength of an element may occur
even with laced reinforcement by crushing and/or spalling of the concrete in
the compression region of the element. As the concrete on the compression face
fails, the stresses are transferred from the concrete to the reinforcement with a
reduction in the internal lever arm. The magnitude of this strength reduction
is a function of the concrete cover. Therefore, by holding the concrete cover
over the s~eelto a minimum, this strength reduction is also minimized.
Unless adequate shear strength (equal to or greater than the flexural capacity)
is provided, failure (FIGURE 3 ) due to high shear stresses will occur at the
support of an element. Lacing reinforcement provides this required strength by
its own strength and by developing the dowel action of the flexural steel and the
remaining strength of the concrete. Extension of lacing reinforcement into the
supports (FIGURE 7b) affords the anchorage required to prevent diagonal tension
failure. Also, because of the continuity of the lacing, direct shear failure as may
FIGURE
10. Test results of reinforced concrete slab.
Cohen & Dobbs: Design Procedures and Details 463
FIGURE
13. Backwall failure of cu6icle with laced reinforcement.
Cohen 8r Dobbs: Design Procedures and Details 465
Specimen three (FIGURE 12) illustrates failure at the plastic hinges developed
in the element, after yield. It can be seen that, even though the member has
failed, the sections between the hinges remained intact with only minor rubble
occurring at the points of failure. The compression reinforcement at the points
of failure remained intact, preventing the failed sections between the hinges from
being detached from the rest of the specimen.
Specimen four (FIGURE 13) also illustrates the effects of lacing reinforcement
and flexural ductility on the failure pattern of an element. In this test, the back
wall of a cubicle collapsed, resulting in a failure analogue to a swinging door
(FIGURE 13). Although both the tension and compression reinforcement at
midspan and the tension reinfoncement at the supports failed, the compression
steel at the supports and the concrete sections between the hinges remained intact.
After failure, the compression reinforcement at the supports served as hinges to
produce rotational motion rather than translation of failed sections. Energy,
which would ordinarily result in translational velocity was, in this case, tranferred
to the ground adjacent to the structure where the failed sections came to rest.
The magnitude of the blast overload was not sufficient to completely detach the
failed sections from the remainder of the structure. In other similar tests, with
larger charge weights, separation of the failed sections did occur and the detached
sections came to rest several feet from the point of initial impact. In these
cubicle tests, small fragments produced at the center hinge of the wall were
of negligible volume relative to the major detached sections and of low velocity
relative to fragments observed in tests of Standard Walls.
FIGURE 14 illustrates a full capacity test performed on a one-eighth-scale model
of the bay structure used in the Scaling Testss A preshot analysis of this structure
predicted a prototype capacity of 7,000 pounds of uncased T N T explosive when
detonated at the center of the structure (FIGURE 14a). Test results indicated an
actual explosive capacity, prior to failure, approximately 10 percent higher than
that predicted. In this test, the back wall, which was of composite construction,
was the critical element of the structure, and its overall damage approached an
incipient failure condition. The tension reinforcement at the supports (back wall
panels supported at the base slab and at the two side walls of the cubicle) and
at the center of the donor panel failed with the compression steel at these sections
still remaining intact. It may be noted, in FIGURE 14b, that a typical concrete
yield crack pattern was formed. The acceptor panel of the back wall remained
intact, although the magnitude of the panel’s deflection indicated that this
portion of the wall was on the verge of collapse. Spalling of the acceptor surface
of the acceptor panel occurred at the supports (FIGURE 14c). This spalling was
attributed to the high compression forces which crushed the concrete cover of
the compression reinforcement. Spalling of other portions of the rear of the
acceptor panel was prevented, despite the high-peak pressures of the blast loads.
TABLE 1 illustrates the test set-up and results of six one-third-scale reinforced
concrete slab tests previously mentioned. The first three slabs listed in TABLE 1
were single concrete panels, while the latter three specimens were composite
slabs. All specimens were one-way spans and were restrained at both supports.
Both cubicle and simple barrier arrangements were used in the test set-up. To
simulate a cubicle arrangement, structural steel plates were utilized as the cubicle
side walls, while the test specimen simulated the back wall.
