CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW ATTY. REYNANTE B.

ORCEO

LIST OF CRIMINAL LAW CASES

1. People of the Philippines vs. Amado V. Hernandez, Et., Al., G.R. Nos. L-6025-26,
July 18, 1956, 99 Phil. 515
RELEVANT PROVISION: RPC Art 48, 134,135
ELEMENTS: (of Rebellion, Art134)
1. That there be:
a. Public uprising; and
b. Taking up of arms against the government
2. For the purpose of either:
a. Removing from the allegiance to said government or its laws:
i. The territory of the Philippines, or any part thereof, or
ii. Any body of land, naval or other armed forces; or
b. Depriving the Chief Executive or Congress wholly or partially of any of their powers or prerogatives.
NATURE: petition for bail

FACTS:
 Hernandex et al. (31 defendants), were convicted by the lower courts of rebellion, w/
multiple murder, arsons and robberies
 Organizations they were found to be affiliated w/ (and took part in ‘rebellious’
activities w/): Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) w/c is an instrumentality of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP); Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan (HMB,
a.k.a. Hukbalahaps/Huks)
 Defendants apparently took arms w/ the Huks to make armed raids, sorties and
ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachments as well as
innocent civilians, and, as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in
connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, they also committed then and there
committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of
private and public property
 The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged with, and has been convicted of,
rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the capital
punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed, although the lower court sentenced him
merely to life imprisonment
 The defense contends, among other things, that rebellion cannot be complexed with
murder, arson, or robbery.

ISSUES:
(1) WoN rebellion can be complexed w/ murder, arson, or robbery. NO
(2) WoN defendants should be granted bail

HELD:
(1) NO. Consider first the following Articles of the RPC:
a. Art 48, RPC:“When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period.”
i. presupposes the commission of 2 or more crimes, does not apply when
the culprit is guilty of only one crime
ii. a mere participant in the rebellion, who is not a public officer, should
not be placed at a more disadvantageous position than the promoters,
 maintainers or leaders of the movement, or the public officers who join
the same, insofar as the application of this article is concerned
b. Art 135; RPC: “…any person, merely participating or executing the
commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in
its minimum period.”
i. The penalty is increased to prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
P20,000 for “any person who promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion
or insurrection or who, while holding any public office or employment,
takes part therein”: (1) “engaging in war against the forces of the
government”, (2) “destroying property”, or (3) “committing serious
violence”, (4) “exacting contributions or” (5) “diverting public funds
from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated”.
ii. Whether performed singly or collectively, these 5 classes of acts
constitute only one offense, and no more, and are, altogether, subject
to only one penalty — prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000.

Since all of the acts enumerated in Art 135 constitute only ONE offense, Art 48
cannot apply since it presupposes the existence of TWO. In no occasion has the court
ever complexed the crime of rebellion. The rule is that the ingredients of a crime form
part and parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished
either separately therefrom or by the application of Art 48. (court uses several cases to
show how this rules is applicable to treason, then says the rule is even more applicable
to rebellion, basically, these violent acts are part of the crime, they are how one
commits them, they are inherent to the crime).

Citing Spanish and other foreign cases, the SC states that national, as well as
international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that
common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their
character as “common” offenses and assume the political complexion of the main
crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished
separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the
imposition of a graver penalty.

Further, if Art 48 were to be used in this case, it would be unfavourable to the culprit,
and Art 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him
to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts
performed by him were punished separately. SC also states that simply because one
act may constitute two or more offenses, it does not follow necessarily that a person
may be prosecuted for one after conviction for the other, without violating the
injunction against double jeopardy.

(2) YES. Since exclusion from bail in capital offenses is an exception to the otherwise
absolute right guaranteed by the constitution, the natural tendency of the courts has
been toward a fair and liberal appreciation of the evidence in the determination of the
degree of proof and presumption of guilt necessary to warrant a deprivation of that
right. In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other important
factor to be taken into account. The court took into account the ff. things: (1)
Whether it appears that in case of conviction the Defendant’s criminal liability would
probably call for a capital punishment (Answer: no clear showing); and (2) the
probablility of flight (Answer: possibility seems remote and nil). Additionally, the
 decision appealed from the opposition to the motion in question do not reveal
satisfactorily and concrete, positive act of the accused showing, sufficiently, that his
provincial release, during the pendency of the appeal, would jeopardize the security of
the State.

PETITION FOR BAIL GRANTED.

(summary of separate opinions in next page, might be asked but not completely
necessary I guess)

TL;DR SEPARATE OPINIONS

 Padilla—Bail shouldn’t be granted. After conviction for a capital offense, the

Defendant has absolutely no right to bail, because even before conviction a Defendant
charged with capital offense is not entitled to bail if the evidence of guilt is strong.
Even if the majority opinion that the crime charged in the information is rebellion
only — a non-capital offense — be correct, still the granting of bail after conviction is
discretionary, and I see no plausible reason for the reversal of this Court’s previous
stand, because the security of the State is at stake.
 Montemayor—Other crimes shouldn’t be absorbed by rebellion. The main
contention to why it cannot be complexed. is that it cannot be complexed as the acts
enumerated in Art 135 are inherent to rebellion (necessary means to commit it).
However, “necessary means” as interpreted by criminologists, jurists and legal
commentators, does not mean indispensable means, but merely the means by which a
crime is ordinarily committed. The logic is the same as why abduction or trespass to
dwelling are not necessary means to rape, they are simply ways the culprit used to
facilitate his crime. Applying Art 134’s description of rebellion, it may be committed
by merely rising publicly and taking arms against the government, thus acts
mentioned in Art 135 are not necessary means to committing the crime. (Montemayor
agrees that bail shouldn’t be granted though)
 Labrador -- Agrees with J. Padilla that bail shouldn’t be granted, and w/ J.
Montemayor that a complex crime of rebellion exists in our laws.

2. People of the Philippines vs. Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr., G.R. No. 140756, April 04,
2003, 448 Phil. 749

Facts:
The accused, with force, violence and intimidation, robbed a passenger bus routed to
Pampanga. When the accused approached and about to rob the deceased victim, the
discovered that the said victim was a member of the Philippine National Police. The accused
then informed the victim that they will kill him for being a police. The victim plead for his
life. The accused disregarded the plea and shoot the victim multiple times. After the robbery,
the accused were arrested a a criminal cae was filed against them for the crime of Robbery
with Homicide.

Issue:
Whether Treachery in a crime of Robbery with Homicide should be treated as a qualified
aggravating circumstance.
Held:
No, Treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said
crime is classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. Treachery is
not a qualifying circumstance because “homicide” is used in its broadest and most generic
sense.

Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime
specially punishable by law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of robbery with
homicide and prescribing the penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime
of robbery with homicide. Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime.

3. Ernesto M. De Guzman vs. Hon. Abelardo Subido, G.R. No. L-31683, January 31,
1983, 205 Phil. 373
Facts: Ernesto M. de Guzman violated a city ordinance on jaywalking and another ordinance
requiring a cochero to occupy only the seat intended for a cochero in a calesa. The petitioner
was disqualified for appointment to the Quezon City Police Force.

ISSUE: Whether or not violations and/or convictions of municipal ordinances constitute

“criminal record” disqualify the petitioner under the Police Act of 1966 (R.A. 4864) from
appointment to the Quezon City Police Force.

RULING: No. In order for a violation of a municipal or city ordinance to be considered as a

“crime”, it must involve at least a certain degree of evil doing, immoral conduct, corruption,
malice, or want of principles reasonably related to the requirements of the public office.

4. Elvira Yu Oh vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125297, June 6, 2003, 451 Phil. 380

FACTS: Elvira Yu Oh purchased a number of jewelry from Solid Gold International Traders.
Due to her failure in paying the purchased price, the latter filed a case against the petitioner.
Solid Gold International Traders, through its General Manager, Joaquin Novales III, entered
into a compromise agreement to settle the said civil case.

The compromise agreement, as approved by the trial court, provided that the petitioner shall
issue a total of ninety-nine post-dated checks in the amount of P50,000.00 each, dated every
15th and 30th of the month starting October 1, 1990 and the balance of over P1 million to be
paid in lump sum on November 16, 1994 which is also the due date of the 99th and last
postdated check. Petitioner issued ten checks at P50,000.00 each, for a total of P500,000.00,
drawn against her account at the Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC), Grace Park,
Caloocan City Branch. Novales deposited each of the ten checks on their respective due dates
with the Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC). However, said checks were dishonored
by EBC for the reason "Account Closed."
On October 5, 1992, Novales filed ten separate Informations, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 92-26243 to 92-36252 before the RTC of Quezon City charging petitioner with violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.

On December 22, 1993, the RTC rendered its decision, finding the accused GUILTY of ten
counts of violation of BP 22 and hereby sentenced her to a penalty of one year imprisonment
for each count, or a total of ten years, to be served in accordance with the limitation
prescribed in par. 4, Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code and to indemnify the complainant
the amount of the checks in their totality, or in the amount of P500,000.00.

Republic Act No. 7691 "JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980", was effective
year 1994. The petitioner raised that the Court of Appeals deprived her of giving retroactive
effect to the provision of R.A. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the inferior courts to cover
the offenses involved in these cases pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in not granting retroactive effect to R.A.
7691 in view of Article 22 of the Revised Penal

RULING: No. Penal laws are those which define crimes and provide for their punishment.
Additionally, laws defining the jurisdiction of the court are substantive in nature and not
procedural, for they do not refer to the manner of trying cases but to the authority of the
courts to hear and decide certain and definite cases in the various circumstances of which
they are susceptible. R.A. 7691 is not a penal law, therefore Art. 22 of the RPC does not
apply.
5. Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, Et. Al., G.R. No. 128096, January 20,
1999, 361 Phil. 25

TOPIC: Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases (RA 8249 and BP 129, as amended)

DOCTRINE: The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act
which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this
petition for prohibition and mandamus. To fall under the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan, it is
required by law that the offense committed is a violation of RA 3019, the offender
committing the offense is a public official or employee holding positions as enumerated and
the offense committed is in relation to office. What determines the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those
public officers or employees enumerated.
FACTS: Eleven persons believed to be members of Kuratong Baleleng Gang which is a
syndicate involved in several robberies in Metro Manila were killed in Quezon City by
members of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group headed by petitioner Chief
Superintendent Lacson, arguing that it was a summary execution and not a shoot-out and the
investigation concluded that said incident was a legitimate police operation. Ombudsman
recommended the indictment of multiple murder against 26 respondents. All the accused
questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
information, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to RA 7975 which
limits the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the principal
accused are government officials with SG27 or higher or PNP officials with high ranks. The
cases were ordered to be transferred to the RTC but the Office of the Special Prosecutor
insists that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan according to RA 8249, an act
further defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: W/N Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.

RULING: No. To fall under the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan, it is required by law that the
offense committed is a violation of RA 3019, the offender committing the offense in items a,
b, c, and e is a public official or employee holding positions enumerated in paragraph A of
section 4 and the offense committed is in relation to office. Paragraph A of RA 8249 states
that what
determines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender
that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated. Section 4 does
not make a reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer, however, no
specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim was intimately related to the
discharge of their official duties as police officers. Due to such failure of meeting the said
requirements, the case is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby
sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997, Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is
REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to
23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive
original jurisdiction over said cases.

FACTS: Panfilo Lacson was charged with multiple murders for the shooting and killing of 11
persons who were members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang after SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes
had testified that the killings were summary executions and not shootout. After due hearing.
The trial court judge issued a Resolution dismissing the criminal cases against Lacson. As a
result, 11 Informations for murder involving the same allegations of killing the 11 persons of
the Kuratong Baleleng gang were refiled against Lacson.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 8, Rule 117 should be applied retroactively

RULING: Section 8 of Rule 117 was approved with the intention that it should be applied
prospectively for the reason that applying it retroactively would defeat its purpose; to give the
State a period of two (2) full years from notice of the provisional dismissal of criminal cases
with the express consent of the accused. In the case at bar, applying it retroactively to Section
8 of Rule 117, the State would only be given one year and three months to revive the criminal
cases which do not conform to the intent of Section 8.
6. Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison vs. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, G.R. No. 212719,
June 25, 2019

Facts:

Facts: On May 29, 2013, then President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law R.A. No.
10592, amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815, or the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). Pursuant to the amendatory law, an IRR was jointly issued by respondents
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
on March 26, 2014 and became effective on April 18, 2014.

Petitioners and intervenors assail the validity of its Section 4, Rule 1 that directs the
prospective application of the grant of good conduct time allowance (GCTA), time allowance
for study, teaching and mentoring (TASTM), and special time allowance for loyalty (STAL)
mainly on the ground that it violates Article 22 of the RPC.6 They contend that the provisions
of R.A. No. 10592 are penal in nature and beneficial to the inmates; hence, should be given
retroactive effect in accordance with Article 22 of the RPC. For them, the IRR contradicts the
law it implements.
Issues:

Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy in this case?

Ruling:

Yes. There is an actual case or controversy in the case at bar because there is a contrariety of
legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence. By the mere enactment of the law or the issuance of an IRR thereto, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act.

Respondents stand for the prospective application of the grant of GCTA, TASTM, and STAL
while petitioners and intervenors view that such provision violates the Constitution and
Article 22 of the RPC. The legal issue posed is ripe for adjudication as the challenged
regulation has a direct adverse effect on petitioners and those detained and convicted
prisoners who are similarly situated. There exists an immediate and/or threatened injury and
they have sustained or are immediately in danger of sustaining direct injury as a result of the
act complained of. In fact, while the case is pending, petitioners are languishing in jail. If
their assertion proved to be true, their illegal confinement or detention in the meantime is
oppressive. With the prisoners’ continued incarceration, any delay in resolving the case
would cause them great prejudice. Justice demands that they be released soonest, if not on
time.

7. People of the Philippines vs. Leo P. Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472, February 07, 1997,
335 Phil. 343

Per Curiam
Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
Date: February 7, 1997
Ponente: As it is a Per curiam decision, the court is acting collectively & anonymously.

Facts:

 The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the
accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. 
 The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was
already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of
death.
 The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on
the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the
alleged false accusation of rape against the accused.  The motion was dismissed as the
SC found no substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb the verdict.
 On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R.
Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free
Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines. (FLAG)
 A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of
accused-appellant aiming for the reversal of the death sentence.
  In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1)
mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2)
alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal
question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is unconstitutional

Held: No.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration & supplemental motion for reconsideration
are denied for lack of merit.

Ratio:
 Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v.
Georgia. To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically
ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is
misleading and inaccurate.
 The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness
pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the
accused by the sentencing jury.  Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered
not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on
the discrimination against the black accused who is meted out the death
penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional discretion to determine
whether or not to impose the death penalty.
 Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and
unusual per se.  While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death
penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion which these
statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and
without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not
altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and
discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
 accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not
involve the taking of life.  
 In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia:: "Rape is without doubt
deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the
injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which
does involve the unjustified taking of human life.  Although it may be
accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the death
of or even the serious injury to another person.  The murderer kills; the rapist,
if no more than that, does not.  Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and
normally is not beyond repair.  We have the abiding conviction that the death
penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and irrevocability' x x x  is an
excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life"
 The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds: 
 first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as
a proper punishment for the crime of rape through the willful omission
by the state legislatures to include rape in their new death penalty
statutes in the aftermath of Furman;
  Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this
could have any bearing on the Philippine experience and in
the context of our own culture.
 second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation
of a woman's spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and psychological
balance, does not involve the taking of life.
 Phil. SC: we disagree with the court's predicate that the
gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty
or not, is the attendance of the circumstance of death on the
part of the victim.  Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of
the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an
eye, a tooth for a tooth".
  The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the death
penalty in specified crimes under specific circumstances.  As early as 1886, though,
capital punishment had entered our legal system through the old Penal Code, which
was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
 Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason,
correspondence with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide,
murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly weapon
or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson
resulting in death.
 The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional
question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or
unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel
and unusual punishment
 Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel,
unjust nor excessive.  In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States
Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning
of that word as used in the constitution.  It implies there something inhuman
and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
 People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly
believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or
ineffective.  However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and
as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the
duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private
opinions,"
 Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty.
Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be
valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first
be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty.
Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last
recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society
 what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice,
public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the
penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the
death penalty for said crimes.
 Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent
manner in which the same was committed or by the reason of its inherent
 viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the law, public peace
and order, or public morals.  It is an offense whose essential and inherent
viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society
and hence, shock the moral self of a people.
 The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this means that
the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the integrity
and the sanctity of his or her own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or
her own spiritual, psychological, material and social preferences and needs. 
 Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped,
tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in
death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the
victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide,
infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is
detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on
the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery
with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and
carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is
killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are
clearly heinous by their very nature.
 SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because:
 the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have
so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive
effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through
organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry
 they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and
the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety
of individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently
prevented from doing so
 People v. Cristobal:  "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another
person. It does injury to justice and charity.  Rape deeply wounds the respect,
freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person has a right.  It causes
grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act
xxx an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society
itself.

The accused-appellant in this case is charged with Statutory Rape on the

basis of the complaint, dated July 14, 1994. The gravamen of the said
offense, as stated in paragraph 3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
is the carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old.[24] Rodessa
positively identified his father accused-appellant, succeeded in
consummating his grievous and odious sexual assault on her is free from
any substantial self-contradiction.

Apparently, as a last glimpse of hope, the accused-appellant questions

the penalty imposed by the trial court by declaring that he is neither a
father, stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa although he was a
confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother.
The Court notes that Rodessa uses the surname of the accused-appellant,
not Rivera (her mother's maiden name) nor Alfonso (her grandmother's
live-in partner). Moreover, Rodessa's mother stated during the cross-
examination that she, the accused-appellant and her five children,
including Rodessa, had been residing in one house only.[28] At any rate,
even if he were not the father, stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa, this
disclaimer cannot save him from the abyss where perpetrators of
heinous crimes ought to be, as mandated by law. Considering that the
accused-appellant is a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother, [29] he falls
squarely within the aforequoted portion of the Death Penalty Law under
the term "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."

The fact that the ten-year old Rodessa referred to the accused-appellant
as "Papa" is reason enough to conclude that accused-appellant is either
the father or stepfather of Rodessa. Thus, the act of sexual assault
perpetrated by the accused on his young victim has become all the more
repulsive and perverse. The victim's tender age and the accused-
appellant's moral ascendancy and influence over her are factors which
forced Rodessa to succumb to the accused's selfish and bestial craving.
The law has made it inevitable under the circumstances of this case that
the accused-appellant face the supreme penalty of death.

8. People of the Philippines vs. Beth Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008,
594 Phil. 680

TOPIC: Estafa, Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

DOCTRINE: A person convicted for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code, may for the same acts,
be separately convicted for Estafa.

FACTS: Accused Rosemarie “Baby” Robles, Bernadette Miranda, Nenita Catacotan, and Jojo Resco
and appellant Beth Temporada, all employees of the Alternative Travel and Tours Corporation
(ATTC), were recruited and promised overseas employment, for a fee, to complainants Rogelio
Legaspi Jr. as technician in Singapore, and Soledad Atle, Luz Minkay, Evelyin Estacio and Dennis
Dimaano as factory workers in Hongkong. Upon submission of the requirements, none of the
complainants was able to leave nor recover the amounts they had paid. Thus, separate criminal
complaints were filed against the accused and appellant before the City Prosecutor of Manila. Six
information against the accused and appellants, one for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and five
counts of estafa. It was only the appellant who was apprehended and brought to trial since the other
accused remained at large, and upon the arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the
merits ensued.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a judgment convicting the appellant of all the charges. The
case was then referred to the Court of Appeals (CA) for intermediate review. However, the latter court
affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC. The appellant alleged that the trial court erred in
finding her guilty of illegal recruitment and five counts of estafa despite the insufficiency of the
evidence for the prosecution. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not trial court properly meted the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
P500,000.00 on the appellant.

RULING: Yes, the trial court properly meted the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
P500,000.00 on the appellant.

Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. No. 8042) provides for the penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine of not less than P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000,000.00 for the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale or by a syndicate.

It is also provided that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code, may for the
same acts, be separately convicted for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC. In order to be
held liable for estafa, the following requisites must be present: (1) the accused defrauded another by
abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered
damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.

In the present case, the appellant together with her co-accused defrauded the complainants into
believing that they had the authority and capability to send the complainants overseas for
employment. Thus, with the assurances given by the appellant and her co-accused, the complainants
gave their hard-earned money in exchange of such promise to work abroad, but it did not materialize
and they weren’t able to recover their money.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED with respect to the
indeterminate penalties imposed on appellant for the five (5) counts of estafa, to wit:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 02-208372, the accused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4
years and 2 months of prisión correccional as minimum, to 9 years, 8 months and 21 days of
prisión mayor as maximum.

(2) In Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02-208376, the accused is sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional as minimum, to 10
years, 8 months and 21 days of prisión mayor as maximum for each of the aforesaid three
estafa cases.

(3) In Criminal Case No. 02-208374, the accused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4
years and 2 months of prisión correccional as minimum, to 12 years, 8 months and 21 days of
reclusión temporal as maximum.

In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

9. Aristotle N. Valenzuela vs. People of the Philippines,

G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007, 552 Phil. 381

Laws Applicable: RPC Art. 6

Ponente: Justice Dante O. Tinga

Doctrine: Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed
complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no
opportunity to dispose of the same.

FACTS: Sometime in May 1994, petitioner and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside SM
North EDSA by security guard Lorenzo Lago, unloading cases of detergent Tide Ultramatic
on an open parking space. Minutes later, petitioner loaded the cartons of detergent while
Calderon was looking into a taxi and procedeed to leave the parking area. Lago stopped the
cab, checked the cartons, and asked for a receipt but Valezuela and Calderon reacted a fled on
foot. The same were apprehended on the scene and the stolen merchandise recovered was
worth P12,090.

The two pleaded not guilty. Valenzuela said that he was with a friend to buy snacks when
they heard a gunshot fired by Lago. Calderon, on the other hand, said that he was with his
cousin when he heard a gunshot fired by Lago that caused everyone to flee on the viscinity.

RTC convicted the appellants guilty of consumated theft. CA affirmed. Petitioner contends
that he was only guilty of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprefended, he was never
placed in a position to freely dispose the articles stolen.

ISSUE: WON Valenzuela is guilty of consumated theft.

RULING: YES. Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and
attempted felonies. A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present. It is frustrated when the offender performs all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. Finally, it is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a subjective phase, or that portion of the acts
constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime
and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior acts, should result in the
consummated crime. After that point has been breached, the subjective phase ends and the
objective phase begins. It has been held that if the offender never passes the subjective phase
of the offense, the crime is merely attempted. On the other hand, the subjective phase is
completely passed in case of frustrated crimes, for in such instances, [s]ubjectively the crime
is complete.

The court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property by one
with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose
the property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of execution and the
deprivation from the owner has already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a
frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or consummated.

10. People of the Philippines vs. Guillermo Manantan, G. R. No. L-14129, July 31, 1962,
115 Phil. 657

TOPIC: Interpretation of Penal Laws

DOCTRINE: The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and when the omission has
been clearly established.

ISSUE: Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code.

RULING: NO. The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere
fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular
person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case,
and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a
substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized time
and again by decisions of various courts. Thus, cases will frequently be found enunciating the
principle that the intent of the legislature will govern. It is to be noted that a strict
construction should not be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute. The
court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance, where a
literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear
purpose of the law makers.
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the purpose of the
statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges
of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the
old statute, are now within its encompass. If such were the evident purpose, can the
legislature intend to eliminate the justice of the peace within its orbit? Certainly not. 
DISPOSITIVE: The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case was
remanded for trial on the merits.

11. The People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Elkanish, G .R. No. L-2666, September 26,
1951, 90 Phil. 53

TOPIC: Double jeopardy

DOCTRINE: short only.

FACTS: Elkanish was charged of illegal importation of 65 large boxes of blasting caps under the
Revised Administrative Code (RAC), and illegal possession under Act No. 3023, when the said
articles were seized while the ship was anchored inside the breakwater off Manila. He pleaded not
guilty for the information on illegal possession, and moved to quash the information on illegal
importation on the following grounds: 1) blasting caps are not lawful objects of commerce, therefore
not covered by the RAC, and 2) prosecution for importation is barred by prosecution for illegal
possession. The judge of the CFI Manila dismissed the information.

ISSUE: Whether the CFI judge was correct on dismissing the information because prosecution for
illegal possession bars the prosecution for the other.

RULING: YES. Sec. 9, Rule 113 of the ROC provides that when a defendant is convicted/acquitted,
or the case against him is dismissed/terminated without his consent, after the defendant has pleaded,
the conviction/acquittal/dismissal shall bar another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the former offense charged.

Here, possession of blasting caps is inherent in importation, making them juridically identical. There
was jeopardy when the offense charged in the second information is necessarily included in the first
information.

DISPOSITIVE: The appealed order is affirmed without costs.

 12. People of the Philippines vs. Daniel C. Quijada, G.R. Nos. 115008-09, July 24, 1996,
328 Phil. 505

FACTS: Respondent killed Diosdado Iroy using an unlicensed firearm. He was convicted of
2 offenses, which were separately filed: 1. Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code;
2. Illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form under PD 1866 Par. 2 of Sec. 1 of PD
1866 states that, “If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
the penalty of death shall be imposed.”

ISSUE:

1. W/ON THE TRIAL COURT’S JUDGMENT SHOULD BE SUSTAINED IN

CONFORMITY WITH THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN PEOPLE V. TAC-AN,
PEOPLE V. TIOZON, PEOPLE V. CALING, ETC. OR TO MODIFY THE JUDGMENT
AND CONVICT THE APPELLANT ONLY OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM
INTIS AGGRAVATED FORM PURSUANT TO PEOPLE V. BARROS.

2. W/ON THE 2ND PAR. OF SEC. 1 OF PD 1866 INTEGRATED ILLEGAL

POSSESSION OF FIREARM AND THE RESULTANT KILLING INTO A SINGLE
INTEGRATED OFFENSE.

