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American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of The National Committee On American Foreign Policy
American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of The National Committee On American Foreign Policy
To cite this article: J. Peter Pham (2008) What Is in the National Interest? Hans Morgenthau's Realist Vision and American
Foreign Policy, American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 30:5,
256-265
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American Foreign Policy Interests, 30: 256–265, 2008
Copyright # 2008 NCAFP
ISSN: 1080-3920 print
DOI: 10.1080/10803920802435245
assumes the essential goodness and of self-interest and the struggle for power and
infinite malleability of human nature the inevitable nexus between moral principles
and attributes the failure of the social and statecraft—and proceed to examine how
order to measure up to the rational they have shaped the contours and continue
standards to lack of knowledge and to influence the ongoing understanding of the
understanding, obsolescent social major objectives of U.S. foreign policy.
institutions, or the depravity of cer-
tain isolated individuals or groups. It
trusts in education, reform, and the Interest and Power
sporadic use of force to remedy these
deficiencies. A jurist by training and a philosopher by
The other school believes that the inclination, Morgenthau only reluctantly dedi-
world, imperfect as it is from the cated himself to the study of international rela-
rational point of view, is the result of tions because in the wake of World War II,
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forces which are inherent in human when he began to focus his attention on the
nature. To improve the world, one subject, it was increasingly evident that if the
must work with those forces, not rising power of the Soviet Union was not
against them. This being inherently balanced, freedom itself would be lost. As
a world of opposing interests and of Robert J. Myers, who was a student of his at
conflict among them, moral principles the time, has noted, for Morgenthau ‘‘rallying
can never be fully realized, but at best the West against this threat through rapid
approximated through the ever tem- rearmament was the immediate goal,’’ while
porary balancing of interests and the idealism ‘‘was blind to this menace, and its reli-
ever precarious settlement of con- ance on such ideas as collective security
flicts. This school, then, sees a system through the United Nations and goodwill
of checks and balances a universalist toward the Soviet Union, which was gobbling
principle for all pluralist societies. It up Eastern Europe, seemed a reckless steward-
appeals to historic precedent rather ship of the national interest.’’5 To counter
than to abstract principles, and aims the idealists who expected international
at achievement of the lesser evil tensions to be resolved through open negotia-
rather than the absolute good.4 tions marked by goodwill and self-denial,
Morgenthau articulated in the first edition of
The fact that these lines so well describe the his Politics Among Nations—a classic work that
fault lines revealed in the debates concerning ‘‘altered the way international relations was
United States foreign policy during the 2008 taught in the United States’’ by putting ‘‘the
presidential election campaign and will pursuit of specific American national interests
undoubtedly continue to manifest themselves at the center of foreign policy analysis while
through the coming years as the new adminis- qualifying that objective with a strong commit-
tration manages America’s international rela- ment to ethical imperatives and restraints’’6—
tions underscores the perennial wisdom of what would become his realist theory of interna-
Morgenthau’s realist vision and its ongoing tional politics, an approach that, he argued,
relevance to the conduct of foreign policy, partic- had the advantage of being concerned ‘‘with
ularly the articulation and pursuit of the human nature as it actually is, and with historic
country’s national interests. This article will processes as they actually take place.’’7
briefly review two of the major pillars of In the framework that Morgenthau elabo-
Morgenthau’s political realism—the permanence rated, every political action is seen as directed
national interest, generally defined as power. mine political action. He subsequently clarified
that the emphasis on power must be adapted to
Forget the sentimental notion that the changing circumstances of international
foreign policy is a struggle between vir- politics.
tue and vice, with virtue bound to win.
Forget the utopian notion that a When the times tend to depreciate the
brave new world without power poli- element of power, [the discipline of
tics will follow the unconditional international relations] must stress
surrender of wicked nations. its importance. When the times
Forget the crusading notion that incline toward a monistic conception
any nation, however virtuous and of power in the general scheme of
powerful, can have the mission to things, it must show its limitations.
make the world over in its own image. When the times conceive of power pri-
Remember that the golden age of marily in military terms, it must call
isolated normalcy is gone forever attention to the variety of factors
and that no effort, however great, which go into the power equation.11
and no action, however radical, will
bring it back. Moreover, even when the importance of a specif-
Remember that diplomacy without ic interest for a nation’s relative power position
power is feeble, and power without is undeniable, that fact does not give it license
diplomacy is destructive and blind. to neglect other interests that are likewise
Remember that no nation’s power essential to its security, even if their significance
is without limits, and hence that its is perhaps less obvious.
policies must respect the power and
interests of others.
