Conceptual Art, Ideas, and Ontology

Author(s): WESLEY D. CRAY

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , SUMMER 2014, Vol. 72, No. 3
(SUMMER 2014), pp. 235-245
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics

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 WESLEY D. CRAY

Conceptual Art, Ideas, and Ontology

ABSTRACT

Peter Goldie and Elisabeth Schellekens have recently articulated the Idea Idea , the thesis that "in conceptual a
physical medium: the medium is the idea ." But what is an idea, and in the case of works such as Duchamp's Fo
does the idea relate to the urinal? In answering these questions, it becomes apparent that the Idea Idea sho
After showing this, I offer a new ontology of conceptual art, according to which such artworks are not ideas
imbued with ideas. After defending this view from objections, I briefly discuss some implications it has for the
in general.

Even a cursory glance at literature on concep-
tual art- including commentaries by conceptual
artists, art theorists, art historians, and philoso-
phers of art alike- reveals a general consensus
that such art has something to do with ideas } Lucy
Lippard and John Chandler discuss at length the
"dematerialization of the artwork" that has hap-
pened alongside an increasing focus on the non-
perceptual idea, with Lippard elsewhere chroni-
cling this focus in great detail.2 Sol Le Witt tells us
that the idea "is the most important aspect of the
work" and that "conceptual art is only good when
the idea is good."3 Timothy Binkley suggests that,
with conceptual art, "to know the art is to know the
idea," and Joseph Kosuth goes as far as to say that
"the 'art idea' (or 'work') and art are the same."4
With conceptual art, Paul Wood seems right: "the
what ideas are, it is hard to know w
such claims.
My goal here is to make some progress on these
issues. In Section I, I present the Idea Idea. In
Section II, I discuss the ontology of ideas. In
Section III, I argue that, on any plausible ontology
of ideas, the Idea Idea is problematic. In Section
IV, I offer a new ontology of conceptual art accord-
ing to which conceptual artworks are not ideas but
artifacts imbued with ideas and spell out what this
notion of imbuing amounts to. In Section V, I dis-
cuss a potential worry, and, finally, in Section VI,
I discuss some applications this ontology has for
not just conceptual art but more traditional art as
well.
I. THE IDEA IDEA

idea is king."5
Peter Goldie and Elisabeth Schellekens have
According to Goldie and Schellekens:
codified these sentiments into the Idea Idea : "in
conceptual art, there is no physical medium : theconceptual art has no physical medium : the m
medium is the idea ."6 But, as Robert C. Morgan of conceptual art is ideas, and any physical pre
points out, "[to] say that art is about ideas is merely
a the means by which the artist lets us gai
problematic and misleading assertion to his ideas. . . . The idea idea, thus understood
leading to the extent that the question
conceptual of 'ideas'
art works with ideas, or with concepts
is too general, too open-ended, andand
medium, without an
not with shapes, colours, or materia
appropriate context it meanswe nothing."7
think, is whatMorgan
marks out conceptual art as ra
is right: without offering something to say
different from about
traditional art.8

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72:3 Summer 2014

© 2014 The American Society for Aesthetics

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236 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

The medium , as understood

senting it as one. What by Goldie
these steps might be is a and
matter I is
Schellekens, is that which do not address here, as
central to thisour
is intended
appre-
ciation of a work.9 Theonly
means
as the start ,of on the
an answer. other
I take it, though, hand
that means
are just that: the mere this start is the by
best start for friends of we
which the com
to appreciate that work.
Idea IdeaThough,
and that the challengewith some
of fleshing it out ar
forms- perhaps painting
more fullyor sculpture-
would prove tractable. it might
feel natural to take the medium and the means to The Idea Idea has virtues. It makes sense of
be one and the same, there are others in which they conceptual art's characteristic "dematerialization
plausibly come apart. According to the Idea Idea,of the object" as well as the apparent radical dis-
in the case of works such as Duchamp's Fountain , tinction between conceptual and more traditional
the medium is the idea, whereas the urinal is theart. It also gives us a story to tell about why and
mere means by which we come to engage with andhow conceptual art is to be appreciated- recall
appreciate that idea.10 The exact physical detailsLe Witt's assertion that "conceptual art is only
of the urinal are irrelevant to our appreciation ofgood when the idea is good." Furthermore, it does
the idea (hence Le Witt's remark that, in concep-so within what seems to be a remarkably simple
tual art, "the execution is a perfunctory affair"),ontological framework: accounting for conceptual
but the urinal itself allows us access to and aids us artworks requires no commitment beyond a com-
in focusing on that idea.11 mitment to ideas. This all constitutes an argument:
Here, the inquisitive ontologist will ask: What, the Idea Idea ought to be accepted because it helps
then, is the work? What sorts of things are Foun- us, in a relatively simple manner, make sense of
tain and its ilk? The best answer for the friend conceptual art and our engagement with it.15
of the Idea Idea is that the work itself really
is the idea: as Schellekens herself has said, "the
II. THE ONTOLOGY OF IDEAS
claim is that the artwork actually is the idea."12
This makes good sense of the remarks mentioned
earlier by Le Witt, Binkley, Kosuth, and others. Given their importance so far, we should p
It also makes good sense of Le Witt's claim that to consider what ideas are. After all, whether
"[i]deas alone can be works of art," Piper's claim Idea Idea is ultimately a plausible position
that the existence of "[g]ood ideas [is] necessary pends in part on our ontology of ideas.
and sufficient for [the existence of] good art," andThough she does not tell us what ideas ar
Schellekens's own discussion of the artwork "con- Schellekens does discuss what they are not.
ceived as idea."13 The Idea Idea is properly un- we do when we engage with a work suc
derstood, then, as the thesis that works of concep- Rauschenberg's Erased de Kooning , Schelle
tual art- including Fountain and its ilk- really are tells us,
ideas themselves.
But even if conceptual artworks are ideas, itis not simply imagine that there was a drawing, that it
cannot be that all ideas are works of art: Darwin's was erased, and that the canvas is now empty. Rather, we