HELD:

1. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed In light of the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Tac-
an,and reiterated in People vs. Tiozon,People vs. Caling,People vs. Deunida,People vs.
Tiongco,People vs. Fernandez,and People vs. Somooc, that one who kills another with the
use of an unlicensed firearm commits two separate offenses of (1) either homicide or
murder under the Revised Penal Code, and (2) aggravated illegal possession of firearm under
the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866, we sustain the decision of the trial court
finding the appellant guilty of two separate offenses of murder in Criminal Case No. 8178
and of aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1866, we sustain the decision of the trial court finding the appellant guilty of two
separate offenses of murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 and of aggravated illegal possession
of firearm in Criminal Case No. 8179. Although Tac-an and Tiozon relate more to the issue
of whether there is a violation of the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy if an
accused is prosecuted for homicide or murder and for aggravated illegal possession of
firearm, they at the same time laid down the rule that these are separate offenses, with the
first punished under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a special law; hence, the
constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply.

2. 2nd par. of Sec 1 of PD 1866 does not support a conclusion that intended to treat said two
offenses as a single and integrated offense of “illegal possession with homicide or murder”. It
does not use the clause “as a result” or “on the occasion of “to evince an intention to create a
single integrated crime, but rather it uses the clause “with the use of”

the crime of either homicide or murder is committed NOT AS A RESULT

OR ON THE OCCASION of the violation of Section 1, but WITH THE
USE of an unlicensed firearm, whose possession is penalized therein.
There is a world of difference, which is too obvious, between (a) the
commission of homicide or murder as a result or on the occasion of the
violation of Section 1, and (b) the commission of homicide or
murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm. In the first, homicide or
murder is not the original purpose or primary objective of the offender,
but a secondary event or circumstance either resulting from or
perpetrated on the occasion of the commission of that originally or
primarily intended. In the second, the killing, which requires a mens
rea, is the primary purpose, and to carry that out effectively the
offender uses an unlicensed firearm.

What then would be a clear case of judicial legislation is an

interpretation of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 that
would make it define and punish a single integrated offense and give to
the words WITH THE USE OF a similar meaning as the words AS A
RESULT OR ON THE OCCASION OF, a meaning which is neither born
out by the letter of the law nor supported by its intent. Worth noting is
the rule in statutory construction that if a statute is clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation,[51] leaving the court no room for any extended
ratiocination or rationalization of the law.[52]

13. Luis Marcos P. Laurel vs. Hon. Zeus C. Abrogar, G.R. NO. 155076, February 27,
2006, 518 Phil. 409

LUIS MARCOS P. LAUREL vs HON. ZEUS C. ABROGAR

LUIS MARCOS P. LAUREL vs HON. ZEUS C. ABROGAR
G.R. No. 155076
January 13, 2009

FACTS:

Luis Laurel (Laurel) was charged willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and use the
international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple
Resale (ISR), which is a method of routing and completing international long distance calls
using lines, cables, antenae, and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local or
domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined, effectively stealing this
business from PLDT while using its facilities.

PLDT claimed such the “international phone calls” which are “electric currents or sets of
electric impulses transmitted through a medium, and carry a pattern representing the human
voice to a receiver,” are personal properties under Art. 416(3) Forces of nature which are
brought under control by science
Laurel claims that the telephone conversation is not synonymous to electric current or
impulses hence it is not susceptible of appropriation, thus cannot be considered a personal
property.

ISSUE:

Is Laurel Guilty of Theft of Personal Property? YES

RULING:

The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the Penal Code is
that it be capable of appropriation. The act of conducting International Simple Resale (ISR)
operations by illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus to private respondent
Philippine Long Distance Telephone’s (PLDT’s) telephone system, through which petitioner
is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using respondent Philippine Long
Distance Telephone’s (PLDT’s) facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction.
Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all things which are or may be the object of
appropriation are considered either real property or personal property. Though Business is
likewise not enumerated as personal property under the Civil Code. Just like interest in
business, however, it may be appropriated.
Following the ruling in Strochecker v. Ramirez, 44 Phil.933 (1922), business should also be
classified as personal property. Since the Business of providing telecommunication service is
not included in the exclusive enumeration of real properties under Article 415, it is therefore
personal property.

The business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service are personal property
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR is an act of
"subtraction" penalized under said article. However, the Amended Information describes the
thing taken as, "international long distance calls," and only later mentions "stealing the
business from PLDT" as the manner by which the gain was derived by the accused. In order
to correct this inaccuracy of description, this case must be remanded to the trial court and the
prosecution directed to amend the Amended Information, to clearly state that the property
subject of the theft are the services and business of respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this
amendment is not necessitated by a mistake in charging the proper offense, which would
have called for the dismissal of the information under Rule 110, Section 14 and Rule 119,
Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. To be sure, the crime is properly
designated as one of theft. The purpose of the amendment is simply to ensure that the accused
is fully and sufficiently apprised of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and thus
guaranteed of his rights under the Constitution.

14. People of the Philippines vs. Walpan M. Ladjaalam, G.R. Nos. 136149-51, September
19, 2000, 395 Phil.

Ponente: PANGANIBAN

FACTS:

The trial court found the appelant guilty of maintaining a drug den, an offense for which was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Appelant’s guilt was established by the testimony of
Prosecution Witness , who himself had used the extension house of appellant as a drug den
on several occasions, including the time of the raid. The former’s testimony was corroborated
by all the raiding police officers who testified before the court. That appelant did not deny
ownership of the house and its extension lent credence to the prosecution’s story.

The trial court also convicted appellant of direct assault with multiple counts of attempted
homicide. It found that “[t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle [at] the policemen[,]
who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant x x x” constituted such complex
crime. Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide,
the trial court convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms
under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision
correccional to 8 years of prision mayor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant can be convicted separately of illegal possession of firearms after
using said firearm in the commission of another crime.

HELD:

NO. The appealed Decision was affirmed with modifications. Appellant is found guilty only
of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon
and (2) maintaining a drug den.

RATIO:

The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms,
provided that “no other crime was committed by the person arrested.” If the intention of the
law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have
expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish,
neither should [the courts].

The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an
M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault.
While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional.
Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such
weapons in committing an even lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or slight physical
injuries, both of which are punishable by arresto menor. This consequence, however,
necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Court’s
review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to
Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from
the manifest intendment and language of the legislature. [The Court’s] task is constitutionally
confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and [this Court] have
done so in this case.

 simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the

commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple
illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the "other crime" is murder or
homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating
circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple
attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer
be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.

[62]
 In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294's simple language is most
favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified,
for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to
favor the accused.[63] Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two
separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with
attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct
assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms
cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.

We reject the OSG's contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its

amendment by RA 8294, should be applied in this case. When the crime
was committed on September 24, 1997, the original language of PD 1866
had already been expressly superseded by RA 8294 which took effect on
July 6, 1997.[64] In other words, no longer in existence was the
earlier provision of PD 1866, which justified a conviction for
illegal possession of firearms separate from any other crime. It
was replaced by RA 8294 which, among other amendments to PD
1866, contained the specific proviso that "no other crime was
committed."

Furthermore, the OSG's reliance on People v. Jayson[65] is misplaced.

True, this Court sustained the conviction of appellant for illegal
possession of firearms, although he had also committed homicide. We
explained, however, that "the criminal case for homicide [was] not before
us for consideration."

Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no

justification for limiting the proviso in the second paragraph to murder
and homicide. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple
illegal possession of firearms, provided that "no other crime was
committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the
second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should
have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the
law does not distinguish, neither should we.

The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of

illegal possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a
penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the first
is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed,
the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by
using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense,[66] like alarm
and scandal[67] or slight physical injuries,[68] both of which are punishable
by arresto menor.[69] This consequence, however, necessarily arises from
the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Court's
review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise
should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to
give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment and
language of the legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to
applying the law and jurisprudence[70] to the proven facts, and we have
done so in this case.

15. People vs. Samonte, G.R. No. 36559, July 26, 1932, 157 Phil., 968

This view has been adopted in the case of People vs. Samonte, No. 36559 (July 26, 1932; 57
Phil., 968) wherein this Court held, as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General that "it is
clear that a person under sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his liberty and
escapes from the restrictions of the penalty when he enters the prohibited area." Said ruling in
that case was ratified by this Court, though, indirectly in the case of People vs. Jose de Jesus,
(45 Off. Gaz. Supp. to No. 9, p. 370)1, where it was held that one evades the service of his
sentence of destierro  when he enters the prohibited area specified in the judgment of
conviction, and he cannot invoke the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
which provides that its provisions do not apply to those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence.

16. The People of the Philippines vs. Herminio Barut, Et., Al., G.R. No. 42666, March
13, 1979, 178 Phil. 12

TOPIC: The death of a person by reason or on occasion of a robbery includes bystanders and
does not necessarily have to be the victim

DOCTRINE: Robo con Homicido is committed even if the victim killed was not the person
being robbed.

Facts: Marcelino Grospe while pasturing his carabao saw Barut, Ramiscal, Quebral, Agustin
and Acson going towards the hut of Lazaro. Acson was armed with a carbine, sensing the
group had evil intentions informed his neighbors. Acson proceeded to rob Grospe. Later on
Grospe and his neighbors armed with guns and bolos went to Lazaro’s house constituting
themselves as the rescue party. A gun fight ensued and one of the neighbors Evaristo was
shot, he was also the lone fatality in the gun fight. The warrant of arrest was only served on
the accused-appellants 3 years after its issuance.

ISSUE:
1. WON Constabulary officers are considered peace officer who can investigate crimes

2. WON bare denial of appellants is enough to lessen the credibility of the prosecution’s
witnesses
3. WON the killing of Evaristo was by reason or on occasion of the crime of robbery

RULING:
1. YES The term "peace officer" in section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which
enumerates the persons who are competent to file a criminal complaint, includes
members of the Constabulary.
2. NO Appellants' uncorroborated alibis have no exculpatory value. When the robbery
with homicide was committed, appellant Barut was allegedly in Barrio Malbog,
Tagkawayan, Quezon Province where he was working on a farm owned by his
uncle; appellant Quebral was at Barrio Baua, Gonzaga, Cagayan, while appellant
Ramiscal was at Barrio Salindingan, Ilagan, Isabela. The three appellants allegedly
stayed in those places for four years. The three appellants are admittedly close
friends. Together with Acson and Agustin, they were all residents of Barrio
Masigun, Roxas. The probability is that immediately after the occurrence of the
incident in question they fled from Barrio Masigun and stayed for more than three
years in those aforementioned places as fugitives from justice in order to avoid arrest
and prosecution. They then utilized their stay in those places as the basis of their
alibis. As has been repeatedly observed in cases of similar nature, appellants' alibis
cannot destroy the positive Identification made by the prosecution witness,
Marcelino Grospe, who is acquainted with the appellants and who had no motive for
fabricating evidence against them.
3. YES Although the killing of Evaristo Tuvera was perpetrated after the
consummation of the robbery and after the robbers had left the victim's house, the
homicide is still integrated with the robbery or is regarded as having been committed
"by reason or on the occasion" thereof. There is robo con homicidio even if the
victim killed was an innocent bystander and not the person robbed. The law does not
require that the victim of the robbery be also the victim of the homicide

DISPOSITIVE: Decision is affirmed with slight modifications as to their liability. Petition

DENIED

17. The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Manuel E. Abuyen, G.R. No. 30664,
February 02, 1929, 52 Phil. 722

TOPIC: Habitual Delinquency

DOCTRINE: The provisions of Act No. 3397 on habitual delinquency are applicable to the crimes
therein enumerated, which are defined and penalized in the Penal Code, not only when
consummated, but also when only attempted or frustrated

FACTS: Manuel Abuyen y Elais appeals to this court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Manila in which he was convicted of the crime of frustrated qualified theft, having confessed, and
sentenced to one month and one day arresto mayor, and to the additional penalty of ten years, for
habitual delinquency, with the accessories of the law, and the costs of the action.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to the additional penalty of 10
years imprisonment in considering the habitual delinquency without having first required the Attorney
General to prove it, or to present the cases wherein it appears that the defendant had been really and
truly convicted of the same crime of theft, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3397.

RULING: No. The defendant confessed on the crime charged and provided the prosecution the
information of his criminal history. The defendant has been thrice convicted of the crime of theft, and
that he is a habitual delinquent in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3397 Sec.1 of said law
who defines habitual delinquent as: “Any person who within a period of 10 years from the date of his
release or of his last conviction by the courts of this country of the crimes of robo, hurto, estafa,
embezzlement, or forgery, or of a violation of the laws against vagrancy or prostitution, is found guilty
of any of said crimes a third time, or oftener." As this is a definition of the law, it is presumed the
defendant knew it, and in pleading guilty to the crime charged in the information, though frustrated, he
admitted all the facts alleged therein and relieved the prosecution of the obligation of proving that he
had thrice been convicted of the crime of theft, and that for the fourth time he has committed the same
crime of theft within the period of ten years from the date when he was set at liberty, or since his last
conviction of said crime by the courts of this country.

DISPOSITIVE: By virtue whereof, and in accordance with the recommendation of the Attorney-
General, the defendant-appellant is hereby sentenced to two months and one day arresto mayor, and
to the additional penalty of ten years, in accordance with Act No. 3397, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.

18. The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Manuel E. Abuyen, G.R. No. 30664,
February 02, 1929, 52 Phil. 722
See above
19. People of the Philippines vs. Guillermo Manantan, G. R. No. L-14129, July 31, 1962,
115 Phil. 657
See above
20. Atty. Reynante B. Orceo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190779, March 26,
2010, 630 Phil. 670

TOPIC: Article 254 - Discharge of Firearms

DOCTRINE: An airsoft gun can be considered a firearm. Airsoft guns are firearm replicas, often highly
detailed, manufactured for recreational purposes.

FACTS: Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments among family members, and families
are entitled to protection by the society and the State under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Pursuant thereto, they are free to choose and enjoy their recreational activities. These liberties, petitioner
contends, cannot be abridged by the COMELEC. Thus, petitioner contends that Resolution No. 8714 is not in
accordance with the State policies. As a response, COMELEC defends that constitutional freedoms are not
absolute in a sense, and they may be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and important interests.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations in the term “firearm” in Section 2(b) of RA 8714?

RULING: NO. A word of general significance in a stature is to be taken in its ordinary sense and
comprehensive sense, unless it is shown that the word is intended to be given a different or restricted meaning;
what is generally spoken shall be generally understood and general words shall be understood in a general sense.
The term “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714 was intended for purposes of the gun ban during the election period.
The inclusion of airsoft guns in the term “firearm” and their resultant coverage by the election gun ban is to
avoid the possible use of recreational guns in sowing fear, intimidation, or terror during the election period. An
ordinary citizen may not be able to distinguish between a real gun and an airsoft gun. It is fear subverting the
will of a voter, whether brought about using a real gun or a recreational gun which is sought to be averted.

DISPOSITIVE: Wherefore, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED insofar as the exclusion of replicas and
imitations of airsoft guns from the term "firearm" is concerned. Replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and
airguns are hereby declared excluded from the term "firearm" in Resolution No. 8714. The petition is
DISMISSED in regard to the exclusion of airsoft guns from the term "firearm" in Resolution No. 8714. Airsoft
guns and airguns are covered by the gun ban during the election period.

FACTS: Petitioner contends that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in including "airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations" in the
definition of "firearm" in Resolution No. 8714, since there is nothing in R.A. No. 7166 that
mentions "airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations." He asserts that the intendment of R.A.
No. 7166 is that the term "firearm" refers to real firearm in its common and ordinary usage.
In support of this assertion, he cites the Senate deliberation on the bill, which later became
R.A. No. 7166, where it was clarified that an unauthorized person caught carrying a firearm
during the election period is guilty of an election offense under Section 261 (q) of the
Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner contends that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in including "airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations" in the definition of "firearm" in Resolution No. 8714, since there is
nothing in R.A. No. 7166 that mentions "airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations." He
asserts that the intendment of R.A. No. 7166 is that the term "firearm" refers to real firearm in
its common and ordinary usage. In support of this assertion, he cites the Senate deliberation
on the bill, which later became R.A. No. 7166, where it was clarified that an unauthorized
person caught carrying a firearm during the election period is guilty of an election offense
under Section 261 (q) of the Omnibus Election Code. Further, petitioner alleges that there is
no law that covers airsoft guns. By including airsoft guns in the definition of "firearm,"
Resolution No. 8714, in effect, criminalizes the sport, since the possession of an airsoft gun
or its replica/imitation is now an election offense, although there is still no law that governs
the use thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns
and their replicas/imitations in the term “firearm” in Section 2(b) of RA 8714?

HELD: The petition is PARTLY GRANTED insofar as the exclusion of replicas and
imitations of airsoft guns from the term "firearm" is concerned. Replicas and imitations of
airsoft guns and airguns are hereby declared excluded from the term "firearm" in Resolution
No. 8714. The petition is DISMISSED in regard to the exclusion of airsoft guns from the
term "firearm" in Resolution No. 8714. Airsoft guns and airguns are covered by the gunban
during the election period. The Court holds that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in including airsoft guns and airguns in the term "firearm" in Resolution No. 8714
for purposes of the gun ban during the election period, with the apparent objective of
ensuring free, honest, peaceful and credible elections this year.
The Court holds that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in including airsoft
guns and airguns in the term "firearm" in Resolution No. 8714 for purposes of the gun ban
during the election period, with the apparent objective of ensuring free, honest, peaceful and
credible elections this year. The term “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714 was intended for
purposes of the gun ban during the election period. The inclusion of airsoft guns in the term
“firearm” and their resultant coverage by the election gun ban is to avoid the possible use of
recreational guns in sowing fear, intimidation or terror during the election period. An
ordinary citizen may not be able to distinguish between a real gun and an airsoft gun. It is
fear subverting the will of a voter, whether brought about by the use of a real gun or a
recreational gun which is sought to be averted.

21. James Ient and Maharlika Schulze vs. Tullett Prebon (Philippines), Inc., G.R. No.
189158, January 11, 2017, 803 Phil. 163

Commercial Law; Corporation Code; Liability on Sections 31 and 34; SC held that through
a thorough scrutinizing of the different provisions in the Corporation Code including
Sections 31 and 34, they only impose civil liability aside from Section 74. SC concludes that
had it been the intention of the drafters of the la to define Sections 31 and 34 as offenses, they
could have easily included similar language as that found in Section 74. The intention can
also be gleaned from the floor deliberations of its proponents.
SERENO,C J.:
FACTS: Tradition Group, where petitoners herein are employed, and Tullett are competitors
in the inter-dealer broking business. On the Tradition Group's motive of expansion and
diversification in Asia, petitioners lent and Schulze were tasked with the establishment
Tradition Financial Services Philippines, Inc.
However, Tullett, filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the City Prosecution Office of Makati
City against the officers/employees of the Tradition Group for violation of Sections 31 and 34
of the Corporation Code which made them criminally liable under Section 144. Impleaded as
respondents in the Complaint-Affidavit were petitioners lent and Schulze, Jaime
Villalon ,who was formerly President and Managing Director of Tullett, Mercedes Chuidian
who was formerly a member of Tullett's Board of Directors. Villalon and Chuidian were
charged with using their former positions in Tullett to sabotage said company by
orchestrating the mass resignation of its entire brokering staff in order for them to join
Tradition Philippines which was evident on their conduct of several meetings with the
employees. According to Tullett, petitioners lent and Schulze have conspired with Villalon
and Chuidian in the latter's acts of disloyalty against the company. Petitioners argued that
there could be no violation of Sections 31 and 34 of the Corporation as these sections refer to
corporate acts or corporate opportunity, that Section 144 of the same Code cannot be applied
to Sections 31 and 34 which already contains the penalties or remedies for their violation; and
conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied to the Sections 31 and 34 of the
Corporation Code. The city prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint however, on
respondent’s appeal to the Department of Justice, the dismissal was reversed finding the
arguments of the respondent proper. CA affirmed the decision of the DOJ secretary.
ISSUE/S: WoN Section 144 of the Corporation Code appliesto Sections 31 and 34 of the
same code, thus, making it a penal offense so that conspiracy can be appreciated and the
petitioners can be impleaded?
RULING:
NEGATIVE. The Supreme Court applied rule of lenity as a principle related to liberal
interpretation in favor of the accused in criminal cases. The rule applies when the court is
faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused
and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which
is more lenient to the accused.
According to SC, a close reading Section 144 shows that it is not purely a penal provision
because it provides that when the violator is a corporation, an administrative penalty is
imposed in form of dissolution, which is not a criminal sanction. The Court also added that
there is no provision in the Corporation Code using an emphatic language to compel the SC
to construe the provision as a penal offense. SC held that through a thorough scrutinizing of
the different provisions in the Corporation Code including Sections 31 and 34, they only
impose civil liability aside from Section 74. SC concludes that had it been the intention of the
drafters of the la to define Sections 31 and 34 as offenses, they could have easily included
similar language as that found in Section 74. The intention can also be gleaned from the floor
deliberations of its proponents. Quite apart that no legislative intent to criminalize Sections
31 and 34 was manifested in the deliberations on the Corporation Code, it is noteworthy from
the same deliberations that legislators intended to codify the common law concepts of
corporate opportunity and fiduciary obligations of corporate officers as found in American
jurisprudence into said provisions. In common law, the remedies available in the event of a
breach of director's fiduciary duties to the corporation are civil remedies. If a director or
officer is found to have breached his duty of loyalty, an injunction may be issued or damages
may be awarded. A corporate officer guilty of fraud or mismanagement may be held liable
for lost profits. A disloyal agent may also suffer forfeiture of his compensation. There is
nothing in the deliberations to indicate that drafters of the Corporation Code intended to
deviate from common law practice and enforce the fiduciary obligations of directors and
corporate officers through penal sanction aside from civil liability. GRANTED. Court of
Appeals Resolutions are REVERSED and SETASIDE.

22. The People of the Philippines vs. Mariano Terrado, Et., Al., G.R. No. L-23625,
November 25, 1983, 211 Phil. 1

While the informations sufficiently alleged the commission of

falsification of public documents under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal
Code, the offenses alleged to have been committed have already
prescribed since the preparation and submission of false affidavits in
support of a petition or claim respecting lands of the public domain is
also punishable as perjury under Sec. 129 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended, which reads, as follows:
"Sec. 129.  Any person who present or causes to be presented, or
cooperates in the presentation of, any false application, declaration, or
evidence, or makes or causes to be made or cooperates in the making of a
false affidavit in support of any petition, claim, or objection respecting
lands of the public domain, shall be deemed guilty of perjury and
punished as such."
Falsification of public documents is punishable by prision mayor and a
fine not to exceed P5,000.00.[1] Prision mayor is an afflictive penalty,
[2]
 and hence, prescribes in 15 years.[3] Perjury, upon the other hand,
is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period,  or from four (4) months
[4]

and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months, which is
correctional in nature,[5] and prescribes in ten (10) years.[6] However,
Public Act No. 3326, as amended by Act 3585 and Act 3763, provides
that "violations penalized by special laws shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following
rules:  (a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by
imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years
for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less
than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment
for two years or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve years
for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more,
except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years", so
that perjury which is punishable by imprisonment of from four (4)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months prescribes
after eight years.
Penal statutes, substantive and remedial or procedural are, by
consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and
liberally in favor of the accused.[7] As it would be more favorable to the
herein accused to apply Section 129 of Commonwealth Act 141 and Act
3326, as amended, in connection with the prescriptive period of the
offenses charged, the same should be applied.  Considering, therefore,
that the offenses were alleged to have been committed during the period
from May 15, 1952 to February 2, 1953, with respect to Criminal Case No.
7613; from May 28, 1952 to August 18, 1952, with respect to Criminal
Case No. 7614; and from November 16, 1951 to February 21, 1952, with
respect to Criminal Case No. 7615, and the informations were filed only
on March 13, 1962, or more than eight (8) years after the said offenses
were allegedly committed, the lower court correctly ruled that the crimes
in question had already prescribed.

23. In The Matter of the Petition of Antonio Infante for the Issuance of A Writ of Habeas
Corpus. Antonio Infante vs. The Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental, G.R. No.
L-4164, December 12, 1952, 92 Phil. 310

According to article 93 of the Revised Penal Code the period of

prescription of penalties commences to run from the date when the
culprit should evade the service of his sentence. It is evident from this
provision that evasion of the sentence is an essential element of
prescription.