As seen from TABLE 1, good agreement has been obtained between calculated
values of the charge capacities (W,) of the specimens and the charge weights
(W,) used in the tests. The deflections of the individual specimens as obtained
466 Annals New York Academy of Sciences
FIGURE
14. One-eighth-scale bay structure test.
1
TABLE
COMPARISON
OF CALCULATED CHARGE WEIGHT CAPACITYWITH RESULTS OF
R. C. SLABE ~ L O S ITESTS
VE
P
o\
Type I: Simple Barrier Type 2: Cubicle Back Wall 4
Slab Prop. Long. R e i d . Prop. (70) Deflection Rotation
Slab
No. L T Donor Acceptor Lacing XM xE %/XE (degree) Remarks
(In.) (In.) Surface Surface (In.) (In. 1
3
0
c
a
v;
3
470 Annals New York Academy of Sciences
from the test results were used to calculate the values of W,. These deflections
are given in TABLE 2. The data in TABLE 1 give typical results. The ratio average
of (W,WT) and standard deviation for 40 response tests performed on one-
third-scale reinforced concrete slabs were 1.09 and 9.7 percent, respectively.
OF TESTS
COMPARISON UTILIZING
STANDARD
AND
NEWCONSTRUCTION TECHNIQUES
The difference in results obtained using existing Standard Wall construction
and the new construction techniques in blast resistant design described in this
paper is illustrated by two similar explosive cubicle tests.
The structure used in the first test series was the Full-Scale C-13 Cubicle
utilized in ASESB Phase C Cubicle Program.s This structure was built using
modified Standard Wall cubicle construction, while the second structure
(FIGURE 15, One-Third-Scale Modified C-13; Reference 10) consisted of a
one-third-scale model of a revised design utilizing the type of laced reinforce-
ment previously described.
The full-scale cubicle (FIGURE 16a) consisted of three reinforced concrete
composite walls, with Standard Wall reinforcement, supported on a reinforced
concrete base slab. The fourth side and the roof were open to the atmosphere. The
dimensions of the interior floor area of 6.e cell were 10 ft, 6 in. long by 8 ft,
5 in. wide and the clear height between the floot slab and the top of the walls was
9 ft. Each wall had an overall thickness of 5 f t consisting of a 3-ft layer of sand
sandwiched between two 1-ft concrete panels.
The floor dimensions and total wall thickness of the model (FIGURE16b) were
equal to one-third those of the full-scale structure. The walls of the model were
slightly higher to accommodate the wire bridge strands used to support the
top of the side walls. Although the overall scaled thickness of each wall of the
model was the same as the thickness of each wall of the full-scale cubicle, the
individual wall components differed. In the model, the scaled-up thickness of
each reinforced concrete panel was 18 inches, and the thickness of sand was
24 inches, compared with the respective 12- and 36-inch thicknesses of the full-
scale structure. The panel steel at each surface was 2.7 percent for the model as
compared with 0.16 percent for that of the full-scale structure. In addition, the
flexural reinforcement of the model was fully laced.
The scale-model was built with wall and floor slab extensions to simulate the
restraint afforded by adjacent cells on the cell containing the explosion. The
inclusion of such extensions would have had negligible effect on the results of
the full-scale structure test.
Both structures were tested with the same equivalent scaled charge of 1,640
pounds located near the floor slab and at the center of the cell.
The difference, in the results of the two tests, is apparent from FIGURES 16a
and b. The full-scale cubicle was completely demolished except for the floor
slab, which was cratered below the donor charge. The debris formed by the
collapse of the walls consisted of concrete rubble and was dispersed over a wide
area of the test range. The model structure approached incipient failure conditions
with permanent angular rotations of the concrete panels in the order of 12 de-
grees. Although scabbing of the acceptor sides of the model walls did occur, the
velocities were small and would not have been a source of danger for explosive
acceptor systems.
Cohen & Dobbs: Design Procedures and Details 471
W
B
.s
'u
B
.s
472 Annals New York Academy of Sciences
I WCTlLE Y O M
QIIRITTLE YODE
SHEAR
I
f
SENSITIVE
EXPLOSIVES
FIGURE
17. Design procedure for explosive protective structures.
Cohen & Dobbs: Design Procedures and Details 473
NEWDESIGNPROCEDURE FOR
EXPLOSIVE-PROTECTIVE
SYSTEMS
The relationships between the three components in the design of an explosive
system must be defined in order that a safe design may be achieved (FIGURE 17).