idea of evolution through natural selection is not have to enter into a slightly more challenging imagina-
an artwork, and it does not seem that my idea for tive relationship with the work
a conceptual artwork that I am going to create 'that a drawing has been erased', as that
but have not yet created is really an artwork yet. for the particularity of the case.16
What is it, then, that distinguishes the ideas that
are artworks from those that are not? This suggests that ideas cannot be th
One line of response focuses on how the idea serve as the referents of such that-cl
in question is presented. Darwin's idea was pre- propositions. Reinforcing this poin
sented as a scientific claim, whereas Duchamp's writes, of the 1970 Art Workers'
idea was presented in a particularly artistic fash- And babies? A. And babies ,
ion: associated with physical means, in an artworld
context, for artistic appreciation by members of [the] contextualized photograph of h
the artworld.14 My idea for a conceptual artwork strewn over a small road in South-East
I would like to create is not yet a work, but will idea of injustice to us in a way that a me
become one once I take the requisite steps for pre- the event cannot. The power of the artw

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Cray Conceptual Art, Ideas ; and Ontology 237

more and more

value, cannot be reduced to the proposition individuals enter into tokens of
'Innocent
people have suffered tremendously asthat mental of
victims state
US type,
for-the idea spreads, becoming
what Everett
eign policy'. The image of the massacred womenand Schroeder
and refer to as a spatially
children, together with the burning discontinuous
question and individual
shock- ?° The idea, then, is the
ing answer painted over it enables us spatially discontinuous
to appreciate system of these contentful
the
token mental states.
situation's true callousness and horror.17
Though this is just a rough sketch of the view,
Everett
Propositions, it seems, just cannot get andtheSchroeder's
required ontology of ideas is at-
work done. tractive. According to it, ideas are historical partic-
Furthermore, as Anthony Everett and Timothy ulars, originating at particular times, in particular
Schroeder point out, ideas are, intuitively, things places, with particular agents. The account also lo-
we "come up with."18 But when Darwin "came cates ideas in physical space, making them publicly
up with" the idea of evolution by natural selec- accessible and giving us a convenient framework
tion, he did not in any sense "come up with" the within which to understand their causal efficacy.
proposition that organisms evolved by natural se- The question of how ideas can inspire us, moti-
lection. Ideas are not eternal abstracta ; they orig- vate us, instill in us happiness or distress, and so
inate within the minds of thinkers, at particular on is now just the question of how one physical
times and places. Propositions do not, so ideas mental state can cause another. The account also
should not be identified with propositions. We preserves the intuition that ideas can be spread or
can run similar arguments that suggest that ideas forgotten: ideas are spread as more agents come
should not be identified with senses, states of af- to have the appropriate mental states, causing the
fairs, facts, or other, similar entities. system to grow, and forgotten when, for whatever
But if ideas are not those sorts of things, what reason, no more tokens of the relevant type can be
are they? Any adequate ontology of ideas, I take tokened.21 And, finally, the account does all of this
it, should satisfy certain criteria. First, whatever within an ontologically parsimonious framework:
ideas are, they should be the sorts of things that ideas are not some new class of entity but instead
we "come up with"- that is, creatable historical systems of things we already believe in, namely,
particulars. Second, they should be public rather mental states. Together, these virtues offer us good
than private: ideas are the sorts of things that we reason to accept Everett and Schroeder's account
communally engage with. Third, ideas should be of ideas.
causally efficacious: they can inspire us, motivate
us, instill in us happiness or distress, and so on.
And fourth, ideas should have dynamic lives: they III. ARE CONCEPTUAL ARTWORKS IDEAS?
are the sorts of things that are capable of being
spread, forgotten, and so on. Whatever account Combining this idea of ideas with the Idea Idea,
we offer should, at minimum, meet these criteria. Fountain is not a urinal but a spatially discontinu-
Goldie and Schellekens suggest that ideas are ous individual, a distributed system of contentful
nonphysical when they say that, in conceptual art, token mental states of the same type that have as
there is no physical medium and then say that their content some relevant entity, be it a sense,
the medium is the idea. If the medium is the idea proposition, state of affairs, fact, or some similar
and there is no physical medium, then, straight- entity. Similarly with Erased de Kooning , Q. And
forwardly, the idea cannot be physical. But they babies? A. And babies , and the like.
do not need to say this, as nothing in their account But this leads to trouble. It very much seems
hinges on such a claim. that Fountain is located in a particular place-
In fact, Everett and Schroeder do think of ideas most plausibly wherever the urinal is. When Foun-
as physical things- specifically, as "distributed tain was on display in Alfred Stieglitz's gallery, 291 ,
systems of contentful mental states"19 Ideas are in 1917, it was located in that gallery and not else-
created when- and where- an individual adopts where. But according to the Idea Idea, it turns out
the first token of a novel mental state type, which that, since the work is the idea, Fountain is located
has as its content a sense, proposition, state of af- wherever anyone is having the relevant idea. De-
fairs, fact, or some similar entity. Ideas are trans- spite it seeming clear that, as of the time of this
mitted via various forms of communication: as writing, I have never been in the same room as

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238 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