There has been no such evasion in this case. Even if there had been one
and prescription were to be applied, its basis would have to be the
evasion of the unserved sentence, and computation could not have
started earlier than the date of the order for the prisoner's rearrest.
We think, however, that the condition of the pardon which the prisoner
was charged with having breached was no longer operative when he
committed a violation of the Motor Vehicle Law.
Pardon is an act of grace, and there is general agreement that limitations
upon its operation should be strictly construed (46 C. J. 1202); so that,
where a conditional pardon is susceptible of more than one
interpretation, it is to be construed most favorably to the grantee. (39
Am. Jur., 564.) Thus, in Huff vs. Dyer, 40 Ohio C. C. 595, 5. L R A , N S,
Note 1064), it was held that the duration of the conditions subsequent,
annexed to a pardon, would be limited to the period of the prisoner's
sentence unless an intention to extend it beyond that time was manifest
from the nature of the condition or the language in which it was
imposed. In that case, the prisoner was discharged on habeas
corpus because the term of the pardon in question did not, in the opinion
of the court, imply that it was contemplated to have the condition
operate beyond the term of his sentence. The herein petitioner's pardon,
it will be noted, does not state the time within which the conditions
thereof were to be performed or observed. In adopting, which we hereby
do, the rule of strict construction, we take into account, besides the
benevolent nature of the pardon, the fact that the general run of
prisoners are unlettered or at least unfamiliar with the intricacies and
legal implications of conditions subsequent imposed in a pardon.
There are courts which have gone so far as to hold, not without plausible
argument, that no conditions can be attached to a pardon that are to
extend after the expiration of the term for which the prisoner was
sentenced, although this view is not shared by the weight of authority.
(39 Am., Jur. 564, 567; 46 C. J. 1201.)
Unless the petitioner's pardon be construed as above suggested, the
same, instead of an act of mercy, would become an act of oppression and
injustice. We can not believe that in exchange for the remission of a
small fraction of the prisoner's penalty it was in the Executive's mind to
keep hanging over his (prisoner's) head during the rest of his life the
threat of recommitment and/or prosecution for any slight misdemeanor
such as that which gave rise to the order-under consideration.
There is another angle which militates in favor of a strict construction in
the case at bar. Although the penalty remitted has not, in strict law,
prescribed, reimprisonment of the petitioner for the remainder of his
sentence, more than ten years after he was pardoned, would be
repugnant to the weight of reason and the spirit and genius of our penal
laws. If a prisoner who has escaped and has given the authorities trouble
and caused the State additional expense in the process of recapturing
him is granted immunity from punishment after a period of hiding, there
is at least as much justification for extending this liberality through strict
construction of the pardon to one who, for the same period, has lived
and comported as a peaceful and law-abiding citizen.
Not improper to consider in this connection is the circumstance that the
prisoner's general conduct during his long confinement had been
"excellent", which had merited his classification as a trustee or penal
colonist, and that his release before the complete extinguishment of his
sentence could have been intended as a reward for his past exemplary
behavior with little or no thought of exacting any return from him in the
form of restraint from law violations, for which, after all, there were
independent and ample punishments.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, without costs.
Facts: Antonio Infante was sentenced to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal for murder.
After serving fifteen (15) years, seven (7) months and eleven (11) days of his sentence, he
was granted a conditional pardon and released from imprisonment.
The period of the sentence remaining to be served was one (1) year and eleven (11) days. The
condition of his pardon was that "he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines."
After ten (10) years one (1) month and nineteen (19) days, petitioner was convicted of a
violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, a special law, for driving a jeep without a
license and was sentenced to pay a fine of P10, with subsidiary imprisonment in ease of
insolvency.
The Executive Secretary ordered the re-arrest and recommitment of petitioner for violation of
the conditions of his pardon.
He was arrested and he sued out this writ of habeas corpus.
The Court of First Instance discharged the petitioner on habeas corpus because the term of
the pardon in question did not imply that it was contemplated to have the condition operate
beyond the term of his sentence.
The petition having been granted, the Provincial Fiscal has appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the petitioner should be detained for violation of his conditional pardon after his
original sentence has already elapsed.

Ruling: No. The Court thinks that the condition of the pardon which the petitioner was
charged with having breached was no longer operative when he committed a violation of the
Motor Vehicle Law.

The herein petitioner's pardon, it will be noted, does not state the time
within which the conditions thereof were to be performed or observed.
In adopting, which we hereby do, the rule of strict construction, we take
into account, besides the benevolent nature of the pardon, the fact that
the general run of prisoners are unlettered or at least unfamiliar with the
intricacies and legal implications of conditions subsequent imposed in a
pardon.

24. In Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010, 626 Phil. 177

TOPIC: Article 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability and Complex Crime

DOCTRINE: The real nature of the offense is determined by the facts alleged in the
Information, not by the designation of the offense. What controls is not the title of the
Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the Information. In
other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of
the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the Information. It is the exclusive
province of the court to say what the crime is or what it is named. The determination by the
prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed is merely an opinion which is
not binding on the court.

FACTS: Mediatrix Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of

petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. De Carungcong,
filed a complaintaffidavit for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese
national. It was alleged that the said accused feloniously induced Manolita Gonzales, the
owner of the estate and herein deceased, to sign and thumb mark a special power of attorney
(in the pretense of presenting a document pertaining to taxes) which authorized the sale,
assignment, transfer and disposition of the latter’s properties. In relation to this, the accused
moved for the dismissal of the case. As a defense against his arrant prosecution, the accused
here applies Art 332 of the Revised Penal Code. He cites that he falls under the enumeration
of those relatives who shall be exempt from criminal prosecution. Being a relative by affinity,
he cannot be held liable for the crime of estafa as stated in the law. He further counters that
the same law makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in case of death
of spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, the death of his spouse
Zenaida Carungcong Sato though dissolved the marriage with the accused, did not on the
other hand dissolve the mother in-law and son-law relationship between Sato and his wife’s
mother, Manolita. He then cannot be removed from the protective mantle of Art 332.

ISSUE: Whether or not does beneficial application of Article 332 cover the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification

RULING: Yes, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and
falsification of public document is required for a proper conviction for the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document. It means that the prosecution must establish
that the accused resorted to the falsification of a public document as a necessary means to
commit the crime of estafa. The falsification of a public, official or commercial document
may be a means of committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually
utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage
or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of a public,
official or commercial document. The allegations in the Information show that the
falsification of public document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA
to Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her intention in connection with her taxes.
While the falsification was consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation
of the estafa occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he
had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice
to Manolita was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to
the property rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign the document) but by the
subsequent use of the said document. That is why the falsification of the public document
was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the commission of the
estafa.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated

August 9, 2007 and the resolution dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. S.P. No. 95260 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial
court which is directed to try the accused with dispatch for the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents
 25. Martin Centeno vs. Hon. Victoria Villalon--Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092, September
01, 1994, 306 Phil. 218

TOPIC: Construction of Penal Laws

DOCTRINE: it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by
implications, intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. They are not to be strained
by construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies.
Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny
and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the accused. If the statute
is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which
operates in favor of a party accused under its provisions is to be preferred. The principle is
that acts in and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there
is a clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make them such. Whatever is
not plainly within the provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as without its
intendment. The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape
punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts.

FACTS: Sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as
the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of
renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the
chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles,
a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the
solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.

Judge Angeles filed against petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and
Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein
do not constitute an offense, claiming that Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers
solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a
religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel. The RTC ruled in favour of Judge
Angeles.

On appeal, petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to

solicitations for contributions intended for religious purposes with the submissions that (1)
the term "religious purpose" is not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence
what the law does not include, it excludes; (2) penal laws are to be construed strictly against
the State and liberally in favor of the accused; and (3) to subject to State regulation
solicitations made for a religious purpose would constitute an abridgment of the right to
freedom of religion guaranteed under the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether the phrase "charitable purposes" should be construed in its broadest sense
so as to include a religious purpose.

RULING: NO.
It is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications,
intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. They are not to be strained by
construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies. Hence,
in the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to
construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the accused. If the statute is
ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which operates
in favor of a party accused under its provisions is to be preferred. The principle is that acts in
and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there is a clear
and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make them such. Whatever is not
plainly within the provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as without its intendment.
The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment
through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts.
The word "charitable" is a matter of description rather than of precise definition, and each
case involving a determination of that which is charitable must be decided on its own
particular facts and circumstances. The law does not operate in vacuo nor should its
applicability be determined by circumstances in the abstract. Furthermore, in the provisions
of the Constitution and the statutes mentioned above, the enumerations therein given which
include the words "charitable" and "religious" make use of the disjunctive "or." In its
elementary sense, "or" as used in a statute is a disjunctive article in indicating an alternative.
It often connects a series of words or propositions indicating a choice of either. When "or" is
used, the various members of the enumeration are to be taken separately. Accordingly,
"charitable" and "religious," which are integral parts of an enumeration using the disjunctive
"or" should be given different, distinct, and disparate meanings. There is no compelling
consideration why the same treatment or usage of these words cannot be made applicable to
the questioned provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1564.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
petitioner Martin Centeno is ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.

26. Bernardo Lacanilao vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34940, June 27, 1988, 245
Phil. 519

TOPIC: Article 69 in relation to special mitigating circumstance

DOCTRINE: Incomplete justification is a special or privileged mitigating circumstance that

reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. Basic is the rule that
penal laws in favor of the accused should be given liberal construction without, going beyond
the obvious intention of the legislature. Article 69 is in favor of the accused as it provides for
a penalty lower by reason of the diminution of either freedom of action, intelligence, or
intent, or of the lesser perversity of the offender.

FACTS: Lacanilao, policeman, shot Ceferino Erese when he tried to stop him and the latter’s
companions from their drunken and disorderly conduct. The CFI found Lacanilao guilty of
homicide for the death Erese. CA found that Lacanilao acted in the performance of a duty but
that the shooting of Erese was not the necessary consequence of the due performance thereof,
therefore, crediting to him the mitigating circumstance consisting of the incomplete justifying
circumstance of fulfilment of duty.

ISSUE: When the decision finds in favor of the accused the circumstance of incomplete
fulfilment of duty or lawful exercise of a right, would Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code
apply, thereby resulting in the lowering of the penalty by one or two degrees?

RULING: Yes, Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code would apply.

Under Article 69 of RPC, incomplete justification is a special or privileged mitigating

circumstance, which, not only can not be offset by aggravating circumstances but also
reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law.

Here, the present case would have fallen under No. 5 of Article 11, on Justifying
Circumstances, if the two conditions therefor, viz.: (1) that the accused acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office and (2) that the injury or
offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office, concurred. However only the first condition is
fulfilled. Consequently, Article 69 is applicable. The requirement "that the majority of such
conditions be present" is immaterial since there are only two conditions under No. 5 of
Article 11 of the RPC. Basic is the rule that penal laws in favor of the accused should be
given liberal construction without, going beyond the obvious intention of the legislature.
Article 69 is in favor of the accused as it provides for a penalty lower by reason of the
diminution of either freedom of action, intelligence, or intent, or of the lesser perversity of the
offender.

DISPOSITIVE: GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the modification of the penalty pursuant
to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code and our ruling in Oanis. The petitioner is hereby
SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of from two years, four months, and one day of prision
correccional, to eight years and one day of prision mayor. The questioned judgment is AFFIRMED in
all other respects.

27. The People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Montenegro, G.R. No. 46728, September
30, 1939, 68 Phil. 659

TOPIC: Prescription of Offense

DOCTRINE: It is well settled that the prescription of a crime or offense is but the loss or
waiver by the State of its right to prosecute an act prohibited and punished by law.

FACTS: The accused was charged in the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros with a
violation of section 114, Title 38, of the United States Code Annotated, for having collected,
in or about the month of September, 1932, in the municipality of Dumaguete, Province of
Oriental Negros the sum of $700 equivalent to P1,400 from Valentina Calugcugan by reason
of his having acted as attorney or agent of the latter in the filing and prosecution of her claim
for pension earned upon the death of her husband Lorenzo Yrad, a soldier in the Philippine
Scouts, when the Federal Government of the United States made the first remittance of the
sum of $1,386.60 on account of said pension, the compensation collected by the accused
being in excess of that permitted by law, and the violation having been discovered only in the
month of August, 1937.

In the justice of the Dumaguete, where the original information was filed, the accused
interposed a demurrer and filed a motion for dismissal based respectively on the grounds that
the courts of this country have no jurisdiction to try the alleged offense and that the same,
assuming that it had been committed and is cognizable here, has already prescribed. Both
Pleadings were Overruled for lack of merit. When the case was called for trial, the accused
prayed that his demurrer and motion for dismissal be considered reproduced. The court
overruled the demurrer but sustained the motion for dismissal on the ground that the offense
had already prescribed and, consequently, the case was dismissed, with the costs de oficio.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the fiscal having been denied, he interposed the
present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the offense charged has already prescribed.

RULING: Yes. The pertinent portion of section 114, Title 38, of the United States Code
Annotated, reads as follows: ". . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanour, and upon
conviction thereof shall, for each and every such offense, be fined not exceeding $500 or
imprisoned, not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court."

Section 582, Title 18, of the same United States Code Annotated, provides, in part, as
follows: "SEC. 582. Offenses not capital. — No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished
for any offense, not capital, except as provided in section 584 of this title, unless the
indictment is found, or the information is instituted, within three years next after such offense
shall have been committed. . ."

It is admitted that the offense under consideration is not among those denominated as capital
offenses, nor among the exemptions enumerated in section 584 of the same title. The
pertinent part of section 1 of Act No. 3763 provides as follows: "Violations penalized by
special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the
following rules: x x x (c) After eight years for those punished by imprisonment for
two years or more, but less than six years."

The fiscal contends that the statute of limitations applicable is the above-quoted portion of
Act No. 3763, while the accused maintains that it should be section 582, Title IX, of the
United States Code Annotated. It is admitted that if the former statute were the one
applicable, the appealed order should be reversed and the case tried on the merits, while if the
latter statute were the one applicable the appeal must be dismissed for lack of merit.

It is well settled that the prescription of a crime or offense is but the loss or waiver by the
State of its right to prosecute an act prohibited and punished by law. It should be noted that
the provisions relative to the limitation established in Act No. 3763 refer to violations
punished by special Acts passed by the Philippine Legislature, and the violation imputed to
the accused is not included among them. On the contrary, the limitation acknowledged in
section 582, Title 18, of the United States Code Annotated, together with the provisos
enumerated therein, is applicable to all crimes and offenses penalized by the United States
statutes. We cannot conceive of any sound or convincing reason justifying the nonapplication
of said section 582 to offenses committed within this jurisdiction and punished by statutes
promulgated by the United States Congress. Reasons of high sense of justice demand that the
accused be granted the same kind of treatment as any other violator of the same law residing
and tried in a United States territory. We conclude, therefore, that section 582, Title 18, of the
United States Code Annotated, is applicable to the violation imputed to the accused, that the
order appealed from is in accordance with law, and that the assignments of error relied upon
by the fiscal are unfounded.
DISPOSITIVE: The order appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance de oficio.

28. Edgardo A. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69809, October 16,
1986, 229 Phil. 139

FACTS:

A direct assault case against Leonardo Laconico was filed by complainant Atty. Tito Pintor
and his client Manuel Montebon. The said complainants made a telephone call to Laconico to
give their terms for withdrawal of their complaint. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC)

Laconico, later on, called appellant Gaanan, who is also a lawyer, to come to his office to
advise him about the proposed settlement. When complainant called up, Laconico requested
appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as
to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. After enumerating the
conditions, several calls were made to finally confirm if the settlement is agreeable to both
parties.

As part of their agreement, Laconico has to give the money to the complainant's wife at the
office of the Department of Public Highways. But, he insisted to give the money to the
complainant himself.

After receiving the money, the complainant was arrested by the agents of the Philippine
Constabulary, who were alerted earlier before the exchange. Gaanan vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC)

Appellant stated on his affidavit that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the
withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the
complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against the complainant. 

In defense, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act as the appellant heard the telephone conversation without complainant's
consent.

Trial Court: both Gaanan and Laconico were guilty of violating Sect. 1 of RA No. 4200.
IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Hence, this petition. The case at bar involves an interpretation of the Republic Act No. 4200
or also known as Anti-Wiretapping Act. Petitioner contends that telephones or extension
telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording
devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated
by law. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

However, respondent argues that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term
"device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a
complete set of a telephone apparatus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the
Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful
interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line. 

HELD:

No.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200

  Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized
in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc
record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word
secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this
law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents
thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or
partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as
evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof,
shall not be covered by this prohibition. 

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be
either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or

the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line.

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement", although not exclusive to that enumerated
therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is,
instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It
refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or
parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their
purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation. Gaanan
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

The petition is granted and the petitioner is acquitted of the crime of violation of Republic
Act No. 4200.
 29. The United States vs. Antonio Abad Santos, G.R. No. 12262, February 10, 1917, 36
Phil. 243

Facts:
The appellant here is accused of violating the Internal Revenue Law. He was convicted and
sentenced to pay a fine of P10. He appealed.
Section 185 of Act No. 2339 (now section 2727 of the Administrative Code
The appellant is the owner of a printing establishment called "The Excelsior" and as such was
required by law to keep a book in which he should make the entries required by the above
quoted regulation. It is charged in the information that he violated the provisions of said...
regulation in that he failed to make any entry for the 5th day of January, 1915, indicating
whether any business was done on that day or not.
Issues:
a person should be held criminally liable for the acts of another done without his knowledge
or consen
Ruling:
Courts... will not hold one person criminally responsible for the acts of another, committed
without his knowledge or consent, unless there is a statute requiring .it so plain in its terms
that there is no doubt of the intention of the Legislature. Criminal statutes are to be strictly
construed. No person should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within them,
nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute.
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the accused acquitted

Principles:
It is undisputed that the accused took no part in the keeping of the book in question in this
case and that he personally never made an entry in it. He left... everything to his bookkeeper.
Under such circumstances we do not believe that the mere proof of the fact that the
bookkeeper omitted to make the entries required by the Internal Revenue Circular for the 5th
day of January, 1915, is an act upon which the conviction of the accused can be based. No
knowledge on his part was shown with regard to the bookkeeper's omission and the
Government does not contend that he had any knowledge. Nor is it contended that the
bookkeeper omitted the entry under the direction of the accused or with his connivance. No...
connection between the accused and the omission of the bookkeeper is shown or claimed. On
the contrary the broad contention is that the accused is responsible for the acts and omissions
of his bookkeeper, and that, if any act or omission of the bookkeeper violates the criminal...
law, the principal is responsible criminally.
With this we cannot agree. Neither the statute nor the circular of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, nor both together, expressly require such a result nor can we say from the circular
or the law that the intention to do so was so clear as to leave no room for doubt

30. People of the Philippines vs. Alejandro Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05, February 10,
1998, 349 Phil. 825

DOCTRINE: The time-settled rule is that nocturnity, as an aggravating circumstance, must

have been deliberately sought by the offender to facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery
or evade his capture or facilitate his escape.[14] The culprit must have purposely taken
advantage of the cover of night as an indispensable factor to attain his criminal purpose
FACTS ""Private complainant Regina Guafin, told the court that she is a granddaughter of
Trinidad Mejos and that the accused Alejandro Atop is the common law husband of said
Trinidad Atop . Her mother is a daughter of said Trinidad Ato and lives in Pangasinan. She is
an illegitimate child and she does not even know her father. Since her early childhood she
stayed with her grandmother Trinidad Atop [sic] and the accused at Barangay Santa Rosa,
Matag-ob, Leyte. Sometime in 1991 when she was already 10 years of age the... accused
started having lustful desire on her. The accused then inserted his finger into her vagina. She
told her grandmother about this but her grandmother did not believe her. She was then told by
her grandmother, Trinidad Mejos, that what her grandfather did to her was just a...
manifestation of fatherly concern. She continued staying with her grandmother and her
common law husband Alejandro Atop, the herein accused. On October 9, 1992, she was
called by the accused Alejandro Atop to do something for him. When she approached him the
accused rushed towards her, removed her panty and inserted his male organ into her vagina.
She was not able to do anything to resist him... because the accused gagged her mouth and
was carrying a knife with him. She was then 12 years old when the first rape was committed
to her and at that time her grandmother was then attending a delivery since her grandmother
was a 'hilot'. When her grandmother returned home she... told her what the accused did to her
but her grandmother, again, refused to believe her. She also remember [sic] of another
incident wherein she was raped again by the accused Alejandro Atop. On December 31,
1994, while she together with her Aunt Gloria Montealto and her two (2) nieces Rubilen and
Jubilen Atop were about to go to sleep, she noticed that the accused was looking for her.
Upon seeing her the accused rushed towards her and was about to... lay on top of her. She
kicked him. After that, the accused caressed and touched his nieces but his nieces also kicked
him.. She reported the incidents of rape that happened in 1992, 1993 and 1994 only in
January 1995. It took her so long to report the said incidents because she was afraid. The
accused threatened to kill her should she tell anybody about the incidents. She was...
accompanied by her Aunts Fe Decio and Rosenda Andales in reporting the said incidents to
the police. Her statement was taken by the police at the police headquarters. Thereafter, she
filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Judge of Matag-ob, Leyte

ISSUE/S The trial court erred in appreciating the circumstances of nighttime and relationship
as aggravating the penalty imposable for the rape allegedly

RATIO The time-settled rule is that nocturnity, as an aggravating circumstance, must have
been deliberately sought by the offender to facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery or
evade his capture or facilitate his escape.[14] The culprit must have purposely taken
advantage of the cover of night as an indispensable factor to attain his criminal purpose , that
the prosecution failed to prove that nighttime was deliberately sought by appellant to
facilitate his dastardly acts. In fact, the prosecution failed to show that appellant...
consummated his carnal designs at night, except only for the December 26, 1994 incident
which the victim said occurred at 11:00 p.m.[16] Much less is there any evidence
substantiating the trial court's conclusion that... appellant intentionally sought the darkness to
advance his criminal exploits. Neither can we appreciate relationship as an aggravating
circumstance.

The scope of relationship as defined by law encompasses (1) the spouse, (2) an ascendant, (3)
a descendant, (4) a legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or (5) a relative by affinity
in... the same degree. Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond
such as marriage. Relatives by affinity therefore are those commonly referred to as "in-laws,"
or stepfather, stepmother,... stepchild and the like; in contrast to relatives by consanguinity or
blood relatives encompassed under the second, third and fourth enumeration above. The law
cannot be stretched to include persons attached by common-law relations. Here, there is no
blood relationship or legal bond that links the appellant to his victim. Thus, the modifying
circumstance of relationship cannot be considered against him.

Undisputed is the fact that appellant is not the common law spouse of
the parent of the victim. He is the common law husband of the
girl's grandmother. Needless to state, neither is appellant the victim's
"parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree." Hence, he is not encompassed in
any of the relationships expressly enumerated in the aforecited
provision.

31. The People of the Philippines vs. Jose Deleverio, G.R. No. 118937-38, April 24,
1998, 352 Phil. 382

TOPIC: Rape. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659

DOCTRINE: Mandatory death penalty to the rape of a child who is 12 or younger is not applicable to the
victim’s step grandparent.

FACTS: 8-year old Roxan Benarao was raped by Jose Deleverio, her step grandparent (common law spouse of
her grandmother) on 2 separate occasions. These 2 incidents (April and May 1994) took place at the accused’s
residence in Basilan. Some time in May 1994, Susan Benarao took back her two children. When the child victim
told her brother and grandmother about what happened, they did not believe her. She then told her mother the
fact of her having been "molested" twice by the accused. Upon medical examination, it was confirmed that
Roxan lost her physical virginity.

Jose Deleverio was found guilty of 2 counts of rape by the trial court and was sentenced to mandatory death
penalty.

ISSUE: Whether the mandatory death penalty should be imposed to the victim’s step grandfather

RULING: NO, it does not apply to a step grandparent.

The mandatory death penalty is imposed when the victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is "a
parent, ascendant, step parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."

The trial court has thus held incorrectly in considering appellant, who is legally married to Roxan's natural
grandmother, as among those named in the enumeration. Appellant is merely a step-grandparent who obviously
is neither an "ascendant" nor a "step-parent" of the victim.

It is a basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused.
Court's must not bring cases within the provision of a law which are not clearly embraced by it. No act can be
pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by statute; so, too, no person who is not clearly within the
terms of a statute can be brought within them. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.

DISPOSITIVE: Conviction of 2 counts of rape is AFFIRMED but death penalties imposed are both reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
 32. Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001,
421 Phil. 290 32
TOPIC: Plunder Law

DOCTRINE: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.
In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his
favor the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State
succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused
is entitled to an acquittal.
It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive
crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It
is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed
“willfully, unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of
petitioner.

FACTS: Petitioner Estrada, President of the Phililippines is being prosecuted under RA 7080
(An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder as amended by RA 7659. He contends
that the, Plunder law is unconstitutional for being vague; second, The Plunder Law requires
less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of
the accused to due process; and third Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum,
and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.

ISSUE:
1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder
and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process
3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within
the power of Congress to so classify it.

RULING:
1. No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those
who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will
be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating
w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to
have committed. We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will
confuse petitioner in his defense.
Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his
fundamental right to due process. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because
general terms are used herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them.
2. No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of
plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it
being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his
favor the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State
succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused
is entitled to an acquittal.
Relative to petitioner’s contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that
“pattern” is a “very important element of the crime of plunder;” and that Sec. 4 is “two-
pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime, “ such that
without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder. We do not subscribe to petitioner’s
stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its
definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe
a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the
accused but only operated in furtherance of a remedy.
3. No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the
constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution
for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder
was committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the
part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is
the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator
Tañada made during the deliberation. Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge
is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act
done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable
doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of
the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element
of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal
intent.
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to
have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among
the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is
a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they
are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially
since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.