Initially, the donor system is analyzed and the output in terms of the primary
missiles and blast pressures is determined. The protective structure (shelter or
barrier) is then selected to afford the required protection for the acceptor system
(personnel, equipment, or another explosive).
Once the loading and the structural configuration are determined, the struc-
ture’s elements are designed for ductile response. Here, the bending resistance,
deflections, and shear capacity are computed based on the predetermined re-
sponse range of the structure, i.e., ( 1 ) limited deflections, (2) incipient failure,
or (3) total destruction with limited fragment velocities or trajectories (FIGURE
17).
Deflections may be limited for structures that are designed to withstand the
additive effects of more than one explosion and/or if increased protection is
desired for the structure’s contents. The limited deflection criteria is usually used
for design of personnel and/or valuable equipment shelters.
Incipient failure criteria is utilized in the design of protective structures that
are subjected to close-in effects of the blast output. Such structures may be
either protective shelters for personnel or barriers for explosive acceptor systems.
Where personnel is involved, provisions must be made to provide protection
against direct spalling and scabbing of the concrete surfaces. Ground shock
effects and pressure leakage should also be congidered.
Once the capacity of the protective structure is known, an analysis may be
performed to determine the velocities of secondary fragments produced by a
blast overload. The magnitude of the fragment velocities must be controlled
in the design as specified by the sensitivity of the acceptor system.
DESIGN
PROCEDURES FOR DUCTILE
MODERESPONSE
Dynamic Analysis
The dynamic response of a structure or element to an applied dynamic loau
may be obtained in terms of either stress of displacement, if the structure re-
mains elastic. Since for most facilities subjected to accidental explosions it is
uneconomical to design for completely elastic action, it is usually more ap-
propriate to permit deflections well beyond yield. The required member resistance
is obtained by equating the initial kinetic energy resulting f r o m the applied blast
impulse to the potential energy of the element. This potential energy is expressed
in terms of the ductility of the element (its ability to deflect) and its strength
(resistance).
In the case of the single-degree-of-freedom system shown in FIGURE 18a, the
response is obtained by application of the basic equation of motion:
F = ma (1)
where a = acceleration of the mass
m = mass of the moving body
F = applied force as a function of time
P
LOAD 4
P
RESISTANCE
4
ELASTO-
PLASTIC
xt 4 xu
where
I
I = Fdt = total impulse (area under
pressure-time curve- ( FIGURE 18b)
dv = change in velocity
Therefore, the momentum is equal to the impulse:
mV=I (3)
Knowing the momentum, the equation for the initial kinetic-energy may be
expressed in terms of the applied impulse and the mass, as:
Structural Behavior
When a blast load is applied to a structural element, the element deforms and
at any instant exerts a resistance to motion that is a function of the amount of
deformation (elasto-plastic behavior). Under idealized conditions, once the
maximum resistance of an element has been developed, this resistance remains
constant until one or more sections of the element fail and a portion of the
total resistance is lost. This loss of resistance will continue as the various sections
fail until complete collapse occurs.
To illustrate the idealized flexural action of an element as designed above,
consider a panel supported on three sides, having one of its longer sides un-
supported, a length-to-width ratio greater than two, and having uniform rein-
forcement. The panel will initially be stressed elasto-plastically until the maximum
resistance at final yield of the reinforcement occurs at a deflection XE (FIGURE
18). It is assumed that this maximum resistance is maintained until the initial
failure occurs along the supported long side of the panel, at which time a loss in
resistance will occur. After initial failure, the panel is assumed to span between
the two opposite short supports until these sections fail and complete collapse
occurs.
The above illustration is typical of statically redundant two-way elements,
whereas simple elements spanning in one direction will usually exhibit complete
collapse at the time for initial failure. Other physical properties of the element
476 Annals New York Academy of Sciences
will also affect the type and number of intermediate failures that occur before
complete collapse. These include dimensional arrangement, initial and secondary
support conditions, structural detailing, and percentage and distribution of re-
inforcement. Criteria for defining intermediate and final collapse will be dis-
cussed in the following sections.