Fountain , it follows from the

ties presented ideas.Idea
If we posit Idea that
such things, the fact I have
that Duchamp
been many times. In fact, I am and right
Fred engaged now
in distinct and,
pre- pre-
sentational is
sumably, so are you. This acts would be sufficient for individuat-
a strike against the
Idea Idea: it gets the location
ing Fountain fromof Anothermany
Fountain , evenconceptual
though
artworks wrong. Call this they are working
the with the same idea. This Objection.
Location would,
Why should we take of course, require the friend
intuitions of the Idea as
such Idea tothese
seriously? Here, I follow explain what
what exactly the difference is
David between a
Davies calls
the pragmatic constraint givenonidea and its associated
the presented ideas. of
ontology Is it art. If
we are to respect "artistic really plausible to suppose that we
practice," generate newis the
which
entities- presented ideas- simply by presenting
extant ideas? Is not
touchstone for our philosophical the presented idea really
theorizing just
about art,
the idea, presented?25
. . . [artworks] must be entities that can 1 do notbear
mean these theques- sorts of
properties rightly ascribed tions to
as objections
what per se. Instead,
are the objection 'works'
termed
is this: by
in our reflective critical and invoking presented ideas,practice;
appreciative the friend that
are individuated in the way of the Idea
suchIdea incurs the burden ofare
'works' answeringor would
very difficult
be individuated, and that have the metaphysical
modal questions, and it would
properties that
are reasonably ascribed to be preferable if such
'works,' in questions
that did practice.22
not come up
at all.

Davies is quite right: if Alternatively,

we are the friend
to of the Idea Idea might
inquire respon-
sibly into the ontology claim
of that conceptual artworks are
conceptual not identical
artworks, we
must respect these sortswith
of the relevant ideas, but are instead
intuitions or constituted
risk losing
by them, much
touch with our very subject in the same way that many claim
matter.23
that the statue,
The pragmatic constraint, as while not identical with
stated, can the lump
be bro-
of clay, isFirst,
ken down into three parts. still constitutedwe
by it.26ought
Distinct artworks
to make
couldthe
sure that works can bear be constituted by the same idea, thereby
properties that they
seem to have, given ourallowing Fountain and Another
reflective Fountain to re-
critical and ap-
main distinct
preciative practice. Second, wedespiteought
both being constituted by
to individu-
Duchamp's
ate works in the way they idea.27 While
seem to thisbe
strategy is promis-
individuated
ing, it does we
in that practice. And third, come with a commitment
ought to coincident
to make sure
objects, which
that works have the modal some take as a theoretical ascribed
properties cost.28 It to
them in that practice. also
Thedoes nothing to solve the Location
Location Objection
Objection is
and, these,
a worry for the first of in fact, tells us but
that Fountain
thereand Another
are also
Fountain
worries pertaining to the are necessarily
latter colocated, which seems
two.
false.29 The strike
Suppose that Fred, a lesser remains.
known contempo-
rary of Duchamp's, gets The
a third
hold worry,ofcorresponding
Duchamp's to the third idea,
grabs a bathroom sink, part
and of the calls
pragmatic constraint,
it Anotherdeals with modal Foun-
properties
tain , intending to make and, more specifically,
an artwork survival condi-
that reiterates
tions. Suppose
the very same point already that Picasso's
made by Guernica gets lost
Fountain. In
and, over time, everyone
this case, Fred is not working with forgets his
about it. own
We idea
would be hesitant
but really with Duchamp's- we to conclude
can from this that
think of it as
Guernica thereby
a case of artistic quotation. According goes out of existence.
to the Instead,
Idea
we should
Idea, since the ideas here are say the
that Guernica
same, lives on, albeit un-
Fountain
and Another Fountain knownare to those deprivedthe
actually future same
individuals. To
art-
avoid an unprincipled
work. This is another strike against asymmetry,
the Idea we should be
Idea:
it incorrectly conflates equally
artworks hesitant tothat
concludeshould,
that Fountainintu-goes
itively, remain distinct out
andof existence
thereby if the urinal
fails becomestolost and,
prop-
erly individuate works. overCall
time, everyone
thisforgetstheabout the idea.30 But
Conflation
Objection. the death of Fountain in such circumstances, along
The friend of the Idea Idea might respond to with the asymmetry that goes along with it, is ex-
this worry in one of two ways. First, she might sug- actly what the Idea Idea commits us to: if, as dis-
gest that the work is not the idea itself, but the cussed in Section II, ideas have dynamic lives and
idea as presented as an artwork.24 Call such enti- go out of existence when forgotten, then when

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 Cray Conceptual Art, Ideas, and Ontology 239

Another strategy
the idea is gone, so is the work.31 That's is to
yettake the
an- work to be a set,
the members
other strike: the Idea Idea gives of which are
incorrect the artifact and the idea.
survival
This, however,Call
conditions for conceptual artworks. will still not do:
this if sets are located
the
Survival Objection. where their members are, we face consequences
That is three strikes. If we analogous accept to those just mentioned.
Everett and And if sets are
Schroeder's idea of ideas, the notfriend of
located where the
their Idea
members are, we find our-
Idea faces the Location, Conflation, selves with the result
andthat Sur-Fountain exists in the