DISPOSITIVE: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise

known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently,
the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit

33. Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Et., Al. vs. The Secretary of Justice, Et.,
Al., G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014, 727 Phil. 28
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions seeking to declare several provisions of R.A. No. 10175
(The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012), unconstitutional and void.
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Petitioners claim
that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities
violate certain of their constitutional rights.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE CYBERCRIME
PREVENTION ACT ARE CONSTITUTIONAL INSOFAR AS THEY REGARD
CERTAIN ACTS AS CRIMES AND IMPOSE PENALTIES FOR THEIR
COMMISSION AS WELL AS WOULD ENABLE GOVERNMENT TO TRACK
DOWN AND PENALIZE VIOLATORS
 
RULING:
Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access is NOT unconstitutional.
 Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of
laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people and should thus be struck down.
The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional
construct, useful in determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of
things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage
of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to prove
that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest. Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess
the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.
Strict Scrutiny Standard not applicable in Illegal Access provision.
The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny
standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is
essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system of another without right. It is
a universally condemned conduct.
Engagement of ethical hackers requires an agreement, therefore, insulating him from the
coverage of Section 4(a)(1).
Petitioners fear that this section will jeopardize the work of ethical hackers, professionals
who employ tools and techniques used by criminal hackers but would neither damage the
target systems nor steal information. Ethical hackers evaluate the target system’s security and
report back to the owners the vulnerabilities they found in it and give instructions for how
these can be remedied. Ethical hackers are the equivalent of independent auditors who come
into an organization to verify its bookkeeping records.
Besides, the client’s engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as
to the extent of the search, the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested. This is
referred to as the “get out of jail free card.” Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior
permission from the client, such permission would insulate him from the coverage of Section
4(a)(1).
Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference is NOT unconstitutional.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to
discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression,
creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to
state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly,
thereby invading the area of protected freedoms. But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on
these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of
willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer
data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to
guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and
private documents.
Petitioners fail to discharge the burden of proving that the provision is invalid under the
Overbreadth Doctrine.
All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in
terrorem effect or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are
minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the State from
legislating criminal laws because they instill such kind of fear is to render the state powerless
in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct. Here, the chilling effect that results in
paralysis is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil that it seeks to punish
and creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise of one’s constitutional rights.
Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that
under no set of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid. Petitioner has failed to discharge
this burden.
No Equal Protection violation under Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause
in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same
fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other
literary device. For example, supposing there exists a well-known billionaire-philanthropist
named “Julio Gandolfo,” the law would punish for cyber-squatting both the person who
registers such name because he claims it to be his pseudo-name and another who registers the
name because it happens to be his real name. Petitioners claim that, considering the
substantial distinction between the two, the law should recognize the difference.
But there is no real difference whether he uses “Julio Gandolfo” which happens to be his real
name or use it as a pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he uses the name that the
law condemns. The law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad
faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the
rightful opportunity of registering the same. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section
4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.
Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft is NOT unconstitutional
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to
privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.
The right to privacy
The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution
as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
But the Court acknowledged its existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc, it ruled that the
right to privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty; it is in itself deserving
of constitutional protection.
Zones of Privacy
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of
intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal
process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction
that the right to privacy is a “constitutional right” and “the right most valued by civilized
men,” but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
mandates that, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy” and
“every has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the
right to privacy of communication and correspondence. In assessing the challenge that the
State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether
a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation
has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.
No showing how the provision violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the
right to due process of the law.
The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his
residence address, his contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if
any, his occupation, and similar data. The law punishes those who acquire or use such
identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to
show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to
privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of the law.
Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold
water since the specific conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like
speech. Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions, the acquisition, use, misuse
or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire
another’s personal data.
Section does not violate freedom of the press
Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that
journalists would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the
news to secure information about him that could be published. But this is not the essence of
identity theft that the law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of identity
information must be intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring and
disseminating information made public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a form of
theft.
The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through the
overt acts of the offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property
pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the
perpetrator. As such, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation, has
nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is
required by this Section.
Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex does NOT violate freedom of expression
Petitioners claim that the section violates freedom of expression. They express fear that
private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults,
which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes
when done “for favor” in cyberspace. In common usage, the term “favor” includes “gracious
kindness,” “a special privilege or right granted or conceded,” or “a token of love (as a ribbon)
usually worn conspicuously.” This meaning given to the term “favor” embraces socially
tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms
of married couples or consenting individuals.
The understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of “engaging
in a business” necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex. The Act actually seeks to punish
cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and consideration. This
includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam.
Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography committed through a computer system is NOT
unconstitutional
The section merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 (ACPA) to
cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from
invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using a
computer system.
The law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace.
But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative
and there is rational basis for such higher penalty. The potential for uncontrolled proliferation
of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.
Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications or SPAM is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating freedom of expression
The section penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also
known as “spam.” The term “spam” surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive
fantasy games. One who repeats the same sentence or comment was said to be making a
“spam.” The term referred to a Monty Python’s Flying Circus scene in which actors would
keep saying “Spam, Spam, Spam, and Spam” when reading options from a menu.
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial
communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of
internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes
with the owner’s peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass
to one’s privacy since the person sending out spams enters the recipient’s domain without
prior permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads
reduce the “efficiency of computers.” Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of
computers, have already been receiving such unsolicited ads by mail. These have never been
outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. What matters is that the
recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with spams.
Their recipient always have the option to delete or not to read them.
Commercial speech still entitled to protection
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his
emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate
category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally  guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The
State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
Section 4(c)(4) on Cyber-Libel insofar as it penalizes the author of the libelous
statement or article is NOT unconstitutional
Petitioner lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of
the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of “presumed malice” even when the
latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of “actual malice” as a basis
for conviction. Petitioners argue that inferring “presumed malice” from the accused’s
defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Petitioners would go further. They contend that the laws on libel should be stricken down as
unconstitutional for otherwise good jurisprudence requiring “actual malice” could easily be
overturned as the Court has done in Fermin v. People even where the offended parties
happened to be public figures.
Elements of libel: (a) allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b)
publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
There is “actual malice” or malice in fact when the offender makes the defamatory statement
with knowledge that is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The
reckless disregard standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of probable falsity.
There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence
is not sufficient to establish actual malice.
Prosecution bears the burden of proving actual malice in instances where such element is
required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement
turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public
figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director,
First National Conference on Land Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly, the
cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court recognizes that these
laws imply a stricter standard of “malice” to convict the author of a defamatory statement
where the offended party is a public figure. Society’s interest and the maintenance of good
government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence
of malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory
character of the assailed statement. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a
justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.
Cybercrime Prevention Act does not violate the Philippines’ obligations under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
General Comment 34 of ICCPR does not say that the truth of the defamatory statement
should constitute an all-encompassing defense. As it happens, Article 361 recognizes truth as
a defense but under the condition that the accused has been prompted in making the statement
by good motives and for justifiable ends.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be
admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made against government employees with
respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties.
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be
acquitted.
Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting the Commission of Cybercrime should be permitted to
apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section
4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on
Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-Squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-
related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on
Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex.  
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person
who willfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses
enumerate as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect
on protected expression.
Aiding and abetting certain cybercrimes must be distinguished between the actors
In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a) the blogger who originates the assailed
statement; b) the blog service provider like Yahoo; c) the internet service provider like
PLDT, Smart, Globe, or Sun; d) the internet café that may have provided the computer used
for posting the blog; e) the person who makes a favorable comment on the blog; and f)the
person who posts a link to the blog site.
The question is: are online postings such as “Liking” an openly defamatory statement,
“Commenting” on it, or “Sharing” it with others, to be regarded as “aiding or abetting?” In
libel in the physical world, if Nestor places on the office bulletin board a small poster that
says, “Armand is a thief!,” he could certainly be charged with libel. If Roger, seeing the
poster, writes on it, “I like this!,” that could not be libel since he did not author the poster. If
Arthur, passing by and noticing the poster, writes on it, “Correct!,” would that be libel? No,
for he merely expresses agreement with the statement on the poster. He still is not its author.
Besides, it is not clear if aiding or abetting libel in the physical world is a crime.
But suppose Nestor posts the blog, “Armand is a thief!” on a social networking site. Would a
reader and his Friends or Followers, availing themselves of the “Like,” “Comment,” and
“Share” reactions, be guilty of aiding or abetting libel? And, in the complex world of
cyberspace expressions of thoughts, when will one be liable for aiding or abetting
cybercrimes? Where is the venue of the crime?
Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed Like,
Comment and Share) are essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may think little or
haphazardly of their response to the original posting. Will they be liable for aiding or
abetting? And, considering the inherent impossibility of joining hundreds of thousands of
responding “Friends” or “Followers” in the criminal charge to be filed in court, who will
make a choice as to who should go to jail for the outbreak of the challenged posting?
Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting” cyber-libel,
unsolicited commercial communications and child pornography is a nullity for being
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives,
and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which
seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a person’s
reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep,
invading the area of protected freedoms.
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await
internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be
threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for
law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep that generates chilling
effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other
messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on
the cyberspace is a nullity.
When void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable
When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on
the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. Generally, the overbreadth and vagueness
doctrine is inapplicable in ‘facial” challenges to penal statutes not involving free speech. In
an “as applied” challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right
must assert his own right, not that of third persons. This rule is also known as the prohibition
against third-party standing.
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a “facial” challenge
to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own right under the
assailed statute where it involves free speech on the grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of
the statute.
The rationale for this exception is to counter the “chilling effect” on protected speech that
comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech
constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from
speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills
him into silence.
Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises
apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the
freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors
in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal
crimes such as libel are not punishable unless consummated. In the absence of legislation
tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other
countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited
Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand
scrutiny.
Section 6, which imposes a higher penalty on crimes penalized under the Revised Penal
Code if committed through information and communication technologies, is NOT
unconstitutional.
Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying
circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction
between crimes committed through the use of information and communications technology
and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the
offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater
harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.
Section 7, which allows prosecution both under the Cybercrime Law and the Revised
Penal Code, is UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as cyber-libel and cyber child
pornography is concerned.
There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is
again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate
libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the
other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and
are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under
Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)
(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication. Charging the
offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against double
jeopardy.
The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands
the ACPA’s scope so as to include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed,
ACPA’s definition of child pornography in fact already covers the use of “electronic,
mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means.” Thus, charging the offender under
both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Section 8 which imposes penalties for cybercrimes is NOT unconstitutional
The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative
prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards
as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear appropriate to the evil sought to be punished. The
power to determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded simply
because at some prior time the act or omission was but an element of another offense or
might just have been connected with another crime. Judges and magistrates can only interpret
and apply them and have no authority to modify or revise their range as determined by the
legislative department.
Section 12, authorizing law enforcement to collect real-time traffic data, is TOO
SWEEPING AND LACKS RESTRAINT
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record
traffic data in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official
abuse. They claim that data showing where digital messages come from, what kind they are,
and where they are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or recipients before
they are to be protected. Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be
protected from government snooping into messages or information that they send to one
another.
The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper governmental purpose since a law
may require the disclosure of matters normally considered private but then only upon
showing that such requirement has a rational relation to the purpose of the law, that there is
compelling State interest behind the law, and that the provision itself is narrowly drawn. In
assessing regulations affecting privacy rights, courts should balance the legitimate concerns
of the State against constitutional guarantees.
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a
need to put order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good. To do this, it is
within the realm of reason that the government should be able to monitor traffic data to
enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or recording of traffic data is part,
aims to provide the law enforcement authorities with the power they need for spotting,
preventing, and investigating crimes committed in cyberspace. Crime-fighting is a state
business.
Those who commit the crimes of accessing a computer system without right, transmitting
viruses, lasciviously exhibiting sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or consideration,
and producing child pornography could easily evade detection and prosecution by simply
moving the physical location of their computers or laptops from day to day. In this digital
age, the wicked can commit cybercrimes from virtually anywhere: from internet cafes, from
kindred places that provide free internet services, and from unregistered mobile internet
connectors. Criminals using cellphones under pre-paid arrangements and with unregistered
SIM cards do not have listed addresses and can neither be located nor identified. There are
many ways the cyber criminals can quickly erase their tracks. Those who peddle child
pornography could use relays of computers to mislead law enforcement authorities regarding
their places of operations. Evidently, it is only real-time traffic data collection or recording
and a subsequent recourse to court-issued search and seizure warrant that can succeed in
ferreting them out.
Two categories of right to privacy
In Whalen v. Roe, the United States Supreme Court classified privacy in two categories:
decisional privacy and informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to
independence in making certain important decisions, while informational privacy refers to the
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter right – the right to
informational privacy – that those who oppose government collection or recording of traffic
data in real-time seek to protect.
Informational privacy and its two aspects
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed,
and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion. In determining whether or not a
matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a
subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of
privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of
privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable.
Without reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact
Computer data – messages of all kinds – travel across the internet in packets and in a way that
may be likened to parcels of letters or things that are sent through the posts. When data is sent
from any one source, the content is broken up into packets and around each of these packets
is a wrapper or header. This header contains the traffic data: information that tells computers
where the packet originated, what kind of data is in the packet (SMS, voice call, video,
internet chat messages, email, online browsing data, etc.), where the packet is going, and how
the packet fits together with other packets. The difference is that traffic data sent through the
internet at times across the ocean do not disclose the actual names and addresses (residential
or office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded internet protocol (IP) addresses.
The packets travel from one computer system to another where their contents are pieced back
together.
Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the
messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient.
ICT users must know that they cannot communicate or exchange data with one another over
cyberspace except through some service providers to whom they must submit certain traffic
data that are needed for a successful cyberspace communication. The conveyance of this data
takes them out of the private sphere, making the expectation of privacy in regard to them an
expectation that society is not prepared to recognize as reasonable.
“Due Cause” under Section 12 has no precedent in law or jurisprudence
Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, “with due cause,” to collect or record by
technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time. But the cybercrime law, dealing with a
novel situation, fails to hint at the meaning it intends for the phrase “due cause.” Section 12
does not even bother to relate the collection of data to the probable commission of a
particular crime. It just says, “with due cause,” thus justifying a general gathering of data. It
is akin to the use of a general search warrant that the Constitution prohibits.
The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks
restraint. While it says that traffic data collection should not disclose identities or content
data, such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly, nothing can prevent law enforcement
agencies holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity of their sender or
receiver and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked
information or, worse, to extortion from certain bad elements in these agencies.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those “associated with specified
communications.” But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the
law enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is
virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in “fishing expedition,”
choosing whatever specified communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of
individuals to privacy.
This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the government and kindred
institutions to monitor individuals and place them under surveillance in ways that have
previously been impractical or even impossible. “All the forces of technological age x x x
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusions into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a
democratic and totalitarian society.” The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take
advantage of these technologies be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure
respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.
Section 13 on preservation of computer data and Section 17 on destruction of computer
data do not constitute undue deprivation of right to property
The contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their authors or
recipients and are to be considered private communications. The data that service providers
preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by
reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of preserving data will not unduly hamper
the normal transmission or use of the same.
It is unclear that the user has demandable right to require the service provider to have that
copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he wanted them preserved,
he should have saved them in his computer when he generated the data or received it. He
could also request the service provider for a copy before it is deleted.
Section 14 on disclosure of computer data does not violate privacy of communications
and correspondence
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of subpoena. Executive
agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.
Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant,
a function usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their
executive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would not constitute an
unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and
correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.
Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer data does not supersede
existing search and seizure rules
On its face, Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that
would ensure the proper collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data that
have been seized by virtue of a court warrant. The exercise of these duties does not pose any
threat on the rights of the person from whom they were taken. Section 15 does not appear to
supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely supplements them.
Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer data is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Computer data may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware, as well as
files that contain texts, images, audio, or video recordings. Without having to go into a
lengthy discussion of property rights in the digital space, it is indisputable that computer data,
produced or created by their writers or authors may constitute personal property.
Consequently, they are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, whether while
stored in their personal computers or in the service provider’s systems.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in one’s
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the Government, in effect,
seizes and places the computer data under its control and disposition without a warrant. The
Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.
The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19
operates as a restriction on the freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all
forms of speech are protected. Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, declare certain
kinds of expression as illegal. But for an executive officer to seize content alleged to be
unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not enough for him to be of the opinion that
such content violates some law, for to do so would make him judge, jury, and executioner all
rolled into one.
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards
jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech.
Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests:
the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and present
danger rule. Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to be blocked be found prima
facie in violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration,
this can actually be made to apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not take into
consideration any of the three tests mentioned above.
Section 20, punishing non-compliance with any order issued by law enforcement
agencies under Chapter IV, is NOT unconstitutional
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that
mere failure to comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to situations
where non-compliance would be reasonable or valid.
But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of P.D. 1829, Section 20
necessarily incorporates elements of the offense which are defined therein. Thus, there must
still be judicial determination of guilt, during which, defense and justifications for non-
compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies to the provisions of
Chapter IV which are not struck by the Court.
Sections 24 and 26, which provides the creation and powers of the Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordination Center, are VALID
Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national
cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow.
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has
adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test,
the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second
test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and
implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the
law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of
cybersecurity.
Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to
“prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and
prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for
fast and reliable international cooperation.” This policy is clearly adopted in the interest of
law and order, which has been considered as sufficient standard.

34. Spouses Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez vs. Commission on

Elections, G. R. No. 167011, April 30, 2008, 576 Phil. 357

FACTS:
Dennis Garay filed a case alleging that petitioners made false and untruthful representations
in their Voter’s Registration Record by indicating therein that they are residents of 935 San
Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents
of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City in
violation of Section 10(g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of Republic Act Nos. 8189 –
Voter’s Registration Act of 1996.    
\
Petitioners knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank
spaces corresponding to the length of time for residence. 
 
1.    A Complaint-Affidavit with a Prayer for Preliminary Investigation be conducted by the
COMELEC;
2.    Petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss contending that they
did not make any false or untruthful statements in their application for registration as
evidenced by;
o   Their act of leasing a house for 5 years in the locality.
o   A Resolution of Welcome passed by Barangay District III Council of Barauen.
3.    COMELEC investigating officer issued a resolution recommending to the COMELEC
Law Department the filing of appropriate information against the petitioners.
4.    COMELEC en banc filed information before RTC
5.    Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
 
Petitioners contend that Section 45(j) of the Voter’s Registration Act was void for being
vague as it did not refer to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would
constitute an election offense; hence, it ran contrary to Section 14(1) and section 14(2),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution ( due process clause)
Nevertheless, the Commission on Election (COMELEC) Charged the petitioners with
violations of Section 10 (g) and (j) , in relation to Section 45 (J) of the Voter’s Registration
Act.
 
Section 10 of RA No. 8189:
SEC 10 – Registration of Voters. -  A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list
of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides to be able to vote in any
election. To register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish an application form for
registration as prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies before the Election Officer
on any date during office hours after having acquired the qualifications of a voter. The
application shall, inter alia, contain the following data:
(g.)Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;
(j.)  A statement that the application is not a registered voter of any precinct;
 
SEC 45. Election Offense. -  The following shall be considered election offenses under this
Act:
(j.)  Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of its jurisdiction when it premised its resolution on a misapprehension of facts and failed to
consider certain relevant facts that would justify a different conclusion.

HELD:
NO.
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The void-for-vagueness
doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. However, this Court has imposed certain
limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized.
This Court has declared that facial invalidation or an “on-its-face” invalidation of criminal
statutes is not appropriate.
        Indeed, an “on-its-face” invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal
of parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would
constitute a departure from the usual requirement of “actual case and controversy” and permit
decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness. The rule
established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be
subjected to a facial challenge.
        Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will
be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is
evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. It is
succinct that courts will not substitute the finding of probable cause by the COMELEC in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility
 35. Alfredo T. Romualdez vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152259, July 29,
2004, 479 Phil. 265

Facts: People of the Philippines, through PCGG, filed a petition charging the accused with
violation of Section 5, RA. 3019 as amended. Said petitioner, brother-in-law of former
President Marcos and therefore, related by affinity within the third civil degree, did then and
there willfully and unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his
self-interested sic and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between
the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and
controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a
private corporation, the majority stocks of which is owned by former President Marcos,
whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and all
its titles and interests over all equipment and facilities including structures, buildings, shops,
quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at the Engineer
Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some of its equipment and machineries
from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship
repair program for the amount of P5,000,000.00.

Issue: whether or not petitioner enjoys derivative immunity from suit.

Ruling: In Estrada vs. Desierto, the SC exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity
in order to determine the extent of its applicability. Executive immunity applied only during
the incumbency of a President.  It could not be used to shield a non-sitting President from
prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office.  The reasoning of petitioner
must therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from one who is no longer sitting as
President.  Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and their close relatives are not acts of
the State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same
footing as any other trespasser.

36. People of the Philippines vs. Evangeline S. Siton, G.R. No. 169364, September 18,
2009, 616 Phil. 449

Doctrine:
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes any person found loitering about public or
semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets
without visible means of support. It provides:

Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. — The following are vagrants:

1.     Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and who
neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;

2.     Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering
about the country or the streets without visible means of support;

3.     Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or pimps and those who
habitually associate with prostitutes;
4.     Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found
loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable
purpose;

5.     Prostitutes.

For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.

Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles shall be punished by arresto menor
or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to
prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the
discretion of the court.

Facts:

Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy under Article 202
(2) of the Revised Penal Code. Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, they
filed separate Motions to Quash on the ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for
being vague and overbroad.

The municipal trial court declared Article 202(2) constitutional. Evangeline and Krystel filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, directly
challenging the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law.  They claimed that the definition of
the crime of vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart from being vague, results in an arbitrary
identification of violators, since the definition of the crime includes in its coverage persons
who are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts. They likewise claimed that Article 202
(2) violated the equal protection clause under the Constitution because it discriminates
against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable
classification.

The Regional Trial Court agreed with Evangeline and Krystel.  In declaring Article 202 (2)
unconstitutional, the Regional Trial Court opined that the law is vague and violated the
equal protection clause.  It held that the “void for vagueness” doctrine is equally applicable
in testing the validity of penal statutes.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court reversed the Regional Trial Court and ruled that Article 202(2) is not
vague:

The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and
inherent in the sovereign power of the state to maintain social order as an aspect of police power.
The legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful
provided that no constitutional rights have been abridged.  However, in exercising its power to
declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature must inform the citizen with reasonable
precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of
conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid. This requirement has come to be known as the
 void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. . . ”

The Regional Trial Court, in asserting the unconstitutionality of Article 202 (2), take support
mainly from the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in the Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville . . .

The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: 1) the assailed Jacksonville ordinance “fails to
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the
statute;” and 2) it encourages or promotes opportunities for the application of discriminatory law
enforcement.

The said underlying principle in Papachristou that the Jacksonville ordinance, or Article 202 (2) in
this case, fails to give fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct, finds no application here
because under our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
This principle is of Spanish origin, and we adopted it to govern and limit legal conduct in this
jurisdiction. Under American law, ignorance of the law is merely a traditional rule that admits of
exceptions.

Moreover, the Jacksonville ordinance was declared unconstitutional on account of specific

provisions thereof, which are not found in Article 202 (2). . .

Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacksonville declared the ordinance unconstitutional, because
such activities or habits as nightwalking, wandering or strolling around without any lawful
purpose or object, habitual loafing, habitual spending of time at places where alcoholic beverages
are sold or served, and living upon the earnings of wives or minor children, which are otherwise
common and normal, were declared illegal. But these are specific acts or activities not found in
Article 202 (2). The closest to Article 202 (2) – “any person found loitering about public or semi-
public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without
visible means of support” – from the Jacksonville ordinance, would be “persons wandering or
strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object.” But these two acts are
still not the same: Article 202 (2) is qualified by “without visible means of support” while the
Jacksonville ordinance prohibits wandering or strolling “without any lawful purpose or object,”
which was held by the U.S. Supreme Court to constitute a “trap for innocent acts.”

The Supreme Court also ruled that Article 202(2) does not violate the equal protection clause:

Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the
poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for
being poor or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to
endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or
unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.

Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive. It is a

public order crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time
which orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to
the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society,
as would engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the
community.

Finally, the Supreme Court also emphasized the rule the statues are presumed constitutional:

. . . we agree with the position of the State that first and foremost, Article 202 (2) should be
presumed valid and constitutional. When confronted with a constitutional question, it is
 elementary that every court must approach it with grave care and considerable caution bearing in
mind that every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor
of its constitutionality. The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and
to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is based on the
doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the
acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of
the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied, crafted and determined to be in accordance with
the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.

It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been
defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and
pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the
general welfare. As an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2) must therefore be viewed in
a constitutional light.

37. Allan Madrilejos, Et., Al. vs. Lourdes Gatdula, Et., Al., G.R. No. 184389, September
24, 2019

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would
be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or
dismiss it on ground of mootness.

FACTS:
• On July 7, 2008, 12 pastors and preachers from various churches filed a joint
complaintaffidavit against the officers and publishers of seven men's magazines and tabloids.
The complainants alleged that sometime during the period of September 2007 to July 2008,
the identified magazines and tabloids, which were printed, published, distributed, circulated,
and/or sold in the City of Manila, contained material which were "clearly scandalous,
obscene, and pornographic within the meaning and in violation of Articles 200 (Grave
Scandal) and 201 (Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent
shows) of the Revised Penal Code and Ordinance No. 7780 of the City of Manila."

Among those charged were petitioners Allan Madrilejos (Madrilejos), Allan Hernandez
(Hernandez), and Glenda Gil (Gil), Editor-in-Chief, Managing Editor, and Circulation
Manager, respectively, of For Him Magazine Philippines (FHM Philippines), with Lance Y.
Gokongwei and Lisa Gokongwei-Cheng, Chairman and President, respectively, of Summit
Publishing, FHM Philippines' publisher.

On July 24, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila (OCP Manila) issued a
subpoena requiring petitioners to submit, within 10 days from notice, their counter-affidavit,
among others, and appear before the proper authorities to testify under oath or answer
clarificatory questions.6 On August 14, 2008, petitioners appeared before respondent Lourdes
Gatdula (Gatdula). They were informed of the creation of a panel of prosecutors, composed
of respondent Gatdula with co-respondents Agnes Lopez (Lopez) and Hilarion Buban
(Buban), to conduct the preliminary investigation in the case. When petitioners requested for
additional time within which to study the complaint and prepare their respective counter-
affidavits, preliminary investigation was again reset to August 28, 2008.

Instead of filing their respective counter-affidavits, however, petitioners, prior to the August
28, 2008 hearing, filed an urgent motion for bill of particulars. • Meanwhile, on September
24, 2008, and pending the resolution of their urgent motion for bill of particulars, petitioners
filed the present action "on the ground that Ordinance No. 7780 is invalid on its face for
being patently offensive to their constitutional right to free speech and expression, repugnant
to due process and privacy rights, and violative of the constitutionally established principle of
separation of church and state." • Petitioners informed the Court that the OCP Manila had
already issued a Resolution dated June 25, 2013, which dismissed the charges for violation of
Article 200 of the RPC and Ordinance No. 7780 but nevertheless ordered the filing of
criminal informations for violation of Article 201(3) of the RPC.