Remember that the American Moral Principle
people have shown throughout their
history that they are able to face the and Statecraft
truth and act upon it with courage
and resourcefulness in war, with com- It must be noted that Morgenthau’s realism
mon sense and moral determination was never divorced from a profound moral
in peace. foundation. In his early work Scientific Man
vs. Power Politics, Morgenthau sketched out an However, in such a seemingly bleak
ethical vision that acknowledged the dilemmas Hobbesian landscape of constant tension and
inherent in free will and power in an imperfect struggle with states pursuing their own inter-
world, arguing that the best course is to choose ests, what are the prospects for peace and
‘‘among several possible actions the one that is security? Morgenthau held that traditionally
the least evil.’’12 Subsequently this norm was there were two devices through which order
expanded in the context of a theory of interna- can be maintained. The first was the balance
tional relations to the principle that as long as of power, which is eventually arrived at
there is no international community capable through the struggle for power, the clash of
of guaranteeing security amid fierce competi- those pursuing imperialist policies and those
tion, a nation fulfilled the duty to choose the trying to maintain the status quo. However, in
lesser evil by following its national interest. the changed circumstances that he surveyed
after World War II, the balance of power was
In the absence of an integrated inter- no longer an adequate instrument, especially
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national society, the attainment of a given the disappearance amid the ideological
modicum of order and the realization contest between the superpowers of the
of a minimum of values are predicated restraints of times past when ‘‘foreign policy
upon the existence of national com- always operated within a generally accepted
munities capable of preserving order framework of moral values and ways of life
and realizing moral values within common to all participants in the struggle for
the limits of their power.13 power.’’15 The second was the normative limita-
tions imposed by international law, morality,
Thus Morgenthau argued emphatically that and public opinion. Alas the loss of moral con-
sensus and the lack of a central legal authority
Despite the profound changes which on the international stage comparable to the
have occurred in the world, it still state on the domestic level render norms weak
remains true, as it has always been instruments for keeping the peace at best,
true, that a nation confronted with although Morgenthau always held out hope
the hostile aspirations of other nations that the United Nations might mature into a
has one prime obligation—to take care structure that might ‘‘contribute to the cause
of its own interests. The moral justifi- of peace by preventing the superpowers from
cation for this prime duty of all going to the extremes which virtually nothing
nations—for it is not only a moral else prevents them from going to except their
right but also a moral obligation— self-restraint born of mutual fear.’’16
arises from the fact that if this parti- Thus having systematically rejected other
cular nation does not take care of its instruments as either impractical or inade-
interests, nobody else will. Hence the quate, by the third edition of Politics Among
counsel that we ought to subordinate Nations, Morgenthau touted the virtues of
our national interest to some other diplomacy that could ‘‘make peace more secure
standard is unworthy of a nation great than it is today’’17 by minimizing conflicts and
in human civilization. A nation which contributing to the growth of a sense of world
would take that counsel and act con- community upon whose foundations might
sistently on it would commit suicide someday in the far distant future be erected a
and become the prey and victim of world state that would ensure universal
other nations which know how to take peace.18 Diplomacy, however, cannot carry out
care of their interests.14 its function unless it abides by nine rules that
Morgenthau elaborated in considerable always on one’s side and that what one wills
detail.19 cannot fail to be willed by God also.’’22
4. Nations must be willing to com- the Federalist period and what he viewed as
promise on all issues that are the three premises underlying the founders’
not vital to them. conception of America’s interest in foreign
5. Give up the shadow of worthless affairs.
rights for the substance of real
advantage. . . . The first was that the interest of the
6. Never put yourself in a position United States in international affairs
from which you cannot retreat was fundamentally different from
without losing face and from those interests that European nations
which you cannot advance with- traditionally pursued. . . . This purpose
out grave risks. . . . leads to the second presupposition of
7. Never allow a weak ally to make the Federalist conception of foreign
decisions for you. . . . policy . . . [that] there exists something
like a natural isolation of the United
8. The armed forces are the instru-
States . . . [that was] the result of an
ment of foreign policy, not its
intelligent and deliberate foreign
master.