vival Objections, which together realm ofgive mathematical

good objects,
rea- and, hence, again
son against identifying conceptual not where artworks
we might think with it does. Either way, tak-
ideas. So, insofar as the Idea Idea tells us that ing such works to be sets leaves us vulnerable to
conceptual artworks are ideas, and insofar as the Location Objection.
Everett and Schroeder's idea of ideas is indepen- Conceptual artworks, then, should be identified
dently plausible, we find ourselves with good rea- neither with ideas themselves nor with fusions of
son to reject the Idea Idea. ideas and artifacts nor with sets of such things. I
Furthermore, notice that the objections just dis- propose instead that conceptual artworks are im-
cussed presuppose only that (i) the idea in ques- bued artifacts. They are physical objects, events,
tion is not necessarily located where the associ- activities, or perhaps tokens of some other type of
ated object is located, (ii) ideas are public, rather object- perhaps even ideas!- that stand in a spe-
than private, and (iii) ideas can go out of exis- cial relation to certain ideas. Fountain is a urinal,
tence if forgotten. As stated earlier, these should but it is no mere urinal: it is a urinal that stands in
turn out to be true on any adequate ontology of a special relation to an idea that originated with
ideas. So, even if we find reason to reject Everett Duchamp. Call this view the Imbued Artifacts Ac-
and Schroeder's idea of ideas, the Idea Idea still count (henceforth, IAA).
faces the same troubles. Before 1917, that particular urinal was yet not
an artwork, but it later became one. The urinal was
a mere urinal until it came to stand in that special
IV. IMBUED ARTIFACTS
relation with Duchamp's idea; after that, it was an
artwork. Since Fountain is a urinal, albeit a special
We would do well to reconsider the role ofone,
theit sup-
exists right where we might think it does.
posedly "dematerialized" object. Schellekens is lost- which it did- and everyone forgets
If it gets
about
friendly to this suggestion, stating that "we it, that same urinal is still Fountain?* If it is
should
be wary of the conceptualist's claim that theand
found fo- no one remembers it, it is still Fountain ,
cus of appreciation in conceptual art does exclude
even though no one knows it. And, as long as
the [means] completely and art has been any entirely
artwork involves any other artifact, even if
dematerialized."32 But what, then, is theit relation
involves the same idea and even if it involves
between these means and the work itself? some similar urinal, that artwork is distinct from
Let us call these means artifacts , taken loosely Fountain.
here to include not only physical objects, events, All of this hinges on what this special relation
activities, or other things created or modified by amounts to. Say that an agent imbues an artifact
agents, but also natural and otherwise unmodified a with an idea i just in case that agent presents
objects merely indicated or selected by agents.33 a with the intention that, if a were presented to
We might, then, take works to be mereological fu- an appropriate artworld audience, a would elicit
sions of ideas and artifacts; on such a view, the uri- in that audience artistic or aesthetic appreciation
nal and Duchamp's idea are both proper parts of of i (or perhaps the relation between i and a or
Fountain. This, however, will not do. Since mere- between i and current artworld paradigms and so
ological fusions are partially located where each on). I take it that the notions of the artworld and
of their parts is located, we would again face the appreciation are familiar enough, and that, if our
aforementioned Location Objection: Fountain is understanding of such things is cloudy, it is cloudy
partially located wherever anyone has the rele- in ways that are problematic for all parties, not just
vant idea, so Fountain is not wholly located just the present account. Say that a has been imbued
where we might think that it is. with i just in case there has been a time t such that

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240 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

an agent has imbued a with

also forces us i at the
to reject t.claim
Ifthata has
Fountain is, been
imbued with i, call a an imbued strictly speaking, a artifact.
urinal. Instead, on this view, it
The imbued with relation is propertakes
part of a urinal.
onlyFortunately, throughout re-
extant
lata : both a and i must exist at the time of im- the rest of this discussion, nothing I say crucially
buing. Since imbued artifacts are artifacts, if a depends
is on which of these strategies we adopt. As
destroyed, the artwork is destroyed. By contrast, such, I avoid talk of temporal parts, but everything
i need exist only at the time of the imbuing: if I say
i could be translated into this alternative.
goes out of existence later, a does not automati-There are some notable consequences of the
cally revert to being a mere artifact. Conceptual IAA. First, some of Duchamp's readymades-
artworks are artifacts that have been imbued; such so as Fountain , Coat Rack , and 50cc of Paris
as long as there was a time at which an artifact Air- were such that the artifact was either lost
was imbued, it remains a conceptual artwork even or destroyed and a new artifact or series of arti-
if the idea is forgotten. That is, at the time of thefacts was created and imbued with the same idea.
imbuing act, the artifact is changed, entering into On the IAA, it follows that these artworks really
the category of conceptual artwork and remaining were lost or destroyed and that the later artworks
there for the rest of its existence. So, even if the were, in fact, replicas. The artworks we see in mu-
imbued urinal is lost- which, again, it was- and seums today presented as Fountain are not, then,
everyone forgets the idea, Fountain still exists. In really Fountain , but replicas of Duchamp's origi-
this way, having been imbued is like having been nal work. This consequence seems correct at best
kissed: once you have been kissed, you are always and palatable enough at worst.36
such that you have been kissed, even if the personSecond, since some artworks, such as Barry's
who kissed you no longer exists. Likewise, once an Inert Gas: Helium or Acconci's Following Piece ,
artifact has been imbued, it is always an imbued are plausibly taken to be imbued events or activi-
artifact, even if the idea is lost. The IAA thereby ties, such works share the life spans of those events
avoids the Survival Objection. or activities. This suggests that, despite our still be-
The IAA also avoids the Conflation Objection: ing able to engage with and appreciate them, such
since Fountain is a urinal, albeit a special one, no works existed in the past but do not exist now. This
artwork, even if it involves the same idea, is iden- consequence is, again, tolerable, as the puzzle of
tical with Fountain unless it is that urinal. Fred's how we can presently engage with and appreciate
Another Fountain , being a bathroom sink that is works that do not presently exist is no more puz-
distinct from Duchamp's urinal, is a distinct art- zling than the puzzle of how I can appreciate my
work, despite both having been imbued with the deceased grandfather- which is not to say that it
same idea. is not puzzling, but that the puzzle is not at all
Finally, the IAA also avoids the Location Ob-specific to the present account.
jection: since Fountain is a urinal, albeit a spe- Third, it might seem that, on the IAA, the
cial one, it exists exactly where that urinal exists.proper object of appreciation is not the artwork
And though it was not yet an artwork beforeitself but the idea with which it is imbued. Re-
Duchamp's imbuing act, it still exists exactly whencall again Le Witt's remark that "conceptual art is
the urinal exists. We can correctly say, after all, only good when the idea is good," as well as the
that President Obama has existed since 1961, evenerror George Dickie makes in claiming that we ap-
if he did not become president until 2008. While preciate Fountain because of "its gleaming white
it follows from this that there was a time duringsurface, the depth revealed when it reflects im-
which Fountain was not yet an artwork, this is no ages of surrounding objects, [or] its pleasing oval
more problematic than saying that there was shape."37a If the idea is the proper object of appre-
time during which President Obama was not yetciation and "the execution is a perfunctory affair,"
president. does not the IAA, in telling us that the work is the
If the above consequence is unpalatable, there artifact, simply get the proper object of apprecia-
is an alternative: say that Fountain is the ob- tion wrong?
ject composed of all and only the urinal's tem- It does not. When we appreciate Fountain , we
poral parts after (and perhaps concurrent with) are appreciating the imbued urinal in part be-
Duchamp's imbuing act.35 This is available, of cause it triggers in us further understanding and
course, only if we accept temporal parts, and it appreciation of Duchamp's idea, much like how