ISSUE(S):

1. WON the dismissal of the criminal charges against petitioners for violation of the
provisions of Ordinance No. 778014 has rendered this case moot and academic
2. WON Ordinance No. 7780, an anti-obscenity law, cannot be facially attacked on the
ground of overbreadth because obscenity is unprotected speech

RATIO:

1. YES. In light of the dismissal with prejudice of all criminal charges against petitioners,
this case has clearly been rendered moot and academic. A moot and academic case is
one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so
that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. This
pronouncement traces its current roots from the express constitutional rule under
paragraph 2 of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that "[j]udicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x." Judicial power, in other words,
must be based on an actual justiciable controversy at whose core is the existence of a
case involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Without this
feature, courts have no jurisdiction to act. a. The "moot and academic" principle is not a
magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts
will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review. b. All the foregoing exceptions are present here
and justify this Court's assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners
alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is
no question that the issues being raised affect the public's interest, involving as they do
the people's basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press.
Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the
bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the
protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents' contested actions
are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.
2. YES. Even granting, for the sake of argument, that petitioners' case has not been mooted
by the dismissal of the charge for violation of Ordinance No. 7780 against them, they
have still failed to establish a cause of action to warrant a ruling in their favor. The
present petition does not involve a free speech case; it stemmed, rather, from an
obscenity prosecution. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from
their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area
of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech
cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. a. Petitioner asserts that
his utterance in question is a protected form of speech. The Court rules otherwise. It has
been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value expression
refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading
advertisement, insulting or "fighting words," i.e., those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering
national security. Under the circumstances, the proper recourse for petitioners would
have been to go to trial to allow the RTC, as the trier of fact, to judicially determine
whether the materials complained of as obscene were indeed proscribed under the
language of Ordinance No. 7780. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

38. People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Estrada, G.R. No. 130487, June 19, 2000, 389
Phil. 216
TOPIC: Exempting Circumstances (ART. 12)

DOCTRINE: An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted
during lucid interval. If the court finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was
committed, he shall be acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital or
asylum for treatment until he may be released without danger. An acquittal of the accused
does not result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict which is followed by
commitment of the accused to a mental institution.

FACTS: In 1994 at the St. John’s Cathedral, Dagupan City the sacrament of confirmation
was being performed by the Bishop. When the bishop was about to give his final blessing to
the the children, the accused-appellant who was from the crowd went up the altar and sat on
the Bishop’s chair. Santillan, assisting the Bishop, approached and requested him to vacate
the the chair but he replied in Pangasinense: “No matter what happen I will not move out!”.
Some of the churchgoers summoned Mararac, the security guard then he approached the
accused and told him to vacate but the latter merely stared intensely. The guard tapped the
hands of the accused with his nightstick but on his second strike the accused suddenly drew a
knife, lunged and stabbed Mararac, hitting him below his left throat. He got up and went to
the microphone and shouted:”No one can beat me here!” then he returned to the chair. SPO1
Francisco, who was directing traffic outside, received a report of the commotion inside the
cathedral. He ran to the accused and advised him to drop the knife. The accused obeyed and
Chief Inspector Rosario went near and was able to subdue the appellant then he was brought
to the police station and placed in jail. Mararac died in the hospital. An information was filed
charging accused Estrada with the crime of murder. At the arraignment, Estrada’s counsel
filed an urgent motion to suspend arraignment and to commit accused to psychiatric ward
because the accused cannot properly and intelligently enter a plea due to mental defect. The
trial court motu proprio propounded several questions on the accused and since he was able
to answer, the court denied the motion. The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty
was entered by the trial court on Estrada’s behalf. A Demurrer to evidence and
reconsideration was likewise denied, instead ordered the accused to present evidence. A letter
by the Jail Warden stating the irrational behavior of Estrada in the jail was also disregard by
the trial court. The accused did not take the witness stand, instead his counsel presented the
testimony of Dr. Gawidan stating that accused suffered from Schizophrenic Psychosis,
Paranoid Type. The trial court still upheld the prosecution evidence and found Estrada guilty
and sentenced him ton death.

ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime
charged, despite clear and convincing evidence on record, supporting his plea of insanity as
an exempting circumstance.

RULING: Yes. Art. 12 of the RPC provides that an imbecile or insane person is exempt
from criminal liability unless the latter has acted in lucid interval. When the imbecile or
insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony, the court shall order
his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for such persons thus afflicted,
which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission from the same
court. In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability. Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as
an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence referring to the time
preceding the act or the very moment of its execution. Circumstantial evidence, if clear and
convincing suffices for the unfathomable mind can only be known by overt acts. Here, the
absence of direct proof of insanity at the time of killing does not entirely discount the
probability that Estrada as of unsound mind, Several testimonies were presented that should
have been placed the trial court on notice of the unsoundness of mind such as those by
Santillan and the jail warden and also his former medical records. The fact that Estrada was
able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not conclusive evidence of
competency since the trial judge is not an expert in determining a person’s mental health. The
court should have ordered the mental examination of Estrada considering that he was
previously diagnosed with schizophrenia paranoid type which is a lifetime illness requiring
maintenance medication to avoid relapses. If medical examination was promptly made, it
would have determined his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of killing.

DISPOSITIVE: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D convicting accused-appellant Roberto
Estrada and sentencing him to death is vacated and the case is remanded to the court a quo for
the conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a determination of his
competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings.

39. People of the Philippines vs. Roger Racal, G.R. No. 224886, September 04, 2017, 817
Phil. 665

Facts: In an Information, Racal was charged with the crime of murder when the said accused,
armed with a knife, with treachery, unexpectedly, attack and use personal violence upon the
person of one Jose Francisco by stabbing the latter, at his body, thereby inflicting a fatal
wound and as a consequence of which he died. The prosecution established that while the
“trisikad” drivers were waiting for passengers, Racal told the group of drivers not to trust
Francisco because he is a traitor. Francisco asked Racal why the latter called him a traitor.
Without warning, Racal approached Francisco and stabbed him several times with a knife,
hitting him in the chest and other parts of his body.
Racal did not deny having stabbed Francisco but he raised the defense of insanity contending
that he has a predisposition to snap into an episode where he loses his reason and thereby acts
outside his conscious control.

Issue: Whether or not the defense of insanity may be validly invoked.

Ruling: No, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. In the eyes of the law,
insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. The
accused must be deprived of reason and act without the least discernment because there is a
complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
In the present case, the separate psychiatric evaluations of appellant were taken three and four
years after the crime was committed. An inquiry into the mental state of an accused should
relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed. On his
part, Dr. Gerong testified that he found appellant to have “diminished capacity to discern
what was wrong or right at the time of the commission of the crime.” “Diminished capacity”
is not the same as “complete deprivation of intelligence or discernment.”
The Court, however, appreciated the mitigating circumstance of illness as would diminish the
exercise of willpower of appellant without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of
his acts, pursuant to Article 13, paragraphs 9 and 10 of the RPC.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every
person is of sound mind and that all acts are voluntary.

Gist: Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant, Roger Racal,

assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed, with modification, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City finding herein appellant guilty of
the crime of murder.

40. Artemio Villareal vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 151258, February 01, 2012,
680 Phil. 527

Doctrine:
Because of the legislative treatment of hazing as malum prohibitum, the Supreme Court in
Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012 and Estrella vs. People, G.R. No.
212942, June 17, 2020 declared it as malum prohibitum.

PROBATION - Accused is charged of sale of dangerous drugs. Pursuant to a plea-bargaining

agreement, he pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of possession of drug paraphernalia, which
is punishable 6 months and 1 day to 4 years. Sale of dangerous drugs is not probationable.
However, in applying for probation, what is essential is not the offense charged but the
offense to which the accused is ultimately found guilty of. In sum, in determining the
eligibility of the accused for probation, the court shall consider possession of drug
paraphernalia for which he pleaded guilty, and not sale of dangerous drugs with which he is
charged. Possession of drug paraphernalia is probationable since the penalty prescribed for it
does not exceed 6 years of imprisonment. Under Section 24 of RA No. 9165, any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing cannot avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation Law. However, possession of drug paraphernalia is not considered as drug
trafficking or pushing. Hence, the accused is eligible to apply for probation. (Pascua vs.
People, G.R. No. 250578, September 07, 2020)

Offense where the penalty is more than 6 years of imprisonment is nonprobationable. In

Colinares vs. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011, the accused, who was convicted
by the lower court of a non-probationable offense of frustrated homicide, but on appeal was
found guilty of a probationable offense of attempted homicide, may apply for probation.

In Villareal vs. People, G.R. No. 151258, December 1, 2014, accused was convicted of
homicide, a nonprobationable crime, by the trial court. However, the SC found them liable
for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, which is a probationable crime, because of
lack of dolo. They can still apply for probation. RA No. 10707 has amended Section 4 of PD
968 by adopting the Colinares and Villareal. Under this provision, when a judgment of
conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment
is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be allowed
to apply for probation based on the modified decision before such decision becomes final.
This notwithstanding, the accused shall lose the benefit of probation should he seek a review
of the modified decision which already imposes a probationable penalty.

In Hernan vs. Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, December 5, 2017, accused was
convicted of malversation and sentenced to suffer a penalty of 11 years, 6 months and 21
days of prision mayor, which is non-probationable. The judgment becomes final prior to the
effectivity of RA No. 10951. Under Article 217 of RPCas amended by RA No. 10951, the
penalty for malversation involving an amount of not exceeding P40,000 is only prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Despite the immutability of a final
judgment, the Supreme Court reduced the penalty to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days of prision
correccional in accordance with RA No. 10951, which penalty is now probationable. It was
stated that because of RA No. 10951, not only must sentence of the accused be modified
respecting the settled rule on the retroactive effectivity of favorable laws, she may even apply
for probation. In sum, applying Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, as amended by R.A. No. 10707,
since the judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is modified through
the imposition of a probationable penalty, she is now allowed to apply for probation based on
the modified decision before such decision becomes final. (See also: Aguinaldo vs. People,
G.R. No. 226615, January 13, 2021)

FACTS: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity).

The neophytes, including victim, Lenny Villa, were subjected to initiation rites. After the
second day of initiation rites has ended, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members
Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened.
The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the
insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity
members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to
additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so
strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense
pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no
longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the
day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the
carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and
incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they
thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling
cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him
through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed
him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans.

G.R. No. 151258; Villareal v. People: The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly
committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 first,
denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. While
the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of
Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13
March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by
petitioner does not survive the death of the accused.

G.R. No. 155101; Dizon v. People: Petitioner Dizon sets forth two main issues first, that he
was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right to
present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process when the CA did not
apply to him the same "ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other accused.

G.R. No. 154954; People v. Court of Appeals: This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and
convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical
injuries. According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have
been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been
criminalized at the time Lenny died.

In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld,
inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the
injuries led to the victims death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally
liable for the resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080; Villa v. Escalona: Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal
of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a
reasonable period of time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the
delay, as the original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were still
in the appellate court.

ISSUES:

[1] G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People: Did the death of Villareal extinguish his
criminal liability?
[2] G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People: Was Dizon deprived of due process?
[3] G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals: Did the CA err in convicting accused of
the lesser offense of slight physical injuries instead of homicide?
[4] G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona): Did the CA err in dismissing the
case for violation of the accused's right to speedy trial?

HELD: G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People: In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and
while the Petition was pending resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioners
Notice of Death of Party.

According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties
is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary
penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term "personal
penalties" refers to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties, while the term
"pecuniarypenalties" (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs, including civil liability
predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto). However,
civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the
accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.

Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both
personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict
complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against
him deemed closed and terminated.

G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People): The right of the accused to present evidence is
guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself.

Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel" This constitutional right includes the right
to present evidence in ones defense, as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in
person at every stage of the proceedings.

The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25
August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have
considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused
General had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding
trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the
trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to
impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days
set for Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates
constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.

In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the court
is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a
waiver of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply
warned of the consequences of another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court
must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and consequences
of a waiver.

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona): We do not see grave abuse of discretion
in the CAs dismissal of the case against accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on
the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial.
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to the
delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to
speedy trial has been utterly violated in this case.

The absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case
were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order
of the court a quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from
the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an
Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete
records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said
Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated
December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not
stated when such order was complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5,
2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was
made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused
Concepcion.

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of
almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the
pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January
29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998
which the court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length of
time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution
frowns upon.

From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that
accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the
records that would show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S.
Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.

G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals): The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits
the state from appealing the judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the
penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or
through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.

As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, a verdict of acquittal is

immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate
courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense.

This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts acquittal
of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized
exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process; (2) where there is a finding of mistrial; or
(3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.

The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies
when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused. We have also
recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear
demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to
deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. The present case is one of those instances of
grave abuse of discretion.

The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa in finding that the four accused
should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of "the
death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity
or medical attendance required. The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced.

On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were
liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact.
According to the court, the four accused "were found to have inflicted more than the usual
punishment undertaken during such initiation rites on the person of Villa. It then adopted the
NBI medico-legal officers findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the
"multiple traumatic injuries" he suffered from the initiation rites. Considering that the CA
found that the "physical punishment heaped on Lenny Villa was serious in nature, it was
patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries, which
is a light felony.

Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the
consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person
is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical
injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the
legal framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to
discretion.

Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of
themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof
that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered, the
only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have
been proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The
accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we
find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical
injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give due
course to the Petition.

41. Norma De Joya vs. The Jail Warden of Batangas City, G.R. Nos. 159418-19,
December 10, 2003, 463 Phil. 339

TOPIC: Writ of Habeas Corpus; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

DOCTRINE: The writ of habeas corpus is not allowed if the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. The Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the Courts to take into account not only the purpose of the
law but also to see to it whether the accused acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact
without any taint of negligence.

FACTS: Accused Norma De Joya, with the knowledge that she does not have funds in or
credit with the Solid Bank, make and issued to one Flor Catapang De Tenorio a check
postdated to October 28, 1994 in the amount of P150,000.00. However, when the check was
presented for full payment with the drawee bank within a period of 90 days from the date of
the check, it was dishonored by the drawee bank since the funds were insufficient, and
despite the notice of dishonor and demands made upon the accused to make payment in full
directly to Catapang de Tenorio, she failed and refused to do so. Same thing happened to
Resurrection T. Castillo, wherein the accused issued a postdated check worth P225,000.00
postdated to October 24, 1994.

The accused was then charged separately for the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P.
Blg. 22) before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities in Batangas City. Upon arraignment, the
petitioner pleaded not guilty for the crime charged. While the trial was on going, the
petitioner jumped bail. The trial court ruled against the petitioner. No appeal was made and
for the meantime, the Court issued Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
enjoining all courts and judges concerned to take notice of the ruling a policy of the Court as
held in Vaca v. Court of Appeals and Lim V. People with regard to the imposition of the
penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22. After five years, the petitioner was finally arrested
while applying for an NBI clearance. She then filed an urgent motion to the trial court asking
the later to apply the circular to her pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code and
order her to release from detention. The public prosecutor opposed the motion, and the trial
court denied the motion of the petitioner. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.

RULING: No, the petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that the writ of habeas
corpus is not allowed if the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record.

In the present case, the petitioner was arrested and detained by virtue of the final judgment
issued by the trial court which convicted her for violating B.P. Blg. 22. Thus, it is clear that
the petitioner is not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus. Her allegation that a convicted
person is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law is
misplaced. It is clear that the issued circular is not a penal law, thus, Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code is not applicable since the circular only applies to cases which are pending as to
its effectivity and not to cases which are already terminated by final judgment. Also, the said
circular merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. Such circular does not amend nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law.
It merely urges the Courts to take into account not only the purpose of the law but also to see
to it whether the accused acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without any taint of
negligence. Thus, the said circular does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty
for violations of B.P. Blg. 22. The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to
impose a single penalty or conjunctive penalties.
In providing for alternative penalties in B.P. Blg. 22, the Congress took into account the
principal objectives of the law, which is the prohibition on the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. The law punishes the act as an offense against public order
and not as an offense against property. On the other hand, in imposing penalties for crimes,
the Philippine penal law is based on the Spanish penal code and has adopted features of the
positivist theory of criminal law wherein it states that the basis of criminal liability is the sum
total of the social and economic phenomena to which the offense is expressed. The convict
was looked upon as a member of the society and the factors that needs to be considered in
determining the penalty to be imposed on him are his relationship towards his dependents,
family, and their relationship with him, and his relationship towards the society at large and
the State.

In the present case, the petition will still be dismissed even if the circular will be applied in
favor of him since the petitioner did not present any evidence during trial and the judgment
has become final and executory since there was no appeal filed and the petitioner remained at
large for five long years.

DISPOSITIVE: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO
ORDERED.

42. The People of the Philippines vs. Eugenio M. Garcia, G.R. No. L-2873, February 28,
1950, 85 Phil. 651

FACTS: Eugenio Garcia Madrigal was found guilty of the crime of robbery. He was 17 years
of age at the time of commission of the crime. The lower court, ignoring the defendant’s
minority, sentenced him an indeterminate penalty from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision
correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, and was sentenced the offended party the sum of
Php 85.00 as indemnity.

R.A. 47 (Oct. 3, 1946) reducing the age from 18 to 16 below which accused have to “be
committed to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable institution,”
instead of being convicted or sentenced to prison. The Solicitor General believes that the
amendment by implication has also amended par. 2 of Art. 80 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides that when the offender is over fifteen and under eighteen years of age, “the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Eugenio, being 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the
crime, was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of Art. 68, par. 2 of RPC.

RULING: Yes. Eugenio, defendant is entitled to the privilege of mitigating circumstances

under Art. 68 of the RPC. The preamble or explanatory note to Republic Act No. 47 cannot
be used as basis for giving it a meaning not apparent on its face. A preamble or explanatory
note is resorted to only for clarification in cases of doubt.
 43. Rosario Valera vs. Mariano Tuason, Jr., Et. Al., G.R. No. L-1276, April 30, 1948, 80
Phil. 823

TOPIC: Right to Due Process

DOCTRINE: --

FACTS: Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. They bought a
parcel of land from Carmel Farms, Inc. located in a subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan
City. The new Torrens Title was issued in the name of the spouses and took possession of
their property.
Some eight (8) years thereafter, the Tuasons' travails began. They woke up one morning to
discover that by presidential fiat, they were no longer the owners of the land they had
purchased with their hard-earned money, and that their land and the other lots in the
subdivision had been ordered and decreed by dictator Ferdinand Marcos in Presidential
Decree 293, that any and all sales contracts between the government and the original
purchasers, of the subject land are cancelled, and those between the latter and the subsequent
transferees, and any and all transfers thereafter. He declared open for disposition and sale to
the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide
occupants thereof."
The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the
Marcos decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a
selected group, in violation not only of the constitutional provisions on due process and
eminent domain but also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility
of Torrens titles; and they prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the
derogatory inscription on their title and restore its efficacy, or in the alternative, that they be
compensated for the loss from the Assurance Fund.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the right to due process to which the
petitioners are entitled in virtue of the Constitution.

RULING: Yes. Marcos had assumed to exercise power — i.e., determined the relevant facts
and applied the law thereto — without a trial at which all interested parties were accorded the
opportunity to adduce evidence to furnish the basis for a determination of the facts material to
the controversy. He made the finding ostensibly on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of
Lands." Prescinding from the fact that there is no indication whatever the nature and
reliability of these records and that they are in no sense conclusive, it is undeniable that the
petitioner Tuasons (and the petitioners in intervention) were never confronted with those
records and afforded a chance to dispute their trustworthiness and present countervailing
evidence. This is yet another fatal defect. The adjudication was patently and grossly violative
of the right to due process to which the petitioners are entitled in virtue of the Constitution.
Mr. Marcos, in other words, not only arrogated unto himself a power never granted to him by
the Constitution or the laws but had in addition exercised it unconstitutionally.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, Presidential Decree No. 293 is declared to be unconstitutional and

void ab initio in all its parts. The public respondents are commanded to cancel the inscription on the
titles of the petitioners and the petitioners in intervention of the memorandum declaring their titles null
and void and declaring the property therein respectively described "open for disposition and sale to
the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc.;" to do whatever else is needful to
restore the titles to full effect and efficacy; and henceforth to refrain, cease and desist from
implementing any provision or part of said Presidential Decree No. 293. No pronouncement as to
costs.

FACTS: A complaint was filed in the justice of the peace court of Lagayan which Judge
Paredes presided. Finding himself disqualified to try the case by reason of relationship. Judge
Paredes transferred it to the justice of the peace court of La Paz, the nearest municipality
from Lagayan.

The justice of the peace court of La Paz proceeded with the trial, after which he gave
judgment for the plaintiff and returned the record of the case to the justice of the peace of
Lagayan. Justice Tuason, Jr., the newly appointed justice of peace of Lagayan, overturned the
decision on the ground that “the designation of another justice of the peace to hear, try and
decide a given case, when the justice having jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the case
disqualifies himself, is not in law given to the disqualifying justice but ‘to the judge of the
district’ who ‘shall designate the nearest justice of the peace.’”

- Section 73 of Act No. 190 as amended:

In every case, whether civil or criminal, of disqualification of a justice of the peace of the
peace upon any ground mentioned in section 8 of this Act, the regular justice shall notify the
auxiliary, who shall thereupon appear and try the cause, unless he shall be likewise
disqualified or otherwise disabled, in which event the cause shall be transferred to the nearest
justice of the peace of the province who is not disqualified.

- Section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code:

The auxiliary justice of the peace shall have the same qualifications and be subject to the
same restrictions as the regular justice, and shall perform the duties of said office during any
vacancy therein or in case of the absence of the regular justice from the municipality, or of
his disability or disqualification.

In case there is no auxiliary justice of the peace to perform the duties of the regular justice in
the cases above mentioned, the justice of the district shall designate the nearest justice of the
peace of the province to act as justice of the peace in such municipality

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code has impliedly
repealed Section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

RULING: No. Section 73 of the Act no. 190 and Section 211 of the Revised Administrative
Code can stand together. In order that one law may operate to repeal another law, the two
laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable
with the latter act. (U.S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil., 208.)
44. The United States vs. Jose S. Serapio, December 07, 1912, 23 Phil. 584

A "special law" is defined in U.S. vs. Serapio, 23 Phil.

584, as a penal law which punishes acts not denned and
penalized by the Penal Code.
Special law is a statute enacted by the Legislative
branch, penal in character, which is not an amendment to
the Revised Penal Code. Special laws usually follow the
form of American penal law.

45. Benjamin ("KOKOY") T. Romualdez vs. Hon. Simeon V. Marcelo and Presidential
Commission on Good Government, G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006, 529 Phil. 90
FACTS: Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure
to file his Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during his
tenure as Technical Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs. However, the petitioner
contended that his criminal liability was extinguished by way of prescription. Respondents
alleged that the prescription was interrupted due to the absences of the petitioner for being
abroad.

ISSUE: Whether the prescription period of an offense of a special law may be interrupted by
the absence of the accused for being outside the criminal jurisdiction of our court through
Suppletory application of Art 10. of the RPC.

RULING: No, if there is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the
RPC applies suppletorily, Thus, the Court has applied suppletorily various provisions of the
RPC to resolve cases where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. Section 2 of
Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The
legislature did not consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to
the running of the prescriptive period.
46. Evangeline Ladonga vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. NO. 141066, February 17,
2005, 492 Phil. 60

TOPIC: ARTICLE 10. Offenses Not Subject to the Provisions of this Code. — Offenses which are or
in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code . This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

DOCTRINE: B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of
the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC
which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.

FACTS: Spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became regular customers in the pawnshop
business of complainant Alfredo Oculam. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained
three loans from him, guaranteed by three post-dated United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Checks.
The three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason of ‘closed account’. When the Ladonga
spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, Alfredo Oculam filed a criminal
complaint against them. Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the
obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature.  RTC
rendered a decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P.
Blg. 22. Adronico filed for a probation which was granted, while Evangeline Ladonga elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring
with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law.
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner. Hence this case.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the principle of conspiracy, as defined under
the RPC, to violations of B.P. Blg. 22.

RULING: No. The Court of Appeals did not err in applying the principle of conspiracy, as defined
under the RPC, to violations of B.P. Blg. 22. The B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the
suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P.
Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be
applied suppletorily.

The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application of
the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte.  For once conspiracy or action in concert
to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise
extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals.  BUT in the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any
overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.  Conspiracy must be established, not by
conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated May
17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443 affirming the Decision, dated August 24,
1996, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070
convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.

FACTS: Evangelina and Adronico Ladonga and spouse, conspiring and knowing fully well
that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB), drew and issue UCPB Check No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of
P9,075.55), payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter that they
did not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the check, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said
check to Alfredo by way of rediscounting of the aforementioned checks; however, upon
presentation of the check to the drawee bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for
the reason that the account of the accused had already been closed, to the damage and
prejudice of Alfredo.
The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Adronico applied for probation which was granted. On the
other hand, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in
finding her criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is
inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the
checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.

ISSUES: a.) Whether conspiracy is applicable in violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, by
invoking art. 10 of RPC?

b.) Whether or not the cases cited by the CA in affirming in toto the conviction of petitioner
as conspirator applying the suppletory character of the RPC to special laws like BP 22 is
applicable?

RULING: A.) YES. Some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition
of the second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg.
22 does not provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows: ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of
this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless
the latter should specially provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future
are made punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while
the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws

B.) B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of
the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of
the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs. People the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on
subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.

The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the
application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act
of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them
becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. BUT In the present case, the
prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the
alleged conspiracy. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. Thus, Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges
against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
47. The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Gregorio Santiago, G. R. No. 17584, March
08, 1922, 43 Phil. 120

Subject Matter: State authority to punish crimes

Relevant Codal Provisions/Doctrine (accdg to Course Outline): 1987 Constitution
Article II. SECTION 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty,
and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy.
Article VI. SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the
extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
Article II. SECTION 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

The People of The Philippine Islands (plaintiff & appellee) v. Gregorio Santiago (defendant
& appellant)
G.R. NO. 17584 / 43 Phil. 120 / 08 March 1922 (before the 1987 Constitution)
Ponente: ROMUALDEZ

Facts:
 Defendant Gregorio Santiago, with his automobile, ran over Porfirio Parondo (7 years
old) due to his negligence (failure to drive with vigilant care). Santiago was
prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless negligence and was sentenced to
suffer one year and one day of prison correccional, and to pay the costs of the trial.
 Defendant appealed with the allegation that the lower court has committed four errors:
1. Appellant was prosecuted in conformity with Act No. 2886 of the Philippine
Legislature and that this Act is unconstitutional and gave no jurisdiction in this
case.
2. Lower court erred in not dismissing the case after the presentation of the
 evidence, if not before, for the reason that Act No. 2886 is unconstitutional.
Thus the proceedings had no due process of the law.
3. The court lacked jurisdiction over the person of the accused and over the
subject-matter of the complaint.
4. The trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged and in
its sentence.