policy to be achieved by hard thinking
9. The government is the leader of and hard work . . . . The third presup-
public opinion, not its slave. position of the Federalists was that,
in order to make the United States
The first four rules are fundamental, whereas immune from foreign interference
the latter five are prerequisites for the possibil- and, more particularly, from being
ity of compromise. All nine require statesmen drawn into the squabbles of Europe,
familiar with ‘‘the eternal laws by which man its foreign policy had to be the policy
moves in the social world’’20 who refuse to of the balance of power.23
‘‘identify the moral aspirations of a particular
nation with the moral laws that govern the According to Morgenthau, that meant that his-
universe.’’21 There is, Morgenthau furthermore torically the prime objective of United States
asserted, ‘‘a world of difference between the foreign policy was the country’s security and
belief that all nations stand under the judg- status as ‘‘predominant power without rival’’24
ment of God, inscrutable to the human mind, in the Americas. ‘‘This first concern,’’ he wrote,
and the blasphemous conviction that God is ‘‘leads with logical necessity to the second one,
the security of the United States.26 sades, thus straining their resources to exhaus-
How Morgenthau reconciled his analysis tion,’’29 would not be terribly enthusiastic about
that the existence of hegemony over the old a ‘‘forward strategy of freedom’’30 aimed at
world threatened the core national interests of ‘‘replacing hatred and resentment with democ-
the United States and his opposition to what racy and hope across the broader Middle
he disparaged as ‘‘utopian’’ schemes to roll back East.’’31 Always monitory against the tempta-
what was, at least in the early 1950s, the tion of nations to project their interests and
Moscow–Beijing axis controlling the heartland image onto others, Morgenthau was downright
of Central Eurasia is illustrative of the realist skeptical of the transformative efficacy of inter-
vision he championed. Although he acknowl- ventions into the affairs of other states, writing
edged that ‘‘the captivity of any nation, large in the midst of the Vietnam War, a military
or small, close or far away, is a moral outrage commitment he came to oppose, that
which cannot be tolerated’’ and that ‘‘the pres-
ence of the Russian armies in the heart of We have come to overrate enormously
Europe and their cooperation with the Chinese what a nation can do for another
armies constitute the two main sources of the nation by intervening in its affairs—
imbalance of power’’ that threatened American even with the latter’s consent. This
security,27 Morgenthau insisted that certain overestimation of our power to inter-
questions needed to be answered in order to vene is a corollary of our ideological
consider the situation rationally. commitment, which by its very nature
has no limit. . . . Both the need for
While the United States has a general intervention and the chances for suc-
interest in the liberation of all captive cessful intervention are much more
nations, what is the hierarchy of limited than we have been led to
interests it has in the liberation, say, believe. Intervene we must where
of China, Estonia, and Hungary?. . . our national interest requires it and
What resources does the United where our power gives us a chance
States have at its disposal for the to succeed. The choice of these occa-
liberation of all captive nations or sions will be determined not by
some of them?. . . Are we more sweeping ideological commitments
likely to avoid national bankruptcy nor by blind reliance upon American
by embarking upon a policy of power but by a careful calculation of
the interests involved and the power which is another moral good, to the
available. If the United States applies detriment of the promotion of univer-
this standard, it will intervene less sal liberty, which choice ought he to
and succeed more.32 make? The utopian will not face the
issue squarely and will deceive him-
On the other hand, assertions that ‘‘the mission self into believing that he can achieve
of the United States is to provide global both goods at the same time. The
leadership grounded in the understanding that realist will choose the national inter-
the world shares a common security and a com- est on both moral and pragmatic
mon humanity’’33 fly directly in the face of grounds; for if he does not take care
Morgenthau’s maxim that this world is ‘‘a world of the national interest nobody else
of opposing interests and of conflict among will, and if he puts American security
them.’’34 Nor would calls for belief in ‘‘change,’’ and liberty in jeopardy the cause of
especially in the international arena, likely liberty everywhere will be impaired.36
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which a nation may pursue in its relation[s] is candid about its real capabilities, restrains its
with other nations are of infinite variety and unreasonable expectation that every problem
magnitude,’’ the resources which are available has a ready solution achievable in all-too-short
to the United States—or any country—for the time frames, and prioritizes action in favor of
pursuit of such interests would necessarily be the most critical objectives of its foreign
‘‘limited in quantity and kind.’’39 He went on to policy, most challenges that it will encounter on
explain not only how to go about that but also the global stage can be managed to the benefit
to warn of the particular danger that democra- of America’s true national interests—solid coun-
cies face in this exercise, one that will resonate sel for any administration in Washington that
with many in the wake of the foreign policy wishes not only to maintain its international
debates of the 2008 general election campaign. relations but to see them prosper.
3. George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 18. See James P. Speer II, ‘‘Hans Mor-
1900–1950 (Chicago, 1951). genthau and the World State,’’ World Politics,
4. Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘‘Another ‘Great vol. 20, no. 2 (1968): 207–227.
Debate’: The National Interest of the United 19. See Morgenthau, Politics Among
States,’’ American Political Science Review, Nations, 3rd rev. ed., 561–567. Also see Greg
vol. 46, no. 4 (1952): 961–962. Russell, ‘‘Hans J. Morgenthau and the Norma-
5. Robert J. Myers, ‘‘Hans Morgenthau’s tive Foundations of Diplomacy and Statesman-
Realism and American Foreign Policy,’’ Ethics ship,’’ Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 2, no. 1
& International Affairs, vol. 11, no. 1 (1997): (1991): 130–160.
256–257. 20. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power
6. Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, ‘‘Ethi- Politics, 220.
cal Realism and Contemporary Challenges,’’ 21. Morgenthau, The Decline of Democratic
American Foreign Policy Interests, vol. 28, Politics, 11.
no. 6 (November=December 2006): 414. 22. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations,
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34. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 38. John McCain, Remarks to the Los
3rd rev. ed., 4. Angeles World Affairs Council (March 26,
35. Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘‘The Pathology of 2008), http://www.johnmccain.com/Informing/
American Power,’’ International Security, vol. 1, News/Speeches/872473dd-9ccb-4ab4-9d0d-
no. 3 (winter 1977): 20. ec54f0e7a497.htm
36. Morgenthau, ‘‘Another ‘Great Debate,’’’ 39. Ibid., 976–977.
987. 40. Ibid., 977.
37. Ibid., 977.
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