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 Cray Conceptual Art, Ideas, and Ontology 241

we appreciate Guernica in urinal partafter

because it trig-
(and perhaps concurrent with) his
gers in us certain attitudes buing about act, andbombing
the Rauschenberg's
of is the fusion
Guernica in 1937. Furthermore, the aesthetic those temporal parts after (and perhaps conc
properties (or lack thereof) of the urinal do play rent with) his imbuing act. This would be s
into our appreciation of the work as a whole: ficient for properly individuating the works,
as Cabenne documents, Duchamp purposefully only if the imbuing acts occur at different tim
chose objects that would inspire "visual indiffer- Duchamp and Rauschenberg could imbue
ence," and the interplay between that indifference same urinal at the same time, so the Conflat
and the relevant idea is part of what makes the Objection still looms.
work so biting.38 There are (at least) three options available
This is all consonant with Schellekens's discus- the friend of the IAA. First, she could bite
sion of Q. And babies? A. And babies , quoted in bullet: the Conflation Objection is a worry,
Section II, where she emphasizes the bearing the there is no immediately apparent solution to
image and text have on our appreciation of the This is not so bad, however, since it is just as m
work. Here, as with many other works of concep- a worry for the Idea Idea. Both views face t
same objection, so the playing field is leveled
tual art - including, if what I have said above is cor-
rect, Fountain- proper appreciation of the work neither view is worse off than the other. Thi
requires not just engaging with the idea but engag- however, a less than satisfying response and
ing with that idea alongside the artifact, consider- takes some of the force away from the earlier
ing the artifacťs properties and how they relate to guments against the Idea Idea.
the idea. The artifacts are, in such cases, carefully A second solution is to deny that conceptual a
chosen by the artist, it seems, for reasons relevant
works are, strictly speaking, identical with imb
to the appreciation of the piece: for Duchamp artifacts,
it but instead claim that they are constit
was, again, "visual indifference," whereas for theby such artifacts. Since multiple artworks coul
1970 Art Workers' Coalition, it was the disturbingconstituted by the same artifact, the friend of
imagery which conveyed a specific sense of horror view- which we can call the Constitution Vie
and callousness.39 contrasted with the earlier Identity View- av
The IAA, I claim, is preferable to the Idea Idea.
the Conflation Objection. And recall that a si
This is because the Idea Idea, when combined lar move cannot be made by the friend of the
Idea: as discussed in Section III, if we take c
with the idea of ideas developed by Everett and
Schroeder- or, for that matter, any plausible idea
ceptual artworks to be constituted by ideas alo
of ideas- faces several objections that the IAAwe end up with the undesirable result that wo
does not. Put another way, the IAA succeeds in like Fountain and Another Fountain are necessar-
preserving important intuitions whereas the Idea
ily colocated.
Idea simply fails to do so. When it comes to the While the Constitution View offers a solution
analysis of costs and benefits, the IAA comes out
to the Conflation Objection not available to the
ahead. friend of the Idea Idea, it comes with a commit-
ment to colocated objects, which, again, might be
a theoretical cost. It also fails to preserve the claim
V. THE CONFLATION OBJECTION RETURNS that Fountain is, strictly speaking, a urinal. Addi-
tionally, the friend of the Constitution View also
Suppose Duchamp imbues his urinal with his the
incurs ideaburden of offering an understanding
ii, and Rauschenberg goes on to imbue of the constitution
that same relation defined on both con-
urinal with his idea, i2. If the artwork iscrete
theandarti-
abstract objects, since in the case of some
fact, and, in this case, the artifact is the same,
works,then
such as more conceptual works of music or
the resulting artworks are identical. Intuitively,
literature, the artifact might be abstract. Whether
however, the two artists create distinct works. The count as objections will vary largely
these worries
IAA, then, just like the Idea Idea, faces with
the metaphysical
Con- temperament; I do not intend
flation Objection.40 to settle such issues here.
We might try to fall back on the temporal Forparts
those who would rather avoid such wor-
view discussed in the previous section: Duchamp's
ries, there is a third option. The friend of the
work is the fusion of those temporal partsIAAofwho the
prefers the Identity View could say that,