Flexure
Resistance to Binding
For uniformly loaded, one-way elements, the maximum resistance developed
may be expressed in terms of the ultimate moment capacity of the members,
such as:
TABLE3
RESISTANCE
COEFFICIENT
FOR ONE-WAY
SPANS
Dist.
1 Type of Support
Shear*
Cantilever 112
-d
a
m
Simple -Simple
Fixed-Fixed
118
1/16
1/16
1/32
EDGE
SUPPORT--,
"U,N + %.P
C
WHERE :
MU,N * TOTAL ULT. MOMENT OF NEG.REIWF.
Yu,p * TOTAL ULT. MOMENT (F POS. MW.
R = TOTAL RESISTANCE O f SECTION
C = CEWTROIDAL DISTANCE
b. RESISTANCE OF TRIANGULAR SECTOR
FIGURE
19. Symmetrical reinforced two-way panel (three sides fixed and one side free).
Cohen & Dobbs: Design Procedures and Details 479
Ultimate Moment Capacity
Although methods of calculation of the moment capacity of reinforced concrete
sections is well defined in References 11 to 16, the effects of spalling and/or
crushing on the compression surface of the section must be included.
Where spalling or crushing occurs, the effective depth of a section is reduced
progressively, resulting in a reduced moment capacity. By minimizing the concrete
cover, the strength loss to spalling or crushing is also minimized.
As large deflections are encountered, the concrete may be severely cracked
and incapable of providing the required compression forces. Unless lacing re-
inforcement is provided, the crushed concrete will be disengaged and the element
disintegrated. With lacing, the concrete is confined between the layers of flexural
steel and the compression reinforcement is prevented from buckling, allowing
the reinforcement to resist the compression stresses. As a result, in elements
with less compression than tension reinforcement, the flexural resistance in the
later stages of response may be greatly reduced. On the other hand, symmetrical
reinforced elements will sustain their resistance until rupture occurs in the tension
reinforcement. For symmetrical reinforcement, the final ultimate resisting
moment may be taken as:
M u= Asfdsd’ (9)
where
Mu = ultimate resisting moment
A, = area of the compression or tension
reinforcement
fas = dynamic stress in reinforcement
d’ = distance between the centroids of the
compression and tension reinforcement
Deflection Criteria
Laced reinforced elements can sustain larger deflections, prior to failure than
unlaced elements. For symmetrically reinforced elements, deflections at failure
are a function of the ductility of the reinforcement and the span to thickness
ratio of the member.
The deflection at failure may be expressed in terms of angular rotation. In the
previously mentioned scale model slab tests, one element with an A-15 steel
reinforcement spanning in one direction, fixed at both ends and having a span-
to-thickness ratio of 6, achieved a 17.8 degree rotation (TABLE 2). The rotation
of another element whose span was four times its thickness was 14.7 degrees.
In both these cases, incipient failure was imminent. Damage sustained by the
other slabs presented in TABLE 2, was less than incipient failure conditions.
482 Annals New York Academy of Sciences
However, their permanent deflections were somewhat larger than those which
could be incurred by unlaced elements.
At the present time, another series of tests is underway to define more closely
the magnitude of the incipient failure rotation of symmetrically reinforced laced
members as a function of the span-to-thickness ratio, percent reinforcement and
variation of the support conditions. In the interim, based on present data, it
appears permissible that a 12-degree rotation be used as the criterion for incipi-
ent failure for flexural members prior to failure. This recommended maximum
permanent rotation has been achieved in .a past series of model-cubicle test^^-^
where the models remained intact.
Based on present test data, the use of the ductility ratio (ratio of final deflec-
tion, XM,to deflection at yield, X,) does not appear to be a useful criterion for
incipient failure. TABLE 2 indicates very large ductility ratios which have been
found to be typical.
The resistance-deflection curve for an element spanning in one direction may
be approximated by a constant resistance in the plastic range, while the re-
sistance-deflection “curve” for two-way elements requires a stepped relationship
(FIGURE 18c). The break in the “curve” indicates a loss in resistance after a
failure at one of the element’s plastic hinges points.