Issue/s:
Whether or not Act No. 2886, under which the complaint in the present case was filed, is
valid and constitutional.
- This Act is attacked on account of the amendments that it introduces in
General Orders No. 58, the defense arguing that the Philippine Legislature
was, and is, not authorized to amend General Orders No. 58, as it did by
amending section 2 thereof because its provisions have the character of a
constitutional law. Said section 2 provides as follows: "All prosecutions
for public offenses shall be in the name of the United 'States against the
persons charged with the offenses."

Holding: Yes. The act is valid and is not a violation of any constitutional provision.
 Procedure in criminal matters is not incorporated in the Constitutions of the States,
but is left in the hands of the legislatures, so it falls within the realm of public
statutory law.
 It is urged that the right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of sovereignty
(US government). But by reason of the principle of territoriality as applied in the
suppression of crimes, such power is delegated to subordinate government
subdivisions such as territories.
 The power to define and punish crimes is possessed by the Philippine Legislature by
virtue of the provisions of section 7 of the Jones Law. These territorial governments
are local agencies of the Federal Government, wherein sovereignty resides; and when
the territorial government of the Philippines prosecutes and punishes public crimes it
does so by virtue of the authority delegated to it by the supreme power of the Nation.
Jones Law - Section 7. "That the legislative authority herein provided shall have power,
when not inconsistent with this Act, by due enactment to amend, alter, modify, or repeal any
law, civil or criminal, continued in force by this Act as it may from time to time see fit."
 LAW RELATING TO PLAINTIFF IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS.—There is not
a single constitutional provision applicable to the Philippines prescribing the name to
be employed as party plaintiff in criminal cases. The Philippine Government is
autonomous and acts under its delegated powers in the prosecution and punishment of
crimes, and Act No. 2886 was not expressly repealed by Congress and it neither
contravenes any provision of the Federal Constitution nor of the Philippine Organic
Act. Therefore, its provision that all prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the
name of the People of the Philippine Islands against the person charged with the
offense is valid and constitutional.

Dispositive: Decision of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros (Judge Villareal)
affirmed. The appellant is furthermore sentenced to the accessory penalties prescribed in
article 61 of the Penal Code, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000
and to the payment of the costs of both instances.
 48. The United States vs. Andres Pablo, G.R. No. L-11676, October 17, 1916, 35 Phil. 94

TOPIC: Repeal of penal laws must be Express

DOCTRINE: Administrative code that impliedly repealed the Penal Code, was subsequently
repealed by another law, the provisions of the penal code is revived.

FACTS: Andres Pablo a policeman in Balanga went by order to raid a jueteng game. Pablo
reported that he raided the jueteng however, only found one Francisco Dato and refrained
from arresting Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo. Upon arraignment Dato pleaded guilty
and Malicso and Rodrigo pleaded not guilty, Pablo testified that he only saw Dato and did not
see Malicsi and Rodrigo. In view of Pablo’s testimony Malicsi and Rodrigo was acquitted
and Dato was convicted. Before the trial, Pablo had an interview and conference with accused
Malicsi and Rodrigo and was instructed not to testify against them for the sum of P5 received
through one Gregorio Ganzon. Based on the foregoing a preliminary investigation was
conducted charging Pablo of perjury, and upon testimony of Dato and Malicsi saying that
Pablo saw them during the raid and Malicsi and Pablo had a personal relation, Pablo was
convicted under Administrative Code. 1697, which was however repealed by Administrative
Code 2657. ISSUE: WON Administrative Code 2657 effectively repealed perjury under the
Penal Code

RULING: NO. Administrative Code 2657 repealed perjury under Administrative Code 1657,
but it did not effectively repeal the provision of the penal code regarding perjury. However,
since the provision of the penal code regarding perjury was impliedly repealed by
Administrative Code 1657, the Supreme court held that the provision of perjury of the penal
code was revived in the interest of justice. However, since the Penal Code went into force,
the crime of false testimony has been punished under the said articles of the said Code, which
as we have already said, have not been specifically repealed by the said Act No. 1697, but
since its enactment, have not been applied, by the mere interpretation given to them by this
court in its decisions; yet, from the moment that Act was repealed by the Administrative
Code, the needs of society have made it necessary that the said articles 318 to 324 should be
deemed to be in force, inasmuch as the Administrative Code, in repealing the said Act
relating to perjury, has not explicitly provided that the said articles of the Penal Code have
likewise been repealed.

DISPOSITIVE: Decision reversed, accused Pablo guilty of perjury

PETITION GRANTED

FACTS:

· On October 21, 1915, Andres Pablo, a policeman of the municipality of Balanga, was
instructed by his Chief to raid a jueteng game in the barrio of Tuyo

· Andres Pablo arrived at the scene and saw the two cabecillas Maximo Malicsi and
Antonio Rodrigo leaving the place but refrained from arresting them since he had no material
proof that the game was being played
· He only found gambler Francisco Dato and arrested him. He also found thereon, a low
table, a tambiolo and 37 bolas

· Subsequently, The Chief of Police filed a case against the three men using the
testimony of policeman Andres Pablo as an evidence against them

· During the trial, Andres Pablo testified otherwise and denied under oath that he had
seen Malicsi and Rodrigo ran away

· The provincial fiscal investigated further on the case and found out that before the
case came to trial in the justice of the peace court, the policeman Pablo had conference with
the accused Malicsi and Rodrigo and agreed that he would exclude the involvement of the
two in the case in exchange of a bribe of fifteen pesos.

· Because of this development, the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance charging Andres Pablo with the crime of perjury in violation of section 3 of Act
No. 1697 declaring that he willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously affirmed and swore under
oath in legal form before the justice of the peace during the hearing of the case of Rodrigo
and Malicsi for violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 5 of the municipality of Balanga when
he excluded the two accused from involvement in the incident despite being utterly false and
material to the decision of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of the crime of perjury or of false testimony
under Art. 318 to 324 of the Revised Penal Code

RULING: Yes. The respondent is guilty of such crime under Article 318 to 324 of the Penal
Code since such Articles are not expressly repealed by the Administrative code when it
repealed Act No. 1697.The Article 318 to 324 of the Penal Code in which the crime of false
testimony has been punished was not specifically repealed by the said Act. No. 1697. Article
318 to 324 of the Penal Code is deemed to be in force and are properly applicable to crimes
of false testimony
49. People of the Philippines vs. Yolanda P. Santos, G.R. No. 237982, October 14, 2020

TOPIC: Qualified Theft

DOCTRINE: Each occasion of "taking" constitutes a single act with an independent existence and
criminal intent of its own. All the "takings" are not the product of a consolidated or united criminal
resolution, because each taking is a complete act by itself. Each taking results in a complete
execution or consummation of the delictual act of defalcation.

FACTS: Respondent-Appellant is the Officer-in-Charge property accountant of the private respondent

Dasman Realty and Development Corporation with duties to collect, issue receipts, account and
liquidate all payments, collections and remit the same to the latter. On fourteen different occasions,
Yolanda failed to remit several sums of money in favor of the private petitioner alleging she gave it to
the engineer whom passed away.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent-appellant is liable for qualified theft for the failure to remit several
sums of money.

RULING: Yes. Thus, the elements of qualified theft punishable under Article 310 in relation to Article
308 of the RPC are as follows: (1) there was a taking of personal property; (2) the said property
belongs to another; (3) the taking was done without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking was done
with intent to gain; (5) the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against person, or
force upon things; and (6) the taking was done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article
310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.

In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish the presence of all the elements of qualified
theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 308 of the RPC. Accused-appellant, as part of her duty as
OIC-Property Accountant of Dasman Realty, admitted that she received the payments from Dasman
Realty’s clients for the period September 2011 to May 2013 in the total amount of P1,029,893.33,
thus, she had actual possession of the monies, yet failed to remit the same to Dasman Realty. As an
employee tasked to merely collect payments from Dasman Realty’s clients, she did not have a right
over the thing as she was merely entrusted to collect the cash collections in behalf of Dasman Realty.
In fact, accused-appellant never asserted any such right over the collections, as she even admitted
that upon receipt of the monies, it was her duty to remit the collections to the cashier.

Furthermore, the prosecution was able to show that the taking was clearly done with grave abuse of
confidence. As OlC-Property Accountant who was tasked, among others, to assist in the collection of
the payments being paid by the unit owners and lots, accused-appellant made use of her position to
obtain the payment collections due to Dasman Realty. From the nature of her functions, accused-
appellant’s position entailed a high degree of confidence reposed by Dasman Realty as she had been
granted access to funds collectible from clients. She would not have been able to take the money paid
by clients if it were not for her position in Dasman Realty. Such relation of trust and confidence was
amply established to have been gravely abused when she failed to remit the entrusted amount of
collection to Dasman Realty.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 3, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 08721 finding accused-appellant Yolanda Santos y
Parajas, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of fourteen (14) counts of Qualified Theft, defined and
penalized under Article 310, in relation to Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION such that Yolanda Santos is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment as follows:

(a) In Criminal Case No. R-PSY-14-08614-CR, two (2) years, four (4) months and 1 day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, two (2) months and twenty one (21) days of prision
mayor, as maximum.

(b)In Criminal Case No. R-PSY-14-08615-CR, four (4) years, two (2) months and 1 day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of  prision mayor, as
maximum;

(c) In Criminal Case No. R-PSY-14-08616-CR, four (4) years, two (2) months and 1 day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months and one (1) day of  prision mayor, as
maximum;

(d) In Criminal Case No. R-PSY-14-08617-CR, two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, two (2) months and twenty (21) days of prision
mayor, as maximum;

(e) In Criminal Case No. R-PSY-14-08618-CR, four (4) years, two (2) months and 1 day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum;

(f) In Criminal Case No. R-PSY-14-08619-CR, four (4) years, two (2) months and 1 day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum;

(g) In Criminal Case No. R-PSY-14-08620-CR, four (4) years, two (2) months and 1 day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum;
(h) In Criminal Case No. R-PSY-14-08621-CR, four (4) years, two (2) months and 1 day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of   prision mayor, as
maximum;

(i) In Criminal Case No. R-PSY-14-08622-CR, four (4) years, two (2) months and 1 day of  prision
correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum;

(j) In Criminal Case No. R-PSY-14-08623-CR, four (4) years, two (2) months and 1 day of  prision
correctional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of  prision mayor, as
maximum;

(k) In Criminal Case No. R-PSY-14-08624-CR, four (4) years, two (2) months and 1 day of prision
correctional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of  prision mayor, as
maximum;

(1) In Criminal Case No. R-PSY-14-08625-CR, four (4) years, two (2) months and 1 day of prision
correctional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of  prision mayor, as
maximum;

(m) In Criminal Case No. R-PSY-14-08626-CR, four (4) years, two (2) months and 1 day of prision
correctional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of  prision mayor, as
maximum.

(n) In Criminal Case No. R-PSY-14-08627-CR, four (4) years, two (2) months and 1 day of prision
correctional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of  prision mayor, as
maximum.

FACTS: On July 11, 2014, fourteen (14) Informations for qualified theft under Article 310 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) were filed against accused-appellant Yolanda P. Santos. She
was the Officer In Charge (OlC)-Property Accountant of Dasman Realty for its Dasman
Residences project which is a corporation engaged in realty and development business. In the
instant case, the prosecution was able to establish the presence of all the elements of qualified
theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 308 of the RPC, thus found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for Qualified Theft and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with eligibility for pardon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court imposed the proper penalty

HELD: The trial court’s order was hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The trial
court imposed the single penalty of reclusion perpetua for all fourteen (14) counts of qualified
theft. However, with the passage of R.A. No. 10951,48 the penalties of some crimes which
are dependent on the value of the subject matter of the crimes have been greatly affected, and
one of these is theft. The law being more favorable to the accused, in general, the same is
given a retroactive effect, and, thus, the need to revisit the computation of penalties.
Moreover, even without applying R.A. No. 10951, we note that the trial court's imposition of
a single indivisible penalty for all fourteen (14) counts of qualified theft is improper, as this is
not a continuous crime where there are series of acts yet there is only one crime committed,
hence, there is only one penalty.
 50. Lito Corpuz vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014, 734 Phil.
352

TOPIC: Estafa

DOCTRINE: No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not
even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it
has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of
the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.

ISSUE: Whether or not demand to return the subject pieces of jewelry, if unsold, or remit the
proceeds, if sold – an element of the offense – was proved?

RULING: NO.
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,
goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation
be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received
such money, goods, or other property; x x x

The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or
other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same ; (b) that there
be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of
such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party
on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant narrated
how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of
jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay them.
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even
be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has
indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the
money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.
As expounded in Asejo v. People, with regard to the necessity of demand, the Court agree
with the CA that demand under this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court
observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus,
when the law does not qualify, we should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary, the law
would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as
to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a written
demand as evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted
to the accused, the Court held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus the law does not
require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime of embezzlemen t. It so
happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by other proof, such as that
introduced in the case at bar.
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the
existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in
trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or
return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to
remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same
pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand from the private complainant, to the
prejudice of the latter.

DISPOSITIVE: The Petition for Review on Certiorari of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED.

51. In The United States vs. Jacinto Borromeo, Et., Al., G.R. No. 7150, October 16, 1912,
23 Phil. 279

1. ABDUCTION. — The two essential elements in the crime of abduction as defined and
punished by article 445 of the Penal Code are (1) a taking against the will of the woman and
(2) with lewd designs.

2. ID.; CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS. — The duration of penalties is vested in

the legislative department and requires a large measure of discretion. The courts will never
declare a penalty fixed by the legislature to be "cruel and unusual" because of its severity,
unless it is so out of proportion to the crime as to "shock public sentiment."

3. ID.; ID. — Abduction as defined in the Penal Code has always been recognized by
civilized nations as deserving of the severest penalties. It cannot be said, therefore, that the
prescribed penalty in this case is cruel and unusual
52. //Zenon R. Perez vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164763, February 12,
2008, 568 Phil. 491

Restitution of fund (Nauarro u. Meneses III, CBD Adm. Case

No. 313, January 30, 1998, En Banc; Perez u. People, G.R. No .
164763, February 12, 2008; 1999 Bar Exam) or partial restitution
(Venezuela u. People, G.R. No. 205693, February 14, 2018) is a mitigating circumstance
analogous to voluntary surrender if it was
immediately and voluntarily made before the case was instituted.
This circumstance can be appreciated in malversation (Navarro v.
Meneses III, supra) or failure to render an accounting. (People v.
Lumauig, G.R. No. 166680, July 7, 2014)

53. //The People of the Philippines vs. Pablo De La Cruz, G. R. No. L-5790, April 17,
1953, 92 Phil. 906
54. //People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy, Et., Al., G.R. No.
L-45127, May 05, 1989, 255 Phil. 94

A convict shall suffer subsidiary imprisonment for nonpayment

of fine by reason of insolvency. The phrase "If the convict
has no property with which to meet the fine" in Article 39 means
that a convict shall not suffer subsidiary imprisonment if he has
property to pay fine. The convict could not opt to serve subsidiary
imprisonment instead of fine if he is solvent. A fine, whether imposed
as a single or as an alternative penalty, should not and cannot be
reduced or converted into a prison term; it is to be considered as a separate and independent
penalty. (People v. Dacuycuy, G.R. No.
L-45127, May 5, 1989; 1954 Bar Exam)

55. People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Simeon N. Ferrer, Et., Al., G.R. No. L-32613-14,
December 27, 1972, 150-C Phil. 551

TOPIC: Bill of Attainder

DOCTRINE: The Government has a right to protect itself against subversion is a proposition
too plain to require elaboration. Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society. It
surpasses and transcends every other value, "for if a society cannot protect its very structure
from armed internal attack, no subordinate value can be protected".

FACTS: Hon. Simeon N. Ferrer in his capacity as Judge of the CFI of Tarlac, Branch I
dismissed two (2) cases involving criminal complaints for violation of Anti-Subversion Act
on the grounds that the said act is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad. Private
respondents were among those charged with violations of the Anti-Subversion Act which
outlawed the Communist Party of the Philippines and other subversive associations, and
punishes any person who knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with,
becomes or remains a member of the Party or of any other similar subversive organization.
The two cases include that of Feliciano Co who was criminally charged for violation of
Section 4 of AntiSubversion Act and Nilo Tayag et. al., who were charged with subversion.
In both cases aggravating circumstances are present. Counsel on both cases moved to quash
the complaint on the ground that the basis of the complaint, the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill
of attainder. Respondent judge ruled that Act as unconstitutional for being a bill of attainder.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Act is indeed a bill of attainder

RULING: No. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act with
reservation. On the grounds that the act provides that the guilt of the accused has to be
judicially established. Specifically, the statute requires that membership must be knowing or
active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4
means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been
acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." The ingredient of specific intent to pursue
the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes an element of
"membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of
direct participation in the organization’s unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of
mere adherence to the organization’s illegal objectives.

DISPOSITIVE: ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set

aside, and these two cases are hereby remanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits.
Costs de oficio

FACTS: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the
Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of
subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and
insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.)
Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people
to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances
of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of the opinion that 1.) The
Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing
the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a
presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20 June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP
and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the
Communist Party as being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and
other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the
Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the
CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the
Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for a
penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts
penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the
CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its
valid exercise under freedom of thought, assembly and association.

ISSUES: a) Whether or not RA 1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

b) Whether or Not RA 1700 violates freedom of expression.

RULING: a. No.The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill
of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the
substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a
statute to be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The
statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reaches past
conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act.

The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose
and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not the person.

Membership to these organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership

was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the
element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof
of a member’s direct participation. Why is membership punished? Membership renders aid
and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after
approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this
Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with
Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes
have been made.
b. No.The declaration that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine
Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of
the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise
of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the
statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The
court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded
in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY
and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to
proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be
established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization's
purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination
of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.

2. In the case of CPP, the continued pursuit of its subversive purpose. Membership is
willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.

The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The
Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.

56. Roman C. Tuason vs. Register of Deeds, Caloocan City, Et., Al., G.R. No. 70484,
January 29, 1988, 241 Phil. 650
FACTS: Spouses Tuason were retired public school teachers. With funds from their
retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. a piece of land in the
latter’s subdivision in Caloocan City. In virtue of this sale, Carmel’s Torrens title was
cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons took possession of
their property. Some eight years thereafter, the Tuasons’ travails began. They woke up one
morning to discover that by presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of the land they
had purchased with their hard-earned money, and that their land and the other lots in the
subdivision had been “declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the
Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof.”

On September 14, 1973-a year almost to the day after the declaration of martial law Mr.
Marcos, invoking his emergency powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate
effect. The decree invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons’ vendor, Carmel, which had
earlier purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several
lots for sale to the public. Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding that Carmel had
failed to complete payment of the price.
Mr. Marcos disposed of the land of the petitioner spouses and others similarly situated as
they, in the following imperious manner: order and decree that any and all sales contracts
between the government and the original purchasers, are hereby cancelled, and those between
the latter and the subsequent transferees, and any and all transfers are hereby declared invalid
and null and void ab initio as against the Government.
On the strength of this presidential decree, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City caused the
inscription on the Tuasons’ title, that their certificate of title is declared invalid and null and
void ab initio and considered cancelled as against the Government and the property described
herein is declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang
Homeowners Association, Inc.

The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the
Marcos decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a
selected group, in violation not only of the constitutional provisions on due process and
eminent domain but also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility
of Torrens titles; and they prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the
derogatory inscription on their title and restore its efficacy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Decree 23 is valid.

RULING: No. PD 293 reveals that President Marcos exercised a judicial function when he
made determination of facts and applied the law to those facts. It was shown that the acts
were done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction -
exercising judicial power not vested to him by the Constitution. The petitioners were also
deprived of their rights to due process in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Thus,
the acts were not only unconstitutional because of the also in violation of the right to due
process to which the petitioners are entitled in virtue of the Constitution
57. Paul Joseph Weight vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113213, August 15, 1994,
305 Phil. 366

TOPIC: Extradition, Ex post facto laws

DOCTRINE: The principles of international law recognize no right of extradition apart from that arising
from treaty. Extradition is an intrusion into the territorial integrity of the host State and a delimitation of
the sovereign power of the State within its own territory.
The prohibition of retroactive application applies only to criminal legislation which affects the
substantial rights of the accused. The Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal
procedural statute.

FACTS: short only. Delete dates if not material to the case.

Wright is wanted for the following indictable crimes:

1.   Wright/Orr Matter - one count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the
Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and
2. Wright/Cracker Matter - Thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to
Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; one count of attempting to Obtain Property by
Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and one count of Perjury
contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958.
Pursuant to Section 5 of PD No. 1069, in relation to the Extradition Treaty concluded between the
Republic of the Philippines and Australia on September 10, 1990, extradition proceedings were
initiated on April 6, 1993 by the State Counsels of the Department of Justice before the respondent
court.

The Trial Court and CA granted the petition for extradition requested by the Government of Australia,
concluding that the documents submitted by the Australian Government meet the requirements of
Article 7 of the Treaty of Extradition and that the offenses or which the petitioner were sought in his
country are extraditable offenses under Article 2 of the said Treaty. 

ISSUE:
1. Whether the extradition of Wright who is wanted for prosecution by the government of Australia
be granted in spite of the fact that the offenses for which Wright is sought in his country were
allegedly committed prior to the date of effectivity of the Treaty. YES
2. Does the Treaty's retroactive application violate the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto
laws? NO

RULING:

1. Yes, the offenses for which Wright is sought by his government are clearly extraditable under
Article 2 paragraph 4 of the Treaty, to wit:

Article 2(4) of the Treaty unequivocally provides that:

4. Extradition may be granted pursuant to provisions of this Treaty irrespective of when the offense in
relation to which extradition is requested was committed, provided that:
(a)   it was an offense in the Requesting State at the time of the acts or omissions constituting the
offense; and
(b)   the acts or omissions alleged would, if they had taken place in the Territory of the Requested
State at the time of the making of the request for extradition, have constituted an offense against the
laws in force in that state.

The principles of international law recognize no right of extradition apart from that arising from treaty.
A paramount principle of the law of extradition provides that a State may not surrender any individual
for any offense not included in a treaty of extradition. Extradition is an intrusion into the territorial
integrity of the host State and a delimitation of the sovereign power of the State within its own territory.
The act of extraditing amounts to a "delivery by the State of a person accused or convicted of a crime,
to another State within whose territorial jurisdiction, actual or constructive, it was committed and which
asks for his surrender with a view to execute justice." An act of extradition, even with a treaty rendered
executory upon ratification by appropriate authorities, does not impose an obligation to extradite on
the requested State until the latter has made its own determination of the validity of the requesting
State's demand, in accordance with the requested State's own interests.

Here, the offenses committed in the Requesting State irrespective of the time they were committed fall
under the panoply of the Extradition Treaty's provisions. Hence, the grant of petition for extradition is
proper.

2. No, the Treaty's retroactive application does not violate the Constitutional prohibition against ex
post facto laws.
Under the Constitution, ex post facto laws are 1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime
when such act was not an offense when committed; 2) laws which, while not creating new offenses,
aggravate the seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which prescribe greater punishment for a crime
already committed; or, 4) laws which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it substantially easier to
convict a defendant " The prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial
rights of the accused.

Here, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. It merely
provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense
or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified.

DISPOSITIVE: DENIED.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, we hereby
AFFIRM the same and DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.

58. Republic of the Philippines, Represented by The Anti-Money Laundering Council

(AMLC) vs. Hon. Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr., Et., Al., G.R. No. 174629, February 14,
2008, 569 Phil. 98
TOPIC: Bank Secrecy Act

DOCTRINE: Because of the Bank Secrecy Act, the confidentiality of bank deposits remains a basic
state policy in the Philippines. Subsequent laws, including the AMLA, may have added exceptions to
the Bank Secrecy Act, yet the secrecy of bank deposits still lies as the general rule . It falls within the
zones of privacy recognized by our laws. 

FACTS: Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an application to inquire into or
examine the deposits or investments of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong before the RTC
of Makati, Branch 138, presided by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Sixto Marella, Jr. The
application was docketed as AMLC No. 05-005. The Makati RTC heard the testimony of the Deputy
Director of the AMLC, Richard David C. Funk II, and received the documentary evidence of the
AMLC. Thereafter, on 4 July 2005, the Makati RTC rendered an Order (Makati RTC bank inquiry
order) granting the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the subject bank accounts of Alvarez,
Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court being satisfied that there existed probable cause
[to] believe that the deposits in various bank accounts, details of which appear in paragraph 1 of the
Application, are related to the offense of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act now the
subject of criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan as attested to by the Informations, Exhibits
C, D, E, F, and G Pursuant to the Makati RTC bank inquiry order, the CIS proceeded to inquire and
examine the deposits, investments and related web accounts of the four.

Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, Dennis Villa-Ignacio, wrote a
letter dated 2 November 2005, requesting the AMLC to investigate the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO,
and several other entities involved in the nullified contract. The letter adverted to probable cause to
believe that the bank accounts were used in the commission of unlawful activities that were committed
a in relation to the criminal cases then pending before the Sandiganbayan. Attached to the letter was
a memorandum on why the investigation of the [accounts] is necessary in the prosecution of the
above criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan. In response to the letter of the Special Prosecutor,
the AMLC promulgated on 9 December 2005 Resolution No. 121 Series of 2005, which authorized the
executive director of the AMLC to inquire into and examine the accounts named in the letter, including
one maintained by Alvarez with DBS Bank and two other accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with
Metrobank. The Resolution characterized the memorandum attached to the Special Prosecutors letter
as extensively justifying the existence of probable cause that the bank accounts of the persons and
entities mentioned in the letter are related to the unlawful activity of violation of Sections 3(g) and 3(e)
of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended.

ISSUE: Whether AMLA is an absolute exception to Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act.

RULING: No. Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically legislated.
Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may be
examined by any person, government official, bureau or official; namely when: (1) upon written
permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and (4) the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by this Court as constituting an additional
exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality, and there have been other similar recognitions as
well.