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 242 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

while the works are strictly

cases a uniform speaking the
treatment: though the same
relevant
object, the differences we attribute
artifacts are quite different,toboth them sim-
works ultimately
are- or are constituted
ply arise from the difference in roles by- imbued
thatartifacts. As
object
can play in different contexts.
such, the IAA offers When thought
more than just an ontology of
as Duchamp's work, the work
of conceptual art:might be original,
it gives us a unified account of
but when thought of as Rauschenberg's
contentful artworks in general.44 This iswork,
a distinct it
might be derivative- theadvantage
same over the Idea Idea. that is, can
object,
take on different aestheticFountain either is or is constituted
properties dependingby an
on how it is conceived. Suppose
artifact- that
a urinal- imbued with someone
an idea. We ap- is
both the president of the preciate
United
the urinal insofar
Statesas (i) it acts
and as a conduit
a store
for further
manager. It is still true that the appreciation of the idea in
president question
has and
prop-
erties and powers that (ii) the manager
its aesthetic does
features (or lack not,
thereof) comple- and
vice versa, despite them ment being
that idea. Wethe
do not,same person,
however, appreciate
because the possession theof urinalthose properties
for its aesthetic and
features in general-
powers largely depends this
on would be to make the
which mistake
role attributedperson
that to
is playing in a context. Dickie
The in same, itcan
Section IV. We seems, can be
think of engagement
said for imbued artifacts.41
with Fountain , then, as running along two axes:
there is
This third strategy might engagement with
initially the urinal
seem to quabe,
urinal in
and
principle, open to the engagement friend of
with thequaIdea
the urinal conduit Idea
for appre-as
well. If conceptual artworks ciation of Duchamp's
are ideas,idea. Call the first axisone
then the
idea could play the role physical
of axis two and the second the conceptual
artworks (such axis. as
Fountain and Another Fountain Appropriate engagement
) in the with Fountain
same involves
man-
ner as suggested above.putting If this were
very little weight onso, the
the former andplay-
very
ing field would again be much weight on the
leveled: latter, as well
rather thanas considering
both
views facing the Conflation the relationship between these armed
Objection, two axes. with
this response, neither the friend
Likewise, ofis the
Guernica either IAA by
or is constituted nor
the friend of the IdeaanIdea artifact- need
a painting- worry.
imbued with an But,
idea. Just as
before, opting for this strategy like Fountain , we appreciate
leaves the painting
the friend insofarof
the Idea Idea with the consequence as (i) it acts as a conduit forthat Fountain
further appreciation of
and Another Fountain the are idea necessarily
in question and (ii) its aesthetic
colocated,features
which seems false. Since friends of the Idea Idea complement that idea. Unlike Fountain , however,
we do also appreciate the painting for its aesthetic
can adopt this strategy only by biting a bullet else-
where, the IAA still comes out ahead. features in general- there is no mistake made in
appreciating the painting as a visual object. En-
gagement with Guernica , then, also runs along
VI. ONTOLOGY AND APPRECIATION the same two axes, though appropriate engage-
ment with the work involves putting much weight
on the
Goldie and Schellekens discuss the distinctly physical axis but still also some weight on
onto-
the conceptual
logical challenge conceptual art purportedly con- axis. And again, considerations of
the relationship
fronts us with.42 They claim that conceptual art is between the two axes will also be
relevant
" radically different from traditional art."43 insofar as we should consider how well
But,
the visual
really, how radically different is conceptual artimage represents or communicates the
from traditional art, ontologically? relevant idea.
The IAA gives us a unified treatment of both
Recall the comparison made earlier between
Fountain and Guernica : full appreciationconceptual
of eitherart and contentful, traditional art: both
work requires some engagement with an kinds of art
idea. In either are or are constituted by imbued
the case of Fountain , the idea in question artifacts,
is that with the difference between them being
which has as its content Duchamp's commentary not an ontological difference but a difference in
on the artworld community, whereas in the appropriate
case of appreciation- in how much weight
Guernica , the idea in question is that which we put
hason as each of these axes of appreciation.45
its content the horror of aerial bombardment. A Traditional artworks involve much more weight
virtue of the IAA is that it allows us to give these being put on the physical axis, whereas conceptual

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 Cray Conceptual Art, Ideas, and Ontology 243