Composite Construction
The method of calculating the impulse capacity of composite elements (two
concrete panels enclosing a layer of sand) is similar to that for single concrete
elements except that the impulse of the blast absorbed by the sand must be
included, which may be approximated from FIGURE20.
An empirical procedure for estimating the charge capacity of a composite
wall or other similar elements is as follows:
1. Assume ch2rge weight, W.
T,
2. Calculate T, and T, (where equals scaled thickness of the concrete and
T, equals scaled thickness of the sand).
3. Calculate i, (scaled unit impulse capacity) for each concrete panels.
4. Use FIGURE 20.7
a. Enter ordinate at value of;,, (scaled impulse capacity of acceptor
panel). - . -
b. Proceed horizontally fr%m iC&o T,.
c. Proceed vertically from T, to-T,. -
d. Proceed horizontally from T, to i, [sum of scaled unit impulse of the
acceptor panel and ImpulsLabsorbed by the sand).
-
5. Calc_ulate the Summation of iCd(scaledimpulse capacity of donor panel)
and i, to give it (total unit impulse capacity of element).
References 1 0 ~ 1 8 .-- -
6. Determine the scale unit impulse of the applied blast load ( i d from
I
0
0
0
0
d 0
0 0 N
0 *
0 *
484 Annals New York Academy of Sciences
The resistance and maximum deflection of each panel is computed as for
individual elements.
Lacing Details
All flexural reinforcing bars are tied with continuous diagonal lacing rein-
forcement. At any particular section of an element, the main tension and com-
pression flexural reinforcement is placed to the interior of the secondary flexural
reinforcement which, in turn, is tied by the diagonal lacing (FIGURE 21). Several
alternate details may be used to achieve full confinement of the flexural steel,
the appropriate method depending on the amount of lacing required. Several
details are illustrated in FIGURE 21. Also illustrated is a method for the splicing
of lacing bars. FIGURE 22 presents typical lacing details at wall intersections.
SECTION A-A
SECTION e-B
Lacing Details
Lacing Splices
. FICURe 21. Construction details for laced reinforcement.
486 Annals New York Academy of Sciences
Horiz. Locing
I -Provide Raq'd
Length tor Full
Development
Post-Failure Fragments
When unlaced reinforced concrete structures collapse due to substantial over-
loading by the blast output, concrete rubble is formed and displaced at high
velocities. The fragments may be a source of danger to acceptor systems, depend-
ing upon the velocity-mass sensitivity characteristics of the systems.
The velocity of individual fragments varies and depends upon: ( 1 ) the magni-
tude of excess impulse defined as the blast impulse minus the impulse capacity
of the barrier; (2) the mass of the fragment; ( 3 ) the location of the fragment
prior to collapse; and (4) the interaction between the fragments during their
flight. Although velocities of individual fragments will differ, the average velocity
of all the rubble can be approximated from the excess impulse and the total
mass of the barrier. In other words, the momentum of the wall after collapse is
numerically equal to excess impulse:
I, = mV (16)
where
I, is the excess impulse,
m is the mass of the wall, and
V is the average fragment velocity.
Maximum fragment velocities, obtained from results of cubicle tests20 in
which concrete rubble was formed from unlaced elements, have been compared
to average velocities calculated by the above method. The test structures afforded
negligible structural resistance to the blast loads in these tests.
4
TABLE P
00
00
COMPARISON
OF CALCULATED
AND TESTFRAGMENT
VELOCITIES
- .
I I I I I
1.0' 0.33 2.22 0. 5 0. 25 134.4
REFERENCES
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fragments velocity, ID. P-1954 United States Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake,
Calif.
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design slabs, Tech Note 302-2, United States Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake,
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storage and processing of explosive materials-interim report no. 1, summary of one-
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Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, N. J.
5. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY. 1961. Army materiel command safety manual AMCR 385-
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New York, N. Y. and Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, N. J.
7. SCHWARTZ, A., E. COHEN & N. DOBBS. 1966. Supporting studies to establish safety
design criteria for storage and processing of explosive materials - report no. 6, summary
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8. COHEN,E., N. DOBBS& S. WACHTELL.(To be published.) Supporting studies to estab-
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