The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11, the AMLC may
inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of the AMLA, it
having been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to
unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering offense under Section 4
thereof. Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are
related to kidnapping for ransom, certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder, then there is
no need for the AMLC to obtain a court order before it could inquire into such accounts. It cannot be
successfully argued the proceedings relating to the bank inquiry order under Section 11 of the AMLA
is a litigation encompassed in one of the exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act which is when money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. The orientation of the bank inquiry order is
simply to serve as a provisional relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such does not
entail a full-blown trial.

Nevertheless, just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it
does not mean that the later law has dispensed with the general principle established in the older law
that all deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines x x x are
hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature. Indeed, by force of statute, all bank
deposits are absolutely confidential, and that nature is unaltered even by the legislated exceptions
referred to above.

There is disfavor towards construing these exceptions in such a manner that would authorize
unlimited discretion on the part of the government or of any party seeking to enforce those exceptions
and inquire into bank deposits. If there are doubts in upholding the absolutely confidential nature of
bank deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into such accounts, then such doubts must be
resolved in favor of the former. Such a stance would persist unless Congress passes a law reversing
the general state policy of preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the PETITION is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

59. People of the Philippines vs. Ricky V. Hijada, Et., Al., G.R. No. 123696, March 11,
2004, 469 Phil. 284
FACTS: Appellants Ricky Hijada y Villanueva (Ricky), Danilo Alcera y Alfon (Dante) and
Rodelio Villamor y Rabanes (Rodel) were charged with the crime of Robbery with Multiple
Homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On January 16, 1996, after all the
evidence was presented, the trial court rendered its decision wherein the guilt of the accused
appears duly proven beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with multiple
homicide. Accordingly, all the accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of
DEATH, with the accessories of article 40 of the Revised Penal Code; each to indemnify the
respective heirs of the deceased Filonila M. Tupaz, Filomena P. Garcia and Rosemarie C.
Diaz in the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); and to pay the proportionate costs.
However, two Appellant's Briefs were filed. One was filed by Atty. Rolando L. Villones for
all appellants, which presented that the court erred in meting out the extreme penalty of
death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court imposed the proper penalty

HELD: The decision of the trial court was modified. While the Court considers the guilt of
appellants to have been duly proven, the trial court erred in imposing upon them the supreme
penalty of death.The crime of Robbery with Homicide is a special complex crime punishable
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion perpetua to death. However, at
the time the crime was committed, on September 14, 1992, the death penalty could not be
imposed in view of Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution.Subsequently, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death for Robbery with Homicide was again imposed in 1993 with the
enactment of Republic Act No. 7695.[35] The provisions of Republic Act No. 7695,
however, cannot be applied retroactively, for that would violate Article III, Sec. 22 of the
Constitution stating that no ex post facto law shall be enacted, as well as Article 21 of the
Revised Penal Code.[36] Consequently, the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua
should be imposed on each of appellants.Furthermore, there is no crime of Robbery with
Multiple Homicide under the Revised Penal Code. The crime is Robbery with Homicide
notwithstanding the number of homicides committed on the occasion of the robbery and even
if murder, physical injuries and rape were also committed on the same occasion.
 60. The United States vs. Antonio Parrone, G.R. No. 7038, January 07, 1913, 24 Phil. 29

TOPIC: Article 22 of the RPC; Retroactivity of penal laws; Falsification of a personal cedula

DOCTRINE: Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony or
misdemeanor, even though at the time of the promulgation of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same.

FACTS: Antonio Parrone was found guilty for the crime of the falsification of a personal cedula. The crime
at the time of its commission was punishable under section 55 of Act No. 1189 and the penalty provided was a
fine in the sum of not less than P2,000 nor more than P10,000 and imprisonment for a term of not less than one
year nor more than five years, in the discretion of the court.

Said Act was amended by Act No. 2126 of the Philippine Legislature on the 1st day of February, 1912 which
provides for a lesser fine and lower penalty. The alleged offense was committed February 24, 1908, nearly 4
years before the amendment to the said law. It will be noted that the penalty in the new law is more favorable to
the defendant than that provided for by the old.

ISSUE: Whether a party convicted under said Acts No. 1189 and 2126 can claim the benefits of article 22
provided the punishment created by the amendment is more favorable to the accused than the original law

RULING: YES, convicted parties can claim the benefits of Article 22 of the RPC if it is favorable to the
accused.

Act No. 2126 provides a lesser punishment than Act No. 1189. It is, therefore, favorable to the accused.

Article 22 provides that "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a
felony or misdemeanor, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same."

The provisions of article 22 can only be invoked with reference to some other penal law. It has no application to
the provisions of the Penal Code except in relation with some other law. It is not believed, therefore, that the
Legislature in enacting article 7 of the Penal Code intended to provide that article 22 should not be applicable to
special laws.

DISPOSITIVE: Sentence modified. The provisions of article 22 in relation with the more favorable provisions
of Act No. 2126, and in view of the nature of the offense in this case, the sentence of the lower court should be
modified and that the defendant should be sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two months and to pay a
fine in the sum of P200 and costs.

FACTS: February 24, 1908; the accused Antonio Parrone did maliciously, criminally and
unlawfully alter and falsify his personal cedulas by substituting his own surname “Parrone”
as it appeared on said cedulas that of “Partacio,” the surname of one Antonio Partacio, and
then delivering them to said Partacio in payment of the sum of P2.20, which the latter had
given said accused.Parrone was found guilty of the falsification of cedula and sentenced him
to be imprisoned for a period of three years and to pay a fine of P200, and in case of
insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, in accordance with the provisions of section 55
of Act No. 1189.The crime was committed by Parrone was amended by (Act No. 2126),
which give the accused favorable conditions.

ISSUE: Whether or not, Act. 2126 should be given retroactive effect in so far as they favor
the accused

HELD: Yes. The provisions of article 22 of the Penal Code, however, penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony or misdemeanor, even
though at the time of the promulgation of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and
the convict is serving same. Art. 22 has no direct application to the provisions of the Penal
Code. Its application to the Penal Code can only be invoked where some former or
subsequent law is under consideration. It is not believed, therefore, that the Legislature is
enacting Art. 7 of the Penal Code intended to provide that Art. 22 should not be applicable to
special laws.Further, the imposition of a single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua
would lead to confusion considering that there were 14 separate informations against
accused-appellant, and she had been in fact convicted on all 14 counts of qualified theft.
Consequently, accused-appellant should be sentenced to imprisonment on all 14 counts of
qualified theft, under Articles 310, and 309 of the RPC, as amended.

61. Norma A. Del Socorro vs. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707,
December 10, 2014, 749 PHIL. 823

TOPIC: Violation of RA 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 200); Doctrine of
Processual Presumption; Territoriality Principle; Article 14 of the Civil Code; Prescription

DOCTRINE: If the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the
foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as
regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to
be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizes
the non-compliance therewith. (Doctrine of Processual Presumption)

However, even if pleaded and proved, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

FACTS: Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem were married in 1990 and
were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. They got divorced while their son was only 18
months old. Roderigo went back to the Philippines with his mother.Despite promising to give support to their
son, the respondent, who is also now in the Philippines and re-married, failed to provide support for Roderigo.
Norma sent a letter demanding for support but the respondent refused to receive the letter.

A complaint for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of RA 9262 was filed against Van Wilsem for his unjust
refusal to support his minor child with the petitioner. The RTC of Cebu found that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and the case was
dismissed.

Petitioner now invokes Article 195 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his
child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26
of the Family Code,respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child
with petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that
she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support. Respondent also added that by reason of the
Divorce Decree, he is not obligated to petitioner for any financial support.

ISSUES:

1. Whether a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law;

2. Whether he can be held criminally liable under RA 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so;
3. Whether the action has already prescribed

RULING:

1. IT DEPENDS.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal
obligation to support exists.

Respondent is correct that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support
from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of
nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family
Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners
such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, RTC-Cebu is correct that he is subject to the laws of his
country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so.

This does not, however, mean that the respondent is not obliged to support the petitioner's son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While
respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his
son, he never proved the same.

Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice
of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

In view of the respondent's failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded
and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.
Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and
proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of
parents to support their children and penalizes the non-compliance therewith.

However, in the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and
proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao
Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the
forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his
child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines
because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.

2. YES, he can be held criminally liable under RA 9262 for his unjustified failure to give support to his
minor child.

The respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing
to give support to their son.

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of
violence against women and children.

Considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, Petitioner’s claim is correct that the
Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant
case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who
live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to
support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of
the Province of Cebu City.
 3. NO, the action has not yet prescribed.

Section 24 of RA 9262 provides that acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in 20 years while acts
falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in 10 years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense,
which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case clearly
has not yet been prescribed.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is GRANTED. RTC Orders are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.

62. The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Wong Cheng (Alias Wong Chun), G.R. No.
18924, October 19, 1922, 46 Phil. 729
TOPIC: English Rue and French Rule

DOCTRINE:
The French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not
be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed,
unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on
the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under
such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were
committed.

FACTS:

In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case
and in which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half
miles from the shores of the city.

ISSUE:
Whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein involved,
committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph

RULING:

YES. There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law;
to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels
should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were
committed, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English
rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes
perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory
they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at
present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in
the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this
court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the
inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere
possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory
those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public order. 
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is
certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its
pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in
mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.

DISPOSITIVE:

The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So ordered. 

63. //The United States vs. Look Chaw (Alias Luk Chiu), G.R. No. 5887, December 16,
1910, 18 Phil. 573
64. //The United States vs. Ah Sing, G.R. No. 13005, October 10, 1917, 36 Phil. 978
65. //The United States vs. H. N. Bull, G.R. No. 5270, January 15, 1910, 15 Phil. 7
66. //Silverio Valdez vs. Antonio G. Lucero, Et., Al. G.R. No. L-246, March 27, 1946, 76
Phil 356
67. //The People of the Philippines vs. Felipe A. Livara, G.R. No. L-6201, April 20, 1954,
94 Phil. 771
68. //The United States vs. Philip K. Sweet, G.R. No. 448, September 20, 1901, 1 Phil. 18
69. Teodoro Cantos (Teodoro Tatishi) vs. Wilhelm D. Styler, G. R. No. L-492, June 28,
1946, 76 Phil. 748

TOPIC: Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases

Doctrine: War crimes may be committed by any person regardless of his nationality. It is
well settled that war crimes may be committed not only by lawful belligerents but by any
men and bodies of men, who, without being lawful belligerents nevertheless commit hostile
acts of any kind. Persons of the enemy territory who steal within the lines of hostile army for
the purpose of robbing, killing, etc. are also war criminals subject to the jurisdiction of
military commissions.

FACTS: Teodoro Cantos filed a petition for habeas corpus against Lieutenant General
Wilhelm Syer, commanding General of the US Army Forces, on the ground that Cantos is a
Filipino citizen residing in Davao City and is now confined by the order of Syer at the
residence of the High Commissioner in Manila, with no legal cause. Cantos’ mother is a
Filipina and his father is a Japanese but at the age of 27 he elected to become a Filipino
citizen by the CFI of Davao in 1939. In 1946 he was indicted for war crimes before the
military commission for allegedly killing unarmed and non-combatant Filipinos by striking
them with a saber and shooting them and also for taking or looting personal properties during
a time of war between the USA, its allies and Japan. The military commission found Cantos
guilty after hearing and sentenced him to death by hanging. Cantos argued that he is a
Filipino civilian when he allegedly committed the crimes charged so the military commission
has no jurisdiction but the Philippine courts.

ISSUE: W/N the military commission has jurisdiction to try Cantos.

RULING: Yes. US Supreme Court said that citizenship in the United States of an enemy
belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful
because in violation of the law of war. Citizen who associate themselves with the military
army of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country
bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and
the law of war. After due hearing, the military commission found Cantos to be a Japanese
mestizo. There is evidence that during the war Cantos was a member of the Japanese civil
army and committed atrocities, indeed, he never acquired Filipino citizenship or he already
lost therefore he is a war criminal subject to the jurisdiction of the military commission, and
his confinement by Syer is not illegal.

DISPOSITIVE: Fore all the foregoing, petition is dismissed, without costs.

70. // Fe V. Rapsing, Et., Al. vs. Hon. Judge Maximino R. Ables, Et., Al., G.R. No.
171855, October 15, 2012, 697 Phil. 472
71. //Lt. (SG) Eugene Gonzales, Et., Al. vs. Gen. Narciso Abaya, Et., Al., G.R. NO.
164007, August 10, 2006, 530 Phil. 189

Doctrine of absorption - If murder, kidnapping or arson committed in furtherance of

rebellion, they will be divested of their character as common crimes and will assume the
political complexion of rebellion. Hence, rebellion absorbs these crimes (People vs.
Geronimo, G.R. No. L8936, October 23, 1956; People vs. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. L-6025-26,
July 18, 1956; Enrile vs. Salazar, G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990). Doctrine of absorption is
applicable to coup d’etat for being a political crime because the purpose of coup plotter is to
seize or diminish state power (Gonzales vs. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 8, 2006,
concurring opinion by Justice Callejo).

72. George Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, Et., Al., G.R. Nos. 105965-70, August 09, 1999, 371
Phil. 1

TOPIC: Jurisdiction.

DOCTRINE: The Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases
not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken
cognizance of by the latter.

FACTS: Petitioner George Uy, was a Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine Navy and was designated
by his immediate supervisor, Captain Lusito F. Fernandez, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for
Comptrollership, to act on the latter’s behalf to perform activities of the Fiscal Control Branch, O/NG
during his absence. One of the tasks is the authority to sign disbursement vouchers relative to the
procurement of equipment needed by the Philippine Navy. Thereafter, six information for estafa
through falsification of official documents and one information for the violation of Section 3 (e),
Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. No. 3019) were filed against the petitioner the nineteen co-accused
before the Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan issued an order directing a comprehensive re-investigation of the cases.

Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor issued an order recommending that the information for estafa
through falsification of official documents be withdrawn and information for violation of Section 3 (e) of
R.A. No. 3019 be filed against the eleven accused including the petitioner. Thereafter, the number of
those charged was reduced to five including the petitioner and was later reduced to three upon the
filing of the motion for reconsideration. Six separate information were also recommended to be filed
for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019 be filed against the petitioner, Lieutenant Commander
(LCMDR), Rodolfo Guanzon, and LT. Teddy Pan. A motion to quash was filed but was denied. Hence,
this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner.

RULING: No, Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the petitioner.

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 (R.A. No. 8249) provides for the scope of Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction. It provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving violations of R.A. No 3019, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent or acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense: (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and
all officers of higher rank.

The nature of the offense and the position occupied by the accused are conditions sine qua non
before the Sandiganbayan can validly take cognizance over the case. In the present case, the
petitioner is charged for violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 which is an offense covered by
Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law. Additionally, his position as LCMDR is a rank lower than the
naval captains and all officer of higher rank. His position does not fall with the term “rank” requirement
as stated in Section 4. Thus, it is the Regional Trial Court (RTC) who has jurisdiction over the offense
charge since Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. Blg. 129) clearly provides that the RTC
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter. Thus, it is
the prosecutor and not the Ombudsman who has the authority to file the said information against the
petitioner since the Ombudsman only exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and not the RTC.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 10, 1992 in Criminal
Cases Nos. 16905-16910, is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the Sandiganbayan
is ordered to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 16905-16910, and to inform this Court of the action taken
hereon within fifteen (15) days from finality of this decision. No costs. SO ORDERED.

73. //Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, Et., Al. vs. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, Et., Al., G.R No.
187167, August 16, 2011, 671 Phil. 243
74. //73. AAA vs. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018, 823 Phil. 607

TERRITORIALITY - For purpose of venue under the Rules of Criminal Procedure and
territoriality principle in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the place of commission of the
criminal act and the place of occurrence of the effect of such act, which is an element of the
offense, shall be considered. If one pulled the trigger of his gun in Quezon City and hit the
victim in City of Manila, who died as a consequence, Quezon City and City of Manila, which
are the places of commission of the criminal act and the occurrence of the criminal effect, are
proper venues. If the psychological violence consisting of marital infidelity punishable under
RA No. 9262 is committed in Singapore but the psychological effect occurred in the
Philippines since the wife of the respondent, who suffered mental anguish, is residing in the
Philippines, our court can assume jurisdiction (see: AAA vs. BBB, G.R. no. 212448, January
11, 2018). However, if the commission of the criminal act consummates the crime and the
effect thereof is not an element thereof, the place of occurrence of the effect shall not be
considered for purpose of venue and territoriality rule. Bigamy committed in Singapore is
beyond the jurisdiction of our court although the offended spouse is residing in the
Philippines since the psychological effect of bigamy on her is not an element thereof.

In AAA v. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018, the accused was prosecuted for
psychological violence against woman under Section 5 (i) for having an illicit affair with a
Singaporean that causes mental or emotional anguish to his wife.

75. //The United States vs. William Fowler, G.R. No. 496, December 31, 1902, 1 Phil.
614
76. //Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Health Secretary
Francisco T. Duque III, Et., Al., G.R. NO. 173034, October 09, 2007, 561 Phil. 386
77. //Khosrow Minucher vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, Et., Al., G.R. No. 142396, February
11, 2003, 445 Phil. 250

Consular and diplomatic immunity - Consular officers are immune from criminal
prosecution of acts performed in the exercise of function (1967 Convention on Consular
Relation). Immunity does not cover slander (Liang vs. People, GR No. 125865, January 28,
2000), or reckless imprudence resulting in homicide for not being function-related. A Chinese
diplomat, who killed another Chinese diplomat in Cebu, is immune from criminal prosecution
(The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations). Unlike consular officers, diplomatic
agents are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits (Minucher
vs. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003).

78. //Bayan Muna, Et., Al. vs. Alberto Romulo, Et., Al., G.R. No. 159618, February 01,
2011, 656 Phil. 246
79. //Jesus Miquibas vs. Commanding General, Philippine-Ryukus Command, United
States Army, G.R. No. L-1988, February 24, 1948, 80 Phil. 262
80. Godofredo Dizon vs. The Commanding General of the Philippine Ryukus Command,
United States Army, G. R. No. L-2110, July 22, 1948, 81 Phil. 286

TOPIC: May jurisdiction be waived in favor of the USA

DOCTRINE: Well-settled principles of International Law that a foreign army allowed to

march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or
sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place

Facts: On March 14, 1947, an Agreement was concluded between the Philippines and the
United States of America whereby the latter is authorized to occupy and use certain portions
of the Philippine territory as military bases and to exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses
committed within and outside said bases. For an offense allegedly committed at the main
storage area, Philrycom Engineer Depot, United States Army, APO 900, located at Quezon
City, Philippines, the petitioner was prosecuted in and convicted by a General Court Martial
appointed by the Commanding General of the Philippine-Ryukus Command of the United
States Army and accordingly sentenced, on March 4, 1948, to confinement at hard labor for
five years. his petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court on March 24, 1948, lastly
amended by motion dated April 9, 1948, the petitioners contends that the General Court
Martial had no jurisdiction over the alleged offense which was committed in a place not a
base of the United States Army within the meaning of the Agreement concerning military
bases of March 14, 1947, and that even assuming that the offense was committed in a base,
said Agreement is unconstitutional because it deprives the Philippine courts of the
jurisdiction over all offenses exclusively vested in them by Article VIII, section 1, of the
Constitution, and violates section 1 of Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing to every
person in the Philippines due process and equal protection of the law.

ISSUE: WON the US ARMY have jurisdiction over crimes committed in american bases in
the Philippines.

RULING: YES Court enunciated the principle that as a rule "the Philippines, being a
sovereign nation, has jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its territory, but it may,
by treaty or by agreement, consent that the United States or any other foreign nation, shall
exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within certain portions of said territory.
Even absent declaration in the Constitution that the generally accepted principles of
international law are made a part of the law of the Nation, we are bound to uphold the
immunities above referred to. Under the Agreement of March 14, 1947, the United States was
given express permission to establish military bases on certain portions of the Philippine
territory and to exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses. The rights thus granted are no less
than those conceded by the rule of international law to "a foreign army allowed to march
through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or
sovereign." For this reason, if for no other, the constitutional point raised by the petitioner
becomes untenable.

DISPOSITIVE: Jurisdiction being validly waived in favor of the United States under the
Agreement in question, it follows that petitioner's contention regarding alleged denial of due
process and equal protection of the law becomes unfounded. PETITION DENIE

81. The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Juan Moran, Et., Al., G.R. No. 17905,
January 27, 1923, 44 Phil. 387

TOPIC: Art. 22

DOCTRINE: While it is a rule regarded as universally accepted by the courts and expressly
sanctioned by most of modern nations that penal laws cannot have retroactive effect, which means
that no act or omission can be held to be a crime, nor the author thereof punished except by virtue of
a law in force at the time the act is com-mitted, yet such a rule has no reference to the retroactivity of
a penal law more favorable to the offender, which is upheld not as a right of the latter, but upon the
very principles, underlying the right of the State to punish and threaten punishment, such a rule being
one of strict justice and not an exception based on political considerations.

FACTS: On December 20, 1920 an action was filed against defendants Juan Moran, Fructuoso
Cansino, and Hilario Oda, election inspectors of the first precinct of the municipality of Binalonan,
Pangasinan, for having falsified election returns. The defendants and were later found guilty by Judge
of First Instance Nepomuceno and again on appeal by the Supreme Court for a crime punishable
under Chapter 18 of the Administrative Code or the “Election Law”.

On March 9, 1922, Act No. 3030 amending certain provision of the Election Law and providing for a
prescriptive period for acts done in violation of said code was enacted by the Legislation. Section 71
of Act No. 3030 says: "Offenses resulting from violations of this Act shall prescribed one year after
their commission,"

On May 2, 1922, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration in the Supreme Court alleging that
the crime complained of had prescribed under the new provisions of section 71 of Act No. 3030.
Defendants pray that they be absolved from the complaint and from the related penalties thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prescriptive provision of Act No. 3030 be given retrospective effect for
offenses committed done before its effectivity, in accordance with Art. 22 of the Penal Code?
RULING: Art. 22 of the Penal Code states “Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they
favor the person guilty of a felony..” In the case at bar, defendants were charged with violating the
Election Law on December 20, 1920. On March 9, 1922, Legislation passed an Act amending the
Election Law and providing for a one-year prescriptive period for offenses resulting from violations of
the said act.

The SC maintained that said article 22 of the Penal Code refers NOT only to penalties but also to
appeals and proceedings, because the prescription of the crime is intimately connected with that of
the penalty. It also held that the prescriptive provision of Act No. 3030 must have retroactive effect,
the same being favorable to the accused. It stated “the sovereign, in enacting a subsequent penal law
more favorable to the accused, has recognized that the greater severity of the former law is unjust.
The sovereign would be inconsistent if it would still enforce its right under conditions of the former law,
which has already been regarded by conscientious public opinion as juridically burdensome.”

DISPOSITIVE: In view of the foregoing, we find the said crime to have prescribed, and setting aside
the decision of this court published on the 31st of March of this year, the present action is dismissed
with all the costs de oficio, and the bond given by the accused for their provisional release is
cancelled, which release is hereby declared final. So ordered.

82. The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Norberto Parel, G.R. No. 18260, January 27,
1923, 44 Phil. 437

TOPIC: Retroactive application of Penal Laws

DOCTRINE: Whenever a new statute dealing with crimes establishes conditions more lenient or
favorable to the accused in regard to a certain offense, the statute becomes retroactive as to the
offense and the accused must receive the benefit of the new conditions no matter whether the offense
was committed before or after the enactment of the new statute.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 71 of Act No. 3030 by its terms is applicable only to offenses resulting
from that Act and cannot be given retroactive effect?

RULING: YES. In view of the fact that Act No. 3030 is only amendatory of the Election Law, the Court
think it is fair to presume that section 71 was intended by the Legislature as an amendment to the
Election Law in order to remedy an obvious and quite serious defect in that law. From this point of
view, there can, be no doubt that the period of prescription fixed by the section applies to all election
offenses alike whether committed before Act No. 3030 went into effect or not.

But it is vigorously argued that the language of the section is so plain as to make any
interpretation unnecessary and that when a section of the Act says "this Act" it means the Act in which
it occurs and no other. As far as the present case is concerned, both theories will lead to the same
result if article 22 of the Penla Code is taken into consideration and we shall, therefore, for the
purposes of the argument, take the language of the section literally and assume that the period of
prescription it establishes relates only to offenses defined and penalized in Act No. 3030.

Comparing the penal provisions of the Election Law with those of Act No. 3030, it will be
found that practically all of the offenses defined in the former law are also defined in the same
language in Act No. 3030, the only difference being that the penalties have been increased.

Article 22 of the Penal Code applies to all penal statutes alike and furnishes our only
guidance in determining the extent to which a penal statute is retroactive. Unless the statute is taken
out of its operation either by express provisions of law or by necessary implication, the article applies.
There is, as far as we can see, absolutely nothing in Act No. 3030 indicating that it is not subject to
exactly the same measure of retroactivity as any other penal statute. Retroactivity, as we here speak
of it, means of course, retroactibity as to particular penal offenses, and bearing this in mind in
connection with the provisions of article 22, does it not, then, seem obvious that if an offense was
defined and made punishable by the Election Law as contained in the Administrative Code and is
defined in exactly the same language in the amendatory Act No. 3030 with merely an increase in the
penalty, article 22 of the Penal Code must be held to be applicable and that in all in which the new law
is more favorable to the accused it becomes retroactive as to that offense?

The defendant was convicted by the Court of First Instance under section 2639 of the
Administrative Code of the offense of having failed, as an election inspector, "to perform any duty or
obligation imposed by the Election Law." Section 49 of Act No. 3030, in amending section 2639 of the
Administrative Code, defines the offense in question in exactly the same language as failing "to
perform any duty or obligation imposed by the Election Law," and only increased the penalty; the
offense is exactly the same under both sections. Consequently, if the Court hold that the prescription
provided for in Section 71 applies to all offenses defined and penalized in Act No. 3030 and not
merely to offenses there defined and made punishable for the first time and the Court further hold, as
we must, that Article 22 of the Penal Code is applicable to all penal statutes, including those for the
limitation of penal actions, and not merely to the measure of the penalty, the conclusion is irresistible
and unaviodable that the present action, not having been instituted within the prespective period fixed
by section 71 of Act No. 3030, must be dismissed.