artworks involve much more being

9. Goldie put
and Schellekens, Who 'son
Afraid the
of Conceptual
Art?, p. this
conceptual axis. Surely enough, 60. makes the dis-
10. Throughout this discussion, when I talk about Foun-
tinction between traditional and conceptual art-
tain , I have in mind the original readymade, produced by
works vague, but, seeing as itDuchamp
is quite natural
in 1917, rejected toofde-
by the Society Independent
scribe some works as "moreArtists,
conceptual" or Steiglitz.
and photographed by Alfred "more This work
traditional" than others, thiswas lostvagueness is a
shortly after originally being posi-
displayed, though, as
tive feature. Gavin Parkinson tells us in The Duchamp Book (London:
Tate, 2008), p. 61: "facsimiles of Fountain were found or
Conceptual art, then, poses no new ontological
made by Duchamp or others in 1950, 1963, and 1964 (the
challenge, nor is it radically
last adifferent,
multiple edition of eight withontologi-
two artist proofs), which
cally, from more traditionalwere art. The
close enough to the"dematerial-
1917 version to satisfy Duchamp,
who went ahead
ization" of the object, so central to and discussions
'signed' them too (as 'R. Mutt')."
ofThe
relation between the original work and these "facsimiles"
conceptual art in general, need not be thought of
will depend on our ontology of conceptual art; I return to
as an ontological claim, but can
this topic instead
throughout the restbeof thisthought
discussion when aspects
of as a relative devaluing of the
of the physical
views under consideration have axis of
consequences for it.
11. Le Witt, "Paragraphs
appreciation in favor of an increased focus on Conceptual
on Art," p. 12.
the
12. Elisabeth Schellekens, "The Aesthetic Value of
conceptual axis. What makes a work of contentful
Ideas," in Philosophy and Conceptual Art, eds. Peter Goldie
art a work of conceptual art is not merely what
and Elisabeth Schellekens (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007),
kind of thing it is but how pp.
it71-91,
is most
at p. 75. appropriate
to engage with and appreciate13. it.46
Sol Le Witt, "Sentences on Conceptual Art," 0-9
5 (1969): 3-5, reprinted in Alberro and Stimson, Concep-
WESLEY D. CRAY
tual Art, pp. 106-108, at p. 106; Adrian Piper, "Idea, Form,
Context," in Out of Order, Out of Sight, Volume II: Selected
Philosophy Department Writings in Art Criticism (MIT Press, 1996), pp. 5-12, at p. 5;
Grand Valley State University Schellekens, "The Aesthetic Value of Ideas," p. 85.
Grand Rapids, Michigan 49401 14. Compare Le Witt, "Sentences on Conceptual Art,"
p. 107: "All ideas are art if they are concerned with art and
internet: crayw@gvsu.edu fall within the conventions of art."
15. This line of argument can be extracted from Who's
Afraid of Conceptual Art?, though Schellekens has clarified
1 . I here follow Peter Goldie and Elisabeth Schellekens,
to me that it was not their intention to endorse this argument.
who, in Who's Afraid of Conceptual Art? (New16. Elisabeth Schellekens, "'Seeing Is Believing' and
York:
'Believing
Routledge, 2010), take 'conceptual art' to refer not to the Is Seeing,"' Acta Analytica 20 (2005): 10-23, at p.
20.
specific movement between 1966 and 1972 but instead to
the more general and inclusive category of art dating17. Schellekens,
back "'Seeing Is Believing' and 'Believing
Is Seeing,"' pp. 20-21.
roughly to Marcel Duchamp's readymades and containing
works since then more or less in that tradition. 18. Anthony Everett and Timothy Schroeder, "Ideas
for Stories,"
2. Lucy Lippard, Six Years: The Dematerialization of unpublished manuscript, p. 2.
the Art Object 1966-1972 (New York: Praeger, 1973); 19. Everett
Lucyand Schroeder, "Ideas for Stories," p. 4.
Lippard and John Chandler, "The Dematerialization 20. Everett
of and Schroeder, "Ideas for Stories," p. 3.
Art," Art International 12 (1968): 46-50. 21. Stating exactly when this would occur turns out to
3. Sol Le Witt, "Paragraphs on Conceptual Art," Art Timothy Schroeder and I hope to say more
be complicated.
about
Forum 5 (1967): 54-79; reprinted in Conceptual Art: A this issue in future work.
Crit-
22. David Davies, Art as Performance (Maiden, MA:
ical Anthology , ed. Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson
(MIT Press, 1999), pp. 12-16. Blackwell, 2004), pp. 17-18.
23. It
4. Timothy Binkley, "Piece: Contra Aesthetics," Theis exactly because of these considerations that
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 35 (1977):I resist Davies's own ontology of art, according to which
265-277,
at p. 266; Joseph Kosuth, "Art After Philosophy," works Studio areIn-
to be identified with generative performances.
ternational 178 (1969): 134, 160-161, 212-213, reprinted For more in on the tension between Davies's pragmatic con-
Alberro and Stimson, Conceptual Art , pp. 158-177 straint and his ontology, see Andrew Kania, "Review of
(quota-
tion at p. 166). David Davies, Art as Performance ," Mind 114 (2005): 137-
5. Paul Wood, Conceptual Art (London: Tate, 141; Robert
2002), p. Stecker, "Review of David Davies, Art as Per-
33. formance," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63
6. Goldie and Schellekens, Who 's Afraid of Conceptual (2005): 75-77; Robert Stecker, "Methodological Questions
Arti , p. 33. about the Ontology of Music," The Journal of Aesthetics and
7. Robert C. Morgan, "Introduction," in Art Into Ideas: Art Criticism 67 (2009): 375-386.
Essays on Conceptual Art (Cambridge University Press, 24. As indicated types, as developed in his "What a Mu-
1996), pp. 1-9, at p. 1. sical Work Is," Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 5-28. 1 take
8. Goldie and Schellekens, Who 's Afraid of Conceptual this to be a real worry for Levinson: if indicated types are dis-
Art?, p. 60. Emphasis in original. tinct from the original types, indicated- as he needs them to

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 244 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