A strong appeal has been made to our emotions by describing in rather vivid colors the
disastrous consequences which will result from the dismissal of action in which the accused have
already been convicted of election offenses by the trial courts and it has been intimated that for us to
impute to the Legislature the intention of bringing about such a state of affairs would constitute a
serious reflection not only on the honor of the Legislature but also on this court.

As to this we can only say that it is our duty to apply the law as we find it; that it is also our
duty to observe the rule that the defendant in a criminal case is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable
doubts, both as to the facts and as to the law; and that we believe that the interests both of justice and
of the public welfare will be best served by this court doing its duty without fear or favor. We should,
indeed, be recreant to that duty were we to allow our zeal for the punishment of crime to lead us to
distort the language of plain provisions of the law in a sense adversely to the accused. In regard to the
presents case, we also believe that the disadvantages of the uncertainly and confusion which would
eventually result from a forced construction of the law would much more than offset the advantages of
securing the convictions and imprisonment for a few months of a relatively small number of infractors
of the Election Law.
Including the present, there are eleven cases before this court which will be affected by this
decision, there are also three cases pending decision in the Courts of First Instance and fourteen
cases pending trial in which prosecution has not been instituted within a year from the date of the
discovery of the alleged offense. In some of these cases the prosecution is, no doubt, meritorious,
but, in view of the delay in presenting the complaints, it is not unreasonable to assume that most of
them are more or less of the character of the present case.
More than three years have passed since the elections of 1919 and the Election Law has
since been so amended as to remedy many of the defects which offered temptations and
opportunities for infractions of the law and rendered the placing of the responsibility for such
infractions difficult. Under the circumstances, it is by no means certain that the Legislature has acted
unwisely in wiping the state clean and casting oblivion over election offenses the prosecution of which
has not, after so many years, been brought to a conclusion. In any event, the impending alleged
calamity is not so grave a nature as to justify a court in misinterpreting the law in order to avert it.

DISPOSITIVE: The motion is GRANTED and the present case is hereby dismissed, with all costs de
oficio

83. Trinidad H. Pardo De Tavera vs. Vicente Garcia Valdez, G.R. No. 922, November 08,
1902, 1 Phil. 468

TOPIC: Libel – Article 355. Defamation committed by means of writing, printing, lithography,
engraving, radio, phonograph, painting or theatrical or cinematographic exhibition, or any similar
means of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
DOCTRINE: It is settled that "in determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are
to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as
they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used
and understood in another sense.”

FACTS: Defendant was the editor of “Miau”, a periodical published and circulated in Manila, which
later published an article containing an alleged injurious matter. Thereafter, defendant was found
guilty of the offense “injurias graves” of Articles 457 and 458 of the Penal Code. Meanwhile,
subsequent to the article’s publication, Act No. 277 was enacted “defining the law of libel” and
reforming the pre-existing Spanish law on the subject of calumnia and injurias. Section 13 of the same
act if laws which may be in conflict with said act are deemed repealed; provided that it shall not apply
to laws which are applicable to pending actions or existing causes of action. An appeal was filed
claiming that the punishment for defendant should be that as stated in Act No. 277.

ISSUE: Did the lower court erred in applying the punishment?

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that since Act No. 277 explicitly stated its inapplicability, the
said act cannot be applied to the present case; that the act is left intact in all its parts as respects
pending actions or existing causes of action. Thus, the punishment must be determined exclusively by
the provisions of the former law.

In view of all the circumstances of the case we fix the penalty as four years of destierro and a fine of
4,000 pesetas, with subsidiary liability to one day’s banishment for every 12 ½ pesetas not paid, and
the costs of both instances.

DISPOSITIVE: The judgment of the court below will be modified in accordance with this opinion, and
the record will be returned to that court for the execution of the sentence as thus modified.

84. //Clemente Magtoto vs. Hon. Miguel M. Manguera, Et., Al., G.R.Nos. L-37201-02,
March 03, 1975, 159 Phil. 611
85. //Elvira Yu Oh vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125297, June 06, 2003, 451 Phil. 380

FACTS: Elvira Yu Oh purchased a number of jewelry from Solid Gold International Traders.
Due to her failure in paying the purchased price, the latter filed a case against the petitioner.
Solid Gold International Traders, through its General Manager, Joaquin Novales III, entered
into a compromise agreement to settle the said civil case. The compromise agreement, as
approved by the trial court, provided that the petitioner shall issue a total of ninety-nine post-
dated checks in the amount of P50,000.00 each, dated every 15th and 30th of the month
starting October 1, 1990 and the balance of over P1 million to be paid in lump sum on
November 16, 1994 which is also the due date of the 99th and last postdated check. Petitioner
issued ten checks at P50,000.00 each, for a total of P500,000.00, drawn against her account at
the Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC), Grace Park, Caloocan City Branch. Novales
deposited each of the ten checks on their respective due dates with the Far East Bank and
Trust Company (FEBTC). However, said checks were dishonored by EBC for the reason
"Account Closed." On October 5, 1992, Novales filed ten separate Informations, docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 92-26243 to 92-36252 before the RTC of Quezon City charging
petitioner with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing
Checks Law. On December 22, 1993, the RTC rendered its decision, finding the accused
GUILTY of ten counts of violation of BP 22 and hereby sentenced her to a penalty of one
year imprisonment for each count, or a total of ten years, to be served in accordance with the
limitation prescribed in par. 4, Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code and to indemnify the
complainant the amount of the checks in their totality, or in the amount of P500,000.00.
Republic Act No. 7691 "JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980", was effective
 year 1994. The petitioner raised that the Court of Appeals deprived her of giving retroactive
effect to the provision of R.A. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the inferior courts to cover
the offenses involved in these cases pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in not granting retroactive effect to R.A.
7691 in view of Article 22 of the Revised Penal

RULING: No. Penal laws are those which define crimes and provide for their punishment.
Additionally, laws defining the jurisdiction of the court are substantive in nature and not
procedural, for they do not refer to the manner of trying cases but to the authority of the
courts to hear and decide certain and definite cases in the various circumstances of which
they are susceptible. R.A. 7691 is not a penal law, therefore Art. 22 of the RPC does not
apply

86. People of the Philippines vs. Martin S. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 304
Phil. 725

FACTS:Accused Martin Simon was charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic
Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He sold tea bags of marijuana to a
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer. The confiscated 4 tea bags, weighing a
total of 3.8 grams, when subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for
marijuana.Simon denied the accusation against him, claiming that on the day of question,
he was picked up by the police at their house while watching TV. He was told that he was a
pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they
finally reached the camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was
boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his
signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge of the
marked money or the 4 teabags of dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the marked
money came from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was
because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro.Simon then seeks the reversal of
the judgement

ISSUE: Was the conviction of Simon correct?

RULING: The court held that Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No.
7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their
technical terms, hence with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of
determining the maximum of said sentence, the court have applied the provisions of the
amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code
to impose the same in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special
law, is now in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to
determine the minimum, the court applied first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs
that “in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or
its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could
be properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.”

Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within
the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the
 maximum range have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised
Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6
months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional

87. //Miriam Armi Jao Yu vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 134172, September 20,
2004, 481 Phil. 780

Deficiency of the Law — The penalty for violation of

B.P. Blg. 22 is imprisonment and fine. However, this law is deficient
as to the rule on conversion of fine into subsidiary imprisonment
in case of non-payment thereof due to insolvency. Hence, there is
a need to seek supplemental rule f rom the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, Article 39 of the Code on conversion of fine into subsidiary
imprisonment can be used to supplement B.P. Blg. 22 in case the
convict failed to pay fine imposed thereunder due to insolvency.

88. United States vs. Fred C. Bruhez, Et., Al., G.R. No. 9268, November 04, 1914, 28
Phil. 305

TOPIC: Jurisdiction over instrument of crime

DOCTRINE: The court having jurisdiction of the offense has also jurisdiction to determine the
disposition of the instrument used in the commission of the crime; and it is its duty to dispose of the
same upon the application of any person interested.

FACTS: Joaquin Lorenzo Uy Yjo, bribed Fred C. Bruhez, at that time a customs inspector, by
delivering to him P3,500, consisting of seven P500 bills, obtained the importation of a considerable
quantity of opium into the Philippine Islands. The bribery and the consequent importation were
discovered and both parties were arrested charged with the illegal importation of opium. The P3,500
was found in the possession of Bruhez, was seized by the customs officials and was presented in the
Court of First Instance as evidence upon the trial of Joaquin Lorenzo Uy Yjo. He was duly convicted
and sentenced, but the money was still left in the hands of the court to be used as evidence upon the
trial of the other accused, Fred C. Bruhez. He, however, eluded detention, escaped from the
Philippine Islands and has never been brought to trial. The information filed against him was later
dismissed on the application of the prosecuting attorney.
It was at this point that the present application was made for the recovery of the P3,500. Such
application, however, was not made by Joaquin Lorenzo Uy Yjo, who delivered the money to the
customs official, but by one Ignacio Velasco, who asserts that Joaquin Lorenzo Uy Yjo, at the time of
the illegal importation complained of, was in his employ as a trusted and confidential servant and that,
during the absence of Velasco from Manila, and without his knowledge or consent, Joaquin Lorenzo
Uy Yjo drew a check upon Velasco's bank account for the sum of 3,500, by means of which there was
turned over to said Joaquin Lorenzo Uy Yjo by the bank seven P500 bills; that said bills belonged to
Velasco and the identical bills involved in this application were used in bribing Fred C. Bruhez to
permit the illegal importation of opium. This petition was denied by the court and the court turn it over
to the Collector of Customs for confiscation.

ISSUE: To whom the P3,500 should be delivered.

RULING: (the Court did not answer the issue)

If that money was owned by Joaquin Lorenzo Uy Yjo and was by him used to bribe a customs
official to permit the illegal importation of opium, it became an instrument used in the commission of
that crime and would be susceptible to the dispositions provided for in articles 25 and 62 of the Penal
Code. Article 25 provides, among other things, that, as an accessory penalty, there shall be "a
forfeiture of the instruments and proceeds of the offense" and article 62 provides that "every penalty
imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime
and the instrument with which it was committed. Such proceeds and instruments shall be forfeited
unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense."
These articles constitute the law which governs the disposition of the money in question. If
Joaquin Lorenzo Uy Yjo had been convicted of the crime of bribery, then the money paid as a bribe
would have been forfeited by virtue of article 389. The crime charged and prosecuted, however, being
that of illegal importation of opium, the money became an instrument used in the commission of the
crime and, therefore, became subject to the articles of the Penal Code already referred to.
Under these articles of the Penal Code the court trying the cause has jurisdiction to determine
the ownership and disposition of the instrument used in the commission of the crime, and any person
claiming this instrument has a right to take his proceeding in that court for the purpose of determining
his rights in the premises.

DISPOSITIVE: The judgment of the court below is hereby set aside and vacated and the cause
returned to the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, with instructions to determine the
questions presented by the issues framed with respect to the sum of P3,500 which is the subject
matter of the action. This court expresses no opinion as to whom the said sum belongs. That is a
matter which is left to the judgment of the trial court from the evidence presented to it.

89. People of the Philippines vs. Li Wai Cheung, G.R. Nos. 90440-42, October 13, 1992,
289 Phil. 105

TOPIC: Dangerous Drug Act

DOCTRINE: short only.

When two (2) or more offenses are charged in a single information, and the accused failed, as here,
to object to the duplicitous information before trial, the settled rule is that the Court may convict the
accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and may impose on him the penalty for each
and every one of them.

Both offenses (sale and possession), being penalized by a special statute, are not subject to the
provisions on complex crimes set out in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.

FACTS: short only. Delete dates if not material to the case.

Li Wai Cheung  was charged, in three (3) separate informations, with unlawful possession of
methylamphetamine crystals, in violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425 as amended; with
the unlawful possession of marijuana leaves and seeds, in violation of Section 8, Article II of the same
statute; and with the unlawful possession and sale of heroin powder. He was
arrested in flagrante delicto, having been entrapped into revealing his possession of a ready supply of
prohibited drugs, available for sale and disposition at his dwelling to anyone willing to pay the price. as
a consequence of the in flagrante arrest of the accused, a search of the premises of the accused was
conducted by the Narcom Law enforcers which search resulted to the recovery and confiscation of the
following items namely: all five (5) grams of white suspected heroin powder (which were sold by the
accused to the Narcom agents acting as poseur buyers) were found positive for the presence of
heroin, which is a prohibited drug. That the forty-one (41) grams of white suspected heroin powder
placed in forty-one (41) small plastic packets (found inside the blue Echolac suitcase of the accused)
were likewise found positive for the presence of heroin, a prohibited drug. That the one hundred
twenty-three grams of white granular substance placed in a plastic bag (also found inside the Echolac
suitcase) was found positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug
and one (1) small plastic packet containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds inside a clay jar
was found positive for the presence of marijuana, a prohibited drug. That the weighing scale was
likewise found positive for the presence of residues of heroin.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial court erred in believing the testimony of the prosecution witnesses tending to
show that they succeeded in entrapping Li Wai Cheung inside his condominium unit as a
possessor and peddler of regulated and prohibited drugs on the evening of 14 February 1987,
 and in disbelieving the claim of the defense witnesses that what had really taken place on that
date was a robbery and an attempt to extort money perpetrated by rogue policemen against Li
Wai Cheung and his family. NO

2. Whether the trial court failed to appreciate that there were in fact two (2) offenses, one the sale of
five (5) small plastic packets of heroin powder and the other the possession of forty-one (41)
small plastic packets of heroin powder, charged in the information and proven at the trial of this
case. YES

3. Whether Li Wai Cheung 's conviction of "reclusion perpetua" is proper. NO

RULING:
1. No. The Supreme Court, which is not a trier of facts, necessarily accords great respect to the
factual conclusions drawn by trial courts, particularly on the matter of credibility of witnesses,
since the trial judge had the opportunity (which this Court does not have) of observing the
deportment and demeanor of witnesses while listening to them speak, enabling the judge to form
at first hand a judgment as to whether witnesses were telling the truth or not. The positive
testimonies of the arresting officers is sufficient to sustain such conviction.

Here, Li Wai Cheung failed to show why the Court should depart from this general rule.

2. Yes. When two (2) or more offenses are charged in a single information, and the accused
failed, as here, to object to the duplicitous information before trial, the settled rule is that the Court
may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and may impose on him
the penalty for each and every one of them. 

Here, the five (5) packets of heroin powder were received from Li Wai Cheung during the entrapment while
the other forty-one (41) packets of the same substance were found in Li Wai Cheung's Echolac
suitcase by the Narcom agents in the course of their subsequent search of the condominium unit.
These offenses were distinct and separate from each other. Both offenses (sale and possession),
being penalized by a special statute, are not subject to the provisions on complex crimes set out in
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, Li Wai Cheung failed to object. Hence, Li Wai
Cheung is guilty of both sale and possession, as the offenses as are charged and proved.
3. No, the proper technical nomenclature is, of course, life imprisonment.
It appearing that Li Wai Cheung is liable for serving four (4) successive sentences corresponding to
the four (4) crimes for which he was found guilty, the rules on the service of sentences set forth in
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code are applicable here by way of supplementation. Under those
rules, the maximum period of a convict's imprisonment in the service of his successive sentences
shall not in any case exceed forty (40) years, life imprisonment being counted as thirty (30) years.
Immediately after service of his forty-year sentence, Li Wai Cheung as an alien shall be deported from
the Philippines without further proceedings.

90. Evangeline Ladonga vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. NO. 141066, February 17,
2005, 492 Phil. 60

See above

91. People of the Philippines vs. Bulu Chowdury, G.R. No. 129577-80, February 15,
2000, 382 Phil. 459
FACTS: Representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport
workers... for employment abroad, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another,... and feloniously recruit the... complainants: Estrella B. Calleja, Melvin C. Miranda
and Aser S. Sasis, individually or as a group for employment in Korea without first obtaining
the required license and/or authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration. They were likewise charged with three counts of estafa committed against
private complainants. However, later dismissed the estafa charges against Chowdury and
filed an amended information indicting only Ong... for the offense. For his defense,
Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer at Craftrade from 1990 until 1994. His
primary duty was to interview job applicants for abroad. As a mere employee, he only
followed the instructions given by his superiors, Mr. Emmanuel Geslani, the... agency's
President and General Manager, and Mr. Utkal Chowdury, the agency's Managing Director.
Chowdury admitted that he interviewed private complainants on different dates. Their office
secretary handed him their bio-data and thereafter he led them to his room where he...
conducted the interviews. During the interviews, he had with him a form containing the
qualifications for the job and he filled out this form based on the applicant's responses to his
questions. He then submitted them to Mr. Utkal Chowdury who in turn evaluated his
findings. He... never received money from the applicants. He resigned from Craftrade on
November 12, 1994.

The trial court found Chowdury guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale. It sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P100,000.00. It further ordered him to pay Aser Sasis the amount of P16,000.00, Estrella
Calleja,... P20,000.00 and Melvin Miranda, P25,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not principals, accomplices and accessories shall be held liable in the
offense of large scale illegal recruitment?

RULING: The last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act (RA) states who shall be held
liable for the offense, thus:

“The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and
accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction
of their business shall be liable.”

As stated in the first sentence of Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons who may be held liable
for illegal recruitment are the principals, accomplices and accessories. An employee of a
company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal,
together with his if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal
recruitment. It has been held that the existence of the corporate entity does not shield from
prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally causes the corporation to
commit a crime. The corporation obviously acts, and can act, only by and through its human
agents, and it is their conduct which the law must deter. The employee or agent of a
corporation engaged in unlawful business naturally aids and abets in the carrying on of such
business and will be prosecuted as principal if, with knowledge of the business, its purpose
and effect, he consciously contributes his efforts to its conduct and promotion, however slight
his contribution may be. The law of agency, as applied in civil cases, has no application in
criminal cases, and no man can escape punishment when he participates in the commission of
a crime upon the ground that he simply acted as an agent of any party. The culpability of the
employee therefore hinges on his knowledge of the offense and his active participation in its
commission. Where it is shown that the employee was merely acting under the direction of
his superiors and was unaware that his acts constituted a crime, he may not be held criminally
liable for an act done for and in behalf of his employer.
 92. People of the Philippines vs. Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20,
2011, 669 Phil. 461
FACTS: Task Forcer Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City
received a report that Mantalaba, who was 17 yrs old, was selling shabu. After a buy-bust
operation, two pieces of information were filed against Mantalaba which was later on
consolidated. Mantalaba pleaded not guilty.

RTC found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was penalized of reclusion
perpetua to death and fine of 500,000 for selling shabu and for illegally possessing shabu,
Mantalaba was penalized, in application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 6 yrs and 1 day
as minimum and 8 yrs as maximum prison mayor and fine of 300,000/. CA affirmed in toto
the decision of the RTC. Thus, the peasant appeal.

Mantalaba contend that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him and that there was no
evidence of actual sale between him and the poser-buyer during the buy-bust operation. He
also claims that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not established.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mantalaba’s minority is privileged mitigating circumstances?

RULING: Yes, Mantalaba’s minority is a privileged mitigating circumstance. The Supreme

Court ruled that Mantalaba, was a minor during the buy-bust operation but was of legal age
during the promulgation of the decision. It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect after the
promulgation of the RTC’s decision against Mantalaba. The RTC did not suspend the
sentence in accordance with PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) and Rule on Juveniles
in Conflict with the Law that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of the
judgment. However, as ruled in People vs. Sarcia, suspension of sentence can still be applied
but not when the offender upon the promulgation of Judgment is 21 yrs old. or older.
Mantalaba is now 21 yrs old, therefore his suspension is already moot and academic.
But as to penalty, CA must have appreciated Mantalaba’s minority as privileged mitigating
circumstance in fixing the penalty. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty
should be one degree lower that reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated.

93. //People of the Philippines vs. Tsang Hin Wai, Et., Al., G.R. NO. 66389, September
08, 1986, 228 Phil. 23
94. The United States vs. Antonio Parrone, G.R. No. 7038, January 07, 1913, 24 Phil. 29

See above

95. Arturo V. Escalante vs. Paulino Santos, G.R. No. 36828, February 02, 1932, 56 Phil.
483

TOPIC: Retroactive Effect of Penal Laws

DOCTRINE:
As we have just held in the case of Laceste vs. Santos, it is evident that the principle that penal laws
are retroactive so far as they favor the accused, is sanctioned by the present as well as the former
Penal Code. 

FACTS:
The present habeas corpus proceeding was instituted by Arturo V. Escalante, who is in Bilibid Prison.
On November 14, 1928, he was convicted of estafa  and sentenced to two years, eleven months, and
eleven days of presidio correccional, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P4,836.53, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. This penalty is the minimum of
the maximum degree of the penalty provided in article 534, paragraph No. 3, of the Penal Code then
in force, that is, presidio correctional in the minimum and medium degrees, i.e., six months and one
day to four years and two months of presidio correctional, because the amount abstracted exceeds
6,250  pesetas. 

Estafa in that amount (P4,836.53) not exceeding P6,000 is punished in the Revised Penal Code, in
force since the first of this year (article 315, paragraph 3), with a penalty ranging from arresto
mayor  in the maximum degree to prision correctional  in the minimum degree, i. e., four months and
one day to two years and four months of imprisonment. 

The Attorney-General, recommending that the petition be granted and the petitioner set at liberty.
Petitioner, having already served more than three years, is entitled to be now discharged under the
provisions of article 22 of the new Penal Code.

ISSUE:
Whether the penal law shall have retroactive effect in this case

RULING:

YES. Inasmuch as the law in this case is more favorable to the accused, and the latter has not been
shown to be an habitual criminal, article 315, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code now in force
must be applied to the estafa  of which the petitioner was convicted; and inasmuch as he has already
served that penalty, he must be set at liberty immediately. 

As we have just held in the case of Laceste vs. Santos, it is evident that the principle that penal laws
are retroactive so far as they favor the accused, is sanctioned by the present as well as the former
Penal Code. 

DISPOSITIVE:
The petition for habeas corpus  being justified, it is hereby granted, and let the petitioner be at once
set at liberty, with cost de oficio. So ordered. 

96. //The People of the Philippines vs. Abelardo Subido, G.R. No. L-21734, September
05, 1975, 160-A Phil. 51
97. //People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, Et., Al., G.R. No. 227899, July 10,
2019

Protector or coddler – P/Supt. Borromeo's participation was not limited to merely protecting
the violators nor facilitating their escape. His co- conspirators regularly reported to and
updated him of the operations in the shabu laboratory. He monitored all the illegal
activities through Dante, who acted under his control and carried out specific instructions
coming from him. These acts sufficiently established his pivotal role in the conspiracy. Thus,
there was no logical reason for the CA to downgrade his liability from that of a co-
conspirator to a mere coddler or protector. Although the prosecution, at the time of the filing
of the Information, used the words "protector" or "coddler" to specify Borromeo's
participation in the conspiracy, the terminology is immaterial there being a clear finding of
conspiracy. The use of the words "protector" or "coddler" should not be taken to mean that
his liability as co-conspirator is automatically negated or reduced. (People vs. CA, G.R. No.
 227899, July 10, 2019)

98. People of the Philippines vs. Luisito D. Bustinera, G. R. No. 148233, June 08, 2004,
475 PHIL 190
FACTS: Bustinera was driving one of the taxi units of Elias Cirpiano under the “boundary
system”. As one of the drivers, Bustinera would take a unit and use it to transport
passengers then return the unit at a particular time together with the “boundary”. On 25
December 1996, Bustinera took the taxi unit which he was supposed to return on the
following day. He failed to do so because he was not able to raise the “boundary”. Cipriano
then went to the residence of Bustinera to find out why the unit has not been returned yet
but did not find the taxi there since according to Bustinera’s wife, the latter was still
transporting passengers to raise the boundary. Cirpriano then proceeded to the police and
reported his unit as missing. A case of qualified theft was then filed against Bustinera and
after hearing, the Trial Court found him guilty of the crime. Bustinera appealed the case on
the ground that there was no basis for the court’s conclusion that his failure to return the
unit was with the intent to gain among others.

ISSUE : Whether or not Bustinera has an intent to gain?

RULING : YES, The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s finding of guilt but not of
qualified theft under the Revised Penal Code but should be under the Anti- Carnapping
Act. “Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of
unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same. In the 2000 case of
People v. Tan where the accused took a Mitsubishi Gallant and in the later case of People
v. Lobitania which involved the taking of a Yamaha motorized tricycle, this Court held that
the unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the anti- carnapping law and not
by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery” (G.R. 148233, June 8, 2004). In answering
the main issue raised by Bustinera that there was not intent to gain, the Court said: “Actual
gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term gain is not
merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense
may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the
thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes gain”. Therefore, when a
person takes a vehicle without the owner’s consent even for the purpose of just going for a
“joyride”, he is guilty of carnapping because “his intent to gain is evident since he derived
therefrom utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure.”

99. //People of the Philippines vs. Alex Panida, Et., Al., G.R. Nos. 127125 & 138952,
July 06, 1999, 369 Phil. 311

Doctrine of imputability can also be applied to supply specific criminal intent

required to commit a crime. In carnapping, intent to gain is an element thereof.
But if there is conspiracy, the act of a conspirator with intent to gain is
imputable to his co-conspirator, who has no intent to gain. Thus, all of them are
liable for carnapping. In People v. Panida, G.R. No. 127125, July 6, 1999,
accused took the tricycle of complainant. Although only accused Hora appears
to have mortgaged the motorcycle, the intent to gain on the part of all the
accused can be inferred from the unlawful taking of tricycle by them. Moreover,
“intent to gain” as an element of carnapping shall be considered as present even
though the accused intended that any one of them should benefit or gain from
the taking.

100. //The United States vs. El Chino Cuna (Alias Sy Conco), G.R. No. 4504,
December 15, 1908, 12 Phil. 241