"came up," and (ii) the

be- we face very difficult questions time at which
that we theycould
can no longerotherwise
be
remembered.
avoid. For one, it seems very odd Thanksthat to an anonymous
we can referee create
for pushing a new
entity simply by indicating this
or presenting another entity; it
point.
32. Schellekens, "The
does not seem that we can generate new Aesthetic Value of Ideas," p. persons
indicated
85. Schellekens uses
or presented coffee cups simply by 'vehicular medium' here, rather persons
indicating than or
'means,'
presenting coffee cups. If we want but I taketo
it thatsay
the two are,
thatin this context,
types equiv- or ideas
are somehow special in thisalent.
respect,
I switch to 'means' forwe incur
consistency with the restthe
of this burden
of explaining how and why. article.
Compare Gregory Currie, An
Ontology of Art (London: Macmillan,33. Including events allows
1989),us to makep. sense of works
58.
such as Robert Barry's
25. Compare Currie, An Ontology of 1974 Art,
Inert Gas: Helium
p. 58. ; includ-
ing activities allows Identity
26. See, inter alia, David Wiggins, us to make sense of works
and, such asSpatio-
Temporal Continuity (Oxford: Vito Acconci's 1969 Following Piece
Blackwell, ; and including
1967); E.nat- J. Lowe,
"Identity, Instantiation, and ural orConstitution,"
otherwise unmodified options allows Philosophical
us to make
Studies 44 (1983): 45-59; E. sense
J. of, say, pieces of "Coincident
Lowe, driftwood presented as ready-Objects:
In Defense of the 'Standardmades or the ideas or propositions
Account,'" that make up Barry's
Analysis 55 (1995):
171-178; L. R. Baker, "Why1969 All the things I know but of
Constitution Iswhich
Not I am notIdentity,"
at the moment thinking-l:36
Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 599-621; P.M.; 15Kit
June 1969, New
Fine, "The
York.
Non-identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter," Mind 112
(2003): 195-234. 34. See above, n. 10.
27. Regardless of whether the friend of the Idea Idea 35. For discussion of temporal parts, see, inter alia,
adopts Everett and Schroeder's account of ideas or some David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Maiden, MA:
other account, if she is to avail herself of this strategy, she Blackwell, 1986), pp. 202-205; Theodore Sider, Four Dimen-
must either acknowledge that ideas are physical objects or sionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time (Oxford:
offer an understanding of the constitution relation defined Clarendon Press, 2001).
on nonphysical objects. This, I take it, is a challenge and a 36. If, like me, you think that this consequence is cor-
reason for the friend of the Idea Idea sympathetic to the rect, we see a return of the Conflation Objection to the Idea
constitution view to accept an account of ideas as physical Idea: since the idea behind Duchamp's original Fountain
objects. and all of the replicas that have since been created is the
28. Compare to Michael Burke, "Preserving the Prin- same, if we take the work to be the idea, independent of
ciple of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the any of the relevant urinals, we then incorrectly conflate the
Relation Among Objects, Sorts, Sortais, and Persistence original with the replicas. See above, n. 10.
Conditions," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37. George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institu-
54 (1994): 591-624. tional Analysis (Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 42. For
29. The same could be said if we identify works with criticism of Dickie's claims, see James Shelley, "The Problem
titled ideas, along the lines of the account developed in Jer- of Non-perceptual Art," The British Journal of Aesthetics 43
rold Le Vinson's "Titles," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art (2002): 363-378.
Criticism 44 (1985): 29-39. Even though such a move would 38. Pierre Cabenne, Dialogues with Marcel Duchamp
individuate Fountain from Another Fountain on the basis of (London: Thames & Hudson, 1971), p. 48.
the difference in title, it would still face the Location Ob- 39. Thanks to an anonymous referee for drawing atten-
jection and the unpalatable consequence that Fountain and tion to this point.
Another Fountain are necessarily colocated. Thanks to an 40. Thanks to Joshua Spencer for pushing me on this.
anonymous referee for pushing me on this point. 41. This move is inspired by the general strategy pro-
30. Perhaps it is the case that there should be some dis- posed in Ross P. Cameron's "There Are No Things That Are
analogies between conceptual artworks like Fountain and Musical Works," The British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2008):
more traditional pieces like Guernica , but it is not at all clear 295-314.
that they should be disanalogous in this respect. The most 42. Goldie and Schellekens, Who's Afraid of Concep-
striking asymmetries between conceptual and more tradi- tual Art?, pp. 21-34.
tional artworks- and, I think, the one we have the strongest 43. Goldie and Schellekens, Who's Afraid of Concep-
intuitions about- are asymmetries with respect to how we tual Art?, p. 60.
appreciate these different kinds of works. These asymme- 44. This unified account is similar to Arthur Danto's
tries, however, can be accounted for without a difference in idea of the transfiguration of the commonplace, as devel-
ontology or survival conditions, as I argue in Section VI. oped in The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (Harvard
31. One might reject this claim, however, and instead University Press, 1981). Whereas Danto casts artworks in
claim that, once created, ideas exist eternally, even if they are terms of embodied meanings (a topic which is expounded
forgotten and, for whatever reason, cannot be remembered. upon in his Embodied Meanings: Critical Essays and Aes-
Going this route requires rejecting Everett and Schroeder's thetic Meditations [New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
idea of ideas and also raises problems for the earlier claim 1994]), the IAA identifies the works not with meanings, but
that ideas should be causally efficacious, since it is difficult to with the artifacts which embody them. A key difference
understand how eternally existing objects could enter into here has to do with the history and location of the piece:
causal relations with physical objects. Rather than take on an imbued artifact exists where and when the artifact ex-
such questions, I suggest instead sticking to the view that ists, whereas an embodied meaning exists where and when
ideas are historical particulars, the life spans of which are the meaning exists. To sidestep this conclusion, Danto might
bounded by (i) the initial time at which they, as it were, take embodied meanings to be objects that are distinct from

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 Cray Conceptual Art , Ideas, and Ontology 245

the meaning itself or the artifact in which

pretend it account
that the is embodied,
offered here offers a full story of
but are instead constituted by the meaning as
the ontology of anyembodied
art form. in
an artifact. The resulting view would be46. For
very helpful feedbackto
similar andthe
discussion, I owe many
Constitution View discussed in Section
thanks V, and face
to audiences at the similar
2012 Meeting of the American
worries. Society for Aesthetics, Rocky Mountain Division; the 2012
45. In the case of artworks such asMeeting
works of the
of British
music, Society
lit-of Aesthetics; the 2013
Siena
erature, poetry, and the like, the story Heights
told University
about Philosophy Workshop; the 2013
the artifact
Dubrovnik
will be far more complicated. If, for example,Inter-University
we find Center Conference on Art and
our-
selves drawn to Levinson's view that musical works are ab- Reality; and a 2013 colloquium at Grand Valley State
stract types, then, on the accounts under development here,University. Special thanks to the anonymous referees and
works of contentful music would either be or be constituted the editors of this journal as well as Ben Caplan, Sam Cowl-
by such types imbued with ideas. This is, of course, to re- ing, Anthony Everett, David Sanson, Sarah Sawyer, Elisa-
main silent on the metaphysics of types. As such, I do not beth Schellekens, Timothy Schroeder, and Joshua Spencer.

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